RESPOND

Working Papers

Global Migration：
Consequences and Responses

Governance of Migration
in and through Crisis:

A Comparative Report on RESPOND Research

Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek*
Soner Barthoma**
N. Ela Gökalp-Aras*

* Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul
** Uppsala University

RESPOND: Multilevel Governance
of Migration and Beyond (770564)

Co-funded by the Horizon 2020 programme
of the European Union

Table of contents

List of Tables

Table 1: Policy Areas in Migration Governance by Country

Table 2: Crisis Responses of the RESPOND Countries

List of Abbreviations

AFSJ	**Area of Freedom, Security and Justice**
CEAS	Common European Asylum System
CJEU	Court of Justice of the European Union
DI	Differentiated Integration
EASO	European Asylum Support Office
EC	European Commission
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FRONTEX	European Border and Coast Guard Agency
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
IOs	Inter-governmental Organisations
MLG	Multi-level Governance
MSs	Member States
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
RESPOND	Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond-Project
UK	United Kingdom
WP	Work Package

About the RESPOND Project

RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond Project (hereafter RESPOND) is a three-year project (2017-2020) that is funded by the European Commission under the Horizon2020 Programme to enhance the governance capacity and policy coherence of the European Union, its Member States and neighbours.

RESPOND is a comprehensive study of migration governance in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, one of the biggest challenges the Union has faced since its establishment. The crisis foregrounded the vulnerability of European borders, the tenuous jurisdiction of the Schengen system and broad problems in the multilevel governance of migration and integration. One of the most visible impacts of the refugee crisis has been the polarisation of politics within the EU Member States and the (in)coherence in Member States' response policies to the crisis.

Bringing together 14 partners from 7 disciplines, RESPOND aims to:

- provide an in-depth understanding of the governance of recent mass migration at macro, meso and micro levels through transnational comparative research;
- critically analyse governance practices to enhance the migration governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and third countries.

RESPOND is a comprehensive study of migration governance in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis. The project probes policy-making processes and policy (in)coherence through comparative research in the source, transit, and destination countries. RESPOND addresses how policy (in)coherence between the EU and its MSs and between states differentially positioned as transit, hosting and source countries, affects migration governance. Specifically, it analyses the reasons behind the apparent policy incoherence by delineating interactions and outcomes between national refugee systems and the EU.

RESPOND studies migration governance through a narrative which is constructed along with five thematic fields: (1) Border management and security, (2) Refugee protection regimes, (3) Reception policies, (4) Integration policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization. Each thematic field reflects a juncture in the migration journey of refugees and is designed to provide a holistic view of policies, their impact, and the affected actors' responses.

More about the project and its achievement can be found at www.respondmigration.com

Acknowledgements

Executive Summary

Based on outputs from the EU Horizon 2020 project RESPOND, this report seeks to revisit multilevel governance as a theoretical framework in comparative migration research. Focusing on the period of 2011-2018 where the governance of migration has been very much affected by the 'crisis' climax, we question the adaptability of multilevel governance in describing main patterns in governance, their drivers and consequences. The report problematizes the generalized notions of local, nationalist, centralist turn in migration management, instead offering more nuanced understanding that highlights the dynamism and tensions within spatial and temporal axes.

Firstly, we propose that when migration is managed through and in a crisis, such as in mass migration or protracted refugee situations, actors at multilevel governance settings choose from a repertoire of possible and available actions, including strict non-admission, deterrence, restriction, *ad hoc* or welcoming responses. These responses may have historical roots, chosen from a repertoire of sedimented forms of policy options applied when faced with crisis-like situations, or may indicate a 'new' discursive direction in policy-making. In each response or in the assemblage of responses (sometimes even the contradicting ones), scope of policies, boundaries of institutions and types of cooperation are re-negotiated and re-defined in relation to the notion of crisis. Over the course of time, the responses are calibrated in line with various stakeholders' immediate needs and long-term interests. Migration is governed in and through crisis and the notion of crisis instrumentalized as a governance mode by multiple power centres – not merely populists – to mobilize the resources and legitimize policy actions.

Second, we contend that four characteristics have increasingly marked the inscription of 'crisis' in the multilevel governance of migration, including: 1) complicated and fragmented legal systems, 2) multiplicity of actors, 3) re-nationalisation and restrictiveness and 4) increased complexity and uncertainty. Accordingly, we highlight ways in which these characteristics are observable (or impact on) in concrete policy practices in diverse sub-policy fields involving remote border controls, blocking reception, downgrading protection and slowing integration. These are shaped by restriction, control and deterrence policies.

Lastly, we conclude that multilevel governance *in* and *through* crisis inevitably leads to temporary governance models that become visible through policy convergence in strengthening restrictive measures, sophistication of remote controls, eradication of the norms and rights-based procedures of the refugee regime. The temporality of these governance modes runs the risk of governance failure and gridlocks in developing common solutions (for example, the EU's internal solidarity crisis or problems in relocation quotas). For the affected populations (irregular migrants and asylum seekers) this brings protracted transitionality embedding the logic of temporality, legal uncertainty, social and economic fragility and dehumanisation.

Based on the meta-analysis of thematic country and comparative reports produced in the RESPOND project, we illustrate our arguments by a tentative typology clustering selected empirical data from 11 country cases, including EU member states (Germany, Italy, Sweden, Greece, Australia, Poland, Hungary), those in the grey area (Turkey, the United Kingdom/ UK) and non-EU (Lebanon, Iraq). These countries are both source and transit as well as old-established and new destination countries, which also provides a rich material for studying governance in different contexts.

1. Introduction

One of the RESPOND project's main goals was to understand the governance of mass migration in Europe and beyond. We started to research what kind of conceptual vocabulary can best help us make sense of migration governance developing at various levels? To what extent are the existing frameworks like Multilevel Governance applicable to our country cases (EU countries and non-EU countries like Lebanon, Iraq, and countries in the grey zone like Turkey)? Is a 'local turn' or a 'national turn' a dominant pattern in migration policy-making and implementation? What is the role of non-governmental actors and transnational actors? Moreover, how can we situate refugees' political subjectivity within the migration governance framework? To address these questions, the RESPOND research focused on (a) studying *governance responses* of various countries along the migration route; (b) examining governance *responses in times and in the aftermath of a crisis*; and (c) scrutinising migration governance by *de-constructing the main policy contours of migration* in terms of legal frameworks, borders, protection regimes, reception and integration policies.

To examine all these dimensions, RESPOND generated a new dataset drawn from research in 11 countries (Austria, Hungary, Germany, Greece, Iraq, Italy, Lebanon, Poland, Turkey, Sweden, UK). The empirical data is obtained from interviews (with more than 535 refugees and 220 stakeholders), and a survey study (with 1,600 Syrian refugees in Turkey and Sweden) supported by the analysis of legal and policy documents. Based on this empirical research, the project partners have produced more than 70 thematic country and comparative reports. Analysis of such extensive data enables us to rethink migration governance from both a critical and an evidence-based perspective.[1]

The concept of governance has gained much popularity in the last decades and attracted the attention of scholars from different academic fields. Governance has been used in multiple theoretical frameworks as an empty signifier (Offer 2009), a framing device (Peters and Peirre 2006), a bridging and a descriptive concept to explain the transformation of power (Kok and Veldkamp 2011), the role of the nation-state and dispersion of authority to different levels of policy-making (Ålund, A., & Schierup 2019; Piper and Grugel 2015). The term is used to imply at least four common meanings, as Levi-Faur (2012) rightly summarizes:

> As a structure, governance signifies the architecture of formal and informal institutions; as a process, it signifies the dynamics and steering functions involved in lengthy never-ending processes of policy-making; as a mechanism, it signifies institutional procedures of decision-making, of compliance and of control (or instruments); finally, as a strategy, it signifies the actors' efforts to govern and manipulate the design of institutions and mechanisms in order to shape choice and preferences. (Levi Faur, 2012: 6)

When governance is used to imply structure, variations in institutional architectures beg for an explanation. The variations are conceptualized by referring to three different directions:

---

[1] In our point of view one of the central aspects of governance is the political subjectivity of refugees (also called micro level), that has been extensively addressed in the RESPOND project. Due to the scope of this report, we have not dealt with this micro dimension, while kept the focus on macro and meso levels. There will be an additional publication about the refugee agency and its interaction with the governance scales.

upward (to the regional, transnational, intergovernmental, and global), *downward* (to the local, regional, and the metropolitan), and *horizontally* (to private and civil spheres of authority) (Ibid.).

The governance terminology has also found considerable adoption in migration scholarship. It has been used both as a concept and a theoretical framework, while the term of migration governance is variously defined. In this report, we use migration governance in order to refer to governing models and structures of migration that are articulated in legal and political mechanisms and processes in each polity and constantly negotiated through the interplay of actors (local/national/regional/supranational) at different scales. Our analysis of migration governance pays attention to both normative aspects and institutional dimensions of governance as well as power relations. It also recognizes that the governance of migration is a complex field as it is contingent upon the nexus between multiple regimes (border, security, social welfare, citizenship) operating in migration. The complexity intrinsic to the governance of migration paves the way to continuous tensions and sources of diversions between actors and levels within spatial and temporal axes. It also generates variations.

To unpack the complexity of migration governance, an emphasis on scales and different sub-policy fields is a useful starting point because decision points about migration governance are scattered across different scales (global, regional, national, local, individual) and directions within these scales (upward, downward, horizontally). To this end, RESPOND applied a holistic perspective that involves a *macro* focus on policies and legal frameworks, a *meso* dimension to study policy practices and the implementation of policies at different levels and an ethnographic *micro* lens to understand refugee experiences. Research focusing on levels and sub-policy fields shows how legislation and policy filter down into implementation processes and are then felt and experienced by refugees. We suggest that this triangulated lens provides a more inclusive understanding of governance in a given context and temporal axis. Also, another layer of complexity in migration governance is related to its multisectoral characteristic. To tackle this, we zoom in on different sub-policy fields, including border management, international protection, reception and integration.

Our study focused on a period (2011-2018) where the governance of migration has been very much affected by the 'crisis' climax. The coupling of migration and crisis is not a recent phenomenon. In the 1990s, global migration was perceived as one of the 'new' threats challenging the international order and thus, framed within the security discourse. This security lens formed the conditions of seeing and understanding the global migratory movements as a 'crisis-generating phenomenon' (Weiner 1995).

This report adopts a constructivist approach to understand the nexus between migration governance and crisis, and show how the crisis has become an omnipresent lens in the public discourse for understanding global migratory movements. We argue that in the period of this study (the 2010s) migration is governed *in* and *through* the crisis in all 11 countries. The 'crisis' – regardless of being a fact, as a perception or discourse – was *governed in* the context that triggered actors at all scales to immediately 'respond' and create collective action. The crisis has also become a governance mode (*governance through*) to manage migration; an instrument and a strategic tool that the state actors have strategically adopted to legitimize actions, to expand their power and authority. Understanding migration with the discourse of crisis is overwhelmingly dominant, especially in Europe, and this has also been reflected in the terminology deployed to understand the different dimensions of migration. In some

definitions, the use of 'refugee crisis' semantically addresses 'refugees' or 'migrants' as the main cause of the 'crisis', which has been widely opposed and criticised in academic circles (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018; Dines et al., 2018). In some other definitions, the notion of crisis is used as a signifier to explain its diverse consequences on different actors and systems, mainly on "Europe", "EU" or "the EU Member States", such as "European refugee crisis", "European humanitarian refugee crisis" (Carrera et al., 2019), or European "migration crisis" (Kalir and Cantat, 2020), European "solidarity crisis" (Grimmel and Giang, 2017), Europe in crisis and European "identity crisis" (Rizcallah, 2019). Regardless of the terminology used, for governing actors the case of relatively large numbers of arrivals in short periods is perceived as a 'crisis'. Along with this perception, the emphasis on receiving capacity of large inflows and political concerns have contributed to the development of temporary precarious governance regimes. These regimes relegated the ideal of structured and sustainable governance on the one hand, and rights- based regimes founded on long-established global meta norms (principles of non-refoulement, refugee protection, responsibility-sharing) on the other hand. These tensions and gaps inevitably trigger the governance failures in multiple levels that would lead testing new models that are believed to –superficially or substantially– fix the problem of the failure.

A synopsis of global governance literature and multilevel governance of migration

Since the 1990s, "global governance" has become a core interest of academics and practitioners, producing an extensive literature. Broadly speaking, governance research aims to figure out how global challenges (environment, migration, peacebuilding, health, education, finance, terrorism etc.) are managed in the absence of a global government (Grigorescu, 2020). It mainly focuses on institutions that build global governance architecture, intensity and scope of relations among them, and the outcomes of interactions, repeatedly posing the questions of who governs or is competent to govern and 'orchestrate' the system in the context of extensive transnationalisation of issues, flows, and actors (Abbott et al., 2021; Weiss and Thakur, 2010). The inevitable common answer to these questions is that global governance is a mix of several actors, regulations and scales. The changes in the global governance are explained by the (i) the dispersion of authority to different governing levels, (ii) the fragmentation and hybridisation of modes of control, (iii) multi-dimensional structures and mechanisms for decision-making processes and institutional practices, and (iv) the notion of a network which has opened up the recognition of informal spheres of authority (Levi-Faur, 2012).

Perceived as a global challenge, migration emerges as a matter of global governance. Global migration governance has historically emerged as a patchwork of international institutions (Kainz and Betts, 2020: 1). Although interdependency in the international system and the rise in mobility of people necessitated regulations and cooperation at a global level, the resilience of state sovereignty towards admitting 'foreigners' turned the topic into a matter of nation-state control. It has remained one of the dominant national issues since it touches on public policy on welfare, security, economy, development, domestic politics and others. Since migration has strong socio-cultural implications, states find difficulty in balancing their acts, swinging between a desire to maintain control and comply with prolific regulations, ranging from norms to international law, treaties, legislation, standards, guidelines, plans, procedures and so on. Not only international institutions and states, but also non-governmental organisations, firms, experts, media activists and individuals are involved in migration governance, making the scene messy.

Scholars from different disciplines have applied multiple theoretical and conceptual lenses to the study of the messiness of migration governance. Scholars tend to identify the crowded international legal orders and the institutional architecture with descriptors such as complex (Scholten, 2020), fragmented (Geddes, 2018), multi-level (Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2018) and multi-scalar (Schiller, 2015). These are defining characteristics of global migration governance, but also adopted to explain specific policy fields such as integration or protection in a national or local context (Breugel and Scholten, 2019; Fakhoury, 2020). Regime terminology is also adopted in migration studies to identify national *models* or *types* of immigration and integration as well as the interplay between migration and other related regimes (welfare, citizenship, mobility, deportation) (Boucher and Gest, 2015; Horvath et al., 2017; Sainsbury, 2006; Peutz and De Genova, 2010). The regime terminology is used to discuss norms, principles, organisations that regulate migration and refugee affairs at the national, regional and global level. Critical scholarship on migration management and border control practices, particularly in the EU also apply the regime terminology (Hess, 2012; Glick Schiller and Salazar, 2013). Several other studies make calls to pay attention to the agency and power in governance, through consulting with theoretical lenses of governmentality, actor-network and assemblage theories (Bigo, 2002; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Molfette and Walters, 2018). Unlike structure-centric theories, assemblage thinking underlines the need for being more sensitive to the complexity of power relations, including the life of migrants, while it challenges the dichotomy between structure and agency as well as oppression and resistance (Wiertz, 2020)

Due to our focus is on EU member states and Europe's periphery, the theoretical perspectives on Europeanisation and externalisation can be consulted. This scholarship is by and large connected with the governance literature. While Europeanisation explains the changes in the domestic policy areas of member states in relation to the decisions taken at the EU level (Ladrech, 1994; Vink, 2002; Radaelli, 2003), externalisation refers to the EU's influence or Europeanisation beyond its territory (Olsen, 2002; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2002 and 2004; Schimmelfenning, 2012). It is a strategy to externalize policy implementation beyond EU. Both for Europeanisation and externalisation, asylum and migration issues play an overwhelmingly determinant role in discursive, legislative and institutional realms. Different Europeanisation discourses deploy different, and most often diverse approaches to governing migration (see further RESPOND Work package 6 reports). The core argument is the EU Member States, and non-EU members would converge at different speeds in different EU policy areas with 'ins' and 'outs' (Gökalp-Aras, 2021). The concept of "differentiated integration" is convenient to describe divergences in the field of common asylum and migration policy in Europe, especially during the 1990s and in the recent "refugee crisis" (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 2012; Schimmelfennig et al., 2015; Holzinger and Tosun, 2019). This approach also provides some insights into understanding the 'three-level game' of migration and asylum governance which comprise the roles and preferences of the EU institutions, the MSs, and the third countries. (Reslow and Vink, 2015).

Among the extensive list of theoretical stances to examine migration governance, the most promising one is Multi-level Governance (MLG). It is a starting point to explore migration actors operating in different layers and covers various issue-areas. The most common definition of Multi-level Governance is provided by Hooghe and Marks (2001: 3) who refer to "the dispersion of authority away from central government – upwards to the supranational level, downwards to sub-national jurisdictions, and sideways to public-private networks". It

recognizes both the interdependency and the interaction between levels and actors therein, leading to a degree of bargaining and negotiation (Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2017: 1996). MLG has been widely adopted to understand migration governance (Scholten and Penninx, 2016; Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2018: 3). Its interpretative lenses emphasise the questions of who are the actors and institutions involved in governing migration, including mass movements and what types of modes of interaction and political-legal commitment they have. MLG focuses on several policy levels, including global, supranational, regional, national, and local (sub-national) where migration policies are formed. MLG provides insights for understanding not only national but also global and local initiatives that are set-up to strengthen cooperation on migration. Furthermore, MLG allows capturing of the growing importance of local levels –mainly cities– especially in the field of immigrant integration, for example, by highlighting 'local turn' (Dekker et al., 2015; Oliver et al. 2020).

One of the main questions that MLG offers insights into is how different policy-making levels interact, contradict and are compromised. This was systematically theorized by Scholten and Penninx (2016) who proposed four modes of multilevelness: centralist, localist, multi-level and a decoupled mode. The centralist mode of governance aims to bring policy convergence via top-down approaches with a clear hierarchy between government levels. In localist type, local governments frame migration policies, including reception in a specific local way, which in turn leads to policy divergence. Multilevel governance type is when interaction between the various levels of government occur without the clear dominance of one level, which engenders some convergence between policy frames at different levels, produced and sustained by their mutual interactions. The decoupled type refers to the absence of any meaningful policy coordination between levels, hence disengagement from initial cooperation and mutual support to increase their mandates and power (Scholten, 2013: 93-94). Despite its high potentials in describing migration policy-making and interaction among actors, MLG has a number of limitations[2] in addressing mass migration governance, as our empirical findings illuminated in three years of research. These limitations can be summarised as follows.

First, MLG treats the governance from a static perspective, ignoring largely the temporal changes and complexities of interactions shaped by politics, perceptions and power relations. Temporality is at the heart of the migration governance, particularly in a time of crisis. MLG stresses on current problems in public policy-making, by assuming the improvement of coordination and cooperation among actors is the ideal solution. Doing this, it fails to reflect on the politics behind policies. For example, domestic politics[3] behind governance and power struggles among actors and conflicting and competing frames impact governance. MLG also tends to simplify complexities of interactions among actors because it "sheds light on the possible patterns in vertical relations, while it does not effectively explore the horizontal relations, which are however crucial, especially at the local level" (Campomori and Ambrosini, 2020: 1). It partially discloses conflicting and competing frames between different tiers of governance. The MLG concentrates in a limited fashion on the historical trajectory of migration politics and geopolitics that are crucial components of the governing of migration in regions encountering massive displacements from neighbouring countries such as those in

---

[2] The MLG has been also criticised for lacking conceptual clarity and theoretical grasp (Piattoni, 2020; Tortola, 2016).

[3] For exceptions see Smith, M. 2004. "Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy-making: Multi-level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy". *Journal of European Public Policy*, *11*(4), pp. 740-758.

the Middle East (Chatty 2017; Fakhoury, 2019). MLG needs extra lenses to capture dynamics such as 'dynamic multi-level governance' (Sikkink, 2005) or 'multistage governance' (Şahin-Mencütek, 2018). The meta-narratives (also called ideologies, worldviews, underlying orders) such as neoliberalism rarely find a space in the MLG, unlike the Foucauldian/governmentality approaches that pay stronger attention to these ideational ordering structures. Due to MLG's focus on levels and actors operating on the global, national and local scales, it fails to zoom into the more micro and informal governing components such as practices, techniques, knowledge and expertise that are highly related when controlling borders (Fassin, 2011; Frank, 2014; Scheel and Rathfisch, 2014; Tazioli, 2019).

Lastly, the MLG rarely concentrates on governance failures.[4] The literature on governance failures focuses on the performance of political systems in supplying governance and policy, by raising questions about collective resources, capacity, willingness to make and implement policy (Bovens et al., 2000; Jessop, 1998; Peters, 2015; Torfing et al., 2011). Characteristics of governance failure include inactivity, "the presence of multiple programs and policies", non-existent or perverse results. Major failures are gridlocks, poor coordination and ineffectiveness (Peters, 2015: 262). Possible reasons of governance failure are found in the features of the policies themselves (designed to failure), interactions among policies as well as the political, political-socio-economic context, and institutional pathways in which these policies are developed and implemented (Mesquita, 1999; Peters, 2015).

In this report, we aim at addressing these limitations of MLG by putting them in dialogue with our approach which has been inductively developed through the comparative research conducted within the Respond project. To this end, in the next section, we elaborate further on governing migration in and by the crisis by identifying four patterns: 1) complication and fragmentation in legal systems, 2) multiplicity of actors, 3) re-nationalisation of governance structures, and 4) complexification of governance practices. In order to illustrate the increased complexity and uncertainty in governance, we focus on three crucial sub-policy fields (border management, reception/protection, integration. We generalize their notable forms, namely remote border control practices, blocking reception, downgrading protection and slowing integration. We show how restrictiveness and deterrence underscore all these policies and practices. Then, the report discusses how all these patterns and forms lead to governance failures. The report ends with a summative table designed across sectors, actors and governance modes, and concluding remarks on the EU's new migration and asylum pact.

---

[4] See Jessop, B. 2009. "From Governance to Governance Failure and from Multi-level Governance to Multi-scalar Meta-governance". In *The disoriented state: Shifts in governmentality, territoriality and governance.* Springer, Dordrecht. pp. 79-98.

2. Governance of migration *in* and *through* crisis

The concept of crisis is contested. In this report, we use the term "governance *in* and *through* crisis" as a descriptive concept through which we understand different governance responses to the perceived crisis of policy actors and explain how in times of crisis-like situations, governance structures and mechanisms are changed, and how the notion of crisis is used for governing migration in more restrictive, governmentalist modalities and directions. As we discussed elsewhere, "mobility and migration itself are depicted in policy and political fields through descriptors and metaphors such as 'crisis, 'flow, 'threat, and similar. These characterisations are detrimental to the definition of the situation as a policy problem or not, as well as for deciding the type of problem it is." (Şahin-Mencütek, 2020: 6).

We argue that there is a need to analyse crisis-led governance practices that are highly relational and mediated by multiple actors to comprehend how the crisis is used for structural and discursive changes (Carrera et al., 2019). We propose that when migration is governed in and through crisis, such as in mass migration or protracted refugee situations, several governance dimensions are reshuffled to respond to stakeholders' immediate needs and long-term interests. The scope of policies, boundaries of institutions and types of cooperation at multiple levels are renegotiated and re-defined in relation to the notion of crisis.

Migration is governed in and through the crisis, in other words, it has become 'a governance mode' in its own sake and the notion of 'crisis' itself (linked to migration) has been instrumentalized by many authority centres – not merely populist – to mobilize the resources with underlying logics of control, to restrict and deter migrants from arriving in national or continental territories. Such governance inevitably leads to a restrictive approach materialised in policy convergence by strengthening security/efficiency measures and eradicating the norms and rights-based procedures of the refugee regime. Presenting any population movement or mobility as a crisis enables justification of a "state of emergency" in regulations and practices. If the subjects are asylum seekers, the crisis terminology allows room for side-lining vital international norms and principles such as international protection, responsibility-sharing, non-refoulement, prevention of -harm, equality and so forth. The terminology, such as crisis, contributes to securitisation of migration policy, by making "a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" for a definite temporality (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 491).

Securitisation of migration is not unique to times of crises, but it speeds up and intensifies during such periods. Securitization means that one issue, like migration, is removed from the normal sphere of politics and is defined as a security issue that necessitates "extraordinary defensive moves" (Buzan et al. 1998: 204). Securitisation, along with deterrence has been at the centre of migration governance for decades, particularly in the EU's migration policy targeting its external borders (Andersson 2014; Triandafyllidou and Dimitriadi 2014). The 2015-16 is another occasion to observe the dominance of securitization and deterrence in irregular migration governance. The immediate neighbouring countries, where millions of Syrians sought refuge, approached the massive displacement as a flow and a humanitarian urgency from 2011. When Europe felt the impact of this mass displacement in 2015-2016 with

the 'irregular crossings' of thousands of migrants[5] (mainly Syrians, Afghans, Iraqis and others from Asia and Africa) to the European territory through the Greek islands and Balkan land-crossings, this has been labelled as a crisis by the EU and member states. The irregular border-crossings at the EU's external borders were recorded as 1,822,337 in 2015, while almost half of the irregular entries recorded on the Eastern Mediterranean route were 885,386 (Frontex, 2016: 16). In the same year, asylum applications reached their peak at 1,257,000 (Eurostat, 2017). Although the irregular migration's actual size attracted disproportionate political attention, it gave new political impetus to the EU's migration and asylum agenda. The depiction of 2015-16 as a crisis opened a wide space for collective securitisation and the launching of restrictive policies in Europe (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). The crisis-discourse normalised exceptional measures such as accelerated procedures, dehumanisation, poor accommodation and many others. It also led to the criminalisation of not only immigrants but also of natives aiding them (Cuttitta, 2018).

RESPOND data illustrates that policy responses are shaped through a policy repertoire which is historically shaped and deployed by governance actors in crisis-like situations. Responses given varied along a spectrum from strict non-admission, deterrence, downsized protection and reluctant reception/integration to welcoming swift settlement. Having said that we should also note that each of these responses varies across space and over time. In many RESPOND countries, initial responses to migration have changed. In this report, we try to explain this with the notion of 'crisis' which becomes a signifier for comprehending governance structures. We have identified five common characteristics. These include 1) complicated and fragmented legal systems, 2) multiplication of actors, 3) renationalisation and restrictiveness, 4) increased complexity and uncertainty and 5) failures or gridlocks. These will be discussed below.

2.1   Complicated and fragmented legal systems

Both international and national legislations are key to migration governance. All RESPOND countries, except Iraq and Lebanon, are signatories of the 1951 Geneva Convention and its additional protocols. Only Turkey has retained a geographic limitation to its ratification, meaning that it grants refugee status only to those fleeing from European countries. Most of the RESPOND countries (except Iraq and Lebanon) recognise the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), together with its principle of protection against torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as important safeguards. At the regional level, there has been a long-term attempt at the harmonisation and Europeanisation in the field of asylum and migration. All EU RESPOND countries are bound by the EU acquis that includes the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) that establishes common minimum standards for asylum and the operation of the Dublin Regulation[6], that determines which EU state is responsible for processing an asylum claim. As a non-EU country, the UK, is only part of the first phase of the CEAS comprising the 'Refugee Qualification Directive' (Directive 2004/83/EC), the

---

[5] Recent studies claim that these figures may have been anywhere from 1, 9 million to 3.8 million for the EU in 2008 (Kovacheva and Vogel, 2009: 7) and 2.9 million to again 3.8 million in 2017 including the irregular stays (Connor and Passel, 2019: 5; Spencer and Triandafyllidou, 2020: 2). It means that irregular migration accounts for 0.4-0.8 % of the total 447.7 million EU population (Eurostat, 2020).

[6] Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanism for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or stateless person (recast) (hereafter "Dublin Regulation"), OJ 2013 L180/31.

'Asylum Procedure Directive' (Directive 2005/85/EC), and the 'Asylum Reception Conditions Directive (Directive 2003/9/EC).

Despite a level of policy convergence regarding legislation emanating from international and EU frameworks - as expected by the multilevelness mode of the MLG - the comparison of national asylum regimes of the RESPOND countries shows evidence of potentially contradicting modes such as centralisation, localisation and decoupling at times of crisis. This can be partially explained with deviations from supra-legal frameworks during their adoption into the national and local regulations. Moreover, for both EU and non-EU countries, national legislations have been frequently updated, amended, changed and revoked. For example,

> ...in the UK, 12 Acts of Parliament regulating immigration issues have been approved in the last 20 years. In Italy, the Consolidated Law on Immigration is the result of multiple, fragmentary normative stratifications, jeopardising internal consistency and effectiveness. The very same complexity and rapid evolution is also apparent in the legal frameworks of Germany and Austria. (Pannia et al., 2018: 25)

Unlike what was expected, the changes in legislations were not necessarily coherent and clear. They do not seem to serve improving the level of cooperation and coordination both at the global and national levels. Instead, they widen the gaps between the norms of international law and their national adaptation and relegate the rights-based approach. As Pannia et al. note:

> In all [RESPOND] countries, the legal framework concerning migration and asylum/international protection is extremely complex and hypertrophic. In each country, legislation has been changing continuously and not necessarily coherently, frequently with lawmakers resorting to decrees instead of proper statutes/acts of Parliament. The outcome is a stratified legal framework that is extremely fragmented and difficult to be consistently interpreted and implemented. Therefore, the legal enforcement and guarantee of fundamental rights is jeopardised, and often it largely depends on the discretionary power of single offices and individuals. Against the fundamental axiom of legal certainty and predictability, the legal status of migrants and asylum applicants is more and more based on uncertainty (Pannia et al., 2018: 6).

The impact of complex legislations is mainly felt in the field of international protection – in other words in asylum policies. In most RESPOND countries, governments extended their adoption of diverging labels for migrants as protection seekers, guests, displaced persons, economic migrants or illegal migrants. These made the nexus between irregular migration/asylum/mixed migration more ambiguous than before (Gökalp Aras et al., 2020). The legal changes complicate bureaucratic procedures and extended the duration of decisions as countries aimed to reduce the number of asylum applications. Additional accelerated, fast-track and border procedures were introduced to prevent and restrain access to international protection and speed up asylum applications and assessments (ibid.). In many countries, permanent protection schemes are replaced by subsidiary and temporary protection mechanisms. Stratified legal statuses with different procedures and specified rights exacerbated nationality-based discrimination against certain asylum seekers (e.g. Afghans) and deepened the dichotomies of 'desirable' and 'undesirable' migrants/refugees (Ibid.).

Almost in all countries, the legislative structures also rarely reflect constructive, participatory law-making processes, because parliaments, civil society and refugees have a limited say on policy changes as in the UK, Sweden Greece. Instead, recent regulations are mainly developed via secondary legislation (e.g., bylaws, decrees, circulars, regulations, guidelines) as in Turkey or Italy. In almost all countries, legislation is decided on by governments and implemented often by the ministries of interior that are well-known for having security-oriented lenses in approaching migration issues. Secondary legislation is rarely subject to parliamentary debate. Even if migration topics come to parliament, they are treated as non-significant as other business.[7] Moreover, both decision-making and implementation are all concentrated into the hands of the executive, sometimes facing challenges from national or international judiciaries.

Since 2015, contested ad hoc legal instruments, such as statements, deals, compacts, joint actions, joint declarations have also appeared such as Turkey-EU statement of 2016, Joint Action Plan agreed between Turkey and EU, EU-Jordan Compact, join return operations of Frontex and Greek authorities (Favilli 2018; Gokalp-Aras & Sahin-Mencutek 2019; Karamanidou and Kasparek 2020; Paola et al. 2018; Sahin-Mencutek 2018). These arrangements fall outside of the ambit of international refugee law and the EU Treaties for the governance of migration. They are often designed in a way not only contradicting the EU's norms and standards but also side-lining the European institutional architecture such as the Parliament or the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) (Ibid.). The fragmentation of legal systems goes hand in hand with the multiplicity of actors operating with often blurry, overlapping, competences. These urge us to examine actors in decision-making and implementation of migration governance which we attempt to summarize below.

2.2 Multiplicity of Actors

The list of actors involved in governing of migration in EU is extensive, including the EU institutions, intergovernmental organisations (IOs), governments, ministries, immigration and asylum offices, parliaments, parties, municipalities, courts (judges, lawyers, bar associations), humanitarian actors, rights-based groups, activists, refugee community organisations and others. MLG directs attention to the levels where these actors work. It is true that, as indicated in the country reports, migration governance illustrates a multi-level system of regulation and actors from the EU level down to the federal/regional level (Germany, Italy, the UK) to the province/city and the municipal levels, but it is worthwhile to zoom in these levels to explore the modes of interactions and outcomes that are vital for cooperation, coordination and contestation.

The EU has a long-term objective of managing migration. At least four EU institutions are involved in the policy-making process: The European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council and the European Parliament along with the Member States. From 2011 to 2017, these institutions published at least 95 documents in the format of policy documents, proposals, speeches, ordinary conclusions, resolutions, directives, agreements, reports on immigration and asylum (Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018: 85).

---

[7] https://respondmigration.com/blog-1/press-release-horizon-2020-project-respond-research-project-attests-ongoing-governance-failures

The bone of contention is that traditionally, states used to remain the main actor with exclusive legislative power in matters of migration, the right to asylum and the legal status of foreigners. States decide on the rules of entry, exit, access to rights and the legal categories. Particularly in mass migration situations, states determine border rules or use of forces to halt flows. Afterwards, the state labels people in mobility as regular, irregular, refugee or temporary protection holders. The acquisition of permanent residency and citizenship is also a field under the jurisdiction of state agencies. Nation-states do not abandon their claims of sovereignty over migration; hence there is **a high level of centralisation and re-nationalisation in country examples** (e.g., Austria, Italy, Turkey).

Besides EU and central state authorities, sub-national entities (federal states or municipalities) are involved in migration governance, specifically for newcomers' reception and integration, but not necessarily in protection and border controls. They take more decisive roles in implementation, but do not hold legislative power: that is reserved for the central government, except in a few cases such as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland who have the power to decide on housing, health care, education, children's services and the social welfare of refugees and immigrants that might collide with the national legislation of the UK (Hirst and Atto, 2018). In Italy, despite the 2001 constitutional reform stressing the central government's exclusive competence in migration affairs, regions play a decisive role in passing legislation on healthcare, education, children's services and social welfare (Ibrido and Terlizzi, 2019). In Austria, access to civic integration is for city authorities to decide on objecting to the federal approach (Josipovic and Reeger, 2018). However, as in the case of Sweden, 'there is a tendency towards the centralisation of authority in areas previously allocated to local authorities" (Barthoma et al. 2019: 42).

We also observed the **privatisation and outsourcing of services** that lead to involving private actors such as businesses, the third sector, private companies and faith communities in governance. In the UK, three private providers manage the entire asylum reception system (Hirst and Atto, 2018). The Italian system of reception is mostly managed by a complex system that includes municipalities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), associations and cooperatives of the third sector and the Catholic Church (Ambrosini, 2018). In all countries, the role of 'care-taker' is undertaken by an increasing number of non-state actors, although state actors are still in control. In all countries, civil society movements monitor and criticise legal disparities, problems in the implementation of policies and arbitrary practices. The involvement of companies is also the case in some countries. For example, in Germany, the execution of forced returns is carried out by Federal and/or State Police forces, and in some cases private contractors (Hänsel et al., 2019a: 33), while accommodation centres and asylum consultations also benefit from the services of private companies (Hänsel et al. 2019b: 41). Specifically, in the sub-fields of integration, namely housing and health, the private sector plays a prominent role (Barthoma et al., 2020). The outsourcing of immigration-related services to the private sector creates a mixed web of contractors and subcontractors with (limited) coordination with central asylum authorities, regional and local municipalities (Hirst and Atto, 2018). The international IOs and NGOs also outsource their services to the private sector when the need arises.

From a governance perspective, top-down and bottom-up initiatives can be present simultaneously, however shows differences on the basis of sub-issues areas. Whereas in borders and protection (admission) nation-states are at the centre in shaping governance

models, in reception and even more in integration (long term settlement), the more remarkable role of local governance models, including the engagement of non-state actors is present. States invite non-state actors into the process on a case-by-case basis in times of crisis, returning to the normal state of affairs once the crisis is over. In reception and integration, new actors, such as refugee community organisations, emerge or are "invented" for subsidiarity purposes. These actors survive if they make themselves in line with the dominant power relations and policy directions, while they are seldomly included in the decision making and actual governing (Şahin-Mencütek, 2020). In general, the state actors have increased their capacity to fulfil management requirements and IOs, and non-state actors have increased service provision capacities and taken on limited roles in providing care services. However, their role in shaping and carrying out governance functions does not represent a real transfer of power from the state to non-state actors (Gökalp Aras, 2020: 77, 88). The subsidiarity roles given to the non-state actors in reception and integration reflects the outsourcing too.

Patterns in actors' roles in governance modes can be summarized as follows: 1) Nation-states are still at the centre of policy-making processes. 2) Transnational actors (e.g. EU) play an intermediary role – which can turn into a role of meta-governor, setting the (new) norms and mechanisms for migration governance in an increasingly interdependent world. 3) One can observe an increased resistance at the local level towards central policy structures, which is also a source of fragmentation and innovation. 4) Non-governmental actors are involved in this process in two ways a) in a neo-liberal governmentality mode they contribute to the development of a control regime or b) by resisting and exercising an external governance mode by monitoring humanitarian values and raising an oppositional/critical voice against restrictive policies.

Given the fact that adequate **mechanisms of coordination** are often lacking, this multiplicity of actors ends up undermining the uniformity of practices and often results in substandard services and uncertain rights.[8] The multilevel scheme may lead to more progressive approaches in specific regions, provinces and local municipalities, in contrast with the overall tendency of the national level. However, they also carry the risk of exacerbating the fragmentation of migrants' rights (Pannia et al., 2018: 27).

Regarding its adaptability, MLG enables us to identify actors and issues related to coordination. However, it does not fully capture the complex political dynamics and competing interests. The political context and power relations largely shape the process of policy-shaping and interactions among multiple actors and levels. Without falling into the trap of methodological nationalism and cultural essentialist analysis, contextual and historical factors should be considered in understanding governance structures. We will first briefly discuss the political and socio-economic environment within which governance structures and modalities are shaped before moving on to the further elaboration of practices by policy field and country.

2.3   Re-nationalisation of migration governance and a restrictive turn

Not only legislative content, and institutional actors, but also narratives, framing and politics influence migration governance. Without focus on discourses of and politics behind governance, the analysis tends to remain descriptive. To overcome this, we take a discursive

---

[8]   https://respondmigration.com/blog-1/press-release-horizon-2020-project-respond-research-project-attests-ongoing-governance-failures

approach in this section before moving to identify tools of governance in issue area. There is no doubt that migration has been one of the most politicised topics of European and domestic debate in each country under investigation. The core of the debate is that the increasing external migration is approached as a crisis and something beyond member states' capacities to independently respond. The crisis perception has led to more emphasis on migration narratives that dominate political debates, traditional print media and social networking sites. Narratives may have an impact on drawing boundaries, shaping public opinion, legitimising exclusionary policies as well as providing a better understanding of migrants' experiences and identities. They are deeply embedded in knowledge production, policy-making, politics and power and shaped by them (Şahin-Mencütek, 2020: 1).

In the wake and aftermath of the crisis, migration policy narratives shifted towards more nationalist agendas despite calls for Europeanisation, solidarity and burden-sharing. As it is not the first time, this is called as "**re-nationalisation" of migration governance.** Re-nationalisation advocates restrictive, illiberal immigration policies, along with securitisation in Europe and elsewhere. In terms of policy impact, re-nationalisation in EU countries triggered the decoupling modes in migration and asylum policies.

Re-nationalisation is closely linked to the context of the rise of populism (Guiraudon & Joppke 2001), in which migration is constructed as the main scapegoat for unemployment and societal failures (Cochrane & Nevitte 2014). The rise of populist political elites and leadership models is highly connected to migration. What they propose is actually a new governance model focused on modifying the role of the nation-state in the governance of migration to "fix the migration problem". Particularly in the well-established destination countries (Germany, Sweden, Austria), this is intersected with discussions around social welfare, while austerity policy measures are more linked in countries encountering economic crisis (Greece, Italy). In non-EU countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq), politicisation of migration is overlapped with debates and crises concerning geopolitics, domestic power sharing and resources distribution.

The UK is an illustrative case for tracing concrete consequences of populist political discourses favouring the re-nationalisation of migration governance (Foley 2020; Goodfellow 2020). The UK had previously opted out from the Schengen Agreement, the Economic and Monetary Union and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Before the major opt-out with Brexit (2020), the UK only abided by the first phase of the CEAS (The Refugee Qualification and the Asylum Directive) but opted out of the 'Asylum Recast Package' too (Pannia et al., 2020: 32). Nevertheless, post-2011 developments and the 2015-16 crisis climate made the UK a more reluctant country to provide refugee protection (Foley 2020). Immigration and asylum debates appear as the most vital issues driving Brits to vote to leave the EU in 2016, and finally absconding on 31 December 2020.

Besides populism and concerns about the distribution of social welfare (to whom and how) in Europe, issues around identity/community and self-perception may directly or indirectly influence the migration governance. They provide insights for understanding the social and normative logic of governance communities beyond the functionalist mode of governance. National, regional or local authorities do not adapt their policies only according to a functional need, rather they are influenced by broader narratives on identity, citizenship, and politics. Specifically, in the front states such as Poland and Hungary which have faced migration pressure, migrants (mainly Muslims) are constructed as "complete outsiders" which has

created tension since 2015-16. These countries do not want to self-identify themselves as being buffer zones or waiting rooms for migrants attempting to reach Western Europe.

The re-nationalisation of migration governance is closely linked to conflicting discourses around Europeanisation. The comparative analysis illustrates that government actors have developed both liberal and conservative Europeanisation discourses to stay in line with the humanitarian role of the EU based on the solidarity principle and to strongly prioritise a security-focused national agenda (Josipovic and Reeger, 2021). The discourses are not sole political claims or normative positions. Instead, they serve as the basis of justification and legitimisation of essential policy decisions seen in Brexit. Although there are differences regarding the level of migration and asylum governance, in particular, the shortcomings of the EU in dealing with the "refugee crisis" (in particular the failure of the Dublin system, the hotspots approach etc.), mainstream public opinion in the majority of the RESPOND countries remains pro-European. However, the role of domestic politics (e.g., Poland, Hungary, Greece) is detrimental to the multilevel governance of migration, which has strengthened the inter-governmentalist discourses among the EU Member States. The diverging positions of the member states about the Europeanization range from Europospectism to Europragratism as discussed in WP6 comparative report, reflecting the clusters proposed later on in this report (Section 2.5).

In the non-EU countries, the content of the renationalisation of migration governance via a restrictive turn has shown some similarities. However, the driving forces are slightly different from those in Europe. First of all, these countries (Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq) had faced massive displacement since 2011-12, earlier than European states in 2015-16, although they did not call it a 'crisis' until the latter group put the terminology into broader circulation (Sert and Danış 2020). Security risks and economic fragility in the former group concerning real crisis-engendered displacement (Syrian war) have some real basis because they share long borders and socio-economic relations with Syria. The refugee issue is highly embedded into the geopolitical context, depleting national capabilities and domestic power dynamics, making migration governance more sensitive, conflictual and temporal (Şahin-Mencütek, 2018). The regional destabilisation and deterioration of insecurity at borders over time along with the subsequent influx resulted in stricter entry rules and harsh legal residency requirements after 2014-15, despite ethnic, kinship, clan and religious ties between host and refugee communities. Additionally, the closure of trade routes between Syria and Lebanon has led to a sizable pressure on the Lebanese economy that has intensified the already existent political polarization and gridlock (Rahme 2020). In Iraq, the response to the influx of Syrian refugees was fragmented and motivated by ethnic or local political agendas, as demonstrated by the Kurdish Regional Government's treatment of Syrian Kurd refugees. Also, internal displacement inside Iraq exceeded five million persons after ISIS violence required additional measures (Warda et al. 2019). Turkey's geopolitical-security anxieties about the creation of Kurdish self-administration in Northern Syria, close to the Turkish border and failure to garner support for building a 'safe zone' played a role in changes in responding to Syrian mass migration (Şahin-Mencütek et al., 2021). In the end, domestic and regional concerns gave reasons for these countries to re-nationalise their migration governance along with restrictive policies, similar to those of their European counterparts.

The three afore-mentioned characteristics of migration governance – fragmented legal systems, multiplicity of actors, renationalisation and a restrictive turn – led to increased complexity and uncertainty in governance practices. These will be discussed below.

2.4   Increased Complexity and Uncertainty: Governance Practices

To systematically outline governance practices, it is useful to differentiate main policy areas in migration drawing from RESPOND's work packages. We identify the main characteristics of border controls, protection/reception and integration drawing from the RESPOND findings on patterns across countries.

Table 1: Policy Areas in Migration Governance by Countries

	Border Management	Protection	Reception	Integration
GERMANY	Internal bordering, remote control	Paternalism and control; Downgrading rights	Spatial segregation, camp based and centralised reception and accommodation	Selected Integration
AUSTRIA	Internal bordering	Downgrading rights, more subsidiary modes	Uncertain period of reception	Conflicting views and restrictions about integration
GREECE	Strict border controls as EU's frontline	Slow and differentiated asylum procedures	Spatial segregation and isolation	The absence of long-term planned and comprehensive policies
TURKEY	Strict border controls, subject to EU externalization	temporariness and differences in access to rights for beneficiaries	Ambiguous (From hospitality to reluctance)	Fragile and precarious integration
SWEDEN	Internal bordering, Temporary border controls	Minimising protection rights and introducing temporary protection	From generous policies to the EU minimum level, centralisation of reception services	Fragmented integration; tendencies to introduce assimilation policies
ITALY	Strict border controls as EU's frontline	Arbitrary distinctions between 'irregular migrants' and 'asylum/international protection seekers'	Standards of care and assistance for asylum seekers and refugees vary, subsidiarity role of municipalities	Slow integration

LEBANON	Ad hoc	Generalised and gender-related obstacles in regularising legal status	Absence of a comprehensive reception system	Precarious integration despite lack of state strategy
IRAQ	Flexible border controls	Lacks a clear legal framework to protect refugees	No clear standards for refugee reception	Precarious integration
POLAND	Strict border controls, EU's frontline	New government's stricter approach to protection; withdrew from relocation and resettlement schemes	Isolation, centralised accommodation, the limited access to Polish territory for asylum seekers	Lack of integration strategy
HUNGARY	Strict border controls, EU's frontline	Systematic dismantling of the asylum system	Political discourse retains the crisis narrative that ripples into reception policy; hostile reception policy	Hostile environment
The UK	Strict internal bordering	Control and deterrence; Stratification of rights and devolved implementation	Detention during reception	Barriers to Integration (exclusion, destitution, insecurity)

Despite variations in patterns across countries, it is possible to make generalisations regarding the main feature of each policy field, including remote border controls, blocking reception, downgrading protection and slowing integration. Each will be examined below.

2.4.1 Remote Border Controls

In order to combat irregular and decreasing entries, including asylum migration, the EU places continuous emphasis on border management. It has a complex "ensemble of legislation, policies, implementation practices, institutions, and actors concerned with defining, conceptualising, and policing the external border of the European Union Member States" (Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018: 6). Control measures operate with the involvement of various institutions and regulations at transnational, central and local levels. They start with pre-entry controls, controls at the external border controls applied within the territory that can be subdivided into the regulation of stay and residence, internal control and apprehension measures, and access to social and welfare rights (Ibid.: 7). Also, the border control encompasses detention, return and readmission measures in which externalisation and engagement with non-EU countries take place.

When states encounter mass irregular migration, tightening entry rules and developing border security technologies appear as the main pattern in migration governance. Countries demonstrated a general departure from the initial welcoming approach (e.g., an open-door policy in Turkey and Lebanon; a culture of welcome in Germany), they made amendments or introduced regulations to impose restrictions or limitations on existing standards of rights and narrowed access to the territory and protection system (RESPOND, 2020). For example, six out of 11 countries – Austria, Greece, Hungary, Lebanon, Poland, and Turkey – restricted access to their national territories with the help of new physical and procedural barriers (walls,

fences, dogs, digital devices, etc.). Moreover, systematic push-backs and extensive violence against migrants were reported in Turkey, Greece, Hungary and Poland. One of the most problematic issues in controlling the external border is the interventions of Frontex, blurring authorities over border controls. Despite the existing discussions regarding the controversial role of Frontex and lack of existing monitoring and accountability mechanisms for the acts (e.g. violations in push backs) of this agency, the EU wants to increase its role (European Commission, 2020; Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2020).

The context and strategic usage of crisis discourses justify the use of extraordinary border control measures and more attempts for 'externalisation' of border regimes. Two critical practices of the EU are "hot spots" and returns/readmission. The Hotspot approach is implemented in Greece and Italy. [9] In Greece, "as a result of the EU-Turkey Statement and pertinent laws, any person arriving at the five North-eastern Aegean islands (Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Kos and Leros) was forced into a geographical restriction within the territory and subjected to possible deportation to Turkey after a Fast-Track Border Asylum Procedure. The restriction may be lifted and the asylum seeker may be granted international protection, if s/he is considered vulnerable, or can make use of the family provisions of the Dublin Regulation. However, asylum seekers who have already been recognised as 'vulnerable' often remain in the Hotspot sites for months or a year without being transferred to the mainland due to the lack of adequate accommodation facilities. The Hotspot regime seems to expand boundaries in the territory of the nation-state, by creating buffer zones in Greece that function as multiple filtering mechanisms, not only concerning the movement inside or outside it, but also the movement towards the EU.[10] A similar hotspot approach was implemented in Italy by the end of 2018: four Hotspots were operating in Apulia (Taranto) and Sicily (Lampedusa, Pozzallo, and Messina), down from five in 2017. Since its introduction, the Hotspot approach has been found "effective" for identifying the newly arrived persons on Italian shores, which is a crucial element of the Dublin regulation. However, based on research findings, it is possible to claim that the respect for fundamental rights and asylum seekers' dignity and the rule of law and the principle of fair trial have remained in a critical state. Hotspots in Italy and Greece fail to provide safe conditions for asylum seekers; they also seem to create new forms of discrimination, violations of rights in accessing the asylum procedure and the protection regime in the entire EU (Karamanidou et al., 2020; Gökalp Aras et al., 2020).

As a part of externalization, the return of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum seekers increasingly becomes the dominant discourse among political actors in most EU and non-EU-countries. Returns are approached as the only way to reduce the number of asylum applications and deter prospective arrivals. Thus, destination countries seek ways to legitimise deportations and returns, blurring lines between forced and voluntary returns. Some of the RESPOND countries have bilateral agreements with the country of origin and transit (e.g., Germany, Italy, Turkey). The increasing emphasis on the return discourse and ad-hoc practices and techniques (such as administrative detention or threat to sign voluntary return forms) were seen as commonly implemented. Since 2019, deportation cases have been increasingly reported. These developments created increasing concern about involuntary

---

[9] https://respondmigration.com/blog-1/press-release-horizon-2020-project-respond-research-project-attests-ongoing-governance-failures

[10] https://respondmigration.com/blog-1/being-at-the-gate-the-external-dimension-of-european-crisis-management-at-the-final-respond-conference.

returns and individual cases of administrative detention and deportation of irregular migrants as hampering integration and the development of durable solutions.

With regards to externalization and remote controls, one of the EU's main formal tool is the ratification of readmission agreements. Due to the existing problems, cooperation with countries on readmission has been intensified by utilising several informal and non-binding cooperation formats such as deals, bilateral agreements and compacts that will facilitate returns. For returns, the EU-Turkey Statement is the most illustrative example of governance in and through crisis. As existing human rights and EU asylum legislation do not allow forced returns of migrants, a technical cooperation deal, the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 was put into action to enable returns (Gökalp-Aras and Şahin-Mencütek, 2019). The desired policy outcome was to massively reduce the number of irregular migrants arriving in Europe via Turkey. In brief, the Statement ordered that all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece would be deported back to Turkey.EU would provide financial and institutional support to these countries. The EU praised the EU-Turkey Statement for its continuous delivery of intended results, reducing irregular crossings and losses in the Aegean Sea.

On the other hand, negotiating over migrants brought leverage to negotiating actors. Thus, this specific practice turns into something that re-structures power relations to enable the generating extra capital and symbolic power. The statement sparked heated debates on legitimacy and accountability as it explicitly violates the international refugee regime's basis, the 'non-refoulement principle' and fails to comply with human rights and EU legislation.

2.4.2 Blocking Reception and Downgrading Protection

Together with the remote border control practices, implementation of international protection has been downsized, and reception standards have been lowered in many countries. The main motivation remains the same, deterring, staying and dissuading prospective migrants from embarking on a journey to Europe. European migration and asylum regimes have created the conditions of protracted transitionality, rather than genuine rights-based protection. Hence, the practices for ensuring protracted transitionality intensify in front states, where refugees are both physically and emotionally entrapped and stuck in 'waiting rooms', such as in the hotspots of Italy and Greece. In the same way, this protracted situation embeds the logic of temporality, legal uncertainty, social and economic fragility, downgrades rights and leads to dehumanisation. Thus, asylum seekers are forced to live desperately in legal limbo under precarious conditions and uncertainty, which has detrimental consequences for their well-being.

RESPOND country reports illuminate various practices used by states to maintain this protracted situation since 2015-16. Almost all countries use pre-screening before actual determination procedures, such as "inadmissibility procedures" (Germany and Greece). Accelerated procedures became more common in Austria, Germany and Greece. Procedural acceleration is accompanied by confinement of asylum seekers to various reception/accommodation/sheltering spaces such as the half-closed ANKER system in Germany or closed campsites (as on the hot spots in Greek islands). Many countries introduced new categories like "prospects of staying" (measuring acceptance rates) with fewer procedural and social rights.

Policy convergence is apparent in implementation practices at the expense of downgrading the rights of applicants. This is worsened by lowering reception standards and access to reception assistance (material, legal, social). Even if asylum seekers pass the application stage and are granted a type of protection, the transitionality is maintained, because temporality and deterrence are the persistent driving motives of policymakers and practitioners (interpreters, social workers, asylum officers) serving in various domains of the asylum system. Despite incoherencies, at face value, there is a coherency in the logic and it is reconstructed at several layers by multiple actors.

A critical indicator of deterrence logic at the level of rights is the systemic denial of family reunification for those under protection. In Sweden and Greece, refugees are entitled to family reunification, but they have to submit their application within three months from the granting of status. The same deadline is also provided in the legislations of Germany and Austria. If a refugee fails to meet this deadline, further requirements are imposed to enjoy the right to family unification, namely, so-called material conditions requirements. In Germany, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are denied the right to family reunification, meaning that this right is turned into a humanitarian gesture limited to only a few individuals. In Turkey, a blanket suspension of this right is in place as of 2017. Another reflection of deterrence and temporality logic is about the downsizing of the status of subsidiary protection. The disparity in the legal treatment of this status, as compared to refugee status, has increased in RESPOND countries. For example, in only four out of the 11 RESPOND countries are holders of refugee status and subsidiary protection entitled to receive a residence permit of equal duration (five years in Italy and the UK; three years in Greece and Hungary).

In many RESPOND countries, there is a tendency to merge the status of 'protection seeker' with 'illegality' or 'irregularity'. Following this pattern, more and more governmental authorities deploy the punitive arsenal of criminal law against migrants, NGOs and volunteers providing help and assistance to migrants. Authorities justify criminalisation as an attempt to manage and control migration. However, the distinction between criminal law and immigration law is progressively blurring. Evidence of such schemes has been analysed and theorised in what has been called "crimmigration law".[11] For example, in Italy, new regulations have broadened the range of criminal offences that justify international protection revocation and introduce measures to limit new arrivals and contain irregular immigration (Ibrido and Terlizzi, 2019: 20). In Poland and Turkey, detention (or removal) is applied to secure return the execution of return orders. (Gökalp-Aras and Şahin-Mencütek, 2019; Szulecka, 2019). The UK has systematic detention upon arrival. Detention for deportation has also been the case in many countries.

2.4.3 Slowing Integration

Similar to the reception and protection fields, many countries have introduced more restrictive regulations for immigrant integration. The dominant rationale of deterrence in migration governance makes the ongoing integration patterns slow and fragile. Due to refugees' prolonged stay, integration is an issue for both destination and transit countries in European and non-European countries in the RESPOND project. Due to the entrapment of refugees facing strict border controls, these countries have faced the challenge of developing new measures to meet refugees' basic reception needs, especially in housing, health, education

---

[11] https://respondmigration.com/blog-1/press-release-horizon-2020-project-respond-research-project-attests-ongoing-governance-failures

and the labour market. The integration fields intersect with many other sectors, requiring not only a multilevel but also a multisectoral analysis. The main trends in the labour market, housing, education and civic participation are summarised below.

Asylum seekers face restricted access to the labour market, and problems regarding recognition of their qualifications, language barriers, mismatches, discrimination, etc. Long-lasting asylum procedures result in refugees' non-participation in the labour market, although they have the eagerness to participate. In many countries (Italy, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq), working in the informal sector is common, leading to severe exploitation and violation of rights. Furthermore, restrictions over residence and mobility rights and lack of strategic planning and coordination among relevant authorities seem to worsen employment access.

The field of education presents a relatively better picture of integration and a multilevel mode in terms of coordination and cooperation. "While central governments provide the policies and structure for the education of asylum seekers and refugees in most cases, regional and local authorities play a significant role in implementing policies. The activities of NGOs and CSOs in terms of facilitating language learning and informal educational opportunities as well as promoting and preserving social cohesion are remarkable" (Barthoma et al., 2020: 34).

Housing is a field where multilevel governance is prominent, particularly with the involvement of municipalities, private businesses and networks. The housing issue goes beyond integration by touching reception and protection. For example, the lack of mobility across various areas is more relevant to the limited freedom of mobility rights granted to asylum seekers, while congested living situations in accommodation centres stem from the problems in the reception system. Additionally, even asylum seekers passing through the reception process still encounter challenges in accessing affordable and quality housing, risk being short-changed by unscrupulous "brokers" who take advantage of asylum seekers' restricted access to the housing market and face discrimination from landlords (Ibid.).

The last stage in integration is considered as becoming naturalised by acquiring citizenship of the host country. The countries addressed in RESPOND have diverse citizenship regimes and multiple procedures for the naturalisation of refugees. The residency duration criteria, which are the main criteria for naturalisation, vary according to immigration status and country of origin. Institutionally, the governance system of citizenship is highly fragmented. Although there are multiple application modules, including local-municipal and regional authorities, central state institutions hold a discretionary power over citizenship decisions. The naturalisation processes – both in legislation and administration – have been more constrained since 2015-16. A restrictive turn in policies moved liberal immigration regimes towards the EU minimum level (Ibid.: 88)

While civil society and municipalities take active roles in asylum seekers and refugees' paths to integration and belonging, national-level support remains limited. Some practices of the national authorities, such as detention upon arrival (e.g., the UK), poor mass reception conditions (Greece), structural discrimination (Germany) and backlogs in the asylum system (Sweden) hamper the integration aspirations of immigrants (Ibid.: 89).

2.5 Tentative typology for migration governance in and through crisis

Besides the commonalities addressed above, the meta-analysis of thematic reports produced in various work packages (legal-policy framework, border management, protection, reception and integration and Europeanisation) allow us to tentatively build a typology about "crisis responses" of RESPOND countries as illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2: Crisis Responses of the RESPOND Countries

	Country	Role in the migration regime	Governance scales	During crisis	Post-crisis	Modalities of Governance
Non-European	*Turkey Lebanon Iraq*	Source, transit and destination countries	Transnational (UN, EU) National Federal-local (Iraq-Lebanon)	Indifferent (Lebanon) Welcoming (Turkey & Iraq)	Restriction and reluctance	**MLG modes** Partial Multilevelness Mainly Centralist (Turkey) Localist (Iraq, Lebanon) **Crisis as a governance mode** • Temporal • Restrictive • Renationalization
European	*Greece Italy* *Poland* Hungary	Continuing transit and destination countries New transit and destination countries	EUropean National Federal Local	Ad hoc Reluctant	Restriction Deterrence	**MLG Mode** Multilevelness **Crisis as a governance mode** • Normalization of governing by crisis (Greece& Italy) • Restrictive (all) • Remote control (Italy & Greece) • Decoupling (Poland & Hungary)
	Germany Sweden Austria The UK	Old destination countries	EUropean National Federal Local	Welcoming (Germany, Sweden) Reluctant (Austria, the UK)	Restriction Deterrence	**MLG Modes** • Multilevelness • Localist (Sweden) • Decoupling (the UK) **Crisis as a governance mode** • Normalization of governing by crisis • Restrictive& Re-nationalist (all) • Remote control (Germany)

In the above table, there is a geographical clustering on the basis of being European or non-European countries. European countries (can be also named ad EUropean) are further divided into two subcategories: transit countries (Italy, Greece, Poland, Hungary) and old destination countries (Germany, Sweden, Austria, UK). The first subgroup can also be referred to as front states. As transit/frontline countries also turn into the destination for many migrants, they can be called destination countries. While Greece and Italy have been serving as both transit and destination countries for a long time, Poland and Hungary have recently become the destination and transit countries for irregular migrants who are not able to reach old destination countries. Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq fall under threefold status, being source, destination and transit countries. Turkey can also be considered as a frontline state for Europe. The second column of Table 2 shows variations in governance scales including transnational, European, national and local scales by referring country clusters. Unlike European countries, non-European countries are additionally subject to transnational migration governance schemes, specifically due to the UNHCR role in refugee assistance or status determination in these countries. In the third and fourth column of Table 2, we define responses during crisis and post crisis climax. For crisis response, countries display indifference, ad hoc, reluctant or welcoming responses. Interestingly, neither the geographical location of the country (European vs non-European) nor the role in the migration regime (transit vs origin vs? destination), or the history of reception (new or old destination) have necessarily an impact on the crisis response pattern. Broad variation in the initial crisis period gave way to more policy convergence in the post-crisis stages. Convergence occurs around restriction and deterrence centric governance. In the modalitiescategory, we attempt to make governance mode categorisations. We first recall MLG modes (multilevelness, localist, decoupling, centralist) to see their explanatory power in governance in clusters and by country. Drawing from discussions above, the limitations of MLG requires us to introduce additional modes in relation to the inscription of 'crisis' in the governance of migration (e.g. remote control, restrictive etc.).

As reflected in the table above, we analysed common trends and modalities of migration governance in a mass migration situation which is often perceived as a 'crisis'. We used the term "migration governance" to refer to governing models and structures of migration articulated and practised in legal and political mechanisms and processes in each polity. These modalities are not fixed structures, instead continuously negotiated through the interplay of actors (local/national/regional/supranational) at different levels in and about different sub-policy fields related to migration. All these dynamics also run the risk of governance failures as observed in the RESPOND research.

2.6 Governance failures

Insights from the previous sections signal **governance failure** in the multilevel governance of mass migration. This might be identified as a failure due to the number of attributes that contradict with expectations from a meaningful governance in migration field, including

1. Erosion of key norms of the refugee regime, systematic violation of the right to seek asylum and non-refoulement.
2. A weakening of global and supranational governance structures.
3. Policy convergence in restrictions, downgrading rights and narrowing down options for safe and orderly migration and hindering legal pathways.
4. The rise in the number of fragmented legal frameworks and a high level of ad hoc-ism in practices.

5. The growth in dysfunctional institutions and routines in the wake of emergencies (e.g., inflexibility, lack of mechanisms to prevent gridlocks and institutional inertia).
6. Lack of meaningful cooperation and coordination between levels (lack of leadership, a disincentive to synergy between actors operating at different governance levels) and conflicting approaches.
7. Decoupling practices concerning the further politicisation and securitisation of migration.

It is inevitable that governance failure triggers testing of novel ways in which to address the given challenges. At the global level, states agreed on "enhancing cooperation on international migration" and adopted the non-binding Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (UN 2019) and Global Compact on Refugees (UN 2018). At the regional level, the recent attempt is the EU's new Migration and Asylum Pact (EC, 2020) which is framed for developing a common asylum and migration policy for EU member states. The new pact introduces an assemblage of governance modes portrayed as a 'remedy' for the problems experienced. It is designed to break the gridlock in developing a common migration and asylum policy at the EU level (ibid.). The Pact aims at 1) easing the pressures on host countries; 2) enhancing refugee self-reliance; 3) supporting conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. The only objective targeting the improvements in destination countries is to "expand access to third-country solutions."[12] Hence, the new EU Pact fully reflects the rationale of externalisation of the problem and possible solutions. These aims raise the question of whether it is a breakthrough in finding solutions to governance failure or if it is a sign of another failure from the beginning. While introducing an alternative to the Dublin Regulation and the burden-sharing principle –diagnosed as the main failure points– the Pact attempts to institutionalise the highly contested governance techniques such as the Hotspot approach, fast-track and inadmissibility procedures, and efficient relocation efforts.

From a governance perspective, the Pact aims to find an equilibrium between the Member States and provides a governance approach consisting of an amalgamation of intergovernmental and integrationist discourses. The aim of proposing these plans is to foster convergence in migration policy among MSs and integrate decoupling, non-aligned members. While internally the governance structure envisaged is designed upon loosely- connected governance structures in which the European Commission is trying to play a meta-governor role externally. The Pact aims to continue a policy trend, and governance modality which started to take shape in the wake of the 'crisis', aiming to strengthen remote migration governance.

---

[12] https://www.unhcr.org/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html

3   Concluding remarks

This report provided a comparative analysis of migration governance by analysing 11 country cases covered in the RESPOND Project. To unpack the complexity of migration governance, we suggested that an emphasis on scales and different sub-policy fields is important. Policymaking in the field of migration is scattered across different scales (global, regional, national, local, individual) and directions within these scales (upward, downward, horizontally) which are fundamental for policy outcomes. To this end, we also showed how RESPOND's applied framework/methodology for studying migration governance from a holistic perspective, involving *macro* (policies and legal frameworks), *meso* (practices and the implementation of policies) and *micro* (refugee experiences and responses) levels helped to grasp the complexity and provided us the needed flexibility to zoom in on different sub-policy fields in a given context and temporal axis.

RESPOND focused on the period of 2011-2018, where the governance of migration has been immensely affected by the 'crisis' climax. Migration in all 11 countries is governed through and in a crisis-context that affected all governance modalities and shaped the scope, target and discursive construction of policy responses which in turn paved the way to crisis/security-led institutional developments. 'Crisis' as a governance mode for managing migration is instrumentalized by nation-states and political elites to legitimize restrictive actions, expand their power and authority areas in domestic and foreign policy. Our findings also pointed out that these policy responses (or the assemblage of responses) are historically shaped and deployed in crisis-like situations, but also continuously re-negotiated and modified in the contemporary interdependencies. In many RESPOND countries initial responses to migration have changed over time.

We have identified five salient characteristics of governance modalities in times of crisis. These are 1) complicated and fragmented legal systems; 2) multiplication of actors; 3) renationalisation and restrictiveness; 4) increased complexity and uncertainty, and; 5) failures or gridlocks. The present report has highlighted how these characteristics can be observed in concrete policy practices in diverse sub-policy fields that involve remote border controls, barriers to reception, downgrades in protection and slower integration. These are mainly driven by restriction, control and deterrence-centric approaches. All these modalities are summarised in a tentative typology in Section 2.5.

Our findings demonstrate some typical characteristics of governance failures. In many national practices, we have observed erosion in the key norms of the refugee regime, increases in restrictive policies and legislation, downgrading of rights, and narrowing of options for safe and orderly migration (legal pathways). This combines with growing fragmentation of legal frameworks and governance structures; a high level of ad hoc-ism in policy practices; the weakening of global and supranational governance structures (e.g., intergovernmental governance in the EU); and the strengthening of state-led governance practices. These patterns have together undermined meaningful cooperation and coordination between countries at different levels of governance. Instead, in many countries, populist elites have advanced nationalist agendas and further securitised migration governance. This report encapsulates all these developments vis-à-vis the crisis in migration governance underway since 2015. Table 2 (above) provides an overview of countries and their migration governance modalities. It illustrates the restrictive move observed in all countries studied within the RESPOND project.

The aforementioned analysis — which incorporates various dimensions amidst crisis — has disclosed the dominance of three central concepts: **temporality, complexity,** and **uncertainty.** These are three parallel running processes that impact migration governance and further embedded in the governance. First, crisis constitutes a rupture in the earlier status quo, a change in established forms of policymaking and its forms of governance. Specifically, **temporality** is a process that we have observed in all aspects of asylum and migration systems affecting institutional frameworks and affected populations (both migrants and host societies). Temporary legislation and policies, increased ad hoc-ism, excessive use of discretionary power, bypassing institutional accountability measures are all different forms of temporal governance.

Secondly, the perception of crisis has complicated matters, turning migration into an extremely **complex** policy field, crosscutting diverse sub-policy fields and involving a multiplicity of actors. Despite this increased complexity, the cooperation channels and coordination functions have weakened during the period analysed (2015–2020). In our view, complexity—much like crisis—makes salient the need for political subjectivity/agency, which is assumed to provide solutions to governance problems. The rise of populist leaders in the same period also indicates the urgent need for a new political subjectivity that corresponds to the transformation of societies and governance structures. Right-wing populist leaders fill a void in such systems.

Finally, our report has also pointed out the notion of **uncertainty** experienced at all governance levels. In our view, this is intrinsically related to the crisis in governance structures. Looking at uncertainty from a processual perspective, we can also explain it with the concept of liminality—namely, *a rite of passage* through which the earlier status quo enters into a period of transformation. One characteristic of liminality is an increased ambiguity. Applying this concept to migration governance may provide an in-depth understanding of the destructive consequences of protracted transitional regimes on human populations and the international refugee regime. Drawing a parallel with waiting times for asylum applications, the longer one (i.e., a governance organisation) remains in a state of imminent positionality and uncertainty, the more complex and devastating the problems of migration governance become.

Overall, the report contributes to the study of migration governance in at least two ways. First, it *analyses migration governance comparatively* across 11 different countries (traditionally known as source, transit and destination countries) and at the EU level. In so doing, the report has generated important insights into the various forms of governance from a comparative perspective. Secondly, the report has offered a *holistic perspective on the study of migration governance* during a period of crisis. Drawing from the comprehensive empirical data collected in the RESPOND, the report makes generalizable conclusions about the content, direction and implications of changes regarding migration governance during the period analysed.

Our analysis of migration governance has paid attention to both the normative aspects and institutional dimensions of governance and power relations. It has also underscored that migration governance is a complex field, contingent upon the nexus between multiple regimes (e.g., border, security, social welfare, legal) operating within migration. The complexity intrinsic to the governance of migration paves the way to continuous tensions and sources of diversion between actors and levels within spatial and temporal axes and generates variations.

References

Abbott, K. W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D., & Zangl, B. (2012). Orchestration: Global governance through intermediaries. *Available at SSRN 2125452.*

Ålund, A., & Schierup, C. U. (2019). Making or unmaking a movement?: Challenges for civic activism in the global governance of migration. In *Migration, Civil Society and Global Governance.* Taylor & Francis.

Andersson, R. (2014). Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine migration and the business of bordering Europe. Univ of California Press.

Kalir, B. & Cantat, C. (2020). "Fund but Disregard: the EU's Relationship to Academic Research on Mobility". *Crisis Magazine.* Available at: https://crisismag.net/2020/05/09/fund-but-disregard-the-eus-relationship-to academic-research-on-mobility/ (Accessed 20 January 2021).

Bigo, D. (2002). Security and immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease. *Alternatives*, *27*(1_suppl): 63-92.

Boucher, A., & Gest, J. (2015). Migration Studies at a Crossroads: A critique of the Immigration Regime Typologies. *Migration Studies*, *3*(2): 182-198.

Bovens M., 't Hart, P. & Peters, B. G. (2000). *Success and Failure in Public Governance.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Buzan, B., Wæver, O. & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Campomori, F. & Ambrosini, M. (2020). "Multilevel Governance in Trouble: the Implementation of Asylum Seekers' Reception in Italy as a Battleground". *Comparative Migration Studies*, *8*(1): 1-19.

Caponio, T. & Jones-Correra, M. (2018). "Theorizing Migration Policy in Multilevel States: The Multilevel Governance Perspective", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 22: 1995–2010.

Carrera, S., Santos, J. V. & Strik, T. (eds). (2019). *The External Dimensions of EU Migration and Asylum Policies in Times of Crisis*. The UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Chatty, D. (2017). The Syrian humanitarian disaster: understanding perceptions and aspirations in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. *Global Policy*, 8, 25-32.

Cochrane, C., & Nevitte, N. (2014). Scapegoating: Unemployment, far-right parties and anti-immigrant sentiment. Comparative European Politics, 12(1), 1-32.

Connor, P. & Passel, J. S., (2019). "Europe's Unauthorized Immigrant Population Peaks in 2016, Then Levels Off". Pew Research Centre". Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/11/13/europes-unauthorized-immigrant-population-peaks-in-2016-then-levels-off/ (Accessed 29 December 2020)

Crawley, H., & Skleparis, D. (2018). "Refugees, Migrants, neither, both: Categorical Fetishism and the Politics of Bounding in Europe's 'Migration crisis". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(1): 48-64.

Creek, H. M., & Yoder, S. (2012). "With a Little Help from Our Feds: Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism". *Policy Studies Journal*, 40(4): 674-697.

Cuttitta, P. (2018). "Repoliticization through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean". *Geopolitics,* 23(3): 632-660.

Dekker, R., Emilson, H., Krieger, B. & Scholten, P. (2015). "A Local Dimension of Integration Policies? A Comparative Study of Berlin, Malmö, and Rotterdam", *International Migration Review*. 49: 633–58.

Dines, N., Montagna, N., & Vacchelli, E. (2018). "Beyond Crisis Talk: Interrogating Migration and Crises in Europe". *Sociology*. 52(3): 439-447.

Doukoure, O. & Oger, E. (2007). "The EC External Migration Policy: The Case of the MENA Countries." CARIM Research Reports 2007/06

European Commission. (2020). "New Pact on Migration and Asylum: Questions and Answers". Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_20_1707 (Accessed 7 November 2020).

Eurostat. (2017). "Asylum in the EU Member States". 16 March 2017. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7921609/3-16032017-BP-EN.pdf/e5fa98bb-5d9d-4297-9168-d07c67d1c9e1 (Accessed 24 September 2020).

Faist, T. (2019). Contested Externalisation: Responses to Global Inequalities. CMS 7, 45 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0158-y (Accessed 8 February 2021).

Fakhoury, T. (2019). "Multi-level Governance and Migration Politics in the Arab World: The Case of Syria's Displacement". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45(8): 1310-1326.

Fakhoury, T. (2020). "Refugee Return and Fragmented Governance in the Host State: Displaced Syrians in the face of Lebanon's Divided Politics". *Third World Quarterly.* 42:1: 1-19.

Fassin, D. (2011). "Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times". *Annual Review of Anthropology*. 40: 213–26.

Favilli, Chiara. (2018, September 14). European Union: Legal and Policy Framework of Migration Governance (Version v1). Zenodo. http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1418548

Foley, James. (2020, February 5). Refugee Protection United Kingdom Country Report (Version v.1). Zenodo. http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3638228.

Frank, D. (2014). "Changes in Migration Control During the Neoliberal Era: Surveillance and Border Control in Swedish Labour Immigration Policy". *Journal of Political Power.* 7 (3): 13–32.

Frelick, B., Kysel, I. M., & Podkul, J. (2016). "The Impact of Externalization of Migration Controls on the Rights of Asylum Seekers and Other." *Journal of Migration and Human Security.* 4 (4): 190-220.

Frontex. (2016). "Risk Analysis for 2016 Report", Available at: https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf (Accessed 24 September 2020).

Geddes, A. (2018). The Governance of Migration in Europe: Towards Fragmentation?. In Handbook of Migration and Globalisation. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Glick Schiller, N., & Salazar, N. B. (2013). "Regimes of Mobility Across the Globe". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 39(2): 183-200.

Gökalp Aras, N. E. (2020). "Migration Emergencies and Multi-Level Governance at the EU–Turkey Border", Civil Society Knowledge Centre". *Civil Society Review*. Vol.2(4). 72-91. Available at: https://civilsociety-centre.org/ar/paper/migration-emergencies-and-multi-level-governance-eu–turkey-border (Accessed 30 December 2020).

Gökalp Aras, N. E. (2021). "The EU's Externalisation Policy in the Field of Migration and Asylum: Turkey as a Case Study" Report (D6.2). Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond Project (#770564, Horizon2020) Working Paper Series, Available at https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/

Gökalp Aras, N. E., Papatzani, E., Şahin Mencütek, Z., Leivaditi, N., & Petracou, E. (2020). 2020. "Refugee Protection in and Beyond Europe Comparative Report", Horizon 2020 RESPOND Project (770564) Global Migration: Responses and Consequences Working Paper Series, https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-protection-in-europe-and-beyond-comparative-report (Accessed 29 December 2020).

Gökalp-Aras, N. E. & Şahin-Mencütek, Z. (2019). Border Management and Migration Controls Turkey- Country Report, Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond Project (#770564, Horizon2020) Report Series, available at https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/border-management-migration-controls-turkey-report (Accessed 8 January 2021).

Goodfellow, M. (2020). Hostile Environment: How Immigrants Became Scapegoats. Verso.

Grigorescu, A. (2020). The Ebb and Flow of Global Governance: Intergovernmentalism Versus Nongovernmentalism in World Politics. Cambridge University Press.

Grimmel, A., & S. Giang (eds.) (2017). *Solidarity in the EU A Fundamental Value in Crisis*. New York: Springer.

Guiraudon, V., & Joppke, C. (Eds.). (2001). Controlling a new migration world (Vol. 4). Psychology Press.

Hänsel, V., Hess, S. & Kasparek, B. (June 2019), Border Management and Migration Controls Germany Report, 2019/21

Hänsel, V., Hess, S., & Schurade, S. (December 2019). Refugee Protection: Germany Country Report, 2019/28

Hess, S. (2012). De-naturalising transit migration. "Theory and Methods of an Ethnographic Regime Analysis". *Population, Space and Place*. 18(4): 428-440.

Hirst, C. & Atto, N. (2018). Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance United Kingdom – Country Report. Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond Project (#770564, Horizon2020) Working Paper Series, available at: http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1248430/FULLTEXT01.pdf (Accessed 8 January 2021).

Holzinger, K. & Schimmelfennig, F. (2012). "Differentiated Integration in The European Union: Many Concepts, Sparse Theory, Few Data". *Journal of European Public Policy*. 19:2: 292-305.

Holzinger, K. & Tosun, J. (2019). "Why Differentiated Integration is such A Common Practice in Europe: A Rational Explanation". *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. Vol. 31(4): 642-659.

Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2001). "Types of Multi-Level Governance. European Integration online Papers". (EIoP), Vol. 5, No. 11, Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=302786 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.302786 (Accessed 30 December 2020).

Ibrido, R. & Terlizzi, A. (2019). Refugee Protection Regimes Italy Country Report. Available at: https://www.respondmigration.com/wp-blog/refugee-protection-regimes-italy-countryreport (Accessed 20 January 202).

Jessop, B. (1998). "The Rise of Governance and the Risks of Failure: The Case of Economic Development". *International Social Science Journal.* 50(155): 29-45.

Josipovic, I & Reeger, U. (2021). Conflicting Conceptualisations of Europeanisation Austria Country Report. Paper 2020/67, October 2020. Available at: https://respondmigration.com/wp-blog/conflicting-conceptualisations-of-europeanisation-austria-report (Accessed 22 January 2021).

Kainz, L., & Betts, A. (2020). "Power and Proliferation: Explaining the Fragmentation of Global Migration Governance". Migration Studies. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnaa015 (Accessed 8 February 2021).

Karamanidou, L., & Kasparek, B. (2020). Fundamental Rights, Accountability and Transparency in European Governance of Migration: The Case of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex. RESPOND Working Paper Series, Paper 2020/59. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/43748622/Fundamental_Rights_Accountability_and_Transparency_in_European_Governance_of_Migration_The_Case_of_the_European_Border_and_Coast_Guard_Agency_Frontex (Accessed 2 January 2021).

Karamanidou, L., Kasparek, B. & Hess, S. (2020). Border Management and Migration, Control in the European Union, RESPOND Working Paper Series, Paper 2018/14. Available at: https://www.academia.edu/42383285/Border_Management_and_Migration_Control_Comparative_Report (Accessed 29 December 2020).

Kok, K., & Veldkamp, T. (2011). Scale and governance: conceptual considerations and practical implications. Ecology and Society, 16(2).

Kovacheva, V. & Vogel, D. (2009). "The Size of the Irregular Foreign Resident Population in the European Union in 2002, 2005 and 2008: A Dynamic Aggregate Country Estimate." Working Paper No. 4/2009 from the Database on Irregular Migration. Hamburg. Institute of International Economics.

Ladrech, R. (1994). "Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France". *Journal of Common Market Studies*. No. 32/1: 69- 87.

Lavenex, S. (2006). "Shifting EU and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control". *West European Politics*. 29(2): 329-350.

Lavenex, S. (2015). "The External Face of Differentiated Integration: Third Country Participation in EU Sectoral Bodies". *Journal of European Public Policy*. 22(6): 836-853.

Lavenex, S. & Ucarer, E. (2002). *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration*. Lexington Books, Lanham, MD.

Lavenex, S. & Ucarer, E. (2004). "The external dimension of Europeanization", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 39(4): 417-443.

Leuffen, D, Rittberger, B & Schimmelfennig, F. (2013). *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Levi-Faur, D. (2012). From "Big Government" to "Big Governance"?. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286958228_From_Big_Government_to_Big_Governance (Accessed 8 February 2021).

Long, K. (2014). "Imagined Threats, Manufactured Crises and 'Real Emergencies". In *Crisis and Migration: Critical Perspectives*, Anna Lindley (ed.). Routledge, Oxon: 158-180.

Marks, G. (1993). "Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC." In The State of the European Community. Vol. 2, The Maastricht Debates and Beyond, edited by A. Cafruny and G. Rosenthal, 391–410. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Marks, G. (1996). "An Actor-Centred Approach to Multi-Level Governance." *Regional and Federal Studies*. 6 (2): 20–38.

Mesquita, B., Morrow, J. D., Siverson, R. M. & Smith, A. (1999). "Policy Failure and Political Survival: The Contribution of Political Institutions". *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 43: 147–161

Moffette, D., & Walters, W. (2018). "Flickering presence: Theorizing Race and Racism in the Governmentality of Borders and Migration". *Studies in Social Justice*. 12(1): 92-110.

Offe, C. (2009). Governance: An" empty signifier"?. Constellations, 16(4), 550.

Oliver, C., Dekker, R., Geuijen, K. et al. 2020. "Innovative strategies for the reception of asylum seekers and refugees in European cities: multi-level governance, multi-sector urban networks and local engagement" Comparative Migration Studies, 8, 30. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-020-00189-y

Olsen, J. (2002). "The Many Faces of Europeanization". *Journal of Common Market Studies.* 40 (5): 921–52.

Pallister-Wilkins, P. (2015). "The Humanitarian Politics of European Border Policing: Frontex and Border Police in Evros". *International Political Sociology.* 9(1): 53-69.

Panizzon, M. & Van Riemsdijk, M. (2019). "Introduction to Special Issue: Migration Governance in an Era of Large Movements: A Multi-level Approach', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 45:8: 1225-1241.

Pannia, P., Federico, V., Terlizzi, A. & S D'Amato, S. (2018). Comparative Report Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance. RESPOND Working Paper Series, Paper 2018/15.

Peters, B. G. (2015). "State Failure, Governance Failure and Policy Failure: Exploring the Linkages". *Public Policy and Administration.* 30(3-4): 261-276.

Peters, B. G., & Pierre, J. (2006). The three action levels of governance: Re-framing the policy process beyond the stages model. Handbook of public policy, 13-30.

Peutz, N., & De Genova, N. (2010). The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and the Freedom of Movement. Duke University Press

Piattoni, S. (2010). The Theory of Multi-Level Governance, Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Piper, N., & Grugel, J. (2015). Global migration governance, social movements and the difficulties of promoting migrant rights. Migration, precarity and global governance. Challenges for labour (preliminary title), 261-279.

Radaelli, C. M. (2003). "The Europeanization of Public Policy". In K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli, eds. *The Politics of Europeanization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 27-56.

Rahme, K. (2020, April 16). Reception Policies, Practices and Responses – Lebanon Country Report (Version v.1). Zenodo. http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3754066

Reslow, N., & Vink, M. (2015). "Three-level Games in EU External Migration Policy: Negotiating Mobility Partnerships in West Africa". *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 53(4): 857-874.

Rizcallah, C. (2019). "Facing the Refugee Challenge in Europe: A Litmus Test for the European Union". *European Journal of Migration and Law*. 21 (2): 238-260.

Şahin Mencütek, Z. (2018). *Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East,* Routledge, Global Cooperation Series.

Şahin Mencütek, Z. (2020). "Migration Narratives in Policy and Politics". Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/346946202_Migration_Narratives_in_Policy_and_Politics (Accessed 22 January 2021).

Şahin Mencütek, Z. (2021). Governing practices and strategic narratives for the Syrian refugee returns", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, early view, feaa121, https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feaa121

Sainsbury, D. (2006). "Immigrants' Social Rights in Comparative Perspective: Welfare Regimes, Forms in Immigration and Immigration Policy Regimes". *Journal of European Social Policy*. 16(3): 229-244.

Scheel, S., & Ratfisch, P. (2014). "Refugee Protection Meets Migration Management: UNHCR as a Global Police of Populations". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 40 (6): 924–41.

Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D.& Rittberger, B. (2015). "The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization and Differentiation". *Journal of European Public Policy*. 22(6): 764-782.

Scholten, P. W. (2013). "Agenda Dynamics and the Multi-Level Governance of Intractable Policy Controversies: The Case Of Migrant Integration Policies in The Netherlands". *Policy Sciences*, 46(3): 217-236.

Scholten, P. (2020) Mainstreaming versus Alienation: Conceptualising the Role of Complexity in Migration and Diversity Policymaking". *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.* 46(1): 108-126.

Scholten, P., & Penninx, R. (2016). "The Multilevel Governance of Migration and Integration". In *Integration Processes and Policies in Europe Springer*, Garces-Mascarenas, Blanca, Penninx, Rinus (eds.). Cham: 91-108.

Sert, D. Ş., & Danış, D. (2020). Framing Syrians in Turkey: State control and no crisis discourse. International Migration. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12753

Sikkink, K. (2005). "Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-outsider Coalition". In *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, edited by Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, New York: Rowman and Littlefield: 151–73.

Spencer, S. & Triandafyllidou, A. (2020). "Migrants with Irregular Status in Europe". IMISCOE Research Series and Springer Open, Available at: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-030-34324-8.pdf (Accessed 8 February 2021).

Szulecka, M. (2019). Border Management and Migration Controls in Poland Report. Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond Project (#770564, Horizon2020) Report Series, available at https://www.academia.edu/40245674/Border_Management_and_Migration_Controls_in_Poland (Accessed 8 January 2021).

Tazioli, M. (2019). "Refugees' Debit Cards, Subjectivities, and Data Circuits: Financial-Humanitarianism in the Greek Migration Laboratory." *International Political Sociology*. 13 (4): 392-408.

Torfing J, Peters, B. G., Pierre, J. & Sørensen, E. (2011). *Interactive Governance: Advancing the Paradigm.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Tortola, P. D. (2016). "Clarifying Multilevel Governance". *European Journal of Political Research*. 56(2): 234-250.

Triandafyllidou, A., & Dimitriadi, A. (2014). Deterrence and protection in the EU's migration policy. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 49(4), 146-162.

UN. (2018). Global Compact on Refugees. UN, New Tork, https://www.unhcr.org/5c658aed4.

UN. (2019). Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The General Document #A/RES/73/195. United Nations General Assembly. Last modified: January 11, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/195

Van Breugel, I., & Scholten, P. (2020). "Governance by Proxy: A Comparative Policy Analysis of the Mainstreaming of Immigrant Integration Governance". *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice*. 22(3): 207-225.

Vink, M. (2002). "What is Europeanization? and Other Questions on a New Research Agenda". Paper Presented at the Second YEN Research Meeting on Europeanization, University of Bocconi, Milan.

Warda, William K., Hamed S. A. al-Maffraji, Nahla Arif, Yohanna Y. Toma, & Ayad C. Joffrey. (2019, July 15). Iraq Border Management and Migration Control Regime (Version V1.0). Zenodo. http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3370250

Weiner, M. (1995). *The global migration crisis: challenge to states and to human rights*. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers.

Weiss, T. G., & Thakur, R. (2010). *Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey*. Indiana University Press.

Wiertz, T. (2020). "Biopolitics of Migration: An Assemblage Approach". *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space,* doi:10.1177/2399654420941854.