

RESPOND

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Conflicting Conceptualisations of Europeanisation

Germany Country Report

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About the project

RESPOND is a Horizon 2020 project that aims at studying the multilevel governance of migration in Europe and beyond. The consortium is formed of 14 partners from 11 source, transit and destination countries and is coordinated by Uppsala University in Sweden. The main aim of this Europe-wide project is to provide an in-depth understanding of the governance of recent mass migration at macro, meso and micro levels through cross-country comparative research and to critically analyse governance practices with the aim of enhancing the migration governance capacity and policy coherence of the European Union (EU), its Member States and third countries.

RESPOND will study migration governance through a narrative which is constructed along five thematic fields: (1) Border management and security, (2) Refugee protection regimes, (3) Reception policies, (4) Integration policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanisation. Each thematic field reflects a juncture in the migration journey of refugees and is designed to provide a holistic view of policies, their impact and the responses given by affected actors.

In order to better approach these themes, we divided our research into work packages (WPs). The present report is concerned with the findings related to WP6, which focuses specifically on processes of Europeanization in the light of mass migration.

Executive Summary

- **Goals of the report:** This report explores how recent processes of immigration have changed discourses about “Europe” in Germany. It aims at a) capturing conflicting Europeanisation in the German context and to aid theory-construction by adding to a comparative picture, b) developing a perspective on the role of media in domestic audience-making in this context and c) understanding how the above impacts on different professional audiences, including the stakeholders assembled within the RESPOND project.
- **Relevance of the German case:** The German case is of particular interest for (at least) five reasons: *First*, Germany has been a major destination country for refugees. Between 2011 and 2018, more than two million asylum applications were filed. *Second*, Germany has a unique position within the European Union, being the most populous country with the biggest national economy. *Third*, Germany is highly decentralised (e.g. in comparison to France), in political and economic terms as well as in terms of its media landscape. *Fourth*, having been a late nation state and having unleashed two World Wars, Germany is marked by a particular and twisted national consciousness. *Fifth*, and in a similar vein, unlike other European states, the emergence of a wider right-wing populist movement has been a recent phenomenon.
- **Methodology:** The report is based on discourse and content analytical approaches, which are applied to small corpora of significant political speeches and media articles. In order to assess the repercussion on stakeholders, a content analysis of stakeholder interviews was performed with emphasis on their perspectives on Europeanization.
- **Political Party Structure:** The large-scale immigration since 2011 has reinforced transformations within the party-political structure in Germany. The right-wing populist party “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) started as an anti-Euro party in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and then eagerly adopted the “refugee crisis” along with a cultivation of national, cultural and religious differences. In terms of boundary making and othering, the party has successfully framed “political Islam” as the counterpart to an “occidental” tradition of liberalism.
- **Media Structure:** As in many other countries, the pattern of media use in Germany has undergone significant transformation: In 1988 people spent on average 330 minutes on various media (including television and press), while in 2000 average media use had increased to 480 minutes per day. Younger generations in particular spend much less time on print media and more on audio-visual social media. Nevertheless, there are still roundabout 25 million printed newspapers produced for the German market each day. These include “Süddeutsche Zeitung” (SZ, 430.000 copies per day), “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ, 368.000), “Welt” (264.000), “Frankfurter Rundschau” (FR, 150.000) and “tageszeitung” (TAZ, 56.000).
- **Interpretations of external migration since 2011:** In political speeches and media reports alike, immigration was widely framed as a “refugee crisis”, particularly after 2015, although during the reporting period refugees have only accounted for a minority of all immigrants to Germany (mostly EU-internal labour migration). Along with earlier crises such as the “global financial crisis” in 2008, politicians and journalists interpreted the “refugee crisis” as yet another test of European functionality, thus purporting a strong utilitarian understanding of Europe. In line with earlier studies, national newspapers exhibited an overall pro-European consensus whereas anti-European and classical nationalist positions could rather be found in niche far-right periodicals.
- **Construction(s) of Europe:** When commentators referred to Europe, they usually meant the European Union as a polity. Three main discursive lines can be distinguished: The

programmatic approach emphasises the EU as a historical peace project, highlights the moral obligation for Germany after World War II and promotes an emphatic idea of European solidarity as far as the distribution of refugees is concerned. The *utilitarian* approach underlines the economic and political benefits of European collaboration. From this vantage point, a “fair” distribution of refugees based on the economic capacities of member states must be reached. The *technocratic* approach takes a logistic stance on the institutional mechanisms of European collaboration and integration, e.g. by promoting an evolutionary understanding of Europeanisation as a result of aggregated bilateral cooperation. In this perspective, any decision at the EU level for refugee distribution should take into account the diversity of national interests and trajectories among member states.

- **Europeanization and Euroscepticism:** Although many of the commentators and stakeholders have emphasised the shortcomings of the European Union in dealing with the “refugee crisis” (in particular the failure of the Dublin system), the mainstream public opinion clearly remains pro-European. Explicit Eurosceptic attitudes, in contrast, seem to fluctuate in *far-right counter publics*, be it classical (print or audio-visual) or social media. At the same time, there has been a new appreciation of intergovernmentalism through bi- and multilateral agreements for concrete problems (e.g. border protection), which is implicitly Eurosceptical in the sense that it challenges the capacity of the European Union for effective and sustainable problem solution. Even though Eurosceptic attitudes are not widespread, *instances of emphatic appreciation or positive identification were just as rare* across all communication channels.

Introduction

This report explores how recent processes of immigration have changed discourses about “Europe” in Germany. The research formed part of a country-comparative work package on “Conflicting Europeanisation” (WP6) within the framework of the H2020 research consortium RESPOND (2017-2020). As such, the report will follow various aims, namely a) to capture conflicting Europeanisation in the German context and to aid theory-construction by adding to a comparative picture, b) to assess the impact of post-2011 migration on opinion-formation and claims-making about Europe, c) to help develop a comparative account of the impact of these questions on domestic politics and audiences, d) to develop a perspective on the role of media in domestic audience-making in this context and e) to understand how the above impacts on different professional audiences, including the stakeholders assembled within the RESPOND project.

Within a country-comparative framework, several aspects make Germany a relevant and interesting case: First, Germany has been a major destination country for refugees: during the reporting period (2011-2018), more than two million asylum applications were filed. Second, Germany has a unique position within the European Union, being the most populous country with the biggest national economy. While Germany has been the biggest net-contributor to the European Union, it has also benefited greatly from the free European market given its export-oriented economy. Third, Germany is highly decentralised (e.g. in comparison to France), both in political and economic terms. Its federal structure and high degree of regionalization are also reflected in the media landscape and the patterns of public opinion. Fourth, having been a late nation state and having unleashed two World Wars, Germany is marked by a particular and twisted national consciousness, which a German comedian has brought to the formula: “We are proud not to be proud”.¹ Fifth, and in a similar vein, despite of occasional electoral successes of far-right parties, the emergence of a wider right-wing populist movement has been a recent phenomenon (e.g. unlike Austria, where the FPÖ has participated in government since the 1980s). Against this backdrop, it can be assumed that the mainstream of public awareness in Germany is marked by a pro-European discourse which rests on a specific mixture of guilt and benefit. As a consequence, the European Union, like certain family members, is considered as a given which is not called into question, but not loved very much either.

In the following, I will briefly elaborate on the methodology (section 2) and provide a cursory introduction to the party-political structure (section 3) as well as the media landscape in Germany (section 4). After that, I will address the three main foci of analysis, namely political speeches (section 5), print media (section 6) and stakeholder perceptions (section 7).

¹ The verse is part of the song “Be Deutsch!” by the German comedian Jan Böhmermann. The song (ironically?) applauds the new German virtues and emphasises the lessons learned from totalitarianism. It was presented as a direct response to the so-called “refugee crisis” in March 2016. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HMQkV5cTuoY> (Accessed 15.5.2020).

Methodology

In order to grasp the complexity of audience-making in highly dynamic mediascapes, different strategies of data collection and analysis were applied according to the three main research foci of the report:

Identifying political claims (slogans, tropes, metaphors): In this research focus, data came from speeches by major political actors (leading or serving in government, or official opposition leaders) containing explicit references to the future of the EU and developments in migration. Analytical tables were used to generate categories on diverging courses of Europeanisation in reaction to increased external migration. In the present case study, the significance of speeches was determined by their media coverage, i.e. all 21 speeches in the sample were somehow featured by bigger media houses.

Media audience-making: This data was derived from media articles of various kinds and genres (such as opinion pieces or editorial responses), in three leading national newspapers of different ideological colouring (TAZ, FAZ, WELT). Articles were retrieved from LexisNexis or other data bases (in case of FAZ) and selected, based on the co-occurrence of the themes “refugees” and “Europe” or “European Union”. They were coded with MaxQDA20 in the light of the political speech analysis (see above) and the heuristic distinction between “liberal” and “conservative Europeanisers”, which was underlying all work in WP6.

Stakeholder responses to politicisation: Finally, in order to assess and understand the role of political and media discourses for stakeholders and decision makers in the sphere of immigration, content analysis based on interviews with federal and local immigration professionals was performed. The original idea of this part of the work package was to circle back some of the insights of the speeches and media analysis to stakeholders in the field of migration in order to learn more about their perspective on immigration and Europeanisation and how it shapes their professional behaviour. Due to the pandemic in the first half of 2020, it was not possible to conduct face-to-face interviews or hold focus groups. Therefore, I decided to re-analyse the meso-level interviews for perceptions of Europeanisation. To this aim, a keyword search including “Europe” (and its derivatives), “Harmonisation”, “Integration”, “Populism”, “Brexit” and “AfD” was performed.

In conceptual terms, the analysis is rooted in a heuristic distinction between liberal Europeanisers and conservative Europeanisers. Liberal Europeanisers are pluralists who imagine Europe as an “open society” and aim to incorporate diversity in the European project. They favour an international humanitarian role for the EU. The European ideal is built around a discourse of human rights based on the liberal platform of respect for individual dignity. In relation to refugees, they will favour burden sharing, quotas and reallocation. In contrast, Conservative Europeanisers seek to defend Europe based on notions of a “clash of civilisations” between the Judeo-Christian West and its non-Western counterpart. The imagination of this external antagonist will vary according to national context, but is likely to reference religion, ethnicity or race. They imagine Europe as closed to the external world and favour non-intervention in external development and humanitarian aid. Strongly security-focused, they favour a “fortress Europe” with bright external boundaries and strong internal police enforcement. It is predominantly majoritarian and heteronormative, and opposed to diversity and minority interests. As a matter of fact, this distinction is not meant to offer an exhaustive typology of attitudes vis-à-vis Europeanisation under conditions of immigration, but as a heuristic tool to grasp changes in national discourses on Europeanisation in the light of what some perceived to be a “refugee crisis”.

Party-Political Structure: History and Developments since 2011

It is beyond the scope of this report to provide a comprehensive overview of the political system of Germany. Therefore, I will focus on some rather recent trends and developments of political mobilisation and their relation to processes of European integration.

For many decades, the German party system used to be dominated by two parties, namely the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Although smaller (programme) parties such as the Liberal Democrats (FDP) and later the Green Party (GRÜNE) made it into the federal and regional parliaments and sometimes gained governmental responsibility, it was only recently that a pluralisation or fragmentation of the party system could be witnessed. Whereas the German reunification in 1991 did not lead to any substantial short-term transformations of the party system, it led to the emergence of the left-wing “Party for Democratic Socialism” (PDS), which in 2007 allied with a faction of Social Democrats who had left the SPD in protest against a new “neoliberal” paradigm of social policy which the party had adopted in the early 2000s.

After the two major parties CDU and SPD had defined themselves as promoters of the European idea and institutions, including the European Monetary Union, the first party built on an anti-EU premise was the “Alternative for Germany” (AfD), which was founded in 2013. Starting out as an ordo-liberal movement, the AfD aimed at overcoming the Euro, which was considered a “failed experiment”, and sought to cut the EU back to the scope of the European Economic Community. Since its foundation, nationalist factions gained ground within the party, which led to the expulsion of its founding father Bernd Lucke and a strong “völkisch” turn aligned with xenophobic tropes and a strong anti-immigration campaign. While it was founded as a response to the Global Financial Crisis, the AfD participated strongly in the discursive production of the “refugee crisis”, particularly after the German chancellor Merkel had agreed to accept high numbers of refugees from Syria in 2015.

In spite of a generally positive opinion climate vis-à-vis Europe or the European Union (Medrano 2010, 251), sceptical tropes in Germany have mainly circled around overregulation and bureaucratisation as well as concern about the stability of the Euro, often aligned with a nostalgic longing for the Deutsche Mark as a symbol and fetish of the old Federal Republic of Germany (Risse 2003). As a matter of fact, there were xenophobic attitudes and mobilisation long before the formation of the AfD, which culminated in a series of arson attacks on accommodation centres for immigrants (e.g. in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, Mölln and Solingen in the early 1990s). While politicians made use of these events to restrict the asylum law in order to address the “concerns” of the people, they also received an extensive media coverage and kicked off numerous intercultural and reconciliation initiatives, a number of which are still active. However, the AfD was the first political party which managed to reach out to a broader conservative electorate based on an anti-immigration and (at its core) anti-European programme.

On the positive side, dominant ideas of Europe in mainstream politics and the general public have included Europe as a project of peace and economic prosperity: First, after the World Wars of the previous century, Europeanisation has widely been affirmed as a crucial process of peace building, which was also an important rationale for the inclusion of many Eastern European states. Second, a major source of legitimacy of the European Union in Germany is

its capacity to facilitate the exchange of goods and people, which is supposed to work in favour of the export-oriented German economy.

Both narratives have been contested by right-wing populist parties and movements. An important trope to challenge the narrative of economic prosperity has of course been the myth of Germany as a net contributor within the EU that does not gain sufficient revenue to compensate for its excessive monetary contributions. Another trope to challenge the narrative of the peace project was the idea of a Europe of the nation states (“Europa der Vaterländer”). This concept, which can be traced back to Charles de Gaulle, is now promoted by several right-wing parties throughout Europe and basically advocates an intergovernmental rather than a supranational understanding of the EU and its institutions. In contrast, an important source of resilience against the erosion of pro-European attitudes has been the acknowledgement of Germany’s “historical guilt” (mainly in relation to World War II) and the responsibilities that come with it. In this sense, the discourse on Europeanisation is also connected to discourses on memory and the socio-political culture it breeds.

All in all, the large-scale immigration since 2011 has reinforced but not initiated transformations within the party-political structure in Germany. The AfD started as an anti-Euro party in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and then eagerly adopted the “refugee crisis” along with a cultivation of national, cultural and religious differences in its politics. In terms of delineating boundaries and othering, the party has successfully framed “political Islam” as the counterpart to an “occidental” tradition of liberalism. At the same time, and in response to a shift of the Christian Democrats to the centre, it has become a reservoir of disappointed conservatives of various persuasions, including an ordo-liberal as well as a “völkisch” nationalist faction. Along with its electoral successes (almost 13 percent in the national parliament (Bundestag) and becoming the second-strongest party in some East German Landtage (state parliaments), the AfD has managed to exert pressure on other parties (in particular Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats) and to affect their agenda of migration politics. This ascent was accompanied by an internal crisis of the Social Democrats (including several changes of leadership) and a major uprising of the Green Party, which positioned itself as the new social-liberal option. As a matter of fact, these reconfigurations of the German party system also resonated with the media structure, which I will elaborate on in the following section.

Media Structure and the Question of Europeanisation

It is also beyond the scope of this report to provide a comprehensive account of the German media structure past and present. Instead, I will briefly outline some of the most important structural features, elaborate on recent changes in media use and their implications for political mobilisation, and finally review an empirical study on the role of major German print media in the construction of public awareness for Europeanisation.

In a classical take on the role of mass media within the political system of Germany, Glaab (2004: 3) has distinguished three decisive trends of structural change, namely a) the development of the dual broadcasting system since 1984, b) processes of press concentration since 1990 and c) the expansion of new media. After the end of World War II, the Western allies advocated a public broadcasting system similar to the BBC. Mirroring the federalist scope of Germany, until the 1980s radio and television broadcast was in the hands of regional public service broadcasters, which self-organised in two national consortia (ARD and ZDF). Since 1984, private broadcasting companies are admitted, which gave rise to debates on economisation and a fragmentation of audiences (ibid: 4). With regard to print media, significant processes of press concentration have occurred after the German reunification, particularly in the “new” Länder. Due to economic pressures, local and regional newspapers had to give up or merge, which resulted in extensive print media monopolies on the territory of the former GDR (ibid: 6). Finally, the expansion of new media has brought about massive challenges for classical mass media such as newspapers and television and blurs the lines between providers and users of political communication (ibid: 7).

According to the Federal Agency for Civic Education (*Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*), three types of newspapers can be distinguished in Germany, namely local and regional subscription newspapers, national newspapers and street sale newspapers. Whereas the first type is most commonly reflecting the federal structure of the country, national newspapers are less important and only have a market share of 7 percent. Street sale newspapers, first and foremost the tabloid “Bild”, reach a market share of about 20%.²

As in many other countries, the pattern of media use in Germany has undergone significant transformation. In 1988 people spent on average 330 minutes on various media (including television and press), while in 2000 average media use had increased to 480 minutes per day. Younger generations in particular spend much less time on print media and more on audio-visual social media.³ Nevertheless, there are still roundabout 25 million printed newspapers being produced for the German market each day and political talk shows often invite journalists of the leading newspapers. These include “Süddeutsche Zeitung” (430.000 copies per day), “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (368.000), “Welt” (264.000), “Frankfurter Rundschau” (150.000) and “tageszeitung” (56.000). These newspapers represent the spectrum of political opinions: The “Welt” is conservative and has an older readership, the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” is conservative-liberal whereas “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and “Frankfurter Rundschau”

² <https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-verhaeltnisse-eine-sozialkunde/139158/struktur-und-organisation> (Accessed 25.5.2020).

³ <https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/deutsche-verhaeltnisse-eine-sozialkunde/139157/verbreitung-und-nutzung> (Accessed 25.05.2020).

are left-liberal. Finally, the “tageszeitung” is widely understood to be alternative and critical. It is organised as a cooperative and belongs to its readers.⁴

How do these newspapers differ with regard to their stance on Europe? An older comparative study analysed the “degree of Europeanisation” and “support for Europe” in leading German print media. Based on a content analysis of 8.946 commentaries in the above-mentioned newspapers between 1994 and 1998, the authors investigated the themes, positions, actors and evaluations in relation to Europe (Eilders and Voltmer 2003: 257-258). They concluded that the media attention for Europe was “marginal” in the light of the growing significance of European decisions, and it was limited to the connection between European and domestic issues. This means “Europe is mostly seen from a national angle” (ibid: 267). Despite the generally low interest in European themes, the study discovered “a high degree of support for European integration [...] beyond the usual conflict lines of the political-ideological left-right-wing scheme”. The authors suggest that the discrepancy between a positive attitude towards Europeanisation and negative evaluations of the actual results of European politicians and institutions point to a role of German media as “loyal opposition” vis-à-vis Europe (Eilders and Voltmer 2003: 267).

Although the study is based on older material, the basic observations of a pro-European take of established media as well as of a predominantly national take on European themes still hold. Since Eurosceptic lines are hard to be found in leading newspapers, the AfD has sought to stylise the “mainstream media” as agents of the “old parties” which undermine the freedom of speech by purporting hegemonic political doctrines. In turn, the AfD sympathisers relied on “alternative” media such as “Russia Today”, the ultra-right weekly newspaper “Junge Freiheit” (29.500 copies per week) and the monthly right-wing populist magazine “Compact” (around 40.000 copies per month). Furthermore, the AfD and other right-wing movements such as PEGIDA (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West”) have extensively used social media as channels for mobilisation and agitation. As an analysis of more than nine million social media entries in relation to the election for European Parliament in 2019 showed, 47% of the discussions had a thematic connection to the AfD or right-wing topics whereas only 23% of the contributions were related to all the other parties of the Bundestag and their topics.⁵

It is important to note that the high share of social media contributions with relation to the AfD also includes critical stances. Nevertheless, it indicates that right-wing populist movements have been successful in setting the discursive agenda through social media, which partly resulted in a political competition of restricting immigration among the more conservative parties (CDU, FDP, AfD). Likewise, the electoral success of the AfD triggered debates on media ethics about proper coverage in established media. While some argued that right-wing populists would abuse the public forum offered to them by political talk shows for provocation and agitation, others held that a public debate was necessary in order to disenchant their lack of a political programme. Since the rise of right-wing populism was closely associated with the scandalisation of immigration, I will use the following section to address some of the most prevalent themes in the German asylum and immigration discourse between 2011 and 2018.

⁴ <https://www.deutschland.de/de/topic/kultur/kommunikation-medien/die-zeitungen-im-medienland-deutschland> (Accessed 25.5.2020).

⁵ <https://www.deutschlandfunknova.de/beitrag/social-media-analyse-rechts-dominiert> Accessed 25.5.2020).

Headlines and Events Impacting the Asylum/Migration Discourse since 2011

Historically, several strands of discourse on immigration can be distinguished in Germany, some of which are closely connected to a particular migratory movement. First, the country experienced considerable interior migration after World War II when many German citizens from the former German territories in the East had to find a new home in one of the two new German states. Although the immigration of these expellees (“Heimatvertriebene”) was not problematised as their German origin could not be denied, animosities between the local population and the newcomers were frequent. The second discourse evolved around the so-called “guest workers”, i.e., labour migrants from Southern Europe, Turkey, and North Africa that helped to rebuild the German economy in the 1960s. While these immigrants were welcome as a source of external human capital in times of economic flourishing, the very term “guest” points to the transitory nature of their stay and an asymmetric code of conduct in which the “guest” is supposed to abide by the norms and rules of the “host”. A third strand of discourse was associated with the “Boat people”, i.e. refugees who had fled the Vietnam War in the 1970s. Despite the relatively low overall numbers, the sea rescue of refugees from Southern Vietnam created a broad public awareness and acceptance of humanitarian immigration. As such, it produced at least two tropes, which are also widespread in recent debates, namely the polemic trope of sea rescue as assistance for human trafficking and the critical trope of politically opportune refugees (in this case victims of Communist violence).⁶

All in all, post-war Germany can be characterised as a reluctant immigration country considering the divide between high numbers of immigrants and the lack of a coherent immigration and integration strategy. Whereas most of the immigrants used to be labour migrants (even in 2015, three out of five immigrants to Germany had come from EU countries in the course of the free movement of workers), public discourses on immigration since 2011 have largely concentrated on refugees. As a matter of fact, the prevalence of human capital-based rationales in actual debates could reflect the discursive history of labour migration. It has for instance been an important argument in favour of accepting refugees that they could compensate for the skills shortage (“Fachkräftemangel”) in many branches of the German economy. Likewise, immigrants were discovered as a cure for the demographic challenges of rural areas. Although human capital-based arguments may have the capacity to enhance the public acceptance of immigration, they are inherently utilitarian and tend to fade out the humanitarian background of refugee protection. Where the humanitarian dimensions of refugee migration are acknowledged, they sometimes translate into paternalistic and infantilising notions of refugees as notoriously needy.

As far as the more recent media coverage of the discourse on asylum and migration is concerned, Lexisnexis points to a sudden and massive increase of media attention in the second half of 2015 and a consolidation on higher levels after 2016. In substantial terms, the

⁶ A *fourth* strand of discourse is connected to the immigration of late repatriates (“Spätaussiedler”), mainly after the end of the Soviet Republic in 1991. Since 1990, more than 2.1 million repatriates have immigrated and become naturalised based on their German descent, which underlines the persistence of the *ius sanguinis* as a prerequisite for citizenship in Germany.

media coverage within the reporting period can broadly be distinguished along three lines, namely a) political measures, b) critical incidents and c) wider themes.

Media reports on political and legislative measures have included a critical coverage of European endeavours, mainly the EU-Turkey Deal, and the collaboration with authoritarian regimes in order to prevent refugees from crossing EU borders. In both cases, there was a broad consensus that these measures would put Europe into a position of weakness and dependence vis-à-vis doubtful partners. Some commentaries suggested that making common course with states which systematically violated human rights would compromise the moral integrity of the European Union. National legislative initiatives such as the Asylum Packages (2016) and immigration policy discussions such as the introduction of an annual ceiling (Obergrenze) for asylum seekers were covered as well. While media platforms were rather unanimous in their criticism of European measures, ideological differences were more salient in domestic discussions. That is, conservative media tended to embrace (or at least tacitly accept) the restrictive turn in reception policy whereas left-liberal commentaries heavily criticised it as a symbolic and populist policy of deterrence.

Another focus of media interest were critical incidents, most prominently of course the so-called “border opening” on 4th September 2015, which marked the symbolic climax of an unprecedented migratory movement. While conservative voices questioned the legality of admitting refugees from “secure” countries of origin to the German territory, commentaries from the liberal left applauded it as a humanitarian gesture. Furthermore, two critical incidents have become iconic for the scandalisation of refugees, i.e., the sexual assaults by immigrants during New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne and the terrorist attack on a Christmas market in Berlin in 2016. These incidents and their extensive media coverage contributed to a collective labelling of refugees as criminals and gave rise to a social media industry of mapping their criminal offences. At the same time, the death of Aylan Kurdi appropriated a personal image to the otherwise abstract “wave” of refugees, and led to a wave of public awareness and empathy. In a similar vein, the encounter of Angela Merkel with the “refugee girl Reem” was extensively reported. During a live debate, the 15-year-old Reem Sahwil asked Merkel if there was any way to improve the insecure residential status of her family. When Merkel replied that these decisions took their time and some refugees had to go back, the girl burst into tears. The episode illustrated the gap between personal fates and the “cold” mechanisms of asylum bureaucracy.

Finally, media debates dealt with some of the wider themes related to the reception and integration of refugees. In 2015, several media reports dealt with alleged interreligious conflicts at refugee accommodation centres, including riots after the desecration of a Quran and assaults by Muslim refugees and security personnel towards Christian and Yezidi asylum seekers. These accounts led to a political debate on the spatial separation of refugees based on their religious backgrounds (Nagel and Rückamp 2019). Another major theme was civic mobilisation. While many national and regional newspapers in late 2015 and early 2016 reported extensively on refugee assistance initiatives, terroristic assaults on refugee accommodation centres were also increasingly reported and brought to public attention. Last but not least, personal portraits of refugees came up as a new sub-genre, which sought to draw a nuanced personalised image of either the journey or the experiences of refugees in Germany. On a European scale, a recurrent theme was the fair distribution of refugees across the EU as a proxy for (the lack of) European solidarity. Since this theme was prominent both

in political speeches and media reports, I will elaborate on it in more detail in the following sections.

Political Speeches

In this section, I will present results from the analysis of 20 significant speeches on immigration and Europeanisation between 2011 and 2018. These speeches were delivered by politicians in different functions (Prime Minister, Chancellor, Minister, spokesperson of opposition party) and through various channels (parliamentary speech, television address). The main criterion to select a speech as significant was that it had received wider media attention. In the following, I will summarise and classify some of the main themes and tropes regarding a) the supranational and national polity, b) key actors and their role in the “refugee crisis” and c) propositions related to migration, e.g. diagnoses and prognoses of the situation.

With regard to the European polity, three main tropes were prevalent in the speeches: first, a value-based understanding of a “European Model”, which is built on human rights, the power of law, checks and balances, representative democracy, social stability and ecological sustainability. In a similar vein, many politicians agreed that the current crisis put universal civil rights as the founding myth of the European Union at stake, but also emphasised its “finite capacities” and the necessity to balance the protection of refugees and boundaries. Second, there was a more pragmatic notion of the role or function of Europe vis-à-vis global crises. In a nutshell, this trope suggested that the EU has always been a solution to particular problems and respectively crises have been the very “engine” of European integration.⁷ From this vantage point, the current “refugee crisis” can be framed as a “test” for the function of the EU and its institutions.

As far as the German polity is concerned, there was a strong tendency to celebrate the strength and capability of the German nation and the German “welcome culture”, which had not only helped to preserve the good international image of the country, but even “saved Europe’s honour”. In contrast, there was widespread acknowledgement of the “limits” of support of Europe in general and Germany in particular. Here, I found a characteristic party-political divide: Whereas Social Democrats tended to emphasise the German “responsibility” within Europe resulting from its economic capacity and its unique dependence on the European Union, some proponents of the Christian Socialist Party (CSU) made common cause with the AfD in calling for a suspension of the Schengen agreement if the EU was not capable of protecting its borders.

With regard to the key actors of the “refugee crisis”, the most important objects of the speeches turned out to be refugees and citizens. In relation to refugees, different tropes were evoked in the speeches, which were partly associated with political ideologies. First, there was a broad consensus that refugees were vulnerable and in need of protection. In a similar vein, it was widely acknowledged that asylum seekers must not be treated as beggars, but are bearers of rights. Another strand of discourse was concerned with the capacities of refugees. While some speakers stressed the agency and entrepreneurship of refugees, others underlined that they should embrace the German “Leitkultur” or (in case of the AfD) were doubtful if refugees could maintain themselves at all and envisaged them as a threat to public security. Finally, mirroring discussions of fair distribution, refugees were mentioned as objects of disposition and a cause of disagreement throughout Europe. As far as citizens were addressed as objects of political

⁷ In this section, I use the terms “Europe” and “European Union” interchangeably as many speeches do not semantically distinguish between the “European model” in a wider sense and the European Union as an entity.

speeches, concerns prevailed across traditional political lines that residents in need might feel disadvantaged vis-à-vis refugees and hence be prone to xenophobic agitation.

As far as the audiences of the speeches are concerned, the key actors are much more diverse. Citizens in general were called upon to accept humanitarian policy, to support those in need and to resist xenophobic mobilisation. Other important addressees were politicians. While speakers across political camps encouraged politicians of all levels to be courageous and make quick decisions, speakers from the opposition, in particular, called upon the government to quit its symbolic politics of deterrence and start to fight the causes for mass migration or to stop the delivery of arms to the crisis areas. Other subjects were enterprises (which should be aware of their responsibility), the media (which were encouraged to report on the German “welcome culture”) or other EU member states (which were urged to share responsibility and the costs of the “refugee crisis”).

With regard to the basic propositions related to migration, the speeches exhibited a variety of diagnoses. It was widely acknowledged (in the conservative camp) that the “refugee crisis” constituted a historical challenge like the global financial crisis, natural disasters, Fukushima and, notably, the German Reunification. As a consequence, some conservative speakers pointed to the failure of the European Union in response to the current crisis, which in their view nourished sentiments of insecurity among the population. Other speakers extended their diagnosis to a comparison between political systems such as an alleged “systemic conflict” between Russian or US-American Machiavellianism and European liberalism. Yet other diagnoses explored the reasons of the migratory movements on an international scale (including harmful political and economic interventions by “the West” in the countries of origin and the collaboration with “doubtful” third states (left-wing) as well as the failure of the EU to protect its borders (right-wing)) or sought to identify national conditions of the current crisis (e.g. the lack of collaboration and policy coherence within Germany).

Based on these diagnoses, the speakers arrived at different prognoses and political claims: On the international level, the European Union and its member states were urged to collaborate with third states to fight reasons of forced migration, to support states with a high “burden” of refugees such as Lebanon, and to facilitate repatriation. Furthermore, some speakers called upon the European Union to collaborate with Russia in order to solve the crisis in Syria. On the supranational level, many speakers of different political camps requested a joint European migration policy that ensured that refugees could claim their rights based on comparable standards, that member states provided the same degree of protection and support for refugees and that there was a fair pattern of distribution or compensation. On the national level, important claims included a harmonisation of refugee reception measures throughout the German Länder and the early integration of refugees into the labour market. Mirroring European debates, some speakers (mainly from the liberal left) argued that Germany needed a coherent immigration law whereas right-wing politicians called for a restriction of asylum and consequent repatriation. In the following section, I will analyse how these themes and tropes resonated with wider media coverage.

Circulation of Narratives in the Mainstream Media

In this section, I will present insights from an exemplary analysis of the media coverage on immigration and Europeanisation. Since a full analysis of all relevant media items in the reporting period was not possible in the scope of the work package, I drew a sample of 60 articles. The sample covers three newspapers that represent a wide range of the ideological spectrum as pointed out above, i.e. “Die Welt” (conservative), “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (conservative liberal) and “tageszeitung” (left-wing). It is important to recall, however, that national subscription newspapers only account for a small market share in Germany and that far-right positions are usually not covered (see above). For the media analysis, I selected articles with a minimum of 500 words based on a keyword search on LexisNexis combining the keywords “refugee” and “Europe”. All articles were coded with MaxQDA18 based on the guiding distinction between Liberal and Conservative Europeanisers on which the work package is based. Since only one fifth of all 207 codes could be unequivocally subsumed under one of these categories, other important themes were added based on inductive categorisation. In the following, I will start with the distinction between Liberal and Conservative Europeanisers and then elaborate on some of the other categories.

One of the most prevalent positions of Conservative Europeanisers was a perception of “moralism” in political debates on immigration, which would come along with “prohibitions on thinking” (“Denkverbote”). The basic idea was that the whole discussion about refugees had a normative undercurrent, which would assume unlimited reception as the only moral option and did not tolerate alternative solutions such as an annual ceiling to the number of refugees. As main carriers of this position, commentators identified NGOs and narrow-minded (social) scientists. One author characterised the role of NGOs as follows: “NGOs struggle to accept the contraction between the ideal and what is possible in this imperfect world. They are moral fundamentalists” (Welt, 19.6.2018, translation and emphasis by author). NGOs, as an emblem for all well-intentioned activists, are envisaged as unable to deal with the demands of “Realpolitik”. In another opinion piece on “critical migration studies”, the author identified scholars to be caught “in self-righteous zeal” and concluded that “the healthy impact of engaged science was under threat of being reversed if it overlooks complex relationships, delivers bogus arguments and presents utopian claims as ‘science’” (FAZ, 1.6.2016). These commentaries are linked to wider debates about “concerned citizens” whose “justified preoccupations” must be taken into account in order to prevent them from sympathising with right-wing populism. From this vantage point, it seems necessary that the “the left-liberal bourgeoisie overcomes its moral self-exaltation (in order to) counter populism” (FAZ 24.11.2016).

At the same time, several subcategories could be attributed to Liberal Europeanisers. These included a criticism of the European politics of deterrence in the course of the EU-Turkey Statement, which turns the journey of immigrants into a “lottery game” (TAZ, 7.4.2016). In a similar vein, the collaboration of the EU with authoritarian third states was heavily criticised as an expression of “EU hypocrisy”: “Of course, the Europeans know how embarrassing and despicable all this is. Otherwise, the professional European cynics (“Europäische Berufszyniker”), such as EU politicians and administrators, would not seek to prevent their newest proposals from becoming public” (TAZ, 15.4.2016). Another branch of contributions addressed the problems of refugee reception and increasing xenophobia in a wider social and economic context. In a guest commentary, a spokesperson of the Left Party (Linke) held that xenophobia was mainly a result of a competition within the deprived strata of society, including

immigrants, due to “neoliberal audacities” in the domain of social policy (TAZ, 23.1.2015). Other authors emphasised the prosperous shape of the German economy noting that “migration plainly is the life insurance for overaged Western societies [...]. We are not poor at all and sensible integration is certainly less expensive than silly deportation facilities, overburdened justice or an inflated border guard” (TAZ, 23.6.2018). Much in contrast to the previous narrative, this perspective quite clearly evokes a logic of cost and benefit and ties in with the human capital strand of the immigration discourse mentioned earlier.

One of the most important topics across political camps was the “fair” or the distribution of “burden” of refugees between EU countries with “solidarity”. However, the focus of these debates shifted during the reporting period from the front states in the earlier phases (2011-2015) to Germany and Sweden (2015-2016) to the front states after the EU-Turkey Statement (2016-2018). While most commentators agreed that the Dublin system had failed in practice (as it was not implemented) and in theory (as it would lead to a concentration of refugees in the front states), conservative and left-liberal authors tended to emphasise diverse aspects of the problem. Many reports in conservative newspapers compared the German efforts with the failure or lack of political will in other European countries. From this vantage point, the main goal of a new distribution mechanism would be to relieve states such as Germany, Austria and Sweden (Welt, 14.5.2015). At the same time, reports from the liberal left media adopted a more evident supranational European tone, e.g. pointing at the relatively small overall numbers of refugees in Europe (TAZ, 28.5.2015) and promoting support for the front states. All in all, both conservative and liberal-left commentators endorsed the European endeavours to create a binding “solidarity mechanism”, and harshly criticised those countries that voiced objections (TAZ, 29.5.2015; FAZ, 19.11.2016).

Another important issue was the protection and closing of Europe’s external and internal borders. In this regard, the media coverage differed quite substantially between the political camps. The conservative newspapers in the sample reflected extensively on attempts to “protect” or “effectively secure” the external borders of the EU (FAZ, 24.5.2014) and tended to embrace various measures to achieve this goal (e.g. EUROSUR border monitoring and strengthening Frontex). Critical reflections on matters of border protection were very rare. Some commentators even endorsed the resistance of Visegrad states. They argued that a common distribution mechanism would compromise the ability of these states to govern their domestic borders, and hence offended their national sovereignty (Welt, 16.12.2017). In contrast, commentators from the liberal left had from the start adopted a critical stance towards the closure of European borders in general and the militarisation of border protection as well as the securitisation of the migration discourse in particular (TAZ, 28.11.2013). In line with the narrative of EU hypocrisy mentioned above, most left-wing authors criticised the European bigotry between empty claims of open-heartedness and the empowerment of Frontex as the “centrepiece of a completely failed policy” (TAZ, 7.10.2013). On a wider scale, the limitation of free movement within and across the EU was diagnosed to put the European idea as a whole at risk (TAZ, 7.6.2016).

Altogether, the media analysis partly confirms findings from earlier studies, namely that there is a general pro-European consensus in German national newspapers, regardless of their main political camp. Almost all reports embraced the idea of Europeanisation, e.g. in the form of an obligatory mechanism of refugee distribution, whereas nationalist positions clearly remained exceptions. Despite this relative unanimity, however, some characteristic differences showed up as well: Positions, which can be attributed to *Conservative*

Europeanisers, included first the closure and protection of European external borders through better monitoring and control, second the protection of Germany from being “overloaded” with refugees after a European “burden distribution” (“Lastenverteilung”), and third an ideologically critical perspective towards the alleged “moralism” of the left-wing immigration discourse. They also [...] took a critical stance towards the inability of NGOs and Critical Migration Studies to acknowledge the demands of “Realpolitik”. Positions which can be attributed to *Liberal Europeanisers* included first a critical stance on the securitisation of immigration in general and the militarisation of border protection in particular, second an emphasis on the mismatch between what Europe could do in order to support refugees and what it was actually doing, aligned with notes of support for the front states such as Italy and Greece, and third general criticism of what was perceived as European hypocrisy, e.g. when it comes to the collaboration with authoritarian third states.

Responses of Project Stakeholders

As a matter of fact, discourses on immigration and Europeanisation are mainly being translated into social practice by administrators that are in charge of implementing measures concerning border protection, the protection and reception of asylum seekers as well as the integration of refugees. The original idea of this part of the work package was to circle back some of the insights of the speeches and media analysis to stakeholders active in the field of migration in order to learn more about their perspectives on immigration and Europeanisation and how their perspectives shape their professional behaviour. Due to the covid-19 pandemic in the first half of 2020, it was not possible to conduct face-to-face interviews or focus groups. Therefore, I decided to re-analyse the meso-level interviews for perceptions of Europeanisation. To this aim, I performed a keyword search including “Europe” (and its derivatives), “Harmonisation”, “Integration”, “Populism”, “Brexit” and “AfD”. In the following, I will present the main results along three major lines, namely first immigration and nationalism, second Dublin and the crisis of European multilateralism and third the “utility” of acting European.

Many stakeholders (mainly at the federal level) have addressed the nexus between immigration, Eurosceptic attitudes, nationalism and right-wing populism. One important line of thought was that the attribution of the current “refugee crisis” as a failure or shortcoming of the EU would play into the hands of right-wing populist movements all across Europe. One representative from the German Chancellery pointed out that the “collapse” of the German reception system was “put to political use” by “Orban and these people”. Another interviewee from the Federal Ministry of the Interior Affairs referred to nationalist mobilisation in Italy, and explained how right-wing populist parties such as Salvini’s Lega Nord sought to reframe European measures such as the rejection of the Italian budget by the EU-Commission, as detrimental interventions affecting “ordinary people”. Yet, he concluded that “there is no alternative to Europe, and this is why it must go on. But if necessary, it may boil down to a coalition of the willing”. The same interviewee emphasised the necessity “to shape globalisation in our interest” and pointed out how the German experience with migration might have played a role in the Brexit decision.

Other stakeholders have dealt with the balance of national sovereignty vis-à-vis European attempts of harmonisation. One interviewee identified “multiple frontlines” within the European Union, and distinguished “Central Europe”, “Southern Europe” and the “Visegrad States” as the most important factions. He emphasised the “blunt resistance” of the Visegrad States against taking in refugees, and assumed that from the perspective of these states admitting refugees to European territory would work as a “pull-factor” and the humanitarian obligations of the EU could as well be realised in third states closer to the countries of origin. Another interviewee at the German Chancellery seconded that “we can see a clear positioning against refugees by Eastern Europe, that is, the Visegrad States. [...] This has not happened earlier except from small far-right circles”. He offered a historical explanation: “The Eastern Europeans are in a situation that they have won their own sovereignty 20 years ago for the first time! Hence, we must understand that their historical legacy precludes them from surrendering their sovereignty any time soon”. This trope, which was also prevalent in the media debate, is based on the rationale that young nation states, such as the Visegrad States, are more sensitive to violations of their national sovereignty.

In a similar vein, but on a more practical level, several stakeholders have referred to the failure of the Dublin system and the crisis of European multilateralism. There was a widespread consensus among stakeholders from various levels and sectors that the Dublin system has failed. A local integration officer stated the following. “The Dublin procedure has never worked well and it certainly has not improved. [...] From my perspective, it should be abolished. It is foredoomed to fail”. A spokesperson of a regional reception authority problematised Dublin in a wider context of European integration as follows. “The whole Dublin system must be called into question. If I dare to assess the overall political situation, I do not see any solutions on the table right now, so it may probably be up to the generation after us to *reassemble* (“zusammenfügen”) Europe in a new way”. However, this interview partner also interpreted the failure of the Dublin system as a symptom of a comprehensive European crisis while remaining hopeful for a future European framework.

Other stakeholders pondered on ways to reconcile multilateralism, intergovernmentalism and national sovereignty. With respect to border protection and police cooperation, one interviewee from the Federal Ministry of the Interior Affairs articulated the idea that bilateral and multilateral collaborations may potentially evolve into European legal instruments. In contrast, another interviewee from the same ministry underlined the benefits of a supranational top-down rationale. He indicated that despite certain frustrations with the European handling of the “refugee crisis”, stakeholders embraced the idea of Europeanisation and seek to find a practical balance between national or regional responsibilities and formal competences, on the one hand, and the need for European coordination and integration, on the other.

Finally, several stakeholders have taken a more utilitarian or instrumental perspective towards Europeanisation. Some of them emphasised the higher effectiveness of European collective action on a global scale. An interviewee at the Federal Ministry of the Interior Affairs, responsible for repatriation, for example, held that “the European Union as a political actor has a completely different bargaining position” vis-à-vis third states. Hence, “we as Europeans should not let ourselves appear divided in front of other states”. Another interviewee at the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, responsible for voluntary return measures, also highlighted the utility of European collaboration “in repatriation business”, e.g. when it comes to sharing the costs of return flights.

Apart from these concrete examples of the benefits of collective action, a number of stakeholders associated the value or utility of the European Union with its problem-solving capacity. This idea resonates strongly with a narrative in political speeches according to which the alleged inability of the EU to solve actual problems would compromise its political legitimacy as I discussed above. The strong focus on output-legitimacy goes along with blurring of political lines, as an employee of a local welfare association argued as follow. “For me, the whole talk about left and right is all fiddlesticks (“Quatsch”) and not helpful for refugees, so we have to go beyond this sort of political thinking”. As a consequence, she claims that people working in refugee aid should “get rid of their ideological blockades” and acknowledge that, in effect, refugees would benefit most from the “economic lobby”. All in all, the responses from project stakeholders indicate that administrators in the field of refugee protection and reception reflect on the European dimension of their work and evaluate the process of Europeanization in light of its capacity to solve national problems.

Conclusion

The aim of this report was to analyse discursive changes as to how refugee immigration after 2011 has affected the public opinion about Europe and Europeanisation in Germany. To this aim, the report combined three avenues of empirical research in what might be called a triangulation of perspectives (Flick 1992). First, I explored narratives and tropes of Europe in political speeches following a hermeneutical approach. Second, I carried out a content analysis on a sample of media reports for important trends and themes. Third, I re-analysed interviews with stakeholders active in the field of immigration following an inductive content-analytical approach. Instead of summing up the results here, I will discuss the findings synoptically along three thematic lines, and conclude with a critical evaluation of the heuristic distinction between Liberal and Conservative Europeanisers.

The first line of inquiry is how domestic political and media actors as well as immigration professionals have interpreted and responded to increasing external migration since 2011. In political speeches and media reports alike, immigration was widely framed as a “refugee crisis”, particularly after 2015, although during the reporting period refugees have only accounted for a minority of all immigrants to Germany. Along with earlier crises such as the “global financial crisis” in 2008, politicians and journalists interpreted the “refugee crisis” as yet another test of Europe’s function, purporting a strong utilitarian understanding of Europe (see next paragraph). In line with earlier studies, national newspapers exhibited an overall pro-European consensus while anti-European and classical nationalist positions could rather be found in niche far-right periodicals. Nevertheless, both the speeches and the media analysis provide evidence that right-wing populist parties and movements have managed to hijack immigration as a policy issue, and put the centrist political camp under pressure to adopt restrictive measures in reception and integration policies.

The second thematic line refers to the construction of “Europe” in domestic politics and public opinion. When commentators referred to Europe, they usually meant the European Union as a polity. At a closer look, three main discursive approaches can be distinguished. The “programmatically approach” emphasises the EU as a historical peace project, highlights the moral obligation for Germany after World War II, and promotes an emphatic idea of European solidarity as far as the distribution of refugees is concerned. The “utilitarian approach” underlines the economic and political benefits of European collaboration. In economic terms, Germany is marked as a major beneficiary of the open European market whereas in political terms, the effectiveness of supranational collective action is highlighted, in particular vis-à-vis third states. From this vantage point, a “fair” distribution of refugees based on the economic capacities of member states must be ensured. Finally, the “technocratic approach” takes a logistic stance on the institutional mechanisms of European collaboration and integration, e.g. by promoting an evolutionary understanding of Europeanisation as a result of aggregated bilateral cooperation. In this perspective, the appropriate distribution of refugees should consider the diversity of national interests and trajectories among member states.

The third line of inquiry is concerned with the relevance of Europeanisation and Euroscepticism in explaining domestic political developments. Although many of the commentators and stakeholders have emphasised the shortcomings of the European Union in dealing with the “refugee crisis” (in particular the failure of the Dublin system), the mainstream of public opinion clearly remains pro-European. Explicit Eurosceptic attitudes, in contrast, seem to mainly fluctuate in far-right counter publics, be it in print, audio-visual or

social media. At the same time, there has been a new appreciation of intergovernmentalism through bilateral and multilateral agreements for concrete problems namely border protection, which is implicitly Eurosceptical in the sense that it challenges the capacity of the European Union for effective and sustainable problem solution. Even though Eurosceptic attitudes are not widespread, instances of emphatic appreciation or positive identification were just as rare across all communication channels. Yet although the European Union is far from being embraced, many commentators and stakeholders have pointed to its vulnerability considering how the “refugee crisis” was exploited by right-wing populist mobilisation.

Despite the broad pro-European consensus, the analysis brought to light different approaches to Europeanisation that resonate with the heuristic distinction between Liberal and Conservative Europeanisers. In the terminology of the work package, Liberal Europeanisers are pluralists who imagine Europe as an “open society” and aim to incorporate diversity in the European project. They favour an international humanitarian role for the EU and favour burden sharing, quotas and reallocation in relation to refugees. In contrast, Conservative Europeanisers seek to defend Europe based on notions of a “clash of civilisations” between the Judeo-Christian West and its non-Western counterpart. They imagine Europe as closed to the external world, and favour non-intervention in external development and humanitarian aid. For the German case, this distinction holds true as far as border control is concerned. However, the analysis showed little difference across political camps with regard to European proposals of refugee distribution. Quite in contrast, humanitarian aid was framed as an inherently conservative position inasmuch as it served a purpose of preventing emigration. Last, but not least, the value component (Orient vs. Occident) did not play an explicit role in the mainstream discourse, but was closely associated with Eurosceptic positions apparent within the far right.

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Appendix I: Overview of Speeches

ID	Date	Speaker	Scope (pages)
GER-Gabriel-2015	02.10.2015	Sigmar Gabriel (SPD)	5
GER-Gauck-2013	04.10.2013	Joachim Gauck Bundespräsident a.D.	5
GER-Gauck-2014	30.06.2014	Bundespräsident a.D. Joachim Gauck	8
GER-Gauland-2017	26.11.2017	Alexander Gauland (AFD)	6
GER-GÖ-ECK-2017	31.07.2017	Katrin Göhring-Eckardt (GRÜNE)	5
GER-Höcke-2014	30.08.2014	Björn Höcke (AFD)	
GER-Merkel-2015	18.12.2015	Dr. Angela Merkel (CDU)	5
GER-Merkel-2015	11.09.2015	Dr. Angela Merkel (CDU)	5
GER-Müller-2018	09.07.2018	Gerd Müller (CSU)	3
GER-Müntefering-2016	19.03.2016	Franz Müntefering (SPD)	2
GER-Reiter-2015	5.09.2015	Dieter Reiter (OB München)	2
GER-Roth-2017	29.08.2017	Claudia Roth (Grüne)	6
GER-Schäuble-2015	28.10.2015	Wolfgang Schäuble	6
GER-Schulz-2015	07.12.2015	Martin Schulz (SPD)	4
GER-Seehofer-2015	27.11.2015	Horst Seehofer (CSU)	10
GER-Steinmeier-2017	04.04.2017	Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD)	7
GER-Wagenknecht-2015	24.9.2015	Sahra Wagenknecht (LINKE)	3