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# The Multi-Party System in Indonesia: Reviewing the Number of Electoral Parties from the Aspects of the National Defense and Security

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## Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the effect of the multi-party system on national security stability in Indonesia. There are two questions related to national defense and security aspects, namely how many political parties are suitable, and how do the election and the number of parties influences the stability of national security? The research approach is a mixed method. For quantitative methods, we use inferential statistical analysis based on statistical data from the 1955 to 2019 elections and the 2005-2018 local elections. From the Effective Number of Election Parties (ENEP), the total Crime, and the Indonesian Democratic Index, we find that all national voters in each election in Indonesia will accumulate significantly in the range of five to ten parties, regardless of the number of political parties participating in the election. For qualitative methods, we formed a two-session FGD that discussed ENEP and its risks to national defense and security and how to recommend related policies. We conclude that the 4-5% Electoral threshold is sufficient to be enforced as a rule in the next election. Local elections (pilkada) outside Java and Bali have a more significant influence on national security stability than national legislative elections. The implications of this study encourage policymakers in the field of national defense and security to take anticipatory steps towards differences in the risks of holding elections and local elections (pilkada), as well as the direction and focus of pilkada research, especially in the perspective of national defense and security.

**Keywords:** Effective Number of Electoral Parties, Multi-Party System, National Defense and Security, Social Engineering Policy

## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to see whether there is an explanation of party numbers in elections (legislative elections, presidential elections, and regional head elections) related to national security stability. Many experts argue that a multi-party electoral system has vulnerability to national security stability, especially in countries

that are in transition to mature democracy (Ikrar Nusa Bakti, 2004; Mietzner, 2016; Skaaning, Jiménez, Institute for Democracy, & Assistance, 1975). Although Bawaslu (Election Oversight Body in Indonesia) has published the Election Vulnerability Index (Yamin, 2018), we do not consider its relationship toward the number of parties participating in the election to be so "clear." However, elections are a way out when there is a deadlock between the government and the parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2008). Under such conditions, national security stability can be disrupted if there are effects of political distortion, and will usually be reflected during the political parties' campaign activities, at the time of the election, and after the election results are announced.

Although security instability is not solely due to violence of an election, the apparatus needs to respond thoughtfully to the disruption of national security stability due to such distortions. Furthermore, if not, it will trigger a form of continued political vulnerability that will lead to social conflict. This condition will usually be followed by a decline in several dimensions of state capacity, for example (Mietzner, 2018), the economy, the fall of leadership, and even the risk of national disintegration. Indonesia has experienced such severe cases of political stalemate which, although not purely due to the electoral system, we thought that at that time the multi-party system was not appropriate, so it had the accumulating impacts on political deadlock in Indonesia, for example, cases of political deadlock which led to the fall of President Soeharto and Wahid.

Various kinds of literature interpret election violence as violence to influence the process or the results of general elections (Höglund, 2009). Such abuse will occur a year before the election, which culminates with violence on days before the election day (Harish & Toha, 2017), after the voting, and even after the announcement of the winner of the election when there was much public protest and dissatisfaction (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, & Jablonski, 2018). The peak of uncontrolled political tension will not only lead to violence, even very dangerous for national defense, whose mission is to maintain the integrity of national sovereignty and security. Research conducted by Berenschot (2020) shows the existence of mass manipulation factors as a trigger for violence in the electoral process. Especially in a multi-party system, political actors can manipulate the masses utilizing ethnic patronage networks (Flesken, 2018), religious sentiments (Schwörer & Romero-Vidal, 2020), and clientelistic-political (Berenschot, 2018).

Meanwhile, the security forces will usually be lacking in the amount of force distribution, especially when facing simultaneous elections over a large area. Such a political situation will result in the security forces being overwhelmed based on considerations of standard security measures. From this description, we hypothesize that the more political parties participating in the election, there are more political risks, and there are more actors that will be directly involved in the election process. The actors will try to manipulate the masses through various dimensions of personal and network capacity for their interests. Even Indonesia is suspected by Muhtadi (2019, p. 46) as the third-highest vote-buying in the world. Such conditions will ultimately make election vulnerabilities increasingly nuanced in a corrupt and violent manner and threaten national security stability.

In essence, government instability is closely related to the weakening of the structure of political institutions (Balitbang Kemhan, 2017), such as many conflicts between political parties, weak party coalition, increasingly pragmatic opposition in mobilizing partisans, and nervous political party cadre system. This condition is thought not to reflect leadership and is an indicator of weakness in political institutions in Indonesia. The implementation of multi-party systems in Indonesia should be a way of democracy that results in good governance. However, if it only produces a pragmatic government, in the end, the existence of political parties and the holding of elections only weakens national security stability.

So far, in the discourse on the multi-party system in Indonesia, primarily since the reform era, no formulation of the number of suitable political parties has been obtained, which guarantees that it does not significantly disturb security stability. Reflecting on the multi-party systems that exist in various countries, various policies have been widely discussed, and the results show that almost all systems have a paradoxical nature (Felsenthal & Machover, 2012), or the electoral and party systems applied have advantages and disadvantages. Thus we interpret that it is not a matter of the chosen electoral system accordingly. It is also a matter of implementation and the need for policies to address the emerging paradoxical effects.

The choice of the electoral system is dynamic. Indeed, the rules can change because of changes in society. Nevertheless, as with most electoral histories in various countries (Lijphart, 2012), changes to democratic electoral systems should lead to the formation of effective governance - one of which is through efforts to reduce the number of parties participating in elections. In Indonesia, at least there has been an effort like that, namely attempts to determine the minimum vote acquisition of political parties in the next election through the parliamentary threshold, see the Law of Republic of Indonesia number 7 the year 2017 where the parliamentary threshold is 4% of the national vote. However, the number of political parties with the current system is still considered ineffective in achieving democratic goals (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011), there are still many pros and cons in society (Indrawan & Aji, 2019) and even need to discuss the appropriateness of numbers of parties in an election so that not confuse the public (Fukuoka, 2012; Nico Handani Siahian, 2016). Based on this description, we assume that the "ideal numbers of political parties" is not suitable for articulating the pros and cons of the number of parties participating in the election, at least in the contemporary political context in Indonesia and because of the paradoxical nature of the existing electoral system. The pros and cons are also the reasons why the application of the current political system in Indonesia regarding the electoral threshold figure as a path of natural selection in simplifying parties will continue to be a discourse. We consider the discussions to be reasonable, including if the impact will cause frequent changes to regulations or policies related to political parties, which we then assume will have positive or negative effects on national security stability.

Thus we need to analyze the answer to the research question about how many parties are suitable and how such elections affect the stability of national security. In this study, we use the legislative election data for the DPR (House of Representatives in Indonesia) and the local elections to explore related arguments and also specifically provide an overview from the perspective of national defense. For this reason, we also use other data related to measures of national security stability, namely the Indonesia Democracy Index (IDI) and Total Crime Counts (TCC). Furthermore, the study within the national defense aspects is expected to be able to complement the views in the discourse on the effective number of electoral parties, which so far have rarely been reviewed and considered from the national defense and security approaches.

## 2. Literature Review

The literature is very varied in discussing the themes of the party system, which is based on social heterogeneity as an embodiment of the number of parties participating in the election. It is logical to accommodate social heterogeneity through the party system of election participants to prevent conflict. In the Indonesian context, social heterogeneity can be understood from the meaning of "Unity in Diversity." Thus the number of parties participating in the election is one feature of democracy that will represent the diverse preferences of community groups, religions, ethnicities, and social communities (Moser, Scheiner, & Stoll, 2018). The number of parties forms alternative types and ranges - the more extensive the range of party choices in an election, the more democratic the election will be because it will accommodate more voter preferences. In other words, the size of the party system in an election is a linear function of social heterogeneity. However, the number of parties in the election that is too large will reduce the effectiveness of votes, increase election costs, and also open up opportunities for the emergence of vulnerabilities that will affect government coalitions and public policymaking (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011).

In this study, we take references from various journals that discuss elections in multiple countries that focus on seven dimensions related to election relations and violence, vulnerability, and national security. Generally, the factors or aspects reviewed include: socio-economic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and post-materialist issues (Lijphart, 2012, pp. 76-77). Meanwhile, Bawaslu (RI Election Supervisory Agency) has also published the Election Vulnerability Index (Yamin, 2018), one of the measurement sub-dimensions is the level of security in the electoral process (pre-election, during the election, and post-election). Although there are various dimensions of the discussion related to the conflict, very few, provide a specific review of these dimensions in the context of aspects of national defense and security.

We need a theoretical basis and discourse related to whether there is a relationship between the number of parties participating in the election and the stability of national security. The premise is that "differences in preferences"

can lead to "conflicts" that can have a more significant effect on the disruption of security stability and can also unite forces if differences can be addressed (Reilly, 2001, p.113). In such a context, the premise of holding elections as a manifestation of democracy will have both positive and negative effects. What later became the focus of this study is how to ensure that elections in Indonesia will not shake national security stability. Such efforts are referred to as "non-military defense," as defined in Law Number 3 of the year 2002 concerning National Defense, article 7, paragraph 3.

In the election literature, a measure of party competition in obtaining votes is represented by the ENP (Effective Number of Parties) (Laakso & Taagepera, 2017). Although the use of ENP is widely opposed, it continues to be used in electoral research (Wilkinson, 2004, p.7), and so in this study. Meanwhile, to understand whether the level of competition is related to the level of security, we will use total crime data at the regional and national levels. Furthermore, the deepening of the characteristics of the electoral system needs to be done to understand the simplification of the optimal number of parties participating in the election (Indra, 2014; Nico Handani Siahian, 2016; Romli, 2011). However, to simplify the number of parties, we believe that the discourse needs to be enriched with studies that have the perspective of national defense. The context of enrichment needs to be in line with what was stated by Supriyanto and Mellaz (2011, p. 5) that the application of the threshold of representation in an election needs to be limited, because if not, the number of political parties in the DPR is believed to affect the effectiveness of decision making, which in turn will affect the performance government, and can even undermine democracy (Klimczak & Petersen, 2015). Furthermore, suitability and balance must be calculated so that the reduction effort does not sacrifice the significance of votes (damaging democratic development), and do not let the application of the threshold cause an increase in the number of votes that are not converted into seats, or wasted votes.

### *2.1 The Effective Number of Parties, Diversity, and Balance*

In political science, diversity refers to Hill's number in the second-order known as "Number of Effective Parties (ENP)." Although some believe that ENP has many shortcomings (Golosov, 2010; Grofman & Kline, 2012; Jean- Francois & Patrick, 2009), ENP is still used in socio-political, scientific research (Laakso & Taagepera, 2017; Wilkinson, 2004). According to Laakso & Taagepera, an essential achievement of an effective number of parties is to offer a simple and more easily understood index calculation of the number of parties in a competition that does not depend solely on the votes of the largest party or is distorted by changes in the number of voters in small parties.

The core contribution of ENP on the effect of the electoral system is to predict that the number of effective parties in legislative representation ( $N_s$ ) is equal to the sixth root of the multiplication of the average size of voters per region ( $M$ ) and the size of the number of seats contested ( $S$ ), or mathematically written  $N_s = (MS)^{1/6}$ . Taagepera refers to quantity,  $M$  times  $S$ , as the acquisition of a chair (Ruiz-Rufino, 2007; Taagepera, 2007, p.251). There are two methods of calculation, based on the number of voters called ENEP (Effective Number of Electoral Parties) and based on the number of seats called ENPP (Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties). The general formula of ENEP (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979):

Figure 1 shows the ENP in the 1955 Election. Both pictures explain that there are only five parties and two small party groups, or there are seven effective party groups. The seven parties were in accordance with ENP 1955 (ENEPP = 6.3 and ENPP = 6.4). Thus, the ENP number will provide knowledge about the number of parties that are effective in the election.




Figure 1. Illustration of ENP (ENEP and ENPP)

The minimum number of "relevant parties" occurs when the winning party votes equals the number of votes of the second party, and the smallest party vote reduces both. Under these conditions, it is predicted that the strength of the coalition government will be more stable. Meanwhile, the maximum number will be reached when the winning party gets a dominant vote, e.g., > 50%, and all minor opposition parties, e.g., ~ 1%. For example, the winning party votes are 61%, and there are 39 other parties, each with 1%; in this situation, the cost of coordination will be high. According to Taagepera (2007), for a given effective number of parties, the actual shares of parties may be quite equal or highly unequal. Later, he proposed the index of balance to measure the variation in the form of a logarithmic comparison, see equation (2).

$$B = \frac{\log N_{\infty}}{\log N_0} = \frac{-\log s_1}{\log N_0} \quad (2)$$

No is the number of parties that get a seat.  $N_{\infty}$  is the inversion of the largest percentage of votes, notated as  $1 / s_1$ . As such, we need to map the ENP and B balance to elections in Indonesia and their relevance to political stability and security, such as the level of ideological polarization (Ford & Jennings, 2020), ethnicity, and clientelism (Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019). This balance will characterize the patterns of opposition, whether they are competitive, cooperative, or united (Sani & Sartori, 1983). However, with a few exceptions, that balance might complement the party's number rather than replace it.

## 2.2 The Discourse of Electoral Threshold

An appropriate proportional seat quota is the divisor between the total population (or votes) and the total number of seats, which is  $1 / M$  (where M is the size or number of regional-based seat allocations). This formula has a significant disadvantage because the distribution of population between districts or provinces, or the vote of the party, has almost no such multiple quotas (Colomer, 2004, p.43). Therefore, the remaining seats that cannot be allocated based on the right quota must be allocated using some other additional formulas that can cause significant distortion. This discourse is then closely related to the magnitude of the voting threshold that must be met by the parties participating in the election.

The discourse about the magnitude of the parliamentary threshold revolves around its stipulation, where small and medium parties are afraid of failing to win a significant vote if the threshold is raised so that they wish to keep the number fixed or lowered, in contrast to large parties, to gain more seats will hope to increase the amount of the threshold the boundary (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011). Meanwhile, general elections are closely related to the number of seats contested (M) in the electoral district. The smaller M, the higher the level of competition, and conversely, the greater the M, the lower the level of competition. On the other hand, when there

is high political fragmentation, the government often has to negotiate various policies with very diverse political party interests. The latter situation means that high political fragmentation will have high costs. Thus it becomes crucial to have rules that prevent high political fragmentation without reducing the meaning of democratic development. Such practices are known as the threshold or the number of votes to get a seat.

Mathematically the upper threshold ( $T_a$ ), the lower threshold ( $T_b$ ), and the effective threshold ( $T_e$ ) of the formula are introduced by (Taagepera, 2007, pp. 246-253), see equations (3) and (4). There are three variables in the formula, namely: the average size of the electoral district ( $M$ ), the number of parliamentary seats ( $S$ ), and the number of electoral districts ( $E$ ). The equation shows that the effective threshold value for the (local) district is distinguished from the national level, see equation (5) and (6). Political parties must break the upper threshold ( $T_a$ ) to get their first seat and must break the lower threshold ( $T_b$ ) to get the remaining seats.

$$T_a = \frac{100\%}{(M+1)} \quad (3)$$

$$T_b = \frac{100\%}{2M} \quad (4)$$

$$[for\ the\ district] \quad T_{ed} = \frac{75\%}{(M+1)} \quad (5)$$

$$[for\ the\ nasional] \quad T_{en} = \frac{100\%}{(M+1)E^2} \quad (6)$$

#### 2.4. The Perspective of National Defense and Security

In developing democracy, elections should act as a mechanism for conflict resolution without violence. But the basic nature of elections is to fight for votes for interests and power. Strong parties are more likely to win votes when the public believes that they are not a source of anxiety. Conversely, their defeat has the potential to cause riots (Harish & Toha, 2017). Besides, the ruling regime will face higher levels of political unrest if there are many strong opposition parties (Fukuoka, 2012). The more the level of political unrest, it shows a failed campaign and is associated with a weak coalition regime (Ellman & Wantchekon, 2000; Passarelli & Tabellini, 2017). Therefore, they need more repressive policies that are vulnerable to riots. If the policy fails, then it can create a cycle of recurring riots, which will create more considerable uncertainty over the long-term stability of a country's security (Braithwaite, Kucik, & Maves, 2014).

Several variables can be related to security stability in Indonesia. In this study, we use several independent variables, namely the IDI (Indonesian Demorporation Index) and Criminal Statistics. The correlation between annual IDI statistics and crime rates against elections is essential to know. That knowledge will provide an understanding of the relationship between multi-party systems and the level of democratic achievement and the level of security. That knowledge will be a reasonable basis for encouraging new policies or amending election rules.

The effective number of party votes in elections (ENEP) is generally paired with a formula to calculate the electoral threshold. The electoral threshold ( $T$ ) is a formula to reduce the number of parties that can participate in the next election. The rules regarding  $T$  have changed several times (Indrawan & Aji, 2019; Nico Handani Siahian, 2016). Finally, the  $T$  rate was 4%, but then many academics suggested that  $T$  be 5%. The discourse of increasing the electoral threshold is fascinating seen from various angles. We argue that the Election Vulnerability Index published by Election Supervisory Board (Bawaslu) has not reviewed the effects of ENEP and  $T$ . This is the case when the vulnerability index is confronted with a total crime rate or IDI, specifically to provide an overview from the perspective of national defense and security. Therefore, we will analyze ENEP,  $T$ , TCC, and IDI in this study.

### 3. Method

We use a mixed-methods approach. There are two steps in conducting the plan.

The first step of this research are as follows: 1) Collecting election data: number of parties participating in the election, number of voters, and number of seats; 2) Analyze security stability thorough calculating ENEP, diversity, party balance, and its correlation to total crime and the democratic index; and 3) conclude. In quantitative analysis, we use election data from 1955-2019, local elections from 2005 to 2018, criminal data, and the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI). Data was obtained from BPS Statistics, the General Election Commission (KPU), and the Independent Election Commission (KIP). Also, we got permission to use some of the FGD projects of Balitbang, the Ministry of Defense.

In the second step, we analyze the report of the qualitative data resulted from FGD reported by the Research Team of Balitbang Kemhan that discussed the suitable number of parties for elections in Indonesia related to the national defense and security aspects. A total of twelve experts and researchers attended the FGD session. Some of them are representative of Kemendagri (Homeland Ministry), Kemenlu (Foreign Ministry), and LIPI (National Science Institute), and the rest are from MoD (Kemhan) and TNI (Indonesian Arm Forces). Finally, with this approach, we make conclusions and policy recommendations in securing the holding of near-future elections.

We analyzed the 1955-2019 election data and the Provincial Election (Pilgub) for 2005-2018, which was paired with total crime data. We also examine the correlation and significance of the changes that occur. Meanwhile, to understand whether there was a significant influence on the election due to changes in IDI and total crime, we analyzed by juxtaposing the data and comparing the effects. We try to refer to the underlying assumption in statistics that external variables can influence the results so that we need to release some data that is likely to overlap, the outcome we get 42 valid election data from "outliers" in the total crime data. The analytical framework follows inferential statistical analysis procedures with reliability, validity, normality test, t-test, and variance test.

#### 4. Discussion

##### *4.1 How many parties are suitable for future elections in the context of national security stability?*

Although the government formed from the election results during the New Order era was relatively stable, democratic life was seen as not developing because there were only limited political choices (Ikrar Nusa Bakti, 2004). In addition, the remaining organizational structure was destroyed (Ufen, 2008). Therefore, we are more focused on election data in the reformation era.

Table I shows the results of an analysis of the number of effective parties and the real differences using the party balance index and diversity index (Simpson) based on the results of the 1955, 1971 and 1999-2019 elections. Absolute stability is achieved when entropy = 0. From the ENEP score, we can conclude that the effective number of parties that can represent Indonesian voters is between 5-10 political parties. Regardless of the electoral system rules that have been made, from 1999 to 2019, the number of ENEP with parties that obtained seats was strongly correlated (-0.88 at  $p < 0.05$ ).



Table 1. Diversity Index, ENEP and Party Balance in Legislative Elections

Year	Parties	ENEP	Diversity	Balance
1955	29	6.3	0.84	0.45
1971	10	2.3	0.56	0.22
1977	3	2.1	0.52	0.43
1982	3	2.0	0.50	0.40
1987	3	1.7	0.43	0.29
1992	3	1.9	0.49	0.35
1997	3	1.6	0.39	0.27
1999	48	5.1	0.80	0.35
2004	24	8.4	0.88	0.55
2009	38	9.6	0.90	0.71
2014	12	8.9	0.89	0.72
2019	16	9.3	0.89	0.75

If we only look at ENEP in the reform era, we conclude that regardless of the number of parties participating in the election, only 10 (ten) parties will get a sufficient vote. While the votes in each province in the 1999-2014 elections, minimum accumulation of vote in two parties (ENEP = 2) in two provinces (Bali and Gorontalo). At the same time, the majority of the vote is in 10 (ten) parties (ENEP = 10), which is also in the two provinces (Bengkulu and NTB). The average ENEP for all provinces is 8 (eight). Meanwhile, the comparison of party balance in the New Order era was 0.46, and in the Reformation era was 0.87. According to Taagepera, in the Reformation era shows aspects of the development of democracy better (party balance more than 0.5).

Table 2 shows the electoral threshold variation of 1% -5% and the estimated number of political parties that will qualify. With an electoral threshold of 4% and 5%, the prediction of parties participating in the election that will be eligible for the 1999-2019 election period is 5 to 10 parties. We can make such interference if we look at ENEP, the diversity and balance of the party, which is relatively stable (average B> 0.5), see Figure 2.

Table 2. Threshold Simulation for National Legislative Elections

Year	T1=1%	T2=2%	T3=3%	T4=4%	T5=5%
1955	10	8	4	4	4
1971	7	5	4	4	4
1977	3	3	3	3	3
1982	3	3	3	3	3
1987	3	3	3	3	3
1992	3	3	3	3	3
1997	3	3	3	2	2
1999	8	5	5	5	5
2004	14	11	7	7	7
2009	15	9	9	8	8
2014	11	10	10	10	10
2019	13	11	9	9	8

In Figure 2, the diversity of voters is shown by the Simpson index, where the value of 0 (zero) indicates no difference in voter preferences (usually in a single-party election system), and 1 (one) shows that voter preferences are entirely different (multi-party with the strength of evenly distributed votes). Since the 1999

elections, diversity has been demonstrated that voter preferences are wholly separate and stable until 1919, which is in the range of 0.8-0.9. This diversity figure can be interpreted as the availability of choice and freedom of choice. This figure is strongly correlated with ENEP, and ENPP figures, respectively 0.995 and 0.795 (or very strong). From the results of the two tail t-test test showed the stable diversity of voter preferences, namely in numbers (5,487, 9,291) where  $p < 0.05$ , and therefore it was interpreted that the value of ENEP would be around 5 (minimum) to 10 (maximum). We also tested with the Mann-Kendall trend test/Two-tailed test whether the two numbers (Diversity and ENEP) had a trend, and the results showed they did not have a trend ( $p > 0.05$ ), in other words, the lowest number of 5 and the highest of 10 parties are relatively unchanged (no trend).




Figure 2. Diversity and ENEP in the 1955-2019 Elections

Table 3. The number of qualified parties for the next election using threshold simulation of 2019-Election Data in all Provinces

	T1=1%	T2=2%	T3=3%	T4=4%	T5=5%
Median	14	12	11	9	8
Max	16	15	13	12	10
Min	10	6	5	5	5
Average	14	12	10	9	8

Note: Processed From 2019 Election Statistical Data (BPS, 2019)

We argued that regardless of the number of parties participating in the election in Indonesia, there will only be five to ten parties that will get sufficient votes, and the 5% threshold is relevant enough to guarantee the availability of variations in party choice to the average ENEP rate 9.8 (10 parties) and a balance of 0.7 (this figure is greater than 0.5 which is interpreted as a right balance). Such thresholds have also been discussed by (Indrawan & Aji, 2019) and (Supriyanto & Mellaz, 2011).

The inference is commensurate with Duverger's Law as endorsed by (Bhattacharya & Smarandache, 2006), that when there are quite a lot of floating voters (usually occurs in countries with immature democracy), then the maximum ENP value (ten parties for our context) is the optimal number to guarantee the availability of variations in the choice of voters. Even so, when democracy is ripe, in a proportional system, votes will only accumulate to some effective parties according to the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP). Likewise, seats will be distributed to the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) (Taagepera, 2009).

#### 4.2 Effect of elections on national security stability

We can see in Table 1 that the 1971 elections with ten parties provided the calculation of ENEP = 2.3, Diversity = 0.56, and Balance = 0.22. We understand that the "dominant party" scenario is achieved, with Golkar dominant, 68% of the vote. The dominance of the vote caused the winning regime (New Order) to easily simplify the number of parties for the next election to only three political parties (the seven remaining political parties were merged into two political parties). Although the number of parties participating in the 1977

elections has diminished, the balance of power between parties is still poor. The balance figure is 0.43, still below 0.5, which means there is still a dominant party. Besides, the diversity index declined to 0.52, indicating increasingly limited choices. The decline in the diversity index in the 1977-1999 elections showed the period of "less freedom" in Indonesia.




Figure 3. ENEP plot of Balance (Keseimbangan) and Diversity (Diversitas)

In contrast, the 1999-2019 elections showed a stable balance of more than 0.5. Such stability of balance shows that the political process is functioning as it should.

Furthermore, by conducting a cluster test on the diversity index of all electoral years in Indonesia, it was found that there were only two groups: low diversity group ( $<0.5$ ) and high diversity group ( $>0.5$ ), see Figure 3. The high cluster diversity group is giving broader democratic voter preferences, and vice versa for low diversity groups. Such interpretation is based on the premise of democratic elections, which must guarantee voter differences and freedom. (Amorós & Puy, 2010). A similar test on the balance index shows similar results.

In the context of the discourse to reduce the number of parties, it is imperative to understand the impact. Many previous papers held that the New Order Era (1977-1997), with a low ENEP and destitute of balance and diversity, had curbed people's political freedom, and the ruling regime only privileged one party "Golkar" (Busroh, 2017). Meanwhile, they consider that the elections in the reform era (1999-2019) have been aligned in pursuing democratic development. Therefore, referring to Figure 3, we consider that the simplification of parties must pay attention to ENP (ENEP and ENPP), balance, and diversity. That view has the full support of FGD participants.

According to (Górecki & Kukołowicz, 2018), when we refer to the 'psychological effects of Duverger', that the political elite tends to form fewer parties, and voters tend to avoid supporting small parties; consequently, the number of parties in the election will tend to decrease. The need to limit the number of parties is also widely recommended by experts (Golosov, 2010; Grofman & Kline, 2012; Laakso & Taagepera, 2017; Singer, 2015).

Similar consideration comes from FGD participants that if the election is more permissive to the number of parties, then the widening fragmentation of seats will make it difficult to operate the formation of legislation and governance. For this reason, the concept of the maximum limit of the parties participating in the next general election needs to be applied, while guaranteeing varied party choices. Apart from the current threshold provisions in Indonesia, we recommend that the number of parties participating in elections in Indonesia can be optimally reduced to 10 parties. This number is predicted to be sufficient to maintain the adequacy of choices and still guarantee the balance of party power so that political stability is maintained.

Furthermore, the correlation coefficient shows a moderate relationship between the diversity index and IDI (Pearson)  $R = -0.5735$ . Likewise, between IDI and ENEP with  $R = 0.5219$ . A negative sign indicates the inverse relationship, i.e., when ENEP increases, it will cause IDI to decrease. Meanwhile, diversity is the opposite. Therefore it is necessary to see the achievement of the party's balance outlined in the above discussion.

We also analyzed the Democracy Index (IDI) 2009-2018 during the election year, where if a province had a local election (Pilgub), then the provincial IDI generally declined; 88% of 33 provinces declined, and only five regions (12%) showed an increase in IDI. Meanwhile, during the year of the national legislative election (Pileg), only 3% of the provincial IDI declined, and the rest increased (97%). Higher IDI shows higher political stability and security. Thus, local or regional elections have a dominant-negative influence on political stability, while national legislative elections have a positive impact.

Next, we observed whether there were significant differences in the total crime data (TCC) a year before Pilgub (T1) and in the year of Pilgub (T0). The results show that outside Java, T0 decreased, and T1 increased significantly. As for the Java region, there is no significant difference between T1 and T0. Thus Pilgub does not significantly influence the rise and fall of TCC in Java, but in the other regions, Pilgub greatly influences TCC. Similarly, we also observe whether there has been an increase or decrease in total crime counts (TCC) in the implementation of Pileg in Java and Outside Java. The results do not show the significance of the increasing TCC during the Pileg year.

The discussion about the relationship between political competition and violence is certainly not new (Pierskalla & Sacks, 2017). The result of this study, which shows that there is still an increase in total crime a year before the elections outside of Java, is consistent with previous scholarly arguments. For example, Sambhi (2019) shows that precisely political tensions occurred a year before the election compared to the year of election. Meanwhile, at the level of national elections, the total number of crimes is not significantly affected that in line with the argument Aspinall & Berenschot (2019) about the possibility of the transfer of political and fiscal authority, which has shifted the locus of political contestation to a lower level. As such, we also argue that the context of national political contestation has contributed to the fragmentation of ethnic maps and regionalism, and has expanded the opportunities of the ethnic and regional coalition at national level contestation. The implication of such consideration, firstly, is how the policy should be formulated to anticipate the risk of the violence in local elections or Pileg in the outside of Java, and secondly, how the security enforcement should be devoted to it. Moreover, FGD participants also highlighted the needed regulatory in distributing security enforcement taskforce during the simultaneous local election based on the above analysis.

The last inferential statistical analysis of the regional legislative elections is shown in Figures 5 and 6. There are 12 provinces with ENEP more than ten correlated with an increase in total crime before the election, namely: Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, NTB, NTT, Kalimantan North, Central Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku, and Papua. At ENEP more than nine, there are an additional three of the twelve provinces mentioned above, namely: Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Papua. All fifteen regions are areas outside Java and Bali. Two things need to be underlined, first, for an ENEP number of more than ten, regional legislative elections have a positive correlation with increasing total crime or affecting security stability; and second, local legislative elections have a positive effect on the total number of crimes, or elections affect security stability before the vote takes place. The results of this final analysis reinforce the claims of the analysis described above.




Figure 4. Two-sample comparison of variances of TCC for Province Head Election




Figure 5. Two-Sample T-Test And Z-Test Of TCC For Province Head Election

During the FGD, there were many views and comments about "the optimal number of qualified parties for the upcoming elections." Although there is confirmation of agreement on the electoral threshold from 4% to 5%, there is also a bias in determining whether it is better 4% than 5% or vice versa, to maintain democracy. An essential agreement among the FGD participants was their view that security risks in the application of the 4-5% electoral threshold would still be manageable. With such a view, they stressed the importance of a more comprehensive study and focus on efforts to standardize the level of election security in the future, for example, to strengthen the IKP (Election Vulnerability Index) that has been sought by Bawaslu.

## 5. Conclusion

To answer the question of this study, "how many optimum numbers of parties in an election that should be limited in the context of Indonesia national security stability?" We conclude that in the case of national general elections (Pemilu) and regional head elections (Pilgub) in Indonesia, regardless of its numbers, the number of parties that will get a significant vote is 5 (five) to 10 (ten) parties. In that context, a threshold value of 4% to 5% can reduce the number of parties participating in general elections and local elections that are effective as a different representation of the social preferences of voters; moreover, with such threshold percentages, the national security stability considered to be ongoing maintenance by the appropriate handling of the risk. Another finding is that the national general elections are safer than the regional head elections. Simultaneous local head elections (pilkada serentak) has a significant influence on national security stability. Meanwhile, the national legislative elections (pemilu legislatif) do not significantly influence on national security stability, but for the area outside of Java and Bali, such local election (Pileg and Pilgub) shows a significant influence. The implications of this study encourage policymakers in the field of national defense and security to take anticipatory steps towards differences in the risks of holding national elections and local elections, as well as the direction and focus of the research related to the perspective of national defense and security.

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