

“The great battles lie ahead”

Interview with Allan Carlson (in Moscow, Russia and in Verona, Italy)

The first question is about the history of the World Congress of Families. The story of your encounter with Anatoly Antonov and Viktor Medkov in Moscow 1995 is well-known.¹ But what happened next? Can we say that Russian participation in the World Congress of Families was basically absent for many years after this first meeting?

That really wasn't true. I went to Prague after I came to Moscow, where I attended a conference held by the Civic Institute. The Civic Institute was one of the anti-Communist groups that emerged during the Velvet Revolution there, and they went on to become a think tank and tied to a political party. They put on a small conference, it was not a major conference, it was kind of an experts' conference, but they had a number of politicians and judges on family issues and family policy. That was in 1995. When I was there, I proposed this idea of a world congress meeting. And I talked to the fellow who ran the Civic Institute and asked whether he and his group would be willing to work on such a meeting, maybe Prague would be a good place to hold this. And he said yes. So, we put it together and the first World Congress of Families was held in Prague in 1997. Antonov helped me plan the speakers' list. We had about 700 people come. A large number of that were Russians. I would guess about 100

1 Kristina Stoeckl, *The Rise of the Russian Christian Right: the Case of the World Congress of Families. Religion, State and Society*, forthcoming.

people. So, they were a very visible part of the thing. There were at least half a dozen Russian groups who came and set up panels. Some had to do with teaching Russian children folklore, and what Russia was like before the Communists came and suppressed all that. One was teaching Russian history through puppets, family values through puppets. So, there was a large Russian presence at that event. And that continued, the next congress was held in Geneva in November of 1999. And, again, Antonov was part of the planning committee. We had friendly countries. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation became a partner. We had a number of Muslims involved, strangely, several Iranians, you know, Americans hardly ever talk to Iranians.

But where are the Muslim participants now? One can no longer see them at the Congresses ...

They're not here anymore. But they were, they were very prominent in Prague, and there were quite a few in Geneva. A fair number of Muslims were in Geneva. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation, their ambassador to the United Nations was involved in all these meetings. The third Congress, we had plans, ambitious plans, to hold it in two cities at once. And we liked the tie to Islam. Partly because of the voting bloc, the pro-family, pro-life voting bloc at the United Nations, with the Muslim countries, the Vatican, the Holy See, and occasionally some other countries which had a conservative, usually a Catholic government, some in Latin America, some in Eastern Europe, like Slovakia and Slovenia. So we were going to hold a two-city meeting. Dubai, the Muslim connection, and Mexico City. Hold them simultaneously, and there would be joint sessions through TV connections and so on. I had a sense that the Muslims were looking at a different way to relate to the West, and they thought maybe shared values, shared traditional values was the way to go at that. And we'd raised some money, we even had American Evangelicals on board, which was astonishing, because they're the ones who are seen as the most hostile to dealing with Islam other than to convert them.

But then 9/11 happened, and it's hard to explain to somebody else, it had a peculiar effect in the United States. But when I heard what was

happening, when I saw the pictures of the buildings falling down, I just knew in an instant that our dealings with the Muslims were over. Not so much legally but culturally and otherwise, we were not going to be able to do this two-city thing. So we just put it on the shelf. I had other things I was getting involved in. So the World Congress was put on the shelf for about a year and a half. I stopped pushing it, we just waited.

And what happened next?

Mexicans came to me, a group of prominent Mexicans, I didn't realize until later how prominent they were. But people who'd visited, had been to the Geneva event, and wanted to do something similar in Mexico. So they came to Rockford, and they were very well-connected people, particularly to Catholic groups, and lay Catholic organizations, and to the Catholic Church. Among them was a member of the Pontifical Council for the Family, at the time directed by the cardinal archbishop who ran that, Lopez Trujillo, who had spoken in Prague and spoken in Geneva. And so we just went ahead and did one in Mexico City (2004). And again, they raised most of the money there and it was a very good event.

The Russian presence there was much more modest, was less than it had been at the other two events. Antonov and Viktor Medkov were there. A large number of Russians came to the Congress in Poland in 2007. So, it is true that an event was not held in Moscow till 2011, which was the demographic summit, and things kind of ramped up again to a different level with that. But no, Russia was heavily involved, particularly in the first two Congresses.

Do you see a shift in the WCF? I mean, initially the key participants were scholars, demographers. Now we see more religious participation, for example, representatives of different churches. Can we say that the World Congress of Families is moving from an academic to a more religious format?

Yes, partly I agree, but there were religious people all along. Again, the first two Congresses had strong support from the Pontifical Council for

the Family. Cardinal Alfonso Lopez Trujillo was a great friend. The Mormons have always been involved, to a greater or a lesser degree. They were heavily involved in Salt Lake City, but even more so in Geneva. Brigham Young University paid half the bills. So, it's always been there. When we held the demographic summit in Moscow in 2011, the opening session was like it used to be in the United States, whenever you had a public event in the fifties, sixties, you'd have a Protestant, a Catholic, and Jew. It was like that in Russia at the opening of the demographic summit, but it was a bit more diverse. You had the Orthodox, you had a Jew, you had a Protestant, you had a Muslim, and somebody else, I can't remember who it was. What I remember and what I find so funny is that everyone had really great hats, the religious hats, and I thought these are great hats, because in America people don't wear hats. The Muslims had hats, the Orthodox had hats, the Catholic had hats, really great hats. You may be right, there may be somewhat more emphasis about it, but even this event² is kind of a grandchild of the first World Congress.

But even here you still see the religious element is intermingled with the research side, and the two have always been in my mind, as a Christian but also as someone who's done the academic side of things. The two are not in conflict. I'm a natural law person, and investigations of social phenomena using quantitative methods are going to tell you pretty much what you would know if you read natural law theory about certain things. Children do best when they grow up with both of their natural parents, the safest way to avoid sexual disease is to marry someone and be faithful, a whole lot of things like that which honest science tells us, is also what conventional Christian ethics tell you. I've never seen a conflict between the two. At least not on anything deeply important.

Compared to the beginnings of the World Congress of Families, the first meeting with Antonov in 1995 Moscow, the event in 1997 Prague, where do you see the World Congress of Families now? Do you consider this a success story? Could you have ever planned on that?

2 Carlson refers to the Global Home Education Conference (GHEC) held in Russia (Moscow and Saint Petersburg) on 15th–19th May, 2018.

That's a good question. Actually, at the beginning, I didn't expect it to be any more than one time. I expected the session in Prague would be a sort of a free-standing event. I didn't anticipate having them more frequently or having more of them or certainly not having one every year, which is what we have been doing in the last five years. So in that sense it was a success. But it was not one that was planned. It caught some sparks, hit the grass, and things started to go. And it moved in some directions I didn't anticipate at the beginning but were related to what we did. Is it a success? Well, what's changed now? I think the most significant change has been that early on, we worked on a really tight budget, we did not have government sponsorship officially or otherwise or even indirectly until the meeting in 2007 in Warsaw where the Law and Justice Party was. This was their first time around and they helped. At the World Congress of Families in Verona in 2019 we had the support of the League Party. In Moldova in 2018 the Moldovan president was our host. And in Hungary in 2017, the Fidesz Party was our host and cosponsor. That's different. So something has changed.

The World Congress of Families has succeeded in getting the support of the European populist Right, which didn't exist in in the 1990s. Back in the 1990s, what was your political vision? Did you aspire to reach out to the political center with your message on family values? How do you evaluate the fact that you are now closely connected to the political Right in a political situation that is increasingly polarized?

Well, polarization's taking place all over. Certainly, in the United States we know polarization really well now. This is what happened. We're dealing with a conflict of values that I think is much more fundamental than other post-World War II conflicts over values, for example the conflict between Communism and liberal democracy. The current conflict is over the most fundamental things: What is a human being? What is marriage? I mean, that's not an incidental question. It's perhaps one of the most fundamental questions. What is the purpose of life? Do we exist so that we carry on from our ancestors to our posterity, are we a link in a chain? That's a very fundamental thing. I think that conflict is there.

Our struggle could have gone to the political center. I learned to think about family policy from the Myrdals, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal in Sweden. There was a tension in their work which I talked about briefly in the book I did on Swedish family policy.³ Alva Myrdal started off as a socialist feminist and atheist and internationalist. Gunnar Myrdal, there was always a conservative tug to him, which I didn't fully understand, even when I met him and interviewed him a number of times. But ten years after his death, they released papers. A box of his earliest papers. Which showed that as a young man – and I'm talking about somebody at age 18 or 19 – he was not a social democrat. In fact, he was an extreme right-wing young man. God, soil, country, pro-aristocracy, he opposed women's suffrage, he was a strong Swedish nationalist Christian. This was around 1917, 1918, 1919. So at the time when the Great War was coming to a close, he was very much "hard Right." He favored monarchy and all that. And what happened was that this world of his fell apart by 1919. He worked for a while as part of the Farmer's Party. He was kind of a country lawyer his first year or two. But he met Alva by accident on a bicycle trip and they fell for each other. To put it informally, she took him on as a project and turned him from what he had been into a social democrat. But there was always this underlying theme in Gunnar Myrdal's thought. Their program for pronatalist, pro-marriage policies reflects a kind of moderate Swedish nationalism. And which, of course, was countered with the whole socialist ethos that, "Oh, we're not nationalist anymore." It was certainly not national-socialist, in the German sense, but there was a kind of nationalistic socialism. I'm not trying to say that they had anything to do with Nazism but that's kind of where he was. He made the shift from an authoritarian right-wing person to an authoritarian left-wing person without a whole lot of change. And, in fact, the Swedish welfare state of the 1940s and 1950s – which included some of what the Myrdals wanted, not what Alva wanted, but it was more in line with what Gunnar wanted – it was genuinely pro-family. It was genuinely pro-marriage. In fact I have no real quarrel with what the Swedes were doing in the 1940s and 1950s. Technically a socialist country, their textbooks on marriage and family

3 Allan C. Carlson, *The Swedish Experiment in Family Politics: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis* (Transaction Press, 1990).

and sexuality could have been published by any Christian organization at the time. So, things there could have stayed that way. And I am planning one of these days to write a defense of the Swedish welfare state, but the welfare state of 1955 – not what it is today.

Your Swedish example is not unique in Europe. Most European countries have a tradition of strong coordination between state and church, with the churches having had, in the past, a last word on legislation regarding marriage, divorce, or abortion. This model of state-church coordination in Europe is now coming to a close. Europe is itself arguably nearing the situation of the United States, where in a context of dis-establishment religious organizations and the religious grassroots from below take their claims into politics. The World Congress of Families is an example of this trend. The churches are not necessarily very happy about this development, because it disrupts the older model of cooperation.

That may well be the case. I agree that we, the World Congress of Families, have had an impact. Let's take the example of the Italian "League," or what used to be called "The League of the North." The party started pretty much as a negative party. It was Pagan, anti-immigrant, anti-Sicilians, and all that sort of thing. I think what they've got now is a positive agenda. A pro-family, positive agenda. I think maybe we've contributed to that. I hope the commitment to our agenda is genuine. I cannot judge whether Salvini's support, the League's support for the World Congress of Families, is a cynical act on their part. I hope not. I think in Hungary this support was definitely genuine. Most of the actors of the Fidesz Party are living closer to the core of values we're talking about here. But I understand these problems. What may happen next? I don't know what is going to happen with the French National Front. There again, that's another negative party with Pagan roots who've had some strange policies sometimes. I remember one that bothered me. You may remember a couple of years ago the issue with Muslim women and beaches. They were wearing hijabs. And the National Front said that it was un-French not to wear a bikini. Wait a sec? Modesty and women – well, you know, okay, you don't have to be required but you shouldn't condemn it. I mean, what's wrong with that? I think that's perfectly fine.

What you are pointing to is the contradiction between a political agenda that is prevalently anti-immigrant and anti-Islam, and a political agenda that is more traditionally Christian conservative.

In my view, the Christian democracy that came out of World War II had its roots in French Christian democratic writers of the late thirties, mid-forties. And in the ideas of German writers, such as Wilhelm Röpke. I write about this in my book *Third Ways*.⁴ These thinkers had a consistent family policy that was tied to the model of a modest, real welfare state; a welfare state that took cognizance of children, marriage and families, and tradition. This was the same in Italy, too. This model worked until at some point the Christian Democratic Parties stopped being Christian and became just some center-right parties run by ambitious politicians. Resurrecting Christian democracy of the original kind would be a great thing. Resurrecting the original model of the European Union – I’m all in favor of what the European Union was.

You mean the European Union of Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann?

Yes. A political union that would leave family policy and sexual policy to the member states. That is how it was in the United States initially. Family policies, as they called it back then, were the provenance of the states. The federal government had nothing to say or do about it. I think that was a good system. But all that fell apart slowly between 1865 and 1965. In Europe, that separation has dissolved much more recently and much faster. Starting in the 1990s. I am not against the European Union. I cheered the European Union when it first came out. But I think it’s gotten off track. It has gotten off track because the Christian democrats, who really helped put it together, lost their ideology, gradually dissolving into just a “party of the center-right,” increasingly mostly interested in economic questions.

4 Allan C. Carlson, *How Bulgarian Greens, Swedish Housewives, and Beer-Swilling Englishmen Created Family-Centered Economies – and Why They Disappeared* (ISI Books, 2007).

Why do you think this change came about? Do you blame this development on secularization and the cultural revolution?

Yes. When the cultural revolution or the sexual revolution or all the revolutions tied up together came along, there was no one there, really, to defend the old way, the old system, the old models. Partly because everybody got complacent. Things were going pretty well in the United States, say between '45 and the mid-seventies. The Vietnam War was a symptom as well as a cause of the trouble. But for twenty-five, thirty years things pumped along really well. And then it fell apart. And why? Well, part of it again, complacency by leaders who shouldn't have been complacent. People forgot why things were working well. I've written about American family policy which was never consciously structured quite the way it was in Europe. But we got it right. I'm a persona non grata in many American conservative circles because I've defended the social policies of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal from the 1930s. Because they were pro-traditional family, very much so, pro-marriage, pro-baby. Back then the Democrats were the party of the family. They had not bought into the cultural-sexual revolution. The Republican Party was the party of Wall Street. The Democrats were the party of the main street.

Do you consider yourself to be a "typical American conservative"?

No, I would not consider myself and the aims of the World Congress of Families typical for American conservatives. We're not the people who get invited to speak at a conservative political action committee. This is because of my support of the social policies of the New Deal which were grounded in a real ideology or at least a consistent set of principles.

Do you consider yourself to be representative of the libertarian tradition?

In a way all Americans look like libertarians to Europeans, and I've written for some libertarian journals. So I have done, I have written that and I believe that. What makes me not so libertarian is that I think the cor-

porate sector, particularly finance capitalism, is also a threat to the family. While the state has every interest in weakening the family, so do the high levels of finance capitalism. The family gets in the way of the efficient allocation of labor. The family, particularly the family that feeds itself in its garden or does some home production and repairs things, is not a good consumer, it limits the potential of the consumer market, so capitalism in the abstract has no real place for strong families. I believe in free markets, but capitalism and free markets are not the same thing. In fact, mostly, capitalism winds up with the big guys taking control of the government and running it in their favor and making sure the little guys don't have a chance to compete. Crony capitalism. I greatly love family-held companies, companies that are run by families, real families, and they don't tend to be socially destructive; they tend to be socially creative and socially supportive. But it's the big guys in New York, the finance guys, they don't have much of an interest in such companies. And that's where I'm not a libertarian, because I think that unrestrained capitalism of that sort has its own destructive possibilities.

So could this understanding of a restrained capitalism be the reason why your ideas find resonance in Europe?

Maybe. If you ask me what my economic views are, I'm actually close to the ideas of G. K. Chesterton and the distributist movement of Hilaire Belloc. There were some uncomfortable things in that movement, but mostly, it was good. What do I think the state should do? I think the state should strengthen families. How does a state do that? Some of it is counterintuitive. It can do things creatively. In fact, one of the good things that I think's happening in Europe now is that you're adopting a model that I really like. In particular, not to use allowances so much anymore. Giving state allowances for families and state allowances for this and that. Instead, European states are more and more giving tax benefits, which I think is the right way to go at it. It is a good model when families are raising children, they don't pay as much tax or they pay no tax at all, which is I guess sort of the Hungarian model right now. Sometimes family allowance policies start out pretty good, but they're subject to a lot of political

manipulation. And eventually, even in Sweden, the allowance was not so much a family allowance but a mother's allowance. That was not what Gunnar Myrdal intended. In fact, he favored tax policy. He favored generous tax cuts for families and not allowances which could be tailored, ideologically, to meet certain goals. So, you see, my economic ideas come from there. I'm an untypical American conservative. I favor broader property ownership. I'm in favor of things that shock people in America. We should limit the size and the number of Walmarts or we shouldn't even allow a Walmart to exist. And there's a way to do that – again, using tax policy. You do progressive taxation on corporate income.

Let us shift the conversation to the engagement of the World Congress of Families in Russia. One thing we found out in our research is that there were other pro-family groups in Russia active at the time, during the 1990s. For example, Focus on the Family organized events in Russia during the early 1990s. When you first got into contact with Russians, were you at all aware of that? Were you aware that Russia had become a kind of mission territory for groups from the US?

That's true in a much broader sense. Everybody on the right flooded into Russia. The economic Right, and the Russian experiment of cowboy capitalism, it came with American encouragement, from American support, quite broadly. And that turned sour, for at least a lot of Russians. But you are also right, there were groups like Focus moving in and so on.

What does Russia bring to the World Congress of Families?

Some commentator of the late 19th century or maybe it was early 19th century, looking ahead, said that the world would have two great nations. It's not going to be France, it's not going to be England, it's not going to be Germany. The two great nations of the future are the United States and Russia. And I think that was true. And I think that remains true. It certainly was true for most of the 20th century, although Russia had a bad time for a while, but it's kind of coming back together again, it's becoming an important nation again. It's kind of finding its feet again. So

the first thing Russia brings to the World Congress of Families is Russia itself. The other thing Russia brings is the Orthodox tradition. Over the last ten to twelve years, the Orthodox Church has broken out of its shell and is taking its place as a global religion. And that's particularly important now that under Pope Francis, the Roman Catholic Church is pulling back on these social issues. For whatever reason, Francis has decided not to emphasize pro-family and pro-life activities as much as his two predecessors, who put those things right at the very center of the Catholic Church's international witness, not so much now. I think the fact that the Orthodox Church is becoming a public witness internationally on these questions is a huge development. It's not just small, it's huge. It seems to be something that's going to survive the current patriarch. Even American Protestant Churches are going through a confusing phase right now. The leadership of the pro-family people there is gone, there have been a number of people that either retired or died in the last five or ten years. It appears that a new generation is coming. Probably the most prominent guy is going to be Franklin Graham, Billy Graham's son. He's very strong on these questions, and his father was actually not that great on these questions. He pretty much stuck to evangelism, and he didn't get involved on the social issues. His son is deeply involved, and has been for some decades. So that's changing, too.

Relations between Russia and America today are not the best, can this influence your cooperation?

They're quite bad; well, they're awful. But until I'm prohibited from doing so, I need to work with and strengthen our connection with the Russian Orthodox Church. We're not here to praise or to condemn Putin. That's not what we're about. But we are supportive of most of the pro-family initiatives that the Russian government has taken. But yes, if you praise Putin right now, you get yourself in trouble. Like pro-family people in the Baltic States. They're kind of paralyzed right now, I mean, if you're too pro-family, they say you're for Putin, right? Well, no, it's not.

The leader of the Russian chapter of the World Congress of Families is Alexey Komov. His connection with Konstantin Malofeev is well documented, as are Malofeev's ties to ultra-right Russian groups involved in the war in Eastern Ukraine.

One thing I do want to make clear: We never received – as long as I was running the place, which was until I retired in 2015, when I stopped being responsible for the finances – we never received a dime from any Russian source. Our ideas have been picked up in Russia and in other parts of Europe because of a shared understanding around some fundamental issues. I can't bear responsibility for all sides of this cooperation. I'm a writer and an author. I'm thrilled when somebody sees something that I've written and they like it and they use it and they take it and they go forward with it. And I can't be entirely responsible for it. I'm surprised where this has gone and I'm not quite sure what to make out of what's going to happen tomorrow. If I'm responsible for that on some level? I probably am. Although I come out of the American experience, I've studied the European and the Swedish model, I've looked at the history of Christian democracy. What I try to say is a universalist thing. I am a Christian. Christianity is a universalist creed. It's not just for my little tribe back home. It's for everybody.

How do you see the goal of the World Congress of Families? Where should everything lead to, in your vision?

I wrote that in my natural family manifesto.⁵ There's a section called "Vision." It's a couple of paragraphs: it's happy families, larger families, stronger marriages, more autonomous families, happy children, neighborhoods that are alive again with children, where mothers and fathers are both more economically engaged in their homes. And I'm a great believer in the re-functionalization of home, that's why homeschooling is so important, it's just one way to re-functionalize a home. Homes that don't do anything are weak, and fragile, and easy prey for grasping corpo-

5 Allan C. Carlson, *The Natural Family: A Manifesto* (Spence Pub, 2007).

rations or aggressive states. Families that do things for themselves, that educate their own children, raise some of their own food, run a small business in the home, make things in the home, all of those make the family strong. I'm not a materialist, but I guess love is not enough to hold a family together in the world. It has to have a material dimension to it. And it has to have a functional dimension to it. My vision is to find ways to re-functionalize families. And again, homeschooling is a perfect example of a function that naturally belongs to the family. It was taken away in the 19th and 20th centuries, and is now coming back. And again, the conditions now are much more favorable. I understand why, say, a Russian peasant family in 1890 probably was not set up to home educate their children beyond just being a peasant. They didn't have the time, didn't have the knowledge, they didn't know how to read themselves, or something like that. Things have changed now, and it's possible to be generous to mass state education, maybe it was a necessary stage to lift a great number of people out of illiteracy and out of general ignorance, and to create the conditions where education could come home again. That was not entirely true in the United States, even in the early American colonies almost all children were literate, particularly in New England, the New England Puritans deeply believed in educating their children and the boys and their girls so they could read the Bible, so they could become good Protestants. So literacy was quite common. But in other places, not so much. Not among the Scotch Irish in the hills of West Virginia and so on, they were a different kind of people, less literate.

Modern societies are pluralistic, and individuals have different visions of what makes a good life. The vision you just described is not commonly shared. Do you see this world of families as existing somehow parallel to, let's say, the world of feminism? Like, you just don't touch us, and we don't touch you? Or would you like to see the world develop more in the direction of re-traditionalizing the whole society? Do you see yourself more like a fraction inside a pluralistic society or as a potentially hegemonic force?

Well it may be a fraction inside, but have you read the book *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth* by Eric Kaufman?⁶ He's an English political scientist. He looks at differential demographics, who's having more babies. What communities are having more babies, what are having less? Salafi Islam, Mormons, there's certain ultraconservative groups of Lutherans, even in places like Finland, who have big families. The Old Order Amish in the United States, Hasidic Jews have huge families. And his argument is that, you know, if these current trends continue, in about a century and a half the religious vision is the world's future. Secular liberals are just not having children. However, the flaw in Kaufmann's argument is that secular liberals have found ways to indirectly or directly take other peoples' children by putting them in state schools and teaching them new values, which are not the values of the parents who brought them into the earth. The families in Germany, Sweden, Norway who homeschool are being harassed or imprisoned.

But if you do homeschooling, then you need some universities and so on. You need institutions that would defend you from society for all of your life.

They're there. It's all very small now, it's on the margins, but every great change in human development comes from little groups on the margins. Kaufman talks about the Old Order Amish, a German-speaking people, they go back to the 17th century, they're Anabaptists, they stick to themselves, don't take government welfare, are exempted from all this government benefits, they take care of themselves, as we would say they self-insure. There were only 5,000 of them in 1900. Today, it's about 350,000, and it's all natural growth, they have big families. Now they're starting to slow down a little bit, but they're still having really big families, instead of maybe nine or ten on average it's still six or seven, and they're spreading across the country. The Amish are buying up marginal farmlands, and they can make a living on farmland where a regular American farmer can't anymore. Because they use child labor, they focus on specialty crops, they live

6 Eric Kaufmann, *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth* (London: Profile Books, 2011).

simply, they don't borrow money, and they actually do really pretty well. They're repopulating the American countryside. It's happening without anybody really being quite aware. And one day, you just wake up, and you say, "Oh my gosh, look what's happened. Everything is changed." That is where I think it might come from. It's going to be from groups on the margins, who keep quiet, stay to themselves, one day you wake up and find out "God, they're everywhere." I think that's a way in which something may change. At the very least you carve out your little world, you defend it, you find friends and allies, you be smart politically. I think it's going to be really interesting times ahead. The hegemony of moral liberalism is not going to last; secular liberalism has lost its sustaining mythology. So, the great battles lie ahead. We'll see how it turns out.

*Interviewed by Dmitry Uzlaner (Moscow, Russia, May 2018)
and Kristina Stoeckl (Verona, Italy, March 2019)*