#include #include #include #include #if default_RNG_defined static uECC_RNG_Function g_rng_function = &default_CSPRNG; #else static uECC_RNG_Function g_rng_function = 0; #endif int uECC_make_key_with_d(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key, unsigned int *d, uECC_Curve curve) { uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS]; uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2]; /* This function is designed for test purposes-only (such as validating NIST * test vectors) as it uses a provided value for d instead of generating * it uniformly at random. */ memcpy (_private, d, NUM_ECC_BYTES); /* Computing public-key from private: */ if (EccPoint_compute_public_key(_public, _private, curve)) { /* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */ uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(private_key, BITS_TO_BYTES(curve->num_n_bits), _private); uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key, curve->num_bytes, _public); uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key + curve->num_bytes, curve->num_bytes, _public + curve->num_words); /* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */ memset(_private, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES); return 1; } return 0; } int uECC_make_key(uint8_t *public_key, uint8_t *private_key, uECC_Curve curve) { uECC_word_t _random[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2]; uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS]; uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2]; uECC_word_t tries; for (tries = 0; tries < uECC_RNG_MAX_TRIES; ++tries) { /* Generating _private uniformly at random: */ uECC_RNG_Function rng_function = uECC_get_rng(); if (!rng_function || !rng_function((uint8_t *)_random, 2 * NUM_ECC_WORDS*uECC_WORD_SIZE)) { return 0; } /* computing modular reduction of _random (see FIPS 186.4 B.4.1): */ uECC_vli_mmod(_private, _random, curve->n, BITS_TO_WORDS(curve->num_n_bits)); /* Computing public-key from private: */ if (EccPoint_compute_public_key(_public, _private, curve)) { /* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */ uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(private_key, BITS_TO_BYTES(curve->num_n_bits), _private); uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key, curve->num_bytes, _public); uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(public_key + curve->num_bytes, curve->num_bytes, _public + curve->num_words); /* erasing temporary buffer that stored secret: */ memset(_private, 0, NUM_ECC_BYTES); return 1; } } return 0; } int uECC_shared_secret(const uint8_t *public_key, const uint8_t *private_key, uint8_t *secret, uECC_Curve curve) { uECC_word_t _public[NUM_ECC_WORDS * 2]; uECC_word_t _private[NUM_ECC_WORDS]; uECC_word_t tmp[NUM_ECC_WORDS]; uECC_word_t *p2[2] = {_private, tmp}; uECC_word_t *initial_Z = 0; uECC_word_t carry; wordcount_t num_words = curve->num_words; wordcount_t num_bytes = curve->num_bytes; int r; /* Converting buffers to correct bit order: */ uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_private, private_key, BITS_TO_BYTES(curve->num_n_bits)); uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_public, public_key, num_bytes); uECC_vli_bytesToNative(_public + num_words, public_key + num_bytes, num_bytes); /* Regularize the bitcount for the private key so that attackers cannot use a * side channel attack to learn the number of leading zeros. */ carry = regularize_k(_private, _private, tmp, curve); /* If an RNG function was specified, try to get a random initial Z value to * improve protection against side-channel attacks. */ if (g_rng_function) { if (!uECC_generate_random_int(p2[carry], curve->p, num_words)) { r = 0; goto clear_and_out; } initial_Z = p2[carry]; } EccPoint_mult(_public, _public, p2[!carry], initial_Z, curve->num_n_bits + 1, curve); uECC_vli_nativeToBytes(secret, num_bytes, _public); r = !EccPoint_isZero(_public, curve); clear_and_out: /* erasing temporary buffer used to store secret: */ memset(p2, 0, sizeof(p2)); __asm__ __volatile__("" :: "g"(p2) : "memory"); memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); __asm__ __volatile__("" :: "g"(tmp) : "memory"); memset(_private, 0, sizeof(_private)); __asm__ __volatile__("" :: "g"(_private) : "memory"); return r; }