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Motives of Traditional and Emerging Donors in Aid Giving: Comparative Study between China and France

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Abstract

Since the beginning of bilateral aid giving in the aftermath of the Second World War, the motives for aid giving have changed from being purely political and humanitarian to a mix of different interests. While poverty reduction is frequently stated as the goal of aid giving, it is commonplace for donors to use aid to advance their national interests. The rise of new, emerging donors is creating discussion in both the political and academic fields of aid giving. Traditional or western donors see emerging donors, such as China's efforts in aid-giving as seeking the natural resources of the recipient countries. This paper provides a historical analysis of the aid-giving motivations underlying an emerging donor, China, and a traditional donor, France. The motives for China's and France's aid giving to African countries, with special focus on Guinea, show a great number of similarities.

Keywords: Aid Giving Motives, Emerging Donor, Traditional Donor, Poverty Reduction

1. Introduction

Donor motives are defined as the reasons or the intentions (expressed or hidden) of the donor when providing aid, and have been considered as relevant for poverty reduction. However, different donors have different motives, ranging from moral and humanitarian goals to political, economic and environmental protection motives (Martinussen and Pedersen, 2003). The study of donors' motives is important, as the intention underlying the allocation of aid has an impact on the effectiveness of the aid they provided in relations to poverty reduction (Dreher et al. 2014).

As one of the strongest emerging powers and emerging donors, China has been widely studied by scholars who mostly claimed that the intention of China's aid giving has been as a means to secure access to natural resources and to the recipient's markets for trade and investment, as well as to maintain its soft power over recipient countries (Lum et al., 2009; Dreher & Fuchs, 2011; Sun, 2014a). These studies show that China's aid has had little impact on poverty reduction for the above reasons.

However, there are also studies supporting the claim that foreign aid and investments from China have positive impacts on poverty reduction (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016). Similarly, studies such as that conducted by the Development Assistant Committee (DAC, 2000) have also emphasized the economic and political motives underlining France's aid, which affect the aid's efforts to address poverty.

Therefore, this paper addresses in depth both China's and France's aid motivations through analysis of published data including official policy documents and declarations, and scholarly works on the two countries' aid giving to African countries, especially to Guinea, which is a former colony of France, and the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1959.

2. China's Aid for Countering Expansion of Traditional Donors

The aid giving effort of China has often been viewed as a tool to counter the influence of western donors (Ojakorotu and Whetho 2008; Bräutigam 2010). For example, in the early 1950s, aid was given to support all the non-aligned countries of the Bandung conference in 1955. The rationale behind that was to limit the expansion of the two super powers (the USA and the USSR) over China's partners in Africa, Asia and Latin America. This intention to counter Western and Moscow-based domination was further enforced by former Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, in Ghana in 1964 when he confirmed Beijing's support for African struggles against imperialism (which he called "the poor helping the poor") and set Africa as an ideological battleground, countering both Washington and Moscow (Ismael, 1971).

Even with the end of the cold war, China has always been engaging in limiting the imposition or expansion of the Western development model over developing countries, particularly in Africa. Since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, China has been reiterating its desire to restrict the expansion of the West's development model, mainly the Washington consensus. In the 2000 FOCAC declaration, China and its partner countries agreed that:

"No country or group of countries has the right to impose its will on others, to interfere, under whatever pretext, in other countries' internal affairs, or to impose unilateral coercive economic measures on others. The North and the South should strengthen their dialogue and co-operation on the basis of equality." (FOCAC, 2000, para.1).

In the preamble of the FOCAC declaration, all members consider injustice and inequality in the current international system as an obstacle to the development of southern countries, including African countries, and as a threat to international peace and security. Therefore, the goal of China and its African partners is to work together to establish a just and equitable new international political and economic order, exempt from unipolar or bipolar domination by the western powers. Aid is considered one of the tools to combat such unbalanced international relations. In fact, over the years, China has become one of the most dominant actors in aid giving and investments in Africa (Banik & Chasukwa, 2016).

3. China's Aid for Building Solidarity with Partner Countries

Solidarity has been a guiding principle of China's relations with African countries, as emphasized by the former Ambassador of China in Guinea, Huo Zengde, who stated in his interview with the journal *Guinean Economy* (2009, p. 11), that "the cooperation between China and Guinea is featured by the sincerity, solidarity and reciprocity." More recently, in a speech delivered by the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Li Keqiang, to the Africa Union in 2014, he reiterated the attachment of China to Africa due to their historical relationship, both having been colonized fully or partially by the West. In his own terms he pointed out that: "Over the past five decades, Chinese and African people have helped each other and fostered an unbreakable bond of friendship. As a poet once said, "You may have forgotten the person whom you laughed with; but you will never forget the one whom you wept with." [Li added that] The history of our common struggle for a common destiny will always be our precious memory and inspiration and an inexhaustible driver

for the future growth of China- Africa relations". (Li Keqiang, 2014). Thus, the solidarity between the two partners is built from their similar pasts with western colonial masters and their mutual commitment to assist each other.

In addition to historical factors, China's solidarity towards Africa is justified by China's desire to create a just, equitable and global economy with the African countries. In that regard, China has presented itself as a champion of developing countries' interests in international forums, with the expectation that this sense of solidarity will be reciprocated (Cooke, 2009).

The latest illustration of China's solidarity toward its African partners was in 2014 when three western African countries were affected by an Ebola outbreak. China's aid was delivered under the auspices of solidarity to these three countries. This aid to Guinea took the form of technical assistance (sending medical staff) which was focused on training of Guinean health workers in the prevention and control of Ebola virus. To this, was added US\$50,000 provided by the China Red Cross, and a grant of US\$160,000 from the Chinese government. Moreover, equipment worth over US\$5 million was delivered to the three countries affected by Ebola, and food aid was provided to affected areas in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In separate messages sent to the President of Guinea, Alpha Conde; the President of Sierra Leone, Ernest Koroma; and the then President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the President of PRC, Xi Jinping, expressed sympathy and solicitude for the human and economic losses caused by the Ebola outbreak and appreciated the governments' efforts to fight the epidemic. He stated in his letter that "the Chinese government and people will stand together with the governments and peoples of the three nations and are willing to offer anti- epidemic supplies to them." Calling China and Africa good brothers, friends and partners, President Xi stated that the Chinese government and people will never forget that the African people will always extend timely support and assistance whenever the Chinese people encounter difficulties (Xinhua, August 11, 2014).

This was corroborated by what Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said at the World Economic Forum on Africa in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 8 2014. He stated that "as the Ebola outbreak continues with no signs of stopping, the affected countries have already begun to experience significant economic damage, which may be worrying for Chinese companies with high stakes there" (Caulderwood, 2014). Some scholars consider the expressions of solidarity in China's support to their African partners as veiling a hidden business agenda. However, one can conclude that even if using aid to build solidarity may not be the donor's ultimate motive, it is still considered a means to an end.

4. China's Aid as Reward to Partners for Political Support

Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China has been actively engaging in diplomatic relations with its neighboring countries in Asia, and with African countries such as Egypt, Guinea, and Ghana. China provides aid in the form of grants and interest-free loans (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011) as political rewards for countries supporting Beijing. China's aid was mainly given to socialist nations for building stadiums, hospitals, railroads, and other infrastructure. Technical assistance was also provided, through the sending of expert engineers, teachers, and doctors (Thompson, 2005).

In 1971, China's main diplomatic preoccupation was to take Taiwan's seat at the UN and thereby, strengthen its international position and assume political leadership in the Third World. Out of the 76 countries that voted for China's resumption of its legal seat in the UN, 26 were African countries (Luo & Zhang, 2009). Guinea was a leading country in this fight to support the PRC's accession to the United Nations with veto rights. Between 1959 and 1971, several projects were financed by China's aid as a reward to African countries including Guinea for their support of China's accession to the UN.

China's foreign aid has served as a tool to protect China's political interests, especially its 'One China Policy.' China has invited African partners not to recognize the Taiwanese government as the legitimate representative of the China (Rotberg, 2008). Beijing also committed to continue Taiwan's existing aid projects and offered loans to underwrite a set of new projects for African partners formerly receiving aids from Taiwan. Thus, African governments' political recognition of the PRC was a key driver of China's aid allocation to those countries (Taylor, 2009).

In addition to supporting China in the Taiwan case, the majority of African countries (receiving aid from China) have also shown support for the Chinese government's efforts to prevent the sanctioning of its human rights records in international fora such as the UN Commission of Human Rights (Lammers, 2007; Lancaster, 2007). Aside from providing aid as a result of their political support, China also provided political support to their African partners, reaffirming that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will as always stand by the African countries at the United Nations and other international fora and support the proposals and positions of the African Union. To strengthen this mutual support, the 2018 Beijing Summit of the FOCAC adopted the theme "China and Africa: Toward an Even Stronger Community with Shared Future through Win-Win Cooperation." The Beijing Declaration of the Summit emphasized the deepening of the China-Africa community and enhancing their traditional friendship.

4. China's Aid as Means to Expand Influence

China has been using its aid to maintain its soft power in recipient countries in Africa. Other forms of aid included scholarship programmes, technical assistance programmes, training programmes, supplies of equipment for aid projects, and the establishment of Confucius centers for Chinese language and cultural teaching.

In the education sector training courses have been organized for the Rectors of Universities and primary school head-teachers from African countries. Other training was targeted at particular professions, such as media, culture, specialist health or agricultural fields, even acupuncture and anti-corruption efforts (King, 2013). China's training programmes can be divided into two groups and are based on the duration. They vary from three-week political tours for ministerial officials to advanced degree programmes for university administrators (Kaiman, 2013). The training programmes organized by China have played an important role in spreading China's influence. According to President Xi Jinping's announcement, during a summit in South Africa on 4 December 2015, China would establish regional vocational education centres and colleges for Africa aiming to train 200,000 African technicians. China also planned to invite 200 African scholars to visit China, and offered 500 scholarships for Africans to study in China each year. (MacGregor, 2015).

The education that African youths acquired through scholarships to China and through Confucius schools, inculcates them in Chinese philosophy, material and ideological exchanges, and creates a moral indebtedness that is difficult to totally unpick (*New African Magazine*, May 21, 2014). Haugen already pointed out in 2013, when talking about China's scholarship programme, that the soft power theory "presumes that students with pleasant first-hand experiences of life abroad will admire the host country's political system and, in turn, push politics at home in the direction desired by the country they studied in" (Haugen 2013, p. 318). The increase in China's support in education to Africa is strong evidence that development aid in the form of education is advantageous to China in terms of their influence.

China has also been nurturing its influence in African countries through several cultural activities, and through the establishments of Confucius Institutes in African countries.

In 2006, President Hu Jintao declared that "the strengthening of China and its international influence should be reflected both in a "hard power" including the economy, science and technology, and national defense, and a "soft power" such as the culture" (Hu, 2006).

In that regard, Cultural activities have been held in Africa and in China. Striking examples are: The Chinese Culture in Africa in 2004 and the first Festival of African and Chinese youth in 2004 in Beijing.

In addition, Confucius Institutes have been created in African countries to meet their needs to teaching the Chinese language.

In 2009, there were already 21 Confucius Institutes in 14 different African countries (Luo & Zhang, 2009), as of 2018, the number of Confucius Institutes has increased to 54 in 43 different African countries. These Confucius Institutes were built within the premises of the top national educational institutions which secures the spread of Chinese culture “into the minds of Africa’s leaders of tomorrow in many areas, be it industry, academia and politics” (*New African Magazine*, May 21, 2014, para. 15). Aside from the Confucius Institutes, other institutions such as Chinese Embassies, TV and Radio stations have also been used as means to exert China’s influence in African countries (Cabestan, 2013). Sun (2014b) confirmed in her study that Chinese diplomats are eagerly engaging African media to explain and propagate China’s positions and their benefits to Africa.

In addition to cultural diplomacy, China has recently been promoting “health diplomacy” with its African partners, through the relationship between Chinese doctors and millions of ordinary Africans (Thompson, 2005 p. 2).

5. China’s Aid as Tool to Ensure Economic Interests

With the opening up of China’s economy at the end of the 1970s due to Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, increased emphasis was placed on aid projects that serve the mutual benefit of both China and the partner country (Global Legal Research Center, 2012). This motive seeks to ensure mutual benefit at least in theory between China and its partner countries. Some scholars argue that the mutual benefit policy acts as a different ideology to conceal China’s pursuit of self-interests (Mohan, Tan-Mullins, and Power, 2010). Other issues connected with this mutual benefit strategy include the tying of China’s aid projects to the export of Chinese goods and the use of Chinese labor as executor of the aid project.

For China, mutual benefit means mixing aid, investment and commercial relations tools when delivering aid to its partners. This method of mixing or tying aid to other economic tools is a lesson learned from Japan, which often provided aid to China in exchange for coal and oil (Sun, 2014). This method of mixing aid is also referred as 'tied aid,' where aid is tied to trade and investment. This form of aid received official recognition when China's Ministry of Commerce asserted the role of China's aid in strengthening China's friendly relationship and trade cooperation with other developing countries (Wang, 2007).

There are two types of Chinese aid that are tied; namely grants and zero-interest loans from the Ministry of Commerce. These two instruments are tied to Chinese companies implementing aid projects and the procurement of goods from China. The Exim Bank concessional loans are also tied and require that goods for Exim bank-financed concessional aid projects should be procured from China. According to the Exim Bank’ Regulation, “no less than 50 per cent of the procurements shall come from China” (China Concessional Loan Regulation, 1995).

According to Sun (2014), Africa is China’s second-largest supplier of service contracts, and for every RMB 1 billion given as aid to African partners, China receives service contracts worth USD 1 billion (RMB 6 billion) from Africa. Sun added that:

“In exchange for most Chinese financial aid to Africa, Beijing requires that infrastructure construction and other contracts favor Chinese service providers: 70 percent of them go to “approved” state-owned Chinese companies, and the rest are open to local firms, many of which are also joint ventures with Chinese groups” (p. 8).

In addition to cash flow back from recipient countries to China, studies reflect the fact that China's aid has given Chinese firms' business opportunities. For instance, after the implementation of an aid project to a partner country, Chinese firms bid for commercial contracts in the same partner country (Strange et al., 2013).

Among other big state-owned enterprises taking part of China's aid projects today, there was the China Complete Plant Import and Export Corporation (China Complant) and the China Civil Engineering and Construction Corporation. There are also other state-owned enterprises involved in building social infrastructures such as China's Henan International Cooperation Group Co., Ltd. (CHICO), Sichuan Huanxi Group Co. Ltd., Jinya, Hunan Construction Engineering Group Corporation of China, Shanghai Construction Group General Co., Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. etc (JEG, 2009).

Westerns donors are critical in their understanding of China economic motives, which they describe as securing access to natural resources, subsidizing Chinese firms and exports, and pursuing global economic hegemony (Strange et al., 2013). Scholars like Naím (2007) characterize China's development aid as 'rogue aid' as it is not guided by the needs of developing countries, but rather by China's national interests. However, Dreher and Fuchs (2011) challenged the verdict about China's motives (resources and alliance seeking) saying it is based on selective case studies only and no empirical study exists confirming the various claims about Chinese 'rogue aid'. In their own empirical research, Dreher and Fuchs (2012) claimed that China indeed follows recipient needs when deciding on its aid allocation, favoring countries with low per capita incomes. They also pointed out that while commercial interests matter in China's aid strategy, the empirical evidence from their own research does not support the idea that China puts greater weight on giving aid to either countries with strong commercial ties to China, or to countries that are more abundant in natural resources, in comparison to other donors. This later conclusion was also pointed out by Cheung et al. study. They also found more relations between natural resource seeking and the China FDI distribution (Cheung et al., 2011).

In addition to scholarly work, the report provided by China's White Paper in 2011 pointed out that China's aid is allocated to poor countries and therefore it is a win-win approach which implies that aid satisfies China's interests but also addresses poverty in the partner countries. Following the data provided by the White Paper, 52% of China's foreign aid goes to the Least Developed Countries. Following the UN standard, these are countries where there is extreme poverty and people live with less than \$1.25 a day.

From the African side, political leaders have voiced their opinion in favor of the benefits associated with China's aid. According to the former Senegalese' President Wade, China's aid can be summarized as follows: First, China's approach to the needs of Africans is better adapted than the slow and sometimes patronizing post-colonial approach of European donors' organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The economic relations between both sides are based more on mutual needs.

6. France's Aid as A Means to Expand Its Influence

In practice, different approaches have been used by France to spread French influence. For example, through the diffusion of its culture (also referred to as "Cultural Diplomacy")¹ and know-how. The French Co-operation Minister, Charles Josselin, speaking before the National Assembly when he introduced his 1999 budget pointed out the need for France to build up its capacities for influence abroad. Among the five priorities set for France's foreign policy in a 2008 White Paper, the fifth one highlighted that: France's external actions should "ensure the presence of ideas, language and French culture while promoting cultural diversity" (France's White Paper, 2008, p. 57).

Furthermore, the part related to development aid, considered that:

¹ The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy defines the cultural diplomacy as a course of actions, which are based on and utilize the exchange of ideas, values, traditions and other aspects of culture or identity, whether to strengthen relationships, enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests. Retrieved from http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/index.php?en_culturaldiplomacy

“France’s aid is an integral component of France’s foreign policy, and must contribute to its (foreign policy) main goals: promote a balanced globalization, strengthen peace and security in the fight against poverty and underdevelopment, and support our “influence strategies” (France’s White Paper, 2008 p. 54).

France’s Framework Document for Development (FDDC) in 2011 also reiterated the need for France to expand its influence through the promotion and exchange of know-how and culture.

According to the FDDC (2011), the first strategy laid down for such a purpose is the support of scientific research development of the partner countries and the setting up of research networks to bolster the international activities of French research institutes specializing in development, such as the Inter-Establishment Agency for Research for Development (AIRD), universities and think tanks. The second strategy is the transfer of know-how through technology transfer, capacity building for public authorities in developing countries, and hosting foreign students in France. The third strategy focuses on supporting multilingualism for cultural expansion, especially in Africa, by establishing French networks for cultural and linguistic cooperation abroad through the *Institut Français* (French Institute) (around 99 in the world as of 2019) and the *Agence pour l’enseignement du Français à l’étranger* (Agency for the French Teaching Abroad). There are also other institutions in partner countries expanding French culture and know-how such as the Lycée Français (French Higher School), Alliance Française (around 850 in the world, training about 75,070 students in Africa as of 2019), and the Espace Campus France (about 255 as of 2019) to name a few.

In France’s Document de Politique Transversale (Cross-Cutting Policy Document), the policy emphasized the role of French’ know-how as a means of exercising French influence. It emphasized the development of French partner countries through French ideas and know-how in the emerging countries (DPT, 2012). The tools used by France to exert influence are based on the expansion of French culture and the transfer of know-how. This role is entrusted to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Embassies are the implementing agencies of this policy in recipient countries.

Several sub-tools were identified by the OECD/DAC that France also uses to expand its culture and thus, its influence. Among these, there is technical assistance and scholarship. According to DAC (1998), these motives have nothing to do with poverty reduction as they serve only the interests of the donor rather than that of the recipient country. Nevertheless, they are reported by France as part of its development aid. In addition to technical assistance and scholarship programmes, the “Francophonie” programme has also played an important role in disseminating French culture². It is considered a “the relic of the past and diplomatic tool for the future” (Mauer, 2013, p. 58). Also, the Francophonie has been constantly referred to in French foreign policy as a tool to expand and support France’s cultural diplomacy (Kessler, 2013, p. 35). Besides promoting the French language, the Francophonie also supports the French vision of human rights, democracy, education and research in partner countries.

7. France’s Aid as A Means of Maintaining Historical Ties and Express Solidarity with Former Colonies

Another motive of France’s aid is to preserve historical ties with its former colonies (Berthelemy, 2005, p.11). After the independence of French colonies in the early 1960s, France’s aid was used to maintain the relationship with former colonies. This was also a way for France to get support from these countries in international fora, reinforce its influence in international relations and enlarge its political alliances.

² La Francophonie can be defined as the world community of French-speaking countries, or the collective unit formed by French-speaking people. La Francophonie was created in 1970. Its mission is to embody the active solidarity between its 80 member states and governments (57 members and 23 observers), which together represent over one-third of the United Nations’ member states and account for a population of over 890 million people, including 220 million French speakers. Retrieved from <http://www.francophonie.org/-Qu-est-ce-que-la-Francophonie-.html>

Regarding the solidarity motive, France's aid allocation system is instrumental in that regard. In 1998, France established a Priority Solidarity Zone, composed of 54 poor countries with no access to international sources of private financing. Later, a new category was created and was called Priority Poor Countries (PPPs). France was committed to provide more than half of its aid to these PPPs, which are mainly composed of French speaking countries in Africa (FDDC, 2011). The allocation of aid to these poor countries reflects France's intention to show solidarity to these impoverished countries. A striking example of French solidarity toward the PPPs is the case of Guinea. The country was threatened by the Ebola outbreak that started in March 2014, and both traditional donors like France and emerging donors have all been at the forefront to show solidarity to Guinea. The speech of the former French President Francois Hollande during his visit to Guinea in 2014 highlighted this solidarity motive:

“I wanted to be here in Guinea, to show the solidarity of France in the event that your country is going through. This is not the only one experiencing this situation since there is also Sierra Leone and Liberia. But the relationship between our two countries, Guinea and France require us to show solidarity.”

To put this solidarity into practice, France sent human resources, established a center for the treatment of medical staff affected by Ebola and training centers for medical staff. Medical equipment worth €100 million was donated, according to report from the French Embassy in 2014.

8. France's Aid as A Means of Ensuring French Economic Interests in Partner Countries

Like other donors, France's aid has played an important role in ensuring its economic interest under the label of a win-win relationship. Alain Joyandet (Ministry of Cooperation between 2008 and 2010) pointed out that: “We want to help the Africans, but we must also get something out of it” (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p. 7). Moreover, the then French Ministry of Trade also called for taking better account of French economic interests in official development assistance (Bricq, 2012, p. 7). These statements were reiterated in the French Framework Document in 2011 and laid down in the following terms:

“This document redefines the objectives of France's development cooperation policy, which serves the interests of France and its closest partners, as well as a general interest that transcends borders and which the international community has a shared duty to address” (FDDC, 2011, p. 9).

Among other strategies used to ensure French interests are: tied aid, the seeking of natural resources from partner countries and a brain drain through scholarship programmes (DAC 2000). In the DAC 2000 report, it was revealed that France's aid was tied to the procurement of goods and services originating from France, with only a limited number of goods obtained from the recipient countries (p.1-85). Two decades before the DAC report, the report of Berthelot and Brandt in 1980 on the impact of France's aid on French export and employment in France, considered the return rate on France's aid to be about 70%. These direct returns correspond to the amounts of aid the recipient countries spent in France such as contracts obtained by French companies, French products purchased and transfers to businesses (Guinant, 2013, p.13). However, since the DAC recommendation in 2001 about untying aid, France and other DAC donors have made efforts to untie their aid. It is also worth recalling that, although aid to the poor Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is untied, the aid provided to emerging countries or markets under the direction of the Ministry of Economy and Finances remains tied³.

For the second strategy, the DAC 2000 report pointed out that France's aid has been used to support the efforts and projects of its big oil companies through the provision of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) or through government subsidies and guarantees for production projects in partner countries where oil is being explored. However, no companies were named by the DAC report.

³ The financing instruments are Emerging Countries Reserve (RPE) and the Private Sector Study and Aid Fund (FASEP). The projects financed by France under these two instruments must appeal to French industrial know-how and engineering and promote the French goods or services

For the third strategy (brain drain), scholarships are granted to partner-country students not based on that country's needs, but rather based on France's economic interests. The Foreign Minister, Fabius, requested in 2013 that university scholarships be redirected towards high-potential countries and academic disciplines that match France economic interests (DAC Peer review, 2013, p. 27). So far, there is a dearth of literature on how concretely a brain-drain has occurred because of the scholarship programmes.

The last strategy aims at assigning to the French Development Agency (AFD) group the mission of supporting development efforts in recipient countries while supporting French business communities. For example, the French Council of Investors in Africa (CIAN) has a seat on the AFD Board of Directors. Moreover, AFD Group (including Proparco) and other business institutions such as the UBIFRANCE (whose mission is to scale up the presence of French SMEs in international markets) signed a framework agreement in 2009 to coordinate their actions in partner countries. Among other agreements reached, these agencies agreed to facilitate the promotion of French expertise in partner countries through a better understanding of the financial tools provided by the AFD Group, better knowledge of the projects financed, and a wider dissemination of the bid invitations and procurement procedures that AFD sponsors. They agreed to study prospects for establishing French SMEs in the partner countries, particularly by using a range of financial tools provided by AFD Group (Framework Agreement between AFD Group and UBIFRANCE, 2009). Overall, 25% of AFD' aid is implemented by French companies (AFD, 2010). They have also benefited from aid projects of other donors thanks to the OECD requirement for untying aid. Though France has been untying its aid to poor countries in Africa as evidence of its awareness of the costs of tied aid, it is concerned about the rise of China in Africa, mainly in the French speaking African countries (*Irish*, 2019).

9. France's Aid as A Means of Seeking Strategic Alliances Against Emerging Donors in Africa

In the last decade, emerging countries (China, Brazil and India for example) have been more present in sub-Saharan countries. To some extent, emerging donors became a threat to French influence in the French speaking zone where these donors have been providing African countries with both aid and investment. Recently, France's attention has been focused on China's aid and investment in the African continent. When French companies, especially in oil and infrastructure, started to feel the heat of Chinese competition in the mid-2000s, France started to reconsider its approach, though it was not as heavily affected by the competition as other western donors (such as Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and USA). This was due to the fact that French businesses are more involved in other activities such as telecoms, shipping, port operations, railways and air transport (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p.16). Nevertheless, French businesses have suffered in some other sectors including civil construction activities. This activity is under great pressure because of the lower-priced Chinese competition (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p.18). This situation has also pushed AFD to redefine sectoral intervention of its aid by focusing in sectors where French expertise is competitive such as water/sanitation, new energy and innovative agricultural projects.

Besides the competition from an economic perspective, there is also political competition, vying for the best position to defend the interests of the African countries in international forums. Previously, France and the United Kingdom were taking the lead on debating African issues in international fora (such as the UN Security Council) and drafting most of the resolutions. However, since emerging countries started creating a block at the international level, this role has been diluted as emerging donors started working on the same footing with African countries in most of the international fora. Traditionally, between 15 and 20 African countries vote with France in major UN debates, but French diplomats are worried that this support might have eroded, partly as a result of the increasing involvement of new powers such as China (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p. 18). Thus, providing and increasing aid to the prior *pré-carré* countries has become a strategy for France to maintain its roots in French speaking African Countries. This has also pushed France to relinquish some of its strict conditions for aids to counter China's influence in those countries.

10. Comparison of China's and France's Aid Motives

In light of the analysis provided, there are more similarities than differences between the motives underlying their aid giving to African countries. The major difference being that China partly tends to use aid to reward political support, while France, on some level, gives aid as a mean to transfer political values such as democracy and human rights. Unlike France, China principle of non-interference prevent it from giving or transferring its political views through aid.

Generally speaking, both donors, France and China, shared similar motives in terms of reinforcing historical tie; building solidarity with partner countries; ensuring their own economic interest through strategies like tie aid; expanding their own influence through development aid; and countering the influence of other donors in recipient countries.

Though in broad terms, similarities exist between the two donors' aid motives, in practice some differences need to be pointed out. For example, regarding the solidarity motives, France focuses on a tiny group of French speaking countries which were colonized by France and this could be interpreted as a result of France guilt feelings regarding its role as a colonial master. For China, the solidarity with its partner countries came from the fact that they had the same colonial past and similar development challenges (including poverty challenges). Regarding the economic interests through the tied aid system, China ties aid but does not set any category. The status of the recipient countries (be it LDCs or not) do not matter. However, France ties its aid only to emerging countries. The aid to LDCs is 100% untied. So, although both donors tie their aid, but the implementations are different depending on the status of the recipient.

Though the international community has been advocating that donors should integrate poverty reduction as an overarching goal of their aid, it is important to point out in general that no country will provide aid in a selfless manner or with only one side benefiting. As the famous former French Président, General de Gaulle pointed out, " les États n'ont pas d'ami ; ils n'ont que des intérêt.". Literally translated, "States have no friends; they have only interest.". The equivalent terminology currently used by US leaders is "America firs.". Therefore, there is no exemption from donors looking for mutual benefit, or the win-win approach.

There is little evidence that aid provided under the so-called win-win approach can always deliver mutual benefits everywhere. Nonetheless, still many donors continue providing aid and claiming the win-win result (Girod, 2008; Steele, 2011). Recent studies have created a framework in order for donors to create a win-win strategy really benefiting the aid recipient. Gulrajani and Calleja (2019), have created what they named as Principle Aid Index (PA index) to benchmark the performance of the 29 bilateral donors' motivations for providing official development assistance against the three dimensions of 'principledness' need and vulnerability, global cooperation, and public spiritedness. Currently the index is only used to measure OECD/DAC donors' aid underlying motives, a more thorough study of aid giving motives can be analyzed if the index is extended to emerging donors, such as China, that are not currently on the OECD/DAC list of donors.

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