INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE

THE EXPLOITATION
OF FOREIGN LABOUR
BY GERMANY

C.L.C - e -

'-• '•

Cri 12M Canova 22,
Switzerland,

MONTREAL
1945

STUDIES AND REPORTS
Series C (Employment and Unemployment), No. 25

PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE,
3480 University Street, Montreal, Canada
Published in t h e United Kingdom for the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR O F F I C E

by P. S. King and Staples Ltd., London
Distributed in the United States by the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE,

Washington Branch, 734 Jackson Place, Washington, 6, D.C,

PREFACE
The systematic use of foreign labour by Germany for the purpose of increasing its productive capacity was one of the outstanding aspects of the Second World War. Even before hostilities
actually broke out in 1939 Austrians and Czechoslovaks had already
been added to the labour force of the old pre-1938 Reich. As the
war progressed, almost the whole of Europe was brought within
the German orbit, and Germany deported and exploited foreign
labour on an enormous scale.
The International Labour Office has closely followed these
developments and has regularly published information upon their
various phases and aspects. A previous study, published by the
Office in 19431, reached the conclusion that more than 30 million
inhabitants of the continent of Europe had been displaced from their
own countries since the beginning of the war, and that this figure included aboHt 63^ million foreign workers and prisoners of war
employed, inside Germany. According to a later estimate 2 , by
January 1944 the figure had risen to 8,600,000, including 6,400,000
foreign workers and 2,200,000 prisoners of war. There are indications that in the course of 1944 the number of foreign workers increased still further.
To the foreigners employed in Germany must be added millions
of others who worked for the German war effort under German
control in their own countries, or were moved by the German
authorities from their countries to other German-occupied territories. How this gigantic movement was organised; how recruitment and distribution were undertaken; what the conditions were
under which these workers lived and laboured ; how it was possible
to use this great mass of workers who, from the German point of
view, were potentially disloyal; what care was taken of the workers
in case of sickness; what conditions they had to fulfil in order to
return home; and how their families fared while the breadwinners
were away; these are among the questions which this Report
attempts to answer.
1
Eugene KULISCHER: The Displacement ef Population in Europe, Studies
and Reports, Series O, No. 8 (International Labour Office, Montreal, 1943).
* "The Mobilisation of Foreign Labour by Germany", in International Labour
Review, Vol. L, No. 4, Oct. 1944, pp. 469-480.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Under wartime difficulties of obtaining information, the Report
does not claim to give a complete account of German exploitation of foreign labour. It attempts merely to set forth the evidence
at present available. Wherever possible, it is based on direct German sources. These include official publications, such as the handbook for the guidance of German public employees dealing
with foreign workers; the official gazettes in which legislation
was published, and the publications of the Reich Ministry
of Labour, the Office of the Four-Year Plan, the Office of
the Commissioner-General for Manpower, the German Labour
Front, the occupation authorities, and other German agencies.
Wide use has been made of German periodicals and newspapers,
all, of course, published under Government auspices or Government control. Direct access has not, however, always been possible
to all these German publications which, in such cases, have been
consulted at second hand through quotations in the press, or other
publications, of neutral countries. Another source has been the
information offices of Governments of the United Nations, several
of which published bulletins containing direct evidence and reproducing original documents. Information was also supplied
directly to the International Labour Office, after the liberation of
Belgium, France and Luxembourg, by the Governments of those
countries. Some evidence has been derived from the publications
of international workers' organisations. Lastly, the Office has
availed itself of its own branch offices, and of its correspondents
in various allied and neutral countries.
The German sources have been used with due caution. German publications, needless to say, do not tell the whole story, and,
naturally, attempt to conceal some issues and to place the situation in general in a favourable light. Under wartime conditions
there are, moreover, inevitable gaps in the available information.
The Office is also aware that, in spite of careful checking, there
may be errors of omission or commission. It is hoped, however,
that a sufficient body of evidence has been assembled to prove of
immediate practical value.
The study has been prepared by Mr. John H. E. Fried, a member
of the staff of the International Labour Office.

CONTENTS
Page

PREFACE

I. German War Labour Policy.
Germany's Need of Manpower
An Emergency System
Application of Political and Racial Doctrines
The Results of the Experiment

1
2
6
7
12

II. Administrative Problems
Agencies and Authorities
The Reorganisation of Labour Administration in March
1942

14
14

CHAPTER

CHAPTflp III. The Recruitment of Foreign Workers
Transportation of Foreign Workers
IV. Transplantation
Germany
In the West
In the East

CHAPTER

of Foreign Undertakings

30
41
to

V. The Numbers Involved

VI. The Distribution of Foreign Workers
Distribution of Foreigners in Industry
Distribution of Foreigners in Agriculture and O t h e r . . . .
Occupations

CHAPTER

VII. The Todi Organisation

VIII. Labour Contracts
Bilateral Government Agreements
German-Spanish Government Agreement concerning Allocation of Spanish Manpower to Germany
Italian Workers' Contracts
Government Agreements concerning the Importation
of Agricultural Workers

CHAPTER

43
43
50
54
65
65
69
71
82
82
82
85
85

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
Page

Termination of Contracts
Compulsory Prolongation of Labour Contracts
IX. Living Conditions
Housing
Food
Clothing
Bedding
Vermin in the Workers' Camps

86
87

CHAPTER

90
91
94
100
104
105

X. The Regulation of Wages
Western and Certain Central European Workers
Wages
Separation Bonus
Taxation
Wages and Taxes of Workers from the East
Wages and Taxation of Polish Agricultural Workers.
Wage Conditions of Poles in the Warthegau
Industrial Wages for "Eastern" Workers.
Conclusions
CHAPTER X I . Conditions of Work
Hours of Work, Overtime Pay, Efforts to Increase Output
Home Furloughs
Furloughs for Polish Workers
Holidays
Domestic Workers
Domestic Workers from the West
Domestic Workers from the East
Measures concerning Deceased Foreign Workers
CHAPTER X I I . Prevision for Dependants
The Statistical Aspect
Other Monetary Measures

107
109
109
116
118
124
124
127
128
134
137
138
144
149
151
152
153
153
156
159
166
179

X I I I . Measures to Counteract Foreigners' Resistance
Supervision by Foreign Delegates
Spokesmen and Collaborators
Coercion and Punishment
Divergent Trends in German Labour Policy
Efforts at Political Indoctrination
Foreign Language Press
Work Books
CHAPTER XIV. Social Insurance for Foreign Workers
Workers Other than Polish and Soviet Workers
Unemployment Insurance

183
185
188
189
195
199
203
205
208
208
210

CHAPTER

CONTENTS

V
Page

Sickness Insurance
Removal of Sick and Incapacitated Foreigners
Family Sickness Insurance Benefits
Social Security Benefits in France
Finance of the Benefits
Employment Injury (Accident) Insurance
Invalidity and Old-Age Insurance
War Damage Insurance
Polish and Soviet Workers
Pregnant Women
Conclusions
CHAPTER XV. Industrial Experience for Foreign Workers....
Foreign Preference for Industrial Employment

212
212
216
218
220
224
228
229
231
233
237
239
242

CHAPTER XVI. The Legacy of the System

244

APPENDICES:

I. Organisation of the German-Occupied Eastern
tories

Terri-

II. The Exploitation of Jews

248
250

III. A Survey of German Recruitment Methods in Various
Countries
IV. An Estimate of Foreign Labour Employed in "Greater
Germany" in January 1944
V. Model Labour Contracts

264
268

VI. Food Rations

274

VII. Social Insurance Provisions
VIII. The Deportation of Belgian Workers in the First World
War

256

277
283

CHAPTER

GERMAN WAR LABOUR POLICY
The outstanding aspect of German labour policy during the
Second World War has been its contradictory character. It has
combined the extreme features of an economy of scarcity, with the
extreme features of a system of waste. Waste was continually enhanced by scarcity, while scarcity was continually aggravated by
waste.
This paradox applies particularly to the intricate system built
up by the Third Reich for the exploitation of other countries'
manpower. By military or political domination over ever larger
parts of Europe, Germany for several years acquired mastery over
millions of non-German workers. It decided to use them for its
war needs; which meant, in the great majority of cases, for war
against their own countries. In the attempt to remedy the scarcity
of German labour, foreign labour, seemingly inexhaustible, was
wastefully employed. Methods of deliberate ruthlessness and
coercion were applied on a large scale to non-Germans, and there
was general disregard of human life. But these measures only
served to increase the waste, and to aggravate the scarcity, of German manpower; the cumulative result of persistent compulsion
was to require still greater supervision and repression of the foreign
labour recruits.
In addition to coercion, Germany also employed modern scientific methods of mass administration, mass organisation and mass
propaganda. These methods, however, were always combined with,
and influenced by, the system of physical regimentation. The underlying truth was that all these measures were directed towards compelling conquered peoples to work for their conqueror's war effort—
a practice long prohibited by international law1, and bound moreover to engender grave difficulties.
For these reasons, the wartime administration of foreign manpower in the Reich, as well as in the German-controlled parts of
Europe, came to differ widely not only from peacetime economy,
but also, and fundamentally, from the war economy of Germany's
1

See Chapter XVI.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

opponents. The major Powers engaged in the war were faced,
it is true, with many manpower problems; but measures which in a
non-National-Socialist atmosphere might not have been obnoxious
or might even have eased the lot of labour recruits, must be judged,
in the case of Germany, against a background of ubiquitous fear
and general insecurity.
The same background must be borne in mind in considering
the various incentives used to support the system of coercion,
which, to the disappointment of the Germans, remained mainly
ineffective, because they were outweighed by restrictions and
deprivations.
Yet another difficulty in forming a true picture lies in the fact
that the officiai German sources which form the basis of the present
report often disguise the stark realities of German labour policy
in orthodox legal and economic terminology. The exploitation of
non-German manpower was thus squeezed into the categories of
conventional labour relations and labour law. But the nomenclature created to describe normal industrial relations is not fitted
to describe the schemes applied by Germany to millions of nonGerman workers during the war. To take an example a t random:
it was largely a fiction to speak of a "labour contract" between
the Todt Organisation and a Norwegian or a Frenchman who,
against his will, was compelled to build fortifications for the German army.
GERMANY'S N E E D OF MANPOWER

Labour became scarce in Germany even before the start of
military hostilities. In 1938, a t the height of the German preparations for war, the available labour reserve did not suffice to supply
the workers needed to build the "West Wall" fortifications. Hence,
in June 1938, Reich Marshal Hermann Goring, in his capacity as
Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan, introduced compulsory
labour mobilisation, requiring every German citizen1, regardless
1
Order of 22 June 1938. Subsequently, t h e Order of 13 February 1939 extended compulsory labour mobilisation to all persons on German territory,
regardless of nationality. Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. X L I , No. 6,
J u n e 1940, p p . 590-592; Vol. XLIV, No. 6, Dec. 1941, pp. 633-637; INTERNATIONAL LABOUR O F F I C E : Labour Supply and National Defence, Studies and Reports, Series C, No. 23 (Montreal, 1941), p p . 164-166.
Compulsory labour mobilisation was introduced by Hermann Goring after
the European crisis resulting from t h e German demands on Czechoslovakia.
Compulsory labour mobilisation {Dienstverpflichtung)
must be distinguished
from compulsory labour service (Arbeitsdienstpflicht
or
Reichsarbeitsdienst).
The latter was introduced in June 1935, for German boys and girls only. I t
was used partly to furnish cheap labour for t h e building of strategic roads and
for German agriculture, and partly for a thinly veiled pre-military training;

cf. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR O F F I C E :

Legislative

Series, 1935, Ger. 8.

GERMAN WAR LABOUR POLICY

of professional or social status, to accept any work or to undergo any training to which he was assigned by the authorities.
Compulsory labour mobilisation was intended to hasten the
completion of the"West Wall". The labour offices ordered 400,000
German workers to leave their jobs and allotted them instead to
undertakings connected with this "biggest fortification construction of all time". After the outbreak of war, Walter Stothfang,
Personal Assistant to the State Secretary, Dr. Syrup, in the Reich
Ministry of Labour, wrote:
Today, when the enemy pack once more assaults us, to prevent Germany's
resurrection and to enslave us for all time, we know what the West Wall means
to us. But, we must remember t h a t it was possible to provide the labour force
needed for this enormous construction project only through the Government's
deliberate action, for free reserves of manpower had long ceased to exist. 1

Yet, after the "West Wall" was finished, it was found that compulsory labour mobilisation had to be continued in order to hasten
other huge projects connected with the last stages of German war
preparation, for example, the construction of additional factories
for the hydration of coal2 ; and this despite the fact that compulsory
labour mobilisation was so unpopular in Germany that discontent
with this ultima ratio of labour administration was officially acknowledged.3
By the end of 1938, Dr. Friedrich Syrup, State Secretary in the
Reich Ministry of Labour, estimated the need for additional manpower at one million (25 per cent, for agriculture and 75 per cent.
for industry) .*
During the ensuing months, increasingly severe regulations
prohibited change of occupation and of place of employment; one
such regulation, for example, was issued on the day that the German troops marched into Prague. 6 The tightening of the labour
regulations created such serious discontent that the labour offices
were expressly directed not to apply them "obstinately, as if they
were prohibitions". 6
In fact, from the outset of the régime in 1933, the National
Socialist authorities established, and continued to intensify, a
1
Dr. Walter STOTHFANG: "Der Arbeitseinsatz im Kriege", in Schriften für
Politik und Auslandskunde (Berlin, Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1940), p. 7.
* F . W I L L E C K B : Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, Sept. 1941,
p. 315.
3

Cf.

W a l t e r STOTHFANG, loc. »it.,

p. 2 1 ; F . W I L L E C K B , op.

eil.

Dr. F . S T R U P : "Die Etappen des Arbeitseinsatzes", in Soziale Praxis, 1939,
p. 14.
» Decree of Reich Minister of Labour, 15 March 1939; Reichsarbeitsblatt,
P a r t I, p. 141.
• Walter STOTHFANG: "Freiheit und Bindung im Arbeitseinsatz", in Der
Vierjahresplan, 1941, p. 314.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

system of regimentation for every aspect of labour. The nearer
the Reich came to the end of its war preparations, the more were
the rights of German workers curtailed, in order to keep up the
feverish tempo of armament.
Later, it was officially acknowledged that the régime had,
from the outset, built up its special system of labour allocation
(Arbeitseinsatz) as a prerequisite of German rearmament. While
the branch of the administration concerned (Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung) "assumed ever-increasing tasks and had to bear ever-increasing responsibilities, details about these activities had to be kept
as secret as those which related to German rearmament itself".1
This policy derives from the experiences of the First World War.
In 1916, General Ludendorff could not get his German manpower
mobilisation programme accepted, because of the opposition of
the German trade unions. The National Socialists considered it
essential to prevent a repetition of such events in another war:
After the negative experiences of the last war Germany has realised the importance of the mobilisation of labour in modern warfare. This time, fortunately,
it has neglected nothing in this direction. 2

In short, to enable the Third Reich to prepare for war, the
rights of labour, as guaranteed by the Weimar Constitution of
1919, had to be systematically abolished and a system of everincreasing coercion had to be introduced in their stead.
And yet, in spite of the ruthless execution of National Socialist
schemes (which were to silence all opposition from the workers)
and in spite of the enormous conquests made by the Third Reich
early in the war (which were to make Germany economically selfsufficient and impregnable, and to provide its war machine with
almost unlimited loot) manpower shortage remained one of
Germany's most pressing wartime problems.
This is a rather remarkable fact. During the First World War,
Germany's shortage of food was much more critical, and increased
more quickly than the shortage of manpower. During the Second
World War, the situation was different. The "New Order" has
been more successful during the war in providing food for Greater
Germany than in providing sufficient manpower.
Even before the war there was a tendency towards declining
productivity in German economy, when it was working under the
restrictions imposed by the National Socialist programme of au1
Fritz Sauckel, a t the first congress of officials of the Labour Allocation
Administration of Greater Germany, Weimar, 10-11 September 1942 (quoted in
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 27, 25 Sept. 1942, P a r t V, p . 499) (italics added).
1
Walter STOTHFANG, in Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 4 Mar. 1944.

GERMAN WAR LABOUR POLICY

tarky; and even then, efforts were made to offset this declining
productivity by increasing the number of workers. The tendency
was intensified under the impact of the war. Germany's raw material problems were met by transforming them into labour
problems.
German war economy needed, on the average, more human
labour for the output of one unit than the war economy of other
highly industrialised countries. This was due neither to a general
inferiority of the German productive system nor to a lower productivity per man-hour of the German worker as compared with
other European workers. Its causes were the following:
(1) The lack of a sufficient supply of certain strategic raw materials compelled Germany to rely largely on substitutes; and to
produce substitutes meant the use of more labour than to produce
the original raw material.
(2) The structure of the National-Socialist régime deprived the
economy of very large numbers of able-bodied potential workers
who had to be employed instead in the Gestapo and other special
branches of the police system, in the Party organisations, the
labour administration service, the German Labour Front, the
factory guards, etc. This huge supervisory machine had in turn
to be supplied with adequate clerical staff, with arms and technical
appliances, with special communication and transportation facilities, etc.
(3) Germany's essential war industries and agriculture relied
heavily on foreign workers who, in the great majority, were forcibly
recruited and were kept in line by a machinery of coercion; which
meant that a considerable additional number of able-bodied German
men were used in unproductive positions as overseers of various
kinds.
It must also be remembered that, besides the use of foreigners,
other emergency wartime measures were introduced in Germany
on a large scale, such as the rationalisation and simplification of
manufacturing processes in order to save skilled manpower, to
facilitate the interchangeability of war contracts between the
various factories, and to offset the dislocation caused by bombing;
the centralised distribution of orders; the concentration of industry
through the closing down of less efficient plants; and, in the later
stages of the war, a gradual and increasing elimination of all nonessential activities and professions—a programme which changed
fundamentally the whole structure of German society, economy,
consumption habits and living standards.
Yet the great need of industrial and agricultural manpower

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

made the mass importation of foreign workers one of the most
urgent tasks of the German wartime administration. In importance it ranked as high as, and in the long run perhaps even higher
than, the other spoils of German conquest. When the outlook was
already dark, in the spring of 1944, the German public was still
being told that "the economic strength of Germany and her allies
lies in her wealth of productive human beings, which by far surpasses
the manpower reserves at the disposal of England and North
America for immediate armament production". 1
A N EMERGENCY SYSTEM

According to official German reports, the policy of exploiting
military conquests for the forced deportation of foreign labour
started as far as back as the campaign against Poland in September
1939. Labour recruiting agents, whose task was to round up Polish
workers and transport them to Germany, followed "on the heels"
of the German troops. Later, although the methods were not always
those used in Poland, every new conquest and every further extension of German domination was followed by a systematic and
large-scale utilisation of foreign manpower.
This policy was in line with the National Socialist doctrine of
total warfare. On the other hand, the magnitude of the scheme
had not been foreseen and created, even among the German authorities, much uneasiness, which increased as the war proceeded.
The number of foreign workers who at present [October 1943] are employed
in German factories, plants, and shops goes beyond anything that was known
before and beyond anything that was planned at the beginning of the war. An
army of millions of Europeans of all nationalities has made its entry into the
Reich. . . This development, in the midst of the most serious of all wars, created
a problem which subjected the inner stability of the Reich to a very severe test
•—a test well nigh as severe as that endured on the battlefields. . . It goes without
saying that the dangers from this employment of foreigners grew in proportion
as the Reich was forced to meet new and grave military difficulties.
To have masses of foreigners in the Reich while it is threatened from all sides,
is a gamble.2

Throughout the war, alien manpower was an unwieldy instrument in the hands of the German régime. Wartime utilisation of
foreign labour never ran smoothly; it could be developed only in a
makeshift fashion. Whether or not Germany had entered the war
with a master plan for the importation or for the centralised ad1
Editorial in Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung (May Day edition), 30 Apr. 1944
(italics in original).
3
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 Oct. 1943.

GERMAN WAR LABOUR POLICY

ministration of conquered manpower, the actual course of events
was never entirely foreseen by the German authorities themselves.
The empiric manner in which foreign labour was used was frequently emphasised by official German spokesmen. For example:
The course of the war has forced Germany to adopt measures in the field
of labour allocation which have become more stringent from year to year. It is
true that the uncertainty regarding the nature of the measures that would become necessary at any given time and the extent to which the measures would
be necessary made it impossible to plan much ahead. Germany was forced increasingly to develop a careful system "of expedients" in order to master the
tasks which came up in great variety and in such large numbers. Therefore the
German Administration of Labour Allocation has been taught to be flexible and
adaptable and it cannot be denied that very strong tension exists in this branch
of the administration.1

I n a similar vein, another German authority on labour questions 2
observed that, in dealing with foreign labour, it was possible only
in exceptional cases to issue regulations of a fairly permanent
character, even for parts of the Reich territory itself. "The various
problems which arose had almost always to be settled in an ad hoc
manner." (He added that only a quieter post-war period would
provide the necessary opportunity to create a simplified labour
code for foreigners volunteering for work in Germany.)
APPLICATION OF POLITICAL AND R A C I A L DOCTRINES

The political and racial doctrines of the régime, as well as considerations of military security, militated against large-scale importation of foreign civilians into Germany for any length of time.
The aim of National Socialist policy before the war had been to
remove from German territory all persons and groups which National Socialist political and racial doctrines considered non-German,
and to limit to an absolute minimum the migration into Germany
of persons who were not considered desirable from a racial or a
political standpoint. When millions of aliens who were not even familiar with the German language were living and working in all parts
of Germany, and when almost every German factory and every
German farm became a meeting-place for many nationalities and
languages 3 , one of the fundamental war aims of National Socialist
Germany was invalidated, namely, "to establish clearer racial
boundaries". 4
1

Walter STOTHFANG, in Soziale Praxis, Mar. 1943, p. 95 (italics added).
Dr. Werner MANSFELD, in Deutsches Arbeitsrecht, Feb. 1943, p. 23.
3
Cf. Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No. 3-4, 1943, p. 19.
4
Cf. Adolf Hitler's speech in the Reichstag on 6 October 1939.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

During the war it was not possible to reconcile the national and
racial doctrines of national socialism with the need for an enormous
influx of aliens. Many officiai statements reveal resentment at
this necessity. As German armament factories, German industrial
cities and the German countryside resounded more and more with
foreign tongues, the authorities assumed a somewhat apologetic
attitude—apologetic, that is to say, not to the foreigners, but to
Germans.
The dilemma was by no means theoretical only; it had farreaching practical results. It was in fact largely responsible for
the plight of the aliens recruited for work in Germany and Germanoccupied territory, for the régime tried to uphold its racial and
political doctrines by methodically harsh treatment of the
foreigners.
They were debarred from exercising their basic political rights,
and they had no say in the choice of the officials who exercised
practically unlimited power over their own and their families'
existence. With few exceptions, foreign workers were deprived of
the basic civil rights of free men: they were deprived of the right
to move freely or to choose their place of residence; to live in a
household with their families; to rear and educate their children;
to marry; to visit public places of their own choosing; to negotiate,
either individually, or through representatives of their own choice,
the conditions of their own employment; to organise in trade
unions; to exercise free speech or other free expression of opinion;
to gather in peaceful assembly; and they were frequently deprived
of the right to worship according to their own conscience.
To satisfy National Socialist racial doctrines, emphasis was
constantly placed on the necessity of segregating foreigners and
discriminating against them, particularly in the case of members
of nations and races considered as inferior. Although the realities
of industrial, agricultural and other work made it impossible to keep
foreigners and Germans apart, the policy of segregation and discrimination entailed much suffering and hardship. Foreign workers
were transported in mass transports, lodged in mass lodging places,
fed in mass canteens, supervised during work and after, and were
able to enjoy hardly any private life.
One of the most serious results of the National Socialist system
of recruitment and deportation of workers was the deliberate
breaking up of family life. German labour drives were not limited
to unmarried persons nor to families without young children. Only
in a very few cases were husband and wife taken to the same destination. As a rule, for a married male worker, deportation to Germany
meant prolonged separation, of indefinite duration, from his wife,

GERMAN WAR LABOUR POLICY

or, for a married woman, from her husband. Similarly, boys and
girls recruited for labour in Germany were indiscriminately separated from their parents. Conditions were perhaps even worse for
families whose children were too small to be recruited. Only in
very exceptional cases were small children allowed to join their
fathers or mothers who were going to Germany; as a rule, children
had to be left behind. In the Government-General 1 in Poland the
German authorities prohibited recruited women from taking their
children with them, even if the women were destined, not for
Germany, but for German-controlled work in another region of the
Government-General.
After the members of a family were once separated, they frequently lost trace of one another, owing to the dislocation and
difficulties caused, not only by administrative action, but also
by military operations.
Underground reports reveal that adults and children often
made desperate, but vain, efforts to avoid separation. The Germans
used physical force and are reported" to have shot women trying
to keep their children.
What was the fate of the children left behind ? From available reports, it appears that this depended on the policy pursued
by the Germans in the particular area. If the area was destined
to be "resettled" by "racially German" settlers, the children,
together with those adults who on account of age or sickness were
not deported for work, were regularly transported to other regions,
under most trying circumstances. In other cases Polish children
were removed to special German orphanages and training camps.
There various systematic efforts were made to germanise them.
This germanisation process was in the hands of specially selected
German primary school teachers, students from German universities
and representatives of Party organisations such as the Hitler
Youth and the League of German Girls. Finally, in many areas
the children were left to themselves, or forced to work in special
squads in the construction or other services. Reports from the western provinces of Poland also reveal that boys and girls between
the ages of 10 and 14 were sometimes forced to work in German
munition plants.
*
*
*
While Germany's utilisation of foreign manpower in some
respects ran counter to National Socialist doctrines, it was further
1
For German wartime administration of the occupied Eastern territories, see
Appendix I.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

complicated by the fact that the German authorities combined
with it the fostering of long-run German war aims. It is true that
Germany's wartime policy in the occupied and dominated territories aimed, first of all, at increasing the war potential. But the
determination to put more distant "racial" war aims into practice
was so strong that it prevented rational utilisation of the manpower
supply.
For example, the transplanting of hundreds of thousands of
so-called Volks Germans in the midst of war added greatly to
the difficulties of German administration in the eastern territories, since this policy involved the expulsion of millions of the
former inhabitants of the territories to be resettled by Germans. 1
The policy followed in dealing with Jews was similarly dictated by
racial doctrines. Jews were, at first, put into labour gangs. But
during the later phases of the war the National Socialist
authorities decided that the physical reduction of the number of
European Jews was more important than the utilisation of their
labour. 2
Another illustration is the importation of children for work
in Germany or German-occupied territory. The employment, not
only of juveniles of various nationalities of 14 years of age, but of
much younger "Eastern" children, has been reported again and
again by neutral observers. It appears that they were mostly
used for work on railways and road-building and in mining and
agriculture. Until the later stages of the war, German sources did
not mention this fact. On 26 March 1944, however, the Commissioner-General for Manpower issued a new Order concerning
working conditions of "Eastern" workers employed in Germany.
This Order contains a direct reference to children under 14 years:
" I n so far as juvenile Eastern workers under 14 years of age are
put to work they shall receive 40 to 90 per cent, of the wages of
other 14-year-old foreign workers. Within these limits, the wage
shall be determined according to the output of the individual
juvenile Eastern workers." 3 Provision was thus specifically made
1
In the summer of 1942 a vast scheme was elaborated for the mass migration of some 3 million Netherlanders to colonise the German-occupied Soviet
territories. Cf. Eugene M. KULISCHER: The Displacement of Population in Europe,
Studies and Reports, Series O, No. 8 (International Labour Office, Montreal,
1943), p. 66: "A great deal of propaganda has been spent on promoting this
scheme. The Germans stressed that, next to Belgium, the Netherlands was the
most densely populated area in western Europe; t h a t the country urgently needed
a wider basis for its food supply; and t h a t the waste regions of the east would
'compensate the Dutch for the colonies they have lost forever'. . . To organise
settlement in the east, the Netherlands East Company was created."
2
See Appendix II.
3
Article 3, para. 8, of Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower,
of 26 March 1944; Reichsgesetzblatt 2, No. 14, S Apr. 1944, Part I, p. 71.

GERMAN WAR LABOUR POLICY

for "Eastern" children who produced as little as 40 per cent, of
the output of a 14-year-old non-"Eastern" child (the Order
probably referred to 14-year-old labour recruits from south-eastern
Europe).
In the eastern territories, Germany's large-scale deportation
of workers was accompanied by unparalleled measures of largescale extermination.
After the Soviet armies reconquered
the invaded territories, official investigating committees were set
up to establish evidence about the German occupation. The statements issued by these committees give a shocking picture of the
mass executions carried out by the Germans. 1
According to the testimony of witnesses which the Executive
Office of the President (of the United States of America), War
Refugee Board, declared in November 1944 to "be considered as
entirely credible" and to "tally with all the trustworthy yet fragmentary reports hitherto received",
it is a fact beyond denial t h a t the Germans have deliberately and systematically murdered millions of innocent civilians—Jews and Christians alike—
all over Europe. . . So revolting and diabolical are the German atrocities t h a t
the minds of civilised people find it difficult to believe t h a t they have actually
taken place. But the Governments of the United States and of other countries
have evidence which clearly substantiates the facts. 2

This policy of systematic destruction of potential manpower
can only be explained by a determination on the part of the National Socialist authorities to carry out their geopolitical doctrines
without regard for the consequences to their own war effort.3
During the later phases of the war, the ultimate political aims
of the deportation of foreign labour became even more obvious.
For example, throughout the German retreat in the Soviet Union
and Poland, masses of inhabitants were taken towards the Reich
with little consideration for their working ability. In the autumn
and winter of 1944 the same policy was followed in the Netherlands
and elsewhere. These deportations were clearly aimed, not so
much at strengthening the momentary manpower situation in
Germany, as at weakening the future manpower situation of its
enemies.
1
See Information Bulletins of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Washington, D.C., 11 May 1944, pp. 3 et seq., 2 Dec. 1944, p. 7,
18 Jan. 1945, p. 1, and 1 Feb. 1945, p. 2.
* Executive Office of the President, War Refugee Board, Washington, D.C.,
mimeographed report on German Extermination Camps, Nov. 1944, p. 1.
' The report by the Executive Office of the President states: "This campaign
of terror and brutality, which is unprecedented in all history and which even
now continues unabated, is part of the German plan to subjugate the free peoples
•of the world".

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
T H E RESULTS OF THE EXPERIMENT

By mid-1940 Germany (including its allies) had under its
domination a territory containing a population of approximately
225 millions. Within one year this figure rose, through the conquest
of the Balkans, to approximately 285 millions. At the height of
its penetration into the Soviet Union, Germany dominated a territory containing approximately 355 million persons. Together with
the territories and populations, Germany won the plants, productive equipment and all the raw material which had not been
destroyed by its opponents during their temporary retreat, and
it made the most determined efforts to harness to its own war
economy the enormous reserve of productive capacity of the conquered or politically dominated countries.
The policy of forced importation of labour obtained some
measure of success. As the war proceeded, the proportion of foreign
to German workers in the German armament industries rose to
1:3 and 1:2, and finally, in many places to 1:1, until the number of
foreigners often exceeded the number of Germans. 1 In many
agricultural regions of Germany, all work had to be done by German women, prisoners of war and foreign labour recruits. Outside
the German borders, many labour gangs of the Todt Organisation
consisted entirely of conscripted non-German workers, controlled
by small German staffs. There must also be added, of course, the
foreign manpower outside the frontiers of Greater Germany which
produced industrial and agricultural output for the war machine.
There can be no doubt that without the utilisation of millions of
foreign workers Germany would not have been able to carry on
the war so long.
But in war it is the final result that counts. Viewed, as it must
be, in perspective, this gigantic experiment did not provide a
solution of the German labour shortage problem. It was a partial
solution ; but in spite of continuous importation of foreign workers
and in spite of Germany's success, for several years, in harnessing
almost the whole of Europe to its war effort, the manpower shortage
became increasingly critical as the war proceeded.
The systematic use of propaganda and inducements, and the
fostering of social and national antagonisms produced some effect
in the course of years. With so many persons involved, even a small
percentage of collaborators had some numerical importance, and the
1
A German-dominated Austrian paper of 20 September 1944 stated that in
Austrian arms and war production factories the proportion of foreign workers
amounted to 80 per cent. (It must be noted that Austrian workers are not considered as foreign workers.) A t about the same time, Goebbels' organ Das Reich
spoke of factories in the Reich 90 per cent, of whose workers were foreigners.

GERMAN WAR LABOUR POLICY

German authorities saw to it that foreign collaborators were rewarded with positions in which they could best exercise their influence.
But this small degree of collaboration pales before the courage,
the patriotism and, above all, the resourcefulness with which the
huge majority resisted the German manpower drives and with
which the labour recruits, once in Germany, contrived to minimise
the efficiency of the programme.
Throughout Europe, the conscription of labour, however much
combined with inducements and propaganda, led to resistance.
To their best ability, and often at the cost of their lives, the conscripts and their families resisted participation in German war work.
But for their efforts, the wartime labour policy of the Third Reich
might have had far other results and, indeed, the war itself might
have taken a different course.

C H A P T E R II
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
German administrative machinery for the regulation of labour
questions reflected the outstanding importance which the National
Socialists attached to the subject. The system was intricate and
the administrative "overhead" high. The need for continuous
co-ordination among the three branches of the Government, namely,
the Party, the bureaucracy and the armed forces, was bound to
complicate still further the manifold problems of wartime labour
policy.
In the main the measures concerning labour were shaped and
executed by the following agencies and authorities, whose jurisdiction frequently overlapped.
AGENCIES AND AUTHORITIES

From the beginning of the war the overall direction of Germany's
policy was entrusted to the Reich Defence Council, or War
Cabinet (Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung), which was concerned not only with executive functions at the highest level but
with policy making and full legislative functions as well.
Of the seven men composing the War Cabinet, at least four
were directly concerned with the question of manpower supply:
Reich Marshal Goring, the Chairman, who, as Commissioner for
the Four-Year Plan, was the highest authority on questions
of labour distribution; the Minister of the Interior, Frick (later
Himmler), in his capacity as Commissioner-General of National
Administration; Todt (after his death, Speer), the Minister for
Armament and Munitions and Commissioner-General for War
Production, with his broad powers over all matters of war production; and last, but not least, Field Marshal Keitel, who voiced
the needs of the armed forces, both for manpower and for war
production. 1
1
The remaining members of the War Cabinet were Bormann, Chief of the
highest Party organ, the Chancellery of the National Socialist Party; Funke,
Reich Minister of Economic Affairs and Commissioner-General for all matters
concerning economics; and Lammers, Chief of Staff of the Reich Chancellery,
representing the Führer.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

The Reich Ministry of Labour was the highest federal agency
in the field of labour administration. 1 Until the appointment of the
Commissioner-General for Manpower it was, together with the
Four-Year Plan Organisation 2 , in "central command" of the continent-wide system of labour recruitment and allocation. But
even after the appointment of the Commissioner-General for Manpower, the Reich Ministry of Labour was the chief centre for
the preparation of labour legislation and frequently negotiated
with foreign authorities for the importation of labour. It also
acted as co-ordinator between the various government departments and central Party agencies dealing with manpower questions.
Lastly, it remained the supreme authority on questions of
labour protection (safety, factory inspection, supervision of undertakings and working conditions), and of the various branches of
social insurance.
The Wehrmacht had an important and often decisive voice
in all matters concerning German war economy and, in particular,
manpower problems. In addition to Field Marshal Keitel's position in the War Cabinet, the Wehrmacht exercised legislative
and administrative authority over labour questions in various
German-occupied territories, in many cases for several years. 3
At times there was considerable friction between the military
agencies, which wanted to keep as many civilian foreign workers
1
In order to secure the greatest efficiency in this branch of Federal administration, the National Socialist régime from 1939 onwards took the precaution
of centralising the labour administration of the various German States; only
Prussia continued to have a civil service of its own. Since, however, Reich Marshal
Goring held the post of Prussian Prime Minister, there seems to have been
little difficulty in co-ordinating the activities of the Federal and of the Prussian
administrations.
2
When the first Four-Year Plan Organisation was created on 18 October 1936,
the Ministry of Labour lost some of its jurisdiction over questions concerning
the planned distribution of manpower and war policy. On 18 October 1940 the
Four-Year Plan Organisation was extended for another four years.
8
For example, in Belgium and northern France there was very close collaboration between the German Military Command and the labour offices (recruitment
centres) throughout the German occupation. Summons for labour recruits were
issued partly by the Oberfeldkommandatur or Feldkommandatur and partly by
the labour offices. The military authorities also issued binding instructions to
the labour offices in Belgium (e.g., the Orders of the Chief of Military Administration of the Military Command for Belgium and Northern France, promulgated
in the Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und
Nordfrankeich).
I t is interesting to note t h a t this official gazette of the German military occupation authorities bore on the title page of every issue the notice: "Reprinting—
even in parts—prohibited. Exceptions must be authorised by the Chief of the
Military Administration".
In the East, the occupied territories outside the battle area, particularly the
district of Bialystok, were, until July 1941, t h a t is, for almost two years, under
military administration. After the war against the Soviet Union had started
Adolf Hitler decreed on 17 July 1941 t h a t the administration should be handed
over to the civilian occupation authorities (Kommentar zur Reichsverteidigungsgesetzgebung, Vol. 2, P a r t 4; Reichswirtschaftshilfe,
Allg. IV, "Bialystok",
p. IS, 9th supplement).

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

and as many prisoners of war as possible near the front or, in general,
in the outlying regions, for the construction of defence works,etc.,
and the recruitment offices, which were under strong pressure to
send more and more workers to back areas. 1
The post of Commissioner-General for Manpower was created by
Adolf Hitler in March 1942. In view of the outstanding role he
and his organisation were to play, a more extensive description of
his activities is given below.2
The jurisdiction of two central administrative agencies, the
Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munitions, sometimes tended to overlap. Both supervised
and controlled wartime production. The longer the war lasted,
the more the power of the second increased, largely at the expense
of the former, but partly at the expense of the Reich Ministry
of Labour and the Labour Allocation Administration.
Until the great bombing attacks on Hamburg in July 1943,
the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs still controlled approximately 95,000 industrial establishments, whereas the Reich Ministry
of Armament and Munitions had approximately 90,000 factories
under its control. After that time there was a significant change,
and the second Ministry extended its control more and more. 3
Its position was particularly strengthened by the fact that its
head was also head of the vast Todt Organisation. 4
The governors of occupied territories were appointed by, and
directly responsible to, the Führer. They were endowed with the
widest legislative and executive power over the populations of
their territories.
In territories where puppet Governments were established, the
rules and regulations concerning labour conscription and the despatch of native workers to Germany, or elsewhere, had frequently
to be issued jointly by the German and the puppet Governments.
»
1
T h e German military authorities in the occupied and dominated territories
frequently asked the S.S. to carry out police measures. In the winter of 1943,
for example, when strikes and manifestations had broken out in the Germancontrolled armament factories of Turin, the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht in Italy asked S.S. General Zimmermann to restore order. The S.S. General
issued the following proclamation:

Working men and working women,
T h e Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht in Italy has sent me to Turin
with orders to establish peace and order by every means and to give energetic
assistance to the Italian authorities. . . I wish to make it clear t h a t I have
decided to act, with that promptness and ruthlessness which characterise the
German Wehrmacht, against all those elements who are hostile to State
authority and against all those who stay away from work.
(Quoted in Gazetta del Popolo, 2 Dec. 1943.)
2
See p. 25.
3
Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, 17 Oct. 1943.
4
See Chapter VII.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

At the least, the German authorities had to ensure that their orders
were implemented by the puppet Governments.
However strong Germany's position in relation to allied and
satellite States, it still needed their active support in counteracting
opposition to German demands for manpower. Frequent negotiations, treaties and arrangements were therefore necessary to induce
these Governments to enact and enforce legislation in support of
German measures.
The labour trustee system (Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit), an invention of the National Socialist régime, was created on 19 May
1933, after Adolf Hitler had, in the same month, dissolved the employers' associations and the trade unions. The duty of the labour
trustees was to determine authoritatively wages and working
conditions, formerly settled by collective agreements negotiated
between employers (or employers' associations) and trade unions.
They had also to prevent industrial disputes, that is, to settle
them on their own authority. Their powers were considerably
extended by the National Socialist Labour Code of 19341, and
by the basic Wage Stop Order of 1938.2 The latter gave them
the "key position of guarantors of the wage freeze". 3 The labour
trustees determined authoritatively and in detail for the various
categories of workers hourly and piece rates, rules for the calculation of piece rates, rules for job classifications and other aspects
of the official wage policy. These rules fill many pages of the official
publications of the Reich Ministry of Labour. They were automatically binding on the respective industries and trades. No
appeal against them was possible. In addition, within the framework of the regulations issued by the Reich Ministry of Labour
and, from the spring of 1942, by the Commissioner-General for
Manpower, the labour trustees issued such a countless number
of orders and rules that they were described as "supreme umpires"
in the sphere of industrial relations and economic questions. 4
The regional labour offices acted as intermediaries between the
central authorities and the network of local labour offices. Their
main task was to instruct and supervise the labour offices in their
particular region, and to advise them on the application of the
orders and regulations issued by the higher authorities.
At the outbreak of war there were 13 regional labour offices in
1

Act of 20 January 1934; Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 7, 23 Jan. 1934, Part I, p. 45;

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR O F F I C E : Legislative
2

Series, 1934, Ger. 4.

Order of 25 June 1938; Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 99, 28 June 1938, Part I, p. 691;

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR O F F I C E : Legislative Series, 1938, Ger. 7 (B).

3
"Zehn Jahre Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit", in Die Deutsche
Vol. 12, first June issue, 1943, p . 504.
* Ibid.

Volkswirtschaft,

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

the old Reich, and two branch offices of the Reich Ministry of
Labour acting as regional labour offices for Austria and the Sudeten
region respectively. The number of regional offices was later increased to 26 and finally to 42. Up to March 1939 the regional
labour offices and the local labour offices were provincial (State)
agencies. In March 1939, as part of the centralisation of labour administration, they were turned into Federal agencies.
The object of increasing the number of regional labour offices
was to make them coincide with the 42 Party districts of Greater
Germany (including Austria, the Sudeten region and the annexed
part of Poland). This reorganisation was completed by the summer
of 1943.1
During the war local labour offices were responsible for
the enforcement of the rules and regulations concerning the distribution of workers, and, in some occupied territories, the recruitment of workers. Although the lowest agencies in the hierarchy
of the wartime labour allocation system, they retained considerable freedom of decision. They were in constant touch
with German employers, the German population in general, and
foreign workers. Since the officials of the local labour offices had
to make the actual decisions in practice, their power over the labour
recruits was very considerable.
After the Polish campaign of 1939, there were more than 400
local labour offices. Their number increased with the conquest
of more territories and many offices had branches and sub-branches
attached to them.
That huge National Socialist organisation, the German Labour
Front, which, in 1933, absorbed all the trade unions of the preHitler era, was the regime's main instrument for the control of
labour. Membership in it was compulsory for all employed persons,
for employers and for self-employed persons and for members of
families engaged in industrial or other activities. During the war,
1
In February 1944 the names of the 42 regional labour offices, indicating
their territorial jurisdiction, were as follows (the seats of the offices are given in
brackets) : East Prussia (Königsberg) ; Upper Silesia (Kattowitz) ; Lower Silesia
(Breslau); Mark Brandenburg (Berlin); Berlin (Berlin); Pomerania (Stettin);
Mecklenburg (Schwerin); Schleswig-Holstein (Kiel); Hamburg (Hamburg);
Weser-Ems (Bremen); Eastern Hanover (Lüneburg); Southern Hanover-Brunswick (Hanover); Magdeburg-Anhalt (Magdeburg); Halle-Merseburg (Halle);
Saxony (Dresden) ; Sudetenland (Reichenberg) ; Thuringia (Weimar and Erfurt) ;
Kurhessen (Kassel) ; North Westphalia (Münster) ; South Westphalia (Dortmund) ;
Essen (Essen); Düsseldorf (Düsseldorf); Cologne-Aachen (Köln-Lindenthal);
Moselland (Koblenz) ; Westmark (Saarbrücken) ; Rhein-Main (Frankfort) ; Baden
(Strassbach); Württemberg (Stuttgart); Mainfranken (Würzburg); Franconia
(Nuremberg) ; Bayreuth (Bayreuth) ; Munich-Upper Bavaria (Munich) ; Schwaben
(Augsburg) ; Vienna (Vienna) ; Niederdonau (Vienna) ; Oberdonau (Linz) ; TyrolVorarlberg (Innsbruck); Salzburg (Salzburg); Carinthia (Klagenfurt); Styria
(Graz); Danzig-Western Prussia (Danzig); Warthegau (Posen). (Circular of 21
February 1944; Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 8-9, 25 Mar. 1944, P a r t I, pp. 108-9.)

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

its most important tasks were to supervise the various labour mobilisation schemes in Germany, the foreign workers inside Germany,
as well as in large parts of German-occupied territory, and prisoners
of war working for the German war effort.
The activities of the Labour Front, with its nation-wide network of officials, branches and sub-branches, and its cells in every
undertaking, extended to every corner of the Reich. In every
detail of the life and work of foreign workers, the influence of the
ubiquitous Labour Front was directly felt.
From the summer of 1943, there existed a Central Inspectorate
for foreign workers1, with the task of co-ordinating and facilitating
the work of the German Labour Front as the organisation responsible for the supervision of labour. It was the duty of the Central
Inspectorate to inspect factories and camps regularly in order to
ensure that the instructions concerning the employment of foreign
workers were being observed. For this purpose, the territory of
the Reich was divided into fifteen inspection areas, with inspectors
for each area.
As long as the military and political course of the war permitted, the German authorities sought the active collaboration
of pro-German labour organisations in the countries of origin of
foreign workers. The most important of these, until July 1943,
were the Fascist syndicates and corporations of Italy. They were,
in fact, continued, in a reorganised form, in the German-occupied
Italian Fascist Republic, proclaimed after the events of July 1943.
The Vichy Government made efforts to build up corporate organisations along similar lines. In several other occupied countries,
e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, collaborationists tried, with German support, to form "Labour Fronts"
modelled upon the German Labour Front. Although all these
efforts were failures, owing to the active and passive resistance of
the workers of the countries concerned, the German authorities
granted some degree of apparent autonomy to the leaders of these
organisations, both in their home countries and in dealing with
their fellow citizens employed in Germany.
This long list of the bodies concerned with labour questions
would still be incomplete without mention of the complicated machinery of Government-controlled compulsory organisations of
1
The Central Inspectorate was created under an agreement concluded between
Fritz Sauckel, Commissioner-General for Manpower, and Robert Ley, Leader of
the German Labour Front, on 2 June 1943. In July 1943, Joseph Goebbels, Reich
Minister of Propaganda, and Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied
Eastern Territories, also became parties to the agreement. {Deutsche BergwerksZeitung, 7 Oct. 1943. Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLIX, No. 6, June
1944, p. 680.)

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

employers, which formed the foundation of the National Socialist
"corporative" structure.
The system was constructed along two lines, functional and
territorial. Functionally, every German employer had to belong,
according to his economic function or branch of activity, to one
of the several Reich Groups {Reichsgruppen): Reich Group "Industry", Reich Group "Commerce", Reich Group "Banking",
Reich Group "Insurance", Reich Group "Power" or Reich Group
"Handicraft".
These main groups were variously subdivided. Reich Group
"Industry", for example, which included all German manufacturers, was divided into seven main sections (Hauptgruppen).
Each of these main sections included several economic sections (Wirtschaftsgruppen) which were in turn subdivided into
several branch sections (Fachgruppen) and subsections (Fachunter gruppen).1
In agriculture, employers and independent farmers were
organised, according to branches of production or processing, into
ten main associations (Hauptvereinigungen).
Each of them
covered all undertakings concerned with agricultural products,
from the production stage, through the processing stage, up to the
distribution stage. 2
Territorially, it was the task of the corporative organisation
to co-ordinate, on three levels (Reich-wide, regionally and in the
districts) the activities of the functional bodies described above.
Over the territorial organisation of non-agricultural activities stood
the Reich Economic Chamber (Reichswirtschaftskammer),
including all undertakings belonging to the Reich Groups "Indust r y " and "Commerce", "Power", "Banking", "Insurance" and
1
The seven main sections of Reich Group " I n d u s t r y " comprised the following 32 economic sectors: Main Section I: mining; iron production; non-ferrous
metal production; foundries; refineries. Main Section II: steel and iron construction; machine building; motor-car and vehicle manufacture; aircraft industry; electro-technical industry; precision instruments and optical industry.
Main Section III: manufacture of iron and metal goods; manufacture of iron,
steel, and tin goods; manufacture of metal goods. Main Section IV: stones and
earth; building industry; wood-working industry; glass industry; ceramic industry; sawmills. Main Section V: chemical industry; paper, cardboard and cellulose
manufacture; paper and printing industry; petroleum industry. Main Section VI:
leather industry; textile industry; clothing industry. Main Section VII: foodstuffs industry; brewing; malting; sugar manufacture; alcohol distilleries.
2
The main associations in agriculture were responsible for regulating the following branches of industry: (1) grain and fodder; (2) livestock; (3) milk, dairy
products and all animal and vegetable fats; (4) potatoes; (5) sugar; (6) horticulture (including vegetables and fruits); (7) fish and fish products; (8) poultry
and eggs; (9) hops and breweries; (10) viticulture.
In addition, within the framework of the Reich Food Estate (Reichsnährstand) there were several central associations controlling and regulating the activities, for example, of the margarine industry, the confectionery industry (including
the jam industry) and flour mills.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

"Handicrafts". On the lower levels, these functions were exercised
by 42 (formerly 26) regional economic chambers {Gauwirtschaftskammern) and by approximately 200 chambers of industry and
commerce, and chambers of artisans.
In agriculture, the counterpart of the chambers was the Reich
Food Estate (Reichsnährstand), with subdivisions in the regions
(Gaue), districts (Kreise) and localities (Orte), which were headed,
respectively, by regional, district and local "farmers' leaders"
(Bauernschaftsführer).1
Lastly, there were several Reich associations (Reichsvereinigungen) in industry, which were comparable to cartels. But in
marked contrast to the "private" nature of cartels, which were
independent of the Government, these associations were officially
sponsored by the German Government and worked in close collaboration with the central administrative agencies.
It is impossible to define exactly the extent to which these
corporate bodies were autonomous and the extent to which they
were organs of the Government and the Party. They were very
closely interdependent. The corporate bodies were moreover organised-on the "leadership" principle, for the office holders—active
members in the various branches of economic life—were appointed
from the top downwards. It was thus certain that only men trusted
by the authorities could hold appointments in the corporate system.
The Reich Minister for Economic Affairs appointed the heads of the
Reich Economic Chamber and of the Reich Groups and these heads
in turn appointed the subordinate leaders. Similarly, in agriculture,
the top appointments were made by the Reich Minister for Food
and Agriculture, who also held the Party position of Reich Farmers'
Leader. On the regional and local level, leading Party men
were regularly appointed to posts in the official agricultural
bodies.
The general function of the corporate organisations was to coordinate the economic life of the nation with the policy of the
Government and Party and also to represent the interests of their
members. The Government and Party agencies relied on the corporate organisations to fill in the details in their instructions and
directions, and to exercise control over their member-undertakings.
But the duties of the corporate associations went still further.
During the war, they helped to shape both long-run and day-to1
It is noteworthy that the agricultural organisations extended their activities
into the cities; occupations like butchers and bakers were under the jurisdiction
of the Reich Food Estate. Food rationing in the cities was also largely entrusted
to organs of the Reich Food Estate. The supervisory and regulatory activities
of the Reich Food Estate had thus a direct influence on the life of foreign workers
in Germany.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

day decisions concerning priorities and distribution of labour and
raw material supply, and concerning questions of production
policy—two topics most vital to the foreign worker, because German labour recruitment policy abroad and the conditions of foreigners' employment in the Reich were largely dependent on the
decisions reached regarding labour supply and production.

It may well be wondered how so complicated a system could
work efficiently. Close examination suggests that it was apparently workable for the following reasons:
(1) All agencies and office holders concerned with labour administration were agreed that scarcity of manpower was Germany's
most crucial wartime problem and that they must continue to
supply new contingents of workers to the essential war industries
and agriculture, whatever the cost.
(2) All the authorities and bodies concerned with Germany's
foreign manpower problems were united by a common political
outlook. The few politically unreliable persons who had remained
in the administrative branches dealing with labour questions were
removed after the spring of 1942 by the personnel policy of the
Commissioner-General for Manpower and by the repeated "combing-out" drives for military mobilisation.
(3) One of the characteristic developments of German wartime
administration was the formation of "commissions" consisting
of officials from different Government, Party, and army departments and from employers' organisations. "Combing-out commissions", for example, which inspected plants in order to determine their manpower needs and, primarily, to decide how many
workers could be transferred to other plants, were composed of
representatives of the Ministry of Armament and Munitions,
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the regional labour office, the
military command of the district, and the Reich group or subgroup of the particular industry. The collaboration of these various
interests, in these commissions on the spot, tended to decrease red
tape and jurisdictional disputes.
(4) As early as 1 August 1939 the Reich Ministry of Labour, in
order to adapt labour administration to the needs of the coming war,
made the heads of the labour offices ' 'deputies of the labour trustees' '.
Later, the posts of labour trustees and of heads of regional labour
offices were actually merged. The boundaries of the 26 and, later,

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

of the 42 regions into which the territory of Greater Germany was
divided for the purposes of the Labour Trustee Organisation,
were made to coincide with those of the regional labour offices.
The 26 (later 42) labour trustees were also the heads of the labour
offices of their districts (Gaue).
Furthermore, special labour trustees (Sondertreuhänder der
Arbeit) with jurisdiction over the whole Reich (instead of over
only one of the 26 or 42 regions) were appointed for certain occupational groups in which regional differences were of slight importance,
such as public services, mining and construction, the Todt Organisation, and foreign workers.
(5) By Order of 16 November 1942, Reich Defence Commissioners were put in charge of the complete regional co-ordination
of war economic policy, including manpower questions. 1
The central authorities gave their orders to the regional authorities through the Reich Defence Commissioners, through whom the
regional authorities also reported to the central agencies. The
Commissioners' main task was to co-ordinate in their district the
manpower requirements of war production and of essential civilian
production with the recruitment needs of the armed forces.
(6) German wartime administration was characterised by
extreme concentration of power at the top, but at the same time
by a remarkable flexibility and decentralisation in the actual
application of its economic and labour policies.
A leading German economic journal, Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft2, wrote in December 1942:
After total control was achieved it became necessary to relax the bureaucratic rigidity. The Government has urged upon business uncongenial forms of
State economy. . . planning measures were introduced piecemeal as they were
expedient. This patchwork system led to confusion and orientation became ever
more difficult.

As the Frankfurter Zeitung observed, on 27 July 1943, closer
co-ordination was thus established between industry and the
Government :
Initiative in directing business can be the more effective the more we decrease
the directing machinery and the better we succeed in co-ordinating the attitude
of leading businessmen with the requirements of national socialism. 3

Government and industry became even more closely inter1

Order of 16 November 1942; Reichsgeselzblalt No. 117, 17 Nov. 1942, P a r t I,
p. 649.
2
Quoted by Heinz PAECHTER: "Recent Trends in the German Command
Economy", in Journal of Political Economy, Sept. 1944, p. 225.
3
Ibid., p. 221.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

locked than before the war. To quote the Frankfurter Zeitung
again (16 September 1942)1, in the big undertakings key positions
were held by influential Party members:
The occupation of leading posts in business by National Socialists will contribute to lessen Government intervention because these men understand better
the aims of national socialism. Many business firms have already opened opportunities to such personalities. . . It is deemed undesirable to appoint Party commissioners in the factories. However, the appointment of managing directors and
vice-chairmen [of business corporations] is no longer considered a private unpolitical act. . . Repeatedly the Party has put leading officials, in particular civil
servants, a t the disposal of business.

The machinery of "self-government" sponsored by the National
Socialist régime gave governmental powers to leading industrialists.
Dr. Karl Lange, for example, director of an association of industrialists, acted as managing director of the Economic Group for
Machine Building, as chairman of the Central Committee for
"Machines in War Industry", as head of the Control Office of
Engineering (an official organisation in charge of foreign trade)
and as Deputy-General, with the functions of Reich Commissioner,
for over-all planning in the machine-building trade. 2
In addition, "central committees and pools" (Hauptausschüsse
und Ringe) of industrial experts acted as liaison agencies between
the industrial associations and the Government, especially the
Reich Ministry for Armament and Munitions and the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs.
Lastly, there was an amalgamation of political and economic
functions in the highest organs of Government. For example, the
Reich Armament Council, the policy-making body of the Ministry
for Armament and Munitions, was composed of five generals and
eight leading industrialists and managers.
In the field of labour relations, the cumulative effect of these
arrangements was to leave considerable discretion in the hands
of the firms and institutions which employed foreign workers.
Thus to quite a large extent the treatment that the foreign worker
received depended on the attitude of the German employer.
(7) The most important step for the increased utilisation of
foreign manpower was, however, the appointment of Fritz Sauckel,
Gauleiter of Thuringia, to the newly created post of CommissionerGeneral for Manpower, in March 1942. In a statement of his programme, he said that his administration "has entirely cast off any
liberalistic-capitalistic reminiscences and is fanatically consecrated
1

Heinz PAECHTER, loc. cit. p. 221.

Ibid., p. 222.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

to the philosophy of the Führer. . . We shall fulfil the glorious task
which the Führer has set us as fanatical National Socialists." 1
T H E REORGANISATION OF LABOUR ADMINISTRATION
IN M A R C H 1942

When Adolf Hitler, after two and a half years of war, reorganised
German war manpower administration by appointing one of his
most trusted followers as Commissioner-General for Manpower,
Germany's manpower position was critical. It is significant that
the Decree was countersigned by Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of
the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.2 Speaking at the first
congress of the officials of labour administration of Greater Germany (Weimar, 10-11 September 1942), State Secretary Körner,
Sauckel's deputy, declared: "From the very start of the FourYear Plan (in 1936), plants felt the lack of manpower. . . After
the outbreak of war, new difficulties continually arose. It proved
impossible to bridge the gaps in the production process, although
use was made of millions of prisoners of war. When the war assumed
an even more serious aspect and became a life-and-death struggle
for the existence of the German people, the post of CommissionerGeneral for Manpower was created." 3 At the same congress, Dr.
Timm, another of Sauckel's closest collaborators, admitted 4 that
"early in 1942, there was considerable anxiety in Germany how
to supply the necessary manpower even for the most vital production for the armed forces and for the agricultural needs of the
nation". 6
Fritz Sauckel explained the nature of his duties as follows:
"The Führer has charged me with the task of replacing, at whatever
cost, the German workers who have been called to the front for the
world-wide fight."6 As Commissioner-General for Manpower,
Sauckel was to be the head of a centralised organisation for the
recruitment, utilisation and distribution of labour. His main function was to ensure that German war economy, and especially all
branches of the armament industry, received the manpower they
required.
For this purpose he was given the widest powers. His only
superior was Reich Marshal Goring, in his capacity as head of the
Four-Year Plan. Reich Marshal Goring authorised Sauckel to
1

Arbeitseinsatz
Decree of 21
Arbeitseinsatz
* Die Deutsche
5
Arbeitseinsatz
6
Ibid., p. 146
2

und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Nos. 19-22, Oct.-Nov. 1942, pp. 148-149
March 1942; Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 15, Part I, p. 257.
und Arbeitslosenhilfe, loe. cit., p. 146.
Volkswirtschaft, third February issue, 1943, p. 184.
und Arbeitslosenhilfe, loe. cit., p. 155.
(italics added).

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

issue new laws and to repeal old laws, subject to Göring's consent.
He also delegated to the new Commissioner-General power to
issue binding instructions to the staff of any branch of the German
civil administration, to the National Socialist Party and all its
affiliations, to the Reich Protector (the highest German official in
Bohemia-Moravia), the Governor-General (the highest German
authority in the part of Poland known as the GovernmentGeneral), and to all military commanders and chiefs of the civil
administrations (in the German-occupied territories), with only
one'proviso, that Sauckel must seek the consent of Goring before
taking steps of "fundamental importance". 1
I t is to be noted that Sauckel was given these enormous powers
over German and foreign workers alike, His organisation was made
part of the organisation of the Reich Ministry of Labour. He took
over a portion of the staff and machinery of the Reich Ministry of
Labour, namely, the former "chief sections" III (Wages) and V
(Allocation of Labour).
Upon Sauckel's appointment, Reich
Marshal Goring dissolved the Department for Labour Allocation,
which had been part of his own organisation for the Four-Year
Plan since October 1936, and had dealt with the distribution of
manpower and the regulation of working conditions. 2 The central
Reich Employment Office {Reichsstelle für Arbeitsvermittlung), the
Provincial Labour Offices {Landesarbeitsämter), the Labour
Offices {Arbeitsämter), the Reich Labour Trustees, the Special
Labour Trustees, and the Delegates of the Reich Labour Trustees
a t the labour offices were all subordinated to Sauckel. 3
The number of Sauckel's immediate collaborators was small.
His personal "staff" consisted only of several "efficiency experts
and Party members". It was "headed by his deputy, the Secretary
of State of Thuringia, Party-Comrade Ortlepp. The special task
of Ortlepp is to maintain liaison with all the highest agencies of the
Government, the Party and the army." 4
An Order of 16 January 19426, issued only a few weeks before
Sauckel's nomination, stipulated that Bormann, the head of the
P a r t y Chancellery, must be consulted before any statute, decree
or order was issued by any Reich Ministry or any other of the
1
Order by Reich Marshal Goring of 27 March 1942; Reichsarbeitsblatt,
No.2 15, Part I, p. 257.
Circular Order of 22 October 1936, quoted in Order of 27 March 1942;
Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 40, 21 Apr. 1942, Part I, p. 180.
* There were at that time 26 Reich labour trustees in Greater Germany,
plus three special labour trustees for the public services, the mining industry,
and4 foreign workers respectively.
Gauamtsleiter Oberregierungsrat W. ESCHER, in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Vol. 19-22, 1942, p. 140.
s
Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 6, 24 Jan. 1942, Part I, p. 35.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

highest administrative agencies of the Reich and the States, or by
the Reich governors. Bormann's Party Chancellery was also
required to "co-operate" in all personnel questions concerning
public employees and civil servants.
It may be assumed that these provisions scarcely acted as a
check on Sauckel's activities. As an ardent Party member who
had for many years enjoyed a prominent position in its highest
ranks, he repeatedly emphasised that the German labour allocation administration must work in the closest touch with the National
Socialist Party.
Sauckel also emphasised from the beginning the need for the
utmost centralisation. 1 The process, begun earlier and defined as
"the transition from the employment exchange to the governmentally-planned distribution of labour" 2 , was completed under Fritz
Sauckel. He introduced or intensified the following features of
German foreign manpower policy:
(1) In German-occupied territories and even in territories not
militarily occupied, but politically dominated, by Germany, the
pretence of "voluntary recruitment" was abandoned; the German
labour recruitment agencies relied more and more on methods of
direct physical compulsion. For this, the foreigners themselves
were blamed: "The voluntary recruitment of labour has had less
success of late, and repeated appeals to release older and weaker
workers by a system of voluntary exchange did not have much
success". 3
(2) Manpower should be recruited for the German war effort
not only in Germany and the German-occupied and Germandominated countries but in the "Allied, friendly and neutral States
as well, according to the principle of European solidarity" (statement by Fritz Sauckel, 6 January 1943).4
(3) All available foreign manpower had to be allocated in such
a way as to satisfy, primarily, the labour requirements of war
economy within the Reich territory.
(4) In the occupied territories, labour (both native and imported) had to be allocated according to the following scale of
urgency:
(a)
(£>)
(c)
(d)

work
work
work
work

for
for
for
for

the German armed forces;
the German occupying authorities;
the German civilian authorities;
German armament contracts;

1
Order of 24 April 1942; Reichsgesetzblatt, No. IS, P a r t I, p. 258.
* Dr. Werner MANSFELD, in Deutsches Arbeitsrecht, Jan. 1943, p. 11.
J
Brüsseler Zeitung, 9 Oct. 1942.
4
Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, 7 Jan. 1943.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

(e) agriculture and food industry;
(/) industrial work (other than (d)) for Germany;
(g) only when all these requirements were met, could native
labour be used for industrial work for the occupied country itself.1
(5) In order to release foreigners employed outside Germany
in essential war positions, longer working hours and increased
Sunday work were introduced in the occupied territories.
(6) As an incentive to better individual output, piece rates
for foreigners were introduced on a large scale.
(7) In general, the wages and food of the individual foreign
worker were to be closely related to his willingness and output.
(8) Control over foreigners working in Germany, and for
Germany, in the occupied territories, was tightened. The uniformed
factory guards (Werkschutz) were provided with arms—an important exception to the rule that in National Socialist Germany
only the army and the Party were allowed to wear or possess arms.
In addition, methods of punishment became even more ruthless
than they had been before.
It was no great exaggeration for the Commissioner-General to
speak of "the hundreds of millions of people whose fates are largely
determined by the German Labour Allocation Administration" 3 ,
of which he had been the chief since March 1942. For Fritz Sauckel's powers extended not only over the persons actually recruited
for work and over their families and relatives, but also over those
who were not yet drafted, but might expect to be called up by
another recruitment drive.
While the organisation of labour allocation was formerly predominantly a
German problem, through the appointment of the Commissioner-General for
Manpower it became an all-embracing, European task. . . As far as the allocation of labour is concerned our plans as well as our actions no longer stop a t
the old frontiers of the Reich. . . All this was achieved by establishing our staffs
and sub-branches in all occupied territories as well as in all European countries
which feel an obligation towards the New Europe.
Special representatives of the Commissioner-General, directly responsible
to him and acting under his direct instructions, were sent to the Protectorate
[Bohemia-Moravia], the Government-General and the [other] occupied territories. 2

Although several important changes in the German administrative scheme were made during the later stages of the war, the
1
2
3

Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Sept. 1942, P a r t I, p. 382.
Editorial in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No. 1-2, Jan. 1943.
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 31, 5 Nov. 1942, Part I, p. 475.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

powers of the Commissioner-General were not limited. By an
Order of 11 January 19441, he assumed authority to issue decrees
with the force of collective rules, as well as instructions for
factories and individual working contracts. In the course of the
administrative reorganisation following the attempt on Adolf
Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, Sauckel was subordinated to Reich
Minister Joseph Goebbels in the latter's new capacity as Commissioner-General for Total War Effort.2 This merely meant a
transfer in the supreme supervision of manpower affairs from
Reich Marshal Goring—who had been Sauckel's superior up to
that time—to Goebbels, the Reich Minister of Propaganda and
Enlightenment.

1
Reichsgesetzblatt, 1944, Part I, p. 22. These collective rules and individual
contracts were to be in force in territories which fell under the jurisdiction of
more than one Reich labour trustee.
* Joseph Goebbels' new title was Reichsbeauftragter für den totalen Kriegseinsatz; it emphasised the importance attached to complete mobilisation of the remaining manpower supply.

CHAPTER III
THE RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS
The National Socialist machinery for manpower allocation
(Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung) was regarded as one of the militant
branches of the régime. "Not only during, but before, the war it
successfully stood the test of most difficult conditions. It is accustomed to hard struggles and is excellently equipped to solve
the most complex problems." 1
These problems arose in connection with the recruitment and
deportation of foreign workers, which became, during the war,
the principal task of the German labour allocation service.
In the occupied territories, the members of its staff wore a
field-grey uniform (without insignia denoting rank). On the left
sleeve of the tunic, a badge bearing the swastika and the inscription "Labour Allocation Staff" (Arbeitseinsatzstab) was worn.
These uniforms were shown for the first time in Germany a t the
Weimar Conference of the Labour Allocation Service in September
1942.2
As was pointed out by an official writer, the conditions under
which the officials had to work in the "colonised and occupied
territories" were characterised by the fact that in these regions,
individual dossiers were in most cases lacking, and so, frequently, were
the official circulars and law gazettes. In other words, the German
officials had often to rely on their own discretion in deciding
the methods to be used in order to fill their "quotas" of foreign
manpower for transportation to Germany.
In the Government-General of Poland, a Decree by the
Governor-General, dated 26 October 1939, and amended on 14
December 1939, announced the introduction of forced labour for
the benefit of the occupying authorities. It applied to all Poles,
of both sexes, between the ages of 14 and 60. A further Decree,
of February 1940, provided that these persons might be deported
to Germany for agricultural and other work.
After the end of the military campaign of 1940 in western
1
1

Editorial in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No. 3-4, Feb. 1943, p. 17.
Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No. 1-2, Jan. 1943, p. 9.

THE RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS

Europe, the German authorities sought to induce French workers
to volunteer for work in Germany. They laid great emphasis
on the fact that France suffered from large-scale unemployment,
and that the only efficient way of combating it would be to transfer
large numbers of workers to Germany.
In point of fact, various measures taken by the German authorities resulted at first in an increase of unemployment in France. For
November 1940 the official figure of French unemployed was
1 million. By December 1941, however, it had, according to the
same official source, decreased to 190,000.l It is impossible t o
ascertain to what extent this marked reduction was due to workers'
migration to Germany 2 , to the increased employment of French
workers in German-dominated armament industries, or to changed
methods of computation.
In Italy, the German policy of importing "hundreds of thousands of valuable workers to Germany" was explained as a process
of rationalisation on a European scale. "A considerable portion
of Italian manpower has been moved, so to speak, to the location
where the raw materials can be found", since "the Italian armament industry, on account of the [Italian] raw material situation,
cannot expand to the same extent as the German." 3
From the very beginning of the invasion of the Soviet Union
in the summer of 1941, the German recruitment agencies applied
the same ruthless methods as they had in Poland. 4
1
The Vichy Government published the following figures on unemployment in
the occupied and unoccupied zones of France (without Alsace and Lorraine) :

Number of unemployed

Women
(per cent, of total)

26
November 1940
1,000,000
December 1941
190,000
62
January 1942
183,000
55
February 1942
176,000
60
March
"
166,000
59
April
143,000
66
December "
63,000
67
January 1943
61,000
63
February
"
55,000
65
March
"
46,000
66
April
42,000
66
(Bulletin de la statistique générale de la France, May 1943, p. 135; June 1943,
p. 181.)
2
For an officiai German description of recruitment procedures in the summer
of 1941, see Appendix III.
» Monatshefte für NS-Sozialpolitik, No. 5-6, Mar. 1943, p. 58.
* A description of the mobilisation of Soviet workers for the German war
effort has already been published by the International Labour Office: "Soviet
Workers in Germany", in International Labour Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 5, May
1943, pp. 576-590. For German recruitment methods in the U.S.S.R., see Notes
of 27 April 1942 and 11 May 1943 by Mr. V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar of
Foreign Affairs, to the ambassadors and envoys of all countries with which the
U.S.S.R. maintains diplomatic relations (Information Bulletin, Embassy of the
U.S.S.R., Washington 1942, and 15 May 1943).

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

After the appointment of the Commissioner-General for Manpower in March 1942, the methods of violence which had been
used from the first in the East were increasingly introduced in the
other occupied territories. In a survey of the first half year of
his activities, addressed to "all officials and employees of the Labour
Allocation Administration and the labour trustee offices in Greater
Germany, the annexed and occupied territories, and the friendly
foreign countries", Fritz Sauckel wrote:
In the past six months, the labour allocation services at my disposal have
fulfilled their functions under the most trying circumstances . . . they have rendered a service to the war and the armament industry, and thereby to the Führer
and our nation, of which they can be proud. BUT THERE MUST BE NO
SLOWING UP . . . the outcome of the war is inextricably bound up with the
efficient allocation of labour... This task is, of course, bound to grow increasingly
difficult. Every one of us must therefore increase his or her efforts. The Führer
has ordered that the demand for manpower, both in Germany and in the occupied
territories, must be met in all circumstances. This command will be fulfilled as
thoroughly in the future as it was in the past, in spite of all resistance and difficulties. There is no such word as "impossible" for the Labour Administration. . .
The Labour Administration has to fulfil a gigantic and unique task . . . Again
and again, we shall find the fresh manpower needed for the armament industry
and agriculture.1

The German recruitment campaigns sometimes emphasised the
number, and sometimes the qualifications, of the workers to be
imported. In the latter case, skilled workers, particularly in the
metal and heavy industries, were most urgently demanded; however, the specialists needed covered a very wide range of occupations, from cooks and waiters, gardeners, miners and chauffeurs,
to nurses and physicians.
Very frequently, however, the recruitment agencies were ordered
to supply a certain number of workers, with little regard to their
occupational background. In these cases workers were forcibly
rounded up, put into railway trucks and sent off to unknown
destinations. In some places, advance notice was given; in others
it was not. Men and young boys were often arrested in the streets,
in eating places and motion picture theatres and in -their homes.
Reports from many occupied territories state that on these occasions the German soldiers were armed with machine guns and
accompanied by Gestapo agents.
These methods however, consistently alternated with inducements of various kinds, as a less direct means of persuasion.
The details of these measures of compulsion and pressure varied
greatly.
1
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 31, 5 Nov. 1942, Part I, p. 475 (capitals and italics
in original).

THE RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS

For example, in the Government-General a method sometimes
used was to require each village to produce food for the Reich;
if the quota was not filled, more men were rounded up and transported for work into the Reich (or in some cases executed). On
one occasion Denmark was asked to send 40,000 Danes to Germany
for work as a condition of the despatch of fuel from Germany
to Denmark.
The German Military Administration sometimes promised
Belgians an increased bread ration if they would cease resisting
deportation to Germany; otherwise, agricultural workers and heads
of large families would no longer be exempted. For example, on
5 March 1943, the Military Commander in Belgium and northern
France issued the following Decree in German, Flemish and French:
The communal food and ration services may not issue ration cards to persons
who are reported to them by the Military Administration (Oberfeldkommandatur,
Feldkommandatur, Werbestette) or by the labour offices as having broken their
contract of employment, refused to submit to compulsory employment, or shown
signs of ill will in their employment, until the service that has reported them
withdraws its report.1

In the spring of 1943, Dutch and other "Germanic" foreign
workers were invited to volunteer for work in the Ukraine, with
the promise that they would be allowed to send 20 kg (44 lbs.) of
foodstuff home every month. 2 Priority in obtaining shoes was
promised to Belgian workers who presented themselves provided
with a certificate that they were willing to work abroad for three
months.
In France, German authorities sometimes offered exemption
from prosecution to non-political prisoners awaiting trial if they
would agree to go to work in Germany. In June 1943, the Vichy
Government authorised its Minister of Justice to suspend sentences
of imprisonment in cases not considered harmful to the community,
in order to enable these persons to leave for Germany, because "it
would be intolerable . . . if imprisonment automatically and con>
pletely exempted convicted persons from working in Germany".
Open compulsion, without any offer of inducements to volunteers, was simultaneously used. Early in 1943, the Warsaw Labour
Office secured a list of the students of certain trade schools and
forced the students of some of them (boys of 16 and over, girls of
17 and over) to go to Germany, under the escort of their own
teachers. 3
1
2

Quatrième Ordonnance, No. 96, 5 Mar. 1943, p. 1251.
Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden, 20 May 1943; Deutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung,
28 May 1943.
3
Reported in the March 1943 issue of the Warsaw "underground" paper
Biuletyn Informaczny.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

By "Order of 6 October 1942, the German Military Commander
introduced compulsory labour service for all male Belgians of 18
to 50 years of age, and all unmarried female Belgians from 21 to
25 years of age. The Order expressly stated that all Belgians drafted
for compulsory labour service were liable to be transferred to Germany. Whether the labour conscript had to work in Belgium or
Germany, the work was invariably for German war purposes. For
employment in Belgium, the agencies in charge of the distribution
of Belgian manpower were the German labour offices in Belgium;
for employment in Germany, the German military authorities
(Oberfeldkommandatur or Feldkommandatur)
were responsible.
No Belgian was allowed to leave his employment without previous
authorisation by the German authorities and every male Belgian
between 18 and 50 years of age had to submit proof of the nature
of his employment. Work books were introduced even for those
not drafted for compulsory labour service.1
As an example of methods of enforcement, the following Order
of 1 March 1943, issued by Major-General Bruns, the German
commandant of the city of Ghent, may be quoted:
In order to compel persons to comply with the Decree regarding compulsory
labour service, measures may be taken against them or their possessions. In
order to prevent assistance being given to those refusing labour service, measures
may also be taken against relatives (wives, children, parents, brothers or sisters),
i.e., against their persons or possessions. The same measures may be taken
against all persons assisting recalcitrants. The proceeds resulting from these
measures may be employed for social purposes, especially for compatriots working in Germany.2

Many similar examples could be cited. 3
After the policy of voluntary enlistment had to be relinquished,
the labour recruits from France went to Germany, partly " t o
replace prisoners of war" and partly "as compulsory labour". 4
From time to time, contingents of prisoners of war were promised release and, consequently, exemption from German military
law and courts martial, if their output as workers, while prisoners,
was satisfactory. This method was used on French prisoners of
war, with some intervals, from 1940 onwards; but it is less well
known that it was also used on prisoners of war of other nations.
1
Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich,
No. 87, 7 Oct. 1942.
2
Reprinted in Volk en Staat, 6 Mar. 1943.
3
Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLV, No. 1, Jan. 1942, pp. 84-85;
also Vol. XLVI, No. 3, Sept. 1942, pp. 347-349; Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943,
pp. 372-374; Vol. XLVII, No. 5, May 1943, pp. 654-657; and No. 6, June 1943,
p. 770.
4
Cf. for example, Circulaire M.O. 2/114/79 of 11 October 1943, concerning
the recruitment of workers for Germany; Bulletin officiel du Ministire du Travail
(Vichy), No. 21, 1 Nov. 1943, pp. 1798-9.

THE RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS

On 11 August 1942, for example, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, in agreement with the CommissionerGeneral for Manpower, issued an Order of the Day releasing prisoners of war of Ukrainian nationality from the Galician District
of Lwow, provided that the examination of every individual case
showed that the prisoner was "neither work-shy, nor anti-German
nor suspect from the standpoint of military security". The released
prisoner was not, however, allowed to return home. He was handed
over to the local German labour office "in order to be put to work".
It was ordered that, as far as possible, the ex-prisoner should continue to work at the same employment as before his release. Every
man had to sign the following declaration :
I, the undersigned, having today been released as a German war prisoner,
hereby undertake to perform as a free worker whatever work may be assigned to
me by the labour office and not to leave my place of work without the consent of
the labour office and the police, until the labour office grants me final release.
I understand that whoever illegally leaves his place of employment is liable to
punishment and that, if I do so, I shall be immediately arrested.1

In industrial regions, particularly in France, special recruiting agents were used who were often advised by representatives
of the German undertakings for whom the workers were destined,
"so as to decrease the risk of error". 2 German officials, frequently
accompanied by representatives of German employers, would either
enter French factories and choose workers by name, or demand
lists of workers from the French employer. In both cases the
selected worker was summoned to appear before the German
labour office representative, and if he failed to appear, the French
labour inspector signed a contract in his stead. If the worker did
not appear at the appointed place and time, he was brought forcibly
to the station; if he could not be found, a relative was conscripted
in his place or his family was deprived of its ration cards.'
*
*

The field agents of the Labour Allocation Administration were
conscious from the outset of the physical danger to which they
were exposed from the hostile population of the occupied territories,
and were determined to repay this hostility by ruthlessness. A
high official stated in 1942:
1

Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 29, IS Oct. 1942, p. 439.

Dr. TIMM, in Arbeitsrechtkartei, 3 May 1941.

' Cf. "The Recruitment of French Labour for Germany", in International
Labour Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, pp. 312-343, and "The Mobilisation of French Workers for Germany", in idem, Vol. XLIX, No. 1, Jan. 1944,
pp. 38-51.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Recruitment officials in the new territories have often to discharge their
duties at great risk to their lives. Their only resource is to display absolute authority and great energy.1

A few months later Dr. Werner Mansfeld, State Secretary in
the Reich Ministry of Labour, and editor in chief of the Deutsches
Arbeitsrecht, an authoritative periodical on labour law and industrial
relations, wrote as follows:
The work of these outlying labour recruitment offices, which is full of hardship
and has frequently to be performed in the most dangerous circumstances, can
never be sufficiently appreciated.2

In his New Year message for 1944, Fritz Sauckel clearly revealed the atmosphere in which his administration was working:
During 1943 again, the labour allocation services were faced with extremely
difficult tasks and almost insoluble problems. . . In the fulfilment of their duties
prominent and faithful colleagues fell victims to terroristic and murderous attacks
by the enemy. . . 1944 will confront us with tasks infinitely more difficult than
those which the past year has brought so abundantly. They must be overcome,
whatever the circumstances. . . I must also definitely insist, in spite of all difficulties, on even more speed and efficiency than in the past.3

By the end of 1943, the changed military situation had decisively
reduced Germany's "Eastern" reserve of manpower. Yet greater
help of every description was more urgently needed than ever.
An Order of 5 January 1944, for instance, signed by the Head of
the Public Health Section in the Reich Ministry of the Interior
and by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, emphasised
"the urgency of mobilising all foreign physicians, pharmacists,
doctors of dentistry and dental practitioners". This recruitment
was to be undertaken in German-occupied territories, and also
in allied, friendly and neutral countries, in co-operation with the
Public Health Section, by the Labour Allocation Administration
or by the competent military or civil authorities. The Order expressly forbade "any other authorities, organisations or persons"
to undertake recruitment.'
To compensate for the loss of "Eastern" manpower, it was
proposed that an intensified labour drive should be undertaken
1
Gauamtsleiter Oberregierungsrat W. ESCHER, quoted in Arbeitseinsatz
und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Nos. 19-22, Oct.-Nov. 1943, p. 150.
» Deutsches Arbeitsrecht, Feb. 1943, p. 23.
8
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1944, Part I, p. 13.
4
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 10 Feb. 1944, Part I, p. 53. Under a Decree of the Führer
of 20 July 1942 (Reichsarbeitsblatt, July 1942, Part I, p. 378), the employment of
this medical and dental personnel was to be regulated by the head of the Public
Health Section of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, who, in his Party capacity
as Reich health leader (Reichsgesundheitsführer), controlled medical practitioners, hospitals and health services in Germany.

THE RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS

in the southern and western parts of Europe still under German
domination. The Bremer Nachrichten, for example, wrote on
13 February 1944:
For 1944 not hundreds of thousands, b u t a few millions [of new foreign
labour recruits] are required. . . This task has now become very difficult. . . Yet
closer examination shows t h a t this year too it will be possible to obtain several
millions of foreign workers. . . [They would come] first of all, from Italy, followed
a t some distance by France, and a t a greater interval by the Netherlands and
Belgium. The E a s t and South-East should be able to supply a few hundreds of
thousands, that is, as many as the Netherlands and Belgium together.

A few days later, Dr. Walter Stothfang urged continuous extension of industrial war output in European countries; he demanded that superfluous foreign workers be placed at the disposal
of the Reich, and that the productivity of European workers be
increased. 1
At a meeting of chairmen of regional labour offices in May 1944,
the Commissioner-General for Manpower again called for "calmness and harshness" in the "distribution, direction and guardianship of Europe's manpower". 2
The official attitude wavered between the contention that all
countries in the orbit of Germany should share its war because
Germany, in mobilising Europe's labour forces, was acting as protector of the continent, and defiant acknowledgement of the opposition created by the policy of compulsory recruitment. In
support of the first contention, the non-German nations were frequently reminded that they "had only to work, while Germany
had to fight" and thus really made a bargain. The argument overlooked the fact that the overwhelming majority of foreign workers
considered Germany as their enemy.
As champion and leader in this war, Germany has not only acquired the
moral right but, as the upholder and apostle of a just and sound New European
Order, has indeed the moral duty of ensuring t h a t all European labour reserves
are mobilised. . . It is impossible to do too much in this matter. . . Compared
with Germany's own very heavy sacrifices in blood, the sacrifices in labour which
the dominated nations have had to accept are comparatively small. They must
therefore be made all the more readily and rapidly. . . Germany must demand the
employment of foreigners in Germany; the demand is not unfair in view of the
blood sacrificed by German soldiers. 3

Reports from all parts of German-occupied Europe disclosed that the labour drives were being intensified. Compulsion
1

Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 22 Feb. 1944.
Idem, 17 May 1944.
Walter STOTHFANG, in Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 4 Mar. 1944. He expressed
the same ideas in a lecture on the organisation of European labour supply, delivered before the German Institute for International Affairs.
s

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

was increasingly used; but, on the other hand, some attempt was
made to eliminate the carelessness and wastefulness that had
characterised Germany's foreign manpower policy in the earlier
phases of the war. A circular of the Commissioner-General for
Manpower of 18 January 1944 acknowledged that, in the past,
many foreign workers, particularly from the Balkans, had been
sent to Germany, but had "never begun work, because they were,
from the outset, incapable of it". 1 In a reference to Greek labour
conscripts, it was stated that:
Germany accepts only first-class workers. In addition to skill, the state of
health and the condition of the clothing are taken into consideration. In Salonika,
for example, all volunteers are X-rayed. At the German frontier a thorough
medical examination is made. Those who are not "A-l" are immediately sent
back.

At the end of March 1944, in an attempt to get a new contingent
of 250,000 Frenchmen sent to Germany, and also to get French
workers to work for the occupying Power in France, the Germans,
in co-operation with the Vichy authorities, set up "joint FrancoGerman verification committees". Every French employer had
personally to submit to these committees (which generally met in
the mayor's office or at the Chamber of Commerce) a complete
list of all persons employed by him, including members of his own
family. On the basis of these lists, the committees decided immediately, without hearing the persons concerned, who was to be
recruited for work in Germany. The committees could, in
fact, recruit the employer himself if they considered that his
presence was not absolutely essential for the conduct of his
business. 2
In Paris, as late as May 1944, labour conscription was carried
out in a systematic military fashion. Certain quarters would be
surrounded by strong cordons of German Feldgendarmerie, Gestapo
and French police units, with Germans armed with tommy guns
at street corners.
In Norway, in the spring of 1944, the Germans ordered the
mobilisation of 30,000 to 40,000 Norwegians. The Labour Office
of Bergen and Laksevag ordered all women born between 1 January
1904 and 31 December 1923 to register for mobilisation in the
German labour service. They had to present their registration
forms in order to obtain the ration cards that were to come into
force in May.
1
s

Reichsarbeitsblatt, 10 Feb. 1944, Part I, p. 53.
This scheme applied only to undertakings classified as essential, which had
not, therefore, been closed under the programme of "industrial and commercial
concentration" for the saving of manpower.

THE RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS

After the invasion of France had begun in June 1944, official
policy was well expressed by the Hamburger Tageblatt of 29 July
1944:
It must be fully realised that at the present time it will not be possible to
bring as large numbers of foreign workers to the Reich as in the past two years.
Yet there are still possibilities abroad and the authorities are absolutely determined to use them.

The invasion of June 1944 and the ensuing military events
led, in fact, to an intensification of the labour drive in the various
occupied territories, when Reich Minister Joseph Goebbels was
appointed Commissioner-General for the Total War Effort. From
Greece in the south-east, to Norway in the north-west of Europe,
the mobilisation of foreign workers was accelerated. The Germandominated Dutch press advocated large-scale raids by the (National
Socialist) Dutch Rural Guards to track down evaders of the
labour draft: "procedure must also be simplified, so that armed
terrorists, when arrested, can be summarily judged, and investigation and administration will not be needlessly burdened". 1 In
Norway systematic raids were organised, mostly during the night,
in order to arrest men who had failed to register for conscripted
labour. In August 1944, industrialists in the Netherlands had to
fill out special questionnaires (known as "Z cards") designed to
facilitate total mobilisation. Employers who failed to co-operate
were warned that they would make themselves and their workers
liable to employment elsewhere.2
In the later stages of the war Germany made particularly intensified efforts to mobilise Italian workers. Although the abdication of Benito Mussolini as Duce of Italy was soon followed by
the establishment of the pro-German "Italian Fascist Republic"
in the regions not liberated by the Allies, the German procedure
of military occupation and labour recruitment in Italy, introduced
in the late summer of 1943, did not differ from that followed in
occupied enemy territories.
In September 1943, the German occupation authorities in
Italy appealed to all men aged 17 to 40 and all women aged 17
to 35 to volunteer for work in Germany. On 28 September 1943,
the Milan radio broadcast a warning by the German Army command that "whoever fails to comply at once with this order [i.e.,
to report to the Italian authorities in charge of the recruitment
drive] or tries to evade it by changing his residence will be tried
according to German martial law".
1
1

De Zwarte Soldat (Zwolle), 24 Aug. 1944.
Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden (Amsterdam), 4 Aug. 1944.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

It should be noted that this labour drive was not limited to
Italy proper but was extended to approximately 800,000 Italians
living in southern France. Until General Badoglio's declaration
of war upon Germany, only volunteers were recruited from Italians
living in southern France. After the middle of October 1943 Italians
living in the Bouches-du-Rhône Department were compulsorily
directed to work for Germany, as can be seen from the following
notice published in French and Italian in the French newspaper
Le Mot d'Ordre:
All Italians between the ages of 16 and 50 living in the Bouches-du-Rhône
Department are required to place themselves a t the disposal of the German
authorities for compulsory labour. They must immediately, without exception,
report to the town hall for the census previously announced by the Prefect.
T h e German Employment Office will send those concerned a "transfer notice"
indicating the place to which they are to be transferred. The German authorities
announce for the last time t h a t persons who persistently fail to comply with
transfer notices will immediatejy be arrested by the police and interned.

The German labour drive in northern Italy encountered very
strong opposition. In fact, probably the first organised and largescale strikes which were called during the war in protest against
German recruitment methods occurred in northern Italy between
January and March 1944.
The strike wave was ruthlessly suppressed and deportation of
Italian workers continued. A report published in Sweden 1 stated
that the Italian Fascist militia and German S.S. troops daily raided
cafés, restaurants and bars and also watched motion picture theatres
in order to catch young men, whom they dispatched to Germany
in freight cars and cattle trucks.
A Swiss newspaper, in April 1944, described the comb-out for
manpower undertaken throughout occupied Italy. The original
plan had been compulsory mobilisation of 500,000 workers, in
provincial contingents:
The workers resisted this compulsory service in every possible manner . . . In
addition to legal mobilisation, the occupying authorities resorted to extraordinary
methods of compulsion. They obtained from various undertakings, through the
Union of Industrial Employers, nominal rolls of the workers, with their qualifications and addresses, and exacted the provision of contingents of workers in proportion to the strength of the undertaking. At the outset, a general contingent of
40 per cent, of skilled workers was mentioned, b u t in some cases they apparently
demanded only 20 per cent, and after laborious negotiation they were sometimes
content with a lower figure. The workers were forcibly transported to Germany . . .
There were also special raids directly on factories. They were generally directed against well-known anti-fascist suspects and others whom, as it was said,
it was not desirable to leave in Italy .
1

Aftontidningen,

15 Mar. 1944.

THE RECRUITMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS

In April 1944, advertisements appeared, of which the following
is an example :
Italian workers! All non-essential plants and industries in Italy are to be
closed down. There is but one way of escaping unemployment: To go to work in
Germany.1

After the invasion of western Europe had begun, neutral observers reported increasing harshness and an increase in the number
of executions of Italians in connection with the recruitment drive.
TRANSPORTATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS

Only a small percentage of foreign workers entered Germany
as individual travellers. The great majority of them were taken
into Germany in mass transports, under severe military or police
supervision. The journey from their home countries to their working places often lasted a great many days. Very strict precautions
were taken to prevent them from escaping during the journey.
In accordance with the policy of systematic discrimination,
the transportation of "Eastern" workers was from the beginning
carried out regardless of even minimum standards of hygiene and
comfort. Some of the official German regulations concerning the
transportation of "Eastern" workers used the term verfrachten, a
word denoting the transport of goods or cattle from one place to
another. The lack of adequate provisions can be gathered from
occasional reports in the German press, such as the statement
that recruited "Eastern" workers travelled in freight cars "which
are often comfortably fitted out with stoves and straw" 2 , or that
"tens of thousands of wooden shoes will have to be manufactured
in Germany for the workers from the East, who often arrive in
the Reich bare-footed". 3
In his Note of 11 May 1943, Mr. Molotov stated: "Day and
night, trains with slaves roll to Germany from the occupied districts of the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia. The people are
loaded into cars like cattle, 60 to 70 to each boxcar. Exhausted
and sick people are thrown out of the cars down embankments
and thus the roads to the west are littered with the bodies of Soviet
people."
The longer the war lasted, the more the methods formerly
used only for the transportation of Polish and Soviet workers were
extended to labour recruits from other parts of Europe. The use
1

Crociata Italica (Cremona), 19 Apr. 1944.
* Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, 11 Sept. 1942.
Frankfurter Zeitung, 15 Sept. 1942.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

of freight cars instead of passenger cars, and the locking or sealing
of these cars during stages of the journey, have been reported from
various European countries. At the turn of 1944-45, Netherlands
doctors protested against "the ever-increasing scale and ever more
violent manner of the deportation" of Netherlanders. "The men
are . . . deported regardless of obvious disease or disablement,
driven along roads until they are utterly exhausted, often herded
together like cattle in trucks, freight cars and ships' holds, entirely
without food." For example, on 12 November 1944, a train with
deportees arrived in Haarlem, with 50-60 men locked up in trucks
without straw. "Natural functions had to be performed on the
floor, where they subsequently had to sleep. Diseases included
gonorrhoea, syphilis, pulmonary tuberculosis, diphtheria, and the
serious form of epilepsy . . . There was no heating or lighting . . .
The trains were continually shot at . . . "l

1
Letter from Netherlands doctors to the German Governor, of 6 Jan.
1945, published in Het Parool (Herrijzend Nederland, 20 Jan. 1945).

CHAPTER IV
TRANSPLANTATION OF FOREIGN UNDERTAKINGS
TO GERMANY
IN THE W E S T

On 26 August 1940, two months and a day after the GermanFrench Armistice came into force, the Reich Marshal of Greater
Germany, in his capacity as head of the Four-Year Plan, issued a
Decree concerning "the planned exploitation of the economy of
the occupied western territories for German war economy". 1 The
explanatory statement began:
It is a political necessity of the State to mobilise in a planned manner and to
the greatest extent the economic capacities and raw materials in the occupied
western territories, in order to meet the demands of continued warfare, to relieve
German armament production, and to increase the war potential. The Supreme
Command of the Wehrmacht and the Reich Minister for A r m a m e n t a n d Munitions
have already issued the necessary orders.

In order to facilitate this programme, three central production
boards {Zentralauftragsstellen) were set up: one for the territory
of the Reich Commissioner for the occupied Netherlands; one for
the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France; and
one for the Military Commander in France. 2 It was expressly
stated that these central production boards formed part of the
military administration {Rüstungsinspektion: known in France
as Wehrwirtschafts-und Rüstungsstab Frankreich).
A Decree by Reich Marshal Goring, of 7 October 19403, encouraged the "combination of the capital assets {Kapitalverflech1
Decree V.P. 14/395 (Kommentar z. R.V.G., Vol. 2, P a r t IV, Auftragsverlagerung, pp. 1 et seq.).
J
The Orders concerning the activities of the central production boards in the
occupied western territories were issued jointly by the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs and by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. The
directors of the three central production boards were appointed by the Economic
Department of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, and the assistant
directors by the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs; these appointments were
made by mutual agreement. The central production boards had to give their
consent to all orders from public or private customers in Germany to be executed
in the plants in the occupied western territories, if the orders exceeded 5,000 RM
in value, or required more than 500 kg (1100 lbs.) of iron and steel, 100 kg
(220 lbs.) of non-ferrous metal, 25 kg (55 lbs.) of rubber, or any quantity of
textiles or leather.
» Decree V.P. 16411/5, ibid., pp. 2 et seq.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

tung) of German industry with those of the industries of the occupied
western territories" and demanded that for this purpose "those
German undertakings which transfer part of their own orders to
industries in the occupied western territories should be given an
opportunity to enter into economic combinations with the latter".
In the main, these "economic combinations" took one of two
forms in the field of industrial production. Either German firms
subcontracted or placed orders with the foreign firms and the
orders were then carried out at the foreign plants; or foreign plants
were transplanted, together with their machinery, technicians
and workers, to Germany.
"French metal-manufacturing plants are working almost exclusively on orders transferred to them 'under the transference
scheme' ", wrote G. Ferber in the official quarterly publication of
the Four-Year Plan. 1 As early as July 1942, the head of the Department of Economic Affairs of the Military Command in France
stated that orders placed with French factories in the region administered by the German Military Commander amounted to
more than 100,000 million French francs. He explained that detailed information about these orders had to be withheld for military
reasons, but remarked that "it would certainly be safe to assume
that the French metal industry primarily benefits from this subcontracting of orders". In the rubber industry, German undertakings put their raw materials, production experience and patents
at the disposal of the five leading French undertakings; in return,
the French undertakings ceded some of their foreign investments
to the Germans. The Semperit Gummi Werke A.G., Vienna, for
example, furnished "production advice and synthetic rubber" to
the Hutchinson Company, which in turn handed over to the Semperit concern half its interests in Spain and Italy. 2
In the chemical industry, German-French collaboration was
organised by the Farbenindustrie A.G. on the German side, and by
the Kuhlmann Company on the French side. These two concerns
founded the "Francolor" Corporation for the production of dyes
in France, with a capital of 800 million French francs, 51 per cent.
of which were in German hands.
A vast programme for the transplantation of industrial undertakings from the occupied western territories to Germany was
drawn up in the summer of 1941.3 In compliance with the ruling
that the employment of the productive capacities of western European industry should be organised by combining the capital
1

Der Vierjahresplan, 15 Nov. 1942, p. 529.
Ibid. ; from the report to the shareholders a t the annual meeting of the
Hutchinson Company, quoted by G. Ferber.
3
Circular by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 14 July 1941.
2

TRANSPLANTATION OF FOREIGN UNDERTAKINGS

assets of individual German with individual foreign undertakings,
the scheme provided for individual contracts between German
and foreign industrialists. The contracts had to specify, in detail,
the tasks to be fulfilled by the foreign undertaking while in
Germany, the number and categories of workers to be used, and
the period for which the agreement was to be in force.
The financial conditions "do not concern the agencies in charge
of labour administration"; the profit allowed to the foreign industrialist might be laid down in the contract either as a lump sum
or on a cost-plus basis. If necessary, however, prices could be
controlled by the Reich Price Commissioner. German employers
were merely to be warned by the labour officers that the use of
foreign undertakings must not lead to an increase in prices.
The Labour Office had, however, to watch very closely the relations between the foreign employer and his own workers. Guarantees had to be given that aliens employed by the foreign undertaking would not receive more favourable treatment than comparable German workers. The Labour Office further made it clear
that the conditions applying to foreign workers employed by the
foreign undertaking must be the same as those applying to aliens
recruited for German employment. Otherwise, the official instructions insist, industrial peace would be disturbed and recruitment of
individual workers in foreign countries would be rendered more
difficult. Foreign workers, even if employed by a foreign employer,
were thus subject to German laws and regulations while in Germany,
especially as regards wages, separation allowances and holidays.
As a matter of principle, the rules concerning the employment
of foreign workers by German firms also applied to the use of
entire foreign undertakings. Foreign workers who moved to Germany together with their plant or undertaking were subject to
the same treatment and limitations as if they had been transferred
to Germany to work for a German employer. They had to receive
their wage envelope in accordance with German regulations, at
their place of work. The German provisions concerning sickness
and invalidity insurance, insurance of salaried employees, pension
insurance and insurance of miners applied to foreigners. Contributions had to be paid to the German insurance funds by the
German firm on behalf of the foreign firm. In the case of accident
insurance only, some foreigners, for example, Belgians and Dutch,
continued for the first six months to be covered by the workmen's
compensation insurance of their own country. 1 German taxation
1
German-Belgian Treaty of 6 July 1912 concerning accident insurance, and
German-Netherlands Treaty of 27 August 1907, as amended on 13 May 1914.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

laws applied to foreigners and due regard had to be paid to agreements for the prevention of double taxation.
The Reich Minister of Labour declared that it was "not advisable to quote wage scales in contracts between a German and
foreign employer; it suffices to refer to the existing general wage
regulations in force in the German locality where the work is to be
performed". The German employer, it was pointed out, was fully
protected, because the foreign employer possessed authority over
his own workers and had therefore to settle their complaints. If,
however, the contract between the German and foreign employers
did contain specific wage scales, the consent of the German labour
trustee had to be sought.
Whenever, in the course of the co-operation between the German
and the foreign undertaking, changes were found necessary—in
the number or category of workers, for instance—an additional
agreement had to be signed and submitted to the competent German authorities for their consent. Every additional agreement
had to be examined on its own merits.
Detailed provisions regulated the procedure to be followed by
the foreign employer in securing labour permits for his workers from
the German police authorities.
In the construction industry the German and foreign employers
enjoyed a smaller degree of discretion. The Commissioner-General
for Manpower, in agreement with the Commissioner-General for
special questions concerning the construction industry, issued a
model contract, the conditions of which were declared to be compulsory. The main provisions of this model contract were as follows.
The German firm (called Auftraggeber—the "ordering firm")
specifies the type of work to be executed by the foreign firm (called
Leihfirma—the "borrowed firm"). If the work performed is to be
paid for by a lump sum, the financial arrangements are not to be
mentioned. If, however, the foreign firm is to be remunerated on
a cost-plus basis, the remuneration for every category of worker,
per work day, must be specified. It is explicitly stated in the model
contract that the foreign firm must give detailed information upon
the number and category of workers to be employed, but that the
workers must obey the orders of the German firm, which is also
made responsible for their accommodation and feeding. The cost
of these services is to be deducted from the payments due to the
foreign firm. Travelling expenses to and from the place of work
are borne by the German firm. The foreign employer must guarantee a working week of 60 hours for his workers. For work exceeding 48 hours a week, overtime pay of 25 per cent, must be granted.
On Sundays and holidays, the first eight hours of work are to be

TRANSPLANTATION OF FOREIGN UNDERTAKINGS

paid for at the rate of 50 per cent, and the following hours at the
rate of 75 per cent, above the normal. The wage and working
conditions in force at the place of their work apply automatically
to them. Additional payments are permissible only if authorised
by the Reich Labour Trustee. In the absence of such consent, no
additional payments or other emoluments may be made either
to the foreign workers themselves, or, on their behalf, to any other
person in Germany or abroad. If, as a result of action taken by
the foreign firm, the labour force drops below the number stipulated
in the contract, the foreign firm can be required to bring in an additional labour supply.
The taxes due from foreign workers under German taxation
laws must be paid to the German tax authorities by the German
firm, which debits the account of the foreign firm accordingly.
(Since German labour laws apply to the foreign workers, they
become dues-paying members of the German Labour Front and
of the other National Socialist organisations, membership of which
is compulsory.)
Lastly, the model contract provides that "foreign workers are
to be treated like comparable German workers" (adding, however,
the important proviso "unless German law contains special regulations for foreigners"); that they are to be indemnified like German
workers for time lost on account of air-raid warnings ; and that any
legal action arising out of this contract must be brought before the
competent German law court. 1
Model contracts were not made public for all branches of industry. The model contract for the "recruitment" of chemical
firms, for example, was not published. It was, however, made
known that if German employers "have to fill orders placed by the
Commissioner-General for Special Problems in the Chemical Industry, they are allowed to make agreements with foreign chemical
undertakings in order to get entire foreign undertakings transferred
to Germany".
If a German employer who wished to make such an arrangement
with a foreign employer did not possess the necessary business connections, he was encouraged to ask the labour office of his own district to take the initial steps for him. In such cases the foreign
agencies of the Reich Ministry of Labour proceeded with the
"recruitment of foreign undertakings". They acted, however,
only as intermediaries; once they had established contact between
a particular German and a particular foreign firm, the final arrange1
Der Ausländische Arbeiter in Deutschland (a loose-leaf collection of official
regulations concerning foreign labour and official comments on them, published
in Berlin from 1941 onwards), pp. 124-126.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

ments had to be made in the form of a contract between the German and the foreign undertaking. 1
A Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour of 14 October 1941
stated, for example, that owing to lack of personal contacts between German and Belgian industrialists, too few Belgian construction undertakings had been transplanted to Germany. The
Reich Minister of Labour, in agreement with the Military Commander of Belgium and northern France and with the DirectorGeneral of Construction Work, therefore ordered the German
labour offices in Belgium to bring Belgian construction firms and
German industrialists into contact. As a matter of principle,
permits to employ Belgian firms might be given only in cases of
recognised urgency (for otherwise the restrictions concerning new
construction could be circumvented by employing Belgian construction firms). A German employer who wished to secure the
services of a Belgian construction firm made his application to the
labour office of his own district which, if it found no objection,
forwarded the application to the Military Commander of Belgium
and northern France. The Military Commander then "sought to
recruit" suitable Belgian undertakings. Belgian industrialists were
given opportunities to travel to Germany, in order to inspect the
place of work and learn about the nature of the project, and to
come to terms with the German employers. These arrangements, to
become effective, needed the consent of the Labour Office and the
local representative of the Director-General of Construction Work.
Employers were advised to follow closely the conditions laid down
in the model contract of the chemical industry. Once the agreement between the two employers was signed, the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France recruited the necessary >
manpower, provided for their medical examination, and had the
workers transported to Germany in the usual manner. 2
The regulations issued by the Reich Minister of Labour, in
agreement with the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, concerning the transplantation of French armament plants to Germany,
were more detailed than those concerning the Belgian construction undertakings. In this case the Reich Minister of Labour
determined which German plants should be allowed to employ
an entire French metal plant. The Supreme Commander of the
1

BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 84.
Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 126-128. In 1942, the German labour offices and
the representatives abroad of the Reich Ministry of Labour acted mainly as intermediaries between German and Belgian construction firms (BIRKENHOLZ, in
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 84). Whole building firms were, however, transferred
to Germany from other countries too. For example, the Italian newspaper / /
Messaggero of 16 Apr. 1942 mentioned the transfer of 40 Italian construction
firms to Germany.
2

TRANSPLANTATION OF FOREIGN UNDERTAKINGS

Wehrmacht and the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions
were authorised to make proposals to this effect to the Reich Minister of Labour. If the selected German undertaking desired to avail
itself of the opportunity, it submitted a detailed application to the
labour office of its own district. Unless the labour office raised an
objection, it forwarded the application to the Section for the Recruitment of Undertakings in the Department for Labour Allocation, which was part of the administrative staff of the Military
Commander in France. The Section for the Recruitment of Undertakings was headed by a "personality fully familiar with French
economy and maintaining personal relations with French industry".
Negotiations concerning the transplantation of French firms were
conducted in Paris between the French employer and the chief
of the Section for the Recruitment of Undertakings, in the presence of the German employer concerned.
Before transporting his workers to Germany, the French employer was required to submit a detailed list containing the qualifications of every worker; the chief of the Section for Recruitment
of Undertakings had the right to verify these data. Medical examination was also in the hands of the Department for Labour
Allocation of the Military Commander. The German firm for which
the French undertaking was destined, provided escorts, if necessary,
and paid the travelling expenses to the place of work. In addition,
every transport had to be accompanied by a French escort. 1
*
*

In order to encourage the transfer of undertakings (together
with their workers) from Denmark to Germany, a German-Danish
agreement was concluded on 24 February 1942.2 Under its terms
Danish workers employed by an undertaking which had its seat
in the Kingdom of Denmark, but was working in the Reich as a
transplanted firm, continued to enjoy the benefits of Danish accident insurance. The Reich undertook to pay compensation foraccidents due to war events which these workers might suffer on
German soil.
In the later stages of the war, the extent and direction of the
transfer of machines and equipment from German-occupied countries to the Reich or to other German-occupied countries depended
on the course of military events. As the war drew towards its close,
1

Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 84, 129-132.
Promulgated by the Reich Minister of Labour on 24 February 1942;
Reichsarbeitsblalt, Part II, p. 416. Cf. also Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour
of 26 March 1943; Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 15, Apr. 1943, Part II, p. 16.
1

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

more machinery was moved. In January 1945, for example,
it was reported that in northern Italy the Germans continued their
methodical efforts to dismantle Italian industrial equipment and
to remove it to the Bolzano region in the South Tyrol, to the Valtellina Valley in the Italian Alps, and across the Brenner Pass
into Austria and Germany. 1
I N THE E A S T

Significantly different methods for the exploitation of industrial
capacity were used in the eastern occupied territories. Whereas
in the West the programme was based, formally at least, on voluntary contracts made between individual German and individual
foreign firms, the productive capacities of the eastern occupied
territories were brought into the orbit of the German economy
by direct action.
In the Government-General, German wholesale merchants
and German industry were allowed to organise autonomously (in
the case of industry through the "creation of monopolistic agencies")
the utilisation of the industrial resources of the territory. 2
Thus, in the words of the organ of the Rhine and Ruhr industry,
the Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, the Government-General served as a
"testing ground for the colonial activity of the Third Reich".
The methods first tested in the Government-General were later
applied to the conquered regions of the Soviet Union. 3 When the
armies of the Third Reich invaded the industrialised regions of the
Soviet Union various organisations of German undertakings (Industrielle Wirtschaftsgruppen and Fachgruppen)^, set up special
"East committees" on the basis of the experience gained in Poland
(Ostausschüsse). These "East committees were always composed
of only a few members, and their chairman was always a leading
industrialist in the particular field".
The functions of the "East committees" were: (a) "to administer
the plants and shops taken over in the eastern territories"; (b) to
ascertain the requirements of these plants and shops in manpower,
raw material and machines; (c) to select employers and specialists
"who are qualified for the East"; and (d) to supervise "the erection
of branches of German firms which are to take over plants in the
East". "In this manner German industry autonomously directs
the supply of materials and personnel for eastern industry" and
1
2

Christian Science Monitor, 3 Jan. 1945.
Editorial, "Stetige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Generalgouvernements",
in Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 5 Jan. 1943.
3
Ibid.
* See p. 20.

TRANSPLANTATION OF FOREIGN UNDERTAKINGS

the industrial reconstruction of the German-occupied parts of the
Soviet Union was organised by a system of "determined decentralisation", namely, through independent action by the various
branches of German industry. 1
The policy of germanisation in the German-annexed parts of
Poland is illustrated by the changes that took place in Upper
Silesian heavy industry.
Almost all the mines in the area became the property of
the German State. In particular, the Hermann Goring Works
took over the mines formerly belonging to the Polish firms
Wspolnota Interesow (Community of Interests) and Skarboferm,
the mines in Brzeszcz and Jawiskowice, formerly the property of
the Polish State, the Hohenlohe industrial establishments, belonging to Petschek, and the RybnickicGwarectwo Weglowe. The Trzyniec
foundries, formerly belonging to the French Schneider-Creuzot
interests, became the property of the Bohemian Union Bank
of Prague, which was a branch of the German Bank in Berlin. The
Pokoj foundry and the Rudzkie Gwarectwo Weglowe, which, for
many years belonged to the Polish State, returned to their
former owner, the German Ballestrom firm in Gleiwitz. Even
before the war this firm had been transformed into the firm of
Oberhütte, which was dependent on the German State. The Wspolnota Interesow foundries were for a long period held in trusteeship
by the Röchling interests of the Saar, but (at the end of 1941)
they came under the direct administration of the central Haupttreuhandstelle Ost at Berlin (the central agency for the germanisation of industrial property, headed by Heinrich Himmler), as
negotiations for Röchling to acquire the foundries fell through.
The Silesian Mines and Zincworks, Ltd., returned to their
former owners, the Silesian Foundry and Mining Works at Bytom. The Pszczyna mines, with the addition of further capital
provided by the I.G. Farbenindustrie of Frankfort on Main, and
the aid of a large loan provided by the German Bank, were rendered
dependent on the German State.
Out of the 3,500 to 4,000 industrial establishments in the Lodz
area, 300 to 400 survived the German war against Poland. Of
these remaining enterprises, by the middle of 1941, the Lodz
Treuhandstelle department (a subsidiary of the Berlin central
office for the germanisation of industries) had already managed
to "sell" to Germans 211 wool mills and 39 cotton goods factories.
1
Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 5 Jan. 1943. "In contrast thereto", the report
added, "the activities of [German] wholesale and export trade in the East were
organised, in a centralised manner, through the 'East Department' {Ostreferat)
of the Reich Group 'Commerce' ".

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

The Ostdeutscher Beobachter of 27 August 1941 reported that out
of the 153,700 workers in Lodz before the war, 80,000 had been
carried off to Germany for agricultural work. 1
Although German sources have published very little information on the organisation of the confiscated industrial plants and
on German economic activities in the occupied eastern territories,
in May 1943 the German press mentioned the existence of Ukrainian branch undertakings, with headquarters in Kiev, of such German firms as the Friedrich Krupp and Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G.,
and the Mannesmann Röhren Co. Ltd.
Three distinct phases can be recognised in German policy in
the occupied eastern areas. The first phase was characterised by
systematic deindustrialisation ; many of the territories east of the
German-annexed parts of pre-war Poland were stripped of the
machinery which could be used in German factories. The second
phase was in sharp contrast to this policy. With the intensification of aerial warfare against the old Reich territory, a programme
of large-scale reindustrialisation was carried out in certain regions
of the former Republic of Poland and of the Ukraine. However,
even during the first phase, apart from the deportation of workers,
Germany made use of the local population on a large scale, particularly during the period of preparation for war against the Soviet
Union. In the spring of 1941, for example, the "intensified continuation of war-essential measures" (mainly construction of a
network of strategic highways and railways) led, for a while, to an
almost complete exhaustion of the manpower reserves, including
the small peasants in the Government-General. 2 During the phase
of reindustrialisation, not only equipment, but also large contingents of German and foreign workers, had to be transported to
the occupied eastern territories.
Thirdly, when the Germans retreated from the East, the systematic removal of machines and equipment westward was largely
carried out by the same "East committees" and "East companies"
(Ostgesellschaflen) which had been founded3
to organise the administration of the occupied eastern territories in a decentralised manner. This decentralisation is also maintained during the phase of
liquidation, by assigning to these corporations the task of liquidation, autonomously, but under the control of the authorities.
From regions where the withdrawal was prepared long in advance, plants
together with their machinery and workers were often transplanted almost in
their entirety to localities in the rear. As a rule, however, the machines, goods
1
Polish Fortnightly Review, published by the Polish Ministry of Information
(London), No. 37, 1 Feb. 1942, pp. 4-5.
2
TIMM: Der Einsatz ausländischer Arbeitskräfte in Deutschland, p. 57.
3
"Abwicklung des Treuhandvermögens in den besetzten Ostgebieten", in
Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 13 Aug. 1944.

TRANSPLANTATION OF FOREIGN UNDERTAKINGS

and raw materials salvaged during the evacuation were removed item b y item,
and distributed to plants in the more remote occupied regions or in the Fatherland, according to the urgency, from the standpoint of war production, of their
needs. 1

All firms participating in this distribution scheme (they were
called receivers of "removed goods"-—Räumungsgut) had to make
special applications. Loot not distributed in this way was sold
for cash, at prices determined by'official valuation. 2
Apart from these sales, however, it is noteworthy that no emphasis was laid on strict accounting for removed goods. It was
pointed out that the "financial liquidation" should be determined
by the fact that no private property had existed in those territories
up to thç time of the German occupation; and that, with the exception of the private German undertakings organised during the
occupation, the plants had been administered on behalf of the
Reich by commissioners, trustees and lessees, and were therefore to
be considered as special economic assets of the Reich. These persons
were given to understand that they would not be asked to render
accounts, on the ground that to do so would be a waste of manpower:
As administrators of another's 3 assets the trustees owe to the Reich an accounting of their management in so far as they are able to do so on the basis of
salvaged documents; but-from the standpoint of an efficient manpower policy
it would be irresponsible to undertake post-factum precise auditing, which would
only be of theoretical value. In order to simplify and accelerate the liquidation,
it was therefore decided to waive, and for the future as well, t h e demand for complete final balance sheets of the various undertakings, for the settlement of outstanding debts between undertakings run by trustees, and for statements showing from which undertakings the goods evacuated and sold were derived.
Careful accounting must however be forthcoming in the settlement of the
claims and debts of the undertakings run by trustees vis à vis outside firms,
especially contractors and customers of the Reich. As a matter of fact these
outsiders can in principle make claims only against the assets of the individual
eastern undertakings and not against the administration of eastern economic
affairs as a whole, or against the Reich Treasury, on behalf of which the administration was conducted. But for reasons of fairness, steps will be taken in the liquidation process to satisfy outside firms which possess claims because they
have, through supplying goods or credits, contributed to the development of
German economy in the East, even if the undertakings which were run on public
trust eventually wind u p their affairs with a loss. 4

1
This movement was supervised by Government delegates appointed jointly
by the Ministries of Economic Affairs, and of Armament and Munitions.
ä
Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 13 Aug. 1944.
3
Namely, the Reich's.
* Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung,
13 Aug. 1944.

CHAPTER V
THE NUMBERS INVOLVED
Scarcity of official information is not the only difficulty in attempting to estimate the numbers involved in Germany's exploitation of foreign manpower. Another and confusing factor is the
very divergent use of the same terms in the available data. Moreover, the available figures fall into true perspective and can be
correctly appreciated only if they are placed in the general framework of German war policy.
(1) The first difficulty is the definition of the term "foreign
worker" and of the term "Germany". In answering the questions
"who is a foreign worker?" and "what is German?", the German
sources which form the basis for most estimates start from premises
not accepted by or acceptable to the United Nations. A further
complication is the fact that neither the German nor the non-German
computations have always been consistent in the use of the
terms.
(a) Before the first shot of the war was fired, Germany had
already increased its territory by incorporating Austria, the Sudeten
region of Czechoslovakia, the Free City of Danzig and the region
of Memel (populations approximately 7,000,000, 3,000,000, 400,000
and 150,000 respectively) thus increasing its population from about
69,600,000 to about 80,150,000. Like the other assets of these
occupied regions, the productive capacities of their workers were
used throughout the war to further the German war effort.
Under international law and under the domestic law of these
territories before their annexation, as well as according to the future
map of Europe, all these workers were "foreign workers". But
immediately after occupying these regions, Germany changed by
decree the citizenship of their inhabitants (with very few exceptions) to German citizenship. Thereafter, German legislation
applied to these persons. They were subject to German labour
laws, military service, labour service, etc., like other German

THE NUMBERS INVOLVED

nationals. In the official German statistics they have never been
considered as "foreign workers".
(b) " R u m p " Czechoslovakia (pre-1938 Czechoslovakia minus
the Sudeten region and Slovakia, with a population of approximately 10,900,000) was occupied by Germany in March 1939 and
called the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. While not completely incorporated in the Third Reich, this region, which is highly
industrialised and rich in raw materials and agriculture, has often
been dealt with in German statistics as if it had been fully incorporated. The workers of this part of Czechoslovakia were either
compelled to work for Germany within their own country, or were
transported for work to Germany or to other parts of Germandominated Europe. German statistics often referred to them as a
special group of foreigners, but quite frequently considered them
as a section of German labour. In the latter case they are not
included among "foreign workers". 1
(c) After its first military successes, Germany incorporated
Alsace-Lorraine (population approximately 1,900,000), the region
of Eupen and Malmedy (population approximately 60,000), the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (population approximately 300,000),
and Western Poland (population approximately 10,000,000) into
the Reich. Inhabitants of those regions who were considered
German were granted various types of German nationality.
Their number is difficult to estimate, but probably amounted
to at least 2 to 3 million. Again, from the standpoint of international
and domestic law, and in the eyes of the United Nations, they
are foreigners. However, like the inhabitants of the occupied
regions already mentioned, they have, with minor exceptions,
been covered by general German laws and have not been included
among "foreign workers".
(d) According to National Socialist theory, citizens of nonGerman countries who for biological or political reasons were claimed
by the National Socialists-to be Germans, should be considered as
such, regardless of their non-German citizenship. During the war
Germany was able to translate this theory into reality, and declared probably between 2 to 3 million citizens of countries other than
Germany to be German nationals. These persons again added
to the sum total of "German" manpower and are not included in
the statistics of foreign labour.
1
According to official estimates made by the Czechoslovak Government in
London, approximately 200,000 Czechs and 120,000 Slovaks (exclusive of seasonal
workers) had been moved out of pre-1938 Czechoslovakia by the end of 1941. By
1943, their number had increased to approximately 600,000 (Report on Czechoslovak Workers in Germany, Part I, p. 6).

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Thus, by adding Austrians, Czechs, Frenchmen, Belgians,
Poles, and "racial" Germans of various other countries, Germany
increased its population by at least 14 million (and in so far as
" r u m p " Czechoslovakia was considered as a part of Germany,
by at least 25 million).
German wartime policy compelled the employable portion of
these groups to work for the German war effort, either inside or
outside their home countries. Although they are not listed as
"foreign workers", these persons present various problems that
will call for solution after the war.
(2) The extraordinary circumstances of the war enabled Germany, in many parts of Europe and for several years, to use many
millions of non-German workers for the German war effort, without removing them from their own countries.
All over Europe, laws introducing compulsory labour service
in the interest of Germany were issued, partly by the German
authorities themselves, and partly under German pressure.
This implied the removal of millions of workers from
their usual places of residence, either within their own countries
or to other countries under German domination. Throughout
the years of German domination of Europe, there was a huge
and continuous shifting and displacement of persons under German
orders. 1
For example, according to estimates based on reliable sources 2 ,
only 2,000 Norwegians were working in Germany in January 1944;
but Frolich-Hansen, head of the Norwegian Labour Service,'announced that, during 1944, the number of Norwegian girls conscripted to work for the Germans in Norway (mainly road-building to the Swedish frontier) was to be increased from 20,000 to
40,000. The number of Norwegian women employed in Norway
for the German war effort would therefore have been 10 to 20
times greater than the number of Norwegian men and women
working in Germany proper at the beginning of 1944.
It must always be kept in mind that, however great the number
of persons transported to Germany, probably still more were
deported, not to Germany, but to other parts of their own countries or to other occupied territories.
These persons again were not counted as "foreign workers".
But it is interesting to remember that, after the First World War,
the Belgian Government claimed indemnities from Germany not
only for Belgian workers deported to Germany but also for those
1
2

Cf. Eugène M. KULISCHER, op. cit., passim.
Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. L, No. 4, Oct. 1944, p. 470.

THE NUMBERS INVOLVED

5,7

forced by the Germans to go to northern France or to move within
Belgium. 1
(3) Published German statistics do not usually take into account those non-Germans who were forcibly removed from their
home countries, not as civilian workers, but as political deportees
and racial deportees. Racial deportees (persons who, according
to National Socialist standards, were considered.as Jews) were also
forced to work. As to the number of political deportees, Mr. Henri
Fresnay, Minister for Prisoners of War, Deported Persons and
Refugees in the French Provisional Government, declared in the
late autumn of 1944 that 600,000 political deportees must be presumed to have been taken to Germany from France alone. 2 Most
of the political deportees were forced to work for Germany at
their places of destination. Percentages (which are difficult to
estimate) were, after shorter or longer periods of detention, released as "free" foreign civilian workers in Germany.
(4) In the course of the war the German authorities, from time
to time, changed the status of prisoners of war into that of civilian
foreign workers. In the case of Frenchmen, for instance, this was
done under agreements between the German and the Vichy authorities. In other cases, for example, with respect to Soviet and Polish
prisoners of war, it was done by unilateral action. These changes
in status would apply to great numbers of persons. On the other
hand, the German authorities also, though much less frequently,
reclassified as prisoners of war certain groups whom they had at
an earlier date released. These changes of status also affect the
statistics of foreign civilian workers.
(5) One more consideration has to be taken into account. Most
figures concerning deported workers refer to a given date or period
of time. Such estimates, however carefully made, can only indicate
1
The Belgian Government took the view that not only Belgians deported to
Germany, but also Belgians "who had to do forced labour [for Germany] or were
r removed [on German orders] either into the interior of the country [Belgium] or
from Belgium into France—as happened in the frontier regions—fell under the
same category as those who were deported into Germany" (quoted from Part I,
Chapter VI, entitled "Remunerations aux déportés" of Mémoire sur les dommages
de guerre subis par la Belgique, submitted to the Reparations Commission). The
Reparations Commission accepted this Belgian claim as one to be honoured by
Germany under No. 8 of Annex I of Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles (indemnification for violence against whole portions of the civilian population). (See
decision of the Belgian-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in the case of JulesHector Loriaux v. Etat allemand, of 5 April 1922, Recueil des décisions des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes, 4th year, 1924-25, p. 684.) See also Appendix VIII.
1
The conditions in the German prisons, concentration and punitive labour
camps, in and outside Germany, were notoriously inhumane, with a correspondingly high death rate among their inmates. In the later stages of the war, censorship was particularly rigorous on this subject. However, the Swedish press reported from Norway in the autumn of 1944 "harsher treatment of prisoners by
the S.S. guards, deaths by torture, suicides after Gestapo examinations, and
increasingly horrible conditions in prisons and concentration camps generally".

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

the number of workers employed at any given time. But the number of foreign workers was constantly depleted, first by deaths
(including suicides), secondly, by authorised returns (on account
of sickness, incapacity or termination of contracts), thirdly, by
authorised returns for a limited time, after which, however, the
foreigners often failed to return 1 , and, fourthly, by unauthorised
returns (escape, "desertion"). The system here discussed extended
over several years. It must be assumed that the number of foreign
workers in Germany, unless constantly replaced, decreased through
deaths, escapes and returns at a rate of 10-15 per cent, per year.
No official figures of death rates and turnover have been given
by Germany, but sometimes comparison of figures is revealing.
For example, Dr. Syrup, Secretary of State in the Reich Ministry
of Labour, stated in an article published in the official organ of that
Ministry in the summer of 19412 that "at present" 873,000 workers
from former Poland were employed in the Reich. But the Kölnische Zeitung reported as early as 1.1 October 1940 that, during 1940,
950,000 Poles (550,000 agricultural and 400,000 industrial workers)
had been sent into the interior of the Reich. 3 Thus the Kölnische
Zeitung's figure is 77,000 higher than that given more than half a
year later by Dr. Syrup, although it does not take into account importation of Polish labour during the last months of 1939, or during
the period from October 1940 to the summer of 1941.
In computing the estimate concerning the number of foreign
workers in Germany in January 1944, the International Labour
Review assumed 4 that of the 1,200,000 Poles who, until October
1943, had been moved from the Government-General to Germany 5
(plus those Poles moved from there between October 1943 and
January 1944)6, only 900,000 could still be expected to be alive and
be at work in Germany in January 1944.
1
Out of 72,000 French "voluntary" workers who had been given temporary
leave from Germany, 57,000 were reported not to have returned (Journal français
de Genève, 6 May 1944; International Labour Review, loc. cit., p. 474).
2
Reprinted from Reichsarbeitsblatt in condensed form in Soziale Praxis, 1 Aug.
1941, p. 609.
5
Quoted in Polish White Book, p. 195.
4
Loc. cit., p. 471.
6
Up to 1 April 1942, 655,000 Poles had been sent to Germany from the Government-General (Sozialpolitische Weltrundschau, Part 2; Ministry of Labour,
Berlin, 1 May 1942). In October 1943, the Deutsche Stimme (Munich) stated that
u p to that date the Government-General had supplied the Reich (i.e., apart from
Poles working in the Government-General for Germany) with 1,200,000 Poles.
6
In October 1943, the Deutsche Stimme stated t h a t "owing to the urgent needs
of the Government-General, manpower reserves are no longer available in its
towns". Yet reliable reports of December 1943 stated that "recently, some tens
of thousands of Polish workers, mainly from Lodz, were deported to the Reich".
T h e Wieset Polske (Budapest) of 14 January 1944 reported that 24,000 Polish
workers had recently been sent to the Ruhr basin for industrial work.
Yet the Deutsche Kohlen-Zeitung of 8 February 1944 acknowledged that it had

THE NUMBERS INVOLVED

To summarise: the number of civilian "non-German workers
who, at any given time during the war, were employed in Germany
represents only a part of the total number of persons deported by
Germany for work in the interest of its war effort; and is also considerably smaller than the sum total of foreigners imported into
Germany for work during the whole duration of the war.
*

It does not fall within the scope of the present study to determine the number of persons moved to Germany or German-occupied
countries in order to work for the German war effort. The figures
available up to the middle of 1943 have been analysed in another
publication of the International Labour Office1 and supplemented
by more recent data published in the International Labour Review.2
For present purposes, the following remarks concerning the numerical size of the problem appear pertinent.
Nine months before the outbreak of hostilities Dr. Syrup estimated that Germany would need an additional 250,000 industrial
and 750,000 agricultural workers. 3
Although the war broke out in 1939 a few weeks later in the
year than in 1914, the lack of manpower in German agriculture
was considerably greater than in 1914, because the concentrated
armament programme under the four-year plan had deprived
German agriculture of many hands. In September 1939, the number
of non-German citizens employed in Germany either as migratory
or permanent, wage-earning or salaried employees as well as independent workers, was officially estimated at about 500,0004,
of whom about 120,000 were employed in German agriculture. 5
formerly been easy to obtain labourers from the Government-General b u t t h a t
"in the course of time, this great reservoir of human beings has been exhausted
by the heavy demands made on it", and t h a t therefore "the prospects of acquiring
more workers from there are comparatively small". But the article stressed that
Germany "must go on trying to obtain suitable workers from the GovernmentGeneral, so that we shall have a t least a slight chance of coping with the increasing
manpower shortage in the coal industry".
1

Eugene KULISCHER, op. cit., pp. 122 et seq.

International Labour Review, loc. cit., pp. 469-480.
' "Die Etappen des Arbeitseinsatzes", in Soziale Praxis, 1 Jan. 1939, p. 14;
WILLEKE, in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, Sept. 1941, p. 312,
note 1.
* Dr. TIMM, in his report to the Labour Administration Conference of
September 1942. This figure has usually been accepted by German and nonGerman official publications. But it must be remembered that the figure is
not unequivocal, since it is not clear whether Dr. Timm referred to the German
Reich territory before or after the annexations of Austria, the Sudeten regions
and " r u m p " Czechoslovakia, or considered Austrians and Sudeteners as German
citizens.
6

Dr. SYRUP, loc.

cit.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

In the spring of 1941 (before Germany started war on the Soviet
Union), the number of foreigners employed in Germany was estimated by one official writer a t 1,650,000 civilian workers (of whom
1,350,000 were men), plus approximately 1,400,000 employed
prisoners of war. 1 This source did not indicate the nationality of
the prisoners of war, but broke up the civilians into the following
chief contingents: Poles (873,000); Czechs (150,000); Italians
(132,000); Netherlanders (90,000) ; Belgians (87,000); and Slovaks
(69,000) .2 The number of civilians transported to Germany continued
to rise. Soviet labour was recruited from the very beginning of
the Soviet-German war. 3
As already observed, the number of foreign workers increased
particularly after Fritz Sauckel had been appointed CommissionerGeneral for Manpower (March 1942). The Frankfurter Zeitung
of 15 September 1942 stated that "owing to the efforts of Sauckel
and his staff", the number of foreign workers increased within the
first six months after his appointment "from 3J^ millions, including prisoners of war, to 5J/£ millions, and, indeed, to nearly 6 millions". 4 The pace was even more rapid after the autumn of 1942.
For example, in October and November 1942, it was officially stated
that the German armament programme "made demands on manpower which simply could not be solved by the usual bureaucratic administrative methods" and which in fact "seemed insoluble". 5 At Christmas 1942, Sauckel said that 17 per cent, of all
industrial workers in Germany were foreigners.6 Six weeks later,
1
It must be noted that the number of employed prisoners of war is lower than
their total figures. This is due to three causes: appropriate employment is not
always found for them; some prisoners of war are not fit for work; and according
to Sec. 27 of the Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war, of 27
July 1929 (the "Geneva Convention"), officers and prisoners of equivalent
status may not be compelled to work unless they volunteer for "suitable work".
Non-commissioned officers who are prisoners of war may be compelled to undertake only supervisory work unless they expressly request remunerative occupation. The Soviet Union was not a party to the Geneva Convention and the
Germans, according to reliable reports, often compelled Soviet officers to work,
although this was contrary to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907.
2
I t is to be noted that this official estimate does not mention French civilian
workers among the "main contingents" employed in Germany in the spring of
1941.
3
Cf. "Soviet Workers in Germany", in International Labour Review, Vol.
X L V I I , No. 5, May 1943, pp. 576-590.
4
The Reich Minister of Labour gave a much lower total for all foreign civilians
employed in Germany, namely, 2,138,360 a t the end of June 1942 {Reichsarbeilsblatt, 1942, No. 15, Part V, p. 284). These discrepancies, as said before, are
due to a different system of computation; for example, by applying a different
concept of "foreign workers", such as by considering the more than 200,000
Czech workers who a t that time were employed in Germany as Germans, or by
not taking into account the foreign civilians working a t that time in Austria
a n d / o r Czechoslovakia (without Slovakia), etc.
6
Editorial in Arbeitseinsalz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No. 1-2, Jan. 1943.
« Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 Dec. 1942.

THE NUMBERS INVOLVED

he stated that in Europe's armament industries, in and outside
the Reich, more than two thirds of the workers were non-Germans. 1
The Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs at the Hague estimated
that, during 1942, 170,797 Netherlanders were sent abroad. 2
Between the spring and early December of 1942, 110 new
Germán labour offices were opened in the Ukraine alone. 3 At that
time Soviet workers were poured into German industry at the rate
of 15,000 to 20,000 a day. In all, about two million "Eastern"
workers are reported to have been sent to Germany only in 1942.4
In May 1943, the region (Gau) of Southern Hanover-Brunswick
with, according to the 1939 census, a population of 2,137,000,
had no fewer than 300,000 foreign workers. 6 The city of Linz in
Upper Austria (pre-war population, including the vicinity, 129,000)
housed, in July 1943,168,000 foreign workers, according to German
estimates.
Early in 1943, German and non-German sources estimated the
number of foreign workers in Germany at, variously, between 6
and 8 millions.6
But on 30 June 1943, Fritz Sauckel stated that the number of
foreign workers employed in the German economy had increased
from 500,000 in 1939 to 12,100,000 at the end of May 1943, including prisoners of war put to work.7 It was explained 8 that this
figure, while including employed prisoners of war, did not include
foreigners used for German war purposes beyond the frontiers of
Greater Germany.
This report was variously interpreted outside Germany. The
Economist (London) of 10 July 1943, on the basis of a careful analysis, reached the conclusion that at that time "in Greater Germany
it is possible that 8 or 9 millions out of a total of 28.1 million are
foreign workers—roughly one third".
The Arbeiterzeitung (Schaffhausen, Switzerland) of 3 July 1943
1

Trans-Ocean, 9 Feb. 1943.
Survey by J. A. KNETSCH, Chief of the Employment Section of the (Hague)
Ministry for Social Affairs, quoted in Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden,
12 Feb. 1943. The same German-dominated paper wrote on 6 March 1943:
"Although the Netherlands has been a t war for three years, the magnificent
buildings of banks, shipping companies, and overseas trading companies are still
crowded with employees who do nothing b u t wait for the return of overseas
business. They will be given work in the Netherlands, the Reich, or other occupied countries. Although 300,000 Netherlanders are a t present working in Germany, Netherlands labour reserves are still larger than those of Germany."
(See Appendix IV.)
3
Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, 11 Dec. 1942.
* Monatshefte für N S-Sozialpolitik, No. 23-24, Dec. 1942, quoted in International Labour Review, Vol. X L V I I , No. 5, May 1943, p. 577.
6
Hanoversche Zeitung, 8-9 May 1943.
6
Eugene M. KULISCHER, op. cit., p. 129, note 6.
7
Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 1 July 1943.
8
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 June 1943.
!

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

accepted the figure of 12 million foreigners employed in German
industry and agriculture, including French prisoners of war, as
of 31 May 1943. If, it argued, the employable men and women of
all age groups in Germany at that time numbered approximately
47 millions, and, roughly, 10 millions of them were in the German
armed forces and 10 millions in agriculture, then about 26 million
men and women were available for the armament industries and waressential enterprises of all kinds. This figure of approximately
26 millions included, the Arbeiterzeitung estimated, approximately
10 million foreigners, whereas the remaining 2 million foreigners
were included in the approximately 10 million agricultural workers. 1
In a survey published on 6 February 1944, the Soviet trade
union organ Trud reproduced, without challenging it, the figure of
12.1 million civilians and prisoners of war employed in Greater
Germany in May 1943, and stated that the number had meantime
increased. The article emphasised the fact that, according to
German sources, the increase of foreign manpower in Germany
was comparatively greater in industry than in agriculture.
INCREASE OF NUMBERS OF FOREIGN WORKERS IN GERMANY2
{in thousands)
Year

War industries

1941
1942
1943 (Jan. to May)
Total increase between Jan.
1941 and May 1943

Agriculture

Total

1,300
2,800
1,200

1,700
2,000
750

3,000
4,800
1,950

5,300

4,450

9,750

In any case, it must be assumed that the figure of 12.1 million
claimed by the Commissioner-General for Manpower was reached
by using the broadest definitions, that is, by including foreigners
employed not only in the old territory of Germany, but also in
annexed territories and most probably also in the German-occupied
countries (Todt workers). Owing to the domestic and military
situation of Germany at any given period, the official National
Socialist propaganda found it advisable at times to impress the
German public with the enormous size of foreign manpower working for the German war effort, while, at other times, it tried to
quiet misgivings about the potential danger of this policy and
"reduced" the number by as much as several million. It appears
'According to Eugene M. KULISCHBR, op. cit. (third printing, Jan. 1945,
corrigenda on p. 171), the figure of 12 million foreign workers included foreigners
and native workers employed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and
in the Government-General.
2
Trud (Moscow), 6 Feb. 1944, quoting Essener National-Zeitung, 16 July 1943.

THE NUMBERS INVOLVED

that Sauckel's figure of 12.1 million for the end of May 1943 was not
only a boast about his own "achievements" but was also intended
to calm the alarm caused in Germany by the increasingly ruthless
efforts of the régime to mobilise the last available German manpower
for the armed forces and for war industries.
Large-scale displacements of foreign workers continued throughout the later stages of the war. 1 On account of the intensified
bombing of Germany, many factories were transferred from the
Reich to other parts of Europe still under German domination.
Accordingly, considerable numbers of foreign workers were shifted.
For example, despite the continued recruitment of foreign workers,
the Essener National-Zeitung of 20 January 1944 indicated that a t
that date only 10 million foreigners were living in Germany and
working "side by side with Germans for the preservation and
security of life in Europe".
It would appear, however, that the lower figure of 10 millions
included approximately 1,300,000 non-German workers employed
outside Greater Germany (i.e., the old Reich, plus the territories
incorporated since March 1938, but excluding the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia and the Government-General). According
to estimates made by the International Labour Office, at the beginning of 1944, approximately 8,670,000 foreign workers (6,450,000
civilian workers and 2,220,000 employed war prisoners) were working within the area of Greater Germany. 2 The available evidence
suggests that subsequently this figure was considerably increased.
*
*

It must again be emphasised that the discrepancies between
the various numerical estimates are due to different definitions of
"foreign workers" and to the larger or smaller territory considered. 3
This explains, for example, the seeming discrepancy between the
International Labour Office's estimate of 8,600,000 foreign workers
in January 1944, and the estimate made by the International
Federation of Trade Unions for late September 19444, putting
the number of foreigners ("forced labour, prisoners of war, repatriated Germans, etc.") as high as "up to 15 millions".
It is safe to assume that ever since the mobilisation of foreign
1
See Appendix IV.
* For a short explanation of these figures, territory by territory, see Appendix

IV. 3

Even if the statistics for the various periods did not show an absolute increase, considerable fresh contingents of workers had to be recruited in order to
replace the decreases due to deaths, returns, and "desertions".
4
Bulletin of the International Federation of Trade Unions, 1 Oct. 1944, p. 8.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

manpower was fully developed (that is, since 1942), the number
of non-Germans employed in the German war effort has exceeded
the number of persons serving in all branches of the German armed
forces.
The figures are even higher if account is taken of foreigners
working under non-German employers in German-dominated
countries, and foreigners, who since the autumn of 1939, after
working in or for Germany, died, became disabled, or were for
other reasons eliminated from the foreign labour force employed
by the Germans during the later stages of the war. In order
to form an accurate picture of German manpower policy
during the war and the problems created by it, all these categories
of foreigners must be taken into account. Indeed, in a full appraisal of Germany's wartime exploitation of foreigners, dependent
family members and survivors of the conscripted workers must
also be counted among those adversely affected by it. The effects
of German policy will continue even after the end of the war for
those whose providers died or were disabled, as well as for the
children who suffered through the forced disruption of family life
and, finally, for those who, in this enormous displacement of populations, have lost sight of their families. If the dependent family
members who will still be directly affected by this policy after the
war are' added to the number of workers who during the various
phases of the war were put to work for the German war effort, at a
conservative estimate, a figure is reached of 30 to 35 millions.

CHAPTER VI
THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN WORKERS
The policy of strict centralisation and close control by Government and Party, which had been followed from the beginning in
the recruitment of workers in foreign countries, was equally followed
inside Germany. Throughout the war, the authorities strove to
keep in their own hands the assessment of the need for foreign
manpower and the actual distribution of labour recruits in Germany. 1
For this reason, systematic and continuous efforts were made to
prevent private firms and private individuals from hiring foreign
help of any kind without official permission, and from employing
agents or intermediaries abroad to induce workers to volunteer
for them. 2 As a matter of principle, "foreign workers are allotted
[to German employers] by the Reich Ministry of Labour upon
application made by the employers and according to a plan evolved
from the requirements of high policy". 3
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGNERS IN INDUSTRY

When the Labour Office received an application for foreign
workers, it had to examine: (1) whether the nature of the applicant's
business justified the classification of his demand as "urgent";
(2) whether the wages and working conditions offered by the applicant complied with the regulations and whether the applicant's
record showed that these regulations were obeyed in his undertaking;
and (3) whether the necessary arrangements had been made for the
accommodation and feeding of the workers. If the Labour Office
had no objections to make on these points the application was forwarded to the Reich Ministry of Labour for final decision. The
Labour Office might forward the application directly to a German
recruitment office abroad, without first submitting it to the Reich
Ministry of Labour, only when the application was for a small
number of workers (up to five) who did not belong to the so-called
scarce occupations (Mangelberufe).4
1
Cf. Dr. SYRUP, in Soziale Praxis, 1 Aug. 1941, p. 608.
' Dr. TIMM, in Arbeitsrechtkartei, 3 May 1941.
* BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 83.
4
MÜNZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 8.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Employers might not ask for workers of specified nationalities.
Foreigners were distributed by the labour offices "according to the
available supply of manpower, having regard to political and military security". 1 In the earlier part of the war the view was held in
some quarters that for reasons of political and military security
only workers of a single foreign nationality should work in any
one undertaking, or that, at least, different nationalities working
in the same plant should be kept strictly apart. 2 Other high officials
of the German Labour Administration maintained, however, that
the combination of many nationalities speaking different languages
would ensure the maximum political security.
The employer had to possess a written "employment permit"
•{Beschäftigungsgenehmigung) for every individual foreign worker
allotted to him. These permits were issued upon request by the
labour offices. In addition, the employer (not the worker) had to
apply, not to the labour office, but to the local police authorities
for a "labour permit" {Arbeitserlaubnis) for every foreign worker.
This permit could be issued only if the employer was already
in possession of his own employment permit for the foreigner
concerned. Both permits might be issued, if the employment was to
be permanent, for a period of two years. 3 At first a fee of 3.50 RM for
every employment permit and a fee of 5.00 RM for every labour
permit had to be paid to the Reich. These fees were later abolished.
It was on the whole a difficult task to ascertain the number and
the qualifications of foreign workers needed by various undertakings. Complaints from industry and from the various Government agencies were frequent.
Employers were frequently warned not to try other methods
but always to use the official channel through the labour offices.4
They were particularly forbidden to advertise, either in Germany
or abroad, for foreign workers; the insertion of an advertisement in a paper was permitted only in special cases, and with the
previous consent of the Labour Office or regional labour office.5
As early as the first part of 1942 it was officially stated that "in
1

Dr. TIMM, in Arbeitsrechtkartei,

3 M a y 1941.

2 Ibid.
3
Decree by Reich Minister of Labour, of 13 April 1942. In exceptional cases
(especially if the foreigner had not recently been recruited b u t had been living
in the Reich for more than 10 years) he might apply to the police for a licence
(Befreiungsschein) valid for two years a t the most. Such licences enabled the
bearer to accept work freely anywhere in the territory of the Reich, and neither
he nor his employer was required to apply for additional permits as far as his
individual work was concerned.
4
Cf. Dr. Hans HASTLER, Director of the Labour Bureau in Tetschen: " D i e
Feststellung des Kräftebedarfs", in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No.
23-24, Dec. 1942, pp. 175 et seq.
5
BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 85.

DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN WORKERS

view of the extremely tense situation on the labour market at the
present time, only plants with the highest urgency rating . . . can
expect to be supplied with foreign workers". 1
On the ground that "the needs of the essential war industries
have unconditional priority as far as the distribution of the available labour force is concerned", a Decree for the protection of the
armament industry, signed by Adolf Hitler, made it a criminal
offence for "anybody knowingly to make false declarations about
required or available labour". Such a criminal offence was made
punishable by fines of unlimited amounts and hard labour (Zuchthaus) or, in particularly grave cases, by death. The same Decree
conferred upon the secret tribunal called "People's Court", and
upon the Reich Court-Martial, jurisdiction to try these cases of
"manpower sabotage". 2
Subsequent events, however, proved that this was the wrong
approach. With the manpower shortage steadily growing more
critical, while the need for war production was ever more pressing,
a scramble for foreign workers was bound to continue. The influence of the particular semi-governmental organisation of employers concerned largely decided which undertaking in any one
branch of industry, and which branch of industry, was successful for
a longer or shorter time in the competition for manpower. 3
Early in 1943, the most drastic curtailments up to that date
were ordered, bringing to a standstill practically all activities not
essential to war production. This step had a profound influence,
not only on economic structure and habits of life in Germany, but
even on the social structure itself, for it did away with large portions of the liberal professions, the retail trade, small businesses,
small and medium handicrafts, the small and middle restaurant
and catering industry, etc. The German manpower thus set free
was diverted partly into the armed forces and partly into armament
industry and agriculture. But even this step did not solve the problem; complaints of the efficiency rate in war industry continued
to be heard.
Instead of relying on punishment and death sentences, such
as were threatened in Adolf Hitler's Decree of March 1942, Professor Speer, Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions and
head of the Todt Organisation, created in October 1943 a new corps
of experts on personnel and efficiency problems. As its head he appointed Engineer Gotthard Friedrich, with the official title of
i Ibid., p. 83.
»Decree of 21 March 1942; Reichsgesetzblalt, 9 Apr. 1942, No. 34, P a r t I,
p. 165.
3
Cf. p. 20.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Reich Manpower Engineer (Reichsarbeitseinsatz-Ingenieur).
Friedrich divided the territory of Germany into 34 regions, each headed
by a regional expert on personnel and efficiency questions. 1 Under
Friedrich and his 34 regional subleaders, 5,000 experts on personnel
and efficiency problems (Betriebsarbeitseinsatz-Ingenieure)
were
appointed to individual plants. According to the plan, there was
to be one expert in every undertaking employing 300 or more
workers.
The task of this new organisation was twofold: (a) to make a
thorough investigation on the spot of the personnel and technological problems of the plant, with the object of finding out reasons
for low efficiency or possibilities of higher efficiency; (b) on the
basis of these investigations, to propose changes in personnel
policy, as well as technical and organisational changes on the spot.
In short, the efficiency experts had the task of "streamlining"
production. Their approach was mainly psychological. Indeed,
although these officials bore the title "engineer", they were not
necessarily graduates of a technical school, nor was their task
principally technological. With the assistance of industrial psychologists, plant physicians and motion-and-time-study specialists,
the efficiency experts used the findings of psychological tests to
determine whether individual workers were suited to their tasks
or might not be otherwise employed where they could be of better
use.
The tests were of three types:
(a) psycho-technical tests: mainly concerned with intelligence
and mechanical comprehension, with manual ability and, as important auxiliary functions, with willpower, attention and memory;
(b) examination of character: consisting, in line with German
military psychology, of expression analysis, analysis of life history,
thought analysis (Geistesforschung) and willpower and action
analysis;
(c) aptitude tests: in relation to vocational demands (psychological job analysis). On the basis of job analysis tables 2 the psychological requirements of various jobs in a given industry were rated
by indicating on a seven-point standard scale 28 standardised
principal psychological factors, such as motivation, intelligence,
willpower and character, special intelligence patterns, motor abilities, etc., required for performing specific types of work. "If a
1
!

Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 20 Oct. 1943; Svenska Dagbladet, 23 Oct. 1943.
These job analysis tables had been prepared, since 1938, by the Reich
Institute for Vocational Training in Commerce and Industry (Reichsinstitut
für Berufsausbildung in Handel und Gewerbe). Analysis of all the main branches
of industry had not been completed by the beginning of 1944.

DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN WORKERS

particular job has to be filled, only those traits for which the requirements are high need be tested". 1
On the basis of these technological findings the efficiency experts
were empowered to order workers to change their jobs within the
undertaking. In so doing, they were asked to collaborate with the
representatives of the Defence Commissioners and of the German
Labour Front appointed to the particular plant. However, their
powers were "not limited to orders given by the employers; they
can themselves carry out extensive changes in the placing and
organisation of workers within the undertaking". 2
It is to be noted that this corps of experts worked independently
of Fritz Sauckel's administration. The Commissioner-General for
Manpower had his office at the Reich Ministry of Labour, but
the head of the new organisation of industrial psychologists had
his headquarters at the Reich Ministry of Armament and Munitions. While Fritz Sauckel was responsible to Reich Marshal
Goring (after the summer of 1944, to Reich Minister Goebbels),
Gotthard Friedrich was immediately responsible to Reich Minister
Speer, to whom he had "direct access". His task differed from that
of Fritz Sauckel: "Friedrich is responsible for rationalisation in
the employment of workers in the plants, whereas Sauckel is
responsible for providing the plants with workers". 3
Some improvements in the treatment of foreign workers which
were introduced in the later stages of the war were undoubtedly
the result of the scientific tests used or organised by Friedrich's
experts. According to German reports, the changes and innovations introduced on the basis of the proposals made by the personnel and efficiency experts were to result in an increase of productivity up to 10 per cent. But calculation of foreign manpower
requirements of individual plants continued throughout the war to
be a difficult task for the labour offices.
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGNERS IN AGRICULTURE AND OTHER
OCCUPATIONS

In agriculture and other occupations methods of distribution
were different and far cruder than those used for distributing and
1
This paragraph is based on H. L. ANSBACHER: "German Industrial Psychology in the Fifth Year of War", in Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 41, No. 9, Nov.
1944, pp. 606-607, which summarises the German literature on the subject,
including E. BORNEMANN: "Aufgaben der Arbeitspsychologie der Gegenwart,
Teil I : Entwicklung des Eignungsuntersuchungswesens und ihre gegenwärtigen
Fragestellungen", in Stahl und Eisen (the organ of the German steel and iron
industry), 1944, pp. 37-47.
1
Hamburger Fremdenblatt, 20 Oct. 1943.
*Ibid.
* See p. 133.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

economising foreign manpower in industry. Throughout the war,
the "underground" press in many parts of Europe and newspapers
in neutral countries reported that the German authorities allowed
German farmers, housewives, etc., to select foreign workers under
conditions reminiscent of "slave markets". The German press
itself occasionally published reports alluding to the humiliating
circumstances in which foreign labour recruits were hired at the
labour offices. In the summer of 1942, for instance, a Munich
paper described the procedure at a Bavarian labour office as
follows1 :
Now a village farmers' leader 2 steps before a fence. Behind it, Eastern workers,
recently arrived a t this Upper Bavarian labour office, are lined u p : on the right
hand, along the wall, in double file, the girls and women; on the left hand, already
subdivided into gangs, the men and young boys. An experienced official begins
to select them, accompanied by critical glances, with some comment, from the
village farmers' leader. 3

In the spring of 1944, in the course of the campaign to increase
the output of foreign workers by less humiliating treatment,
endeavours were made to change these methods. An article by
Ministerial Councillor Dr. Bräutigam, distributed by the German
Continental (News) Service and widely reproduced in the German
press, went so far as to admonish Germans that "ragged clothing
should not induce anybody to consider Eastern workers as morally
debased persons". 4

Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 5 Aug. 1942.
"Village farmers' leader" was the title of the heads of village branches of
the National Socialist Farmers' Organisation.
3
For the employment conditions of foreign domestic workers, see Chapter X I .
4
Article released on 6 April 1944 by Deutscher Heimatdienst, a subsidiary of
the Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau (quoted by Peter CONRAD in Die Zeitung
(London), 21 Apr. 1944).
2

CHAPTER VII
THE TODT ORGANISATION
The Todt Organisation, a vast undertaking for the construction of highways and fortifications, became one of the most
important institutions of the National Socialist war machine. It
owed its name to Dr. Fritz Todt, Major-General of the Air Force
and holder of one of the highest ranks in the S.A. (Standartenführer
on the Staff of the Supreme S.A. Leader) 1 , who began his spectacular
career immediately after the Party came into power in Germany.
From June 1933, as Inspector-General of the German Highway
System he was responsible for the construction of the network of
strategic highways that preceded the outbreak of war. 2
Fifteen months before military hostilities began, on 28 May
1938, the Todt Organisation was founded, with Fritz Todt at its
head, mainly with the object of hastening the completion of the
West Wall. Soon afterwards, by Decree of 9 December 1938, Todt
was appointed Commissioner-General for the Construction Industry. Early in 1940, he was also made Inspector-General for
Special Tasks under the Four-Year Plan, Inspector-General for
Water and Electric Power and—just before the beginning of the
German offensive in the West—Reich Minister of Armament and
Munitions.
When Fritz Todt was killed in an air accident he was succeeded
in all his posts by Professor Albert Speer, Inspector-General of
Urban Development of the City of Berlin (15 February 1942).
In homage to Todt, the Organisation continued to be known as
the Todt Organisation ("O.T."). Only one branch, which was
most directly connected with the armed forces, was called the
"Speer Construction Staff".
1
Another post in the Party hierarchy held by Dr. Todt was "Head of the
Central
Office for Technology of the National Socialist German Workers' Party".
8
Under the Act of 17 June 1933, the Highway Construction Administration
planned the construction of 4,500 to 4,800 miles of roads. It is estimated that
less than two thirds of the programme was actually carried out; cf. Alfred VAGTS:
Hitler's Second Army (Infantry Journal, Washington, D.C. (Penguin Special),
1943, pp. 118-119). By 1938 the construction of the West Wall and of other
fortifications, which strained German building and affiliated industries to the
utmost, was considered more urgent than the continuation of the highway construction programme.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

From the first German victories in the East, the Organisation
went on extending its widespread activities to every newly won
territory. It was the Organisation, for example, which erected the
intricate system of defensive fortifications stretching from the
northern part of Norway to the Spanish frontier (the so-called
"Atlantic Wall").
In the words of the Reich Labour Trustee for the Todt Organisation :
. . . next to the Reichsbahn [the State-owned railways] . . . the "O.T." is today
undoubtedly the biggest employer in the world. Many hundreds of thousands
of foreign workers are working side by side with a nucleus of German
"O.T." workers at thousands of building sites.
. . . On the Atlantic Wall alone, workers from more than a dozen different
countries are employed: Belgians and Netherlanders, Frenchmen and Flemings,
Italians and Croats, Czechs and Poles, Spaniards and Danes, Moroccans and
other African tribes, even Indians, Annamites and Indo-Chinese (taken prisoner
with the French Army) as well as workers from the East. . -1

The Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger, official
news agency of the German newspaper publishers, made the following comment on this statement:
Wherever there are German soldiers, there too the earth-brown uniform of the
"O.T." worker is to be found. On every front, he has proved himself the indispensable helper of the troops. . . . The "O.T." builds everything: pill-boxes and coastal fortifications, roads,
snow tunnels, railways and bridges, harbours and quay installations, armament
works and power stations; it even develops and works mines, bores for oil and
mines other raw materials.

The list was not complete. This giant organisation also performed the following war tasks in all parts of the continent of
Europe: repair of bomb damage; removal of German industries,
or industries working for Germany, out of reach of Allied bombers ;
and, when necessary, construction of trenches, military camps,
hangars, airfields and the like, and repair of damage at and immediately behind the German front lines. The Todt Organisation
also constructed, with the greatest secrecy, the installations for the
launching of the "robot" bombs and other weapons used by Germany after the opening of the western front in June 1944.
The longer the war lasted, the greater became the tasks and the
importance of the Organisation. On 2 September 1943 Adolf Hitler
issued a Decree2 which redefined them:
(1) The "O.T." is an institution for the performance of construction tasks of
all kinds essential to the outcome of the war. The head of the "O.T." is the
1

Neue Deutsche Zeitung, 7 May 1943.
* Reichsgesetzblatt, Part 1, p. 530.

THE TODT ORGANISATION

Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions. He is directly subordinate to me
and is responsible exclusively to me.
(2) The " O . T . " can be employed in the Greater German Reich as well as in
the territories annexed to and occupied by it. The " O . T . " is to go into action a t
the command of the head of the " O . T . "
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) also apply to the transportation services working
under the " O . T . "

On the same day Adolf Hitler greatly increased Professor
Speer's jurisdiction by putting the entire German armament industry under him. 1 (This limited the powers of the Reich Minister
for Economic Affairs, but not those of the Commissioner-General
for Manpower.)
*
*
*
The methods used for the recruitment of foreign workers who
were destined for employment in the Organisation did not greatly
differ from the methods used for the recruitment of foreigners for
deportation to Germany. The main difference was that, since the
principal activities of the Organisation lay outside the frontiers
of Germany, foreigners were not transported to Germany, but had
either to work in their own country or in some other occupied
territory.
,
In the recruitment drives for foreign workers for the Organisation, methods of compulsion as well as methods of persuasion
were used, the latter usually with very little result. For example,
in the summer and autumn of 1942, in the Flemish-speaking parts
of Belgium, an intensive recruitment campaign was undertaken
for the Organisation, which "was ready to receive Flemish workers
with open arms". 2 A special Flemish section of the Organisation
was formed, which was employed in some of the German-occupied,
parts of the Soviet Union. Immediately behind the fighting front
the men had to build roads, railways, airfields and depots for the
Luftwaffe.
These contingents, as Obergeneral-Arbeitsführer Dr.
Decker, a high official of the Organisation, pointed out3, were
"liable to be attacked by bombers and dive bombers", and even
had to fight "as infantrymen with the regular army during the
heavy defensive fighting in the Rzev area". On 26 October 1942,
a ceremony was held in Brussels in honour of the three thousandth
Flemish worker leaving Belgium to join this contingent of the
1
Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 529. Under the same Decree Professor Speer's
title was changed from "Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions" to
"Reich Minister for Armament and War Production", "in view of his increased
responsibilities".
s
Volk en Stoat, 15 Oct. 1942.
* Der Arbeitsmann, quoted by Neue Deutsche Zeitung, 4 Sept. 1942.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Organisation in Russia. He was given a copy of Hitler's Mein
Kampf and of K.A. Albrecht's Der Verratene Sozialismus ("Socialism Betrayed"). 1
On 20 November 1942, the well-known economic journal Der
Deutsche Volkswirt stated that foreigners were increasingly needed
"for the Wehrmacht, the German railways and the Todt Organisation". Official German sources estimated at that period that more
than four fifths of the workers serving with the Organisation were
foreigners.2
Although the number of civilian foreign workers recruited for
work inside Germany was discussed at rare intervals, neither
official German sources nor the German press gave any indication
of the number of foreigners employed in the Organisation. Estimates of the number of workers (Germans and non-Germans)
employed by the Organisation varied, before the summer of 1943,
between 450,000 and 2,000,000.3 It seems likely that as early as
the summer of 1943—that is, before the German 'occupation of
Italy—its strength was nearer to the second than to the first figure.
After the German occupation of the non-liberated parts of Italy,
the number of non-Germans pressed into work for the Organisation increased very considerably. In September 1943, among other
large-scale fortification projects, Germany began the construction
of a coastal defence system stretching from Toulon to Spezia (the
"Ligurian Wall"). On 8 September 1943, Organisation headquarters
were established àt Sirmione on Lake Garda. Todt Organisation
camps were at once erected in San Remo, Savona, Genoa, Florence
and Cesena, to carry out preliminary work and to procure material.
At first most of the workers were from Poland and the Balkans;
but voluntary and compulsory Italian labour was very soon employed, and they formed the huge majority, with a small minority
of Germans acting as foremen and the like.4
1
Volk en Staat, 30-31 Oct. 1942. After this recruitment campaign was over,
the same German-dominated Flemish newspaper complained t h a t "foreigners
employed for Germany work badly" and " b y their entire attitude show that
Germany's fate is immaterial to t h e m " (29 Dec. 1942).
2
The number of foreigners "exceeded many times the number of Germans"
(JUNGFLEISCH, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 79).
It must be remembered that, as explained already (see p. 54), these figures do
not refer to German citizens and non-German citizens; in accordance with official
National Socialist doctrine, many non-German citizens, not only from Austria
and Czechoslovakia but also, for example, "racial Germans" and those citizens
of Poland who were enrolled in the "list of Germans", were regarded as Germans
for purposes of National Socialist statistics. If the usual criterion of citizenship
is applied, the percentage of non-Germans among the persons serving with the
Organisation was, therefore, even higher than the "more than 80 per cent." given
by German sources, and the percentage of Germans lower than "less than 20
per cent.".
8

Alfred VAGTS, op. cit., p. 131.

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 May 1944.

THE TODT ORGANISATION

Early in October 1943, the Organisation stated in a proclamation to Italian workers and employers 1 , that the "Todt Organisation, which has been entrusted with vast construction works in all
parts of Europe, is now beginning operations in Italy", and called
for a large number of "labourers, bricklayers, miners, mechanics
for building machines, motor drivers, smiths, cooks, [other] skilled
workers and office staff. Italian workmen report at the offices of
the Todt Organisation which have been opened in all large [Italian]
cities, or at the labour offices". The proclamation promised employment "exclusively on Italian territory" and, invited the collaboration of Italian undertakings with the statement that the
Organisation wished "as far as possible, to employ Italian
firms".
Italians were encouraged to volunteer by the issue to them,
after two months' service, of Todt Organisation uniforms and armbands bearing the swastika. The large majority of Italians recruited for work in the Organisation were not suited for it, for the
recruiting centres in Milan, Verona, Padua, Bologna and elsewhere
were chiefly concerned to fill the quotas required of them. The
Organisation's camps were guarded mainly by armed German
guards, but also secretly supervised by members of the Fascist
secret police, the O.V.R.A.2 In the late spring of 1944, it was reported that a special Italian armed guard (Guardia Armata),
with monthly salaries of 1,000 lire, had been formed to control
Italians working on Todt Organisation construction jobs. 3
According to the Stockholm newspaper Aftontidningen of
4 April 1944, at that timejGermany also began to use foreign women
for Todt Organisation work. As an Allied invasion "somewhere
in Europe" drew near and German defence preparations on all
German-held European coast lines, but particularly in the northwest, were speeded up, recruitment drives for foreign workers for
the Organisation increased in intensity. "Many young women in
the Todt Organisation's ordinary brown uniform have recently
been seen in the streets of Oslo. Some are French, some Dutch,
some probably from the East."
These recruitment drives continued, where possible, after the
Allied invasion of western Europe, and after the Soviet armies
had broken through the outlying fortifications built by the Organisation. In July 1944, for example, former officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Czechoslovak army were deported
from Czechoslovakia and directed to work for the Todt Organisa1

Corriere della Sera (Milan), 9 Oct. 1943.
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 24 M a y 1944.
' Die Zeitung (London), 2 June 1944.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

tion, or were even conscripted into Germany's foreign legions.1
According to a Swedish report 2 , in September 1944, the Organisation employed all available manpower for the fortification of
the southern side of Lyngenfjord, in Norway.
*
*

There were fundamental differences within the Organisation
between the Germans and the foreigners. As the proportion of
foreigners increased, the remaining Germans were more and more
exclusively employed as foremen.
The difference and the distance between the German and the
foreign worker were constantly emphasised. German members
of the Organisation wore a special uniform, consisting of a grey
outfit like ski clothing, and on the left sleeve a swastika and an
armband inscribed "O.T." or "Org. Todt". If employed outside
the frontiers of Germany proper, they were known as "front-line
workers of the Organisation" {Frontarbeiter der O.T.). Foreigners
of "German race" who joined the Organisation, like those who
joined the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-S.S. or the National Socialist
Party, acquired German citizenship from 19 May 1943, or, if
they joined at a later date, from the day on which they joined. 3
The German authorities considered the work of the Organisation as "direct front activity" when it was carried out in an area
not more than 20 miles behind the most advanced front line. German Todt Organisation workers employed in such areas were
therefore, when on holiday, officially considered to be "on leave
from the front". They received a "war leave certificate" and if it
certified that the bearer had been "used in front activities at
the Eastern Front", they were entitled, while on leave, to additional food rations. 4
The special character of the German Todt Organisation worker
from the legal, political, economic and military point of view was
officially acknowledged in the description of him as a
. . . comrade equal in rights to the German soldier, who risks life and health for
the Führer, the nation and the fatherland.
He represents a special type of German worker. On the one hand, he is a
worker who, just like any other, receives the wage due to him according to collective regulations, and is subject to the general provisions concerning taxes and
1
Reuter despatch, London, 31 July 1944; Christian Science Monitor, 31 Sept.
1944.
2
Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 15 Sept. 1944.
3
Decree of the Führer,' countersigned by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery
of the National Socialist Party, and the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Wehrmacht; Reichsgesetzblatt, 1943, Part I, p. 315.
* Decree of the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture of 22 October 1942. •

THE TODT ORGANISATION

social insurance; on the other hand, he is a soldier who, weapon in hand, defends
his life at the front and who therefore is fed, lodged and clothed like a soldier,
receives his military pay, and if he suffers bodily injury due to his employment,
has the same legal rights to care as the members of the armed forces.1
The dangerous character of fortification and construction jobs
and the hazards to which the workers were exposed, were clearly
revealed by the special provisions contained in the Wage Order for
German frontline workers outside the borders of the German
Reich. These regulations granted to the German frontline worker
of the Todt Organisation 2 :
(1) Continued payment of wages up to 13 weeks, if the worker's inability to
work is due to wounds, to accident or to sickness;
(2) The right to free medical care, including orthopaedic and other treatment; whenever the medical branch of the Todt Organisation is not able to provide the necessary services they must be provided by the medical officers and
dentists of the Wehrmacht;
(3) Pensions for disabled workers and, in case of death, for their surviving
dependants; these pensions are to be the same as those for members of the armed
forces and their surviving dependants (widow and other members of the family
entitled to support by the deceased), provided that the workers were employed
for purposes of the armed-forces and that their work served the direct interest of
the fighting troops. Construction work done by the Todt Organisation is considered as fulfilling the requirement of serving "the direct interest of the fighting
troops". Similar payments are due to the families of German Todt Organisation
frontline workers who are missing or have been taken prisoner. These provisions
are also to apply to employers and automobile [truck] owners collaborating with
the Todt Organisation;
(4) Members of the families of German frontline workers are entitled to travelling subsidies to enable them to visit wounded frontline workers infieldhospitals.
Foreign workers and their families were not entitled to these
special payments and benefits.
*

It may be of interest to give, as an example of the wages and
working conditions of foreign Todt workers, a description of a
general regulation which had the force of collective rules for
foreign construction workers of the Todt Organisation.
The regulation is dated 18 January 1943. It came into force
on 1 February 1943 and was issued by Reich Trustee Dr. Schmelter,
"Special Labour Trustee for the German Construction Industry
1
Alex. JUNGFLEISCH (Oberregierungsrat in the Todt Organisation, Berlin) :
"Arbeitsbedingungen und soziale Betreung der O.T. Frontarbeiter", in Soziale
Praxis, Feb. 1943, p. 79.
* Circular Decree by the Reich Minister of the Interior, of 21 August 1941.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Abroad, and Special Trustee for the Todt Organisation". It applied
to foreign construction workers, including non-Germans from the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, employed on construction
work and cognate activities in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, but did not apply to Frenchmen, Netherlanders and Belgians,
persons of German Volkstum, to Poles and persons from the other
eastern territories.
Regular working hours were fixed a t 48. Overtime (to be paid at
25 per cent, increase) was unlimited and compulsory. No wage increase was granted for night work. The regular hours of work for
machinists, stokers, chauffeurs, truck helpers and drivers of horsedriven wagons, was higher, namely, 60 in the week, and 72 in the
week for watchmen, barrack guards, sickroom orderlies and
cooks.
The hourly wages for a few categories of extra-skilled workers,
such as master well-diggers, specialised foremen, and machinists
working on bulldozers, were 85 to 96 Rpf. All other skilled workers,
such as masons, smiths and foremen, received 80 Rpf. The wages
for semi-skilled workers, such as iron moulders, construction machinists, stone masons and foremen of helpers' gangs, were 72 Rpf.,
and for helpers and unskilled workers of all categories, 65 Rpf.
If the work was paid on an hourly, and not on a piece-rate basis,
sustained performance of work, better than the average, entitled
the foreigner to an efficiency bonus of 10 per cent., subject to the
previous consent of the German authorities controlling the construction work. Whenever it was proposed to grant the efficiency
bonus to more than a quarter of the workers employed at any
one locality, the consent of Dr. Schmelter had to be obtained.
Payment had, as far as possible, to be calculated on a piecerate basis. Foreign workers paid by the hour, whose output continued to be below normal capacity, were liable to receive lower
wages than the rates mentioned. These lower wages were to be
fixed by the persons in charge of the unit, after consultation with
the employer or his representative.
Boys under 18 years of age and women above 18 years of age
were entitled to 80 per cent, of the wages of corresponding male
workers. Women under 18 received 80 per cent, of the women's
wage, i.e., 64 per cent, of the male worker's wage. 1
In addition to wages, the foreign workers were to receive free
lodging and free food. It was moreover necessary to grant some
increments to those who at the time of their recruitment had been
promised higher wages. Married foreigners who had been hired
1

The wages of other foreign workers are discussed in Chapter X.

THE TODT ORGANISATION

before 1 February 1943 and whose labour contracts had provided
for higher wages (so long as those higher wages were not contrary to the German regulations then in force) could therefore
apply to receive a "family bonus" until the termination of their
original contract. If the foreigner worked for the Todt Organisation, a special department of it, the Hauptabteilung Arbeitseinsatz
und Sozialpolitik der Organisation Todt-Zentrale, had to send
the family bonus in monthly instalments to the worker's
family.
Lastly, every foreigner, whether married or not, was entitled
to special bonuses {Einsatzgeld) for the duration of his employment
at the construction work. The special bonus was paid beginning
from the time the foreigner was "marched off". The amount of this
special bonus (to be paid in at least three monthly instalments)
differed according to the nationality of the worker. Persons working
in tunnels or underground, as well as divers and compression workers, received hardship bonuses.
The regulation also promised to foreigners, for every year of
employment, a home furlough of 18 days plus the necessary travelling days, with free transportation and pay (10 times the normal
hourly wage plus efficiency bonus and an additional 2.10 RM food
money per day).
On the same date, 18 January 1943, the Reich Trustee, Dr.
Schmelter, issued general regulations for foreign construction
workers in Norway and Denmark, applicable to the same categories
of foreigners as the scheme for France, Belgium and the Netherlands, but excepting Danes and Norwegians instead of Frenchmen, Belgians and Netherlanders. The conditions were practically
identical.
It is safe to assume that these comparatively favourable wage
scales (from which taxes, social insurance contributions, German
Labour Front contributions and home remittances were, of course,
deducted) were intended to diminish opposition from foreigners
forced to work on German fortifications in the strategic areas in
the west and north-west of Europe. But it should be noted that these
wage scales were applicable neither to native workers in these regions
(Frenchmen in France, Norwegians in Norway) 1 nor to Poles and
other "Eastern" workers. Nor did these provisions, though comparatively favourable, include a maximum working day or week,
1
In June 1942, about 100,000 Norwegians were employed by the Todt Organisation on the construction of coastal fortifications, aircraft bases and naval
bases in Norway, according to the Stockholms-Tidningen
of 13 June 1942. At
about the same period, some 54,000 Belgians and Xetherlanders were serving
under the Todt Organisation, building fortifications along the Channel coast.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

the enforcement of safety measures, minimum standards for food
and shelter, nor restrictions concerning wage reductions and physical
punishment for "breaches of labour discipline".
As early as 16 August 1941, the working conditions of men
employed by the Todt Organisation at an undisclosed location in
Europe were described as follows in a broadcast by Deutschlandsender :
Early in the morning the workers are fetched by large buses. They have to
work twelve hours a day, interrupted only by twenty minutes' rest in the morning, twenty minutes in the afternoon and half an hour for lunch. Because of the
urgency of the work now under construction, there has been uninterrupted work
over many months without any break for Sunday or holidays. Leave can be
granted only very sparingly. All these men lead a Spartan existence in their
frugal living quarters, which are of a modest hutment type.

In fact, the Todt Organisation police and punishment camps
were as well known and as much feared by foreign Todt Organisation workers as were the police and punishment systems used
against foreign workers in Germany.
The varied character of the activities of the Todt Organisation
and the severity of its recruitment and labour conditions are illustrated by an Order of the Ministry of Public Health and Social
Welfare of the puppet State of Serbia, issued early in 1943. At that
time the Ministry was responsible for conscripting Serb workers
for employment in the Bor Mines, which were run by the Organisation. An article in the German-dominated Serb newspaper Novo
Vreme of 6 February 1943 observed that compulsory work was
for six months and should not be regarded as punishment, but
as the duty of all Serb citizens. The Ministry was calling
up all fit men between 23 and 30 for employment on surface work at
Bor and the surrounding area, in loading and unloading, the construction of railways and roads, and in forestry and building.
Each man was required to bring warm clothing, a blanket, sound
footwear and eating utensils. The Todtbor officials were responsible for housing them in huts equipped with electricity and hot
baths. The working day lasted for ten hours, wages varied between
2,000 and 2,500 dinars a month, with lodging, heating and light
free. The only reference to food states that the ration "includes
900 grams of bread of mixed wheat and maize flour, and costs 20
dinars a day . . . Strict discipline is maintained and work may not
be left without permission. The prefect's orders must be promptly
obeyed. The minimum punishment is three months' forced labour.
Sentences of imprisonment may also be given."
Workers of other nationalities were also liable to severe punishment. For example, on 6 July 1943, the French paper L'Ouest-

THE TODT ORGANISATION

éclair1 published the following communiqué from the
mandant, Major-General Seebohm:

81
Feldkom-

During the last few months a large number of workmen have left the labour camps
of the Todt Organisation without the necessary permission. According to the French
laws of 9 September 1942 and 16 February 1943, no-one may leave his work
without first obtaining permission from the Labour Inspector or the Commissariat
of the Compulsory Labour Service. Persons infringing these laws are punished
by imprisonment and fines. In addition, unjustifiable breach of a labour contract
will be punished, according to paragraph 20 of the Decree of 18 December 1942,
issued by the Military Commander in France for the protection of the occupying
armies, by hard labour, imprisonment or fine, and even, in serious cases, by the
death sentence.

VOuest-éclair (North Zone), 6 July 1943.

CHAPTER VIII
LABOUR CONTRACTS
BILATERAL

GOVERNMENT

AGREEMENTS

In several European countries, Germany sought and found
active support from Governments for the recruitment and transport
of their nationals to Germany or German-occupied territory. In
these cases bilateral agreements were signed, dealing with the
recruitment of workers within the country, their treatment while
in German employment, and their eventual return.
Like most bilateral treaties concluded between various countries before the war, these agreements usually contained a so-called
model (collective or individual) labour contract which was to serve
as a basis for labour relations between the foreign workers and
German undertakings. It must be borne in mind that it was not
the treaty between the Governments, but a collective or individual
labour contract copying the model contained in the treaty, which
formed the basis of these relations. The contract was often signed
on behalf of the workers by an organisation to which they were
compelled to belong, such as the Italian Fascist Labour Corporations.
German-Spanish Government Agreement concerning
Allocation of Spanish Manpower to Germany
As an example, some of the chief provisions of the Treaty
between Germany and Spain concerning the allocation of Spanish
manpower to Germany of 2 August 1941 may be cited:
The Spanish Government agrees that, through German efforts, Spanish manpower shall be hired in Spain and shall be made available for employment in
Germany (Article 1).
The task of recruiting, hiring and taking care of Spanish manpower lies, on
the German side, in the hands of the delegates of the Reich Ministry of Labour
and the German Labour Front, and on the Spanish side, in the hands of the
Ministry of Labour and of the National Directorate of Trade Unions (Delegación
Nacional de Sindicatos) (Artide 2).
The Spanish authorities1 shall be responsible for recruiting the workers and
for making a preliminary selection from among them. Workers who have been
1
Notwithstanding this provision, the Reich Ministry of Labour set up a
Spanish branch office (Dienststelle) which, in collaboration with representatives of
the German Labour Front, sent flying recruiting columns to various parts of
Spain (Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, Part V, pp. 5-7).

LABOUR CONTRACTS

selected shall be presented to a German-Spanish Commission for final examination
and selection (Article 4 (2)).
The Spanish authorities shall arrange for the departure of the hired workers
a t the time and in the form agreed upon; they shall inform the Reich Ministry of
Labour and the German Labour Front of the time of departure of the various
transports. The competent German authorities shall take over the Spanish
workers a t the Spanish frontier. After the labour contract has expired or otherwise
lawfully ended, the workers shall be handed over t o the Spanish authorities a t
the Spanish frontier (Article 6).
The Spanish workers shall receive in Germany the same treatment as comparable German workers as regards conditions of work, social insurance, safety
provisions and labour courts (Article 8).
Spanish workers who have been duly recruited shall be entitled while in
Germany to send to Spain the savings they make in Germany (Article 9).
The German authorities shall ensure t h a t the housing of the Spanish workers
is suitable, so far as morality and health are concerned (Article 10).
The Spanish workers shall be debited only with the legally prescribed wage
deductions and deductions for membership fee for the German Labour Front
(Article 11).
In collaboration with the competent German authorities, a Spanish delegation in Germany shall exercise control over Spanish workers to ensure t h a t they
fulfil their obligations. For this purpose the delegation shall visit the working
places and living places of the workers. This delegation shall participate in the
execution of the present agreement and shall protect the interests of Spanish
workers vis-à-vis the official German authorities (Article 12).
If the Spanish Government calls workers back to Spain in the interests of the
defence of the country, the individual labour contract in question may be dissolved without notice (Article 13).
The agreement shall be valid until 31 December 1943, and shall be renewed
by tacit understanding from year to year, unless notice is given a t the latest by
1 October for the end of the calendar year (Article 15).

The "model working conditions" (contained in a supplement
to the Treaty and published in an official communiqué) 1 added
several important details. According to them, Spaniards as young
as 16 years of age, as well as married men with grown-up children,
were eligible for recruitment.
After proving his identity, the Spanish worker had to sign an
application for work in Germany. By the act of signing, he assumed
the following obligations: to submit himself to examination by a
Spanish-German commission; to sign with a representative of a
German undertaking an individual labour contract the conditions
of which were to be communicated to him in their entirety (orally)
in Spanish; to submit to labour discipline from the moment of
being assigned to a departing group; to send to his family at least
one half of the salary which remained to him after paying for his
living expenses; and to provide himself with a complete outfit of
clothing, including underwear and shoes, according to orders which
1

Reproduced in the Madrid newspaper, ABC, 5 Oct. 1941.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

he would receive in due time (or if his conditions did not permit,
to pay for an outfit which he would receive in Spain a t the moment
of his departure, by devoting 10 per cent, of his transfers for his
family to the discharge of this debt).
A distinction was drawn between industrial workers and seasonal
or non-seasonal agricultural workers. The industrial workers had
to undertake to remain in Germany for two years 1 , one year to be
spent in the same undertaking, and had to take cognisance of the
fact that even after the two-year period the individual contract
could be renewed for one year at a time.
The "model conditions" further contained a clause permitting
the German employer to transfer the Spaniard (without his consent) to another German undertaking, provided the new job offered
conditions as good as, or better than, those that he had originally
accepted.
The worker was to participate in accident insurance, which also
covered accidents caused by warfare, from the moment of his
crossing the Spanish-French frontier. With regard to sickness insurance, particular emphasis was laid on the fact that he was
promised participation in precautionary medical care (periodical
examinations and prophylactic treatments).
After one year of work he was promised a minimum holiday
of 21 days, to be spent in Spain, travelling time to the Spanish
frontier not being included in the holiday period. Payment for
the holiday was to be granted in accordance with German legislation. 2 Holiday travel had to be entirely at the worker's own expense.
Under the "model contract", Spanish industrial workers were
promised wages between 60 and 90 Rpf. per hour and, under certain
conditions 3 , a daily bonus of between 1 and 2 RM for being separated from their families.4 The agreement also provided that
the Spaniards were to be housed and fed in common lodgings or
camps, provided with interpreters, and if possible, Spanish cooks.
1
In a report on the German-Spanish Treaty, the Reichsarbeitsblall asserted
that the Spanish Government would ensure that Spanish workers hired for
Germany (except seasonal agricultural workers) worked in Germany at least two
years
{Reichsarbeitsblatt, IS Oct. 1941, Part V, p. 517).
2
Such a holiday would extend at least over 23 days; since German labour
legislation provided for holidays with pay for manual labourers under comparable circumstances only for one week (or two weeks at the most) the Spaniards
were
to receive payment only during a part of their holiday.
8
The most important condition was that the worker must have been before
his 4departure the head or provider of the family.
On the assumption that lodging and board would cost between 10 and 14 RM
a week, it was officially computed that they would be left, as a rule, with 20 RM
per week and would be able to send home between 60 and 100 RM a month.
These sums, automatically exchanged by Germany at the official rate of 4.35
pesetas for 1 RM, would "guarantee the absolute economic independence of their
families". This calculation did not take into account the very considerable
German taxes and obligatory contributions to be deducted from the nominal wages.

LABOUR CONTRACTS

The Spanish delegation which supervised the workers while in
Germany also had to ensure that they received religious ministrations.
The salient features of the treatment of Spanish workers in
Germany, as outlined in the model labour contract, can be summarised as follows. They were not allowed to take their families
with them. While in Germany, they were forbidden to take meals
where they pleased or to choose their own living quarters. The
obligation to live in mass quarters also prevented unmarried Spaniards from founding a home in Germany. Since he was obliged
to pay the same taxes, social insurance contributions and fees
(e.g., to the German Labour Front) as Germans, the Spanish
worker had to contribute to various social service schemes the
benefits of which he would not receive, because he had to return to
Spain at the end of his employment. On the other hand, he was
forbidden to return unless his obligations were considered to have
been fulfilled.
Italian Workers' Contracts
The "model contract" for the employment of Italian industrial
workers in Germany was drawn up in German and in Italian. The
parties to the contract were the German employer, and the Fascist
Confederation of Italian Workers, which acted on behalf, and as
representatives of, the Italian workers who were to be sent to Germany and whose names had to be contained in the contract. The
contract had to specify place of destination, type of work, qualifications needed, and wage and bonus scales.1
Government Agreements concerning the Importation of Agricultural
Workers
During the war, agreements concerning the importation of agricultural workers were concluded between the German Government and the Governments or public authorities of Italy, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Netherlands, Spain, Slovakia and Hungary. 2
Most of these agreements contained provisions concerning the
types of workers required, their transportation, normal period of
employment, wages, bonuses, hours of work, accommodation and
food. The full texts of these agreements were kept secret, but
some of the "model labour contracts" attached to them were
published. 3
*
1
1
3

See Appendix V.
W. PETERSSEN, in Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 606, 615 el seq.
See Appendix V.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

It should be noted, particularly in view of the claims that may
be made after the war by, or on behalf of, former deportees, their
dependants, or survivors, that, whenever possible, the German
authorities made foreign workers sign individual contracts. These
contracts were not always based on a "model contract", for the
policy was also followed in cases where no bilateral agreement
existed between Germany and the country of the worker concerned.
The contracts were signed whether the foreigner worker's acceptance
of employment was genuinely voluntary, or not. They usually
contained a clause limiting the length of employment in or for
Germany to a specified period.
TERMINATION OF CONTRACTS

Theoretically, a foreign worker could return to his home country
for any of the following reasons 1 :
(1) Termination of the period for which the worker was engaged.

In normal circumstances, the obligation to work in Germany
would have ended with the end of the period of employment.
(2) Dismissal because of the end of the working season, on the understanding
that the worker was required to return to work at the beginning of the next
working season.

This clause referred to seasonal agricultural workers. In practice,
only a few of them were considered as seasonal workers and released
at the end of the season. Before the war, the greatest number of
foreigners employed in Germany were migratory Polish workers,
who went back home when the work was over. This arrangement
was altered soon after the war began, as is shown by a Reich Wage
Order (Reichslohntarif) of January 19402, concerning the period
of employment of Polish agricultural workers. This Order provided
that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary in individual
cases, Polish workers employed in Germany and paid by the month
must serve until 31 January of the year following the year in which
they were hired. Their employment was moreover automatically
renewed for a year at a time, unless the contract had been terminated by 31 October. The employment could not be terminated,
and the parties could not agree to dissolve their contractual relationship, without the express consent of the labour office. The
worker was entitled to repayment of his travelling expenses from
the pre-war German-Polish frontier to his place of work and, provided that his employment had duly and legally ended, to free
1
2

Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 4 March 1941.
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 2, IS Jan. 1940.

LABOUR CONTRACTS

transport from that place to the nearest railway station and a free
railway ticket back to the frontier.
(3) Termination of work.

This clause was hardly ever applied to any large number of
foreign workers. It affected only a very few technicians who had
been invited to come to Germany for special tasks.
(4) If the German labour administration no longer desired to employ the
worker in Reich territory.

This clause referred to persons whom the German authorities
wished to remove on the ground of physical unfitness or for political
reasons.
(5) Permanent {dauernde) sickness, injury from accident, etc.

Sick or injured workers whose capacity for work could not be
restored within a short period were removed. 1
(6) Unfitness.

"Unfitness" covered not only physical incapacity, but also
political unsuitability, as under clause (4).
(7) Summons to military duty.

This clause referred only to workers from neutral countries and
countries allied to Germany and was thus of slight practical importance.
COMPULSORY PROLONGATION OF LABOUR CONTRACTS

The labour "contracts" which conscripted foreigners had to
sign usually contained a clause limiting the period of work in
Germany to six months or one year. However, millions of foreigners
were forced to continue to work in Germany after the expiration
of the periods originally provided for.
Various methods were used to circumvent the clauses providing
for the release of the labour recruits after a certain period. A
Decree of the Controller-General of Labour of 22 February 19432
referred to the difficulties that had arisen because German employers
"frequently" kept workers longer than the original contract had
provided for, either by unilaterally prolonging the contracts or by
maintaining that a foreign worker who was transferred from one
factory to another was required to work at the new place for
another term. In the case of Italian workers, German employers
1
1

See Chapter XIV.
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Mar. 1943, Part I, p. 181.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

even granted them home furloughs to Italy as an inducement to
serve another term in Germany on returning from the furlough. 1
But devices to force foreigners to overstay their original contracts were not confined to individual German firms; they had
long since become part of the Government's labour policy.
The German Government constantly endeavoured to persuade
collaborationist and puppet Governments to connive at prolongation of the employment of their nationals, by amending the bilateral treaties, or making new agreements. 2 The most important
and best known sample of this technique was afforded by the
periodical negotiations with the Vichy Government. The argument in favour of a "bilateral" agreement, as against simple unilateral action by Germany, was the need for the active administrative collaboration of the foreign authorities in the huge task
of keeping restless foreign populations under control.
Indeed, this necessity gave the foreign authorities some opportunity to resist the repeated German demands; and when their
misgivings could not be overcome by negotiations and pressure,
Germany resorted to unilateral action. The German-dominated
Paris Radio announced, for example, on 18 November 1943, that
all French workers employed in Germany had had their "contracts"
extended by the German authorities for the duration of the war.
As an "authoritative" spokesman, writing in the official magazine of Sauckel's organisation 3 , stated in January 1943, "the German
labour offices were given authority to order workers from certain
territories, whose contracts had expired, to be recruited for compulsory labour service, at first for a period of three months". Later,
this power was extended even further, and the labour offices could
recruit for compulsory labour service "without indicating a specific
date for its termination".
The pressure exerted upon foreigners and their dread of recruitment for compulsory labour service are illustrated by the following
words of the same writer: "Fortunately, the labour allocation
agencies succeeded, through consultation with the workers, in
persuading the great majority of the foreigners to renew their
current labour contracts voluntarily ;\t was necessary only in relative1
The Italian authorities protested against this practice and frequently forbade Italian workers to return t o Germany if their contracts with the German
firms had been made without the intervention of the official Italian representatives.
2
For instance, in the case of Hungarian workers whose contract provided for
their return to Hungary after six months' work, Germany entered into an agreement with the Hungarian Government extending the duration of the contract
(Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 85 (1), supplement, 20 July 1942). The date of this
German-Hungarian agreement was not made public.
•Editorial "von massgeblicher Seite", in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe,
No. 1-2, Jan. 1943 (italics added).

LABOUR CONTRACTS

ly few and exceptional cases to make use of the authorisation"
(to send recalcitrant foreigners to compulsory labour camps).
In a circular Order of 20 February 1943, addressed to all Reich
labour trustees 1 , the Commissioner-General for Manpower decreed
that foreign workers who had been absent from their working place
for reasons such as serving a prison term or confinement in a correctional (labour) camp were to be considered as having stayed away
from their work by default, "just as if they had been absent because they went 'on a spree' or for some similar reason". Hence,
the Order concluded, the duration of employment as stipulated in
the labour contract must be extended by the duration of the prison
or labour camp term.
The authorities did not often consider it necessary even to
make this feeble pretence of legality. Since no foreign worker was
allowed to leave his German place of residence, still less to leave
German territory, without the written consent of the labour office
and the police, the German authorities were in a position to force
him to overstay his original working term, and made extensive
use of their power.2
It should also be noted that no German wartime regulation
provided for the foreigner's right to challenge any Order before
the courts or the administrative authorities. This applied, not
only to such questions as whether and when he was entitled to
return home, but to all other disputes in which the millions of recruited foreigners might be involved.

Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Mar. 1943, Part I, p. 196.
By Order of 30 September 1942, for example, the Commissioner-General for
Manpower decreed t h a t foreign workers who would not voluntarily consent to
extend the duration of their contracts should be recruited for three months of
labour service. Before the three months had passed, he tightened the stipulation,
with the explanation that "henceforward gaps caused by the departure of foreign
workers to their respective countries after the expiration of their labour contracts
cannot possibly be tolerated" (Order of 3 December 1942). Similarly, the Mannheim newspaper Hakenkreuzbanner wrote on 27 April 1944: " T h e labour contracts
of Frenchmen employed in [German] inland shipping during 1943 were to last for
one year and are, therefore, soon due to expire. But since their training has
involved considerable effort and expense, the Commissioner-General for Manpower has decided that the Frenchmen concerned may be conscripted for labour
beyond the duration of their contract if the labour situation requires it."
2

CHAPTER IX
LIVING CONDITIONS
"One of the principles of the German Administration of Foreign
Labour is that the presence of the foreigners in Germany must be
temporary. It must be our principle that the foreign worker is to
put his labour at the disposal of the country by which he is taken over, but
only for a limited period of time. The link between the worker and
his own country must not be broken. Continental migration must
not induce workers to make their homes in the country which takes
them over; it must not facilitate an unnatural intermingling of
European peoples and races. After all, a nation can call its
own only the soil ploughed by itself and the coal mined by
itself."1
This basic position, which reveals that uneasiness over the
mass influx of aliens to which reference has already been made,
coloured the official attitude from the beginning of the mass importations. It contributed a great deal to the plight of the imported workers. The facilities provided for the foreigners were of a
transitory and makeshift nature; yet millions of persons had to
live for years under these emergency conditions.
With the prolongation of the war, the problems grew more and
more complex. On the one hand, the German authorities found
that, in spite of severe control the substandard conditions under
which the foreigners lived lowered their output. Moreover, as the
labour supply grew scarcer and victories gained by the United
Nations stiffened the foreigners' opposition, even to -the point of
attempting strikes 2 , some concessions had to be made, particularly
with regard to food. On the other hand, in the later phases of the
war, control and restrictions were increasingly tightened.
1

Dr. SYRUP, in Soziale Praxis, 1 Aug. 1941, p. 608 (italics in original).
In October 1943, the French "underground" paper Humanité reported t h a t
2,500 Frenchmen working in a locomotive factory in Floridsdorf, Vienna, as a
result of strike action, secured improvements in food and holiday arrangements.
On 1 February 1944, the southern edition of the French "underground" paper
Le Franctireur praised " t h e splendid example given by Danish workers in the
Berlin Siemens-Schuckert works who, by passive resistance, won a substantial
improvement in their conditions". Le Franctireur also stated t h a t oppositional
German workers frequently co-operated with the foreigners.
2

LIVING CONDITIONS

HOUSING

The regulations issued by the German authorities and the
arrangements made between them and German employers laid
the greatest stress on the necessity of lodging foreign workers
in hutments whenever possible. 1 In fact, the countries of origin
had to agree to this principle in their bilateral treaties with Germany. The reason for this policy was the desire to isolate foreign
workers as much as possible from the German population and to
facilitate their policing and control; moreover, unless they were
housed together, it was less easy to feed them together. 2
According to the Völkischer Beobachter of' 20 October 1943,
there were 22,000 camps for foreign workers at that date. The
location of these camps and the distribution of the labour recruits
among them were not made public.
As a matter of principle, responsibility for placing foreigners
in existing buildings or for erecting new huts (Gemeinschaftsbaracken) lay with the undertakings which employed them. The
housing of millions of workers created many new and unwelcome
problems for management. Although every available structure
was put to use, existing facilities by no means sufficed to shelter
such enormous numbers. Wartime restrictions made ' the erection
of new buildings, however primitive, more and more difficult,
and in many cases impossible.
Employers complained that even when they were able to provide and equip mass accommodation 3 the expenses were high.
The Frankfurter Zeitung of 7 November 1942 estimated that,
if new buildings had been erected, costs per bed would have
amounted to between 600 and 1,200 RM, although the initial
outlay was, of course, smaller, if existing buildings, such as
halls and empty wings of factories, could be converted. But,
even after the initial expenses had been met, the Frankfurter
Zeitung continued, the weekly payments of the inmates did not
suffice to cover the actual costs of housing and feeding them. As
1
At the Department for Labour Allocation of the German Labour Front, a
special section (D.A.F., Ami für Arbeilseinsatz, Sonderdienststelle Lagerbau) was
formed to handle all questions connected with the erection of the huts. On 3 June
1939, three months before the outbreak of military hostilities, the Germandominated Prague newspaper, Der Neue Tag, reported that Czech workers employed
in Brunswick had to live in huts with Italians and Slovaks.
2
The Manual for Foreign Industrial Workers of 4 May 1942, which was
handed to foreigners from western countries for their information, made the
following comment on the food and lodging conditions which they should expect
in Germany: "As a rule, foreign workers are lodged in common lodging quarters
which are provided by the employers. Meals are also taken in common. Restrictions due to wartime conditions must be accepted" (reprinted in Reichsgesetzblatt, 25 May 1942, No. 15, Part I, pp. 285 et seq.).
' Construction material had to be furnished by the plants employing the
foreigners.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

a remedy, employers were advised to find ways and means of
reducing costs; for example, the available space should be more
fully utilised by putting more beds into one building. In order
to make the camps self-supporting, the Chamber of Industry and
Commerce had been endeavouring evgr since 1940 to induce several
firms employing workers to use one joint camp, as was done, for
example, in Frankfort and other cities in the Rhine and Main
districts. The firms sharing these joint camps divided the costs
proportionately between them.
In a similar vein, the Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, in an editorial of 22 December 1942, criticised employers who
failed to make provisions to ensure t h a t their foreign workers will be kept in
camps. Some firms consider such camps merely as temporary accommodation
until the worker can be lodged in private houses. It has been proved that foreigners, who are hard-working when they live under the strict discipline of the camps,
frequently become idle and irregular in their working habits when privately
billeted. In this, indeed, they often get the support of irresponsible landlords.

The organ of Rhenish-Westphalian heavy industry was
obviously expressing the views of officials who were disturbed if,
through lack of vigilance on the part of certain undertakings,
foreigners moved into private homes and mingled with the German
population. The article continued:
As the number of foreign workers living in private billets has increased considerably in recent months, the Party and State authorities have found it necessary to take counter-measures . . . In the future, no foreign worker who came
into the Reich after 1 September 1939 may take lodgings in a private house unless
the chief officer of the local German Labour Front agency has stated in writing
that he has no objection. Furthermore, workers who live in private houses and
do not work as hard as possible, or who otherwise offend against the written and
unwritten laws of the State, can be ordered by the German Labour Front to
leave these houses. In future, therefore, only foreign workers who distinguish
themselves by special efforts will be permitted to live in private houses. Additional accommodation will thus be placed a t the disposal of Germans and themanifold dangers arising from the employment in the Reich of millions of volunteers will be reduced.

The head of the Office of Labour Allocation of the German
Labour Front, Franz Mende, writing in the summer of 1943, expressly stated that "the securing of sufficient [mass] accommodation is considered by the German authorities as a political issue.
The recruiting agencies have therefore been instructed to give
orders for the recruitment of foreign workers only if the German
Labour Front attests that sufficient accommodation has been
provided, as required by the regulations." 1
1

Reichsarbeitsblait, 2S July 1942, Part I, p. 332.

LIVING CONDITIONS

In order to facilitate mass housing, in spite of wartime shortages,
and to decrease expenses, many detailed regulations were issued
limiting the use of raw material and labour in the construction of
quarters for foreigners. Considerations of durability were expressly
excluded. General regulations concerning safety devices, minimum
number of staircases, and the like, were not to apply. 1 Most of
the dwellings were inadequately heated, and regulations issued by
Dr. Sauckel as early as 15 July 1942 reveal that heating facilities
were often entirely lacking.
Camps or hutments for "Eastern" workers were of even poorer
quality than for others:
Camps for Eastern workers and for other foreign workers really should not be
mentioned in the same breath, because these two categories receive entirely
different treatment. The first, coming from the occupied regions of the East
and having been taken to Germany to make themselves useful under German
direction, naturally cannot be allowed to do as they please. They are put into
camps where special "house regulations" are in force. They are taken to and
from their place of work in groups. Cleanliness is the supreme requirement and,
with Prussian exactness, great care is taken t h a t this order is carried out. Civilisation is already beginning to make itself felt in these camps. The women are
more easily converted to cleanliness than the men and are generally more adaptable and careful. Their leisure naturally has to be spent in the camp. However,
they are not always left to their own devices. Provided that they have made good
efforts and irreproachably observed all the rules, small groups of workers are occasionally taken out on Sundays.
The other foreign workers are foreigners who have volunteered for work in
Germany, and are naturally treated quite differently. They live in camps for the
sake of convenience, b u t are their own masters during their leisure time. 2

In a circular of 21 November 19423 the Commissioner-General
for Manpower repeated his former Order that "Eastern" workers
should, as far as possible, not be allocated in such a way that members of the same family had to be separated. But, even in the case
of friendly and allied nationalities, such as Hungarians, Croats and
"Flemings", married couples usually lived separately, even if they
were working in the same factory. They were allowed to take their
meals and to spend their free time together. 4
1
A circular Order by the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions, Department of Barracks, of 2 October 1942, directed t h a t from the autumn of 1942
foreign workers in the forestry and timber industries were no longer to be accommodated in barracks, but in huts (Waldhütten).
These huts were to be constructed from locally available material, without the use of construction timber.
If "in certain cases" bricks were needed, application had to be made to the representative of Reich Minister Speer (Reichsarbeitsblatt, Nos. 1-2, 1943, Part I, p. 27).
An article in a technical journal on fire prevention and fire fighting in barracks
stated t h a t "fire security in urban and in rural communities, in industrial plants
and in forest regions has been endangered to an extent hitherto unknown by the
steady multiplication of wooden camps" (Feuerpolizei, Nos. 7-8, 1942, p. 75).
* Essener National-Zeitung (organ of Reich Marshal Goring), 22 Jan. 1943.
3
Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Dec. 1942, p. 187.
* Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 18 Dec. 1941.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Some "model quarters" existed, e.g., in Berlin-Staacken, which
were frequently shown to visitors. As a rule, however, the barracks
were greatly overcrowded. " I t may not have been easy for many
Latvian men or women . . . when six or more, and sometimes up to
thirty persons, had to live together harmoniously in one room." 1
In the barracks for western European workers employed in Berlin
munition factories, long, narrow rooms, 33 yards by 10 feet,
contained 16 bunks, one table, two benches, and 16 small padlocked
cupboards. 2
Le Petit marseillais wrote on 11 February 1944, in a Germaninspired article:
At first, French workers in Germany had the greatest difficulties regarding
food and shelter. Now good workers can sometimes rent private rooms near the
factory or even inside the factory precincts. But these rooms are few and expensive. Generally, the workers live in camps. The buildings are new; the beds
are well spaced in large dormitories containing 100 persons but the camp supervisors often group workers who are friends in rooms with fewer persons.
FOOD

In the instructions issued shortly after taking office, Fritz
Sauckel stated rather vaguely that the food rations for foreign
workers were to be "proportionate" to those of comparable German
workers. "As far as possible, these rations should consist of types
of food to which the workers are accustomed." 3 Feeding, like
housing, was, wherever possible, organised on a mass basis. 4 Under
a Decree by the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture of 22
March 1942, the standard weekly rations for civilian foreign workers
(except "Eastern" workers) lodged and fed in hutments and camps,
irrespective of age and sex, were 5 :
1

Deutsche Zeitung im Osten, 7 July 1942.
In the summer of 1943, the Party paper Angriff (16 July 1943), reported that
in camps for foreigners, especially " E a s t e r n " workers, "cupboards for keeping
their wages are not available, and their wages are therefore in danger of being
stolen".
3
Quoted by M E N D E , loe. cil., p. 230. Under Fritz Sauckel's order, the rations
were to be determined by the Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture.
4
Early in 1944, a Swedish source estimated t h a t there were about 21,000
camp kitchens for foreigners in Germany (Vestmanslands Laens Tidning Vaesteras, 28 Apr. 1944). On one of the very rare occasions when the German-dominated foreign-language labour papers printed complaints by deported workers,
Broen,a. paper for Danish workers in Greater Germany, published, on 4 April 1943,
an angry reply to laudatory statements made in the same paper three weeks
earlier, about a "Visit to the Danish Workers' Camp in Vienna": "As far as food
is concerned, we must contradict. I t is not cheaper and better in the camp than
outside; on the contrary, it is more expensive and not so good. Six days out of
seven the food is uneatable . . . When the food is good it is because an inspection
is taking place . . . These are our corrections to your inaccurate, improbable and
fantastic article. Signed : Kjeld Bruhn PETERSEN, on behalf of the Danish workers
a t the Café Donau, Vienna."
6
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 222 (1), supplement, 1 Oct. 1942.
2

LIVING CONDITIONS
Meat
Fats
Bread

450 grams
225 grams
2,800 grams

These basic rations were in force from 6 April until 19 October
1942, when they were slightly increased 2 :
Meat
Fats
Bread

500 grams
225 grams
3,000 grams

In addition, the factory or camp canteen was authorised to
draw for every foreign worker a weekly supply of:
Flour
Nährmittel* or potato starch products
Ingredients for the preparation of soups 4 ...

30 grams
60 grams
320 grams

Foreigners performing "heavy" and "exceptionally heavy"
tasks {Schwerarbeiter, Schwerstarbeiter) were entitled to certain
additional rations.
The National Socialist authorities realised by the autumn of 1942
that the low food rations, particularly of the "Eastern" workers,
definitely impaired their capacity for work. An Order by the Reich
Ministry of Agriculture and Food, of 6 October 19425, admitted
"frequent petitions", to have, the rations of "Eastern" civilian
workers and prisoners of war increased. This however could be
done "only to a limited degree, owing to the food situation". Supplementary rations for night workers and workers with long hours were
introduced and the potato and bread ration (the latter only for
workers doing the heaviest type of work) was increased. Otherwise
the Order acknowledged that "it has been ascertained that some
of these categories of workers are underfed" but argued that this
was often due, not to an insufficient amount of food, but to faulty
preparation. The Order also strongly hinted that the camp canteens did not actually use all the food which they received.
By Decree of 6 October 1942, the Reich Minister of Food and
Agriculture ordered that male and female "Eastern" workers 6
1

10 grams =3.53 oz.; 1,000 grams = 1 kilogram =2.2 lbs.
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 222 (2), supplement, 5 Nov. 1942.
Nährmittel or "nutritious food products" is a broad term, including, according to the official German instructions, such items as barley, oatmeal, potato flour,
cream of wheat, cream of maize, etc.
* 75 per cent, of which should consist of ingredients for the preparation of thin
soup (lose Suppen), 10 per cent, for the preparation of bouillon and bread-spread
(Brühe,
Pasten), 10 per cent, for sauces and 5 per cent, condiments.
6
Cf. Ministerialrat DIETRICH: "Lebensmittelrationierung", in Kommentar zur
Reichsverteidigungsgesetzgebung,
Part V, Allg., p. 565.
6
For the rations which at the same time came into force for non-German
workers in the Government-General, see Appendix VI.
2
3

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

employed in German agriculture (and mining) and housed in camps
were to receive the following weekly food rations:
Bread 1
Meat
Fats 2
Potatoes
Nährmittel3
Sugar
Tea substitute
Vegetable

2,600 grams
250 grams
130 grams
7,000 grams
150 grams
110 grams
14 grams
if available 4

For heavy forms of work, the first three items were fixed as
follows:
Workers on
long hours
and
night shifts

Bread
Meat
Fats

2,600
300
150

"Heavy"
work

"Exception- Underground
ally heavy"
miners
work

,400

4,400

400
200

500
260

600
300

The weekly ration of tea substitute for underground miners was
also increased to 25 grams.
Fresh milk even if skimmed, could not be given to "Eastern"
workers, but "Eastern" civilian workers and prisoners of war who
were specially and considerably exposed to the effects of poisonous
substances were entitled to receive unskimmed milk.5
It is interesting to note that these rations were, in several
respects, lower than those in force in German concentration camps
and police prisons in the summer of 1941.6

In his commentary on the laws and regulations applying to
foreign workers in Germany, Dr. Birkenholz, of the Reich Ministry
of Armament and Munitions, speaking of conditions prevailing
1
The Decree provided that, to facilitate the preparation of the thick soups to
which Russians are accustomed, 360 grams of corn flour or 380 grams of roughground corn (Schrot) or 360 grams of corn groats might be substituted for
500 grams of bread.
2
"If possible", the fat ration should consist of margarine.
3
For these workers, the Nährmittel were to consist, if possible, always within
the ternas of the Decree, of millet, buckwheat, pastes and potato starch products.
* Vegetables (except turnips) might be issued only if the civilian supply situation permitted. But "vegetable refuse which has been left over after market
days and which cannot otherwise be preserved from deterioration, must a t once
be despatched to foreign workers' camps".
6
Decree by the Minister of Food and Agriculture, of 27 September 1939, confirmed by Decree of 6 October 1942.
6
For further data on food rations, see Appendix VI.

LIVING CONDITIONS

in the summer of 1942, cited the following example as a typical
illustration of the common feeding (Gemeinschaftsverpflegung) of
foreigners who received the same food as their German fellow
workers. 1 In the construction industry (public construction projects) the food consisted, per day, of one cold meal in the morning,
one warm meal in the evening, and a soup (Bunkersuppe) to be
given to labourers whose regular working time exceeded ten hours.
"This soup should be distributed during the middle of the day
at the place of work." Thus, persons working up to ten hours
received only one warm and one cold meal per day. For the preparation of the extra midday soup for labourers working regularly
more than ten hours per day, the camp canteens received, under
the regulations issued by the German Ministry of Food and Agriculture, only "30 grams of meat with bones and approximately
50 grams of Nährmittel".2
For this standard diet the foreigners
had to pay between 1.00 RM and 1.20 RM daily.
In the spring of 1944, the weekly rations (in grams) of specialised
Italian workers were 3 :
Fresh meat
350
Sausage
350
Butter
50
Sugar
200
Potatoes
1,000
Macaroni, spaghetti, etc. . 400
Bread
1,750, plus 1,400 "supplementary bread ration".

At the same period, French workers employed in Germany
received the following weekly rations (in grams) 4 :
Meat
Fats
Sugar
Cheese
Bread

•

750 (including 200 grams of
sausage)
125
120
62
3,250 (including 400 white
bread)

For "heavy" work and work over 55 hours a week, 800 to
1,000 grams of meat and 80 grams of fats were added.
*
*

1
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 207.
* Order of 26 August 1942: Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 208, supplement, 30 Aug.
1942.
* Basler Nachrichten, 23 Mar. 1944 (evening edition).
* Le Petit marseillais, 9 Feb. 1944.

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

The foreigners were allowed to have their food prepared by
cooks of their own nationality—themselves recruited workers—
"if this was justified by the number of foreigners employed and
by the size of the undertaking". 1
As a matter of principle, foreigners catered for in mass canteens
did not receive ration books. 2 Foreigners who wanted to buy
rationed food had therefore somehow to obtain ration coupons.
Hence, despite the risks involved, foreigners begging for ration
coupons became a frequent sight in wartime Germany.
German newspapers frequently complained about "begging'
foreigners and admonished the population not to give in to their
requests. "By giving bread coupons to foreign workers some women
encouraged hopes which led to the gathering of crowds of aliens
outside and inside foodshops." 3 Police reports from Soest, Westphalia, in the winter of 1943-44, mentioned the arrest of Soviet
workers begging for bread coupons or trying to exchange toys
that they had made for bread coupons; this too was described as
prohibited begging. On 13 February 1944 the Essener NationalZeitung expressed satisfaction that the use of trams was forbidden
to "Eastern" workers, because they had been in the habit of going
to the centre of the town to try to make purchases, although the
sale of goods to them was forbidden. The Oberhausen edition of the
same paper complained, however, on 25 February 1944, that "in
spite of all official measures and admonitions, male and female
Eastern workers have been molesting the population increasingly
by begging. Unfortunately, it still occurs that the beggars are
successful."
It should be noted that most camp inmates were also handicapped with regard to non-rationed foods, for the German authorities restricted the sale of foods which were temporarily or permanently free of rationing by other control measures, such as
customers' identification cards, records of customers, housekeeping
permits (Kundenausweise, Kundenlisten, Haushaltausweise), etc.
Shopkeepers were forbidden under penalty to sell ration-free goods
to customers not officially listed in these records or not provided
with these documents.
In these circumstances, it is understandable that, regardless of
the very severe penalties that awaited them if they were caught,
1
s

Manual for Foreign Workers.
Foreign industrial workers who did not receive their food in factory or camp
canteens but had to provide their meals individually, received "special ration
cards for foreign civilian workers" (Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 208, supplement 30
Aug. 1942). In order to facilitate control, applications had to be made through
the employer. Workers coming from the German-occupied Soviet territories were
not eligible for ration-cards.
3
Essener National-Zeitung, 3 Sept. 1944.

LIVING CONDITIONS

foreign workers were compelled to seek food on the black market.
But black market prices were so high that the lower-paid categories
of foreigners could not afford them.
In the summer of 1943, the German-sponsored Netherlands
labour paper Van Honk mentioned that 10 RM were asked and even a
loaf of bread was given in exchange for 50 grams of tobacco. 1 A
year later a Swiss who had been employed for two years at the
Hermann Goring Works in Linz reported that on the black market
it was possible, especially in the Rhineland and Austria, to buy
bread coupons at an average price of 7 RM for black, and 20 RM
for white bread. At the Hermann Goring Works in Linz the rate
for a cigarette was 1 RM, but for a coupon for 1 kg of white bread
a whole package of cigarettes could be obtained. 2
The only legitimate way in which some categories of recruited
workers could add supplementary food to their inadequate rations
was through parcels from home. Simplified customs procedures
were introduced for gift parcels containing up to 2J^ kg of
potatoes. 3 French men and women workers were permitted to
receive from France small parcels weighing up to 1 kg each ; every
two months, one parcel weighing up to 20 kg; and every month,
100 cigars or 300 cigarettes or 500 grams of tobacco, or an equivalent combination.
Duty-free importation was allowed for gift parcels for Hungarians 4 , Serbs5, and persons from the Baltic countries. 6
Statistics are lacking, but it may be assumed that parcels from
home brought no real relief to any great number of foreigners'
employed by Germany. 7 The families and friends of the absent
1

Van Honk, 25 June 1943.
Tribune de Genève, 22 Aug. 1944.
3
BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 211, supplement, 5 Nov. 1942.
4
On the basis of a special arrangement with a Budapest export and import
firm, German-employed Hungarians were allowed to order a food package once a
month, consisting of 1 kg of barley groats (Eiergraupen), 50 grams of green pepper,
and 100 cigarettes or 100 grams of tobacco, for which they had to pay, through
their employer, the remarkably high price of 6 R M to a specified German bank.
Order blanks for these parcels had to be obtained from the Hungarian ConsulateGeneral in Berlin (BIRKENHOLZ, op. cit., p. 211).
6
By a Decree of 10 March 1943 Serbs working in Germany were given permission to receive parcels of up to 20 kg (Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 12-13, 5 May 1943,
Part I, p . 262).
6
The Deutsche Zeitung im Osten of 7 July 1942 reported that, under a Decree of
the Reich Ministry of Finance, edibles destined for personal use were admitted
duty-free provided the consignment did not exceed the needs of the addressee;
tobacco was also admitted (in the same quantities as were allowed to French
workers). Unused clothing, underwear, soap and soap substitutes could also be
exempted from import duties.
7
The agricultural regions under German domination had to furnish food to the
Reich to the limit of their capacity. According to an editorial in the Deutsche
Bergwerks-Zeitung of 25 April 1944 it was stated t h a t "the agricultural surplus of
the Eastern territories annexed to the Reich increased from 177,000 tons of wheat
(Brotgetreide) in the first year of war to 825,000 tons in the fourth and has by now
probably reached the million ton mark".
2

100

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

workers were not often in a position to purchase food or tobacco
for them regularly; and no large quantities of parcels could
be transported in wartime Europe. For real relief, the majority of
the foreigners would have needed every month at least 10 or
15 kg of additional food of high nutritive value. For a non-German
civilian labour force of only 8 million that would have meant the
monthly transportation of between 80,000 and 120,000 tons of
food parcels, or 8,000 to 12,000 freight car loads of 10 tons each.
Not even a small fraction of such an amount of food could be
supplied by the families of the German-employed workers, or
handled by the railways of the continent.
In the later stages of the war the German authorities emphasised
that differences between foreign workers and German workers had
been abolished and that foreigners were even entitled to receive
the occasional special rations distributed in the Reich. There is
however abundant evidence that as a general rule conscripted
workers did not receive the same amount of food as Germans.
This was proved, for instance, by the readiness of foreign workers
to do extra work after their long regular working hours, for example, on farms, mostly in order to get extra food. The Commissioner-General for Manpower laid down that there was generally
no objection to the extra work but that it was a punishable offence
to reward it with food or clothing. 1
After the introduction of the emergency régime in the summer
of 1944, employers were given full jurisdiction over their workers,
whether German or foreign, in all matters concerning labour discipline. An employee whose output was insufficient or who absented
himself from work without due cause was to be punished by the
employer by the curtailment of his food ration. In August 1944,
Gauobmann H. Bangert (Düsseldorf) ordered that civilian workers from the East whose output was higher than that of a German,
were to be rewarded by an additional daily ration of cold food;
these rations had to be deducted from the rations of the "less
willing" workers in the group. 2
CLOTHING

Foreign workers were required to bring their own clothing
with them. For example, the instructions of 4 May 1942 for foreign
industrial workers contained the following rule:
The foreign worker must bring with him a complete outfit of working clothes,
including shoes, underwear and overcoat. At present, the opportunities of acquiring these articles in Germany are limited.
1
2

Essener National-Zeitung, 31 Aug. 1944.
Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 26 Aug. 1944.

LIVING CONDITIONS

101

Every French worker recruited for Germany had to take with
him work clothing, warm underwear, good footwear, two pairs of
sheets and two pillowslips. To emphasise the importance of this
rule, the instructions stated: "You are not entitled to a clothing
card or to a shoes coupon in Germany". 1 In the spring of 1943,
when 250,000 French prisoners of war were transferred to the free
labour market in Germany, Castagnet, the leader of the (Vichy)
French delegation for French workers' welfare in Germany,
declared that the first problem was to procure civilian clothes for
them. 2
Workers' contingents from Italy were also instructed to bring
their clothes with them. The Italian paper II Sole reported as
early as March 1941 that the Fascist Federation of Agricultural
Workers had
decided to make it obligatory for every departing worker to carry with him
the outfit which will best equip him for the requirements of the locality where he is
going to work (Sunday clothes, workday clothes, boots, chest or bag, raincoat,
aluminium pot). Travellers not in possession of the prescribed equipment will
be immediately sent back to the place from which they started.

Similarly, the Corriere della Sera on 12 February 1941 reported
on the despatch of 204,000 Italian industrial workers: "These
Italian workers will leave Italy in uniforms, and will be completely
equipped".
The instructions issued by Fritz Sauckel said:
When foreigners are recruited for work in Germany, they must be ordered to
take clothes and footwear with them. In cases where this is impossible, and also
when their clothes have become unwearable and must be replaced, the foreign
workers are to be supplied with coats and footwear, with due consideration for
wartime restrictions, and only in order to protect them against the hazards of
weather as far as this is necessary for reasons of health. 3

Only at certain times and occasions could the foreign worker
acquire articles of clothing. In 1942, for example, an Order issued
by the Reich Director for Clothing and Related Industries provided that working clothes should no longer become the property
of the foreigners, but should only be lent to them in cases of indispensable necessity 4 :
If, for exceptional reasons, clothes have to be supplied, they must thenceforward remain the property of the undertaking and are only to be rented out to
the workers.
1
Instructions pour la main d'œuvre embauchée pour l'Allemagne: "Workers
must obtain from their mayor's office special coupons for clothes and shoes before
their departure, for they will not be granted any coupons in Germany. They must
also take with them a blanket, sheets and pillowcases" (L'Atelier, 17 Oct. 1942).
1
Pariser Zeitung, 21 Apr. 1943.
3

Quoted by M E N D E , loe. cit.

* Ibid.

102

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Employers are only permitted to issue these clothes when absolutely necessary,
t h a t is, if otherwise there is a likelihood t h a t the worker would not be able to
continue his work.
The foreigner is required to return the working clothes upon termination of
his work. He has to do so even if the clothes have become unwearable and can no
longer be mended.
In order to prevent foreign workers from taking working clothes with them
after termination of their work, a certain sum 1 shall be deducted from their wages
as deposit. This deposit should be fixed as high as possible, b u t should not exceed
the value of the borrowed clothes.
For the use of the clothes, the worker must pay a fee which is to be deducted
from his wages. This fee is to be fixed by the various undertakings in such a way
as to ensure t h a t the expenses of foreigners for their working clothes are never
lower than the expenses to be borne by German workers, who do not participate
in this scheme.

Another Order laid down that foreign workers in Germany
who were not in possession of a ration card for clothes might receive
every three months a coupon enabling them to buy 0.20 RM worth
of sewing material; applications for these coupons had to be submitted by the employers. "Supplies permitting", the Economic
Boards (Wirtschaftsämter) were allowed to issue coupons for footwear and, if sole leather was available, coupons for sole leather to
those able to do resoling themselves. 2
Foreigners were invited to ask their families and friends at
home for clothing. By the autumn of 1942, the clothing situation
of the "Eastern" workers had become so calamitous that Fritz
Sauckel acknowledged an "emergency situation" (Notstand).3 He
asked the Reich Minister of Economics to earmark for them a
"considerable portion" of the clothes collected from civilians
throughout Europe in 1942 for the army on the eastern front, but
he pointed out that this supply "meets only the most pressing and
1
Oberregierungsrat F. H. SCHMIDT (Berlin) noted that employers were also
allowed to ask foreigners for a deposit in kind ("Die neuen Richtlinien für den
Bezug von Arbeits-und Berufskleidung", in Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 5, 1943,
Part V, p. 75).
2
Circular by the Reich Minister of Economics, of 16 August 1940 (quoted in
Order by the Reich Minister of Labour, 5 December 1940) ; Ausländische Arbeiter,
pp. 229-230. The same Order by the Reich Minister of Labour forbade foreigners
with no permanent residence, such as the crews of ships and tugs, and migratory
workers, to have their shoes repaired more than once every five months. Every
repair must be recorded on the migratory worker's registration card {Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 228). After January 1943, leather substitutes could only be legally
sold to "self-repairers" against special coupons (Decree by the Reich Minister of
Economics, 16 January 1943; Reichsgesetzblatt, 2, Part I, p. 26).
Here again, foreigners were hampered by the widespread use of customers'
records. "A consumer may only ask a shoe-repair store to repair his shoes and
the store may only accept them if he is properly listed on the customers' record of
the particular store" (Art. 2V, Order by the Reich Ministry of Economics, 16 January 1943).
3
"Memorandum for employers and local farm leaders concerning the supply
of clothes to Eastern workers" (undated), in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 1010 (7211),
supplement, IS Oct. 1942.

LIVING CONDITIONS

103

most critical demands". A special campaign was therefore arranged
in the German-occupied eastern territories to persuade workers'
families to send winter clothes, shoes and other wearing apparel
to their relatives in Germany. As an inducement, the office of the
Commissioner-General for Manpower promised to pay up to a
maximum of 250 roubles (25 RM) to the senders. A standard
letter in Russian and Ukrainian, purporting to be written by
the worker himself, was distributed among them and they
were urged to sign it and send it to their families without
additional personal comment. The form letter pointed out that its
sender was equipped only with the summer clothing he wore when
he left his country and that this campaign offered a unique opportunity, which would never occur again, to supply him with warm
clothes and other apparel he had left a t home.
Devices of this sort did not ease the situation; and "Eastern"
workers were not the only workers who had often to work barefoot
and in ragged clothes.
Applications for clothing and shoes could not be made individually, but only by the employer. On this subject, the circular
by the Reich Minister of Economics of 18 December 1942 stated:
The employer is personally responsible that applications be made only for
articles which by the strictest standard are indispensable to maintain the
"Eastern'' worker's capacity to work.1

An Order issued on 6 October 1944 stipulated that in general
clothes were to be supplied to foreign workers only on surrender
of their old clothes, since the production of clothes for them could
only be continued if enough rags were forthcoming. In the labour
camps all clothes no longer useable should be collected by the
employers and handed in. The money raised by their sale should
be used by the firm for the benefit of the foreigner.2
1
On 18 Dec. 1942 the Reich Minister of Economics officially stated that
"Eastern" workers were "often supplied with an insufficient amount of clothes
and shoes", and that "appropriate measures" must be taken. He asked the
Reich Central Agency for the Textile Industry (Deputy Reich Chief Dr. Otten)
to devise "special types of clothing for male and female Eastern workers".
Accordingly, with the approval of Sauckel, a "special programme" was decided
upon for the manufacture of a low-quality "special type of clothing and underwear on a considerable scale"; for men: lined jackets and trousers; for women:
lined jackets, skirts and blouses. It was stated that "at present, overcoats can be
supplied only from stocks of old clothes and only if evidence is produced that they
are absolutely necessary for the worker's special task".
The German regulations prescribed that shoes for "Eastern" workers must be
"all wooden, or with wooden soles and two straps, or galoshes with wooden soles".
The upper part "should consist mainly of material other than leather".
The employers' applications had to be verified by the Economic Boards
(Wirtschaftsämter). If the Board had several supply stores (.Auslieferungsstellen)
"the requisitions will be filled in the order of their urgency, because at the present
time only a part of the demand can be met".
2
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Oct. 1944.

104

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
BEDDING

The poor quality of most of the mass quarters and sleeping
facilities (mainly straw-stuffed mattresses) and the frequent lack of
heating made the procurement of bedding equipment a problem
which continued to vex the workers and to occupy the attention
of the German authorities:
Before foreign workers are placed a t the disposal of German employers the
latter must indicate in their applications whether or not they will be able to
furnish bedding if their demand is granted. If the employer does not possess a
supply of bedding, every foreign worker must bring two sets of bed linen from
home. 1

In a Decree dealing with the shortage of bedding, issued
as early as 28 August 1941, the Reich Minister of Economics
ordered that non-German male workers must no longer be supplied
with bedding. 2 The instructions of 4 May 1942 for foreign industrial workers warned them that "in Germany it is in many cases
impossible to supply male workers with any bedding whatsoever,
while for women workers only the most indispensable bedding is
available".
The Reich Farmers' Leader, in a letter addressed to all provincial and regional German farm boards, commented upon the
difficulties of procuring bedding from Italy for Italian agricultural
workers :
My efforts to secure bed linen for the Italian agricultural workers through the
intermediary of the Fascist Corporation of Agricultural Workers have been of
no avail. Since there are a t present no other possible means of supplying Italian
agricultural workers with the necessary bedding, I recommend advising the
Italians t h a t they have their own bedding sent from home. I have made arrangements with the Reich Ministry of Labour and with the Central Inspectorate of
the Italian Corporation of Agricultural Workers for Germany, to the effect t h a t
the cost of the despatch of the bedding will be paid by the [German] employers,
and that furthermore the Italian workers will receive compensation for the use of
this bedding. 3

In view of the precarious situation, the Reich Ministry of
Armament and Munitions issued through its own local offices
(Aussenstellen) a limited amount of bedding for foreigners employed
in the armament industry. These local offices would issue special
coupons entitling foreign armament workers to receive "one woollen
1

BIRKENHOLZ, loe. cit.,

205.

This Order was promulgated by the Commissioner-General for Manpower
after an interval of eight months, on 24 April 1942, and was published after a
further interval of six months in Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 30, 25 Oct. 1942, Part I,
p. 457.
3
This circular was communicated to the German labour offices on 19 Nov.
1941, and published in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 624 (1), supplement, 15 Sept. 1942.

LIVING CONDITIONS

105

blanket and one horseblanket" ("with certain limitations") as
well as one towel for men and l j ^ towels for women. 1
This measure served more to draw attention to the shortage of
bedding than to relieve it. By the autumn of 1942, the scarcity
became so marked that even Germans called up for compulsory
labour service or to undertake employment away from their home
town, were ordered to bring their bedding with them 2 , and a Decree
by Sauckel of 18 February 19433, reiterated that employers did not
need special consent from the Reich labour trustee or special
Reich labour trustee in order to pay the workers appropriate compensation—for instance, 5 Rpf. per day—for the use of their own
bedding. However, as in the case of the German appeals for food
packages and clothing, the occupied countries were too much impoverished to fulfil German requests for bedding.
VERMIN IN THE W O R K E R S ' CAMPS

The spread of vermin is a fair indication of the quality of mass
housing. Once conditions fall below a minimum standard, vermin
cease to be a mere nuisance and become a serious threat to health.
The workers' camps were infested with vermin, owing to insanitary housing ; and the situation was aggravated by the enforced
dirt of their inhabitants, who lacked clean clothing, clean bedding,
clean underwear, hot water, washing facilities and other essentials
of a hygienic life. There was not enough machinery for disinfection. In order to save essential material, the Reich Ministry of the
Interior, in a Decree of 4 January 19434, ordered that "machinery
for the disinfection of lodgings of foreigners employed in armament
plants may be provided only if their number exceeds 4,000" ; camps
containing less than 4,000 but more than 500 foreign workers were
to receive substitute disinfecting machinery, working with dry
heat or chemicals. 5 However, experiences with dry heat were
unfavourable. 6
1
s

BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 209 (2), supplement, IS Oct. 1942.
Circular by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 8 October 1942;
Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Dec. 1942, p. 186.
3
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 7, 5 Mar. 1943, Part I, p. 167.
4
Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower of 8 February 1943;
Reichsarbeitsblatt,
No. 7, 5 Mar. 1943, Part I, p. 160.
6
Circular of 13 February 1943; Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Mar. 1943, No. 8, Part I,
p. 182.
8
Research carried out by the procurement agency of the Wehrmacht showed
that leather, fur, rubber and their substitutes suffered when exposed to hot air
even of 60-80°C. In order to prevent damage to clothes and equipment, Dr.
Paetzold of the Office of the Commissioner-General for Manpower ordered that
wearing apparel made of leather, fur, rubber or their substitutes must not be exposed to temperatures above 35°C. The use of hydrocyanic acid for the disinfection of clothing and utensils of foreigners, particularly "Eastern" workers, was
recommended as the cheapest and most efficient method (Dr. PUNTIGAM in Reiehsarbeitsblatt, No. 30, 25 Oct. 1942, Part V, p. 564).

106

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

In March 1944 the official organ of the Reich Labour Ministry
and the Commissioner-General for Manpower published a summary
of the situation. 1 Dr. Peters, a physician and expert on vermin
extermination, discussed the disastrous spread of vermin in the
camps and reported that the countermeasures taken by the German
authorities had merely been a palliative and did not cope with
a serious situation t h a t had begun in the early period of the war
and had continued for years. Dr. Peters wrote:
There have been bedbugs in Germany before the war, but never did they
become a problem of labour protection, never did they occur in such masses as to
drive thousands of workers from their sleeping places and often seriously to curtail their efficiency. Fleas were exterminated in Germany before the war, but now
there are such masses of them in many hutment camps that they, too, decisively
decrease the inmates' capacity to work.
Bedbugs and fleas impair, Dr Peters continued,
the working capacity of our armament industry (and, incidentally, in the occupied territories, the fighting capacity of our soldiers as well) ; clothes lice are even
more dangerous, because they spread infectious diseases.
The plague of vermin spread, at times, like an explosion, so that it was impossible to cope at once with the demands for material and expert personnel.
Some 1,000 vermin extermination undertakings, using thousands of tons of carbon
disulphide, sulphur, prussic acid, etc., hardly sufficed to eliminate the worst cases
or even to mitigate the plague.
The Armament Ministry therefore organised a special Vermin
Disinfection and Plague Protection Committee (Arbeitsausschuss
Raumentwesung und Seuchenabwehr) as a central extermination and
research agency. " B u t " , asks Dr. Peters,
where should we, in view of the notorious scarcity of raw materials, find even
substitutes for disinfectants ? All the Committee was able to do was to ask the
German Association for Protection against Vermin to test "all the chemicals
which are still available".
By March 1944 no reliable method had as yet been discovered:
" i t would be too early to report about the result of these investigations". The Armament Ministry's Committee was equally unable
t o solve the personnel problem:
The few firms with trained personnel were ordered to concentrate on cases of
extreme urgency, since they could not possibly cope with the huge task of carrying
out measures to be taken in the workers' camps. Therefore, attempts are now
being made to have this job done by untrained camp guards and to provide them
•with substitutes2 which at least may keep the less infected areas under control or
keep a disinfected camp clean as long as possible.
1
Dr. Gerhard PETERS : "Die Scheuerentwesung also wirksames Behelfsverfahren zur Ungezieferbekämpfung in Gemeinschaftslagern", in Reichsarbeitsblatt,
No. 8-9, 25 Mar. 1944, Part III, pp. 35-37.
* Some of the substitute solutions were tar residues containing phenol.

CHAPTER

THE REGULATION OF WAGES
Unless the wages of labour recruits were fixed by agreements
between Germany and authorities of the recruits' home countries,
in a very great majority of cases, they were unilaterally determined by wage regulations (Tarifordnungen).
These wage
regulations were issued periodically by the Reich labour trustees,
and covered either Germans and non-Germans, or only non-Germans, or only Germans. As mentioned before, with the appointment of Fritz Sauckel as Commissioner-General for Manpower,
the Reich labour trustees were put under his authority, and had
to report to him, instead of to the Reich Minister of Labour. Thus,
from the spring of 1942, Sauckel was responsible for the unilateral
determination of wage conditions. On special occasions, particularly when wide regulations concerning Soviet and Polish workers
were to be introduced, the Reich War Cabinet itself issued decrees
concerning the wages and working conditions of conscripted
workers. 1
Only in extremely rare cases (such as those of very highly
skilled specialists from western or north-western Europe) were
non-Germans in a position to negotiate their own wages or salaries
by individual bargaining. But towards the end of 1942 it was
decided that
for reasons connected with the war the determination of individual [wages
and] working conditions could no longer be left to the employers but had to be put
into the hands of the Reich labour trustees. The centralised regulation of [wages
and] working conditions has been pushed to the farthest point in the instructions
issued by the Commissioner-General for Manpower concerning wages in the
armament industry.*

As has already been pointed out in another connection, the
wage regulations issued by the Reich labour trustees differed fundamentally from genuine collective labour agreements negotiated
»Seep. 128.
Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, No. 4, Feb. 1943, p. 116.

108

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

between an employer or a genuine employers' organisation and
genuine representatives of the employees.
In two technical respects, the wage regulations differed from
collective agreements of the pre-Hitler period. Collective wage
regulations covering only one firm ("firm contracts") had "completely disappeared". Even wage schemes valid for all firms of the
same category located in the same city had "almost completely
disappeared". Instead, the same collective wage regulations applied
to a given industry in a wider geographical area, sometimes con. taining several provinces; in fact, many important wage schemes
covered the whole territory of Germany ("Reich contracts"). This
trend had already become apparent in the early stages of the war.
After a detailed survey of collective labour regulations, the Institute for Labour Research of the German Labour Front found
that out of 2,110 of those in force on 1 January 1941, 237 were
"Reich" regulations (i.e., covered all firms of the same category
in the whole of Germany). The tendency was especially marked
in public undertakings; no fewer than 20 of the 28 collective wage
regulations for employees of public undertakings were applicable
throughout the territory of Germany. 1
Before the war, collective regulations covered either wage
earners or salaried employees, but not both. Even in the case of
single "firm contracts" salaried employees would be covered by
one contract, and wage earners in the same undertaking by another.
Since the war, however, more and more collective regulations
covered both wage earners and salaried employees. Of the 2,110
collective regulations surveyed in the study made by the Institute
for Labour Research, 1,728 applied to wage-earning employees 2 ,
199 covered both wage earners and salaried employees8, and only
183 dealt separately with salaried employees. Difficulties had
often arisen in the past in deciding whether an individual was to
be classified as a wage earner or salaried employee; thus the new
trend towards unified wage and working conditions for both categories resulted in considerable simplification.
*
*

The wage regulations in force for non-German workers varied
widely, according to the National Socialist policy of discriminating
1

Soziale Praxis, 15 June 1941, p. 387.
Including 479 collective regulations for home industry.
»Of these 199 regulations, 183 were in force in private industry and 16 in
public enterprises.
2

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

109

between the various nationalities of Europe. The millions of workers imported from the East had to work under "special conditions", which are discussed below. The wages of workers who came
from the south-east and south of Europe (the Balkans, Italy and
Spain) were to a large extent determined by Government agreements.
WESTERN AND CERTAIN CENTRAL EUROPEAN WORKERS

Wages
If a non-German worker did not belong to a category which
was the object of the severest discrimination (Soviet workers,
Poles, and Jews 1 of all nationalities), and if he did not belong to a
category of workers whose wages were determined by Government
agreements, he was, "as a matter of principle", entitled to the
same wage as a comparable German worker. This rule applied first
of all to workers from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Norway, and the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. 2
Several important points have to be remembered in order to
appreciate the real effect of the rule that, as a matter of principle,
favoured categories of non-Germans were entitled to the same
wages as Germans doing comparable work.
(a) The nominal hourly wages which the workers were, at
best, allowed to receive were pre-war rates, since a general wage
stop came into force in Germany in the second month of the.war
(16 October 1939).3 The German authorities were determined to
keep basic wages and salaries "frozen" throughout the war, and
were, on the whole, successful in this effort. How rigidly hourly
wages were "frozen" in Germany can be seen from the fact that
the average hourly wage rate in all industries for German workers
was, in December 1941 (in pfennigs), for skilled male workers, 80.8;
for male helpers, 63.9; for female helpers, 44.5. In December
1943, the figures were 81.0, 64.1 and 44.7, respectively. 4
German pre-war net money wages and German pre-war real
wages were lower than those of some, though not all, of Germany's
neighbours. The movement of gross and net weekly earnings of
German industrial workers from 1929 to 1937, as calculated by
the Reich Statistical Office, was as follows:
1

See Appendix II.
* Dr. Herbert KNOLLE, Regierungsrat in the Reich Ministry of Labour, in
Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 246.
3
Decree of 12 October 1939, promulgated on 16 October 1939; Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 2028.
* Wirtschaft und Statistik, Apr. 1944, and Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Mar. 1942,
quoted in Monthly Review (Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1944, p. 408.

110

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

GROSS AND NET WEEKLY EARNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN
GERMANY, 1 9 2 9 - 1 9 3 7 1

Year

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1

Gross weekly
earnings 1
(RM)

44.09
40.61
35.73
29.51
30.16
32.36
33.15
34.39
35.59

Deductions for taxes and
employees' social insurance
contributions
Amount in R M

Percentage
of gross
earnings

5.29
4.87
4.47
3.69
3.77
4.21
4.31
4.64
4.80

12.0
12.0
12.5
12.5
12.5
13.0
13.0
13.5
13.5

Net weekly
earnings
(RM)

38.80
35.74
31.26
25.82
26.39
28.15
28.84
29.75
30.79

Average for Mar., June, Sept. and Dec.

Since 1937 no official German calculation has been available.
But the movement of average gross weekly earnings between 1938
and 1942 (i.e., a continuation of the first column of the above
table) has been calculated from the German official statistics. 2 The
gross average weekly earnings continued to rise until, in September
1942, it reached, for the first time in 13 years, the 1929 level. I t
must be noted that in other industrial countries the 1929 gross
weekly wage level was surpassed long before, and that the German
upward trend in the gross average weekly earnings was in fact due
to a longer working week. The upward trend in the gross average
weekly earnings was accompanied by a similar trend in the deductions. As said before, official German statistics concerning average
deductions have been lacking since 1937, but it can fairly be assumed that deductions for tax and employees' social insurance
contributions rose from 13.5 per cent, in 1937 to 14 per cent, in
1938 and 1939, and 15 per cent, in 1940, 1941 and 1942. This assumption is based on the fact that, since the wage tax was a progressive tax, increase of gross earnings caused an increased application of the higher tax brackets, with consequent increase of the
average tax percentage; and in September 1939 a war supplement
to the wage tax was introduced. The movement of gross and net
1
René L I V C H E N : " N e t Wages and Real Wages in Germany", in International
Labour Review, Vol. L, No. 1, July 1944, p. 66. Unless otherwise indicated, the
following section is based on this article and the article by the same author,
"Wage Trends in Germany from 1929 to 1942", idem, Vol. XLVIII, No. 6, Dec.
1943, pp. 714-732. In these articles, however, net and real wages in Germany
are not calculated beyond 1941.
2
For the years 1938-1941, quoted by René LIVCHEN, loo. cit.; for 1942 (Sept.
only), Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1943, P a r t V, p. 247.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

weekly earnings of industrial workers in Germany from 1937 to
1942 may therefore be estimated as follows:
GROSS AND NET WEEKLY EARNINGS OF INDUSTRIAL WORKERS I N
GERMANY, 1 9 2 9 AND 1 9 3 8 - 1 9 4 2

Year

1
i

Gross weekly
earnings
(RM)

Deductions for taxes and
employees' social insurance
contributions
Amount in R M

Percentage
of gross
earnings

Net weekly
earnings
(RM)

1929

44.09

5.29

12.0

38.80

1938
1939
1940
1941
1942

37.31
38.72
39.89
42.51 1
44.16 2

5.22
5.42
5.98
6.38
6.62

14.0
14.0
15.0
15.0
15.0

32.09
33.30
33.91
36.13
37.54

Mar., Sept. and Dec. only.
Sept. only.

In September 1942, owing to a longer working week than in
1929, the gross weekly money earnings of industrial German workers
thus reached the 1929 level for the first time; but the net weekly
money earnings (owing to higher deductions than in 1929) had not
yet reached the 1929 level.
Does the picture differ if, instead of nominal wages, a comparison
of real wages is made, that is, of the purchasing power of the money
earned ? Here the question arises as to the reliability of'the German official cost-of-living index, the weights for which were still
based on family budget data for 1927-1928. Calculations made
on the basis of German figures have led to the conclusion t h a t
for the last peace years (1937-1938) the official German cost-ofliving index should be increased by 10 per cent, in order to take
into account the changes that up to that time had actually taken
place in German working-class consumption. In other words,
purchasing power in the last two pre-war years must, according to
these calculations, be assumed to have been nearly 10 per cent.
lower than the official cost-of-living index indicated. 1 On this
assumption, the movement of real gross and net weekly earnings
of industrial workers in Germany was as follows:
1
Cf. Otto N A T H A N : "Consumption in Germany during the Period of Rearmament", in Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LVI, No. 3, May 1942, p. 362;
and Hilde OPPENHËIMER BLUHM: " T h e Standard of Living of German Labor
under Nazi Rule", in Social Research, Supplement V, 1943, pp. 38-39; both quoted
by René LIVCHEN in " N e t Wages and Real Wages in Germany", loc. cit.,
p. 71.

112

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

INDEX

NUMBERS

OF NOMINAL

AND REAL WEEKLY EARNINGS

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN GERMANY IN 1 9 2 9 , 1 9 3 7

AND

1938

(Base: 1929 = 100)

Year

Real gross weeklyReal net weekly
earnings
earnings
Official Corrected Nominal
Nominal
German cost-ofnet
gross
cost-ofliving
weekly according according
living
weekly according according earnings
index
to
to
to
to
index
earnings
official corrected
official corrected
index
index
index
index

1929
1937
1938

100.0
81.2
81.6

100.0
89.3
89.8

100.0
80.7
84.6

100.0
99.4
103.7

100.0
90.4
94.2

100.0
79.4
82.7

100.0
97.8
101.3

100.0
88.9
92.1

Thus, according to the official calculations, the real gross weekly
earnings of industrial workers in Germany would have averaged,
in 1937, 99.4 per cent, of the 1929 earnings, and in 1938 would,
for the first time, have surpassed those of 1929 by 3.7 per cent.
Similarly, according to the official German calculations, the real
net weekly earnings would, in 1937, have been 97.8 per cent, of
those of 1929 and would, in 1938, have surpassed those of 1929
by 1.3 per cent. But according to the corrected cost-of-living index, the real gross weekly earnings amounted in 1937 only to 90.4
per cent, and in 1938 to 94.2 per cent, of the 1929 level, and the
real net weekly earnings were likewise still considerably below the
1929 level, namely 88.9 per cent, in 1937 and 92.1 per cent, in 1938.
The official German cost-of-living index for the years 1939,
1940 and 1941 (calculated as for the preceding years, on the basis
of the data for 1927-1928) were 81.9, 84.5 and 86.5 per cent, respectively of the 1929 level. I t was thus officially maintained that the
cost of living during the first years of the war was still considerably
lower than the cost of living in 1929, while the nominal gross weekly
earnings of industrial workers in Germany were officially calculated
as 87.8, 90.5 and 96.41 per cent, respectively of the 1929 figure.
On the basis of these official cost-of-living indices, the real gross
weekly earnings would have amounted to 107.2, 107.1 and 111.41
per cent, of the 1929 level. Similarly, while the nominal net weekly
earnings for 1939 to 1941 were officially calculated as having
amounted to 85.8, 87.4 and 93.1 1 per cent, of the 1929 level, the
real net weekly earnings would have risen to 104.8, 103.4 and 107.61
per cent, of the 1929 level. Owing to wartime price control, wartime
rationing and the scarcity of certain rationed and unrationed
goods in Germany, which led to the development of an un1

Mar., Sept. and Dec. only.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

113

controlled sector in German economy, the black market, it
is impossible to estimate the extent to which the official German cost-of-living indices—which continued to be calculated
on the data of 1927-1928—should be corrected in order to
give a realistic picture.
It must be noted, however, that,
in any case, the rise in the purchasing power of the wages
as shown in the official calculations was due to an increase
in the average working week, an increase which was absolutely
and relatively greater than the rise, claimed by the official
German statistics, in the net weekly earnings in German
industries in the first years of war. For workers coming from
countries with comparatively high wage levels, like the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, the German wages compared unfavourably with those that they used to receive at home. On the
other hand, workers from countries with a comparatively lower
wage level, France, for example, received somewhat higher net
wages for their longer working week in Germany than for their
shorter working week at home. This advantage was, however,
offset by the fact that during the war the cost-of-living rose much
more quickly outside Germany, for example, in France. For that
reason, and because the exchange rates established by Germany
did not reflect the inflationary tendency of the other countries,
the purchasing power of that part of their wages which these workers transferred to their dependants at home decreased as the war
proceeded.
(b) In the western and north-western countries of Europe
particularly, but also in other parts of the continent, both official
recruiters (labour office agents) and unofficial recruiters (agents
sent out by employers) tried to induce foreigners to volunteer for
work in Germany by promising attractive conditions that would
enable them to live comfortably and also to support the families
that they would have to leave behind. There were numerous
complaints from persons who had been promised (frequently in
writing) favourable wages if they would only volunteer for work
in Germany, and on arrival, were forced to accept employment at
lower rates and, in general, under markedly less favourable conditions. In fact, the attractive offers had frequently been made
with the consent of the German authorities. This was admitted in
the regulations which required German employers to lower the
wages and adjust the working conditions of foreigners as soon as
they found out that they had committed an error, even if the
German authorities had mistakenly given their consent. 1 Employers
were required to communicate immediately with the Reich labour
1

Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 245.

114

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

trustee, asking for information on the wages and working conditions
of a comparable German worker, in individual cases where such
information was lacking or there was an element of doubt. 1
(c) Especially in the early stages of the war, foreigners were,
as a matter of policy, frequently put on jobs of a lower category
than the work that they had done a t home. Later on, the everincreasing scarcity of labour forced the National Socialist authorities to discard the doctrine of German superiority for a more
rational exploitation of foreign labour supply.
(d) Foreign workers were subject to the same deductions (tax,
social insurance and Labour Front contributions, etc.) as Germans.
These deductions were higher than in their own countries. German
workers and their families could reckon on considerable future
benefits in return, but foreign workers rarely received, during the
war, the benefits or services to which they were theoretically entitled. Few foreigners, under wartime conditions, could qualify
for unemployment insurance benefits or old-age pension; and if
their health failed or they became unfit for work on account of
invalidity, they were, as a rule, quickly removed from Germany. 2
Thus foreigners found themselves at a disadvantage, even if they
received the same nominal wage as German workers.
(e) Newly arrived foreigners did not receive the full wage from
the time that they started work. It was pointed out that German
workers frequently had to have years of experience in a particular
industry before they were ranked in the skilled-wage group. 3 A
foreigner who was not accustomed to his work and surroundings
had therefore to be content, for a period, usually six weeks, with
the so-called "initiatory wage" (Einstellohn).
The maximum
rates for initiatory wages were determined by administrative
decree.
(/) Much more important was the general rule that foreign
workers, even after the initiatory period, were entitled to full wage
rates only if their output reached the usual standard of the German
undertaking in which they were employed.
(g) Lastly, the situation of most foreigners was complicated
by the necessity of setting aside part of their earnings for transfer
to their dependants at home. Since hardly any foreigners working
in Germany were able to live in a common household with their
families, their income (even if they received a separation bonus)
"did not go as far" as the same income of a comparable German
worker who lived at home with his family.
1

Decree by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 11 June 1942.
> See Chapter XIV.
3
KNOLLE, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 244.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

115

The cumulative effect of all these factors was so great that
it became necessary for the German authorities to warn German
employers to abstain from paying to foreigners a higher wage
than to comparable German workers. 1 This warning became
necessary, as Dr. Knolle, of the Reich Ministry of Labour, pointed
out, because "in the struggle to secure for themselves as great
a portion as possible of the scarce labour supply, employers have,
here and there, violated the principle of absolute equality in the
treatment of German and foreign workers", i.e., they had granted
higher wages to foreigners than to Germans.
A circular Order by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 24 September 19412, severely criticised a promise made to foreign workers,
in one part of Germany, in the timber industry, to pay wages at
the rates in force in the German State forests, which were "considerably higher" than those usually paid in the private timber
industry. "This", the Minister pointed out, "led to the most
serious difficulties", because, on the one hand, "private undertakings were not in a position to pay the high wages promised to the
foreigners", while, on the other hand, "great unrest developed
among German workers on account of the more favourable treatment of the foreigners".
Allowances for children or wives were to be given to foreigners
under the same conditions and on the same scale as to German
workers, provided that
the conditions and requirements are fully met. In general, it will be for the
foreigner to prove t h a t the conditions and requirements have been fulfilled in his
individual case. In some cases children's allowances and similar payments will be
granted only if the children are given a German education. In those cases the
foreigner will not be entitled to the allowances and payments unless he produces
evidence t h a t his children are receiving a German education. 3

Foreigners were entitled to the same additional payments for
extra work as comparable German workers. Some Government
treaties also provided for overtime rates if the foreigner worked
on his country's national holidays which were not celebrated in
Germany. If no work was done on 1 May or other National Socialist holidays, the foreigner was nevertheless entitled to his
"regulation wage". 4
The official commentary on these rules 'by Dr. Knolle pointed
1
This rule was frequently emphasised in orders and regulations; for example,
in the Decree by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 11 June 1942,
concerning the wages of foreign workers in private employment; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 258, supplement, 30 Aug. 1942.
* PETERSSEN, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 656 (2), supplement, 5 Nov. 1942.
8
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 253 (1), supplement, 20 July 1942.
4
KNOLLE, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 246 (1), supplement, 30 Aug. 1942.

116

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

out that the foreigner was also entitled to "social payments and
social services", which were given to the German worker as of
right, whether or not they were based on administrative wage
regulations, collective agreements, firm contracts, or custom.
But whenever payments or benefits were granted to comparable
German workers, not as of right, but as a special concession, the
German employer had to use his discretion to decide whether
foreigners were eligible. In general, the comment continued, it
would be safe to assume that foreigners could not participate in
all those extra arrangements which resulted from a long relationship
between the German worker and the German employer, and that
the foreigner should not receive a bonus or allowance granted in
observance of special occasions or events which played a specific
role in German tradition. As an example, Dr. Knolle mentioned
that a foreigner connected for only a short time with a German
undertaking would not have the same appreciation of Christmas
as a German. 1
Separation

Bonus

Under various Government treaties, as well as unilateral German
regulations, some categories of foreign workers were entitled to
"separation bonuses" {Trennungsentschädigung).
The bonus was
not meant to compensate the worker for separation from his family
but to compensate the family for separation from its chief provider.
Among the various conditions which the foreigner must fulfil
before the bonus was granted, he (or she) had therefore to provide evidence that before leaving for Germany he (or she) had
actually supported the persons now claimed to be dependants.
In the case of a Croat worker2, for example, members of his
family living with him had to prove that they derived 70 per cent.
of their income from the absent worker's remittances. Workers
of all nationalities had to supply detailed information concerning
family status, occupation, age, other sources of income, average
living expenses and rents paid by their dependants. All this information, subject to penalties for false statements, had to be
verified and officially attested by the local authorities of the home
countries.
The German employer was authorised to pay separation bonus
to a foreign worker provided that:
(1) the working place was so far from his home that it was
impossible for him to live at home while employed ;
1

Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 253.
Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 5 May
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1943, Part I, p. 306, No. 15.
2

1943;

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

117

(2) in equivalent circumstances the employer also paid an equal
separation bonus to his German workers 1 ;
(3) the foreigner could produce evidence that he was married,
or, if widowed or divorced in his own country, that he used to live
with his children of minor age in a common household. While unmarried men were ineligible for a separation bonus, an exception
could be made for an unmarried Frenchman who used to live with
a woman in a common household (en ménage), unless the woman
had, after the man's departure, returned to her own family or
otherwise moved from the place where she had lived with him. 2
The normal rate of the separation bonus was 1.50 RM a day.
If the bonus did not exceed this amount for every day of the worker's actual separation from his home, the employer was allowed
to pay it without special authorisation from the Reich labour
trustee. In special circumstances, the employer might apply to
the Reich labour trustee for permission to pay a higher bonus.
The usual rate of 1.50 RM had to be reduced by 0.50 RM if the
worker received free lodging, and by an appropriate amount if
he was provided with free meals or meals sold to him below cost
price.
The employer was forbidden to pay separation bonus for days
on which the worker through his own fault worked only part of the
day, or not at all ; if this occurred on a day preceding or following
a Sunday or holiday he also lost the separation bonus for those days.
If a foreigner was admitted to hospital, payment of separation
bonus had to cease, beginning from the second day of hospitalisation. 3
In particular cases two separation bonuses (one for the husband
and one for the wife) might be paid: (a) if both husband and wife
were working in Germany, but at different places; (b) if, during
their absence from their own country, their household was maintained in the interests of their family; and (c) if they were in a
position to prove the latter fact by an affidavit by an official authority. 4
' O r d e r by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 2 August 1940; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 260.
1
Order by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 23 September 1941 ; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 269. The bonus could be paid only if the fact that the couple lived
en ménage was proved by an affidavit of the mayor and countersigned by the
competent branch office of the German Military Administration in France or by
the German recruitment office. An Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 12 October 1942 (Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 252), pointed out that
Belgians who lived en ménage were not eligible for separation bonus.
' O r d e r by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 3 May 1941; Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 267.
«Order by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 4 August 1941; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 252.

118

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

It should be noted that German workers who were ordered to
leave their regular residence in order to assume employment elsewhere, and whose situation therefore was in that respect comparable with recruited workers, received additional payments to
which foreigners were not entitled. The special allowances for these
German workers were either given as "separation bonuses" {Trennungszuschlag), "special allowances" {Sonderunterstützung),
or
"payment for faithful service" {Treugeld). These payments were
borne partly by the employers, and partly by the labour offices.
In certain circumstances, they could be accumulated. 1
The "separation bonuses" were given to Germans who "as a
result of their labour service or employment were placed so far
distant from their former residence that they could not return
home daily". 2 They usually amounted to 1.50 RM per day or
10.50 RM per week, but could be increased up to 19 RM per
week3 and could be paid over and above free board and lodging
or board and lodging supplement, provided that the latter did not
exceed }/¿ RM for lodging and 1 RM for board per day.
The "special allowances" could be granted to German workers
if their transfer to another locality resulted in a decrease of their
nominal wage and an adjustment was necessary to protect their
economic situation and that of their families.
"Payment for faithful service" could be granted "in the case of
conscription of Germans for employment of long duration". It
was granted on application and its uniform rate was 26 RM per
month. 4 All these special payments were exempt from taxation
and were excluded in the computation of social insurance contributions. Lastly, German workers were often entitled to allowances for
the purchase of working clothes, for particularly dirty work, etc. 5
Taxation
For taxation purposes, foreign workers were divided into three
groups: a, small minority exempt from German taxation; a majority
which paid higher taxes in Germany than Germans; and a group
which paid the same taxes as Germans.
The small minority of labour recruits exempt from direct taxation while working in the Reich owed this preferential treatment
to the fact that the German authorities considered that they had
1
Cf. "Manual for Labour Conscripts and Similar Categories", in Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, Part I, p. 363, and Part V, p. 419.
* Circular by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 27 March 1941; Reichsarbeitsblatt, Part I, p. 164.
8
"Manual for Labour Conscripts and Similar Categories", loc. cit.
4
Circular by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 27 March 1941; Reichsarbeitsblatt, P a r t I, p. 164.
6
Schmutzgelder, Wegegelder, Bekleidungsgelder, Fahrzeitentschädigungen, etc.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

119

not fulfilled a basic requirement for taxation, namely, establishment of a legal residence.
Some aspects of taxation of non-Germans employed in Germany
were regulated by treaties for the prevention of double taxation
between Germany and other countries. Almost all these treaties 1
provided that foreigners who received payment from public funds
should be taxed by the country in which those public funds were
administered. This rule applied in particular to the German State
railways 2 , which employed a large number of non-Germans.
Where wages paid by private employers were concerned, some
treaties reserved the right of taxation to the country in which the
individual worker had his permanent residence, and others
to the country in which he performed his work. The first
principle was embodied in the treaties between Germany on
the one hand and Denmark and Hungary 3 on the other; by a unilateral German Decree it was also applied to the Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia, which, for purposes of taxation, was considered "an outside territory". But under German legislation4
this principle was of practical consequence only for married persons
from Denmark, Hungary or the Protectorate who were working
in Germany. Married persons coming to Germany from Denmark,
Hungary, Bohemia or Moravia did not have to pay the German
wage tax if their families continued to live in their own countries.
These workers, although employed and living in Germany, were
considered to have maintained their legal residence in their respective countries. But an unmarried person coming from any
of these countries and employed in Germany was assumed to have
established his residence (or at least his "regular domicile") there,
from the moment that he entered the country, and he was therefore,
under the "residence rule", subject to German taxation. 6
Thus, only an insignificant number of foreign workers were
exempt from German taxation. Nevertheless, the fact is of great
legal and practical importance, for it shows that to a certain degree
the German authorities thought it expedient not to impose taxes
on certain nationals of certain countries.
*
*
*
1
One exception is contained in the Schlussprotokoll, 2, Art. 5, of the GermanSwiss Treaty of 15 July 1931, for the prevention of double taxation, concerning
railway, postal, telegraph and customs employees living in the German-Swiss
frontier region.
1
Oberregierungsrat Dr. H. ÖFTERING, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 278.
* Until 31 December 1941 it was also contained in the Treaty between Germany and Slovakia (Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 278).
4
Dr. H. ÖFTERING, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 279.
'Order by the Reich Minister of Finance, of 25 May 1942; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 305.

120

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

In considering foreign workers who were subject to German
taxation, a distinction must be drawn between Russians and Poles,
and the other groups. The other groups were generally subject
to the same taxation as German workers. Their situation was
briefly as follows.
Wage Tax.
Under the German income tax system, the income tax of persons
earning wages and salaries was called "wage tax". The main differences between the wage tax and the income tax of other taxpayers
were that the wage tax was always deducted from the wage or salary
at the source, that is, by the employer (it was computed on the basis
of official tax tables which took into account a flat uniform amount
for deductible expenses of the taxpayer 1 and otherwise differentiated
only between the marital status and the number of children and
other dependants under 25 years of age); and that the wage tax
payments made by the employer on account of the employee were
final; that is to say, adjustments at the end of the taxable year
were not foreseen in German law. Thus with two exceptions 2 , which
were hardly ever applicable to foreign labour recruits, the worker
never came into contact with the Revenue Office and never filed
an income tax declaration.
During the early stages of the war, German law drew certain
distinctions between different categories of foreign workers as
regards the wage tax. These special provisions proved so complicated and created so much difficulty that, before the great influx
of foreign labour recruits, they had to be retroactively abolished as
from 1 January 1941, by a Decree of the Reich Minister of Finance
of 25 April 1941.3 From that date the wage tax, including war
surtax, was deducted by the employer from the foreigner's wage
or salary, in the same way as for German employees. 4
In the spring of 1942 the whole system of the wage tax was
overhauled and greatly simplified.5 This simplified wage tax was
1
Only if a taxpayer had incurred exceptional expenses which considerably
lowered his financial capacity, the revenue offices, on special request, granted
permission to deduct more than the uniform deduction from the taxable income
of persons liable to wage tax.
2
(1) If the wage-tax payer made more than 300 R M within the taxable year
besides his wage or salary, or (2) if the wage or salary income exceeded 8000 R M
during the taxable year.
3
Reichsgesetzblatt, P a r t I, p. 247.
* Foreign workers who had their residence or regular domicile in the Reich
(except the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) were also required to pay wage
tax for wages and salaries earned outside Germany during the taxable year
(Decree by the Reich Minister of Finance, of 25 May 1941) ; Ausländische Arbeiter,
p. 303.
6
Order by the W a r Cabinet, of 24 April 1942; Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 252;
and Order by the Reich Minister of Finance, of 14 May 1942 ; Reichsgesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 297.

121

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

in force from 1 July 1942. It divided wage-tax payers into four
groups; group I, single persons; group II, married persons who
were childless after five years of marriage; group I I I , married
persons who were childless within the first five years of marriage;
group IV, married persons with children (or equivalent dependants
of less than 25 years of age). Group IV was again subdivided for
one, two, three, up to ten children. Wage earners with more than
ten children were exempt from wage tax. One of the characteristics
of the German wage-tax system was steep graduation according
to family status. Thus the tax payable for the same income varied
very greatly for the several tax groups. As will be seen from the
following table, a childless married person during the first five years
of marriage paid often only half, and persons with one or several
children paid only a small fraction, of the tax payable by single
persons in the same income bracket.
The following table gives some examples from the very detailed
official wage-tax table, in force from 1 July 1942.
WAGE

TAX

FOR

GERMAN

WORKERS

AND THOSE

CATEGORIES

FOREIGN WORKERS WHO PAID GERMAN WAGE-TAX RATES, IN
FORCE FROM 1 JULY

19421

Tax (RM)

Gross wage

Single

Childless
married
worker
after 5
years of
marriage

Childless
married
worker
during
first 5
years of
marriage

Tax
group 1

III

(RM)

Married worker supporting

1
child

IV(1)

2.50- 3.00 0.01
0.01
0.01
3.00- 3.10 0.02
0.10
0.02
0.01
0.06
4.00- 4.10 0.25
0.11
0.17
0.03
5.00- 5.10 0.40
0.21
0.30
0.11
6.00- 6.10
0.76
0.38
0.56
0.27
0.99
0.50
0.74
0.37
8.00- 8.10
1.76
0.91
1.33
0.68
9.10- 9.15 2 2.17
1.16
1.66
0.85
11.00- 11.05
2.55
1.38
1.97
1.01
12.00- 12.05
3.32
1.83
2.58
1.35
13.00- 13.05
15.0015.10
i Reichsgesetzblaíí,
16 May 1942, Part I, pp. 301 et seq.

4
2
3
5 to 10
children children children children
IV(2)

0.01
0.03
0.19
0.27
0.51
0.63
0.77
1.02

IV(3)

IV(4)

rV(5-10)

0.03
0.13
0.35
0.43
0.52
0.70

0.10
0.18
0.26
0.35

0.07

s
Beginning with a daily wage of 9.10 R M the war surtax came into force. I t is included in
the above figures.

In 1929 the wage tax averaged 3.5 per cent, of the gross earnings
of wage and salary earners. After a fall during the depression, it
averaged 4.5 per cent, in 1937. Owing to the increase of the total

122

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

of nominal wages and salaries as a result of the increased working
week, and to the introduction of the war surtax, this ratio must
have increased during the war. However, it is to be assumed that
the average deduction from the earnings of the foreign workers
was below this percentage, because the higher averages include
the wage tax also levied on the higher income brackets of salary
earners, such as directors in factories, etc., that is, incomes which
foreign workers never reached. But even with due allowance for
this correction, the wage tax deducted from the foreigners'
wages must have averaged 3 to 4 per cent, of their nominal
income. 1
Municipal

Tax.

Until 1 July 1942 (when the tax system was drastically simplified), foreigners had, like Germans, to pay a municipal tax (Bürgersteuer) if they lived in cities. It was computed and deducted by
the employer. The tax rates, however, differed for Germans and
for foreigners and were changed several times. They averaged 1
to 2 per cent, of the nominal wage. The computation "always
led to considerable difficulties and many doubts". 2 After its latest
revision, which came into force on 1 June 19413, the municipal
tax for foreign workers amounted to 1 per cent, of the wage beyond
a certain minimum. From 1 July 1942 the tax was abolished and
the wage-tax rates were correspondingly increased.
Parish

Tax.

Foreigners were liable to the same parish tax as Germans.
The lower income brackets were exempt. For the others it probably
amounted to a fraction of 1 per cent, of the nominal wage.
Contribution to the German Labour Front.
Although membership in the German Labour Front was theoretically voluntary, actually every German worker had to belong
to it. The membership fees were automatically deducted from the
payroll by the employer. They ranged on the average between 8
and 10 per cent, of the wage tax, plus surtax, but exemptions were
lower than in the case of the wage tax. Thus, with the exception
1
The share of the wage tax in the total tax receipts of the German Reich
amounted for the budget years of 1924and 1925 to 18 and 20 per cent, respectively.
It fell to 15.7 per cent, in the budget year 1928 and to 11.8 per cent, in the budget
year 1938. No data are available for the ensuing years.
2
Dr. H. ÖFTBRING, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 291.
•Order by the Reich Minister of Finance, of 25 April 1941; Reichseesetzblatt,
Part I, p. 247.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

123

of the lowest income brackets, it may be estimated that the contribution to the German Labour Front averaged, during the war,
approximately 1 per cent, of the workers' income.
Various categories of foreigners had to make the same contributions to the Labour Front. 1 For some groups, the contributions went to the German-dominated "Labour Fronts" which
were established by collaborators in their respective countries.
Contribution to the Winter Help Fund.
Another payment exacted from German workers and several
categories of foreigners was the annual "Winter Help" contribution, also automatically deducted by the employer from the payroll. For all practical purposes, this contribution was compulsory.
The usual rate was 10 per cent, of the wage tax 2 , but again with
lower exemptions.
Iron Saving.
The Government-sponsored "iron saving" programme consisted of regular semi-voluntary deductions from the payroll for the
purchase of war bonds. The programme was, at the beginning,
restricted to persons of German race. But by Order of the Reich
Minister of Finance, of 22 December 1941, other workers were
declared eligible, "in exceptional cases", to participate in the programme, "especially if they belong to a friendly nation".

An official handbook, Le travail en Allemagne et la famille,
issued in 1943 by the Commissariat général à la main a" œuvre française en Allemagne under the auspices of the Viçhy Government,
stated that German national and municipal taxes, social insurance
contributions and Labour Front and "Winter Help" fees, according to wage level, region of employment, and family status, totalled
between 10 and 30 per cent, of the gross wage for married French
workers, and between 25 and 30 per cent, for unmarried French
workers.
1
The total assets of the Bank of German Labour (the central banking organisation of the National Socialist labour organisations) were given at the end
of 1942 as 3,681 million RM (the amount of treasury bills held by the Bank
was given as 2,500 million RM). In 1939, the Bank's total assets had amounted to
only 917 million RM {Frankfurter Zeitung, 21 Apr. 1943).
* Der Deutsche Volkswirt, No. 49, put it this way: "A German worker will not
be considered to have fulfilled his duty to his community unless his contribution
to the Winter Help drive corresponds to at least 10 per cent, of his wage tax".

124

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
W A G E S AND T A X E S OF WORKERS FROM THE E A S T

It was officially emphasised 1 that Polish and Soviet workers,
as well as Jews of all categories, were "not parties to a labour contract" but were "in an employment relationship of a special character". This statement was not mere legalistic pedantry; it deprived
workers to whom it applied of the normal rights of employees,
which had been granted to other categories of foreigners. It also
meant that, as a matter of principle, wage rates and tax rates applicable to Germans were not applicable to them without special
provision to the contrary.
Special low wage rates were established for these categories
of workers or, taking the wages of comparable German workers
as a comparison, their wage rates were reduced by deduction of
special taxes. In the early stages of the war, the wages of workers
from the occupied eastern territories were so low that they scarcely
enabled them to pay the standard rates for their mass quarters
and feeding. This was particularly true of Polish- agricultural
workers and both industrial and agricultural Soviet workers.
Polish industrial workers had to pay from 1 August 1940 a special
15 per cent, tax in addition to the German regular and wartime
taxes 2 (before that time, the great majority of imported Polish
workers were employed in agriculture). This special "social equalisation tax" (Sozialausgleichsabgabe) was said to be an equivalent,
partly for the lower standard of living of the Polish workers, and
partly for the fact that they were exempt from the contributions
to the German Labour Front and sometimes also from contributions to the German social insurance system. For workers from
the Soviet Union, a special "Eastern tax" (Ostarbeiterabgabe) was
levied. This tax was so devised that no Soviet worker, whatever
his nominal wage, could receive, after deduction of the tax, more
than 17 RM a week. Later on the tax was gradually lessened,
but it still remained high.
Wages and Taxation of Polish Agricultural

Workers

The first group of foreign workers for whom special wages were
introduced were Polish agricultural workers. A Reich-wide scheme
was introduced on 8 January 1940.3 For the purpose of calculating
1
For example, by Decree of the War Cabinet of 20 January 1942; Reichsgesetzblatt,
27 Jan. 1942, Part I, p. 42.
2
Decree by the German War Cabinet of S August 1940; Reichsgesetzblatt,
P a r t i , p. 1094. The 15 percent, tax was levied on conscripted Polish workers
in the entire territory of Greater Germany except the Protectorate of BohemiaMoravia, and in certain regions of pre-war Poland, in which lower wage rates
applied
instead.
3
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 2, 15 Jan. 1940; seven amendments, issued between
January and November 1940, have also been taken into consideration.

125

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

the wages of Poles employed in agriculture, the territory of Greater
Germany was divided into four "wage groups", group I of which
had to pay the highest, and group IV the lowest wages.
The
various agricultural districts of Germany, Austria and the Sudeten
region were grouped according to their productivity. For example,
Westphalia, the Rhineland and the Saar Region were in wage
group I ; Thuringia, Saxony, south-western Germany and Brandenburg in wage group II; Pomerania, Silesia and parts of Austria
in wage group I I I ; and the Sudeten Region, Bavaria, and parts of
southern Austria and East Prussia in wage group IV.
In all these four wage districts, Poles were working either on
a monthly or an hourly basis. In the first case, they received free
board and lodging in addition to their monthly wage ; in the second
case, they received free lodging, a wage in cash (calculated by the
hour) and sometimes also in kind (free food rations, calculated
by the week).
MONTHLY WAGES FOR POLISH AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
(RM)
Age group

Wage district
I

21 years
and more
18-20 years
17
16
14 and 15
years

HOURLY

men

women

men

women

men

women

men

women

26.50
24.00
21.50
18.00

20.00
17.50
15.00
12.50

25.00
22.50
20.00
16.00

17.50
15.00
12.50
10.00

23.50
21.00
18.50
15.00

15.00
12.50
10.00
7.50

21.00
18.50
16.00
12.50

15.00
12.50
10.00
7.50

13.00

10.00

12.00

7.50

11.00

6.00

8.50

6.00

WAGES

FOR

POLISH

AGRICULTURAL

WORKERS

(**/•)
Age group

Wage district
i

21 years
and more
18-20 years
17
16
14 and 15
years

ill

men

women

men

women

men

women

men

women

25
23
21
18

20
19
18
16

24
22
20
17

19
18
17
15

23
21
19
16

18
17
16
15

22
20
18
16

18
17
16
15

These hourly wages were reduced by 5 Rpf. per hour if the worker
received the standard free food ration for Polish agricultural workers
in Germany, composed of the following items (per week) :

126

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
Potatoes
Bread
Flour
Meat
Fats
Salt
Skimmed m i l k . . . . . . . .

12.50 kg. 1
3.00
"
0.375 "
0.50
"
0.25
"
0.25
"
7 litres 2

Polish agricultural workers paid by the month were not entitled
to additional payment for overtime, Sunday or holiday work.
Workers paid by the hour had to work overtime at the regular
rate, but they were entitled to a 25 per cent, increase for Sunday
and holiday work.
For time lost because of bad weather, the workers were not
entitled to pay, but continued to receive free lodging and the free
food ration ; if time was lost for other reasons, workers paid by the
month had to pay their employers 0.90 RM per day for food and
board, and workers paid by the hour had to pay 0.50 RM.
Workers who for physical or mental reasons were below average
efficiency might receive proportionately reduced wages; the reduction was determined by the employer (if the German workers of
the particular undertaking had the right to form a workers' council
(Vertrauensrat), the employer had to consult the council). The
employer had also to make a written report upon every such reduction to the Reich labour trustee, who might rescind it retroactively
within one month.
Polish agricultural workers covered by this wage scheme were
exempt from the special 15 per cent. Polish tax (Sozialausgleichsabgabe). The wage scales were themselves so low that they left a
considerable margin between the income of Polish workers and that
of comparable German workers; this margin did not, however, go
into the Treasury 3 , but remained with the Polish workers' employers, who were mainly the great land owners.
The difficulties of finding farm help induced some farmers to
disregard the substandard wages prescribed by the German
authorities for "Eastern" workers. As a countermeasure the Reich
Minister of Finance ordered that whenever an "Eastern" worker
received a higher wage than that decreed by the Reich labour
trustee in the general wage regulations, he was forbidden to keep
the difference between the prescribed and the actually received
• 1 kg =2.2 lbs.
J
l litre =0.95 quart.
3
Decree by the Reich Minister of Finance, of 4 May 1941; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 739. Some contingents of Poles employed in the Ruhr mining district
and in the coal mines near Aachen were also exempt from the 15 per cent, special
tax.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

127

wage, but must pay it over to the tax office as an additional tax.
The presidents of the tax districts had to inform the Reich labour
trustees of these cases, and the trustees had to ensure that the
wage was reduced to the permissible rate, and that, if circumstances
required, the employer was punished for infringement of the wage
regulations. 1
Wage Conditions of Poles in the Warthegau
Provisions concerning Poles employed by private industry in
the part of western Poland known as the Warthegau were introduced
by Order of 15 February 19422 (in force retroactively from 15
December 1941). As a matter of principle, the salaries and wages
of Poles were to be 80 per cent, of the salaries and wages established
by collective agreements, wage and salary tariffs, or local custom.
If the efficiency of a Pole was above the average, the employer might
grant efficiency bonuses, but wages and salaries including the efficiency bonuses must not exceed 90 per cent, of the salaries and
wages stipulated in the collective regulations. German wages
or salaries might be permitted, on application by the employer,
by the head of the local labour office only for Poles who performed highly skilled work exceptionally well. As a general rule, no
Polish salaried employee might earn a gross salary exceeding 310
RM per month.
If the output of a Pole fell below the average, the wage or salary
might be reduced accordingly, provided that notice had been given
by the employer to the local labour office and no objection was
raised by the labour office within two weeks. On the other hand,
the head of the local labour office was authorised to order reductions in the wages and salaries of Polish workers.
As far as possible, Poles were to be paid by piece rates. Unless
collective rules, wage tariffs or plant regulations provided
otherwise, the regular piece rates were to be reduced by 10 per cent.
for Polish workers.
Work done in excess of 60 hours a week (except for certain categories of workers such as doorkeepers, guards, and the like, whose
regular working time was longer than 60 hours), if ordered by the
employer or his representative, was to be paid at a 10 per cent.
increase. Unless the wage tariff or the plant regulations provided
for a lower rate, night work had to be paid a t a 20 per cent, increase.
For Sunday work a 20 per cent, increase was authorised. If two
or more increases coincided, only one increase (the highest) was
to be paid.
1

ReichsarbeitsblaU, No. 4, 5 Feb. 1943, Part V, p. 62.
' Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 709 (1), supplement, 10 Aug. 1942.

128

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Industrial

Wages for "Eastern"

Workers

On 20 January 1942 , the Reich War Cabinet, under the chairmanship of Reich Marshal Goring, imposed unprecedented taxes
on the earnings of "Eastern" workers. These special taxes had
to be deducted by the employer, and were retroactive for any
wage or salary paid to an "Eastern" worker after 30 November
1941. The tax started a t 0.50 RM for a weekly wage of 10.01
RM. Rising for every additional Reichsmark of income, the tax
amounted, for example, to 7.40 RM for wages of 20.01 to 21 R M ;
to 15.50 RM for wages of 29.01 to 30.00 R M ; to 24.50 RM for
wages of 39.01 to 40.00 R M ; to 39.70 RM for wages of 55.01 to
56.00 RM ; and from weekly wages of more than 70 RM, the whole
wage, minus 17 RM, had to be deducted as tax. 2
In other words, an "Eastern" worker, whatever his nominal
wage, could never receive more than 17 RM a week, while few of
them received as much. From this wage the employer deducted
10.50 RM for shelter and food.
This system was applied until the end of June 1942. By Decree
of 30 June 19423, a new wage and tax scheme for "Eastern" workers
was introduced. The new scheme was based on a comparison with
the wages (before deductions) paid to a comparable German worker.
For example:
Daily wage
if comparable
«rman worker

(RM)
1.40
1.80 to
. 2.90 to
4.10 to
5.80 to
7.00 to
8.00 to
10.00 to
12.75 to

1.90
3.05
4.25
6.00
7.25
8.25
10.25
13.00

Daily wage
of "Eastern"
worker

(RM)
1.60
1.75
2.15
2.55
3.00
3.30
3.50
3.90
4.45

Thus, in the lowest brackets (up to a daily wage, before deduction, of 1.80 RM) the wage of the comparable "Eastern"
worker was identical to, or even a few pfennig higher than that
of a German worker, to enable him to pay his employer the prescribed rate of 1.50 RM for shelter and food.
In all the
other brackets, the wage, before deductions, for the "Eastern"
worker was very much lower than that of a comparable German
1
2

Reichsgesetzblatt, 27 Jan. 1942, Part I, p. 42.
This confiscatory tax did not apply to persons recognised as belonging to
German Volksum, and to persons from the district of Galicia in the Reich Commissariat Ostland.
3
Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 71, Part I, p. 419.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

129

worker; e.g., half the German daily wage of 6.00 R M , a n d about
a third of the German wage of 13.00 RM.
The difference between the German and the "Eastern" wage
was not a profit for the employer, but for the Reich Treasury.
The employer had to pay an "Eastern worker" tax, rounded to
the difference between the low "Eastern" wage and the wage he
would have paid to a comparable German worker. For example,
a highly skilled Soviet worker, doing the same work as a German
who would have received 13 RM a day, was entitled to 4.45 RM,
while the tax which his employer had to pay for him to the Reich
Treasury amounted to 8.25 RM per day. In the cases of specialists
who, at the German rate, would have received more than 13.00
RM per day, the wage for the "Eastern" worker was increased by
0.05 RM for every additional 0.25 RM paid to a German who
did the same work, while the "Eastern" tax increased by 0.20
RM (equalling, at that bracket, a tax rate of 80 per cent.).
The weekly rates for "Eastern" workers were drawn up in a
similar way. Instead of a comparable German workers' wage of
20, 30, 40 or 60 RM, the "Eastern" worker received 14.70, 18.55,
20.65 or 25.20 RM, and the special "Eastern" tax was 4.90, 11.90,
18.90 or 33.95 RM. The weekly rate for shelter and food to be
deducted by the employer remained uniformly 10.50 RM.
In the computation of "compensation" (for the term "wage"
was often avoided in connection with "Eastern" workers, because
they were not parties to a labour contract, but in an employment
relationship of a special character) an illustration is provided
by an official instruction by the Reich Minister of Finance, issued
with the consent of the Commissioner-General for Manpower 1 ,
which mentioned the case of an "Eastern" worker who in one week
lost two working days because of sickness. If in that case the
comparable German worker's wage for a full week would have been
40 RM, the "Eastern" worker's "compensation" was 10.15 RM
(whereas the amount he owed to the employer for lodging and food
amounted to 10.50 RM). For purposes of comparison, the taxes
of Germans, of Poles and of "Eastern workers" are shown in the
table on p. 130.
From 1 May 1943, a number of improvements were introduced. Up to that time it had been expressly forbidden
to give wage slips to "Eastern" workers (except agricultural and domestic workers). Henceforward they were to
be given an itemised account showing their wages and
deductions; the Commissioner-General for Manpower or his
1

Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. IS, 25 May 1943, Part I, p. 306.

130

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

delegates were given authority to permit or to order employers
to deduct for food and lodging less than the standard rate
of 1.50 RM per day; and the Commissioner-General or his
delegates, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Finance, was
TAXES OF GERMAN WORKERS, FOREIGNERS PAYING THE SAME TAX
AS

GERMAN

WORKERS,

POLISH

WORKERS

AND

"EASTERN"

WORKERS, ON 1 JULY 1 9 4 2 1
{RM)

Type of worker

Germans
Poles
"Eastern"
Germans
Poles
"Eastern"
Germans
Poles
Germans
"Eastern"
Germans
Poles

Gross
wage
RM

Married worker supporting
1
child'

2
children

3
children

4
children

5 to 10
children

Tax
group I

III

IV (1)

IV (2)

IV (3)

IV (4)

IV (5
to 10)

0.13
0.40
0.02
0.24
0.80
0.10
0.47
1.50
0.25
0.77
2.25
0.40
1.07
3.00
0.76
1.73
4.45
0.99
2.13
5.25
1.76
6.85
2.17
7.65
2.55
8.25
3.32
9.85

0.13
0.40
0.01
0.23
0.80
0.06
0.43
1.50
0.17
0.69
2.25
0.30
0.97
3.00
0.56
1.53
4.45
0.74
1.88
5.25
1.33
6.85
1.66
7.65
1.97
8.25
2.58
9.85

0.13
0.40
0.01
0.23
0.80
0.02
0.39
1.50
0.11
0.63
2.25
0.21
0.88
3.00
0.38
1.35
4.45
0.50
1.64
5.25
0.91
6.85
1.16
7.65
1.38
8.25
1.83
9.85

0.13
0.40

0.22
0.80
0.01
0.38
1.50
0.03
0.55
2.25
0.11
0.78
3.00
0.27
1.24
4.45
0.37
1.51
5.25
0.68
6.85
0.85
7.65
1.01
8.25
1.35
9.85

0.22
0.80

0.37
1.50
0.01
0.53
2.25
0.03
0.70
3.00
0.19
1.16
4.45
0.27
1.41
5.25
0.51
6.85
0.63
7.65
0.78
8.25
1.02
9.85

0.37
1.50

0.53
2.25

0.70
3.00
0.13
1.00
4.45
0.13
1.27
5.25
0.35
6.85
0.43
7.65
0.52
8.25
0.70
9.85

0.70
3.00

0.97
4.45

1.14
5.25
0.10
6.85
0.18
7.65
0.26
8.25
0.35
9.85

1.14
5.25

2.40

3.00

4.00

5.00

6.00

Germans
Poles
"Eastern"
Germans
Poles

8.00

Germans
"Eastern"
Germans
"Eastern"
Germans
"Eastern"
Germans
"Eastern"

Childless
married
worker
during
first 5
years of
marriage

u p to
1.40

Germans
Poles

Childless
married
Single worker
after 5
years of
marriage

9.10'

11.00
12.00
13.00
15.00

6.85
7.65
8.25
0.07
9.85

1
Source: For German workers and foreigners paying the same tax as German workers: Reichsgesetzblatt,
16 May 1942, Part I, pp. 301 et seq. for Poles: Decree by the Reich Minister of Finance, of 5 June 1942,
S 2921-335 III, reprinted in Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 756(6) et seq. supplement, 10 Aug. 1942; for "Eastern"
workers: Reichsgesetzblatt, 2 July 1942, Part I, pp. 422 et seq.
* Or for other dependants under 25 years of age, except wife or husband.
* Beginning at a daily wage of 9.10 RM, the German worker and the foreigner paying German tax rate
had4 to pay war surtax, which is included in the above figures.
The official German tax scale for Polish workers does not give figures for taxes calculated on the basis
of a daily wage higher than 9.45 R M .

131

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

authorised to lower the special "Eastern" tax for "Eastern" workers who had exceptionally high qualifications or whose output
exceeded the average to a considerable degree. In this way, it was
officially stated, the "Eastern" worker might even earn the same
wage as a comparable German. 1 Apart from such extraordinary
exceptions, however, the "Eastern" worker continued to be subject
to the "Eastern" tax (Ostarbeiterabgabe) which, though reduced as
from 1 May 1943, was still very much higher than even the tax
on the Polish workers. During this third period of wartime tax
policy towards "Eastern" workers, the rates were altered to the
following levels:
SPECIAL "EASTERN" TAX IN FORCE SINCE 1 MAY 1 9 4 3 2 (IRRESPECTIVE OF MARITAL STATUS) AS COMPARED WITH SPECIAL
"EASTERN T A X " BEFORE THAT DATE

(RM)
Gross wage

2.40
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
8.00
9.10
11.00
12.00
13.00
15.00

after 1 May 1943

before 1 May 1943

0.20
0.50
1.05
1.65
2.40
3.90
4.70
6.30
7.10
7.90
9.50

0.40
0.80
1.50
2.25
3.00
4.45
5.25
6.85
7.65
8.25
9.85

It should be noted that the special "Eastern" tax (like the special
Polish "equalisation" tax) was levied outside German territory as
well. The tax tables were published in the official gazettes of the
German occupation authorities. 3 An interesting provision was
contained in an Order, issued by Terboven, Reich Commissioner for
the Occupied Norwegian Territories, concerning placement conditions of "Eastern" workers in Norway. It stipulated that three
quarters of the special "Eastern" tax levied in Norway on "Eastern"
workers should go to Germany, and one quarter to Norway. 4
At the same time the wage rates for "Eastern" workers were
increased as follows:
1
Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 5 April 1943; Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 11, 15 Apr. 1943, P a r t I, p. 234.
* Reichsgesetzblatt, 10 Apr. 1943, Part I, pp. 183 et seq.
* Cf. Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in BetIgien und Nordfrankreich
für die besetzten Gebiete Belgiens und Nordfrankreichs, issued by the Militärbefehlshaber (Militärverwaltungschef), No. 103, 16 June 1943, pp. 1328 et seq.
* Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Norwegischen Gebiete (Forordningstidend for
de besatte norske omrader), No. 9, 30 Nov. 1942, pp. 29 et seq.

132

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
DAILY WAGE RATES FOR
EASTERN
1 MAY 1 9 4 3
(RM)

WORKERS BEGINNING

"Eastern" workers
Comparable German
workers
Gross daily wage

Up to 1.40
2.40
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
8.00

"Eastern" tax

Daily net wage

Cash payment
received after
deduction of tax
and standard rate
for food and lodging

0.20
0.50
1.05
1.65
2.40
3.90

1.60
2.20
2.50
3.00
3.30
3.65
4.15

0.10
0.70
1.00
1.50
1.80
2.151
2.65

1
For every additional 0.25 R M of the comparable German worker*s wage, the amount to be
paid to the "Eastern" worker increased by 0.05 R M and the "Eastern" tax by 0.20 R M .

WEEKLY WAGE RATES FOR EASTERN
1 MAY 1 9 4 3
(RM)

WORKERS BEGINNING

"Eastern" workers
Comparable German
workers
Gross weekly wage

11.90-12.60
17.50-18.20
28.00-29.05
41.65-43.05
68.25-70.00
89.25-91.00

"Eastern" tax

1.75
7.35
16.80
37.10
53.90

Weekly net wage

12.95
15.75
21.00
25.55
31.85
36.05

Cash payment
received after
deduction of tax
and standard rate
for food and lodging

2.45
5.25
10.50
15.05
21.35
25.55'

1
For every additional 1.75 R M of the comparable German worker's wage, the amount to be
paid to the "Eastern" worker was increased by 0.35 R M and the special tax by 1.40 RM.

The Commissioner-General for Manpower expressly admitted
that, after the introduction of these "considerable improvements",
a Soviet or Polish worker,
even if he does good work, might still find himself, after deductions for food
and board were made, with a comparatively small amount of cash, namely, less
than 40 Rpf. per day, less than 2.80 RM per week, or less than 12 RM per month.
The employer is therefore authorised to decrease a t his discretion the deductions
for food and board in such a way t h a t the worker is left with 40 Rpf. per day (or
2.80 R M per week or 12 RM per month) if he does good work and is of impeccable
behaviour. 1

1
Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 14 April 1943 ;
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 12-13, 5 May 1943, Part I, p. 270; Part V, p. 211.

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

133

Later, in line with the efforts to increase the output of foreign
workers, the underpayment of "Eastern" workers was somewhat
mitigated, and by Order of 23 July 19431, a system of bonuses
was introduced, to encourage individual workers to improve their
output. By a Decree of the War Cabinet of 25 March 19442, the
"Eastern" tax was abolished and Soviet workers were instead
made subject to the 15 per cent, "social equalisation" tax of the
Poles. At the same time it was stated, as a general principle, that
"Eastern" workers should receive the same wages and bonuses as
other foreign workers (this applied to industrial workers only).
However, one important discrimination between "Eastern"
workers and Polish workers continued. The Soviet workers, like
the Poles, had now to pay German wage tax (and all social insurance contributions); but, while the wage tax was graded for
Polish workers according to family status 3 , the Decree of the War
Cabinet stated expressly that all "Eastern" workers fell under tax
group I (tax for single persons). A German worker (married man
with two children)making 6 RM a day as gross wage, had to pay
a wage tax of 0.03 RM. From the spring of 1944 a Pole had to pay
0.70 RM, and a Soviet worker, 1.07 R M . The wage tax was to be
calculated before deduction of the 15 per cent, "social equalisation" tax. In addition, the Soviet worker had to pay social insurance contributions. 4
The concessions made to "Eastern" workers in the spring of
1944 were publicised as a proof of German magnanimity. 5 It does
not appear, however, that the new system was wholly to the advantage of the Soviet workers, who in some instances received
even less than before, and less per month than most German workers
earned per week. In June 1944, an Order by the CommissionerGeneral for Manpower advised employers that where the new
regulations resulted in lower wages than before, they should try
to remedy this either by employing the worker on some other job in
the undertaking, by introducing piece work, by fixing piece rates
correctly, by making the worker increase his output, or by increasing
his working hours. Fritz Sauckel also issued instructions that if
the "Eastern" worker received less than 67.50 RM per month under
the new system his wages might be increased to that level. In in1
1

Reichsgesetzblatt, 9 Aug. 1943, No. 73.
Decree of 25 March 1944, signed by Reich Marshal Goring, in his capacity
as Chairman of the War Cabinet, Heinrich Himmler, in his capacity as Delegate
Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the Reich, and Dr. Lammers, Chief of
the Reich Chancellery; Reichsgesetzblatt, 5 Apr. 1944, No. 14, Part I, p. 68.
3
See p. 130.
* Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 Apr. and 11 June 1944; Berliner BörsenZeitung,
8 May 1944.
6
Cf. "Die Bewährung der Ostarbeiter", in Die Wirtschaftskurve (Frankfort
on Main), May 1944, pp. 307 et seq.

134

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

dividual instances in which the foreigner was earning less than
before, but in fact earned more than 67.50 RM, the employer
might continue to pay the old rates. 1
In a last-minute effort to lessen the opposition of conscripted
workers, it was decided that in the Warthegau Poles with a good
output record {Leistungs-Polen) should be exempted from the 15
per cent, "social equalisation" tax from 1 November 1944. Poles
whose achievements and conduct were satisfactory were also
allowed to receive Christmas bonuses in 1944.
Finally, in early March 1945, the 15 per cent, "social equalisation" tax was abolished for Soviet workers. 2
CONCLUSIONS

As the conscripted workers had no possibility of participating
in the determination of their own wages, the German authorities,
which laid down the rules for the computation of these wages
(except in cases in which they were fixed by bilateral Government
agreements) had a choice between two methods: (a) to prescribe
special wage rates for the various groups of foreigners, or (b) to
apply the German wage rates. The first alternative was chosen
in the case of certain categories of agricultural workers and of
domestic workers 3 , and the second alternative in the case of industrial workers. On the other hand, deductions were made from
the wages paid and these deductions were by no means uniform.
Workers from central and western Europe received the most
favourable conditions but the rule of equality of treatment was
not applied even to them without exceptions. For instance, German workers received certain bonuses which the foreign workers
did not receive.
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the rules relating to
job classification and to piece rates might be applied in a very
discriminatory way and there is reason to think that that was in
fact done. Thus, unless the foreign worker was given the type of
work which would make the fullest use of his skill, he would not
in fact be receiving the same wage as a German worker with similar
skill. In addition, piece rates made the wage system more elastic
but did not necessarily lead to higher earnings, and different piece
1
Völkischer Beobachter, 23 June 1944. In the summer of 1944, efficiency
bonuses were introduced for Polish and Soviet agricultural workers. German
employers were urged to exploit the possibilities of the new scheme as an inducement to greater output, particularly during the grain and root crop harvest
{Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 July 1944).
2
Nachrichten-und Pressedienst (news agency of the German Foreign Office),
7 Mar. 1945.
3
See Chapter X I I I .

THE REGULATION OF WAGES

135

rates might be applied to different groups of workers for political
reasons. When lower piece rates were applied to groups of foreign
workers, that also involved discrimination.
On the other hand, the general rule that workers whose output
was considered inadequate were to receive less than the normal
rate opened the door to arbitrary treatment and necessarily caused
hardship to the individuals concerned.
Various deductions were made from wages and they were
operated in such a way as to discriminate against certain categories
of foreign workers. The central and western European workers,
for example, paid the same taxes as German workers, but Polish,
and especially Soviet, workers paid taxes which were much higher.
In this way the net earnings of the workers from the East were
considerably below those of the others.
It is not possible to present a complete picture of the net earnings of the various categories of foreign workers a t the different
periods of their employment but certain general facts stand out.
The earnings of the majority of the workers, namely, those from the
East, were so low that a large percentage of them were hardly in a
position to do more than pay the standard rate for mass shelter
and board and to purchase the barest necessities. Consequently,
they were unable to contribute to any appreciable extent to the
support of their families. As the war went more and more against
Germany certain concessions were made to these workers, but by
that time their home countries had been liberated from German
occupation and consequently no savings could be transferred to
their families.
There are three other factors which must be taken into account.
First, all foreign workers had to pay the German social insurance
contributions, which were very considerable, and for which they
did not receive the same benefits and services as the Germans. 1
Secondly, the foreign workers in the higher wage brackets were
under strong pressure to earmark part of their earnings for the
benefit of their dependants at home, and the exchange value of
these savings declined steadily in purchasing power in the home
countries owing to the fact that the exchange rates, which were fixed
by the German authorities, generally speaking remained stable despite inflation in those countries. Finally, it may be pointed out that
even with the same net earnings the foreign workers would have
been unable to purchase the same quantity of goods as the German
workers. The German population was helped in a variety of ways
by closely centralised and controlled Government, community
and Party welfare organisations, but the foreigner, far away from
' See Chapter XIV.

136

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

home, without any official connections, very often without ration
cards, had to rely on the black market to a larger extent than
the average German. It is not possible to give a statistical estimate
of the extent to which the actual purchasing power of the foreign
workers in Germany was affected by the fact that they were often
unable to purchase goods at the official prices, but there is no doubt
that it was appreciably less than that of Germans with the same
nominal earnings and that it decreased progressively as the German supply situation deteriorated.
*
*

Until the records can be examined, it will be impossible to
ascertain the amounts which were collected by the German Government from foreign workers by way of wartime taxation. Some
estimate can nevertheless be made. From Soviet workers alone,
whose tax payments were by far the highest, tax receipts must have
reached some thousand million RM. At a conservative estimate,
2 million Soviet workers, paying an average of 15 RM tax a week,
would have contributed to the German Treasury 1,500 million
RM in one year. On the assumption that 134 million Poles paid
on the average only 5 RM per week (15 per cent, special "social
equalisation" tax, plus wage tax), the yield would have been more
than 300 million RM a year. On this cautious estimate, the Reich
Treasury received nearly two thousand million RM a year, for
two or three years, from the workers from the East alone. To these
amounts must be added the taxes paid by foreign workers of other
nationalities. In their cases, the tax rates were very considerably
lower; but a greater number of them, especially of the workers
from the west and north-west of the continent, belonged to the
higher income groups. Their taxes must therefore have added
very substantially to those extracted from the Polish and Soviet
workers.

CHAPTER

CONDITIONS O F WORK
The conditions under which foreign workers had to work
in Germany were well summarised by the Commissioner-General
for Manpower. "The political, moral and economic principles of
the German system of labour administration", Fritz Sauckel
stated, "are dictated by the laws of war, by German justice, and
by National Socialist conscience". 1 Similarly, in a message to the
German people of 24 February 1943, Adolf Hitler declared: "We
shall consider it a matter.of course not to husband foreign lives
at a time that is exacting so heavy a sacrifice of life from ourselves".
National Socialist terminology was characteristically consistent in using the term Einsatz to describe the wartime use of
available manpower. This is a military expression and was formerly
used to denote the despatch of troops to localities where they were
needed for tactical or strategic purposes. "Naturally, labour
Einsatz takes place not on a voluntary basis, but on a basis of
duty." 2 The term well defines the use of manpower for the German
war effort.
All the conditions under which recruited workers had to
work for Germany were coloured by the compulsory nature of their
employment. The compulsion was rendered more severe, and the
less easy to endure, by the fact that most labour recruits, except
that small minority which had gone to Germany on a genuinely
voluntary basis, were in the extremely painful position of being
forced to work for the war effort of the enemy against whom their
own countries and their own friends continued to fight. Presentday industrial psychology rightly stresses the large part that
morale plays, not only in the worker's output, but also in his general
well-being. The protracted and acute psychological strain under
which the very great majority of the labour recruits had to
work must always be borne in mind in attempting to form an idea
of their actual working conditions.
Other factors that must also be remembered were the effects
of constant supervision by the German police, language difficulties,
1

Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Jan. 1943, p. 9.
» Deutsclie Zeitung im Osten, 20 May 1942.

138

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

unfavourable living conditions and, very often, insufficient diet.
T h e cumulative effect of these circumstances was bound to create
among foreign labour recruits a tendency to develop the symptoms
of over-fatigue much more quickly than in normal circumstances.
Official German sources, of course, referred to these circumstances only by implication, mainly in the course of prolonged discussion of methods by which the output of foreigners
could be increased.
H O U R S OF W O R K , OVERTIME P A Y , EFFORTS TO INCREASE OUTPUT

In the years preceding the outbreak of military hostilities, the
German Government's determination to develop its armament
and fortification programme with all possible speed induced it to
increase the working day of various categories of workers and to
suspend the regulations concerning overtime pay. On the day on
which Germany opened its campaign against Poland, all laws and
regulations limiting the duration of the working day and working
week, and prescribing overtime pay, were swept away by a single
Order. 1 Employers were given the right to determine the hours of
work of their employees, on the understanding that during the
war they would normally be 60 per week. Instead of paying
allowances for overtime work (i.e., for working time exceeding 48
hours), employers were ordered to remit the equivalent amounts
to the Reich Treasury.
This rule created so much discontent among German workers
t h a t by Order of 12 December 19392 "suitable overtime pay",
normally 25 per cent., for work in excess of 10 (or 12) hours per
day was permitted, unless a different arrangement was prescribed
by the Reich Minister of Labour.
The regular 6-day working week continued to be 60 hours.
Overtime pay began for work done after 10 hours in the day. If
working time regularly and considerably included periods of mere
presence, overtime additions for male workers over 18 years of
age were to start only after the 12th hour. The overtime allowances
accruing from work between the 8th and 10th (or 12th) hour had
still to be remitted to the Reich Treasury. At the same time, the
discretionary powers granted to employers by the Order of 1 September 1939 were curtailed. The employer was, however, still
entitled to ask for unlimited overtime work, without extra pay,
"if temporary work had to be carried out a t once in an emergency",
1

Order of 1 September 1939; Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1683; INTERNATIONAL

LABOUR OFFICE: Legislative Series, 1939, Ger. 6.

« Reichsgesetzblatt, 13 Dec. 1939, No. 247, Part I, p. 2403; INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR OFFICE: Legislative Series, 1940, Ger. 1 B.

CONDITIONS OF WORK

139

provided he immediately notified the industrial inspection office
when any such work was undertaken.
Nine months later, on 8 September 19401, the right of the
workers to receive overtime pay for work beyond 48 hours a week
was reintroduced. The standard wartime working week remained
at 60 hours which, however, was not a maximum. 2
As a matter of principle, foreign workers were employed in waressential activities where working time was longest. In fact, in the
armament industries the 60-hour week was actually the minimum
rather than the maximum.
*
*
*
The longer the war lasted, the closer grew the connection between hours of work and productivity per man-hour.
In the particular case of foreign workers even the longest working hours did not help if the cumulative effects of the unfavourable
conditions-already mentioned, combined with their own deliberate
slow-down techniques, lowered the output per man-hour too
greatly. 3 In his address at the first Congress of the Labour Administration of Greater Germany in September 1942, the Commissioner-General for Manpower pointed out that "the German
worker is being treated in a hard, honourable and strict manner.
It goes without saying that these principles are also applied to
workers of foreign nationality." The most urgent task of the
agency dealing with the administration of foreign manpower, he
maintained—as he did often before and after—must be to increase
the intensity of work of every individual foreigner: "it can no
1

Order of 3 September 1940; Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 120S.
For women and young persons of both sexes under 18, the maximum working
week was fixed a t 56 hours. It could be extended with the permission of the
labour trustees. Until 1943, night work for German women was forbidden (except
for women in managerial positions) unless with the permission of the labour
trustees. The German Labour Front considered t h a t "night shifts for [German]
women should be introduced only when the last foreign worker is employed on
night shifts and when the last man is taken out of non-essential production" (cf.
Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 25 Mar. 1943). Another reason advanced for the
employment of foreigners, especially those from the East, a t night, was t h a t
supervision was easier if they were kept in their huts during the day.
' Although the labour recruits' deliberate efforts to slow down their work
were generally known to all concerned, public references to them were rare. It
was an exception when the Essener National-Zeitung,
on 13 February 1944,
complained bitterly of "notorious sluggards and saboteurs". I t described "a
group of Eastern workers removing rubble from a burnt-out cinema theatre . . .
The load is what a child of 6 years could manage without strain. Compared with
this . . . a snail's pace is a gallop . . . But in one corner two men are working hard
trying to keep up a fire to warm themselves. It is a real pleasure to see the
muscular strength they exert in chopping firewood. This is only one example of
many similar scenes witnessed daily . . . We feed them in such a way that they
are well able to do their work and they also have to thank us for saving them from
bolshevism. Many of them would probably have been killed long ago in battle
if the Bolshevist recruiters had got hold of them."
2

140

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

longer be tolerated that in the occupied territories even half a
dozen foreign workers do not produce as much as one German
worker in Germany". 1 Even in the summer of 1944, in the course
of the last general tightening of manpower regulations, he declared
that the time must be definitely over when German employers
could get two or three foreigners for every German released for
military duty.
In their efforts to remove the many causes of reduced productivity by foreign workers, the German authorities used a variety
of methods, ranging from threats of coercion, to promises of special
privileges and the introduction of considerable changes in technological processes. It is a far cry from threatening a foreigner
whose output is unsatisfactory, on the ground that he is guilty of
sabotage, with the concentration camp or even the death penalty,
to depicting to him the advantages of promotion, and to promising
him that he could expect better treatment for better work.
Yet it has been characteristic of the German wartime system to
use these contradictory methods at different places and times for
different groups and individuals, in line with the policy of graded
discrimination (which, in reverse, was also a policy of graded
favours); and, indeed, methods of persuasion, of inducement and
of coercion were often applied simultaneously. One of the inducements offered to foreigners in the attempt to improve their productivity was the promise of home leave, which is discussed in
detail below.
A high official, Gau-Obmann H. Bangert, reported 2 that
favourable results had been obtained by awarding a badge to
workers from the East who reached the highest efficiency class
(Leistungsklasse). The holder of the badge was exempt from such
duties as fetching food and cleaning rooms in the camps. He distributed the incoming mail. He was made spokesman for the
group and had to be saluted by the other inmates of the camp.
In short, he was to be considered as "partially a superior" in the
eyes of his fellow workers. The badge, and with it the privileges,
were at once taken away if output ceased to increase or stagnated,
if his own behaviour deteriorated, or if he did not collaborate by
exerting his authority over the members of his group. 3 Among the
various non-monetary rewards promised to individual foreign
1

Quoted in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Oct.-Nov. 1942, p. 45.
H . BANGERT: " H O W to Make the Fullest Use of the Work Potentialities of
Foreign Workers", in Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 9 Mar. 1943.
* In December 1942 Gauleiter Greiser of the incorporated Warthegau, in a
speech to factory workers in Poznan, announced the formation of "an association
of working Poles"; membership in this association was to be open to Poles who
collaborated with the Germans and achieved good output. They and their
families were to receive German food rations and wages equivalent to the German
rates (Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, 20 Dec. 1942).
2

CONDITIONS OF WORK

141

workers for improved output was a "performance badge". This
badge, consisting of a sword crossed with a hammer, was introduced for special achievements in the spring of 1944. A stripe
was added if the bearer was a former légionnaire who had seen
military action against the Soviet Union but had been returned
to factory work owing to injury or illness1. It is to be noted that
the bestowal of these badges and similar inducements were started
only at a late stage of the war, when the German authorities were
making every effort to increase output, at least from a minority
of collaborators.
A much more important device increasingly introduced after
the number of foreign workers had reached large-scale proportions
was the deliberate encouragement of payment at piece-work rates
instead of hourly rates. According to German sources, it was
estimated that, between 1933 and 1943, the Reich Committee for
the Study of Work Methods (Reichsausschuss für Arbeitsstudien,
abbreviated Refa), in close collaboration with the German Labour
Front, trained no fewer than 50,000 time-study experts. 2 The
findings of these experts (or, as they were called in Germany,
"Refa men") were made the basis for the official piece-rate schedules.
According to German sources, the introduction of piece-work rates
proved effective, especially with women and younger men, but it was
less successful with the more mature and the older men.
Great efforts were also made to break up difficult manipulations
(which needed skilled labour) 3 into a large number of simpler
1

Westfälische Neueste Nachrichten (Bielefeld), 9 May 1944.
H. L. ANSBACHER: "German Industrial Psychology in the Fifth Year of
War", in Psychological Bulletin, Nov. 1944, p. 609.
3
Wherever possible, skilled foreigners were employed in their particular field.
For example, it was the German policy to move railway personnel of occupied
countries, together with the requisitioned railway equipment, from the occupied
countries to Germany. Ukrainian miners were shifted to the mines of the Ruhr
region (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 12 Feb. 1942), of Silesia (Die Zeitung (London),
12 Aug. 1943) and of Austria (Völkischer Beobachter, 21 J a n . 1943), where miners
from the Rostov area were reported to be working in the mines near Leoben.
Gardeners from the Netherlands and Bulgaria were employed on vegetable farms
in various parts of Germany, and Italian and French waiters and cooks in many
German restaurants and hotels. However, the majority of the deported workers
were either not skilled in the occupations for which they were needed in Germany or they had to relinquish their own occupations in order to perform functions considered more essential for the German war effort. I t was urged, for
example, t h a t "if a foundry is in urgent need of workers and if a neighbouring
textile factory happens to have in their employ foreign workers fit to do that type
of heavy work, it may be necessary to transfer them to the foundry" (Dr. Herbert
HILDEBRANDT and Dr. Walter R U D I G : Die Mobilisierung von Arbeitsreserven
(Munich and Berlin, 1943)). A Vienna paper reported t h a t among Czechs newly
arrived in the summer of 1943 to work in mechanical and optical enterprises,
16.5 per cent, were former officials and 15.7 per cent, commercial employees
(Südost Echo, July 1943). When La Vie économique in August 1943 stated t h a t
about 240,000 French commercial employees aged 24 to 50 were working a t
various jobs in German factories, there can be no doubt t h a t these "various jobs"
included many activities unconnected with their normal occupations.
2

142

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

manipulations in order to permit wider utilisation of unskilled
labour and greater standardisation of production. 1 These more
standardised performances were, in turn, easier to remunerate on
a piece-rate basis.
Frequent complaints by employers of the unsatisfactory output
of foreigners and, especially of those from the East, were met by
the German authorities with the criticism that, as Fritz Sauckel
put it in an Order of 23 October 19422,
many plants have not even tried seriously to examine the potentialities of
individual foreigners. Since there is such a variety of jobs to be done in large
undertakings, it should be possible after a test to find the right job for the right
person. A rough sorting out {Grobsorlierung)3 on the basis of common sense is not
sufficient, since most of the foreigners do not possess any school certificates or
work certificates when they come to Germany. Furthermore, many Eastern
workers showed a marked preference for agricultural work, and this inclination
considerably influenced their answers when they were subjected to a simple
interrogation.4
The introduction of scientific tests was strongly encouraged.
The German Labour Front set up special training courses in which
examiners were trained for testing. The greatest amount of research
in the field of psychological testing of imported workers was done by
the Institute of Labour Psychology and Labour Pedagogics of
the German Labour Front. Employers were invited to keep in
close contact with the Institute. They were also constantly advised
systematically to exchange their experiences with testing methods
and technological changes introduced to increase the output of
foreign workers. 5 Another method advocated to increase output 6
was to group labour recruits, and particularly those from the East,
into work gangs. The gang was to be led by an able and intelligent
worker (Akkordführer) of the same nationality. In proportion to
1

Die Wirlschaftskurve, July 1943 {Frankfurter Zeitung).
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Nov. 1942, Part I, p. 516.
Such terms as Grobsortierung, which were used officially in connection with
labour deportees, were, in pre-National Socialist Germany, never used with
reference
to persons, but only to commodities and cattle.
4
For a contrary trend among foreigners, see Ch. XV. The CommissionerGeneral probably referred to cases in which labour recruits tried to be sent
to farms because they expected to receive better food there, or endeavoured to
conceal
their industrial skill.
6
The Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions published a magazine entitled "Exchange of Experiences" {Der Erfahrungsaustausch) for the
exclusive purpose of enabling German war industries to exchange information
on production methods and experience in technical and labour problems. The
magazine circulated only among the managerial staffs of the German armament
industry {Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 26 Apr. 1944).
It was also found necessary to appoint special efficiency experts with authority to carry out technological improvements and changes in the assignments of
workers (see p. 67).
6
E.g., BANGERT, in Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 9 Mar. 1943.
2
3

CONDITIONS OF WORK

143

their efficiency, the members of the gang were granted special
wages, special rest periods during the working day, and some
additional food and tobacco. (No wage increase was, of course,
permissible without the previous consent of the head of the labour
office.) If output declined the privileges were to be discontinued.
*
Careful examination of German sources would reveal that the
continuous and systematic efforts to increase the output of foreign
labour recruits, through a combination of compulsion, rewards,
training and changes in production techniques, did achieve some
success, but that the results obtained were definitely limited b y
the continued opposition of a great majority of the labour recruits,
by their exhaustion and fatigue1, and by the need of concealing the
secrets of the German armament production and fortification programme 2 , and of preventing too close a collaboration between
foreigners and German workers, for fear of fraternisation. The
decreasing trend in the productivity per man-hour of both nonGerman and German workers continued throughout the war.
In face of these difficulties, the German authorities always fell
back on two methods: first, on following the formula of the Commissioner-General for Manpower, that the remuneration and food
of the foreign worker must be in proportion to his output and
goodwill3; and secondly, on prescribing long working hours. 4
In the late spring of 1943, the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten
reporte^ that at a model estate near Munich, the working day of
Ukrainian women aged 17 to 45 was 11 hours, after which they had
to do their own cleaning and cooking. 5 The Polish "underground"
paper, Wies i Miasto, stated that 8,000 young Poles conscripted into
the building service, who were working on the railway near Cracow, had to work 12 hours on weekdays and 8 on Sundays. According to a German-controlled Dutch paper 6 , the working hours of
Belgians billeted in huts were usually longer than the hours of
those allowed to live in private quarters; on the ground that they
1
The Westfälische Landeszeitung Rote Erde, 17 Aug. 1943, stated: " I t is intended to arrange the life of the Eastern workers in such a way as to preserve
their capacity to work for the Reich for a considerable time".
2
Cf. BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 83.
'Address a t First Congress of Labour Administration of Greater Germany,
10-11 Sept. 1942; Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Oct.-Nov. 1942, p. 45.
* Some important groups in the German labour administration were critical
of this policy (see p. 95 and International Labour Review, Vol. X L V I I I , No. 2,
Aug. 1943, p. 242), but their views did not prevail.
6
Quoted in Der Landbote (Winterthur, Switzerland), 2 June 1943.
e
Nieuwe Rollerdamsche Courant, 19 July 1943.

144

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

did not lose much time in travelling to and from work they usually
had to work 72 hours a week. In May 1944, Wagner, Regional
Chief of East Prussia, in his annual report to the Regional Labour
Chamber in Königsberg, stated that "men who are often obliged
to work 72 hours a week, including Sundays and holidays, do so
willingly". 1
One of the longest working weeks was reported from the Todt
Organisation in Trondenes, Norway: 76 hours, with one Sunday
off every 3 weeks. At the end of August 1944, Joseph Goebbels,
in his capacity as Commissioner-General for Total War Effort, extended the uniform 60-hour week to public and private office work
and added: "Those sectors where considerably longer hours are
being worked in any case in order to deal with contracts essential for
the war will remain unaffected by this measure". 2
Towards the end of 1944, the Essener National-Zeitung published
a report entitled "Increase of Output through Concentrated
Food" 3 which dealt with the effects of over-fatigue and efforts to
overcome them, among both German and non-German workers.
According to this report, the 60-hour working week had long since
been a matter of course in the essential war factories, and a large
number of workers had been working 70 hours and more. The
article recognised that the demands made upon the workers
were particularly heavy in the very numerous war factories where
the production process did not permit of interruption and asked
for the highest degree of continuous alertness on the part of the
workers ; an even greater effort was exacted from workers in underground factories, with their lack of daylight and fresh air. In order
to counteract these detrimental conditions, it continued, stimulants
had been widely used. They consisted chiefly of cola and synthetic
caffein mixed with chocolate. But "the newest method consists
of mixing caffein and cola with alcohol; this liquor has proved
extraordinarily valuable in the achievement of very high output".
HOME

FURLOUGHS

When large-scale importation of foreigners began, the German
authorities promised that the workers would be sent home o n ,
vacation, usually after either six or twelve months of work in
Germany. The grant of a vacation was to depend, it is true, on
fulfilment of the worker's obligations, a condition which, on the one
1
1

Aftonbladet (Stockholm), Jan. 1944.
Art. 5 of Goebbels' Order of 24 August 1944; Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau,
24 Aug.
1944.
8
"Leistungssteigerung durch Intensivnahrung", in Essener National-Zeitung,
11 Nov. 1944.

CONDITIONS OF WORK

145

hand, was designed to decrease the opposition of the foreigners,
and on the other hand, opened the door to all kinds of individual
and group discriminations.
At first, the general regulations concerning family furloughs for
foreign workers employed in Germany during the war periods 1 promised periodical holidays even to Polish workers, if their work
proved satisfactory. An administrative regulation having the force
of a collective agreement {Tarifordnung), of 27 August 1941, provided that married workers should receive home leave after every
six months of uninterrupted employment in Germany, and unmarried, widowed and divorced workers, as well as Poles, after
twelve months.
A Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 4 March 1941, set
out the following reasons for a foreigner's temporary return to his
country:
(1) family furlough;
(2) home furlough;
(3) furlough for special family reasons and other emergencies
(death, etc.);
(4) short leaves, for example, for the purpose of collecting
winter clothes for his fellow-workers;
(5) sick leave.
Regular family and home leave was to last seven days if the
distance the worker had to travel to reach his family was less than
500 kilometres, and eight, nine or ten days if the distance was
from 500 to 750, from 750 to 1,000, or more than 1,000 kilometres,
respectively. 2
The first difficulties were caused by the great number, the complicated nature and the frequent changes of the formalities which
the foreigner had to go through in order to leave his employment
and cross the frontier. They differed for each nationality and even
for various groups of the same nationality.
No foreigner was allowed to enter or to leave Reich territory
without a German visa issued by the German police. But the
police granted a visa only if the worker had procured a "return
certificate" issued by the employer and countersigned and sealed
by the labour office. The Reich Minister of Labour emphasised,
for example 3 , that the labour offices must in no circumstances
1
Tarifordnung zur Regelung von Familienheimfahrten während der Kriegszeit
für ausländische Arbeitskräfte im Deutschen Reich, of 27 August 1940; Reichsarbeitsblatt, Part IV, p. 1239.
' BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 446.
• Order of 6 February 1942; Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 190, amendment of 20
July 1942.

146

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

countersign a furlough certificate which did not contain full details
about the train by which the worker was to travel.
In addition, various countries issued complicated restrictive
regulations concerning the crossing of their frontiers; and it was
extremely difficult for workers, under the restrictions imposed
upon them in Germany, to provide themselves with the various
travel documents necessary. In many cases 1 the foreigners were
not able to comply with all these regulations before the departure
of their trains and it was officially recognised that this resulted "in
unnecessary additional strain on the railways and in avoidable
resentment from the workers, if they had to be sent back from the
German frontier because they were not provided with one or the
other required certificate". There were frequent official German
complaints of the great number of workers, many of them sick or
disabled, who were stranded a t the frontier without the necessary
papers or visa.2
The difficulties were further increased by the great strain on
transportation facilities. The fact that some categories of homebound foreigners were entitled to free transportation proved another complication, because it raised the question of who had to pay
the expenses. In addition, many categories of workers, among them
practically all those from the East, and certain Balkan areas, were
not allowed to travel individually, but had to await mass transports.
A small part of the cost of running special furlough trains was
borne by the labour offices, and the larger part by the employers.
Workers from western and northern Europe were allowed to travel
individually, but many of them were not able to pay for their
tickets. This led to complicated negotiations between the labour
offices, the employers, the German military occupation authorities
and the foreign authorities. If, as was the practice in many cases,
the money for the ticket was advanced by the employer, arrangements were needed to ensure that the worker did not overstay
his furlough and returned to his place of employment.
Similar problems arose if, as also happened frequently, the
foreigner was not able to pay for his return ticket. For example,
many French workers on their way back to Germany were stranded
in Paris. If the German Military Commander of Greater Paris
paid their travelling expenses from Paris to the Franco-German
frontier (the expenses from the frontier to the place of employment
in Germany would be paid or advanced by the labour offices) he
demanded that the labour offices should require the foreigner to
1
2

Cf. Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1942, No. 15, Part I, p. 258.
Cf. Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 16 April 1943;
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5-15 May 1943, Part I, p. 262.

CONDITIONS OF WORK

147

pay back the money. 1 Many complications also arose from the
changed political conditions of the continent of Europe. German
employers, for example, when asked to provide French workers
with tickets to the Franco-German frontier, would give them
tickets only to Strasbourg, whereas the German authorities in
Alsace considered the route from the eastern to the western frontier
of Alsace as part of the German route. French workers thus
arrived in Strasbourg without sufficient funds2 to purchase tickets
onwards to the western frontier of Alsace and this resulted "in
annoying interruptions in travel and resentment among the travellers"."
Sick or pregnant workers had to undergo examination at the
local insurance office. After this examination, the office had to
make an entry on the furlough certificate, indicating whether or
not it consented to the foreigner's return to Germany.
Since the great majority of workers on leave had to use special
trains for their ultimate return to Germany, serious delay was often
caused by the fact that no special trains were available. To remedy
this situation, the Commissioner-General for Manpower asked, for
example, the Italian sub-branch of the German Labour Administration to examine all furlough certificates at the German (Austrian)Italian frontier. If, at the end of the furlough period, no special
workers' trains running from Italy to Germany happened to be
scheduled, the labour administration representatives were authorised to lengthen or shorten the furlough period so as to make its
termination coincide with the departure of a workers' train from
Italy to Germany. 4 During the early stages of the war, Germanemployed Italians could return to Italy for leave only by special
mass transportation which was organised at intervals jointly by
the German and Italian authorities. By Orders of the Reich Minister
of Labour of 24 September 1941 and 6 February 1942, the labour
offices were empowered to authorise Italian industrial workers
only (not agricultural workers) to travel individually, if the worker
established to their satisfaction that such permission was desirable
because of very exceptional circumstances, and if the urgency of
the journey was confirmed either by an Italian authority or by the
provincial office of the Italian Workers' Corporation.
On 13 October. 1942, Fritz Sauckel changed these regulations
"in order to limit even further the use of regular trains by Italian
1
Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 14 January 1943 ;
Reichsarbeilsblatt, 5 Feb. 1943, Part I, p. 89.
2
See p. 180 for the regulations prohibiting exportation of money.
•Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 16 April 1943;
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5-15 May 1943, No. 12-13, Part I, p. 262.
* Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower of 30 October 1942; Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 120 (2), supplement, 5 Nov. 1942.

148

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

workers". From 1 January 1943, the German labour offices were
instructed to allow Italians the use of regular trains only if the
extraordinary urgency of the furlough was confirmed by the Delegation of the Fascist Confederation of Industrial Labour in Germany.
But even when travelling by mass transportation, Italians, like
all other foreigners, had to produce exit visas from the German
police and furlough certificates issued by their employers and
countersigned by the German Labour Office.
Under the regulations in force after November 1942, Italian
workers' furlough certificates had to contain no fewer than the
following data: place, day and hour of departure of the train to be
taken to travel to and from Italy; statement whether the worker
was sent home for family furlough, home furlough, sickness or
accident furlough, or furlough for special circumstances; details
concerning the return ticket with which the worker had been
supplied; name of the sickness insurance fund with which he
was insured in Germany. As basis and evidence for penal
action in Germany and/or Italy, the certificate also contained
clauses to the effect that the worker had been informed about the
regulations on the exportation of German or Italian currency from
Germany, and that he was bound to return to the same German
undertaking on expiration of the furlough.
The main and most important reason, however, for the refusal
of the authorities of the Third Reich to grant vacations to foreign
workers, even when regular and periodical vacations with pay
had been expressly promised in Government agreements or individual or collective contracts, was unwillingness to lose the
worker. Throughout the war Germany failed to keep its promises
of home furloughs to the recruited labour force. Yet the longer
the war lasted and the more disquieting even the censored news
became about privations and misery in their home countries, the
more urgent grew the desire of the deportees to go home, at least
for a few days, and see for themselves. Others hoped while
in their own country that they would somehow manage to
"desert".
Up to the summer of 1944, when Goebbels, in his capacity as
plenipotentiary for the Total War Effort, ordered "a universal
temporary ban on holidays, with immediate effect"1, the Germans
avoided announcing a wholesale and uniform stoppage of all home
furloughs. Instead, as can be seen from the maze of regulations on
1
Order of 24 August 1944, applicable to all persons, including Germans, except
German women who, before 31 December 1944, would complete their SOth year,
and German men who, before that date, would complete their 65th year;
Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, 24 Aug. 1944.

CONDITIONS OF WORK

149

the subject, fresh hopes of home furloughs were repeatedly encouraged, except, of course for Soviet workers, who were always
excluded from the privilege, and for Poles, whose furlough privileges,
after some wavering at the beginning, were, to all intents and
purposes, abolished long before Germany's military retreat
hampered or prevented the granting of them.
But ever since 1942, the granting of furloughs, under whatever
name and for whatever purpose, became more and more rare and
was made dependent on an increasing number of conditions. In
particular, various systems of keeping "furlough hostages" were
introduced, which led to the curtailment of furlough, or to more
drastic punishment, of the "hostage" if the fellow-worker failed
to return from his furlough.
For example, the German-dominated Paris Radio reported on
25 October 1943 that home furloughs for Frenchmen had been
resumed. Upon their arrival at the clearing camp at Châlons-surMarne, the labour offices and the mayors of their home towns were
notified, in order to control their return to the camp at the
end of the furlough period. If they failed to return in time, the
mayors were again notified ; the extent of the reprisals against the
"deserter", his family and friends depended upon the degree to
which the particular mayor collaborated with the Germans. In
any case, for every Frenchman who failed to return from furlough,
the furlough of another French worker in Germany was cancelled.
On the situation of Belgians, Léonce Pater wrote in L'Avenir
of 2 March 1944: "Some workers fail to return after their furloughs.
Hence a system of guarantors has been established, under which
the worker may go on leave only if he has found a fellow-worker
willing to stand surety for him." The article adds that, nevertheless,
"too many failed to return and forgot their fellow-worker in Germany".
When Pierre Laval and Fritz Sauckel made a new agreement
early in 1944 for the transfer of 300,000 additional French workers
to Germany, the first 57,000 scheduled to go during the month
of February 1944 were to replace approximately 57,000 French
"volunteers" who, while on leave in France, had "deserted" and
not returned to Germany. 1
Furloughs for Polish Workers
Discrimination against recruited Poles in the granting of furloughs is evident in the official German regulations on the subject.
At the beginning of the war, industrial Polish workers were,
1

The quotas for Mar., Apr. and May 1944 were 81,000 French workers each.

150

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

legally at least, entitled to periodical vacations. The wage tariff
regulations of 8 January 1940 provided that Polish agricultural
workers were not entitled to vacations. In the preparatory stage
of the Russian campaign, an Order of 31 March 1941 "concerning
vacations for male and female civilian workers of Polish nationality
working in Germany" 1 , provided that "in so far as Polish industrial
workers had been entitled to vacations" such claims should be
suspended "until further notice", owing to transportation difficulties. But Polish industrial workers recruited for work in Poland
itself continued to be entitled to vacations, because, in these cases,
transportation difficulties did not arise. However, in order "to
end discrimination", the Labour Department of the Reich Governor
decided2 that "the regulation concerning holidays shall not apply
to Polish workers until the end of the war" (except in Danzig,
West Prussia and Upper Silesia). After the beginning of the Russian
campaign various other regulations were made for other parts of
the former Polish Republic. In 1942, the general working conditions of Poles became even worse, because many German regulations which aimed mainly at deported Soviet citizens did not
except Poles, but applied to all occupied territories "in the
East".
On 29 September 1942, a new Order was issued concerning
vacations for Polish civilians working in Germany. As a general
rule, it laid down that the right of Polish industrial workers to
vacations with pay or to home furlough was "suspended", while
Polish agricultural workers had never possessed any such right.
But although Poles cannot in principle be granted any right to be exempted
from work for recreational purposes in the midst of war, it will nevertheless be
appropriate, in the interest of undisturbed production, to open a possibility for
trustworthy Polish workers to return for limited periods to their homes. This is
to counteract the Poles' frequent absences from work, which are said to be due
predominantly to the fact that they are not granted vacations; this will primarily
be an incentive to those Polish workers whose output is not satisfactory, to make
themselves eligible for vacation through specially good behaviour and better
work.'

Fritz Sauckel therefore introduced the following rules for the
granting of furloughs to Poles as special rewards (in agreement
with the Party Chancellery, the Reich leader of the S.S. and Chief
of the German Police, the Reich Minister of Transportation and the
Minister for Food and Agriculture) :
4¡H .
1
1

Deutscher Reichsanzeiger, No. 81; Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, Part I, p. 195.
First Supplementary Order concerning the labour law for Polish workers in
the Warthegau; Amtliche Mitteilungen, p. 44.
3
Reichsarbeitsblatt, Part I, p. 431 (italics added).

CONDITIONS OF WORK

151

In every individual case the consent of the local labour office had to be sought.
Consent was to be given only:
(a) if the work and the behaviour of the Pole had been fully satisfactory;
(6) if it could be reasonably expected that he would duly return to his employment after the termination of his furlough; and
(c) if he had been absent from his home more than 12 months.
If the vacation was granted, the employer had to keep back two weeks' wages
(for agricultural workers, one month's wages) until the worker duly returned from
his vacation.

It was intended 1 that during the second half of November 1942
"trustworthy Polish industrial workers" should be sent to the
Government-General at the rate of one special train a day and that,
after the winter, the schedule should be revised. However, by an
Order of 18 February 19432, the programme was temporarily postponed and a few weeks later, the Commissioner-General for Manpower stated that this system resulted in inequalities among Polish
workers and therefore ordered that from 2 April 1943 their claims
for vacations or family furloughs were "suspended", whether they
were working in Germany proper or elsewhere.3 In special cases,
individual Polish workers might be granted furlough with the consent of the labour offices. Exceptions to this rule could be granted
only by the Commissioner-General for Manpower himself. But
the latter ordered, in a Decree of 14 May 19434, that no vacations
were to be granted to Poles until 1 December 1943.
A Decree concerning the working conditions of Poles employed
in the Warthegau, issued as early as 15 February 1942, stipulated,
with retroactive validity from 15 December 1941, that "provisions
concerning furloughs do not apply to Poles until the end of the
war". 6
Holidays
Theoretically, certain categories of foreign workers were entitled
to periodical holidays, even though they were not able to visit
their families at home. In 1944 this privilege was extended
to "Eastern" workers; after uninterrupted employment for 12
months they were granted the same holidays as German
workers, to be taken within the following 12 months. "Eastern"
workers were informed that special rest camps would be opened
1
Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower to the regional labour
offices and local labour offices, of 13 October 1942; Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 30,
25 Oct. 1942, Part I, p. 459.
a
Reichsarbeitsblatt, Part I, p. 167.
»Order of 24 March 1943; cf. Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 Apr. 1943, Part V, p. 188.
4
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 May 1943, No. 15, Part I, p. 306.
6
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 709 (1), supplement, 10 Aug. 1942.

152

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

for this purpose, but that, since this would take some time, they
would in the meantime have to spend their rest periods at their
own labour camps, where recreation rooms would be put at their
disposal. 1 German broadcasts in the Dutch language reported in
December 1944 that the first rest homes for French, Netherlands
and Belgian workers in the Reich had been opened "in a lovely
part of the province of Brandenburg". All this was, of course,
academic, since Reich Minister Joseph Goebbels in the summer of
1944 had suspended the taking or granting of holidays even for
Germans.
DOMESTIC W O R K E R S

Women were recruited for domestic work in Germany mainly
in Denmark and the Netherlands in the West, and Poland and
the Soviet Union in the East. It is certain that the numbers from
Poland and the Soviet Union greatly exceeded the numbers
from Denmark and the Netherlands, but exact comparison is
impossible. The majority of the foreign domestic workers
were employed, not in urban, but in rural households, where
they had to do agricultural as well as housework, and the statistics included most of these domestics employed in rural
households among agricultural workers. The comparatively low
figures of 49,000 foreign domestic workers for the end of 19412, and
of 77,000 quoted for July 19433 must be accepted with this fact in
mind.
Owing to the great scarcity of servants, foreign women were
assigned only to certain categories of German families. In the first
place, the family must be politically reliable. The selection of eligible
families lay in the hands of the labour offices; the local Party representatives participated in the decision. Families with many
children and families transplanted as colonists (so-called Aufbaufamilien), and families engaged in "reconstruction tasks" in the
newly-annexed eastern territories received preference. In every
case a guarantee was required that the servant would be given
separate accommodation. Especially, "women from the East who
are employed as domestic workers may in no case be accommodated
together with Germans". Persons who employed foreigners in their
1
s

Die Wirtschaftskurve (Frankfort on Main), May 1944, p. 310.
L. MÜNZ, Ministerialrat in the Reich Ministry of Labour, in Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 5.
' Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 29 Dec. 1943, quoted in International Labour
Review, Vol. L, No. 3, Sept. 1944, p. 342. According to this source, in July 1943
the 77,000 foreign domestic workers represented 7 per cent, of a total of 1,100,000
domestic workers in Germany.

CONDITIONS OF WORK

153

households without authorisation from the competent labour office
were liable to heavy penalties. 1
Domestic Workers from the West
Danish and Belgian women were recruited for domestic work
in Germany by recruitment offices in their own countries. They
received "recruitment certificates" {Anwerbebestätigungen), which,
among other matters, contained information on wages and working
hours. Usually these women were hired for six months at a time 2 ,
but found themselves unable to return home at the end of that
period. Under an Order issued early in 19433 they were not to be
left in private homes on the expiry of their contracts, but were to
be placed in hospitals, clinics, factory canteens and similar public
institutions. Theoretically, they were entitled to the same holiday
benefits as Germans, except that it depended on the discretion of
their employers whether they should receive the expenses of their
journey home. The employers were allowed to pay these expenses,
but only as far as the German frontier.4
Domestic Workers from the East
Conditions for domestic workers from the East were far worse
than for those from the West. Even while at work in the house,
domestic workers had to show the "Eastern" badge on their
clothing. Their wages were fixed by the Reich labour trustees,
but, as the official commentary on the labour law for foreign workers pointed out 6 , these wage scales were not to be made public.
Instead, information could "be obtained at the labour office".
Under a Decree of 5 October 1941 concerning the treatment
of Poles, Polish domestic workers had to be paid the lowest rate
of pay for their respective age groups and types of work, as laid
down in the Wage Ceiling Decree of 15 September 1941. They
were forbidden to receive gifts, such as Christmas or birthday
gratuities, or bonuses for faithful service.
In the summer of 1942, the Reich Labour Trustee for the District of Cologne prescribed the following monthly rates (plus free
board and lodging) for "Eastern" women employed in domestic
service in his region 6 :
1

Reichsarbeitsblatt, 15 June 1942, P a r t V, p. 378.
BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 661 (1), supplement, 15 Oct. 1942.
* Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 6, 25 Feb. 1943, P a r t V, p. 105; International Labour
Review, Vol. L, No. 3, Sept. 1944, p. 341.
* Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 3, 25 Jan. 1943, Part V, p. 39; International Labour
Review, loc. cit.
5

BIRKENHOLZ, loc.

cit.

* Kölnische Zeitung, 3 Sept. 1942.

154

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
MONTHLY WAGES OF EASTERN DOMESTIC WORKERS IN THE
REGION OF COLOGNE
Up to 18 years of age

In the city of Cologne
In the outlying districts

Monthly wage (RM)

"Eastern" workers' tax (RM)

6.60
5.10

—
—

12.00
9.00

9.00
4.50

Over 18 years of age

In the city of Cologne
In the outlying districts

The Kölnische Zeitung remarked that a housewife with more
than four children paid only half an "Eastern" worker's tax; this
seems to indicate that the tax was not deducted from the wage,
but paid by the employer. On the other hand, it also stated that
under the labour trustee's Order "bad work is to be remunerated
by an appropriately lower rate".
In the early autumn of 19421, the Commissioner-General for
Manpower organised a special procedure for the large-scale recruitment of Soviet women to work in urban and rural German households. This scheme applied to women of 15 to 35 years of age who
were "physically strong and most closely resemble the German
type in general appearance". The selection was made by the German recruitment agencies in the occupied territories, where the
women were medically examined and then transported in special
railway coaches to reception camps in Germany. There they had
to undergo another examination. German housewives and peasant
women selected them in the reception camps.
The employment conditions of "Eastern" domestic workers
were regulated in a lengthy official "Instruction for the Employment of Eastern Domestic Workers" issued by the CommissionerGeneral for Manpower in agreement with the Head of the Chancellery of the National Socialist Party and other authorities concerned. Part of this Instruction read:
If [in addition to a Soviet woman] the household employs German domestics,
the latter must be put in superior and directing positions, so t h a t no feeling of
solidarity between the Germans and the women from the East can develop.
. . . women from the East are to be treated with justice but with severe discipline and the German family must always maintain an appropriate reserve.
The right t o free time does not exist. As a m a t t e r of principle women from the
East may only leave the house in order to attend to the business of the household.
However, if their behaviour is satisfactory, they may be allowed to remain out of
the house once a week for three hours without attending to business. Their
absence from the house must never extend after darkness and must terminate a t
1
Instructions of 8 September 1942; Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 27, Part I, p. 411. Cf.
"Soviet Workers in Germany", in International Labour Review, Vol. X L V I I ,
N o . 5, May 1943, pp. 588-589.

CONDITIONS OF WORK

155

8 p.m. at the latest. They are forbidden to visit eating-places, cinemas, theatres
and similar places of recreation for German or foreign workers. They are also
forbidden to visit churches.

The head of the household which employed an "Eastern"
domestic worker had to ensure that these and all other regulations
were strictly observed. The Instruction laid special stress on the
prohibition of sexual intercourse with foreign women, and upon
the obligation to remove them should they become pregnant. If a
servant violated the labour discipline as outlined in the Instruction, the head of the household was ordered to report to the Gestapo.
Control of alien domestic workers was entirely in the hands of
regional officers of the Gestapo (Staatspolizei-Leitstellen).
In cases
concerning these foreigners, the administrative agencies as well as
the ordinary police authorities were to follow the Gestapo's instructions.
The most oppressive aspect of this service was that, except in
case of pregnancy, the deportee could do nothing to terminate it.
The instruction stated expressly that "for the time being a vacation shall not be granted", and that "domestic women workers
from the East are recruited for an indefinite period".
In the course of the "total" mobilisation of manpower which
was started early in 1943 to overcome the "ever-growing difficulties" in the manpower situation 1 , the labour offices were empowered to take domestic workers (German as well as foreign)
from private homes and allocate them to more urgent work, whether
domestic or of any other kind. After that date, the number of
foreign domestic workers, particularly in urban households, steadily
decreased. In August 1944, one of the six points in the programme
of the newly-appointed Commissioner-General for Total War
Effort, Goebbels, was that all foreign domestic workers should be
compulsorily transferred to armament work. It appears, however,
that this rule was not readily obeyed. 2 Moreover, as has been
observed already, no distinct line could be drawn between domestic
and agricultural workers, particularly on small farms. I t must be
assumed, therefore, that even after Goebbels' Order, thousands
of women recruited from the East were forced to continue work in
the households and on the farms of German farmers.
By Order of 29 June 1944, new regulations concerning domestic
1
1

Decree by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 27 January 1943.
For example, the Bremen Zeitung of 11 September 1944 reiterated that
"Eastern" and Polish female domestic workers were now mobilised for tasks
other than domestic work; those servants who had not yet done so must therefore
appear at the Bremen labour offices on 14 September, bringing with them their
luggage, food cards and documents. The article warned heads of households
whose domestics did not comply with this Order that they would be liable to the
most severe penalties.

156

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

servants from the East were issued, in the course of the new "mild"
policy towards Soviet workers. These milder regulations serve in
fact to reveal the plight of these women. Working hours were to
be "between 6 a.m. and 9 p.m." A "suitable" amount of free time
was to be granted each week; if this free time was spent outside
the house, the regulations of the Security Police had to be observed.
Within the four wage areas in the Reich, monthly wages for domestic
workers, in addition to board and lodging, were between 7 RM
and 37 RM. But where a child under 14 years of age was employed,
her wages had to be reduced to a suitable amount. The head of
the household had moreover the right to pay less than the minimum wage if he or she found the work inefficient.1
MEASURES CONCERNING D E C E A S E D FOREIGN WORKERS

In the earlier stages of the war, on the death of a foreign worker (except Poles and Russians) 2 , provision was made to allow one
near relative to travel to Germany to attend the funeral. The
travelling expenses as well as the expenses of the funeral in Germany, could be paid by the employer, or by the German sickness
fund, or, in the last resort, by the fund administering the unemployment contributions. At first, it was also permissible to arrange
for transportation of the body to the country of origin. In fact,
it was argued that, as an additional inducement to a foreigner
to accept employment in Germany, he should be assured beforehand that, in case of death, the expenses of transporting his body
home and of his burial there would be met. The official comment
was that the grant of such benefits should be considered as "a
measure to encourage the acceptance of employment". 3
However, under a Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of
20 July 1942, transportation of the body of a foreign worker, of
whatever nationality, was unconditionally prohibited, "even though
it would not be difficult to procure, at or near the locality
where the death occurred, a zinc coffin for the transportation". 4
As far as deceased workers from the East were concerned, long
before their mass importation reached its peak, various restrictive
regulations were issued by the Reich Minister of Labour, Seldte,
which aimed at reducing all formalities to an absolute minimum. 6
1

Reichsarbeitsblatt, 2 July 1944.

TIMM, in Der Einsatz, p. 16.

Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No. 3-4, Feb. 1943, p. 31.
Dr. ADAM, in idem.. No. 1-2, Jan. 1943, p. 7. Dr. TIMM declared t h a t
"the possibility of granting permission to exhume and transport a body after the
war is a matter to be decided later".
6
Cf. Decree in Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1940, Part I,, p. 528; idem, 1941, P a r t I,
pp. 326 and 399.
4

CONDITIONS OF WORK

157

After his appointment as Commissioner-General for Manpower,
Sauckel issued detailed instructions concerning deceased "Eastern"
workers of non-German race, in an Order of 13 May 1942. Under
this Order, which was not published until more than five months
later, on 25 October 19421, a distinction was to be drawn between
workers of non-German race from the District of Byalistok and
the territory of the "Reich Commissariat Ostland" with the exception of "White Russia" on the one hand, and the remaining parts
of the eastern occupied territory, on the other.
For deceased workers from the first-named regions, Sauckel
prohibited, for the duration of the war, their transportation home,
even if their families were ready to pay the expenses; he also prohibited the granting of subsidies to members of the family for their
participation in the burial services or their visit to the place of
burial. For deceased workers from the remaining occupied territories in the East, Sauckel decreed that the transportation of bodies
was forbidden not only during, but after the war, whether the expenses were to be paid by the family or anybody else. Furthermore, he expressly stipulated that this rule was also to apply to
deceased members of the workers' families.
Referring to this Order, Fritz Sauckel issued the following
instructions in a circular addressed to all local and regional German
labour offices on 9 February 19432:
Whatever measures are needed after the death of an Eastern worker shall be
taken by the labour office, unless the latter delegates this task to the employer of
the deceased, in which case the employer has to observe the same regulations.
If an Eastern worker dies while under arrest he shall be buried by the police
authorities or by the prison authorities, as the case may be. Provided the local
circumstances allow, a coffin of the simplest quality shall be supplied. Cremation
is permissible and indeed, if the local conditions allow, desirable. However,
burial must be granted to the deceased if he belonged to the Mohammedan faith,
which prohibits cremation; for example, in the case of a Tartar.
As a matter of principle, the burial must take place a t the public cemetery,
in plots sufficiently separated from those destined for the burial of Germans. The
same applies to the burial of ashes. No objection is to be made if Eastern workers
wish to deposit wreaths of flowers.
It is permissible for small groups of Eastern workers—10 to 15 men—to take
part in burial ceremonies. The decision must be taken by the employer. In exceptional cases—for instance, if a camp leader, etc., is buried—larger groups may
take part. In these cases, however, the police must be informed.
Neither immigrant priests nor other priests are allowed to participate in the
ceremonies. However, there is no objection to allowing acceptable Eastern
workers or so-called lay priests to direct simple ceremonies.

The public cemeteries were accordingly ordered to make plots
1
1

Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 30, 25 Oct. 1942, P a r t I, p . 455.
Idem, No. 26, 25 Feb. 1943.

158

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

available for the "Eastern" workers who died in Germany at an
ample distance from the plots intended for graves of Germans. 1
If an "Eastern" worker left any possessions, various regulations
provided for the transfer of the money assets either to a Germancontrolled bank or to a branch office of the Reich Treasury. In a
circular Order of 10 December 19432, Fritz Sauckel stipulated that
the assets of "Eastern" workers who died within the Reich territory should be subject to the following rules.
As a first step the labour office, through the intermediary of
the Labour Section of the Economic Department for the Eastern
Occupied Territories (Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Chefgruppe Arbeit) had
to ascertain the names and addresses of the next of kin of the deceased. If these data were obtained, the savings certificate of the
deceased (Ostarbeiter Sparkarte, which he or she owned instead of
cash), and whatever cash the deceased had left, or might be collected among his fellow workers (limit, 300 RM) had to be remitted
for transfer in favour of the next of kin to the Berlin Office of the
Central Economic Bank for the Ukraine. All other objects were
to be sent by mail to the next of kin, at the expense of the Reichsstock (the former unemployment insurance fund). The maximum
weight of these parcels might not exceed 10 kg or 22 lbs. The
circular did not provide for cases in which the possessions weighed
more than 10 kgs, but laid down the mailing fee for parcels weighing less than one kg (2.2 lbs.).
If the legal heirs could not be ascertained (which was, of course,
generally the case, since at the time the Decree was issued the
German armies had already been expelled from large parts of the
territory previously occupied, and even in the parts still held by
Germany communication was extremely difficult), belongings other
than cash might be handed to other Soviet relatives working in
the Reich. However, under regulations issued by Alfred Rosenberg,
Reich Minister for the Eastern Occupied Territory, cash assets,
if no relatives entitled to inherit were known, went to the substitute legal heir, namely, the Treasury (Fiskus) of the Reich
Commissariat for the Ukraine, or the Treasury of the General
District of White Russia.

1
Reichsgesundheitsblatt, 16 June 1943. An Order published in the Reichsarbeitsblatt on 25 October 1944 repealed the special restrictions with respect to the
burying of Soviet and Polish workers. Their funerals had no longer to be conducted as cheaply as possible; thenceforward they were allowed to be held under
the same regulations as for those of other foreign workers.
ì
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 10 Jan. 1944, Part I, p. 15.

CHAPTER XII
PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS
As a matter of general policy, the German authorities systematically encouraged foreigners to earmark a portion of their
income for transfer to their home countries. The "manual" for
foreign industrial workers of 4 May 19421 expressly drew their
attention to the fact that they "can transfer from Germany part
of their earnings to their families or to any other destination in
their own country". The manual pointed out that the transfer
should primarily aim at securing the support of the dependants
whom the worker had left behind, and declared that "every worker
is expected to make the fullest use of the possibility of sending
home what he has saved from his earnings". Many contingents
and many individuals from the west, south and south-east of
Europe had to undertake to send a large percentage of their income to their families.2 In these cases the German employers were
required automatically to deduct the agreed portion of the foreigners' wages or salaries from every payment due to them.
The scheme did not cover workers whose countries had been
first occupied and then annexed by Germany (such as Austria,
Alsace-Lorraine, the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, the annexed parts of pre-war Poland and a few small regions
on the western and eastern frontiers of the 1938 Reich territory).
Workers from these countries were free to send a remittance to
their families or not, as they pleased.3 Nor did the scheme originally
cover workers from territories not formally annexed by Germany,
1
2

Reichsarbeilsblatt, 25 May 1942, Part I, p. 258.
Special arrangements were made between Germany and neutral countries
such as Switzerland and Sweden for the wage transfer of the small numbers
of their
citizens working in Germany.
5
The transfer and clearing scheme did, however, apply to non-native foreign
workers employed in these annexed territories, such as Frenchmen working in
a Czech factory, or Italians working in an Austrian mine, etc. For example, from
10 May 1940, when Luxembourg was included in the German currency system,
Luxembourgers working in Germany proper were allowed to send home their
savings without formalities. Belgians working in Luxembourg within 46 miles
(75 km) from the Belgian-Luxembourg frontier received part of their wages (to
cover board and lodging) in German money, and the rest in Belgian money,
which they were free to send to Belgium; but their employers had to submit
weekly wage lists to the German Foreign Exchange Control Agency {Devisenstelle).
Other non-Luxembourgers employed in Luxembourg had to send their remittances, through their employers, to the central clearing agency in Berlin.

160

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

but incorporated in the German currency area, the Protectorate of
Bohemia-Moravia, the Netherlands, the occupied regions of northern Yugoslavia, and the region of Byalistok. Workers from these
territories were free to send money to their relatives by ordinary
means (cheque, or money orders, but not cash), if they used the
official channels. Sometimes they had to use the transfer system
described below.1
But the great majority of the conscripted workers were compelled to use only the official wage transfer scheme. The chief incentive was, of course, the foreigners' desire to help their families. To
earmark part of their earnings for transfer was their only legal
means of getting an equivalent of these earnings outside Germany.
Indeed, in the tightly regulated European exchange control system,
this was declared to be a privilege granted to foreign workers and
was administered accordingly.
At first sight, a policy of systematically inducing foreigners not
to spend their earnings in Germany, but to earmark considerable
portions of them for transfer home, may appear surprising. In
adopting it the German authorities were prompted by various
considerations. It drastically reduced the purchasing power of a
considerable part of Germany's working population; in fact, the
purchasing power of masses of low-paid foreigners, such as Italian
agricultural workers, was reduced to nothing. Their combined
purchasing power would otherwise have added to the drain on
the supply of consumers' goods and become an additional source
of inflationary trends in Germany. I t reduced (and again, for the
lower-paid majority, it practically eliminated) any possibility of
obtaining private accommodation and individual meals, which
were more expensive than mass accommodation and mass feeding.
But while reducing consumption by the foreigners in Germany,
this policy a t the same time increased the inflationary trend in the
German-occupied countries. The policy was, secondly, intended
to have a favourable psychological effect, because it gave the
worker the feeling that by his work and sacrifice he was at least
able to take care of his family. Moreover, the fact that in some
of the most distressed areas of German-dominated Europe dependants of the absent workers received money (coming apparently
1
German sources do not reveal the reasons for which the transfer scheme had
sometimes t o be used even by workers from the territories absorbed into the

German currency area.

Cf. CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTRY OF SOCIAL W E L F A R E :

Czechoslovak Workers in Germany (London, 1943), P a r t I, pp. 24-25. On 4 July
1940 Der Neue Tag reported t h a t for one year t h e total wage remittances of
Czechoslovak workers in Germany were given by the National Bank of BohemiaMoravia, on 6 June 1940, as 104,339,465 Czechoslovak crowns, which represented
well under 1,000 Czechoslovak crowns a year per German-employed Czechoslovak worker (quoted in Sheila Grant D U F F : A German Protectorate: The Czechs
under Nazi Rule (London, Macmillan, 1942), p. 155).

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

161

from their breadwinners employed in the Reich) would, it was
hoped, induce other persons to go to Germany or encourage other
families to persuade some of their members to go.
Thirdly, the extremely rigid German system (methodically
built up since 1933) of control of all matters concerning money
transfer and exchange of currency, gave Germany an additional
tool for regimenting foreigners in Greater Germany and their
dependants outside it.
In fact, the system of money transfer was used as a further
means of controlling the actual mobilisation and distribution
of workers; for only foreigners recruited and placed through the
intermediary of the Reich Ministry of Labour were entitled to
earmark part of their earnings for transfer. 1
Infraction of these rules resulted in the suspension of the privilege, and foreigners who were in concentration camps or in camps for
hard labour, or who had "deserted" from their place of employment, were also automatically prevented from transferring money
to the German clearing authorities, even if they happened to
possess savings from their wages.
But the most important aspect of the matter was that, in
accordance with bilateral arrangements, these amounts were
merely credited to the various foreign Governments or foreign
central banks on the books of the German exchange authorities.
Their value (expressed in non-German currency) was "in the
meantime" being paid to the workers' relatives by the foreign
Governments or foreign central banks concerned.
A typical procedure was as follows: the German central clearing agency (or one of the few German banks specially designated to
collect these funds from workers of certain nationalities) would
receive, via the employer, from the labour recruit the portion of
his wage earmarked for transfer to his dependants. At the same
time, the central bank of the country for which the money was
destined would be: (a) notified that the German clearing agency
had, on its own books, credited the account of the respective central
bank, and (b) requested to make the payment (in foreign currency)
itself in lieu of Germany.
The accounts of the foreign central banks were, to all intents
and purposes, blocked. It depended on Germany's discretion to
what extent the other countries received exports from Germany
which diminished their accumulated credits on the books of the
German clearing agency. The procedure was clearly depicted in
the following passage from the official report (Verwaltungsbericht)
of the German Reichsbank for its administrative year of 1942:
1

STILLER, in Ausländische

Arbeiter, p. 367.

162

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Germany's clearing debts [to foreign countries] have been further increased.
However, this increase was due less to a change in the relation between imports
and exports than to services in the field of war economics rendered by foreign
countries. This applies first of all to the use of foreign workers in Germany; the
savings from their wages, which have reached considerable amounts, have been
transferred within the framework of clearing agreements.1

The complicated details of the European clearing system organised by Germany since 1933, but fully developed only after its
military conquests in the early stages of the war, need not be described. The essential feature of the clearing agreements in Germandominated Europe was that all sums destined to be transferred
from Germany to dependent foreign countries were paid, in
Reichsmarks, into the special accounts which these countries had
with the German Clearing Office in Berlin (Deutsche Verrechnungskasse) ; and all payments due to Germany by debtors in those foreign
countries were paid (in national currency) into the accounts which
the German Clearing Office held with the central banks of the
foreign countries. The conversion took place at exchange rates
arbitrarily fixed by Germany.
The commodities exported and services rendered by Germany
to its partners in the clearing scheme were not sufficient to cancel
the partners' increasing credit surplus. The "clearing balances"
were always, and increasingly, in favour of the dependent countries;
that is, the dependent countries owed Germany less than Germany
owed them. With the deterioration of Germany's balance of payments, the countries of origin of the foreign workers became the
creditors of the Reich. The Reich paid no interest on these debit
balances.
In this disequilibrium of payments, the transfer of wages of
labour recruits played an increasingly important part. In the
clearing accounts, the debts incurred by Germany in respect of
wage remittances to foreign countries were second only to the German
clearing debts resulting from its importations from the dependent
countries. German war economy absorbed raw materials and commodities from the occupied and dominated countries and was
unable to produce and deliver in exchange manufactured goods
with which to pay for its imports. To the clearing debts already
piled up from these foreign trade operations, were added increasing
debts from current accounts for services, especially the services
rendered by the recruited workers in Germany. At a time when
Germany had a permanently passive balance of payments, practically all the wage transfers thus became an additional burden on
the various creditor countries.
1
Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, 12 (1943), No. 6, p. 211 (italics added). The
report gives no figures.

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

163

It should be noted, however, that the mechanism of wage
transfers could not be handled by Germany unilaterally. The
German regulations prohibited the actual transfer of foreigners'
wage remittances to their families abroad. Germany had, therefore, to make arrangements with the foreign authorities to pay out,
in their respective currencies, sums equivalent to the remittances
received by the German clearing agency. For this purpose Germany
made arrangements with the various authorities abroad. For
example, soon after the termination of the Balkan campaign in
1941, the German clearing treaty with the puppet Government of
Croatia provided that:
Payments from wage savings of Croat workers who are employed in the German
Reich are to be remitted to the account "Savings of Workers' Wages" to be
established for this purpose with the German clearing fund. The Croat State
Bank shall immediately pay out the exchange value of this remittance to the assignee.1

Thus the Croat State Bank undertook the obligation, when
notified of a remittance made by a German-employed Croat to
the German clearing agency, of paying immediately an equivalent
amount in Croat money to his family; "immediately" meant that
the Croat State Bank was not to wait until the account of the
German Clearing Office with the Croat State Bank had been credited with an equivalent amount in Croat currency. This was an
exception to the rule governing the payment of commercial and
similar transactions, under which the Croat State Bank had to
pay to the Croat assignee (creditor) the equivalent of an amount
remitted to the German clearing agency only if payments by
Croat debtors to the German clearing agency were made.
As a typical example of a clearing agreement made at a later
stage of the war, the following stipulations of the German-Albanian
Clearing Agreement, signed in Tirana on 27 December 1943, may
be cited. Following the usual general principle, the agreement
provided that no direct payments were to be made from Germany to
Albania, or vice versa; instead, "payments between Greater Germany and Albania shall be effected in Germany exclusively through
the German Central Clearing Office, and in Albania exclusively
through the Albanian National Bank. This applies in particular. . .
(c) to payments deriving from wage savings of Albanian workers."
Remittances made in Germany and destined for Albania had to
be paid to the German Central Clearing Office in favour of the
Reichsmark account of the Albanian National Bank; thereupon
the Albanian National Bank was notified by the Central Clearing
Office, credited the latter on its own books with the equivalent
1
Agreement concerning the regulation of the clearing between the German
Reich and Croatia (Deutsch-Kroatisches Verrechnungsabkommen), of 30 May
1941; Reichsgesetzblatt, 20 June 1941, No. 25, Part II, p. 231 (italics added).

164

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

amount in Albanian francs, and made payment in Albanian
francs to the assignee in Albania. 1
The details of the transaction varied for the citizens of the
different countries and were also subject to changes at different
stages of the war. As a rule employers were responsible for ensuring
that the amount deposited for transfer by an individual foreigner
did not exceed what, under the best of circumstances, he might
have saved from his earnings during a period ranging from one to
three months. 2 If the foreigner violated these restrictions, and
deposited German money in excess of these maxima, the money
was liable to be seized by the German authorities. 3
In the middle of 1942 these limits for the transfer of the savings
of foreigners to their home countries varied between 40 RM (the
monthly maximum allowed to an unmarried Slovak agricultural
worker) and 300 RM (for a French married or unmarried salaried
employee). 4 For certain categories of workers—for instance, Italians
and Spaniards—no maxima were fixed, but they still had to comply
with all the formalities prescribed by the German currency exchange provisions. The different limits established for the different
countries reflected the systematic policy of discrimination between
the various categories of workers.
The restrictions aimed, principally, at preventing the labour
recruit from "smuggling" other persons' money out of Germany,
against the German exchange control regulations.
In order to diminish the opposition of French and Belgian
recruited workers, the Germans did not object to schemes under
which Belgian and French funds made advance payments to families of recruited breadwinners during the first few weeks of absence.
In Belgium, the Commission de l'assistance publique made
weekly allowances to the dependent families of workers who had
left for Germany, beginning these allowances immediately after
the provider's departure. From the autumn of 1942, during the
first six weeks after the worker's departure the Commission paid
a subsidy to the family which had not to be repaid by the worker,
1
Reichsgesetzblatt, 4 Feb. 1944, P a r t II, p. 7. The Treaty, as is typical of
these clearing agreements, contains no arrangements concerning the eventual
straightening out of the clearing balance.
2
Cf. Circular of the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, for Danish Workers
and Employees, of 29 April 1943; Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 15, 25 May 1943, Part
I, p. 302.
3
STILLER, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 366.
4
For certain nationalities, for example, Danes, Finns and Norwegians, the
maximum transfer allowed to married workers was twice that allowed to unmarried workers; while in the case of Bulgarians, Greeks, Croats and Rumanians,
no difference between married and unmarried workers was made. For Frenchmen the monthly transfer maximum was 160 R M for married wage earners, 120
R M for unmarried wage earners and 300 R M for unmarried or married salaried
employees. Belgians and Frenchmen had the privilege of transferring a supplementary amount up to 300 R M after continuous employment for six months.

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

165

but was furnished by the labour office. The amount was 75 Belgian
francs for the wife and 25 francs for each child aged 16 or less.1
In the spring of 1943, the German Military Commander not only
tightened the rules concerning fines, imprisonment and confiscation of property for Belgian evaders of compulsory labour, punishment of their relatives and any other persons assisting the evader,
and trial by court-martial at the discretion of the military administration 2 , but he also authoritatively fixed the amounts which
had to be compulsorily deducted from the wages of German-employed Belgians for support of their dependants. The deductions
varied according to the composition of the worker's dependent
family, from 750 Belgian francs for the wife, to 800,900,1,000,
1,200 or 1,400 francs for a family with one to five dependent
children respectively. 3 An Order of 29 April 1943, issued jointly
by the General Secretaries of the Belgian Ministries of the Interior
and Public Health, Labour and Social Welfare, and Finance, reassessed the advance payments to be made to families of recruited
Belgians before the arrival of the first wage "transfers". The
weekly advance payment, payable from the Sunday following the
worker's departure until remittances were received, up to a maximum period of 13 weeks, was fixed at 210 francs per household
per week, plus 14, 37, 74, 127 or 196 francs respectively for families with one to five children under 15 years of age or incapable of
work, and an additional allowance of 70 francs for every child
after the fifth.4
According to preliminary investigations by the Belgian Government after liberation, the advance payments made by the Assistance publique amounted approximately to:
in 1940:
in 1941:
in 1942:

for families of
il

Flemish workers : 3,220,000
II
Wallon
1,082,000
ii
Flemish
35,000,000
ii
Wallon
16,000,000
Flemish
9,077,000
"
ii
Wallon
5,111,000'

The figures for 1943 and 1944 could not yet be estimated.
1
Le Nouveau Journal, 3 Oct. 1942. This allowance was to be paid to Belgian
families whose breadwinners had signed a contract with any German recruitment
agency after 14 Sept. 1942.
* Order of the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France, of 30
April 1943; Verordnungsblatt des Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich
für die besetzten Gebiete, 6 May 1943.
3
Ibid.; cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 6, Dec. 1943,
pp. 769-770.
* Moniteur belge, 11 May 1943; cf. International Labour Review, loc. cit., p. 770.
6
Information furnished to the I.L.O. by the Belgian Government in February
1945. The Belgian Government's investigation also revealed that approximately
55 of these approximately 70 million francs were refunded by the Belgian Banque
d'Emission during 1940-1942 (see p. 171).

166

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

In France, a period usually of 12 weeks had to elapse before
the equivalents of the amounts allotted by the deportees could
reach their families in France. During that period the municipal
tax collectors paid to the dependent French families an allowance
at the rate of 110 francs a week fof the wife (or for the parents or
grandparents of an unmarried worker) and 65 francs a week for
each child or other dependant in communities of more than 15,000
inhabitants ; in communities with smaller populations the rates were
90 francs and 40 francs respectively. In November 1942, the press
announced that Pierre Laval had decided to extend the period for
which this allowance would be payable to 20 weeks. For the first
eight weeks after the worker's departure, Germany promised to
bear the cost of the allowance and to refund the money to the
French treasury. The allowance for the following weeks had to be
deducted from the wages received by the worker in Germany and
remitted to the German Central Clearing Office.1
As far as "Eastern" workers and payments to their dependants
at home were concerned, no bilateral.treaty, could, of course, be
made, because no national authorities existed in those regions.
The German authorities therefore themselves created, for example, a
Central Economic Bank for the Ukraine with its main seat in Rovno
(share capital of 200 million RM) which was supplemented by seventeen banks, called "economic banks", in the principal Ukrainian
towns, and over 200 smaller branches. The Ukrainian worker was allowed to buy from his employer special savings stamps worth 1,3,5 or
10 RM. These stamps were affixed to a savings card made out in
his name. Both cards and stamps were issued to the employer by
the Berlin branch of the Central Economic Bank of Rovno. .The
"Eastern" worker, through,his employer, remitted the stamped
card to this branch, whereupon a Ukrainian branch of the Central
Economic Bank paid out an equivalent sum in local currency to
the assignee in the Ukraine. 2
T H E STATISTICAL ASPECT

No detailed statistics have so far been available to show how
great have been the amounts involved in the German scheme of
wage transfers, or, in other words, how much money, as expressed
in German currency, has been remitted by foreign workers for their
dependent families at home. But two conclusions can be drawn
from the few figures which have been made public. On the one
1

Cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 3, Mar. 1943, p. 337.
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1942, No. 24, P a r t I, p. 371; Neue Zürcher Zeitung,
18 Jan. 1943; cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLVII, No. 5, May 1943,
pp. 585-586.
2

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

167

hand, it was very exceptional for foreigners to be able to fill
the quotas allotted to them for periodical remittances. On the
other hand, the sum total of remittances made by millions of
labour recruits over a period of years was considerable. This is
borne out by the incomplete data available.
A report published in May 19431 asserted that the Deutsche
Bank, one of the few German banks officially designated to accept
remittances from foreign workers, held the accounts of many hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen, Belgians, Netherlanders, Hungarians, Croats and Italians. 2 On the average, the report stated,
every foreign worker had, up to that time, remitted 516 RM to be
forwarded to his family.
Under earlier agreements, every Italian worker was allowed to
send home a maximum of 88 RM per month a t the special favourable exchange rate of 7.63 lire to the Reichsmark, while anything
exceeding that amount was calculated at a lower rate. But as a
result of a later agreement (concluded early in 1941, when prices
had risen in Italy) they were allowed to send whatever they could
save, at the rate of 7.63 lire to the Reichsmark. 3 Total savings sent
home during 1941 amounted to 230 million RM or 1,750 million
lire, according to a report of the Banca Commerciale Italiana*
German sources reported early in 1942 that savings sent home by
Italian workers totalled 1 million RM daily 5 and the Essener
National-Zeitung of 25 July 1942 stated that Italian workers headed
the list of foreigners who made use of wage transfers; 90 to 95 per
cent, of all Italians regularly remitted parts of their wages to the
Deutsche Bank, while only 50 per cent, of Belgian workers did so.
According to information published in the Monatshefte für NSSozialpolitik, the wage transfer for 12 European countries which
participated at that time in the German transfer arrangements
amounted, between "the beginning of 1940 and the end of July
1942, to 718 million RM. This figure does not include the wage
transfers of workers to the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, the
Government-General, the occupied eastern territories, the Nether1
2

Monatshefte für NS-Sozialpolitik, No. 7-12, May 1943, p. 78.
In addition the Deutsche Bank (according to a circular Decree by Sauckel,
addressed to all regional labour offices and local labour offices, of 11 March 1943;
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Mar. 1943, Part I, p. 193), also handled the remittances of
Bulgarians, Danes, Finns, Norwegians, Serbs and Hungarians, while the Dresdner
Bank was in charge of the remittances of Greeks and Slovaks, the Deutsche Überseeische Bank of Spaniards, and the Amtliches Kroatisches Reisebureau, Berlin,
of Croats. (The latter agency appears to have transferred the money received
to the Deutsche Bank.) The remittances of workers recruited from the Soviet
Union and Poland were to be handled by the German labour offices.
8
Giornale d'Italia, 5 Feb. 1941. After the Italian surrender the exchange rate
was4 lowered to 10 lire to the Reichsmark.
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 19 Mar. 1942.
6
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 Apr. 1942.

168

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

lands, Croatia and Rumania". The figure of 718 million RM
paid by the foreign workers of certain European countries to the
German exchange authorities therefore represented, as this officiai
National Socialist publication emphasised, "only a portion" of
the amounts transmitted by all foreigners to the German clearing
agency during the period of approximately two and a half years.
The 1943 report of the Bank for International Settlements in
Basle stated that the monthly wage remittances of foreign workers
from some 17 countries rose from an average of 10 million RM in
1940 to an average of 60 million RM in the first few months of
1943.1
These figures tally with a report published in the summer of
1943 in Switzerland 2 on the wage remittances of German-employed
foreigners destined for 17 European countries and territories. The
report stated that the wage remittances destined for the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, the Netherlands and the GovernmentGeneral 3 were not included, because these regions were considered
German territory as far as the German clearing system was concerned. Excluding, therefore, these three regions, the wage remittances amounted to:
109.0 million R M
382.7
"
"
605.6
"
"
203.3
"
"
Total:

in 1940
in 1941
in 1942
in the first four months of 1943

1,300.6 million R M from January 1940 to April 1943, inclusive.

The amounts which "Eastern" workers were able to set aside
for their dependants were pitiably small. Out of the sum of 1,300.6
million RM reported to have been set aside for transfer by foreign
workers from 17 occupied territories up to the end of April 1943,
only 7J¿> million RM were, according to the same source, destined
for dependants of "Eastern" workers, an average equivalent to
less than one Reichsmark per worker per year. By the spring of
1943 the transfers for these eastern territories had, on the average,
reached one million RM a month, which was still very much less
1

B A N K FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS: 13th Annual

Report,

April

1942—31 March 1943 (Basle, autumn 1943), p. 6 1 . T h e report adds t h a t the
increase of Germany's clearing indebtedness by some 7,000 million R M during
the year 1942 was to a considerable degree caused by these wage remittances
from foreign workers.
2
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 30 June 1943.
3
According to the official comment on the transfer rules by Dr. Timm {Der
Einsatz ausländischer Arbeitskräfte in Deutschland, 1942, p . 20), the region of
Byalistok, and not the Government-General, was included in the German currency
area. However, the discrepancy in the actual figures cannot be very great,
in view of the small amounts which the .workers both from the GovernmentGeneral and the region of Byalistok were able to set aside for transfer home.

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

169

than half a Reichsmark per worker a month. Compared with the
then monthly average remittance of 60 million RM, this represented
less than 2 per cent, of all remittances, whereas the number of
"Eastern" workers was a t that time well over 50 per cent, of all
foreigners deported for work in Germany.
At the end of 1943, German sources estimated that Germany's
debt for foreign advance payments of wage remittances totalled
2,000 million RM. Most probably this figure did not include the
very considerable transfers made within the German currency
system to dependants of Czechoslovak and Netherlands workers
(as well as the small amounts paid to dependants in the occupied
eastern territories).
Without a thorough examination of German financial manipulations during the war, it is impossible to ascertain whether the 2,000
million RM which, until 1943, the various European countries are
estimated to have paid on behalf of Germany under the heading
of wage transfers, actually represent the sum total of remittances
made by foreign workers to the German Central Clearing Office
up to that time, and what were the amounts subsequently remitted
by them.
At the present stage, it is only possible to indicate the magnitude of the scheme. For example, the extent to which the
German clearing system burdened the economy of France (the
transfer scheme between Germany and France was in force
from November 1940) can be seen from the figures published by
the Bank for International Settlements 1 :
FRENCH BUDGET AND TREASURY ACCOUNTS
(in 1,000 millions of French francs)
Expenditure — budget
Armistice:
Occupation costs
German deficit on clearing
Treasury advances and sundry charges
Total Treasury outlay
Taxation and other ordinary revenue
Total Treasury credit
1

financing

1941

1942

1943

122

133

144

130
12

124>g
33

210
50

266

305J^

419

102

187

209J^

317

B A N K FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, op. cit., p . 193. I t will be noted

t h a t clearing transactions and occupation costs are accounted for separately.
This used to be the case for all German-occupied countries, with the exception of
Denmark, where occupation levies were compensated against t h e clearing
transactions. In the case of the French budget, large amounts were paid out of
the occupation costs to workers employed for t h e German armed forces in
France, especially on the fortifications and " r o b o t " bomb-launching sites built
by the Todt Organisation.

170

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

The payments made by France on account of the wage transfers
of French workers are included in the item "German deficit on
clearing" ("advances by the French Treasury to the French Clearing Office to finance the deficit on Franco-German clearing"). 1
According to this source, the item increased from 12,000 million
French francs in 1941 to 33,000 million in 1942 and 50,000 million
in 1943.
On the French side, most of the monetary transactions involving
German-employed French workers were carried out by the Crédit
Lyonnais. According to preliminary information collected by the
French authorities after liberation 2 , the Crédit Lyonnais made the
following payments to the debit of Germany (in French francs):
Payments on the basis of transfer notifications (3,808,862
notifications) sent from Germany between 1 November
and 31 July 1944 (exchange value of 490,711,920 R M )
Payments for leave cheques (chèques permissionnaires)
issued
in Germany (exchange value of 4,265,499 R M )
Payments for leave vouchers (bons de permissionnaires)
presented by French workers while on home leave
Total

9,814,238,400
85,309,980
1,667,562,792
11,567,111,172

The same preliminary investigation revealed that the remittances made by French workers in Germany, and thus the payments made by the Crédit Lyonnais to French assignees, were particularly high in May 1944, and then fell off during the last two
months of German occupation:
May 1944
June 1944
July 1944

Frs. 846,046,696 (275,176 individual
" 661,600,790(219,573
"
" 466,990,293(154,423
"

transfers)
"
)
"
)

It is interesting to note that as late as .15 July 1944 Pierre
Laval, in the name of the Vichy régime, issued a law3 authorising
the Vichy Government to guarantee to indemnify, within one
month, the French banks for the errors occurring in these transactions "owing to interruptions or difficulties of communication"
(with Germany). This was done to encourage the continuation of
payments of "transferred" amounts despite the decreasing number
of transfer orders arriving from Germany.
The French authorities have ascertained that the sums paid
out by French institutions on behalf of Germany were never actually
transmitted to France from Germany, but merely credited within
the framework of the clearing.
1

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, op. cit., p. 193, footnote 5.
The information on France in the following paragraphs was furnished to the
I.L.O. in January 1945 by the French Ministry of Prisoners of War, Deported
Persons and Refugees.
3
No. 385 of 15 July 1944 concerning the transfer of savings of French workers
i n Germany; Journal officiel, 26 July 1944.
2

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

171

For Belgium, the technical arrangements were different, but the
result was the same: to make the German-dominated country,
and not Germany, pay exchange value of wage savings remitted
to Germany. 1 By Decree of 27 June 1940, the German Military Commander in Brussels created a special bank, called the Banque
d'Emission, empowered it to issue banknotes in Belgian francs
having the force of legal tender in occupied Belgium, and thus
provided the funds needed, among other purposes, for financing
the wage clearing.2 The bank, whose capital was 150 million francs
(15,000 shares at 10,000 francs each) was completely under German
domination. "All important measures" carried out by it were
subject to approbation by the German commissioner at the head
of it. The German Military Commander had the right to appoint
its officials. Any employee could be dismissed without notice.
The bank and its principal officers were expressly exempt from the
Belgian law concerning public supervision of banks; the amount
of banknotes issued by the Banque d'Emission had merely to be
published in the official gazette of the German Military Commander. The bank was exempt from fees and taxes of any sort,
as well as from the obligation of being entered in the Belgian commercial register.3
The Banque d'Emission did not come into contact with the
Belgian public. Individual transfer orders were handled, on the
German side, by the Deutsche Bank, which, by direct agreement
of 18 July 1940 with the Belgian Kredietbank voor Handel en Nijverheid, appointed the latter as its correspondent in Belgium. The
Kredietbank, upon receiving a transfer notification from the Deutsche
Bank, notified the Banque d'Emission and received from it the
equivalent amount in Belgian francs. After deducting a small
fee (and, when necessary, advance payments made by the Belgian
public assistance system) 4 the Kredietbank remitted these sums to
the Belgian assignees. No arrangements existed between the
Banque d'Emission and Germany regarding refunds.6
1
The information on Belgium in the following paragraphs was furnished t o
the I.L.O. in February 1945 by the Belgian Government.
* When the German Military Commander ordered that the clearing between,
Germany and Belgium should be established (10 July 1940), he stipulated that
it should be handled, on the Belgian side, by the Belgian National Bank. A few
weeks later (4 August 1940) he substituted the Banque d'Emission.
1
Articles 1, 3, 4, 11 and 12 of the Order by the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France, 27 June 1940.
* See p. 164.
6
A few months after the liberation of Belgium, the Belgian National Bank
stated t h a t between May 1940 and July 1944, Belgium paid out approximately
65,000 million francs in "conversion costs", 85,000 million francs for home affairs
and 72,000 million francs for occupation costs, making a total of 222,000 million
Belgian francs (quoted in Bulletin of the International Federation of Trade Unions,
1 Dec. 1944, p. 5).

. 172

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

The Banque d' Emission also furnished the money for similar
payments made on behalf of Germany for Belgians working in the
Todt Organisation. These transactions, however, were not carried
out by the Kredietbank, but by the Brussels branch of a French
bank, the Banque de,Paris et des Pays-Bas. The Banque de Paris
et des Pays-Bas had also to pay, through the German-dominated
French-Belgian clearing house of the Banque de France (the French
National Bank), the wage transfers of Belgians deported by Germany
into France. 1 The payments made by the Banque de Paris et des
Pays-Bas for these categories of Belgian workers were estimated at
more than 2,000 million francs.
A preliminary investigation by the Belgian authorities after
the liberation established that Belgium had paid out, during the
German occupation, approximately 13,220 million Belgian francs
under the heading of wage transfers. This sum does not include
the transactions carried out by the Banque de Paris et des PaysBas. Altogether, when the Germans left, the Banque d'Emission
showed a deficit of approximately 63,000 million francs.
As to occupied Denmark, the report of the Danish National
Bank for the year 1944 showed an item of 250 million Danish
crowns as wage advances for deported Danish workers among the
"other obligations" listed in the clearing account with Germany. 2
It should be noted that the French, Belgian and Danish figures
given above are not only preliminary, but also are not intended to
represent the sum total of payments made on behalf of Germany.
Probably the biggest additional item, as far as the labour recruitment scheme is concerned, are the benefits and services paid in
the countries of origin by the native social insurance institutions
and charged to the debit of the German social insurance institutions (see Chapter XIV).
*
*

The establishment of a currency union between Germany and
certain German-occupied countries did not put the latter in a
more favourable situation. For example, after a customs union
had been established between Germany and the Netherlands in
November 1940, a currency union between them was introduced,
beginning on 1 April 1941. This did not mean that Netherlands
1
Order of the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France of 10
February 1942. Before t h a t date, these wage transfers had been handled by the
German regional labour office in Brussels.
2
Quoted in Bulletin of International Federation of Trade Unions, 1 Dec. 1944,
p. 6.

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

173

currency was superseded in the Netherlands by the Reichsmark.
It meant that transfers of funds could be made in limited amounts
from one country to the other and could be exchanged without
restriction at the fixed rate of 132.7 RM for 100 Netherlands guilders. The establishment of a currency union, accompanied by the
maintenance of a separate currency and of a separate note-issuing
bank, facilitated, in fact, the exploitation of the Netherlands.
According to calculations by a Netherlands economist who lived
in the Netherlands during the occupation, Germany's debt to
the Netherlands, which included payments for goods and services,
etc., amounted to approximately 500 million guilders. On 1 April
1941, when the currency union was introduced and the clearing
abolished, the clearing debt of approximately 500 million guilders
was cancelled, as a partial offset to the German occupation costs.
Under the currency union agreement, the Netherlands Bank
(instead of the Netherlands Treasury) had to advance guilders to
Netherlands exporters against their claims on Germany. The claims
accumulating as a result of Netherlands export surpluses were
noted on the books of the Netherlands Bank as foreign assets.
In other words, the Netherlands Bank had to finance the exploitation of its own country. The President of the Bank, Dr. Trip,
refused to apply this policy and resigned shortly before the currency
union came into effect. He was succeeded by one of the leading
Netherlands National Socialists, Marinus Rost van Tonningen,
who announced that the Netherlands Bank was ready and willing to
carry out the new tasks involved by collaboration in building up
the "greater Germanic living space" 1 ; since Berlin was to be the
financial centre of the new "living space" the increase in the Reichsmark holdings of the Netherlands Bank (which had caused some unnecessary anxiety) represented, he maintained, a valuable credit
in the Third Reich.
At the beginning of the German occupation, the foreign
holdings of the Netherlands Bank amounted to 750,000 guilders;
after one year under the currency union, at the end of the financial
year 1941-42, they had risen to 1,204 million guilders. 2
For the purpose of the present study it is important to notice
that, among the payments made by the Netherlands Bank on
behalf and on account of Germany, were listed the wage savings
sent home by Netherlanders working in Germany. No figures are
available which permit an estimate of the amount of this item.
1
Statement by Rost van Tonningen in the Annual Report of the Netherlands
Bank for the year 1940-41 (June 1941).
2
This figure was composed of: foreign bills: 1,129 guilders; foreign currency:
15 million guilders; and other claims: 60 million guilders.

174

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

It was however comparatively small compared with the other
items, namely: payments for German purchases of goods in the
Netherlands; payments to Netherlands firms working on German
contracts 1 ; investments and repayment of debts owed to the Netherlands by Germany and other countries participating in the German multilateral clearing scheme; and, finally, occupation
costs.
During the financial year 1942-43 the foreign (i.e., almost
entirely German) assets on the books of the Netherlands Bank
again more than doubled, and amounted, on 1 March 1943, to 2,221
million guilders. By June 1944, according to a statement by the
Bank, they reached a total of 4,205 million guilders.
*

As the war continued, the discrepancy between the relatively
stable prices of rationed goods2 in Germany, and the inflated
prices in the German-dominated countries steadily increased.
However, the official exchange rates prescribed by Germany did
not reflect this development, and remained in most cases unchanged.
For within the system of forced loans implicit in the multilateral
clearing and currency union scheme, the maintenance of artificially
low exchange rates was a matter of indifference to Germany; what
counted was that the system would have become even more complicated had Germany allowed the exchange rates to vary, and
that the stability of the Reichsmark as compared with the inflated
currencies of the dominated countries made the Reichsmark the
"safest" currency. One consequence of this policy was that, since
the exchange value of the transferred wage savings did not keep
pace with the inflationary trends in the workers' countries of origin,
the purchasing power of these wage transfers decreased proportionately. 3 One of the measures envisaged in Sauckel's fifteenpoint programme for the second part of 1944 was to guarantee to
foreign workers a wage transfer with stable purchasing power, as
1
The Central Order Office in the Hague estimated the total value of German
orders placed in the Netherlands, up to May 1942, a t 2,500 million R M ; cf.
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 7 Mar. 1942; Kölnische Zeitung, 13 June 1942.
2
Under the impact of the steadily deteriorating situation, prices of nonrationed and black-market goods got out of hand towards the end of 1944 in
Germany as well. Das Schwarze Korps wrote indignantly on 28 December 1944:
" I t is intolerable t h a t the foreign black market prices, laughed a t as curiosities
a year ago, almost have an official hue today . . . and t h a t the rubbish offered in
department stores a t shameless prices loudly proclaims the depreciation of our
money". However, a t t h a t time the "transfer" scheme had lost most of its importance, because so large a part of Europe had been liberated.
3
Völkischer Beobachter, 18 Aug. 1944.

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

175

an additional inducement to higher output. 1 Moreover, the reconquest of more and more territory by the armies of the United
Nations and the defection of Germany's allies restricted the application of the wage transfer scheme during the later stages of the war.
By October 1944, transfers to Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland,
France, Rumania, the Government-General and the eastern territories had been suspended. Yet workers from these countries were
officially urged to continue remitting their savings to the Deutsche
Bank for later transfer. 2 It appears that in those cases in which
employers made automatic deductions for wage transfers (in accordance with a clause in the labour contract) no change was made.
The remittances therefore continued to flow into the Deutsche
Bank for transfer, on the foreigners' behalf, to countries no longer
within reach of the National Socialist authorities.
*
*

Although public discussion of the system was practically
impossible, some opposition to it developed in the countries
affected. On 24 October 1943, the German-dominated Antwerp
paper, Volk en rtaat, published one of the extremely rare articles
revealing the great concern of informed Belgian circles at Germany's
everrincreasing clearing debt to Belgium:
In 1941 there was a great deal of discussion when the credit side of the clearing account amounted to some 7,000 million Belgian francs. Today our clearing
credit is hardly ever mentioned, though it has risen to 44,000 million francs—
a sum equivalent to more than half of our paper currency and to one third of our
national debt . . . it is still growing a t an ever increasing rate.
Between 1 January 1942 and October 1942 our claims rose from 7,900 million
to 20,000 million—that is, by 12,000 million. In 1943, during the corresponding
period, they increased from 24,000 million to 44,000 million—that is, by 20,000
million, or 165 per cent, of last year's increase.
We do not know the details of the clearing debt, that is, how much is due to
delivery of goods to Germany and how much to the payment of wages of our
workers in Germany. But, as the number of those workers has considerably increased since 1942, the sharp rise of Germany's debt must be attributed largely
to additional wage payments.
The fact remains that our rapidly increasing clearing credit gravely affects
business at home. Our bank of issue is now chiefly employed in paying out advances to those affected by the clearing, that is, .merchants, wage earners, etc.
1
"Sauckel's 15 Punkte Programm", in Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 20 Aug.
1944.
2
The German authorities decided t h a t Italians working in Germany should
continue to receive separation allowances even if they were not able, owing
to military events, to transfer them home. According to a statement of the
Commissioner-General for Manpower, the same practice was followed with
respect to other nationalities (Der Angriff, 1 Oct. 1944).

176

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

More and more paper money has had to be issued. . . with all the corresponding
price increases.

Hungary and Slovakia, in order to limit the additional burden
imposed by this scheme, forbade their nationals to make remittances
unless they had provided themselves with a "bank permit" from
Hungary or Slovakia. The Hungarian and Slovak authorities reserved to themselves the right to examine each individual case and
the German regulations provided that no Hungarian or Slovak
worker was allowed to remit money to the German central clearing
agency unless he was in possession of a bank permit issued by
his own Government. 1 These efforts were not in fact very effective. According to an analysis published over a pseudonym in the
summer of 1943 in a German-language Budapest paper 2 , the clearing
assets of the Slovak National Bank (difference between total
liabilities and total assets on its clearing accounts) rose from 398.2
million Slovak crowns in 1940, to 845.1 million in 1941 and 1,575.2
million in 1942. " I t goes without saying", the article commented,
" t h a t the Slovak authorities, and especially the National Bank,
are very anxious to decrease these high clearing assets. By far
the largest part of them consist of demands on the German Reich,
and it appears almost impossible for the demands to be paid
within the foreseeable future."
Between early September 1943 and February 1944, while
German-employed Italians continued to remit their savings to the
Deutsche Bank for transfer, the Republican Fascist régime in
northern Italy refused to pay out the equivalent sums to the
families, and merely paid "advances". Considerable pressure had
obviously been needed to overcome Mussolini's resistance at this
point. In an Order of 5 February 19443, Fritz Sauckel announced
that new arrangements had been made between Germany and the
Italian Government (meaning the Republican Fascist régime)
and that, among other matters, the sums paid by the Italians in
Germany since September 1943 should "now, without any delay"
be made available to the Italian families by the Italians. He reasserted the principle that German-employed Italians could
"transfer" their wage savings only through payment, via the employer, to the collective account {Sammelkonto) "Workers from
Italy" at the Deutsche Bank in Berlin. The Order also forbade the
transfer of any savings from wages earned before 1 July 1943. Since
it limited the liabilities of the Italian funds, this provision may
1

STILLER, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 367.
" M " (Bratislava): "Slovakia Fights for a Stable Currency", in Südost
Echo, 6 Aug. 1943, p. 257.
'Reichsarbeitsbtatt,
25 Mar. 1944, Part I, p. 113.
s

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

177

have been a concession by the German authorities (at the expense,
it is true, of the dependent families in Italy). The Turin !paper
Stampa, in an article obviously inspired by the German occupying authorities, stated early in April 1944, that Italians who went
to Germany to work would be allowed to send home 60 per cent.
of their earnings.
German officials occasionally referred cautiously to the growing
indebtedness of the Reich and advanced various arguments to
allay the concern of informed circles. One of the main arguments,
addressed equally to Germany and the German-dominated countries, was that Germany's growing debt was bound to link the postwar fate of Europe even closer to the post-war fate of Germany,
since only a victorious Germany would be able to settle these
debts.
The methods by which the German authorities proposed to
discharge German liabilities again reflected National Socialist
ideology. The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs, Walter Funk,
for example, speaking at Klagenfurt, Austria, in April 1942,
maintained, without expressly mentioning the machinery of wage
transfers, that
after the victorious conclusion of the war, the problem of war indebtedness
could be solved within a relatively short period of time, because we can count
on cheap labour and cheap raw materials on a large scale for the German economic
system. The price of goods thus manufactured will be considerably below the
general German price level. The difference thus resulting will serve to redeem
our war debts and also to preserve the value of our currency. The high standard
of living of the German people will thus be guaranteed. 1

Later on, outright cancellation of the debt was more and more
openly advocated. In the summer of 1943 Dr. Landfried, State
Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, outlined a
scheme for dealing with the German clearing debt. 2 He asserted
that a basic distinction must be made between clearing debts
resulting from the import of commodities, and debts resulting from
other sources, "in the first place, transfer remittances", payment
of freights and other services rendered by foreign countries. This
distinction, he argued, was highly important, because German
debts for imports of commodities were largely offset by German
claims for German commodities delivered to foreign countries;
and although the Reich's direct trade clearing debt was greater
than it would have been if German prices had risen as fast as did
1

News report, Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, 25 Apr. 1942.
"Die Clearing-Verschuldung des Reiches", in Deutsche
Bergwerks-Zeitung,
S Aug. 1943; cf. "Defence Expenditure Must not Burden the Clearing Balance",
by a Berlin correspondent in Stockholms-Tidningen,
7 Aug. 1943.
s

178

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

those of foreign goods1, he maintained that the Reich succeeded in
balancing the import of goods from most European countries by
the export of German goods.2
Yet the State Secretary readily admitted that "the accounts of a
number of States show balances in their favour and that they will
later on be given opportunities to liquidate them through the purchase of commodities from Germany". Foreign claims resulting
from wage "transfers", Dr. Landfried asserted, were not real
debts. The payments made by these countries on behalf of their
German-employed citizens were connected "with the full utilisation of Europe's assets for the defence of the Continent". The
implication was that Germany should, in the future, collect its
commercial debts ("real" debts), while the foreign countries should
not insist on being compensated for their expenses in the "full
utilisation of Europe's assets" for Germany's war.
At this point, Dr. Landfried was asked by the interviewer
whether it would not be logical to make a clean sweep and to
distinguish between clearing debts for commodities received, and
clearing debts for the common European war effort, the latter
including wage transfers. He was not unequivocally in favour of
such a step, but asserted that the situations in the various parts
1
In the winter of 1942-43, Germany established a price equalisation fund,
initially endowed with 1,000 million R M , in order to bring down prices of imported goods (13th Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements, Basle,
autumn 1943, pp. 61, 86). Under a German-French agreement of 14 April
1942, French export prices remained free, b u t charges were to be levied on the
difference between the free export prices and the fixed prices for t h e same commodities on the internal French market; the charges in question were to be credited
to an equalisation fund (caisse de péréquation) from which subsidies were to be
granted to French importers of essential German commodities (ibid., p. 66).
2
According to Dr. Kirchfeld, of t h e Foreign Trade Department in the Reich
Ministry of Economic Affairs, the export and import figures were as follows:

Million RM
Imports

Exports

— Import surplus
-+- Export surplus

1938
6,050
5,620
— 430
1939
4,800
5,200
+400
1940
5,000
4,900
— 100
1941
5,900
6,800
— 100
1942
8,700
7,600
—1,100
1943
8,260
8,590
+ 330
The explanation for the surprising change from an import surplus of 1,100
million R M in 1942 to an exportsurplus of 330 million R M in 1943, was explained by
t h e Economist (London), 2 Sept. 1944 (p. 322) with thiee reasons: (1) the export
surplus resulted largely from statistical changes made for propaganda purposes
to conceal the mounting German clearingdebts; (2) the figures also reflected changes
in import and export prices: the latter changes, in particular, were to Germany's
advantage; (3) the number of German-employed foreign workers had increased
by several millions in 1943 and they produced in Germany what they would
otherwise have produced a t home for export to Germany. On the basis of these
German figures, the Economist estimated that the German direct trade clearing
debt amounted a t the end of 1943 to approximately 1,000 million R M .

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

179

of Europe were too different to allow a uniform procedure. He
admitted, however, that if such a distinction were made, a solution
would have to be found whereby the second category of debts
would "cease to increase Germany's clearing indebtedness". This
was a cautious reference to the possibility of cancelling Germany's
debts for the foreign countries' advance payments on account of
wage remittances, either by declaring those payments a contribution to the common European war effort, or by crediting them
to reparation accounts. It is noteworthy that official German
sources refrained from making any explicit statements concerning
reparation settlements after a German victory. 1
As has been said, German sources estimated that Germany's
debt for foreign advance payments of wage remittances totalled
2,000 million RM by the end of 1943. This sum was small
in comparison with the total national debt, estimated on 11
December 1943 at 111,000 million RM (funded) and 142,000
million RM (floating). Nevertheless, proposals for its amortisation continued to be made, on the assumption of a German
victory. One of them aimed at persuading foreign countries after
the war to issue internal loans for the amounts owed by Germany,
and to strike the claims out of their respective budgets. Subscribers
to the loan would receive priority in the delivery of German machines, quality products, etc., after the war. The loan would also
be negotiable on the stock exchange. 2
The settlement of the debts incurred by Germany during the
war through this system of wage transfers, will obviously be one
of the financial problems to be settled after the end of the war.
OTHER MONETARY

MEASURES

German foreign exchange regulations contained a further
provision which acted as an inducement to foreigners to remit to
the German central exchange agency whatever they were able to
save. Upon leaving Reich territory, foreign workers were as a
matter of principle forbidden to take any appreciable sum with
them. German regulations concerning the maximum amount a
worker might take with him when returning home varied according
1
For example, in a radio speech in April 1944, the Reich Minister of Finance,
Schwerin von Krosigk, exhorted Germans not to worry about the increasing
national debt because: (1) increase of public debt went hand in hand with decrease of private debts; (2) the debts would be largely compensated by the addition of huge fertile territories in the West and the East; and (3) the Reich debts
were fundamentally a debt of the German people to itself, so that its amortisation or anyway, long-term funding, could and must be effected after the war
(quoted in Die Zeitung (London), 21 Apr. 1944).
1
De Telegraaf (Amsterdam), 13 July 1944, quoting an article by Reich Minister
of Economic Affairs, Walter Funk, in the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

180

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

to nationalities. For example, in the middle of 1942 Belgians and
French were forbidden to take with them any German money a t
all, but were permitted to cross the frontier with Belgian or French
francs up to an exchange value of 300 RM. In addition, and as a
special privilege, those French workers who had not transferred as
much money to their families as they were authorised to do could
purchase, up to the remaining amount, money orders of the Deutsche
Bank issued in denominations of 10, 20, and 50 RM, drawn on the
Crédit Lyonnais.
These money orders were exchangeable into
French francs when presented personally by the bearer at the
Paris or any other French branch of the Crédit Lyonnais.1 In an
Order of 18 February 1944, Sauckel reminded employers that these
wage-saving money orders could be issued only to French workers
who were in possession of a special German identification card
(Bankausweis). The Order also pointed out that difficulties had
arisen because it took at least a month for the Deutsche Bank to
issue the money orders, whereas most French workers left at very
short notice. 2 On the other hand Bulgarians were only allowed to
export 10 RM, and Finns 10 RM plus 100 Finnmarks (in coin only).
By an Order of the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs, of
29 April 19433, even Danes, who were among the most favoured
labour recruits, were forbidden to take with them upon their return
more than 10 RM in Danish currency.
The Völkischer Beobachter stated in February 1944 that "guest
workers are also interested in a German victory, because they have
left savings in Germany which can acquire purchasing power only
if the European economy is organised for peace after the victory". 4
In the spring of 1944, an Order by the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs allowed Italian workers to take 5 RM with them only
if they promised to return to Germany to work. Otherwise they
were not allowed to take any money at all. 6
Returning foreign workers were warned again and again that
any violation of the regulations would result in confiscation of the
money found on them and that they would also be liable to punishment. They were further warned that they would have no opportunity to exchange German money into their own currency, either
at the frontier or in their own countries. These provisions and the
favourable rate of exchange granted by the official German clearing exchange agency all served as further inducements to foreigners
to remit as much money as possible to the agency.
1
2
3
4
6

Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 385 et seq.
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Mar. 1944, P a r t I, p. 114.
Idem, No. 15, 25 May 1943, Part I, p. 302.
Quoted in Die Zeitung (London), 25 Feb. 1944, p. 11.
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1944, Part V, p. 98.

PROVISION FOR DEPENDANTS

181

From the standpoint of this report, the most far-reaching and
significant of the various currency reforms and monetary schemes
were those introduced in the German-occupied parts of the Ukraine.
The Germans first created a special banking institution called the
"Ukrainian Bank", which was empowered to issue its own banknotes
(Order of 5 March 1942). The principal officials of the Ukrainian
Bank and many of its employees were Germans. By Order of 5
July 1942 the "karbowanez" was introduced as the new monetary
unit, and made the only legal tender. All roubles had to be exchanged for karbowanez. However, "from motives of monetary
policy" the Germans ordered that at first rouble notes in circulation, except the smallest denominations, should not actually be
exchanged into karbowanez notes, but that special accounts should
be opened for persons handing in rouble notes. By Order of the
Reich Commissioner of 1 December 1942, that is, five months
after the population had been compelled to hand in their rouble
notes for exchange, amounts up to 150 roubles were allowed to be
paid out in karbowanez to the owners of these special accounts.
It was officially declared that the remaining sums would "be paid
at a later date". 1 These measures amounted to "freezing" all funds
and to depriving the Ukrainian population of the use of their individual and collective savings. The policy thus exerted additional
pressure on the Ukrainians to accept employment in Germany.
No information is available on the measures taken by Germany
concerning wage transfers in the period of the war when the military
successes of the United Nations were increasingly separating the
Reich from the countries of its foreign labour recruits. But on the
basis of the available information on Germany's economic situation in that stage of the war, it can safely be assumed that, owing
to the acute shortage of consumer goods, foreign workers in the
better income brackets were not able and were not allowed to spend
the income left to them after payment of board, taxes and social
insurance contributions. At least as far as workers recruited in
the formerly occupied Soviet territories are concerned, there are
indications that parts of their earnings were still deducted and
deposited with the Central Clearing Office (for transfer at a later
date). If, however, the transfer arrangements were abandoned,
foreign workers, owing to the shortage of consumer goods, were
forced either to keep their savings themselves, or to deposit them in
German banks or savings institutions. Under the general German
exchange control regulations, these accounts were blocked, which
meant that no funds drawn from them could be sent beyond the
1

Report of the German Reichsbank for 1942.

182

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

frontier, either in German or in other currency. Even before military
events cut off foreign workers from their own countries, some of
them deposited their wage savings in blocked accounts in German
banks and savings institutions; upon their return home, they were
forbidden to take these savings with them across the frontier. 1
It is therefore to be expected that a t the end of the war, large
sums of money will be distributed over many accounts in German
banks and savings institutions throughout Germany and its
annexed territories.

For exceptions for French workers, see p. 180.

CHAPTER XIII
MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS'
RESISTANCE
When the Germans initiated their recruiting drive they
hoped that at least many workers coming from the less developed
regions of Europe would find the conditions offered to them in
Germany better than those at home, or that they would be impressed by the size and efficiency of the German war effort. On
the other hand, the Third Reich offered to certain industrial countries, particularly to France, the inducement of absorbing the unemployed. Much was always made of the promise that the remittances which German-employed workers would send home would
improve the situation of their families.
However, the expectation that, for these and other reasons, a
considerable portion of the labour recruits would be converted to
the German cause was not fulfilled. There was continual and increasing opposition among the millions of foreign workers compelled to contribute to the German war effort, mostly against their
will and mostly under very unfavourable conditions.
Opposition took many forms. The continuous struggle of the
foreign populations against the German labour drives culminated,
to mention two outstanding examples, in France in the formation
of the Maquis, and in Yugoslavia in the strengthening of the Yugoslav patriot army. Anti-collaborationists invented various devices
to slow down the work of the recruitment agencies, e.g., the insertion of false information in official blank forms, deluging officials
with time-wasting questions, making the most of language difficulties, and destroying files and documents of the labour offices.1
Recruiting officials were often ambushed and killed.2 In Germany
1
In isolated cases the German authorities decided to stop or interrupt the
recruitment of small groups of foreign workers when difficulties became too
great. For example, in November 1942, the Commissioner-General for Manpower
informed all German labour offices and regional labour offices that "the recruitment
of Greek workers for the Reich territories was to be stopped at that date, since
the use of Greek workers in the Reich had, for climatic reasons, led to difficulties"
(Circular of 7 November 1942; Reichsarbeitsblatt, Part I, p. 519).
* For instance, between 5 April and 10 May 1943 eight officials in occupied
Poland were killed, among them the Chief of the Warsaw Labour Office, Hoffman,

(Footnote continued overleaf)

184

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

the opposition of deported workers took many forms, culminating in acts of sabotage and desertion.
In isolated cases, the opposition of foreign workers was officially
acknowledged, as when Das Schwarze Korps, the organ of the S.S.,
wrote 1 that "in Germany, millions of foreigners move around who
cannot be counted among our most cordial friends", or when,
discussing the labour supply for the 1942 harvest, Arbeitseinsatz
und Arbeitslosenhilfe stated editorially that "the importation of
workers from the Government-General and the eastern territories
as well as from other countries met at first with considerable difficulties". However, "the hatred revealed by our adversaries' campaign against our measures proves better than anything else that
we are on the right road". 2 In an address to all labour allocation
services of Greater Germany, Fritz Sauckel declared that his administration was determined to "carry out with German thoroughness whatever order our incomparable and most beloved Führer
Adolf Hitler may give us, so as to meet all the demands of war. . .
Let the enemies of National Socialist Greater Germany, that is,
the plutocrats, the Jews, and the Bolshevist-Stalinist cliques, hate
us even more than they do already. It is only an honour and our
greatest reason for pride." On 25 February 1943, Dr. Sauckel for
the first time openly denounced "trouble-makers, agitators and
malicious saboteurs, and reactionary and Red Front persons among
the foreign workers" and spoke of "malicious persons who, though
their number is infinitesmal, want to disturb the peace of.German
factories". 3 In order to suppress this opposition, the authorities
made systematic use of the wide range of methods put at their
disposal by the National Socialist régime. The longer the war
lasted, the more were all these types of pressure applied.
his deputy, Dietz, and a leading Gestapo agent, Geist. At the end of June, Kurt
Ritter, a high official, was killed a t the German Labour Office of Skierniewiece.
Wilhelm Kube, one of the chief organisers of the mass deportations from White
Russia, and Julius Ritter, who performed similar functions in France, were
killed on 21 and 28 September 1943 respectively. During the war, the Reich
Minister of Labour, Franz Seldte, published in every issue of the official gazette
of the Reich Ministry of Labour, the Reichsarbeitsblatt, a list of war death casualties among the officials of the labour administration service who were in the armed
forces or the S.S. These lists distinguished between officials who had "died in
action" {gefallen), who had "died" {verstorben), who had "died of wounds" {infolge Verwundung verstorben), and who had " m e t with a fatal accident" {tödlich
verunglückt). There is no indication whether these lists included officials killed
or wounded while discharging their duties in the labour administration.
1
Quoted in Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 3 Dec. 1942.
2
Reprinted in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Jan. 1943, p. 9.
3
Reprinted in Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 7, 5 Mar. 1943, Part I, p. 136. If the
propaganda was aimed a t the German population, harsh treatment of foreigners
was explained as a socialist measure. Thus, Professor Heinrich H U N K E wrote in
Deutsche Volkswirtschaft (1943, No. 4, p. 98): " E v e r y social consideration which
after the war would be deemed indispensable b u t which today would deprive
the front of a single man or would weaken our armament, is unsocialistic".

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

185

In Germany, control of civilian workers—apart from supervision by employers and German foremen—was in the hands of the
German Labour Front, the camp commanders, the camp and
factory guards,, the ordinary police and the political police (Gestapo). Some categories of foreign workers were also controlled by
supervisors of their own nationality. Officials of the Labour Front
• supervised and controlled all aspects of the foreigners' lives, including their accommodation, canteens, transportation to and from
work, and spare-time activities. The regulations expressly stated
that this supervision was not restricted to foreigners housed in
mass accommodation, but extended to those who lived in private
residences.1 In particular, it was the duty of the Labour Front to
keep a continuous check on the labour output of foreign workers
and the state of their morale.
The Labour Front, with its wide ramifications, mainly exercised
administrative control. Wherever there were considerable numbers
of foreign labourers actual physical policing was done by factory
and camp guards. These guards, who were often armed, had to be
supplied by the plants, but were trained by officials of the German
Labour Front, under whose control they remained while on duty.*
SUPERVISION BY FOREIGN DELEGATES

The German authorities encouraged the supervision of
foreign workers by delegates from their own countries. As
Dr. Mende, head of the Office for Labour Allocation of the
German Labour Front, wrote in October 19423, "foreign groups
and organisations which are ready to collaborate are being increasingly asked to do so in connection with the allocation of
foreign workers". He defined three methods of organising this
supervision: the grant of increased authority to foreign consuls;
the exercise by foreign authorities of their own system of supervision over their fellow countrymen; and a system of collaboration
between German and foreign agencies, with the Germans in the
leading position. The first method could not be used because "the
Labour Front is unable to control and supervise foreign consuls,
owing to their special legal position". But it was considered desirable to make large use of foreign supervisors, provided that they
acted "under the leadership and direction of the German Labour
Front". Within this framework the foreign representatives "enjoy
a considerable amount of autonomy".
1

Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 204.
* Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 July 1942, P a r t I, p. 332.
3
"Ausländer betreuen ausländische Arbeiter", in Monatshefte für
politik, Oct. 1942, pp. 175 et seq.

NS-Sozial-

186

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

A first experiment was made in the summer of 1938, when
officials of the Fascist Federation of Italian Labour
(C.F.L.I.)
were sent to Germany to supervise Italian workers in Germany,
in co-operation with the Labour Front. The Labour Front later
concluded similar agreements with foreign Governments or
organisations, establishing uniform rules for the control of
their respective nationals. In these cases it was agreed that "a .
major portion of the fees paid by foreign workers to the German
Labour Front shall be transferred to the foreign supervisory agencies, or otherwise be used for the benefit of the foreigners". 1
Subject always to overriding control by the German Labour
Front, the foreign delegates were permitted to exercise supervision
a t three levels:
(a) at the Head Office of the German Labour Front;
(b) at the Gau administration (regional offices) of the German'
Labour Front;
(c) in the camps and plants.
According to the directives issued to foreign delegates the
second form of supervision was the most important. In the autumn
of 1942, the Gau liaison delegates (Gauverbindungsmänner) had
to fulfil the following functions:
assist the German Labour Front in the supervision of foreign workers and
in the solution of their collective problems in the plants and camps; contribute to the establishment of good relations between the German population
and the foreigners; stimulate the foreigners' zeal and output; and influence them
by education to maintain order and discipline.

For these purposes the Gau liaison delegates were permitted,
always under the control of the Labour Front, to keep in direct
contact with foreign workers through letters, consultation hours
at their own offices, and visits to plants and camps; and indirectly,
through contact with the local foreign delegates, who transmitted
workers' complaints to the Gau delegates, and relayed the answers.
In these consultations any "legal information" upon workers'
rights or duties, or any instructions concerning their behaviour
a t or out of work were to be given only with the consent of the
1
Felix Lennholm, a Dane, appointed by the Germans as chief representative
of Danish workers in Germany, with headquarters in Copenhagen, asserted that
as from 1 January 1942, his organisation, the Danske Tysklandarbejderes Forening,
had become "autonomous". It had Danish liaison officers.in Germany to keep
in contact with Danish workers and to safeguard their interests. I t also helped
the families of absent workers by advancing money. According to Felix Lenn'holm, the German Labour Front paid over to his organisation the fees received
from Danish workers. Membership of the organisation was open to Danes working in Germany and cost 2 Danish crowns a year (Faedrelandet, 27 Apr. 1942). .

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

187

Labour Front in every individual case. Foreign delegates, Mende
pointed out, might otherwise give information or instructions incompatible with German orders and thus cause unrest in the plants.
Similarly, foreign delegates visiting plants or camps might meet
the German employer only in the presence of Labour Front representatives. Such visits could therefore be arranged only with
the Labour Front's permission, but on these occasions foreign delegates were allowed to talk undisturbed with their fellow countrymen.
On 26 March 1942, the "Service for French Labour in Germany"
(Service de la main d'œuvre française en Allemagne) was created
under the auspices of the Vichy Government. By order of Marshal
Pétain of 7 February 1943, the organisation ranked as a "General
Commissariat", under Commissioner-General G. Bruneton. 1 It
was the "only recognised body" for watching the interests of French
workers in Germany and their families in France. For this purpose
it created a network of delegations both in Germany and France.
It was constructed on the "leadership" principle; its delegates
possessed "complete autonomy" and were responsible only to their
superiors in the organisation. 2 In an official manual issued in
1943, the Commissariat defined its functions.* It "does not intervene in any way in the selection of the persons to depart for
Germany. Its social functions begin when the French workers
have been placed in German industry either through the general
interdepartmental labour commissariat, which is responsible for
selecting young persons for compulsory labour service, or in accordance with requisition orders from the German authorities." 3
One of the duties of the Commissariat was to discuss with the
Labour Front or the German employer any dispute arising from
the French workers' labour contracts. For this purpose, it appointed
plant delegates (délégués à"entreprise) in German firms employing
more than 20 Frenchmen and regional delegates in the district
(Gau) capital. The general delegate was attached to the central
German authorities in Berlin.4 The Commissariat also controlled all
French charitable and self-help organisations set up for the
benefit of French deportees. In France, it organised various social
services for the families who were left behind.
The extent of this collaboration should not be underestimated.
A Swiss report 5 stated that 15 European countries maintained
offices in Germany for liaison with the German authorities. On 19
1
Commissariat général à la main d'oeuvre française en Allemagne (Etat
français): Le Travail en Allemagne et la famille (Paris, 1943), p. 9.
* Act No. 79 of 6 February 1943; Journal officiel, 7 Feb. 1943, p. 363.
5
Commissariat général, op. cit., p. 21.
* Ibid., p. 63.
6
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 Aug. 1943.

188

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

October 1943, at a meeting of the chief foreign officials (Reichsgauverbindungsmänner) attached to the German Labour Front,
a high official announced that more than 500 non-German officials
held important positions in the Labour Front, with many more
working as liaison officers in the camps and plants. 1
In the spring of 1944, when Germany had lost most of the
eastern territories, Alfred Rosenberg's Ministry for the Occupied
Eastern Territories opened a "Central Agency for Easterners"
(Zentralstelle für Angehörige der Völker des Ostens). Official German
propaganda compared this agency to a consulate for the "several
million workers who had come to Germany from the distant
steppes". 2
SPOKESMEN AND COLLABORATORS

The same reasons which led the authorities of the Third Reich
to encourage the collaboration of foreign delegates, also caused the
appointment of "spokesmen" from among the foreign workers
themselves. If a German undertaking employed 20 or more foreigners (wage earners or salaried employees) of the same nationality, the German Labour Front could nominate foreign spokesmen
(ausländische Betriebsverbindungsmänner).3
Interpreters were eligible for the post, but an official commentary points out that
personality was more important than knowledge of German, which
was not therefore a requirement.
For the supervision of workers from Bohemia and Moravia, a
central "Czecho-Moravian Liaison Office" (Böhmisch-Mährische
Verbindungsstelle) was set up in Berlin.4 Its staff, called guardians
(Betreuer) or liaison officers (Reichsverbindungsmänner) were under
the jurisdiction of the Commissioner-General for Manpower. There
were several regional offices and a number of branch agencies, distributed over the territory of the old Reich, Austria and the German-annexed parts of western Poland. They had to "assist the
German Labour Front by advice and action in arranging for the
care of Czech workers". 5 The whole organisation was designed to
increase control over these workers, and at the same time to facilitate the activities of the German Labour Front. Before a Czech
was allowed to consult a liaison officer, he had first to obtain per1
Völkischer Beobachter, 20 Oct. 1943, quoted in Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, fourth quarter, 1944, p. 36.
2
Kölnische Zeitung, 3 Apr. 1944.
3
BIRKENHOLZ, m Ausländische Arbeiter, supplement, 5 Nov. 1942, pp. 204 (2)
et seq.
4
Czechoslovak Ministry of Social Welfare (London): Czechoslovak Workers
in Germany (confidential report, London, Dec. 1943), Part I, pp. 7-8, quoting
Der Neue Tag (Prague), 16 Apr. 1943.
6
Ibid., quoting Narodni Prace, 10 Apr. 1943.

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

189

mission from the camp leader, who was always an official of the
German Labour Front.
After the expulsion of the Germans from France, collaborationist Frenchmen who had taken refuge in Germany were systematically encouraged to intensify propaganda against the United
Nations among French deportees. Similar use was made of refugee
collaborators from other countries. 1 For example, early in January
1945, a "Greek National Committee" was formed in the Reich,
under the former Greek Deputy Prime Minister Hector Tsiornikos.
It was to "look after Greek national interests and the many Greek
workers in Germany". 2 A Decree of 19 January 1945 by the Mussolini Government created a new "Fascist Republican Ministry of
Labour"; soon afterwards, the labour offices in northern Italy
(whose main task was to conscript workers for Germany) were put
under the control of a newly organised Italian "General Confederation of Labour, Technicians and the Arts", which also took over,
temporarily, the care of the "Italian Labour Abroad" organisation.
COERCION AND PUNISHMENT

National Socialist criminal and police law differed from the laws
of democratic countries in seven main respects. Each of these
differences in itself markedly decreased the personal liberty and
legal rights of the individual; and in their cumulative effect they
concentrated so much uncontrolled and arbitrary power in the
hands of the authorities that the individual lost the rights of a
free man.
(1) The penal code and a vast mass of statutes, orders, and
regulations established a system of excessively rigorous punishment. National Socialist opinion openly regarded the "pitiless"
administration of the harshest possible penal system as essential
to the stability of the régime. The régime therefore abandoned
principles that had been regarded as unquestionable and elementary,
such as the abolition of torture, the equality of all men before the
law, the right of the accused to have access to evidence, his right to
avail himself of the services of a lawyer, the guarantee of minimum
rights to convicted persons, and th,e greatest possible restriction of
capital punishment.
(2) No clear distinction existed between private law offences
and criminal acts. National Socialist penal law, for example, made
it a criminal offence for a worker to refuse to fulfil his duty, or to
1
Das Schwarze Korps (official organ of the S.S.) wrote on 4 January 1945 :
"The émigrés from France, Flanders, Wallonia and Holland are not really émigrés, but the vanguard of the new times. They did not fight against, but for,
Germany; they are persecuted because they were 'collaborationists'."
1
Transocean News Agency, 9 Jan. 1945.

190

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

slow down his work, if such behaviour on his part was deemed due
to malicious intent. In the summer of 19421 the law was made even
more rigorous. It was declared to be a criminal offence for a foreign
worker to "refuse to fulfil his duty" or to "slow down his work-in a
manner incompatible with his duties", whether such behaviour was
dictated by malicious intent or not. 2
(3) One and the same act, according to National Socialist practice, could be punished by the police as well as by the courts. 3 Even
before the war it was an established practice that acquittal in a
court of law need not prevent the Gestapo from taking action. As
a matter of principle, "gypsies, foreigners or persons hostile to the
State" who had been acquitted by the courts or had served their
sentences had to be handed over to the Gestapo. The Gestapo then
decided whether they were to be taken into "protective custody" 4 ,
which, as a rule, meant detention in a concentration camp.
(4) The criminal and police laws were very vaguely worded
and thus left an enormous range of discretion to the individual
German authority. The democratic concept of the rule of law
tends, in penal matters, to protect the individual by careful limitation of the discretionary powers of the law courts and of administrative and police tribunals. The National Socialist system continuously widened these discretionary powers. The Act of 28 June
19355 formally removed from the penal code the principle of nulla
poena sine lege, and permitted the courts to punish acts, not declared punishable by the law, which the courts deemed deserving
of punishment according to "healthy popular feeling".6
The general rule permitting persons to be punished for acts
which were not prohibited was supplemented after the first great
victories in the West, when the principle of retroactivity was extended to all political crimes against the German State or German
officials committed at any time before that date, even though committed abroad and by citizens of foreign countries. Even "mali1
Decree by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 20 July 1942; Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 93, supplement, 30 Aug. 1942.
2
Under the same Decree, foreigners demanding more payment than t h a t
officially prescribed for them were declared liable to fines up to an unlimited
amount or to imprisonment up to six weeks (as were employers who yielded to
such demands, or who hired, or made efforts to hire, a foreigner engaged by
another German employer).
3
Certain categories of foreign workers were under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Gestapo (see e.g., for domestic workers, p. 155), or of special military or
police courts martial (see p. 194).
4
Regulations by the Reich Ministry of Justice, 13 April 1935.
* Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 839.
6
"Whoever commits an act which the law declares punishable or which is
deserving of punishment according to the fundamental principle of a penal law
and according to healthy popular feeling, shall be punished. Where no specific
penal law applies directly to the act, it shall be punished according to the law
the basic principle of which is best suited to it."

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

191

cious or provocative utterances against leading personalities of the
State or the National Socialist German Labour Party" 1 were
punishable under this provision.
(5) When penal or administrative proceedings were instituted,
the legal rights of the accused were reduced to a minimum; the
guarantees of a fair trial were largely abolished, and there was no
trial by jury. Reliable sources reported many cases of summary procedure against foreigners which bore no resemblance to any orderly
administration of justice.
(6) All action taken by the Gestapo and all "political" action
taken by the ordinary police were exempt from judicial review.
This principle was firmly established before the outbreak of the war. 2
(7) Apart from court and police action, there was the system
of punishment by detention in "corrective labour camps" or
"compulsory labour camps". Large numbers of foreigners employed in Germany, who were considered recalcitrant but had not
committed punishable acts, were sentenced to "corrective" or
"compulsory" labour. For example, at the end of 1942, the Commissioner-General for Manpower ordered that "in cases of contravention against discipline" workers could be "removed to a labour
camp, a correctional camp, or a concentration camp". 3 It should
be noted that "contraventions against discipline" referred to acts
which the National Socialist penal system itself did not regard as
criminal offences or misdemeanours. Hence removal to any of
these camps was not considered as a criminal procedure in the
technical sense. All these actions were taken without trial. 4
1
William EBENSTEIN : The Nazi State (New York, Farrar and Rinehart,
1943), pp. 73-74.
2
N o Federal Act was ever passed establishing the Gestapo. Prussia was the
only German State in which the Gestapo was established by law (Act of 26 April
1933). A Prussian Act of 10 February 1936 provided: " T h e orders and activities
of the Secret State Police are not subject" to review in the administrative c o u r t s " .
A few weeks later, the Supreme Administrative Court of Prussia ruled t h a t
actions of the ordinary police were also exempt from judicial review, if they fell
within the province of the Gestapo. (Franz SCHOLZ: "Die neue Rechtsprechung
des Preussischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts", in Verwaltungsarchiv, (1936), p. 417.
See also Werner LEHMANN: "Der alte und der neue Polizeibegriff", in Rechtswissenschaftliche Studien, edited by Prof. F . ANDRE and others, No. 63 (Berlin,
1937), quoted by William EBENSTEIN, op. cit., p. 77.) This precedent was universally followed. On 10 February 1938, t h e principle was also expressed in
statutory form (cf. Superior Judge Dr. SCHÜHLY: "Die neue Rechtsprechung
des Badischen Verwaltungsgerichtshofs", in Verwaltungsarchiv (1940), p. 77,
quoted by EBENSTEIN, op. cit.).
3
Order of 21 December 1942; Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1943, P a r t I, p. 56.
4
In the spring of 1944, documents from German penitentiary camps fell into
the hands of the Danish "underground" paper Frit Denmark. They dealt with
20 cases which the paper called typical. Sixteen inmates died in the camps
of Liebenau on the Weser Farge near Bremen, special camp No. 21 in Watenstedt,
Oberlanzendorf in Lower Austria and in the Dachau concentration camps. Two
were freed and repatriated to Denmark by the Danish Consulate General in
Hamburg; one walked with two crutches and the other, who had lost 52 lbs.,
was unlikely ever to recover from the effects of his stay in the camp.

192

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Employers were instructed that "information concerning
foreigners' disloyalty a t work" must be forwarded to the Gestapo
(information of a similar character against German workers had
to be forwarded to the head of the labour office, who acted as a
deputy for the Reich labour trustee). 1
Neither the Gestapo nor the other branches of the German
police published their own rules and instructions. One of the few
rules that was made public (because it was issued by the Reich
Minister of Labour, and not by the Reich Minister of the Interior
or the Reich Leader of the German Police) stated that if a foreign
worker was sentenced to gaol by the police he must not be released
a t the end of his sentence unless the necessary arrangements for
his return to his place of employment had been completed. 2
Soviet workers were subject to the most cruel system of punishment. A confidential instruction issued by Reich Marshal Goring,
after a secret conference held in Berlin on 7 November 1941, ordered
that the decisive consideration in measures for the maintenance of
order among Soviet workers in Germany should be swiftness and
severity. Only the following varieties of punishment should be
applied, without intermediate grades: deprivation of food, and the
death penalty by decision of court martial. 3
It should be noted that this instruction speaks of the maintenance of order and is not confined to crimes in the legal sense.
Göring's instruction, as well as a great number of similar directives, was designed to notify the officials in control of Soviet
deportees that they were authorised, and indeed expected, to use
methods of indiscriminate violence. Reports from all regions
where Soviet labour recruits were put to work are unanimous
that they were whipped, lashed, otherwise corporally maltreated,
and even shot, without the formality of a court martial.
It must also be remembered that before their arrival at their
places of work foreign workers had undergone persecution in their
own countries 4 , and that their treatment on the way to Germany
had usually been appalling.
1
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 6, 1943, Part V, p. 105. The Order expressly provided
t h a t the Gestapo was to handle cases of "disloyalty a t work" not only in the
case of foreign citizens but also in the case of workers "of foreign extraction or
Volkstum whose home is in Germany, such as Poles or Czechs".
2
Decree of 14 March 1941; Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 164.
3
Quoted in "Note by V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs
of the U.S.S.R., on the mass forcible abduction of peaceful Soviet citizens to
German-Fascist slavery and on the responsibility for this crime of German authorities and private persons who exploit the forced labour of Soviet citizens in Germany", 11 May 1943 {Information Bulletin, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, IS May 1943, p. 2).
4
A long list of such acts, and of the official German decrees ordering them,
is contained, e.g., in Mr. Molotov's Note to the ambassadors and envoys of all
countries with which the U.S.S.R. had diplomatic relations, of 27 April 1942
{Information Bulletin, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, 1942).

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

193

In many respects, Poles were treated little better than Soviet
workers. A Pole, Exiward Sobbowiak, who, when arrested during
a German "police raid against idle Poles", resisted his captors and
attempted to escape, was sentenced to death for using violence
against German officials.1 A 21-year old Pole, Edmund Graczyllowski, was shot for "economic sabotage" because he had injured
two horses and one cow belonging to his German master 2 , and
Michael Lason, probably a Pole, was shot for having "assaulted his
employer". 3 In the summer of 1944, a Special Court at Königsberg
sentenced to death a "racial German" named Zielski, because some
of the Polish workers to whom he had issued leave certificates
attesting that they behaved well and could be expected to return,
had not in fact returned. 4
The fundamental German attitude was shown by Greiser's
statement of policy made at the opening of the Gau Chamber
of Economics at Lodz 5 :
As in the past four years . . . we shall continue to handle the Polish labourer
in accordance with the rules laid down in 1939; he will receive hard but just
treatment . . . Employers must get the maximum amount of work out of the
Poles. They must be just, but as a rule the exploitation of the workman must
be as rational and economical as if he were coal or power.

But while the most ruthless methods of punishment and terror
were used on an enormous scale in the Soviet Union and in
Poland, acts of similar cruelty were also committed by the
German authorities, though less systematically, against citizens
of other countries. While a Dutchman, H. W. van der Maden,
received only three months' imprisonment for failing to appear
before a medical board which was to decide whether he should
be recruited for work in Germany 6 , a 29-year old Dane, Ejler
Lorentzen, who, while under arrest, "tried to escape and assaulted
a guard", was sentenced to death by a special Hamburg court. 7
Three Frenchmen received long sentences of hard labour because
they had penetrated (apparently to find some food) into the pantry
in the basement of the barracks. 8 Death sentences were inflicted
for minor offences, for example, on a Croat who stole a travelling
bag9, on a Czech found guilty of listening to and spreading foreign
1

Ostdeutscher Beobachter, Poznan, 2 Nov. 1942.
*3 Deutsche Rundschau, Bydoczsz, 13 July 1942.
Breslauer Neueste Nachrichten, 11 July 1942.
<
Preussische Zeitung, 28 July 1944.
6
Ostdeutscher Beobachter (Poznan), 21 Aug. 1943.
« De Tijd, 20 May 1942.
7
Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), 16 Oct. 1942.
8
Die Weltwoche (Zurich), 4 Sept. 1942.
9
Ibid.

194

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

broadcasts 1 , and on two Frenchmen, a 26-year old typesetter,
G. Berthe, and 23-year old J. Musilli, for having forged butter
coupons 2 , and two "civilian foreign workers", probably Greeks,
for having stolen food coupons on 23 occasions and sold them
at excessive prices. 3 These are a few examples, chosen at random. •
In the autumn of 1943, when the Soviet armies were moving
towards Poland, Governor-General Frank issued an Order, to come
into force on 10 October 1943, which threatened non-Germans (except citizens of countries which were allied, or not at war, with
Germany) with the death penalty for any infringement of laws or
regulations if committed with the intention of hindering or disturbing "German constructive efforts". The death penalty was the
only punishment provided. The courts martial of the Security
Police were granted complete discretion to determine the procedure
to be followed at these trials. 4
In fact, the German police and S.S. officials were given a monopoly of trying foreigners in various German-occupied countries. As
early as 17 September 1941, for example, the Commissioner for the
Occupied Norwegian Territories introduced the penalty of forced
labour, and, in serious cases, the death penalty, for any person who
disorganised or endangered the national economy and industrial
peace through strike or lockout, or damage or sabotage of works
or equipment, or the incitement of others, or wilful reduction of
output, or any other action; in addition, part or all of his property
might be confiscated. The administration of this Order was entrusted to the German "Northern S.S. and Police Court". 5
1
Sentence by the Provincial Court of Schwerin, Mecklenburg, of 23 August
1943 (Das Rundfunkarchiv, 3rd quarter, 1943). A German woman clerk in a Leipzig
post office was sentenced to death for having connived at, and even participated
in, thefts of clothing, foodstuffs, and goods committed by foreign women sorters
working under her supervision (Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, 6 Dec. 1944). A
German in Saarbrücken was sentenced to death for repeatedly listening to British
broadcasts and passing on the reports to foreign workers (Deutsches Nachrichten
Bureau, 2 Feb. 1945).
2
Sentence by a Special Court in Berlin (Berliner Lokalanzeiger, 28 Jan. 1945).
3
Sentence by Vienna Special Court (Völkischer Beobachter, Vienna edition,
15 Nov. 1944).
4
See Verordnungsblatt für das Generalgouvernement, 9 Oct. 1943, p. 589.
6
Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Norwegischen Gebiete, No. 8, 18 Sept.
1941 (cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLV, No. 3, Mar. 1942, p. 318).
By Order of 19 March 1941, the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Netherlands Territories delegated to the head of the S.S. absolute legislative power.
The Order stipulated that "in so far as necessary for the fulfilment of his duties,
the Superior S.S. and Police Chief may issue rules and regulations having the
force and effect of laws". He himself was, however, not to be bound by his own
law; the Order also provided that "in the fulfilment of his duties, the Superior
S.S. and Police Chief may deviate from existing regulations". Similarly, the
"special agents" appointed by the Reich Commissioner for the areas under
the jurisdiction of the polke courts martial were exempt from the law: "In the
fulfilment of his duties, the special agent shall not be bound by law" (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Niederländischen Gebiete, No. 11, 20 Mar. 1941,
p. 190).

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

195

DIVERGENT T R E N D S IN GERMAN LABOUR POLICY

Since the Geneva Convention of 1929 concerning the treatment
of prisoners of war does not apply to civilians, the International
Red Cross Committee was not in a position to inspect their conditions of life and employment. I t is not yet known whether any investigation of the treatment of foreign civilian workers in Germany
was made by neutral commissions or other bodies during the war.
The German authorities in July 1942 arranged a conducted tour for
foreign broadcasters and journalists to the Junker Aeroplane Factories in Dessau in July 1942. One of the invited group was Gòsta
F. Block, who volunteered to fight for Germany in the First World
War and between February and September 1942 was director of
the Swedish-language broadcasts from the German broadcasting
station in Königsberg. Block reported upon his visit to Dessau on
27 July 1942, in a book, Tyksland Inifran. He had seen
. . . Russians standing at the machines, of ages from 15 up to at least 40.
They were all dressed in the blue overall of the factory with the word "Ost"
embroidered on the breast . . . Most of them pattered about in bare feet on the
cement floor. Once they have worn out what they brought from home there is
nothing they can do but go barefoot both at work and in their spare time . . .
foreign women workers had nothing to remark about their work and the instructions, but the food and lodging and the treatment outside their work was considered unsatisfactory, a view which was shared by all of them, whether women
or men, young or old, married or unmarried. This is very understandable, since
in their work the foreigners are brought together with representatives of the
good-natured German working people who even today deserve both respect and
affection, while in their lodgings and outside their work they are brought together
with specimens of the present German ruling class, big noises in national socialism
of various classes and shades, mostly the worst . . . All this applies not only to
Russians of both sexes, but to all workers, whether "allied", "occupied" or
"neutral".
. . . Then the food! How badly off these Russians were for food was a thing
of which we saw proof. Some of them went round with spoons in the canteen
and collected what other people left. They scraped the tin containers in which
the food was brought into the canteens so carefully that the tin was in danger.
Mr. Block goes on to say that the foreign radio reporters were
invited to try the food of the workers and that, for this reason, the
food on the day of their visit was better than usual. Even so, some
of the visitors could not eat it:
Not even the barrels in which the more fastidious visitors threw what they
could not manage to swallow were safe from these hungry "voluntary" Arbeitsgäste in the Third Reich! It was a wretched sight.
According to the same writer, bad treatment was given not only
to workers who had been conscripted through direct coercion, but
also to foreign volunteers who
. . . were driven by unemployment, hunger and much else at home to make

196

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY .

their way to Germany. To treat these unfortunate fragments of peoples turned
loose from their surroundings as though they were convicts cannot be defended
nor can it be explained by any other term than sadism and brutality. I will not
here go into details, b u t the blue marks, which both men and women showed to
us radio people, had not come of their own accord. Neither had they made them
themselves in order to supply us with evidence, for they did not know t h a t we
were coming.
. . . I myself and my Dutch and Rumanian colleagues were eye-witnesses of
how the Werkschutz (factory guards) in the open street maltreated a foreign
voluntary civilian worker. We happened to walk with a representative of the
works from one part of the factory to another and passed through a small cluster
of villas. There we met a column of workers, probably Russians, guarded by two
uniformed Germans on bicycles. Right in the middle of the column there walked
a man nearly a head taller than the others, who was crying like a child and had
blood oozing out of the left corner of his mouth. To see a big strong man cry was
not an edifying spectacle. Evidently, it had a certain effect on one of the two
wardens, for, when the column was some paces past us he dropped his bicycle,
jumped into the column, and gave the man who was crying a couple of regular
blows in the face.

While German policy towards foreign labour consisted of unparalleled and systematic ruthlessness and intimidation, it was
nevertheless maintained in some German official circles that the
edge had become blunt in the course of the years, and that other
methods should be simultaneously employed.
Dr. Hupfauer, Director of the "Department for Social SelfResponsibility" of the German Labour Front 1 was one of the main
exponents of the doctrine that the output of the foreigners could be
largely improved if they received better psychological treatment.
"Even now in the fourth year of the war", he wrote in February
19432,
the workers undoubtedly possess considerable productive reserves . . . I am
not thinking of a longer working day, from which so many employers expect
miracles. It simply cannot be denied t h a t the physical endurance of man is
limited. Very long working hours result, in the long run, only in longer presence
b u t not in a higher output.

While the main concern of the German agencies in 1942 had
been to send as large a number of "Eastern" workers to Germany
as possible, it was argued later that this policy should be changed
and "Eastern" workers should undergo tests of their individual
capacities and background, which would doubtless result in considerable increase of output. 3
1
Dr. Hupfauer also held the appointment of Beauftragter für den Leistungskampf der Deutschen Industrie.
2
Soziale Praxis, Feb. 1943, p. 53; Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft, third February
issue, 1943, No. 6, p. 184.
3
Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Jan. 1943, p. S. A suggestion of more
specialisation among recruited " E a s t e r n " workers had been made before 1943;
the Donauzeitung (Budapest), of 17 April 1942, for example, advocated the recruitment of miners from the Krivoi Rog region for the mines in the Ruhr district.

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

197

During 1943, the changed military situation and the loss of vast
stretches of territory in the Soviet Union, which had been one of the
principal sources of manpower for German war economy, meant
that foreign labour had to be employed less wastefully. In general,
harsher methods of recruitment were introduced in the Germanoccupied territories, but efforts were also made, by means of various
inducements, to improve output of foreigners already working in
Germany. A leading editorial in the Frankfurter Zeitung of 29
July 1943 pointed out that Dr. Sauckel had officially described
foreigners working in Germany as "guest workers" and that the
position of "guest workers" had been progressively improved. Dr.
Sauckel was credited with "continuous endeavours to make their
lives easier and happier in order to improve output". According to
a report of 28 July 19431, the Reich Minister of Transport permitted men and women workers from the East to drive motor
vehicles if accompanied by a second person acting as supervisor. 2
And the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs decreed that
foreign workers were eligible for the German medal of merit, in
recognition of the "sometimes excellent performance of foreign
workers in the German armament industry". 3 On 31 July 1943, a
Stettin newspaper reported that the Stettin police authorised employers to allow "Eastern" workers, as a reward for good behaviour,
to wear the sign "East" on their left sleeve instead of on the chest.
Der Angriff (Berlin) of 26 September 1943 announced that in future
"Eastern" husbands, wives and other near relatives would, as far
as possible, no longer be allocated to separate working places, but
would be assigned to the same, or at least to neighbouring, localities
and, conditions permitting, would be housed together.
When it had become increasingly impossible for Germany to
return Soviet workers to their homes, Fritz Sauckel made the unconvincing announcement 4 that Germany would limit the forced
employment of Soviet workers to two years, without, however,
taking into account the period before 1 August 1942, so that the
two-year period would, in no case, end for a Soviet worker before
1 August 1944. Even then the labour office was authorised to extend the term of employment by successive periods for another year,
but after the two years, a Soviet worker might take up war work in
the German-occupied parts of his own country, provided that he
1
News Service of the German Newspaper Publishers (a subsidiary of the
Deutsches
Nachrichten Bureau).
1
On the other hand, on 30 July 1943, the Police Chief of Weimar forbade
workers wearing the " P " and "East" badge to use the municipal bus routes, and
threatened not only the foreigners, but also "anybody" enabling them to use
the buses with fines up to 150 RM or six months' imprisonment.
' N.P.D. (News Service of the German Foreign Office).
* Frankfurter Zeitung, 2 Aug. 1943.

198

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

supplied a substitute, if possible from among his own relatives. As
late as the spring of 1944, when Germany had lost most of the conquered Soviet territory, this concession concerning the exchange
of "Eastern" workers was still receiving publicity. 1
A concession was offered to French workers when, on 16 October
1943, Fritz Sauckel informed Pierre Laval, head of the Vichy
Government, that Germany would not demand further French
manpower for Germany in 1943; "from now on, certain Frenchmen
working in Germany will have an opportunity of being replaced,
man by man, in German factories and concerns on the principle
that the total number of French workers in Germany remains the
same". Men over 45 and fathers of four children were to be "methodically" replaced by "young men".
To judge from official utterances, the authorities and camp commandants found that relaxation in the rigidity of treatment was
irreconcilable with the whole scheme of compulsory labour 2 ; yet too
great severity made the foreigners even more stubborn and recalcitrant. District Leader Emil Dörner well expressed this dilemma
in an address in May 1944, when he urged employers to select for
camp leaders only men "whose character and personality will indisputably enable them to turn the foreigners into loyal collaborators and at the same time keep them under 'protective control' ". 3

The measures which the German authorities planned to repress
risings of foreign workers, especially in the later stages of the war,
were never publicly discussed, though oblique references to preparations for such an emergency were sometimes made. The Kölnische Zeitung of 23 September 1944, for example, under the heading
"The Enemy Within", tried to dissipate anxiety over "the secret
army of millions of foreigners assembled in Germany":
They need not love us, but they must be loyal. They are too much influenced
by reason not to know that any lapse of conduct would hurt, not their hosts,
but themselves. Those Germans who think of such dangers can rest assured that
German leadership generally considers problems of this kind several months
before they do.
1
Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 1-2 Apr. 1944.
2
"The humblest member of our people should command more respect than
the alien worker" (Heinrich BANGERT, District leader of the Labour Front,
Düsseldorf, writing in the official economic press service of the National Socialist
Party, Wirtschaftspolitische Parole, 20 Dec. 1942). "Care for the foreigners must
not deteriorate into familiarity. The camps must be organised and the inmates
treated in such a way as to give a strong impression of German socialism" (from
a speech by Tönessen, District Trustee for Camp Welfare, at Wuppertal, May
1944).
3
Rheinische Landeszeitung (Düsseldorf), 8 May 1944.

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

199

Outwardly, however, the keynote of propaganda was optimism
and "true socialism". The head of the German Labour Front, Dr.
Robert Ley, wrote in his Christmas message of 1944 to all foreign
workers 1 :
In the East and West the enemies of Europe have been able to "liberate"
extensive areas, but with them merely came want and death, unemployment,
hunger, despair and chaos, affecting mainly the broad masses of the working
people. I trust that in the coming year you will collaborate with us voluntarily
as before in our common cause: for a Europe free from interference and tyranny
of anti-continental Powers, a Europe which can fulfil the inner desires of our
time in a peaceful competition of peoples and a free development of their national
life; that is, the realisation of true socialism.

Foreigners' "loyalty" was still a propaganda theme even in the
midst of the Soviet winter offensive of 1945. On 3 February 1945,
the President of the Danzig Gau Labour Office, Party Comrade
Stummeyer, said 2 :
In the reliable bearing and industry of the foreign workers in this district
we recognise their faith in our final triumph over the hordes whom international
Jewry drives across our frontiers with satanic methods, in order to destroy Western
civilisation. If we continue to set them a good example, these foreign forces will
constitute a tremendous additional reserve of labour and strength.
EFFORTS AT POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

While Germany was relying chiefly on intimidation and on the
terrorising effects of physical ruthlessness, efforts were also made,
throughout the war, to influence the workers ideologically. In a
negative sense, these efforts were aimed at discrediting anti-National
Socialist and anti-German ideas, and at preventing anti-National
Socialist and anti-German propaganda from reaching the recruited
workers. The positive aspect consisted in the systematic diffusion
of National Socialist propaganda.
In an endeavour to prevent the development of any solidarity
among the polyglot masses, and to foment distrust and discord
between the various groups, linguistic and national differences were
deliberately emphasised. This policy was also pursued among persons coming from the same country, as,for example, French-speaking
and Flemish-speaking Belgians3, persons from the different parts of
Yugoslavia and, in particular, the various nationalities of the Soviet
Union.
1

German-European Service (in Dutch), 17 Dec. 1944.
Danzig Broadcasting Station, 3 Feb. 1945.
* "It has been the tendency of the Germans to accentuate the divisions between French-speaking and Flemish-speaking Belgians. The latter are never
called Belgians, but always Flemings, and are expressly considered as members
of a nation friendly to Germany" (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 Dec. 1942).
2

200

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

In a confidential instruction of 20 February 19421, Heinrich
Himmler, in his capacity as Reich leader of the S.S. and Chief of
the German Police, decreeed that, "for general political reasons"
distinctions should be made, among the workers coming from the
eastern occupied territories, between the three following groups:
(1) Workers coming from what was before the outbreak of the
German-Soviet war Soviet Russian territory, except Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, the district of Bialystok and the district of Lwow;
(2) Workers from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia;
(3) Workers from the Government-General and the territories
connected with it, if they were neither Poles nor Germans, e.g.,
Ukrainians, White Russians, Kasubs, Masures, Slonsakes. In
cases of doubt, whether a person was of White Russian, Russian or
Ukrainian extraction, the "Confidential Agency in Germany" of
Russia, White Russia, or the Ukraine had to be consulted. 2
But a more important form of propaganda was the assertion of
the socialist intentions, and, indeed, socialist achievements, of the
Third Reich. It emphasised the community of interest between
non-German and German workers, and was more consistent and general in its application than was emphasis of national differences. At
the German "Labour Day" celebrations on 1 May 1942, prominence
was given to the participation of foreign workers, because they were
striving towards the same end, namely "a new and better Europe
in which 'friend' and 'socialist' would not be, as in enemy countries,
merely empty words". 3
Franz Mende, who, as head of the Office for Labour Allocation
of the Labour Front, was in charge of the supervision of millions of
labour recruits, writing in the summer of 1943, emphasised the need
of indoctrinating foreign workers (he expressly excluded, however,
workers coming from the East): "the technique for the systematic
use of foreign manpower must start from the firm basis of concrete
political convictions". Since these persons "neither politically, nor
as far as their citizenship and race is concerned, belong to the
1
Referred to by Prof. SIEBERT, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 50 (1), supplement, 20 May 1942.
2
Circular by the Reich Minister of the Interior, 14 November 1940, quoted
in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 51. Soviet workers had always had to wear an " E a s t "
badge. In the spring of 1944 this uniform " E a s t " badge was replaced by three
different badges, in order to distinguish between Russians, Ukrainians and White
Russians. The Münchner Neueste Nachrichten of 1-2 April 1944 observed that,
because of this differentiation, "eveTy man and woman from the East can, from
now on, wear t h e badges with pride". T h e emblems chosen for the new badges
were those of the "voluntary" Russian units in the German Army (Transocean
News Service, 4 May 1944; Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau, 4 May 1944). The
new badges, connoting collaboration with the National Socialist régime, were
thus in fact more obnoxious to non-collaborationist workers than the former,
frankly discriminatory badge.
» Der -Mittag (Düsseldorf), 30 Apr. 1942.

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

201

Greater German Reich . . . the elimination of psychological inhibitions is far more important [than in the case of German workers]. Reservations based on their political beliefs or philosophy of life
must be cleaned out." 1
In a speech made in Brussels2, Sauckel defended Germany
against the accusation of using methods of deportation and slave
traffic. He asserted that, on the contrary, National Socialists
wanted the new Europe to be built upon the basis of a nationalminded socialism, which was the dream, he said, of every worker of
the continent. In order to overcome their negative attitude,
foreigners must "receive an absolutely objective picture of our
socialist intentions". On the position of the foreigner in German
plants, Robert Ley (quoted by Franz Mende) wrote in his Manual:
The impression of us which millions of foreigners will receive now, will determine the future judgement of Europe on Germany and national socialism.
Even the strongest propaganda would never be able to obscure or change the
immediate impression which the present sojourn in Germany will make on foreign
workers.

In the beginning of 1944, an expert on the training of campleader personnel again stressed the fact that the necessary increase
in the productive output of foreigners depended on their "will for,
and faith in, the victory of national socialism and thus of Europe.
Foreign workers must be informed about the reactionary attitude
of our democratic, liberalistic and bolshevist enemies"; Germany,
on the other hand, "will make all its social achievements the common property of all European countries". 3
In German-dominated France, propaganda constantly used
socialist slogans in order to popularise the transfer of workers to
Germany. For example, after a radio broadcast by Pierre Laval
urging French men and women to volunteer for work in Germany,
the spokesman of the Légionnaires said over the Lyons Radio (23
June 1942):
Workmen of France, it is to you especially that Mr. Laval appeals—to your
hearts and feelings. He knows t h a t the revolutionary ideals are deeply engraved
in your hearts. The better socialism for which you long will spring from a regenerated Europe. He knows that he can rely on you.

On 24 June 1942, Dr. Friedrich, a German spokesman, said over
Radio Paris:
1

M E N D E , op. cit.,

228.

» Völkischer Beobachter, 12 June 1943.
3
Max TIETBOHL, in Lagerführer Sonderdienst (Feb. 1944), organ of the Office
of Labour Allocation of the Labour Front. The article was reprinted in t h e
Berlin Party organ, Der Angriff, on 12 March 1944.

202

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

By working in Germany they [the French workers] will get to know another
country. They will see the German worker at his machine behave as they themselves behave at home. They will discover that the German worker is at heart
just like themselves. As representatives of France, they will teach the Germans
to know Frenchmen better. As we know little of you, so you know little of us.
It is partly for this reason that we had war . . . We are all in the same boat. We
are all fighting for a better life. Although national socialism is intrinsically German, its fundamental law is applicable to the whole of Europe: respect for the
nation and respect for the worker; liberty and bread for the whole of Europe;
a higher standard of living for the European worker; respect for everybody's
work, be he a manual or intellectual worker.

During the same propaganda campaign Dr. Ley addressed
French workers in a Paris factory in a similar vein. The Transocean
News Agency reported that his speech had made a deep impression
because (French) "socialist workers have paid particular attention
to the great social progress made in Germany". Official National
Socialist literature also called attention to the "backward character"
of French social legislation and the small influence of labour under
the French Republic. 1
In other countries as well, Germany attempted to influence
non-German workers by appeals to their political aspirations. For
example, after the Italian surrender, the commander of the German
occupation army in Italy, Field Marshal Kesselring, in an official
and widely publicised manifesto, declared on 29 September 1943:
"The Anglo-American war against Germany aims primarily at
abolishing social achievements, because they endanger the attainment of anti-national, capitalist interests. National Socialist
Germany intends to eliminate profiteers, anti-social elements, and
all those who plan to grow rich at the expense of the people." By
"accepting recruitment" for work in Germany, "every [Italian]
worker will be able to contribute by his own labour to final victory
and a better Europe. I am certain that you will realise which is the
proper road to follow." As the military situation worsened, the
claim that the National Socialist New Order represented socialism
was more urgently repeated.
In complaint against the hostility of Netherlands workers
towards national socialism, the German-dominated Utrecht paper
Volk en Vaderland (18 August 1944) exclaimed: "And yet they call
themselves Socialists! . . . If they only could be convinced that the
1
For example, the Year Book, 1940-41, of the Institute for Labour Research
of the German Labour Front stated: "It is altogether characteristic of the period
until 1936 that the influence of the French trade unions upon labour legislation
was insignificant, although the backwardness of French social legislation should
have demanded the tackling of a great many problems". The Year Book added
that "in general the dominance of certain employers' and bankers' circles was
unbroken until 1936".

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS* RESISTANCE

203

only possibility of achieving a Socialist community lies in national
socialism!" 1
Later in the war, many efforts were made to intensify the indoctrination of foreigners, partly by allowing still wider scope to
collaborationists from their own countries, and partly through
"Socialist" reforms. Thus, the Italian Fascist Republic at the end
of 1944 decreed a new organisation of labour which was hailed by
the Repubblica Fascista "as a further step towards the Labour
State which we desire", and by the Corriere della Sera as the
finishing touch to the corporative structure initiated in 1926.2
FOREIGN LANGUAGE PRESS

The great majority of foreign workers did not speak German
and therefore the labour administration considered it necessary to
arrange for the publication of foreign language newspapers. By the
late summer of 1943 the following foreign-language newspapers
had editions ranging from 6,600 to 80,000s (their combined total
circulation was officially reported as 750,000).4
Il Camerata
Enlace
Le Point
L'Effort Wallon
De Vlaamsche Post
Van Honk
Broen
Slovensky Tyzden
Domovina Hrvatska

("The Comrade")
("The Link")
("The Point")
("Wallon Effort")
("Flemish Post")
("Away from Home")
("The Bridge")
("Slovak Week")
("Homeland Croatia")

I talian
Spanish
French
French
Flemish
Dutch
Danish
Slovak
Croat

1
On 4 July 1944, in a propaganda article on the Belgian S.S. Brigade "Wallonia" (the Red Brigade) in the Rexist Le Pays réel, Hubert DETISTE wrote:
"Today, in the clash of passions . . . we keep our faith in our revolutionary Socialist destiny. . . Old revolutionaries . . . rally around the red banners [of the
Rexist Party]. Imbued with greatness and certainty, what do we care for the
stupid mockeries of the hard-pressed bourgeoisie, that fights its war against
social justice ? One thing alone hurts us, the lack of understanding still shown
by too many victims of the [pre-Hitler] régime of shame. . . Today socialism is
up in arms. Socialism, our socialism, will finally conquer Capitalist disorder. . .
Let all proletarians capable of doing so join the Red Brigade, which tomorrow
will be a Division, a Division which, once victory is attained, will not disarm
until capitalism has been definitely defeated. Comrades, Workers! Let the bourgeois who hate you gnash their teeth! Answer the call of your revolution, the
call of socialism! . . . Have confidence in the Chief; he will lead the way to the
only victory which counts for us, which ensures the sovereignty of labour and the
reign of the worker." I t appears that only 76 men volunteered for the S.S. "Wallonia" Red Brigade. A farewell ceremony for them, a t which Victor Matthys,
Chief of Rexists, addressed them, was held in Brussels on 24 May 1944 (Belgian
Radio Home Service, 24 and 25 M a y 1944).
s
Quoted by the German-dominated North Italian Radio, 26 Jan. 1945.
* Report of the Arbeitswissenschaf ¡Itches Institut der Deutschen Arbeitsfront,
in Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, 3rd quarter, 1943, p. 258.
4
Report of the Head of the Department for Labour Allocation of the Labour
Front, a t a meeting of the chief foreign officials assigned to the Labour Front,
on 19 October 1943; Völkischer Beobachter, 20 Oct. 1943, quoted in Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, 4th quarter, 1944, p. 36.

204

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
Rodino.
Trud
Ukrainez
Holos
Bielaruski

Rabotnik

Cesky Delnik

("Homeland")
("Labour") 1
("The Ukrainian")
("The Voice")
("The White Russian
Worker")
("The Czech Worker")

Bulgarian
Russian
Eastern^Ukrainian
Western^Ukrainian
White Russian
Czech

The papers were delivered in bulk to the various plants, where
they were distributed to the subscribers; in certain districts, they
were also on sale a t news stands and in railway stations. Enlace, the
Spanish, and Rodino, the Bulgarian paper, were published biweekly; all the others were weekly.
In addition there were special papers for miners in Russian
(Schachtjor—"The Miner"); in Ukrainian (Na Schachti—"In the
Mine"); and in Croat (Sretno—"Welcome"); and papers for agricultural workers in Dutch (De Landbauwer—"The Farmer"), and
in Slovak (Uroda—"The Product of the Soil"). 2 All the papers,
which were openly propagandist, contained articles about Germany
and news from the home country, as well as official information on
questions such as tax deductions, travelling possibilities, behaviour
in case of sickness, duties towards the employer, replies to queries 3 ,
etc. The papers were produced by native editors, under German
control and direction. 4
1
Trud is the title of the official newspaper of the Central Council of Trade
Unions of the U.S.S.R.
2
Foreigners were also urged to buy National Socialist-inspired illustrated
magazines published in their own home countries. A number of French daily
and weekly papers were sent to, or were on sale in, Germany.
3
A s an example, some items from the "Workers' Mail" column of De Vlaamsche Post (Berlin) of 13 May 1943 may be quoted:
"Question: Jos. Popleu, a Fleming working in Dresden, asks if he is entitled
to textile coupons. Answer: These are no longer distributed in Germany. You
must get them in Flanders during your next holiday. If they are refused, ask
the local relief office.
"Question: Roger Pattijn, a Fleming working in Gerbstedt, asks for a holiday.
Answer: You must know t h a t all holidays are cancelled. Leave is unobtainable
even for the purpose of fetching clothes.
"Question: Leopold Depourque, a Fleming working in Duisburg, complains
that he is not allowed to enter the shelter when the air-raid warning is sounded.
Answer: In certain places, nobody is allowed to enter the shelters. But if other
persons are admitted, the Flemings must be allowed in too.
"Question: Medard Delfour, a Fleming working in Zwickau, complains about
the bad conditions in his camp. Answer: It is a scandal t h a t the Flemings' liaison
officer should be a Wallon. This must be rectified a t once. Your complaints
about the camp leader will be investigated if you send further particulars."
4
Report of the Arbeitswissenschaftliches
Institut der D.A.F.
All foreignlanguage labour papers were published by the Fremdsprachen Verlag G.m.b.H.,
Berlin-Charlottenburg " b y agreement with the Reich Ministry for Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda"; the firm also published technical books in
various foreign languages. The Commissioner-General for Manpower urged
the labour offices to encourage the distribution of the foreign-language papers
and technical books (e.g., Reichsarbeitsblatt, 5 Apr. 1943, Part I, p. 369). For
propaganda among " E a s t e r n " women in particular, an illustrated fortnightly
magazine containing fiction and other "non-political" matter was published in
Russian and Ukrainian (Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Sept. 1943).

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

205

In comparison with the foreign-language newspapers, which
were published in large quantities, other methods of influencing
foreign workers were on a small scale. According to an official
report communicated on 19 October 1943 to the senior foreign
Labour Front liaison men 1 , "during the current year", in the 22,000
camps housing foreign workers, the "cultural programme" consisted
of 3,800 language courses with 167,000 participants, and 4,000
sport events, 5,750 major "Strength through Joy" gatherings, and
18,000 meetings organised in the camps. Thus, on the average,
there was one language course, one sport event, and one major
"Strength through J o y " gathering in every fourth or fifth camp,
and one meeting in 80 per cent, of the camps, during nine months.
According to the same report, 235,000 books, 350 musical instruments and instruments for 60 orchestras, 4,940 radios and 11,000
pieces of sporting equipment were distributed during the period,
or, on the average, 11 books, 16 pamphlets, 4 song books, 1.3
gramophone records, 0.23 musical instruments, 0.23 radios and 0.5
pieces of sporting equipment were distributed per camp, and an
orchestra was organised in one out of every 366 camps.
W O R K BOOKS

From February 19352, every German worker was required to
possess a work book containing his personal particulars and details
of his employment. Both workers and employers were required,
under heavy penalties, to keep the work books up to date. The
work book was a revival of a device the abolition of which had
been an important accomplishment of the German labour movement in the 19th century.
The National Socialist régime used
it as its chief means of controlling the movement of labour, as
well as the whereabouts of the individual worker, whose activities
could be traced through it. The work books also greatly facilitated
the preparation of black lists.
Before the war, special regulations applied to individual foreigners seeking work in Germany, with the double purpose of keeping
undesirables out and keeping those admitted under full control.
But when systematic mass importation of foreigners began during
the war, simplified methods were applied to their work books and
identity papers.
In the occupied parts of the Soviet Union, employment certificates also served as bread coupons and were issued only to persons
whose "work passports" were sent by their employers to the German
1
Völkischer Beobachter, 20 Oct. 1943, quoted in Neue Internationale
der Arbeit.
* Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 34.

Rundschau

206

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

labour office.1 In Norway, the Reich Commissioner introduced work
books on 25 November 1941. His decree openly admitted that the
measure was aimed at providing Norwegians with rationed goods
in proportion to individual efficiency and output of work.2
In other occupied countries where the inhabitants were conscripted for work, the German military and civilian authorities
often made use of the workers' identity papers in order to keep
control over them. For example, early in 1944, Feldkommando
No. 599 issued the following order to Serbs:
(1) Workers leaving their jobs or going home before their work is completed,
will be punished by hard labour up to 3 months at the Banjac camp.
(2) Overseers of the labour units must take the identity paper away from
every new worker. They are to be returned only after the conscript's work is
completed.
(4) All overseers failing to carry out their duties under Articles 1 and 2
will be similarly punished with hard labour.3

Inside Germany the system of work books was completely overhauled in May 1943.4 On the basis of new standardised work books
for the millions of foreigners, a central register of all foreign workers
employed in Germany was established in Berlin.
The foreigner's work book had to contain his personal particulars
and details of his professional qualifications. Skilled trades such as
hole-cutting or riveting, for example, had to be specifically mentioned. 5 Fritz Sauckel also authorised the labour offices to enter
"official statements concerning the performance and the personal
behaviour of the bearer" (obviously to facilitate the compilation
of black lists). In order to distinguish them from the work books of
Germans, foreigners' books were bound in a different colour. The
central register in Berlin contained and kept up to date the name,
personal particulars and all the more important entries made
in every work book.6 On entering employment the foreign
1
See "A Visit to the Pskov Employment Office", in Monatshefte für NSSozialpolitik, No. 5-6, Mar. 1942, p. 70, quoted in International Labour Review,
Vol.2 XLVII, No. 5, May 1943, p. 579.
Order by the Reich Commissioner of the Occupied Norwegian Territories,
Terboven, of 25 November 1941; Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Norwegischen
Gebiete, 29 Nov. 1941, p. 41.
' Novo Vreme, 19 Jan. 1944.
4
Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 1 May 1943; Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 277. An official work book had to be issued to every foreigner
employed within the territory of Greater Germany (with the exception of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia). "Foreigners" were defined in the Order
as: (a) persons of nationality other than German; (6) German-protected persons;
(c) stateless persons; and (d) persons whose nationality could not be ascertained.
6
Order of 4 May 1943.
• After the intensification of air warfare against Germany, the information
contained in the official registers often could not be kept up to date. However,

MEASURES TO COUNTERACT FOREIGNERS' RESISTANCE

207

worker had to surrender his work book to the employer. 1 When the
employment ended, the employer was required to present the book
to the local labour office, which made an official entry recording the
date of end of employment. (By this means control was also exercised over the employer.) The labour office could then either hand
the work book to the foreigner, or withhold it from him. In the first
case, he had to keep it carefully and carry it upon his person at all
times 2 , until he started working on a new job. In the second case, he
would encounter many difficulties. There were hardly any foreign
workers in Germany who were legally—i.e., with the consent of
both employer and the labour office—out of work, and several
specialised police corps (the Gestapo, the German Labour Front
agents, the factory guards, the military police, the railway police,
the municipal police) would ask every foreigner who was suspected
of trying to "loaf" or to escape, to produce his work book. A worker
who left his job without authorisation from both his employer and
the labour office, or a worker whose work book had been withheld by
the labour office, was situated much like a convict escaped from
prison ; it must be remembered that civilian workers from the East
were required to wear a conspicuous badge on their clothing.
The work books increased the efficiency and strictness of control. The fact that they were not fully introduced for foreign workers until the spring of 1943 suggests that before that date the German authorities were content to rely on rigid segregation and supervision of the foreigners, but that the political and military situation
then made it advisable to take this step as an additional safety and
police measure. The decision to issue millions of these documents
and to keep them up to date involved (as various official German
decrees and comments indicate) a very considerable additional
strain on the administrative personnel, and further increased the
unproductive administrative machinery of the compulsory labour
policy.

the destruction of the registers through bombing or fires "does not mean that
they are lost, for in all cases they have been, or are being, reproduced by photostat"
(Die Wirtschaftskurve (Frankfort on Main), May 1944, p. 305).
1
In the spring of 1944, the Reichsarbeitsblatt reminded employers that they
had to keep foreigners' work books during the time the latter were on leave at
home (Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger, 4 Mar. 1944).
2
Ibid., 6 May 1943.

CHAPTER XIV
SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS
WORKERS OTHER THAN POLISH AND SOVIET WORKERS

The shifting of huge masses of workers was bound to affect
profoundly the social insurance rights of the persons and families
concerned, as well as the social insurance systems of their countries.
As a matter of general policy, Germany brought foreign workers
under its own social insurance system (under conditions which are
discussed below), but at the same time extracted a variety of social
insurance services from the foreign countries. The arrangements
varied from nationality to nationality and, often, from year to year.
Some took the form of treaties and agreements concluded between
the Reich and authorities representing (or accepted by the Reich
as representing) the countries of origin of the workers. Not all
these agreements were published. 1 German spokesmen frequently
emphasised that in the field of social insurance, foreigners in Germany were on an equal basis with Germans ("principle of equality
of treatment").
The laws, orders, regulations, instructions and directions concerning social insurance of foreign workers differed not only among
the various nationalities, but often between groups of one and the
same nationality, and were all frequently amended and changed,
so that the picture is extremely complicated. It is, however,
possible to describe their main features.
As "a matter of principle", the German social insurance system
applied to all foreigners working within the Reich, irrespective of
citizenship and origin (except Polish and Soviet workers and Jews
of all nationalities) and whether or not they came to Germany as
members of a foreign firm transplanted as a unit (Firmeneinsatz).2
1

The following agreements were published: with Belgium: Reichsarbeitsblatt,
P a r t I I , p. 401; Bulgaria: idem, 1942, Part I I , p. 480; Croatia: ¿dew, 1942,
II, p. 131; Denmark: idem, 1941, Part II, p. 115; France: idem, 1942,
I I , p. 184, 1943, Part II, p. 240; Hungary: idem, 1941, Part II, p. 332; Italy:
1940, Part II, p. 3.32, Reichsgesetzblatt, 1941, Part II, p. 137; Reichsarbeits1942, P a r t II, p. 477; Netherlands: idem, 1941, Part II, p. 162; Norway:
1941, P a r t II, p. 178; Rumania: idem, 1942, Part II, p. 130; Serbia : idem,
P a r t II, p. 534; Slovakia: idem, 1940, Part II, p. 8; Spain: idem, 1943,
II, p. 417.
2
JUNGFLEISCH, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 463; Decree by the Reich Minister
of Labour, 25 June 1941, ibid., p. 518. By "logical" interpretation of the GermanNetherlands and German-Belgian Treaties concerning accident insurance of
1943,
Part
Part
idem,
blatt,
idem,
1942,
Part

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

209

The same'general rule applied to non-native workers in the German-annexed (as distinguished from the merely German-occupied)
territories in the East 1 and in the Government-General. 2 Aliens
employed in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia were
covered by the rules and regulations of that country (i.e., Czechoslovak law, as amended by German and Protectorate authorities).
One result of the "equality" rule in the field of social insurance
was that the obligations incumbent upon foreigners were the same
as those of insured Germans. 3 They had to pay the same compulsory contributions to German social insurance funds as Germans,
make written or personal reports submitting the requisite information to the German social insurance funds and accept the decisions of
the German institutions. In short, foreign labour was in every
respect subject to German legislation and administration in social
insurance matters. Thus the principle of "equality" was very
advantageous to the German insurance funds, for it added several
million persons to their contributors, without a corresponding increase in expenditure. "As a matter of principle" foreign workers
received the same benefits as insured Germans. But, in the words
of the Director of the Munich Labour Office, "their particular
circumstances had to be taken into account in various ways".
The social insurance benefits provided by German funds to foreigners and their families were reduced to a minimum, owing to the
cumulative effects of the following factors : (a) the German wartime
system of exploitation of foreign labour excluded certain risks,
such as unemployment, covered by the German social security
system; (b) if the risks matured, in many cases fewer benefits were
granted to insured foreigners than their contributions had in fact
covered ; (c) if the risks matured and the foreigner's right to benefit
was acknowledged, various devices were in many cases used to
have the benefits granted by foreign, and not by German funds.
It is unnecessary to describe the German wartime social security
system in detail. It will be enough to say. that on 1 July 19424, when
27 August 1907, amended by supplementary Conventions of 30 May 1914 and of
6 July 1912 (Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, 25 June 1941, ibid.), workers
from Belgium and the Netherlands were allowed, for six months after their arrival
in Germany, to remain insured, under Belgian or Netherlands accident insurance,
provided they had been so insured before their departure. For Italians, see
Appendix VII.
1
Order of 22 December 1941; Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 777.
5
Orders'by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 29 August 1941 and 24 February
1942.
3
Under German law certain categories of workers, such as miners, agricultural
workers and domestic workers, were excluded from the unemployment insurance
scheme. Foreign workers employed in these categories were also exempt from
paying unemployment insurance contributions.
4
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1942, No. 14, P a r t II, pp. 290 et seq.; Betriebskrankenkasse,
1942, Nos. 13-14, pp. 197-199; cf. International Labour Review, Vol. X L V I I ,
No. 2, Feb. 1943, pp. 248-251.

210

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

hope of an early German victory had been definitely abandoned,
the social security contribution system was thoroughly simplified,
together with the simplification of the wage tax system, mentioned
above. 1 The changes did not alter the contribution scales, except
to increase the contribution rates of certain categories of salaried
employees, and this was of no practical importance to foreigners
working in Germany. The industrial employee, whether German
or foreign, manual or non-manual, had to contribute to the three
principal branches of the German social insurance scheme, namely,
sickness insurance, pension insurance and unemployment insurance.
Although these three branches remained administratively and
financially separate, employers had to make only one deduction
from wages and salaries for all three branches, and had to remit
these deductions, together with their own contributions, to the
sickness insurance fund. The sickness insurance fund kept part of
the sums received for itself and transferred the rest to the pension
insurance and unemployment insurance funds respectively. The
total contribution for the three insurance schemes was approximately 18 per cent, of wages and salaries, of which a fixed 5.6 per
cent, was assigned to the pension insurance fund, and a fixed 6.5
per cent, to the Reich Fund for Manpower Allocation on account
of unemployment insurance. The percentage of the sickness insurance contributions varied according to the rules adopted by the
various sickness insurance funds. The total contribution of about
18 per cent, was approximately evenly divided between employers
and employees.
UNEMPLOYMENT

INSURANCE

Even before the outbreak of military hostilities the function
of the German unemployment insurance system underwent a basic
change. The body administering its funds even changed its name
from National Institution for Employment Exchanges and Unemployment Insurance (Reichsanstalt für Arbeitsvermittlung und
Arbeitslosenversicherung) to Reich Fund for Manpower Allocation (Reichsstock für Arbeitseinsatz).2
It ceased to be an autonomous body and became, instead, merely another source of public
revenue. The Fund was now administered by a special department
of the Reich Ministry of Labour, and its President, Dr. Syrup,
became Secretary of State in that Ministry. When Fritz Sauckel
was appointed Commissioner-General for Manpower, he also
x

S e e p . 121.
Decree by the Führer of 21 December 1938; cf. W I L L E K B : "Der Arbeitseinsatz im Kriege", in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, Aug. 1941,
p. 191.
2

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

211

gained control over this Fund - (the revenue of which,
e.g., for the fiscal year of 1942, amounted to not less
than 2,700 million RM). 1 Paradoxically enough, the Fund
financed the supervision and control of conscripted foreign workers.
But this expenditure consumed only a part of its income. For
example, in the fiscal year of 1942, the Fund spent 870 million RM
for "the administration of manpower allocation, the financing of
productive work, unemployment benefit, and administrative
expenses". 2
The circumstances under which foreign workers entered Germany made it evident that they were paying an insurance premium
for a non-existent risk. Whenever a foreigner terminated the job
to which he had been allocated the labour office either transferred
him to another employment, or very rarely, ordered his return
home. The strictness of the German regulations made it practically
impossible for foreign workers ever to qualify as unemployed, within the meaning of German unemployment insurance legislation.
The foreigners realised this situation and strongly objected to
the unemployment insurance contribution, which they considered
rather as a 6 ^ per cent, wage deduction. "Foreign workers",
wrote a high official of the Labour Allocation Department of the
German Labour Front early in 1944', "continue to complain about
this contribution for which, they claim, they do not receive any
equivalent in return. They are, however, mistaken. To be sure,
widespread unemployment has ceased to exist. Hence, unemployment insurance has long since lost its former significance." The
contributions to the Reichsstock of 6J/¿ per cent, were, he argued,
used for financing other "social services", such as "the special care
given to foreigners during their journeys 4 , their passage through
1
The figure of 2,700 million R M was composed of 2,405 million R M unemployment insurance contributions, and 295 million R M other revenue (interest
and refund of loans, surplus of earlier years). The four-year average for the fiscal
years of 1934-1937 was little more than half, namely, 1,480 million R M (1,468
million R M unemployment insurance contributions, and 12 million R M other
revenue); for the four years 1938-1941, the average yearly revenue of the Fund
rose to 2,302 million R M (2,190 million R M unemployment insurance contributions, and 112 million R M other revenue).
* The item of 870 million RM includes an undisclosed amount for expenses
connected with the allocation and control of conscripted foreign workers.
* Dr. F U N K E , Chief of Section, Department of Labour Allocation, German
Labour F r o n t : "Die Soziale Sicherung der ausländischen Arbeitskräfte im
Reich", in Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, 1st quarter, 1944, p. 33.
4
F U N K E , p. 34. A recruited foreigner had to pay the expenses of his journey
from his own country to the place of work. If he was unable to pay for his transportation the German Labour Office paid the travelling expenses, which the
employer had to refund to the worker or to the Labour Office (see, for example,
Order by the Military Commander in Belgium and northern France of 15 January
1943, concerning the conscription of Polish civilian workers; Verordnungsblatt des
Militärbefehlshabers in Belgien und Nordfrankreich für die besetzten Gebiete Belgiens
und Nordfrankreichs, No. 93, 23 Jan. 1943, p. 1130).

212

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

the transit camps, the transportation of the deceased to their
home countries, etc.". The name was therefore changed from
"unemployment insurance" to "labour allocation assistance".
This seemingly innocent explanation really meant that unemployment insurance contributions were partly used for control and
police measures carried out by the German Labour Front, the S.S.,
the Gestapo and factory guards.
SICKNESS INSURANCE

The high pre-war rates of contribution to the German sickness
insurance fund, calculated to provide the high pre-war standards
of benefit, were still in force. But the benefits received by foreigners
fell far below those standards.
In the first place, it was generally very difficult for foreigners
to qualify as sick. The supervising personnel and the German
doctors were usually distrustful of foreigners and were under constant pressure to be ruthless in preventing "unwillingness to work".
On 26 February 1944, the German-controlled Nieuwe Rotterdamsche
Courant reported on the inadequate medical care given to Netherlands Workers in Germany (although they were one of the nationalities that received better treatment) and on the "scepticism
[German] doctors often showed towards foreigners reporting sick . . .
Obviously, the doctors' understandable prejudice may sometimes
lead to really serious cases of illness being overlooked." 1
Removal of Sick and Incapacitated

Foreigners

Another reduction in foreigners' sickness benefits was effected
by the device of transporting them to their own countries when
they suffered from serious illness. It was the policy of the Third
Reich to get rid of sick and disabled foreign workers by removing
them from German territory. Until 1941 the official German
regulations required that sick foreign workers whose recovery was
not to be expected "within two weeks at the most", should not
receive medical treatment in Germany; if the German doctor
certified them fit to travel, they must be immediately sent back to
1
After two years' employment a t the Hermann Goring Works in Linz (Austria), a Swiss worker reported that sick foreigners who absented themselves
without permission from the chief medical officer of the undertaking were immediately handed over to the Gestapo by the factory police. The penalty for
workers from countries occupied by Germany varied between 4 and 6 weeks'
punishment camp. The sentence was posted up in the factory. On entering the
punishment camp, prisoners were often deprived of their shoes, so t h a t they had
to go barefoot. They were frequently detailed to do work outside the camp, e.g.,
they were sent back into the compound of the Herman Goring Works for specially
heavy employment such as construction work on railway lines {Tribune de Genève,
22 Aug. 1944).

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

213

the recruitment district in their own country. 1 Sick and incapacitated foreigners, such as Belgians and Netherlanders, who
returned to their own countries with the consent of the German
Sickness Insurance Office, were entitled to the benefits which they
would have received under German regulations while in Germany. 2
Nevertheless, this was a particularly objectionable feature of German manpower policy. The two-weeks' rule meant that every
foreigner suffering from serious illness was forced, first, to obtain
the necessary papers, visas and permits from the German authorities
(and, frequently, from the authorities of his own country, as well
as of the transit countries), and afterwards to undertake a journey
which, under European wartime conditions, generally lasted several
days and lacked the comforts which a sick person required. German
officials tried to explain the two-weeks' rule by pointing to the
scarcity of hospital accommodation. But the two-weeks' rule had
been introduced and rigorously applied long before Germany
began war against the Soviet Union, that is, before hospital facilities were taxed by the heavy influx of casualties. Later on, the
increasing scarcity of doctors, supplies and hospital space further
restricted medical services to foreigners.
The two-weeks' rule proved so wasteful in practical application
that it was replaced in 1941 by a three-weeks' rule. The difference
was merely one of degree. The principle remained and was steadfastly applied during the period of intensified utilisation of foreign
manpower. If a foreigner fell sick and was incapable of work, he
had, "as a rule", to be removed from German territory to his
recruitment district unless he could be expected to recover within
three weeks at the latest and also unless he could "be expected to
remain afterwards in good health for a reasonably long time, or
unless the illness was so serious that transportation to the home
country was not possible". 3
A foreigner who was too ill to travel was to receive medical
treatment in Germany, but the Reich Minister of Labour expressly
decreed that the patient should be removed from Germany "if
and as soon as he is able to travel". This rule had to be interpreted
as rigidly as possible. Rather than allow a foreigner who was
seriously ill to remain in Germany he "must be sent home, even if
in the opinion of the physicians he can be transported only if accompanied by one or more attendants, so long as the expense will
probably be less than that of continued medical treatment or
1
Order by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 22 October 1940; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 175.
"See pp. 215 et seq.
3
Decrees by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 22 October 1940 and 8 October
1941; Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 175 and 180.

214

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

hospitalisation". 1 It was an additional aggravation that this rule
also applied if, contrary to expectation, a sick foreigner had not
recovered after two (or three) weeks' treatment in Germany and
"absolutely required" further medical treatment or hospitalisation. Attendants were to accompany the patient only to the frontier
(except for Poles and persons from the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia, who had to be accompanied to their home towns).
The introduction of the three-(instead of the two-)weeks' rule
was not entirely advantageous to the sick foreigner ; it was qualified
by the new proviso that, even if recovery was expected within
three weeks, he was still to be sent home immediately, without
medical treatment, if he was not expected to remain in good health
for a reasonably long time afterwards.
The accumulation of disabled foreigners at German frontier
stations sometimes created administrative problems. On 8 January
1944, for example, Sauckel observed in a circular:
A report from Marburg-an-der-Drau informs me t h a t foreign workers continue
to arrive from all parts of the Reich, mainly Croats, Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks,
who on account of sickness or for other reasons are unfit for work and therefore
are t o be returned t o their own countries. In most cases they possess neither
travelling papers nor return permits. Furthermore, they are in many cases provided only with a ticket to Marburg or to the Reich frontier. 2

Legal, bureaucratic and political difficulties apart, sick foreign
workers' chances of receiving medical treatment or hospitalisation,
while in Germany, were poor. As early as 1941, Dr. Birkenholz
stated in his official comment on the German regulations that
"medical treatment or admission to hospital is possible only in
quite exceptional cases". The lighter cases should be given sick
treatment in the sick rooms of the camps and hutments. 3 "The
present heavy demands on hospital medical institutions make it
imperative to limit the admission of foreign workers to absolutely
necessary cases." 4 The foreigners' precarious situation was summarised in the statement that "any medical treatment or admission
to a hospital is possible only in quite extraordinary cases". 6 If
detained by the police, or in prison, concentration camp, correction
1

Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 175 and 180.
The circular continued: " I give warning t h a t even foreigners whoare sent back
to their own countries because of inability to work or for police reasons, in all
circumstances require a regular [German] return visa, a passport and an [entrance] visa [for their own country] . . . They will be given tickets to the railway
station nearest to their homes, whether or not they are liable for payment of their
return fare" (Circular of 8 January 1944; Reichsarbeitsblatt, 10 Feb. 1944, P a r t I,
p. 53).
3
BIRKENHOLZ, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 96.
4
Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 8 October 1941, ibid., p. 180.
2

BIRKENHOLZ, ibid.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

215

camp, etc. (so called "cases of police character") a sick foreigner
was not entitled to any of the services otherwise granted to him. 1
As a rule, foreign workers were not supposed to be treated by
private doctors. Under Sauckel's instructions, they had a choice
only between camp doctors and doctors employed in social security
work; the choice depended not on the foreigner's preference, but
on local circumstances. But there were not enough of these "official"
doctors for the millions of recruited workers.
In. 1942, Germany began to bring in foreign physicians and
surgeons who were to take care, under German supervision, of
their fellow countrymen in the hutments and camps. 2 But by no
means all the foreign doctors brought into Germany were assigned
to this task, and the scarcity of doctors and medical personnel
available for recruited workers continued throughout the war.
*
*

As long as the military situation permitted, the German authorities continued to follow the policy of removing sick, worn-out and
disabled foreign workers from German soil. At the same time they
built up an elaborate system in western and north-western Europe,
to induce social security institutions in the foreigners' own countries
to look after them on their return. The benefits with which
labour recruits were thus provided a t home were granted on behalf,
and allegedly at the expense of, the German social insurance funds.
It is true that means were found to avoid direct payment for these
benefits by foreign social insurance funds. But through arrangements that recall the wage transfer schemes, the greater part of the
benefits at least were paid, not by Germany (which had received the
corresponding social insurance contributions), but by the foreign
countries themselves. This was equally true of the family sickness
insurance benefits granted, on behalf of the German social insurance
funds, to the dependants of foreigners working in or for Germany.
Some aspects of these arrangements may be briefly described.
1
Dr. ADAM: "Kostenregelung bei Erkrankung, Schwangerschaft, Rückkehr
und Tod von ausländischen Arbeitskräften", in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe,
Jan. 1943, p. 7.
1
Information upon foreign doctors has been rare and contradictory. In the
summer of 1942, the German press reported that 200 Ukrainian doctors would
soon be brought to Germany "in order to look after Ukrainian workers". On 10
September 1943, the German-sponsored Dutch paper, Van Honk, spoke of 1,000
foreign doctors working in the Reich. A few days later a Finnish newspaper
mentioned 2,000 foreign doctors in Berlin alone (Ssumen Socialdemokraati, 19
Sept. 1943), a large portion of whom, however, were obviously medical students
rather than practitioners taking care of foreign workers (Radio Paris, 8 Sept.
1943). A Berlin propaganda broadcast of 27 April 1944 claimed that at that date
2,500 foreign doctors were looking after foreign workers in Germany.

216

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY
FAMILY SICKNESS INSURANCE BENEFITS

German sickness insurance contributions were computed to
cover the expenses of medical care and certain other benefits granted
by the German social insurance system to dependants of the insured person, but German legislation limited these services to
dependants resident in Germany. Since the great majority of
dependants did not live with the insured foreigners in Germany,
they were not eligible.
"In order to relieve foreigners working in the Reich from anxiety
about members of their families who fall sick, and thus to create
in the non-German countries an additional incentive to take up
work in Germany" 1 , the Reich, in the two and a half years between
June 1939 and December 1941, made agreements with social insurance institutions in the "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia" 2 ,
the "Republic of Slovakia" 3 , the Governments of Denmark 4 ,
Italy 6 , Hungary 6 , Rumania 7 , France 8 , and Bulgaria 9 , and the "Independent State of Croatia". 10 In these agreements it was stipulated
that certain categories of dependants left behind by heads of families
who were working in Germany should be eligible for family sickness
insurance benefits. The principle was also applied to Norwegian
dependants resident in Norway. In the autumn of 194111, these
arrangements were extended to Frenchmen, Belgians, Netherlanders,
Danes and Norwegians who were working, not in Germany proper,
but for German authorities or German firms in the occupied eastern
territories. Thus, for instance, the dependent wife, living in
Belgium, of a Belgian working in the Ukraine for a German-run
armament factory, would receive sickness insurance benefits from
the German Sickness Insurance Office, functioning under the German Military Commander for Belgium and northern France, in
Brussels.
At about the same time, Danes working in Norway for German
undertakings were included in the German sickness insurance
scheme. Dependants left in Denmark by Danes transported to
Norway were to receive family sickness benefits from the Danish
1

JUNGFLEISCH, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 465.
Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, Part II, p. 6.
» Idem, 1941, Part II, p. 8.
I
Idem, P a r t II, p. 115.
6
See Appendix V I I .
6
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 584 (37), supplement, 20 May 1942.
'•Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, P a r t II, p. 130.
« Idem, 1942, Part II, p. 184.
9
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 585 (1), supplement, 15 Sept. 1942. T h e Bulgarian
agreement was not ratified and therefore did not come into effect until 1943.
10
Reichsgesetzblatt, 1942, Part II, pp. 131, 296.
II
Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 13 September 1941 ; Ausländische
Arbeiter, p. 466 (1), supplement, 20 May 1942.
2

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

217

social insurance institutions, under the control of the German Sickness Insurance Office in Copenhagen.
These arrangements differed very widely, as did the manner
and degree of their actual application in the different countries and
at various stages of the war. But all the arrangements had some
common features. Whatever benefits were granted, they had to be
granted, as a general rule: (a) by the foreign countries themselves,
and (b) under strict German supervision. If the foreigner escaped
from German employment, or got into trouble in Germany, the
family insurance benefits had to be stopped. On the other hand,
the promise that families whose providers had gone to Germany
would be "taken care of" was widely advertised, both as an inducement to foreigners to accept employment and as a means of maintaining their morale when employed.
A typical procedure iiPoccupied western Europe was as follows.
The German sickness insurance office at which the head of the
family was insured while working in Germany, would issue an individual certificate. This certificate would then be sent to the German
branch office in Paris, Brussels or The Hague, as the case might be,
whence it would be forwarded to the worker's home in France,.
Belgium or the Netherlands. If a case of sickness or pregnancy
occurred in his family, the sick or pregnant dependant had, in
person, to submit to the mayor the German certificate in question, to testify before him that the head of the family was still
working in Germany and to specify what medical services were
desired. Thereupon, the mayor, if satisfied1, issued a "sickness
certificate". This certificate entitled the patient to free treatment
by an authorised doctor or dentist during the next three months 2 ,
to a 70 per cent, refund for certain medicines and minor medical
appliances,'and to payment of 50 per cent, of the minimum hospital rates (but never exceeding 3 RM a day and, in France, not
exceeding 60 francs) up to 13 weeks. The assistance given in case
of childbirth of the absent worker's wife, daughters, step-daughters
or foster-daughters, consisted of 20 RM (in Norway, 30 RM, in
Denmark, 25 RM) 3 "in lieu of the services of a midwife". In addition,
medical care, medicines and some minor medical appliances might,
if necessary, be granted to a limited extent. 4
1
In France, one of the changes introduced by the German-French agreement
on social insurance questions of 16 May 1943 (superseding the German-French
agreement of 14 October 1941) transferred these duties from the mayors to t h e
social insurance institutions.
a
Workers from western Europe were entitled, on the death of the wife or a
dependent child, to a payment of 20 R M or 10 R M respectively. Instead of
being sent to the absent widower or father, these small sums were usually paid t o
the person who assumed responsibility for the funeral (Ausländische
Arbeiter,
p. 468, p. 513 (6), supplement, 20 May 1942).
* Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 28 February 1941; ibid., p. 499.
4

JUNGFLEISCH, ibid., p. 467.

218

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

In France, before 1 June 1941, the sickness certificate entitled
the bearer to receive treatment only from practitioners whose names
were entered in the Vichy Government's corporative registers
•Ordre des médecins de France and Confédération nationale des syndicats dentaires, or Fédération dentaire nationale de France.1 In order
t o tighten political control and to prevent contact between the
population and "unreliable" members of the medical profession,
the official National Socialist Association of Social Insurance
Practitioners of Germany was, from 1 June 1941, put in control
of the medical practitioners in all occupied western territories. 2
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS IN FRANCE 3

During the first phase of German wartime labour policy, when
recruitment from France was still largely "voluntary", the Germans issued unilateral regulations providing for the grant, in
accordance with German legislation, of family sickness benefits and
sickness benefits to French workers who, with German authorisation, returned to the occupied zone (always with the exception of
Alsace-Lorraine). 4 These benefits were provided by the German
Sickness Insurance Office set up in Paris. During that period, i.e.,
until November 1941, no benefits were granted, as far as Germany
was concerned, to dependants or returned French workers in the
¡unoccupied zone.6
After two weeks of negotiations, held, it appears, on German
initiative, an agreement {procès-verbal) was signed in Paris on 14
October 1941, between delegates of the German Military Commander, the Reich Minister of Labour and the French (Vichy)
.Secretary of State for Labour. The agreement, which was expressly
described as provisional, regulated the conditions under which
German-employed French workers and their families were to be
entitled to sickness (including maternity) benefits, benefits after
the death of the insured worker, employment injury (accident)
benefits and invalidity and old-age pensions. Its main provisions
«came into force on 1 November 1941.
Under the agreement, the German Sickness Insurance Fund in
Paris and its branches in Nancy and Lille continued to grant
1
Instructions of the Paris Deutsche Krankenkasse für die besetzten Französischen Gebiete (undated), quoted ibid., p. 513 (3), supplement, 20 M a y 1942.
2
Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 15 M a y 1941; ibid., p. 511.
3
T h e following passage is largely based on information given to the International Labour Office by the Provisional French Government in February 1945.
4
Decrees by the Reich Minister of Labour of 28 September 1940, 6 November
1940 and 15 M a y 1941 {Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 485, 489, 508).
6
Circular by the French Secretary of State for Labour to the directors of the
Services régionaux des assurances sociales, of 28 October 1941.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

219

benefits, under German law, to the categories mentioned. For the
unoccupied zone, the Germans agreed that French social insurance
institutions should grant benefits, in accordance with French law.
The cost of these services was to be refunded by Germany, provided that they were rendered only after consent had been obtained
from the German Sickness Insurance Fund in Paris. That fund had
also to furnish to the French institutions, for the computation of
the benefits, such data as the periods for which benefits were to be
granted, the wages of French workers while in Germany, and the
like. Until they received this information the French institutions
could only make provisional arrangements.
It should be noted that benefits could be granted in either zone
only on receipt of individual notifications from the social insurance
fund in Germany to which the French worker concerned was
attached. Much difficulty was caused by the slowness with which
these official notifications arrived and additional delays arose from
the slowness of the German Sickness Fund in Paris in communicating its information and consent. There were many further complications due to differences between German and French law as applied
in each of the two zones.
The scheme was revised as the result of a German-French
agreement of 16 May 1943, which came into effect on 1 July 1943.
The grant of benefits for the whole of France was now entrusted to
French departmental sickness insurance funds (Caisses départementales). The German Sickness Fund in France ceased to handle
individual claims itself, and was confined to directing and supervising the French departmental funds. 1 At the same time, the
scheme was extended to cover German-employed French agricultural workers and their dependants. Without lessening German
control, the formalities were made less cumbersome. 2 Benefits were
granted according to French law, but with modifications (e.g., concerning free medical care, computation of cash allowances and reimbursement of costs of pharmaceutical supplies) which were
partly favourable to the beneficiaries. An arrangement which until
1 July 1943 had applied only to the occupied zone now extended to
the whole of France; medical treatment (at the practitioner's office
or the patient's home) and dental treatment had to conform to
1
Later in the war, the Germans, while keeping full control, tended to entrust
the technical and administrative side of social insurance to national institutions
in other countries too. At the end of 1943, German social security offices still
existed in Paris, Brussels, The Hague, Copenhagen, Oslo, Belgrade and Riga.
"Mostly, however, the foreigners, once returned to their own countries, were
cared for by the social insurance institutions of their respective countries, which
granted benefits a t the request of the German social insurance institutions"
(FUNKE, op. cit., p. 31). For arrangements concerning Italians, see Appendix V I I .
* Circular by the French (Vichy) Minister-Secretary of State for Labour, to
the. directors of the Services régionaux des assurances sociales, of 10 June 1943..

220

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

the agreements between the official German National Socialist
doctors' and dentists' organisations, and the Vichy Ordre des
médecins de France.1
In spite of this simplification, many difficulties still arose. Delays due to the German Sickness Fund in Paris continued ; and the
various official German documents which individual claimants had
always to produce before receiving benefits, were still arriving very
late, and, when they came, were often incomplete. According to
investigations carried out after liberation, the "return passes" of
sick, injured or disabled French workers hardly ever contained
authority from the German social insurance fund to which they had
been attached while working in Greater Germany, to grant them
benefits after their return. As said before, such authorisation was
a prerequisite; but experience showed that many sick or injured
French workers, particularly those most gravely affected, could not
cope with all the formalities before their return. A third GermanFrench agreement was concluded on 11 March 1944. Among other
minor modifications, it provided that the German Sickness Fund in
Paris should, in exceptional cases, itself grant the authorisations
not granted by the social insurance funds in Greater Germany
before the claimant's return.
Finance of the Benefits
French institutions making payments on behalf of German
insurance funds had to send their requests for repayment, with all
the necessary evidence, to the Union of Social Insurance Funds of
the Paris District, which, after examination, forwarded them to
the German Sickness Fund in Paris. The German Fund, after
further examination, then repaid the money through the same
channel. During the last year of German occupation, under the
1943 agreement, the French departmental funds received, from
July 1943, a monthly lump sum of 25.40 francs (equivalent to
1.27 RM) for every industrial or other non-agricultural French
worker employed in Germany, and of 17.80 francs (equivalent to
0.89 RM) for every agricultural worker. Out of these payments,
the departmental funds paid family sickness and maternity benefits
and the sickness and maternity benefits due to returned French
workers. 2 The 1943 agreement provided for revision, upward or
1

Circular by the French (Vichy) Minister-Secretary of State for Labour.
The cost of benefits paid, on behalf of Germany, on the death of a Germanemployed French worker, under French "survivors' insurance", continued to
be repaid through direct accounting with the German Sickness Fund in Paris.
One of the concessions in the 1944 agreement was a doubling of the benefits to
be paid under French "survivors' insurance".
2

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

221

downward, of these lump sum rates, if the actual expenses of the
French institutions differed by more than 5 per cent. The 1944
agreemeht accordingly adjusted the account by fixing the lump
sum for the last six months of 1943 at 20.80 francs (equivalent to
1.04 RM) for every German-employed French worker1, and added
6 million francs for hospitalisation expenses during that period.
It also increased, from 1 January 1944, the monthly lump sum
payments for industrial and other non-agricultural French workers
in Germany, to 32.00 francs (equivalent to 1.60 RM) and for
agricultural workers to 22.40 francs (equivalent to 1.12 RM). 2
When the Germans left France, the arrears, according to preliminary investigations, amounted to approximately 40 million
francs. The greatest part of this amount was due for repayment
of the cost of family sickness benefits; the second largest, though a
much smaller sum, for payments made by the French institutions
on behalf of Germany to the Ordre des médecins de France. But
otherwise, the French institutions which handled these matters
did not have to use their own funds, since they were repaid by
the German Sickness Fund in Paris, while the German fund itself
handled individual insurance cases in the occupied zone of France
until July 1943.
Whence did the German Fund in Paris obtain the money ?
The arrangements which it made with the various social insurance funds in Germany to which foreign workers were attached
and for which it acted are not known. There were two obstacles
to the actual remittance of funds, either in German or foreign
currency, outside the Reich. One was the clearing system organised
by Germany during the war, which put Germany in debt for forced
loans in the countries which it dominated. As in the case of wage
transfers 3 , the true circumstances were concealed from the beneficiaries, the population at large, and, often from the administrative
authorities of the country. In France, preliminary investigations
led the French Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance to the
conclusion that the money needed by the German Sickness Insurance Fund in Paris and its branches for its payments, probably
1
The agreement also fixed a t 649,000, for the second quarter of 1943, the
number of French workers in Germany for whom the French departmental funds
received lump sum payments from the German Sickness Fund in Paris (Arrangement of 11 March 1944, Declarations, §1, Taux forfaitaires).
2
The agreement of 11 March 1944 provided t h a t a revision of the lump sum
rates could be demanded, a t the latest, by 30 September 1944. Otherwise, they
were to remain in force until 30 June 1945, after which they would be tacitly
renewed for nine-month periods until, a t the latest within one month before the
expiration' of each period, a demand for modification was made to the German
Military Commander in France (Art. 10, Agreement of 16 May 1943, as amended
by Agreement of 11 March 1944).
3
See Chapter X I I .

- 222

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

came, not from Germany, but from the Vichy Government. No
information is available upon the origin of the French francs which
the departmental funds received from the Germans in repayment
of lump sum advances. But there are strong indications that the
various German social insurance funds deposited repayments with
the German clearing agency in Berlin, and that the corresponding
amounts were paid by France, in French francs, to the debit of the
Reich. In Belgium the German Sickness Fund in Brussels continued to handle individual family sickness insurance benefits
for German-employed Belgians. The Belgian social insurance
system differs more widely from the German system than does
the French, and the Germans therefore chose to continue, up
to the end of their rule, an arrangement which was discontinued
in France in 1943. After liberation, the Belgian Government
found that the German Sickness Insurance Fund in Brussels had
received its funds, not from Germany, but from the Belgian Banque
d'Emission, the note-issuing bank created by the Commander
of the German occupation army. 1
German legislation on transfer of money from Germany to
foreign countries is relevant in this connection. Six days before
the outbreak of the war, on 26 August 1939, the Reich Minister of
Labour issued a Decree concerning the transfer of money and the
crediting of foreign accounts for social insurance services.2 The
Decree was a sequel to secret orders issued in preparation for the
war by the Reich Minister of Economics, orders which were not
made public and were to come into effect on 1 September 1939
(the day on which the German attack on Poland began). Under
regulations of the same date, certain transfers of money by mail
were still permissible, but in other cases no German-held account
of a foreign social insurance fund could legally be credited on the
books with any amount, without a permit from a German foreign
exchange control board {Devisenstelle).
A few months later, a Decree concerning the handling of
foreign assets, dated 15 January 19403, prohibited any payment
to an enemy 4 (physical or legal person) abroad, either directly or
indirectly, by cash, cheque, draft, or any other form. The same
provision applied to social security funds. 5 The secret regulations
1
Information received by the International Labour Office from the Belgian
Government in February 1945.
2
Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 587.
3
Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940, P a r t I, p. 191.
4
For an example of the impact of German administration upon the social
insurance system of a country which, after being occupied, was not considered as
an enemy country, but was annexed to the Reich, see Appendix VII regarding
Luxembourg.
6
JUNGFLEISCH, in Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 484, supplement, 20 May 1942.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

223

issued by the Reich Minister of the Interior in 1939 preceded t h e
outbreak of the war and were a part of Germany's preparations.
Similarly, the Decree of 15 January 1940 preceded the second'
stage of the war, namely, the Reich's invasion of north-western,
western and south-eastern Europe.
By the time the drive for labour began in these parts of Europe,
it had already been made impossible to transfer funds for the payment of sickness insurance benefits to the dependent families of
German-employed breadwinners. In the spring of 1942, an official
comment on German legislation on foreign labour stated that "in
the meantime, owing to the favourable development of the war,
the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs has granted exceptions
from this prohibition on a large scale". 1 These exceptions do not
seem to have been granted for family insurance benefits. In the
summer of 1942, the Reich Minister of Labour established a clearing system for the family insurance benefits of French, Danish,
Belgian, Netherlanders', Norwegian, Czech, Slovak, Italian, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgar and Croat dependants. 2 A central clearing o r
pooling agency, the Verbindungsstelle der Deutschen Krankenversicherung^^
created at the National Association of (German) Local
Sickness Insurance Funds (Reichsverband der Ortskrankenkassen)
in Berlin. German insurance branch offices in France, Belgium,
Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, and the German Social I n surance Control Office in Prague (Verrechnungsstelle der Reichsverbände der Reichskrankenkassen und der Reichsknappschaft) were
ordered to report regularly to the new pooling agency, indicating;
the services rendered on behalf of German family insurance withini
their respective jurisdictions. The pooling agency in Berlin wouldi
then allot the costs of these services among the various local.
German insurance funds (which had received the contributionsof German-employed foreigners), prescribing to each how much
it had to contribute to meet the total expenditure incurred outside
the Reich. The sums owed to these outside agencies were thus
collected by, or credited to, the central pooling agency in Berlin.
In Italy (until the summer of 1943), Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Croatia, a somewhat different method was used. There
were no branches of the German sickness insurance system in these
countries, nor did Germany require reports from them. Instead,
the central Berlin pooling agency used its discretion in deciding
what sums were to be credited to the German-held accounts for
sickness insurance benefits of families whose providers had gone
to Germany. No provision was made for the families of workers
> Ibid.
Decree of Í8 July 1942; ibid., p. 585 (1), supplement, 15 Sept. 1942.

224

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

from other countries, such as the occupied parts of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia (with the exception of Croatia) or Poland.
EMPLOYMENT INJURY (ACCIDENT) INSURANCE

While in Germany, foreigners from countries other than Poland
and the Soviet Union were entitled to the same benefits under
German employment injury (accident) insurance as comparable
German workers. 1 In spite of this equality rule, foreign workers
suffered from the same disadvantages as under the sickness insurance system. The policy of removing from the Reich disabled
foreigners who could not be expected to recover rapidly was applied
with special severity to these cases, so long as the course of the war
permitted, since industrial accidents and occupational diseases often
involve the grant of benefits over long periods of time, and lead
t o protracted or permanent incapacity for work.
The German Social Insurance Code provided that non-German
•citizens, to be eligible for benefits, must have their regular residence
within the borders of the Reich.2 This provision covered both disabled foreigners and, if the accident resulted in death, their dependent survivors; so long as such persons were domiciled outside
'Germany their respective claims were "suspended". Foreigners
•who on account of injury or occupational disease were removed
from Germany would thus have been prevented from receiving
•medical care, cash allowances and pensions; and if the injury or
•disease proved fatal, the provision would have prevented their
survivors from receiving the pensions to which they were entitled
under German law.
No figures concerning industrial accidents and occupational
diseases were published by the German authorities, but occasional
references indicated a greatly increased frequency rate of industrial
accidents and occupational diseases even among German workers. 8
1

In this branch of social insurance contributions were paid by the employer

•only.
2

The German Insurance Code provided t h a t exemptions might be made for
.persons living in frontier districts, and for citizens of countries whose legislation
•granted equivalent accident insurance benefits to survivors of a German citizen
killed by an industrial accident in their country, even if the German survivors did
n o t live in the country where the accident occurred.
3
For example, Arbeiterschutz wrote on 15 May 1943: "At present it is extremely difficult . . . to install ventilating equipment or devices of even the simplest
kind, to say nothing of a more elaborate kind. Even respirators for workers especially exposed to danger cannot always be provided promptly and in sufficient
numbers . . . The restrictions on the employment of women and juveniles on unhealthy work are no longer completely applicable to the handling of substances
containing benzine and the like." The article added that the extension of working
hours in badly ventilated rooms increased the danger of poisoning. An Order of
the Reich Minister of Labour, of 22 February 1944, referring to working conditions of German women in the timber industry, pointed out t h a t "very frequently

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

225

From the German point of view, there were two disadvantages in
leaving incapacitated foreigners without assistance after their return
home. It would create an administrative problem for the German
authorities outside Germany; and it would cause additional bitterness among the deportees and their families and thus increase
resistance to new recruitment drives. Administrative and political
considerations of this kind prompted Germany to waive the
"residence-in-Germany" requirement, but not to abandon the
policy of removing incapacitated foreigners from the country.
Germany succeeded in fact in transferring to the countries of origin
responsibility for the administration of medical benefits, on behalf
of the German employment injury insurance fund. This transfer
of responsibility was convenient for Germany from every point
of view: simplified administration; economy in money, medical
personnel and equipment; and avoidance of language difficulties
and political complications.
The transfer could not be achieved without the active collaboration of the countries concerned. Germany therefore invoked prewar bilateral treaties, as in the case of Belgium1, the Netherlands 2 ,
Denmark 3 , (non-German) persons from Bohemia and Moravia 4 ,
and Yugoslavia (except Croats) 5 , or concluded new treaties, as
with Italy 6 , France 7 , Hungary 8 , Rumania 9 , Croatia 10 and Bulgaria. 11
A few weeks before the opening of hostilities against the Soviet
Union, the Reich Minister of Labour decreed that the residence
requirement was abrogated for the occupied territories of western
dust exhausts are inadequate ; moreover, since the war, many firms have possessed
no dust-removing installations or their installations have not been working owing
to lack of power. In most cases, it is therefore inevitable t h a t fine dust should
settle in the hair, eyes, and respiratory organs of workers, who are thus exposed to the danger of silicosis" [Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger,
22 Feb. 1944).
1
Treaty of 6 July 1912; Reichsgesetzblatt, 1913, p. 23.
2
Treaty of 27 August 1907 (ibid., p. 763), amended b y Treaty of 30 M a y 1914
(ibid., 1915, p. 312) and extended to cover Austria by exchange of notes between
Germany and the Netherlands of 30 September 1938 and 8 June 1939 (ibid.,
Part II, p. 937).
3
Treaty of 19 July 1933 (ibid., 1934, Part II, p. 937).
4
Treaty of 21 March 1931 (ibid., 1933, Part II, p. 1016) as basis of agreement
of 14 March 1940 (ibid., P a r t II, p. 107).
6
The Treaties between Germany and Yugoslavia of 15 December 1928 (ibid.,
P a r t II, p. 561), and between Austria and Yugoslavia of 21 July 1931 (Bundesgesetzblatt, 1934, p. 59), were declared applicable by Order of the Reich Minister of
Labour of 2 January 1940 (not published) (Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 482, supplement, 15 Oct. 1942).
6
See Appendix V I I .
7
Agreements of 14 October 1941, 16 May 1943, 11 May 1944.
8
Treaty of 24 July 1941 (ibid., p. 483 (9), supplement, 20 May 1942).
9
Treaty of 23 August 1941 (ibid., p. 483 (4), supplement, 20 May 1942).
" T r e a t y of 10 December 1941 (ibid., p. 483, supplement, 20 May 1942).
11
Treaty of 2 December 1941 (ibid., p. 481, supplement, 15 Oct. 1942). As
already stated, this treaty was not ratified until 1943, owing to the special political
situation in Bulgaria, but German official instructions ordered its application notwithstanding the absence of ratification.

226

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

and north-western Europe, and for Denmark (which, at that time,
was not considered occupied territory). 1 Again, the arrangements
varied from country to country. The general principle was to
grant to incapacitated foreigners benefits under German employment injury insurance only up to the time that they recrossed the
frontier ; they were afterwards taken care of by the social insurance
institutions of their own countries. Some of the agreements provided that they were entitled to benefit under the legislation of
their own countries; others, that they were entitled to benefits
under German legislation (which was often more advantageous to
the beneficiary). These benefits were to be granted by the foreign
institutions on behalf of Germany, which was to make the necessary repayment. Cash allowances and pensions granted under
German legislation on employment injury insurance had to be
paid partly by the foreign institutions on behalf of, and against
repayment by, Germany, and partly by Germany directly.
The German-French agreements contained detailed provisions
concerning French workers who returned home because they were
suffering from the results of an industrial accident or from occupational disease, but these provisions did not specify whether Germany
or France was to pay the expenses. In the occupied zone, until
July 1943, the German Sickness Insurance Fund in Paris and its
branch offices administered benefits according to German legislation, on behalf of the German insurance funds to which the French
beneficiaries were attached while in Germany. The German fund
in Paris also paid pensions on behalf of these insurance funds in
Germany to workers (or their survivors) in the unoccupied zone.
In the unoccupied zone, benefits other than pensions were paid,
on behalf of the German funds, by the French Caisses primaires
maladie maternité des assurances sociales. In certain circumstances,
these funds also paid, against repayment by Germany, and under
German control, the benefits in kind and cash under French
legislation concerning temporary incapacity due to industrial
accidents. 2 Under the agreement of 16 May 1943, French institutions were responsible, in the whole of France (except, of course,
Alsace-Lorraine) for granting all benefits except pensions (medical
care, dental care, hospitalisation, medicine, medical appliances,
1
Order of 15 May 1941; ibid., p. 472 (3), supplement, 20 May 1942. Danish
workers transferred to Germany together with a Danish firm (Firmeneinsatz)
continued to belong to the Danish employment injury insurance scheme. If they
met with an accident or suffered from an occupational disease covered by Danish
insurance, the German insurance funds took care of them until they crossed the
frontier into Denmark; the Danish institution had to refund the expenses (German-Danish Agreement of 24 February 1942; Reichsgesetzblall, P a r t II, p. 416).
2
§§ 14-19 of Agreement of 14 October 1941, and Instructions by the French
(Vichy) Secretary of State for Labour of 28 October 1941.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

227

artificial limbs, cash allowances, occupational therapy and reeducation, etc.). Pensions were paid on behalf of the German funds,
through the intermediary of the German Sickness Fund in
Paris.
It should be noted that, as with sickness and maternity insurance, a prerequisite for these benefits was that the French
worker must possess, not only an authorisation from the German
police and labour administration to return, but also an authorisation from the German employment injury insurance fund to which
he had been attached. This second authorisation was often difficult
or impossible to obtain. If the patient had not been able to obtain
it himself, the French institutions could intervene on his behalf in
Germany, but always through the intermediary of the French
Union régionale in Paris and the German Sickness Fund in Paris.
Since many disabled workers (or their survivors) were not receiving benefits because they did not possess the required German
documents, the agreement of 11 March 19441 provided that the
German Sickness Fund in Paris should be entitled to issue, those
authorisations that could not be obtained from Germany. On
the other hand, in order to prevent the victim of the injury or
occupational disease from accumulating cash benefits, the amendments of 11 March 1944 provided that the German fund (in
Germany) should inform the French fund of the grant of every
pension and should start paying the pension only after a lapse
of eight weeks after the notification, but that as long as the French
institution did not receive the notification from the German fund,
the French fund should continue to grant benefits (including cash
allowances) according to French legislation.2
So far as these benefits were granted by French social insurance
institutions on behalf, and under the control, of the Germans,
they were entitled to demand repayment from the German fund
which, in the individual case, would have been competent if the
French beneficiaries had had their residence in Germany. These
demands for repayment, as in the case of sickness insurance, were
centralised by the Union régionale in Paris and the German Sickness Fund in Paris. As long as the military situation allowed,
German regulations provided that employment injury pensions
should be paid by the German insurance fund to which the individual French worker had been attached while in the Reich.
It will require further investigation to ascertain whether the rigid
1
Circular Order by the Director of the Union des caisses, Paris, of 28 March
1944.
s
Circular Orders by the Director of the Union des caisses, Paris, of 28 March
and 20 April 1944.

228

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

German clearing and foreign exchange control regulations were
set aside in these cases, or whether these payments were made
through the Reichskreditkassen in France, or through French banks
from French funds to Germany's debit in the German-French
clearing account.
INVALIDITY AND OLD-AGE INSURANCE

Invalidity and old-age insurance benefits in the German social
insurance system consisted mainly of pensions granted after extended contributory periods, which only in very few cases were
likely to be completed during the war. "So far as old-age and invalidity pensions are concerned, the regulations therefore aim
generally at adding the periods for which German pension insurance
contributions have been paid, to the waiting periods required by
the pension insurance of their own countries; and, furthermore, in
certain categories, at granting increases of pensions to the debit
of the German pension insurance fund." 1 The same principle was
more shortly expressed in the statement that German regulations
concerning foreign workers' contributions to German invalidity
and old-age insurance generally aimed at "preserving the person's
claims under the pension insurance scheme of his own country, by
crediting him with the contributions made under the German
scheme". In other words, the German authorities endeavoured to
induce the old-age and invalidity insurance funds of the foreign
countries to credit the accounts of their respective nationals as if
the amounts received by the German funds had been received by
those non-German funds. 2 The following are two examples.
Under a provisional German-Netherlands agreement published
in 19413, the Netherlands Social Insurance Bank (Ryksversekeringsbank) undertook the obligation to pay to Netherlands workers who
had been officially recruited for work in Germany, or, after their
death, to their widows and children, provisional invalidity and
old-age pensions, both for the Netherlands and the German insurance periods. The German fund was to pay a proportionate
contribution to the Netherlands Social Insurance Bank. It was
expressly stipulated that individual workers who, while in Germany, were insured in the German fund (or after their death,
their widows and children) should have no claim against it. Definite arrangements concerning pension insurance for German1

F U N K E , loe. cit.,

p. 31.

Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger, 23 Mar. 1944.
3
Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 23 April 1941; Order by the
Secretary-General of the Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs (The Hague), 20
February 1941 (Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 466,516, supplement, 20 May 1942).

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

229

employed Netherlanders and their survivors were to be made at a
later date.
Similarly, if a French worker, after employment in Germany,
(or, in the event of his death, his widow and children) became
eligible for invalidity or old-age pension, the French insurance
fund had to compute it according to French law. The GermanVichy French agreement of 14 October 1941 stipulated:
20. Workers from France who were employed in Germany and during
t h a t period belonged t o the German invalidity-old-age insurance for [manual]
workers or salaried employees—on the understanding t h a t the computation of
the pension in case of coexistence of French and German periods of insurance
shall be determined a t a later date—shall receive, a t the occurrence of the risk,
the benefits from the competent French insurance institutions in accordance with
the provisions of French legislation.
21. (1). To determine whether the worker is entitled to benefit . . . [and]
the amount of the benefit, the French insurance institution shall take into account
the insurance periods passed in Germany, in the same manner as its own insurance
periods.
22. The German insurance institution shall repay to the French institution
the amount by which the pension was increased in consequence of the German
insurance periods having been taken into account.
T h a t increase shall be
calculated by deducting from the amount of the pension . . . the amount which
the French institution would have paid had the pension been computed on the
basis of the combined insurance periods in Germany and France, [but] only
according to the wage earned in France. 1

These provisions were amended, in some details, by the subsequent German-French agreements, but the important provision in § 20, which left final settlement to an indefinite date,
was not changed.
W A R DAMAGE

INSURANCE

On 10 November 1940, detailed regulations were issued concerning indemnities to civilians who suffered injuries from enemy
war action, such as bombing attacks. As of right, these benefits
were expressly limited to Germans, but foreigners, while not legally
entitled to them, were free to apply for them. 2 In no case was an
injured worker, German or foreign, entitled to double indemnity;
this meant that indemnity could be granted to him either under
war insurance, or as employment injury benefit.
The provisions of the Injury of Persons Order of 10 November
1
§ 23 provided t h a t the German and French insurance funds concerned
should clear administrative and financial matters through the intermediary of
the Reich Insurance Office, and the Caisse générale de garantie des assurances
sociales in Paris.
' Personenschaden-Verordnung;
Reichsgeselzblatt, 1940, Part I, p. 1482.

230

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

1940 were gradually extended to certain categories of non-Germans;
for instance, by agreement between Germany and Denmark of 24
February 1942, to certain categories of Danes working in Germany
or Norway, and, a year later, to French civilian workers and released prisoners of war. 1 According to a manual issued by the
official Vichy organisation for the information of German-employed
French workers 2 , benefits were granted under the war insurance,
provided that the damage to the persons was not caused while
the persons were at work, or on the way to or from work, or at
their camps; in these cases the damage was to be covered by the
ordinary employment injury (accident) insurance. But in these
cases too, the victim was free to choose benefit under war insurance
if it was higher than benefit under employment injury insurance.
According to the French manual, the benefits under war insurance
which could be claimed, if the victim had obeyed the German air
raid precaution regulations, were:
(a) in case of injury, resulting in 100 per cent, permanent incapacity for work:
a monthly basic pension of 40 to 50 R M for unmarried persons, 70 R M for childless married persons and 80 R M for married persons with children. Possible additions: occupational indemnity of 10-50 R M ; a portion (up to 75 per cent.) of the
workers' income before the injury; 100 R M if the accident resulted in blindness;
for those who needed another person's assistance: 50-125 R M .
(2>) in case of injury resulting in permanent incapacity for work of more than
20 per cent.; according to the degree of incapacity: monthly pension of 15 to 80
R M with a possible addition of 10-20 R M .
(e) in case of death: funeral allowance of 165 R M . The widow was entitled to
a pension equal to 60 per cent, of the basic pension and of the occupational indemnity the victim would have received had the accident resulted in 100 per cent.
permanent incapacity for work. Every child up to the age of 18 was entitled to
an orphan's pension equal to one fifth of the widow's pension, and to one third if
the child was orphaned of both parents. The parents of the deceased were entitled to a pension equal to 50 per cent, of the basic pension if the deceased had
supported them and if they passed a needs test.

If the death of a Belgian working in Germany resulted from an
act of war, the widow was entitled to a pension amounting to 60
per cent, of the old-age pension which would have been payable
to the worker himself, but not less than 60 RM per month. The
orphan's pension in such a case was 20 per cent, of the widow's
pension (i.e., 12 per cent, of the old-age pension to which the deceased worker would have been entitled) and was to be increased
to one third of the widow's pension (i.e., 20 percent, of the father's
presumptive old-age pension) in the event of the mother having
1
Order by the Reich Minister of the Interior of 28 February 1943; Commissariat général à la main-d'œuvre française en Allemagne ( E t a t français): Le
travail en Allemagne et la famille (Paris, 1943), pp. 49 et seq.
2
Ibid.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

231

died previously. The indemnity for funeral expenses varied between
65 and 210 RM. 1
With the intensification of aerial warfare against Germany the
number of victims among foreign workers increased considerably,
because they were frequently employed in target areas. Whether
and to what extent benefits were granted to injured foreigners
continued to depend on the discretion of the German authorities.
Early in 1944, Dr. Funke stated in the article which has already
been quoted 2 that "whereas foreigners injured by enemy action
have no legal claims under the Injury of Persons Order, the German authorities may grant them benefits under this Order if the
prerequisites are fulfilled".
POLISH AND SOVIET WORKERS

As already noted, the principal exception to the rule of theoretical equality in social security matters concerned Polish and
Soviet workers. Up to a late stage in the war, they were excluded
from the equality rule, and also from the obligation to make contributions to the German social security system. They had, instead, to pay special taxes. If, as has been reported, sickness and
death rates were highest among Polish and Soviet workers, their
need for sickness insurance benefits was all the greater.
In the Government-General, a "social assistance" scheme was
introduced, the benefits of which were granted as privileges and on
the understanding that no Pole was legally entitled to them. Some
measures of assistance were gradually introduced, at least in theory,
for larger groups of Polish and Soviet workers. The fact that this
was not done until a late stage of the war was officially attributed
1
Le Soir (Brussels), 13 Sept. 1943. The article also gave details concerning
benefits for survivors of Belgians who died from causes other than war injury in
Germany. The widow was entitled to a pension equal to one fifth of the wage
earned by the deceased during the last year; it was increased to two fifths of the
wage if her earning capacity was reduced by a t least 50 per cent, owing to illness
or infirmity. In addition each child, until completion of his eighteenth year, was
to receive an orphan's pension equal to one fifth of his father's last yearly wage,
but the total of the combined widow's and orphan's pension was never to exceed
80 per cent, of t h a t wage. Persons who were mainly dependent on a deceased unmarried Belgian worker might claim a pension not exceeding one fifth of the
yearly wage. The article also stated t h a t if the death of a German-employed
Belgian worker was due to natural causes or to an industrial accident covered by
German employment injury insurance, his dependants were entitled to an indemnity for funeral expenses. The amount varied according to the worker's wage;
the minimum was 20 times the basic daily wage.
2
Neue Internationale Rundschau der Arbeit, p. 34. This part of the article was
also quoted by the Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen Zeitungsverleger, of 23 March
1944, which added: "Physical injuries suffered [by foreigners] in air raids could
be legally classified as accidents suffered while at work; the benefits of the employment injury insurance scheme are therefore available under certain circumstances".

232

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

to "the special conditions prevailing in their own countries".
The Soviet worker can be led only gradually towards the social
insurance law of the Reich.1
Until March 1942 no provision was made for "Eastern" workers
who fell sick and therefore were unable to pay for bed and food in
their mass quarters. A special scheme was then introduced under
which employers of "Eastern" workers had to pay a uniform
monthly fee of 4 RM. The money thus collected was to be used
for the maintenance and treatment of sick "Eastern" workers.
By an Order of 1 August 19422 this scheme was retained only for
"Eastern" workers in domestic service and was replaced for the
other categories by a flexible scale. To prevent employers from
turning sick "Eastern" workers out of their quarters, the social
insurance funds were ordered to pay the employers a standard
daily rate of 1.50 RM for their upkeep.
Under this scheme, the social security funds' hospitals were
permitted to accept sick "Eastern" workers. Since this was only
a permission and not an obligation, the hospitals often refused to
accept them. In the spring of 1943, the Reich Federation of Local
Sickness Insurance Funds addressed a circular to its members,
advising them that although the admission of "Eastern" workers
to hospitals depended on their discrstion, that discretion must be
"duly" exercised, and requests for admission from "Eastern"
workers should not be refused automatically and without examination. 8
By Order of 30 March 1943 an employment injury (accident)
insurance plan was introduced for "Eastern" workers. 4 The service
was administered by Reich accident insurance funds and was to
consist of medical treatment (nursing was expressly ruled out)
and cash benefits of 1.50 RM daily, to be paid directly to the employer who provided board and lodging. Thus, this scheme was
also designed to ensure to the employer payment of the standard
rate for the worker's maintenance. If the injury resulted in a reduction of more than one third of the worker's earning capacity he
was to be entitled to employment injury benefits, such as medical
care, but pensions were excluded. If the injury resulted in the
worker's death, the widow was entitled to a cash benefit, but not
to a pension as long as she was capable of work. Finally, if the
incapacitated worker returned to his own country with the consent
of the competent German authority, compensation could be paid
1

F U N K B , ibid., p. 30.

Reichsarbeitsblatt, Part II, p. 453.
» Idem, No. 14, IS May 1943, P a r t V, p. 234.
4
Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 33, 31 Mar. 1943, P a r t I, p . 165.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

233

to him even after his return home. 1 It should be noted, however,
that the Order stipulated that none of these benefits could be
claimed as of right, but that they were to be granted at the discretion of the Reich accident insurance fund concerned.
These special regulations of 1 August 1942 and 30 March 1943,
as amended, were repealed by an Order of 25 March 1944.2 From 1
April 1944 "Eastern" workers had to pay the regular social security
contributions because they were now included in the general German social insurance system. This applied also to "Eastern"
workers employed in agriculture and domestic work.3
Sickness insurance funds were ordered to provide necessary
hospitalisation or care for all foreigners recruited by the German
labour administration, if they were in need of treatment. Polish
labour in the Government-General and all foreigners employed
in their own countries were expressly excluded. The services
were to be rendered even if the patients were not entitled to
them under the statutory regulations, and to meet the increased
costs the labour offices were ordered to pay, for every case, out of
the Reich Fund for Manpower Allocation, 15 RM plus the costs,
if any, of hospitalisation. Much depended, of course, on the interpretation of the two important qualifications "necessary care"
or "need" of treatment, but the sum of 15 RM for all services except
actual hospitalisation per case indicates the limited nature of the
scheme.
PREGNANT WOMEN

The basic rules concerning pregnant foreign workers were laid
down in a Decree 4 by the Minister of Labour in August 1941. The
Decree stated that in most cases, because of the unsuitability of
their lodgings, both in agricultural regions and in the (industrial)
camps, the women could be delivered only in hospitals or homes,
but that they were not in a position to pay the expenses of their
confinement. To economise public funds, the following regulations
were therefore issued:
(1) As a matter of principle, pregnant foreign workers must be transported
back to their own country as soon as the pregnancy becomes known [to t h e
German authorities], however far advanced pregnancy may be a t the time that
the information is given. Undertakings employing foreign women must therefore
be informed t h a t it is their d u t y to give notice to the labour office a t once, as soon
as they learn of the pregnancy of any of their foreign female workers.
1
"Soziale Verbesserungen für Ostarbeiter", in Monatshefte für
politik, May 1943, p. 77.
1
Reichsgesetzblatt, P a r t I, p. 68.
3
Decree of Reich Minister of Labour, of 20 July 1944; Amtliche
für Reichsversicherung, No. 22, 10 Aug. 1944, Part II, p. 196.
' D e c r e e of 15 August 1941.

NS-SozialNachrichten

234

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

(2) An exception to the rule that pregnant foreign women must be transported back to their own countries can be made only if the employer is especially
interested in keeping a particular worker and if he assumes a written obligation
to the effect that he will assume responsibility for lodging the foreign woman and
the expected child . . .
(3) If a foreign female worker cannot be transported back to her own country
in time before her delivery because neither the employer nor the labour office has
been notified of the prospective childbirth, she must be transported back as soon
as she is fit to travel, unless the employer expressly assumes responsibility for
lodging the mother with her child. In these cases the child shall not be placed in
a children's home unless either the mother or the father of the child or the employer bears the expenses.

Official German opinion differed as to whether pregnant foreigners should be removed at once, regardless of the length of time they
had worked in Germany. In December 1942, an official comment
on the regulations concerning pregnant foreigners ruled that unmarried expectant mothers should, without exception, be returned
to their recruitment districts; but in as much as the employer had
to pay for the return journey if the worker had been in his employment for more than six weeks, it was stipulated that the woman
must continue to work until six weeks before childbirth. 1 Under
the German-French agreement on social insurance of 11 May 1943,
the French social insurance institution was entitled to grant maternity benefits on behalf of the German funds to French female
workers only if they had left their German place of employment
within six weeks of the presumed date of childbirth. On the other
hand, Dr. Adam, director of the Munich Labour Office, in his
paper on the medical care of foreigners, stated that expectant
mothers, whether married or not, must at once be sent back; otherwise, he added, these cases would become public charges, because
"the usual result would be that neither the mother nor the father
of the child would be able to pay the expenses".
Similarly, there was no uniform practice with regard to the
expectant mother who was living in Germany with her husband or
family. If she was allowed to remain in Germany despite her pregnancy or if, as frequently happened, a married or unmarried woman
concealed her state so long that she could not be transported to her
recruitment district, the German regulations required that she be
given the "necessary" medical care, while attention and nursing
were to be given by fellow countrywomen. 2
With the intensification of the labour shortage the application
of these rules was relaxed. In the first half of 1943, Sauckel decreed
1
Instructions by the French Ministry of Labour, of 10 June 1943; Circular of
the Union des caisses d'assurances sociales, Paris, of 31 July 1943.

»MENDE, loe. cit., p. 231.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

235

that the regulations of the Maternity Protection Act, 19421 (which
in 1942 had been extended to cover Italian and Spanish women
working in Germany), should apply to women employed in the
Reich if they belonged to any of the following nationalities: Bulgar,
Croat, Slovak, Hungarian 2 , Danish, Netherlands, Norwegian, Rumanian, Swedish or Swiss. Belgian expectant mothers were also to
receive the same preferential treatment if they were in a position
to prove their Flemish race (Volkstum) by official evidence from
Belgium. 3
Finally, by Order of 8 January 1944, the Act was extended to
cover Latvian, Estonian and Finnish women, provided that they
were employed in the Reich in accordance with a treaty concluded
with their national authorities as recognised by Germany. 4 T h e
benefits of the Act included a weekly subsidy equal to the average
wage during the previous 13 weeks (at least 2 RM per day), for
six weeks before and six weeks after childbirth, and a daily allowance
of 0.50 RM (up to 26 weeks) for women nursing their babies.
Since the Maternity Protection Act did not provide for medical
care, the Reich Social Insurance Code was declared applicable to
foreign women workers, on condition that they had been insured
with the German sickness insurance system for at least two years.
Most of the wartime treaties concluded by Germany provided,
however, that these waiting periods were deemed to have been fulfilled if the women had complied with them at home.
If the foreign woman was able to qualify, she was entitled to
the services of a midwife, a contribution towards the expenses of
confinement (10-25 RM), medicine and, if necessary, medical care.
Hospitalisation was not provided for, but admission to a nursing
home was theoretically possible, as was the granting of cash subsidies, or of the services of home nurses. The latter benefits depended on the regulations of the various social insurance funds.6
As the list of the privileged nationalities shows, not only were
the great masses of Soviet and Polish women excluded, but also
French, the majority of Czechoslovak and Yugoslav women, as
well as Belgians of Wallon origin, and Jewesses of all nationalities.
Even expectant mothers who were entitled to benefits faced extraordinary hardships and difficulties. The bad housing conditions to
which the Reich Minister of Labour referred in August 1941 re1

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR O F F I C E : Legislative

Series,

1942, Ger. 1; Gesetz

sum Schutze der erwerbstätigen Mutter, of 17 M a y 1942; Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 53,
18 J a n . 1942, P a r t I, p . 321, cf. International Labour Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 5,
Nov. 1942, pp. 598-601, and Vol. L, No. 3, Sept. 1944, pp. 345-348.
2
Reichsarbeitsblatt, No. 4, 5 Feb. 1943, P a r t V, p. 58.
3
Ibid., No. 14, 15 M a y 1943, P a r t I I I , p . 141.
4
Ibid., No. 8-9, 25 Mar. 1944, P a r t I I , p . 60.
6

F U N K E , loe. cit., pp. 32-33.

236

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

mained, at the best, unchanged during the later war years, and
were ita. most cases as thoroughly unsuitable for infants as they were
for women before and after childbirth.
It should be noted that those expectant mothers who were excluded from the benefits of the Maternity Protection Act, were
still, under severe penalties 1 , obliged to report their pregnancy to
their employer "as soon as they knew of their state" ; the employer,
in turn, had to report "immediately" to the labour office. Under
National Socialist legislation, compulsory notification of pregnancy
often amounted to self-incrimination, for a foreign woman was
liable to severe punishment if the intercourse had constituted a
breach of disciplinary regulations or, much worse, a "race crime"
in view of her or the man's origin.
It is true that, apart from this obligatory declaration of pregnancy, the law entitled pregnant women to claim exemption from
heavy and dangerous work2 even though they were excluded from
maternity protection, and forbade them to do any work within six
weeks after childbirth. But in the absence of any protective measures for these women, such rights were merely theoretical, while
the dangers connected with the revelation of pregnancy were very
real.
*

Special provisions applied to the children of members of the
German armed forces in the occupied foreign lands. According to
National Socialist racial doctrine, the treatment of both child and
mother in these cases differed widely, according to the mother's
nationality. The most privileged were Norwegian and Netherlands
women who had children by German soldiers or officers. A Decree
of 28 July 1942 provided as follows:
1. In order to save and foster racially precious Germanic stock, the Führer
hereby declares t h a t children begotten in the occupied Norwegian and Netherlands territories by members of the German Armed Forces and borne to Norwegian or Netherlands women shall be granted, a t the request of the mothers,
special assistance and care by the offices of the Reich Commissioners for the
Occupied Norwegian and Netherlands territories respectively.
2. (1) This care includes payment of confinement expenses, payment of
subsidies to the mothers for the period before and after childbirth, payment of
subsidies for the children, the placing of the mothers in clinics or institutions and
1
Introduced by Administrative Order of 17 May 1942, accompanying the
Maternity Protection Act of the same date (Reichsgesetzblatt, No. 53, 18 May
1942, Part I, p. 324). Both the Act and the Order came into effect on 1 July 1942.
2
The types of work from which pregnant women were exempt, whether or
not they were covered by the Maternity Protection Act, were enumerated in the
Administrative Order of 17 May 1942.

SOCIAL INSURANCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

237

also, with the consent of the mothers, the placing of the children in homes, and
similar measures.
3. (1) The care provided for mothers and children is designed to protect
the mothers from any disadvantage and to foster the development of the children.
(2) If the mother so desires, she shall be assigned to appropriate employment.1

German regulations endeavoured to achieve two aims simultaneously : to increase the birthrate of the stock considered racially
desirable, and to induce the women concerned, either before or
after childbirth, to come to Germany for employment. 2 On the
other hand, the tendency to protect members of the armed forces
(who could decline fatherhood by successfully claiming the defence
of plurium concubentium)3 restricted the application of the policy.
CONCLUSIONS

The treatment of foreign workers with respect to social insurance presents a complicated picture. However, the following
features are outstanding.
(1) Social security contributions from foreign workers provided
the Reich with considerable revenue. No statistics are available,
but it is certain that the contributions deducted from the wages
and salaries of western workers during the war years were higher
than the taxes paid to Germany by these workers. On the other
hand, since Polish and Soviet workers during the greater part of
the war did not pay social security contributions (the particularly
high deductions from their wages and salaries were classified as
taxes) it is uncertain whether thé sum total of social security contributions paid by all foreign workers would prove to be greater
than the sum total of all taxes paid by them.
(2) The benefits and services received by foreign workers and
their families and survivors from German social insurance funds
were far from commensurate with their contributions.
(3) Germany received social insurance contributions from the
foreigners, but systematically directed their claims for social
insurance benefits to the foreign and not the German fund.
1
This Decree was signed by Adolph Hitler, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, Keitel, and the Chief of the (Party) Reich Chancellery,
Lammers (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Norwegischen Gebiete, No. 7, 26 Oct.
1942,
pp. 21-22).
1
Cf. Order by the Reich Commissioner for the Occupied Norwegian Territories,
of 26 October 1943; ibid., No. 1, 14 Jan. 1944, pp. 1-3.
3
§ 4 of the Decree of the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht,
of 13 February 1943; ibid., No. 6, 29 June 1943. The German War Cabinet's
Decree of 9 March 1943 for the protection of marriage, family and motherhood
(Reichsgesetzblatt, 16 Mar. 1943, Part I, p. 141), authorised the Reich Minister of
Justice to issue general exemptions from its provisions for those who violated the
Decree with respect to non-German women, and provided that such exemptions
need not be published in the official gazette.

238

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

(4) In various German-dominated countries, in fact, the Germans often induced the national social insurance funds to extend
services and benefits to the dependants of their nationals employed
in Germany.
(5) The policy of requiring the social insurance funds in the
workers' own countries to grant services and benefits to their
nationals caused an additional strain on these institutions and in
general on the national resources of the countries involved.
(6) There is every reason to fear that many workers who had
been employed in Germany will return to their own countries in
impaired health. The German system of exploiting large numbers
of non-Germans for their war effort will thus have produced the
result that many foreign workers on their return home will be
worse risks than they would have been in normal circumstances.

CHAPTER XV
INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS
As was said at the beginning of this report, German war economy
was in two respects an economy of scarcity. There was a scarcity
of raw materials and a scarcity of skilled labour. Apart from geopolitical and racial aims, the idea behind the importation of foreign
labour to Germany was to solve these two problems by the use of
an abundant supply of unskilled labour.
Even if the Third Reich's policy of coercion of labour had not
wasted manpower, the production of essential war goods in Germany would still have frequently required more man-hours than
in countries better supplied with raw materials, because the manufacture of substitutes demands more manpower than production
or importation of the genuine raw materials. In addition, a
considerable waste of manpower, expressed in the number of manhours needed per unit of output, is unavoidable if unskilled or semiskilled workers have to be trained to do the work because skilled
workers are not available in sufficient numbers.
The industrial leaders of Germany were aware of this situation.
The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Gustloff Works at
Weimar, Beckurts, writing in the official publication of the German Labour Administration 1 , as early as the autumn of 1942
expressed the views of German industry:
The workers which industry would like to have are no longer available. Most
of the workers who are normally available today can hardly qualify as first class,
either physically, or as far as their professional qualifications are concerned.

In view of this situation, German labour policy had to undergo
a very remarkable change during the war. The German labour
administration went on bringing foreign workers into the German
war economy regardless of their skills, abilities, or even capacity
to learn. At the same time they were compelled by the
increasingly critical manpower situation to ensure fuller use of
the skilled workers available and to encourage the training
of unskilled foreigners. At first, semi-skilled foreigners were
1

Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, No. 19-23, Oct. 1942.

240

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

p u t in the places of skilled German workers who could be more
usefully employed in other jobs. This, however, was not enough.
In 1942 the administration's most urgent task was to increase the
number of metal workers, a task that had to be carried out by
training workers who were unskilled or who were skilled in other
occupations. 1
Official orders 2 emphasise«! the considerable expense and effort
incurred by undertakings in training unskilled foreigners. In a
report of November 1942, the economic section of the Frankfurter
2.eitung% pointed out that "younger workers from the East can, if
t h e y show willingness, be trained for semi-skilled work in three
t o four months". A German business leader, General Director
Zangen, stated at the end of 1942 that Germany had by that time
trained and adjusted "hundreds of thousands of specialised
European workers". 4 He repeated, early in 1943, that Germany
had, to a large extent, become the "apprentice workshop of
Europe". 5
This policy was continued in 1943 and was accentuated in
1944.
The Commissioner-General for Manpower announced in
April 19436 that it was "necessary to train the greatest possible
number of specialists (assistant locksmiths, assistant turntable
workers, assistant hole cutters, assistant electricians)" and stressed
the necessity of making "most careful ability tests". He also
stated that "if the training of foreigners, who so far have been used
only for simpler work, promises better results [than the training of
Germans] then foreigners must be given opportunities of special
training".
This policy entailed the training of agricultural or unskilled
labourers for semi-skilled or skilled industrial jobs. The Deutsche
Bergwerks-Zeitung of 9 March 19437, for example, discussed how
t o ensure "the highest possible efficiency among the many foreigners
-who previously were not employed as workers or who are not
acquainted with machinery and industrial work. It is recommended
that the necessary steps be taken for their training." The difficulties
•encountered in this programme were, obviously, considerable:
•"The training is particularly successful if the teacher masters the
1

Dr. TIMM, in Arbeitseinsatz und Arbeitslosenhilfe, Oct.-Nov. 1942, p. 2.
* For example, Order by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 14
"September 1942; Reichsarbeitsblatt, P a r t I, p. 428.
3
Heddy NEUMËISTER: "Europas mobile Arbeitskraft", in Die Wirtschaftskurve,
.published in collaboration with the Frankfurter Zeitung, Nov. 1942, pp. 228 et seq.
4
Quoted by MANSFELD in Deutsches Arbeitsrecht, Jan. 1943, p. 11.
' Q u o t e d in an article, "Arbeitseinsatz aus gesamteuropäischer Perspektive",
ï n Soziale Praxis, Mar. 1943, p. 110.
6
Deutsches Arbeitsrecht, p. 53; also Decree of 16 February 1943 (ReichsarbeitsMatt, P a r t I, p. 157).
' Cf. also Reichsarbeitsblatt, 25 Sept. 1942, P a r t V, p. 9.

INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

241

elementary expressions of the trainees' native language. In particular, he must himself have a good knowledge of the machinery,
tools, danger points and safety measures. If some plants lack
technically trained interpreters they should ask for them from the
Gau Office of the German Labour Front."
In the autumn of 1943, the Junkers Works started a two-year
training programme for 60 Netherlands boys of 14, who were transported for the purpose from the Netherlands to Dessau. Dr.
Mittweg, Head of the Department for Social Administration at
the Reich Commissariat, stated, in a speech at the Junkers Works'
Office in Amsterdam, that this was to be the beginning of a largescale German training programme ' for non-German apprentices,
undertaken on the orders of the Commissioner-General for Manpower. The Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden of 20 September
1943, observed that this programme "is rather expensive and must
be regarded as an additional burden on German undertakings",
which, however, considered such a programme necessary, in order
to secure a larger supply of skilled labour when the war was
over.
During 1944, as the available manpower diminished, increased
efforts were made to improve the output of foreign workers by
means of free training courses. Dr. Speer organised free training
courses for chauffeurs in the occupied territories. 1 Dr. Robert
Ley said in his May Day manifesto of 1944: "The places of men
who are called to the colours are, to a very large extent, taken by
women and by foreign workers who must be first trained, instructed
and gradually educated to higher achievement". In an article
entitled "Mobilisation of Manpower Reserves in Undertakings",
in a leading organ of German heavy industry 2 , a high party
official wrote:
Since so many foreigners were working in German undertakings, they, too,
had to receive vocational training in order to achieve maximum output . . . For
this purpose the German Labour Front organised special courses for foreigners in
which they were taught German and were encouraged to make proposals for the
improvement of production. Steps must also be taken to ensure that German
foremen fulfil their duties in controlling foreigners; it was moreover necessary to
find, among the ranks of the most efficient and loyal foreign workers, foremen
who, under German supervision, could be put in charge of foreign workers.

At about the same time, the official Four-Year Plan publication
printed a report from the Head of the Office for Increased Performance, Vocational Training and Industrial Management of the
German Labour Front, describing the "increased performance
1
5

Essener National-Zeilung, 3 Feb. 1944.
Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung, 18 Apr. 1944.

242

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

scheme". 1 According to this report, over 1,200 training centres
were then engaged in the training of men and women workers,
either in the plants in which they were employed or outside the
plants, in afternoon and evening sessions. The staff consisted of
19,200 instructors. For foreign workers, 600 to 800 special training
groups were being started every month. 2
Each training group contained workers of only one nationality
and, after some experimenting, the number in each group was cut
down to 20.3 The German press reported that the training of
French and Czech workers proved particularly successful.4
The magnitude and the novel character of the scheme make
it difficult to predict its ultimate effects in the post-war era. But
it seems that an important result, unintended by the Third Reich,
will be an increase in the proportion of skilled and semi-skilled workers, particularly among the less industrialised European nations.
FOREIGN PREFERENCE FOR INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT

It is interesting to note that this development was facilitated by the foreigners themselves. Many labour recruits deported to
Germany for agricultural work desired to shift to industrial
work. In the earlier stages of the war this tendency caused the
German authorities considerable concern. In a circular Order of 6
March 19416, the Reich Minister of Labour pointed out that it had
been found in 1940 that an increasing number of foreigners were
moving from agriculture to industry; many, indeed, "had
obviously contemplated such a step even before they came to
Germany". Agricultural labourers who had behaved satisfactorily,
the Minister stated, had been encouraged to switch to industry
because they could earn higher wages there; "such tendencies
must be opposed with the utmost severity". Since no foreigner
could change his employment without the consent of the labour
office, the Minister threatened to take severe steps against officials
who encouraged the movement of foreigners away from the farms.
Nine months later6, however, the Minister complained that
the number of foreign agricultural workers attempting to shift to
industry had not decreased and that "this led to a dangerous
1
M E S S E R I U S : in Der Vierjahresplan, quoted by Nachrichtendienst der Deutschen
Zeitungsverleger, 1 Mar. 1944.
* In August 1944, the number of training groups organised for foreign workers
was 510; Nachrichten -und Pressedienst (news service of the German Foreign
Office), 8 Nov. 1944.
3
Nachrichten -und Pressedienst, 21 July 1944.
'•Ibid.
6
Ausländische Arbeiter-, p. 658 (2), supplement, 15 Sept. 1942.
6
Circular Order of 18 December 1941; ibid., p. 658 (3), supplement, 15 Sept.
1942.

INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS

243

situation in agriculture". He therefore ordered that foreign agricultural labourers should be allowed to shift to industrial employment only if they "were no longer physically capable of doing agricultural work". In these cases, special permits were required, to be
granted by the district labour offices, which, if necessary, required
an affidavit by an authorised physician. The Minister further
decided that it should be illegal for foreign agricultural workers
who had duly completed their obligations in Germany to seek employment in German industry instead of returning home, since
the inevitable result would be a decreasing supply of foreign agricultural workers for Germany. Applications for special permits
for foreign agricultural workers to seek employment in German
industry instead of returning home had therefore to be submitted
to the Minister himself.1
As time went on, this policy could no longer be continued.
The increasing shortage of labour induced the German authorities
to ' extend the original contracts of foreign agricultural workers
for unlimited periods. On the other hand, fewer and fewer efforts
were made to counteract the trend towards industry.

Ibid., p. 85, second supplement, 20 July 1942.

CHAPTER XVI
THE LEGACY OF THE SYSTEM
The preceding chapters describe the measures adopted by
National Socialist Germany to increase its labour supply during
the war, by recruiting large numbers of foreign workers for employment both in the Reich itself and in countries under its domination.
Every phase of this vast scheme of European-wide labour mobilisation was shrewdly planned and ruthlessly carried out. One of
the first tasks of the German authorities, when they took over the
control of a conquered territory and began to recruit labour, was
to install their own labour offices or to adapt those already in
existence. This was done in Poland even before the end of the
campaign of September 1939, and it was repeated with monotonous
regularity in 1940 to 1942 as the German tide of conquest rolled
onwards. An air of legality was given to the recruitment by the
negotiation of bilateral agreements with the Governments of
allied and neutral States and wherever possible with the authorities of the occupied countries. Great pressure was brought to
bear on the workers in the occupied countries to register voluntarily for work in, or for, Germany, and, since those who refused
experienced much difficulty in obtaining any other employment,
the temptation to register must have been considerable. Nevertheless, the number of foreign workers who genuinely volunteered
was very small and the great majority of them were in fact
conscripted for the purpose of adding, by their labour, to the
productive capacity of their country's enemy.
These workers came from every part of Europe, and their
numbers ran into many millions. Their conditions of life and labour
varied considerably, according to place and type of employment,
phase of the war, and, particularly, nationality. Those from the
East were treated worst of all; those from other parts of Europe
received less inhuman treatment. But no-one who reads these
pages with care can help coming to the conclusion that even in the
most favourable cases their conditions resembled slavery and the
general picture is one of arbitrariness, oppression and humiliation.
The compulsory mobilisation of the civilian population in coun-

THE LEGACY OF THE SYSTEM

245

tries under wartime occupation is almost without precedent in
modern times and it would be necessary to go back a long way in
history to find anything comparable on a large scale. There has,
however, been one example in the recent past, namely, the deportation of Belgian workers during the First World War. On that
occasion, means were found of defeating the efforts of the German
Government and putting a stop to the deportations after a comparatively short time. 1 Yet, as an impartial observer wrote almost
a decade later, that scheme "had considerable consequences for
the Belgian people as a whole because their physical and social
conditions were profoundly affected by it during and after the
war". s During the present conflict, on the other hand, the deportation of labour, which was carried out on an incomparably larger
scale and with even greater ruthlessness, lasted throughout the
war.
The tremendous accession to German manpower would, it was
confidently v hoped in the Third Reich, enable production to be
maintained at such a level as to ensure armament superiority and
military victory for Germany. In this the Germans were of course
disappointed. It is, however, beyond doubt that this army of
foreign labour brought great advantages to Germany in increasing
its productive capacity. On the other hand, there were also certain
disadvantages which are less often mentioned, but which were of
considerable importance. For instance, the Germans had to create
a huge machine for the control of the foreign workers. Nevertheless,
the labour recruits were obviously in a position to slow down production and even to effect actual sabotage and it can hardly be
doubted that in spite of very strict German supervision they took
advantage of their opportunities, though to what extent cannot
be determined at present.
In the occupied countries themselves, however, the results
were both more serious from the German point of view and much
more unexpected. Evasion of forced labour led the peoples of
those countries to passive, and later to active, resistance, and it
can be stated with confidence that the birth of the Maquis in
France and of similar resistance movements in other countries was
due in large measure to the compulsory recruitment imposed
by Germany. When workers had a choice between forced labour
in the enemy country and participation in a campaign, however
dangerous, for the liberation of their own, the most active and
most intelligent did not hesitate.
1
See Appendix V I I I .
' J a m e s T. SHOTWELL, in Fernand PASSELECQ: Déportation et travail forcé des
ouvriers et de la population civile de la Belgique occupée {1916-1918) (Paris-New
Haven, 1927), p. X I .

246

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Many people in Germany believed that the foreign workers,
when brought into touch with German methods of production and
German organisation, would be filled with admiration for the country able to achieve such things and would become partisans of a
European new order under German leadership and control. In
fact, the results are likely to be the exact opposite. All the indications are that these men and women and, indeed, children too,
have emerged from their experiences with hatred against the system
of bondage under which they lived and worked, and against those
responsible for such a system.
At the same time, many of the workers have, while in German
employment, received a training in skilled or semi-skilled operations; and this will be very valuable both to themselves and to
their countries, especially if the latter have hitherto been predominantly agricultural and seek to increase their industrial
capacity in the years to come.
Many problems raised by this mass displacement and exploitation of labour have had to be solved since the countries occupied
by Germany were liberated, but there are others which will require
years to settle.
The first problem, in point of time, was of course the collection
of the workers concerned in suitable centres and their repatriation.
It is likely that this first problem will be well on the way to solution by the time this report appears. In this connection, reference
may be made to the resolution concerning measures for the protection of transferred foreign workers and of foreign workers' and
employers' organisations, adopted by the International Labour
Conference at Philadelphia in May 1944. In it the Conference
recommended that:
1. Precautions should be taken, subject to the removal of all officials identified with the former totalitarian régime, to ensure t h a t the administrative machinery set up by the former régime for handling questions connected with the utilisation of foreign labour power, together with all its records and documents, is for
the time being preserved intact. In particular, the United Nations and the
occupying authorities should make it clear t h a t the personnel concerned will be
held individually responsible for the preservation of such documents and records
and t h a t persons convicted of destroying or concealing them will be severely
punished.
2. Pending the repatriation of foreign workers, which should be carried out
with the greatest possible speed, the competent occupation authority should
take appropriate action for the purpose of protecting such workers in regard to
their feeding, accommodation, health, safety, welfare and general interests.
3. All discriminatory treatment in respect of remuneration, the right to employment, conditions of employment, the wearing of distinctive badges, etc., on
account of race, national or local origin, or religion, should be immediately
abolished.

THE LEGACY OF THE SYSTEM

247

4. The competent occupation authority should in the matters concerning
foreign workers in Axis nations collaborate with the Governments and trade
unions of Allied countries.

A second problem is concerned with possible compensation,
which, as a part of a more general question, the Governments of
the liberated countries and, in fact, of the United Nations as a
whole, may wish to consider. One aspect of this problem, namely,
the situation of the social insurance funds, is under consideration
by a special committee appointed by the Governing Body of the
I.L.O. Another aspect is the debt incurred by Germany through
wage transfers within the framework of the German wartime
clearing system. There are also large amounts of money which
belong to foreign workers and are deposited in frozen accounts in
German banks or invested in German savings bonds. Further,
many deportees did not survive the harsh treatment and heavy
work, and measures are needed to help their dependants. In the
examination of these questions, the facts contained in the present
report may prove useful to the Governments and to the private
organisations concerned.
What is of immediate importance to the liberated workers
themselves is an assurance that they will be properly cared for
and provided with suitable employment. All these persons need
rest and the chance to recover from the hardships they have suffered.
Many of them will be broken in health and will need medical care.
Those fit for work will need employment in useful occupations, just as
their war-torn countries need their productive capacities. In order
to achieve that objective, not merely in the transition period, but
in the long run as well, it is essential that measures be adopted to
ensure a high general level of employment. If the general demand
for labour is high, a solution of the problems of particular groups,
even of such large groups as those referred to here, is relatively
easy. For that purpose, it is necessary to have not only measures
of national scope in each of the countries concerned but also wide
international co-operation in the social and economic fields.

APPENDIX I
ORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN-OCCUPIED
EASTERN TERRITORIES
After the termination of Germany's campaign against Poland
in 1939, western Poland and a large part of central Poland, comprising altogether some 36,000 square miles, with a pre-war population of some 10 million, were incorporated into the Reich. Administratively, this was effected by adding the Polish areas of
Ciechanow and Plock to the German province of East Prussia,
and Polish East Upper Silesia to the German province of West
Upper Silesia, and by transforming the Polish provinces of Poznan
and Pomorze and the greater part of Lodz province into two new
German administrative areas (Gaue), Wartheland and "DanzigWest Prussia". All these annexed territories were to be completely
germanised.
The remainder of the Polish territory occupied by Germany in
1939 (some 37,000 square miles, with a pre-war population of some
11.4 million), was, with the exception of the territory of Byalistok,
also incorporated in the Reich as a dependent territory. It was
administered by a German Governor-General, Hans Frank, appointed by Adolf Hitler, and by a special German administration.
In order to obliterate the name of Poland, the region was officially
called the "Government-General". The status of the GovernmentGeneral differed greatly from that of the so-called Protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia (comprising part of Czechoslovakia), where
a native administration continued to function, although under
complete German control. In the Government-General, no native
Polish administration existed throughout the five years of German
rule. 1
After the German attack on the U.S.S.R., the territory of the
Government-General was increased by the addition of the former
Polish south-eastern provinces of Lwow, Tarnopol and Stanislawow, to approximately 61,000 square miles, with a population
estimated, by the Polish Ministry of Information (London) in
January 1942, at some 21 million.
In contrast to the German-annexed parts of pre-war Poland
which were to be germanised, and the German population of which
1
The Government-General "is distinguished very essentially from a Protectorate by the circumstance that the German administration in the Government-General is not a supervisory administration over a non-German State
administration, but is itself the State Administration, right down to the lowest
unit". (Under-Secretary of State Ernst KUNDT, in Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, 30
Nov. 1941, quoted in Polish Fortnightly Review, published by the Polish Ministry
of Information (London), No. 37, 1 Feb. 1942, p. 2.)

ORGANISATION IN EASTERN TERRITORIES

249

was therefore favoured in every respect, the Government-General
was to be reserved for persons considered by the Germans to be
ethnically Poles, and was subjected to a régime of deliberate ruthlessness. The territory of Byalistok, including the towns of
Lomza and Byalistok, was formed into a special administrative
area governed from Königsberg in East Prussia. All the other
German-occupied territories in the east of Europe, including the
former Polish provinces of Polesie and Volhynia, the Baltic Republics of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, White Russia, the Ukraine and all other parts of the Soviet Union occupied by the Germans, were administered partly by the German military authorities,.
and partly by the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories under Alfred Rosenberg.
As in the case of Poland, the Germans endeavoured to obliterate
the names of these territories. In official German usage, the occupied
territories to the east of the annexed parts of Poland and of the
Government-General, were called the "Eastern Territories" (Ostland).
The workers imported from these regions were called
"Eastern" workers. But the nomenclature was not always precise.
Polish workers from the German-annexed provinces and from the
Government-General were frequently included among "Eastern"
workers and all occupied territories lying to the east of the pre1939 German frontiers were often called "Eastern territories". In
the Eastern Territories, as in the Government-General, the German
occupation authorities abolished the native administration. The
German régime in these territories was characterised by even
greater ruthlessness than in western Poland and the GovernmentGeneral.

A P P E N D I X II

THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWS
Each time that Germany brought a foreign country under its
occupation or control one of its first steps was to impose National
Socialist anti-Jewish doctrines with relentless vigour. 1 The National Socialist definition of Jews applied irrespective of citizenship,
nationality and, in fact, religious creed. If the four grandparents
of a person were "racially fully Jewish" or if one grandparent was
"Aryan" and three were "racially fully Jewish", that person, under
National Socialist law, was "fully Jewish". 2
Before the war, the employment of Jews in Germany was prohibited. "As early as the year 1938, Jews were, to all intents and
purposes, completely excluded from employment. This is also true
of Jews who were employers." 3 When the war brought large masses
of non-German Jews under German rule, two policies were simultaneously adopted: they were prohibited from continuing their
occupations; and they were used for forced labour. Whenever
the régime decided to utilise the productive capacities of Jews,
the conditions under which they had to work were inhuman. Their
work was a form of punishment. The economic result was therefore entirely out of proportion, as a rule, to the hardship inflicted
on the victims.
1
Another group which fell under the full impact of National Socialist race
doctrine and was treated, so far as labour regulations were concerned, in the
same way as Jews, was Gypsies. Professor W. SIEBBRT of the Law Faculty of the
University of Berlin explained that "the blood currents which can be traced in
the mixed Gypsy race are those of Asia Minor, India and the Mediterranean area.
It is the task of the Reich Central Agency for the Campaign against the Gypsy
W a y of Life (Reichszentrale zur Bekämpfung des Zigeunerunwesens), in collaboration with the Research Institute for Race Hygiene in the Reich Health Department, to determine who is to be considered a Gypsy". Under an Order by Heinrich Himmler of 7 August 1941 (Ausländische Arbeiter, pp. 49 and S3), racial
diagnosis had to distinguish between full Gypsies (category Z), persons with prevalently Gypsy blood (category Z plus), and persons whose blood was half Gypsy
and half German (category ZM). Later, a category ZM minus (persons whose
blood was prevalently German) was added. "All provisions concerning the labour
and social conditions of Jews apply, mutatis mutandis, to Gypsies. Hence, their
employment status is of a special kind, outside the German social order" (SlEBERT,
loc. cit., p. 840). Some exceptions were granted to the category ZM minus (Order
by the Commissioner-General for Manpower, of 21 June 1942, loc. cit., p . 854,
supplement, 30 Aug. 1942). According to the available information, few of the
European Gypsies who fell under German rule have survived.
2
Persons with two "racially fully Jewish" and two "Aryan" grandparents
were defined as "half Jews" or "first degree mixed", unless for special reasons,
for example, marriage to a "full Jew", they were considered as "full Jews".
Persons with only one "racially fully Jewish" and three "Aryan" grandparents
were called "quarter Jews" or "second degree mixed". Persons considered as half
or quarter Jews were not subject to the provisions concerning Jewish labour.
3
Kommentar zur Reichsverteidigungsgesetzgebung, Vol. I, P a r t 2, Juden, p. 11.

THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWS

251

In the Government-General, two Orders were issued on 26
October 1939, one prescribing compulsory labour service (Arbeitspflicht) for Poles and one introducing "forced labour" (Arbeitszwang) ; this second term emphasised the penal character of the
measure for Jews. Whereas the first Order mentioned that Poles
should be entitled to "equitable" pay, the regulations for the forced
labour of the Jews contained no reference to payment. An Order
of 12 December 19391 stipulated that all Jewish inhabitants of the
Government-General between 14 and 60 years of age were liable
to forced labour, normally for a period of two years. But the duration of the forced labour was lengthened if the "educational purpose" was not attained within that period. If the German authorities so decided, even the sick and disabled ("those not fully
capable") were to be assigned to activities "according to their
capacities". Handicraftsmen, especially owners of shops, were
compelled to deliver their entire equipment when reporting for
forced labour. The Order also provided that Jews who were called
up for forced labour were to be put into labour camps. According
to the available information, conditions in these camps hardly
differed from those in concentration camps.
Other forms of forced labour were organised in the ghettos
which were established by the Germans, at first in the Germanincorporated Polish provinces and in the Government-General
and, after the invasion of the Soviet Union, in the western Ukraine.
Not only Jews who, before the war, had lived east of Germany's
borders, but Jews from other German-occupied countries, as well
as from "Greater Germany", were herded into these places. Although large contingents were taken at intervals from the ghettos
into forced labour camps (for example, according to one report 2 ,
more than 100,000 Jews, of 15 to 60 years of age, were moved out
of Warsaw in the summer of 1941), the Institute of Jewish Affairs
in New York estimated that, despite the high death rate, the
number of Jews held in German-established ghettos in the eastern
territories was "no less than one million" in November 1941 and
had increased to one and a half million in the early summer of
1942.3
Some of the ghetto population were forced into gangs which
worked for German civilian or military authorities. Others were
forcibly organised in "producers' co-operatives". 4 In the autumn
of 1941, a Cologne newspaper stated 5 that in the Polish ghettos
1
This Order, dated Cracow, 12 December 1939, was signed by Krüger, Chief
Director of the S.S. and Police (Verordnungsblatt für die besetzten Polnischen
Gebiete, 1939, p. 246, quoted by Raphael LEMKIN: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe
(Washington, D.C., 1944), p. 544).
1
Jewish Telegraph Agency, 30 July 1941.
3
Contemporary Jewish Record, Feb. 1942, quoted by Eugene KULISCHER,
op. cit., p. 108. For further information on the displacement and treatment of
Jews in German-dominated Europe, see ibid., pp. 95-116.
4
Under the title "Jews at Work: Jewish Dexterity Used for Productive Purposes", the Deutsche Zeitung (Budapest) of 26 June 1942 reported on arrangements in Bochnia, in the province of Cracow. These were considered exemplary.
Eight hundred Jews, among them physicians and lawyers, were engaged in
such tasks as "working on old clothes which no tailor would ever have repaired".
1
Kölnische Zeitung, 5 Sept. 1941.

252

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

400,000 Jews, working in special workshops managed by German
commissioners, produced goods for the German army and other
essential war products. In an address delivered in November 1941,
the governor of the Warthegau stated that 180,000 Jews were working in the ghetto of Lodz. 1 At that period, German manufacturers
were officially urged to place orders with the Jewish artisans and
co-operatives in the Warsaw ghetto. A special office of the German
administration in Warsaw advised on the placing of orders, and a
circular pointed out that 40 per cent, of the 500,000 Jews in Warsaw were skilled craftsmen, particularly tailors, leather workers,
tilers and joiners. The mayor of the town of Warta inserted the
following advertisement in the Litzmannstädter Zeitung (a German
newspaper in Lodz) : "I am in charge of 250 qualified Jewish tailors,
hatters and furriers; I undertake all sorts of work for military and
civilian customers". 2
The work in the ghettos was either under the control of S. S.
troopers or of employees of the German labour administration,
assisted by S. S. men. In the summer of 1942,.for example, it was
reported that 60,000 Jews in the Warsaw ghetto, mainly tailors,
shoemakers, furriers and tinsmiths, were placed under the supervision of German Labour Front employees—3 directors and 60
assistants—who had been specially assigned to this task. 3 Instead
of, or in addition to, direct German supervision, less direct forms
of compulsion were often used. The whole ghetto, or part of it,
or prominent members of the Jewish community, were held collectively responsible for the output demanded by the Germans, and
frightful reprisals were inflicted in case of non-compliance. The
working time of Jewish tailors organised by the German authorities
for the manufacture of uniforms for the Luftwaffe was 12 to 18
hours a day. Living and working conditions were also appalling.
Jewish workers were starved; one of the differences between the
treatment of Jews and that of other foreign workers was that
neither the German authorities nor German employers made any
provision for their feeding.
There is little information to show whether they received pay
or not. Three methods were used. One consisted in paying no
wages to Jews, and thus forcing the Jewish community to care for
them. For example, the German Commissioner-General in Riga
issued the following Order on 19 March 19424, for the General
District of Latvia:
" 1 . Jews shall receive no wages.
1

Jewish Telegraph Agency, 26 Nov. 1941. At that time, the ghetto of Lodz
was the largest ghetto in the Warthegau, and thus the largest in "Greater Germany". (Other German-established ghettos, e.g., in the Government-General,
a t times held many more persons, but they were outside "Greater Germany".)
When the policy of "liquidation" of the ghettos began, the first to be "liquidated"
were those in the Warthegau.
However, according to information emanating
from Germany in the early spring of 1945, more than 100,000 Jews from all parts
of Europe were still employed in coal mines in German-annexed Polish Upper
Silesia before the Soviet break-through.
2
Jewish Telegraph Agency, 16 Feb. 1942.
3
Idem, 7 June 1942.
4
Deutsche Zeitung im Osten, 31 Mar. 1942, quoted by Raphael LEMKIN, op.
cit., p. 341.

THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWS

253

"2. (1) Employers of Jewish labour shall pay a fee to the Financial Department of the competent District Commissioner,
which shall be in accordance with the wage rates established in the
General Decree of the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories of 21 November 1941, concerning native labour in public
services and in trade. The District Commissioner shall issue special
provisions concerning these payments.
"(2) For overtime work, or for work on Sundays, holidays
and a t night, which may be required only with the consent of the
District Commissioner (through the labour office), no extra fee
shall be paid.
" 3 . Violation of this regulation shall be punishable by imprisonment or fine, or both."
A second method, which was really only a variation on the first,
was to levy contributions from a part of the ghetto population
with which to pay persons working for the Germans. Thirdly,
wages were sometimes paid by the German employers or authorities, but "in blocked Reichsmarks redeemable at stores usuallydevoid of food by the time that Jews were allowed to shop". 1
In the occupied territories of western Europe, Jews were also
subjected to cruel persecutions from the outset. In the earlier
stages of the war, however, it appears that they were seldom put
to forced labour unless they were sent into concentration camps.
In the concentration camps of western Europe—that at Tervueren
in Belgium was particularly notorious—working conditions were
little better than in the concentration camps in the East. In 1941
and 1942, the forced labour of "free" Jews increased. Their numbers dwindled, however, partly as a result of persecution, and partly
because Jews from occupied western countries, as well as from all
other territories occupied or dominated by Germany, were systematically transported to the East.
In the labour conditions of Jews in "Greater Germany" the
National Socialist Government made no distinction between Reich
German or Austrian or Sudeten Jews and the small contingents of
Jews from occupied countries who were deported for work to "Greater
Germany". 2 They were all considered as the lowest group of foreign
workers. They were assigned to the most strenuous or most dangerous types of work. Various authorities, especially labour trustees
and S. S. officials, issued, at their own discretion, divergent regulations for the employment of Jews. In order to unify these rules,
an Order on the employment status of Jews in Germany was issued,
on 31 October 19413, by the Reich Minister of Labour, in agreement
with the Chief of the Party Chancellery and the Reich Minister
of the Interior. The most important provisions in this Order were
those dealing with assignment to work, suspension of industrial
safety measures and wages.
1
2

Information issued by the Polish Information Centre, New York, 8 Jan. 1941.
The following section refers to "Greater Germany" west of the pre-1939
Polish-German border (that is, without the Polish territories incorporated by
the 3 Reich).

Reichsgesetzblatt, 4 Nov. 1941, Part I, p. 681. Cf. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR

OFFICE: Legislative Series, 1941, Ger. 4 (B).

254

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

This Order allowed no exceptions concerning minimum or maximum age, sex, or health, and required Jews to accept any work
assigned to them. The assignments were to be made by the labour
offices. The duration of the assignment was not limited. Except
with special permission, Jews had to work in segregated groups or
gangs. If ordered to work elsewhere than at their place of residence,
they had to be lodged in quarters separate from those of other
German or foreign workers. Young Jews were excluded from the
legal provisions concerning the protection of young workers. For
all Jews, the industrial inspection offices were authorised to issue
"special provisions concerning safety measures differing from the
existing regulations". In other words, with the consent of the
Industrial Inspection Service, safety regulations could be disregarded. 1
The Order of 31 October 1941 provided that Jews were entitled
to the wages in force at the place of their employment, but not to
wage supplements for overtime, night, Sunday or holiday work,
nor to family and child allowances, maternity and death benefits,
Christmas and similar bonuses, dismissal pay, etc. Whether a Jew
had a wife and children to support or not, he had to pay the highest
wage tax rate, namely, that for unmarried persons2, and, in addition,
the same social equalisation tax as Poles.3 Furthermore, the many
restrictions imposed upon Jews in Germany decreased the purchasing power of their net wages. They were often unable to purchase the small food rations to which they were theoretically
entitled. Lastly, their earnings, like their other property, were
always liable to be confiscated.
It should be pointed out that the voluminous collections of
rules and regulations issued by the German authorities in the
Reich and in the occupied territories contain exceedingly little
upon the utilisation of Jewish labour. Jews were considered as outcasts and they were completely at the mercy of their oppressors.
*
*

About the beginning of 1943, the systematic extermination of
the ghetto populations was accelerated. Nobody was spared, not
even the craftsmen who had manufactured goods for the Luftwaffe.
At the same time, Jews were transported in increasing numbers
1
In the winter of 1941-42, the Netherlands Government in exile stated t h a t
740 of 1,200 Netherlands Jews sent to work in the salt and sulphur mines near
the Mauthausen concentration camp in Upper Austria had died because they
were not protected against the poisonous vapours (quoted in Jewish
Affairs,
Mar. 1942, p. 2).
1
Order by the Reich Minister of Finance, of 10 March 1939 (Reichsgesetsblatt, 1939, Part I, p. 449). There were only two exceptions to this rule: (a) for
Jews supporting legitimate children or grandchildren who, by official standards,
were non-Jews (e.g., the offspring of a half-Jew who had married an "Aryan") or
supporting non-Jewish foster children; (b) for Jews who had formerly supported
such persons (e.g., if the non-Jewish foster child had died). For German wage
tax rates, see pp. 120 et seq.
* Jews had to pay social equalisation tax after 1 Jan. 1941 (Order by the Reich
Minister of Finance, of 24 December 1940; Reichsgesetzblatt, 1940, P a r t I,
p. 1666). For the social equalisation tax, see pp. 124 et seq.

THE EXPLOITATION OF JEWS

255

to the concentration and extermination camps, mainly in the
Government-General and western Ukraine. Ostensibly, the object
of transportation to the East was often to put the-Jews to work
there. At the entrance of the notorious Oswiecim Camp there was
a huge poster with the inscription Arbeit Macht Frei ("Work Makes
Men Free"). Inside the camp were several factories; a war production plant (Deutsches Aufrüstungswerk), a factory belonging
to the Krupp works, and another belonging to the Siemens concern.
Other prisoners were employed in a huge Buna plant outside the
boundaries of the camp. 1 Thus, to the end, exploitation was combined with extermination.
Even after the destruction of the majority of the Jews under.
German rule, the survivors were forced to work for the German
war effort. Under a Decree issued by the Reich Government at
the end of October 1944, all male Jews between the ages of 10 and
60 were called up for military labour service (Wehrarbeitsdienst).2
But even at so late a date as the spring of 1945, in commenting
on the decisions of the Yalta Conference, the Germans declared
that "above all, when this war comes to an end, there will be no
more Jews in Europe". 3

1
Executive Office of the President, War Refugee Board, Washington, D.C.:
mimeographed report on German Extermination Camps, Nov. 1944.
» Deutches Nachrichten Bureau, 22 Oct. 1944.
» Idem, 13 Mar. 1945.

APPENDIX

III

A SURVEY OF GERMAN RECRUITMENT METHODS IN
VARIOUS COUNTRIES 1
RECRUITMENT IN THE PROTECTORATE OF BOHEMIA-MORAVIA

In order to "achieve rigid direction of labour allocation and to
mobilise even the last reserves of manpower" of the Protectorate,
the following measures were taken: work books were introduced,
change of employment was limited, and compulsory labour service
was established. Under the control of the Reich Minister of Labour,
the Protectorate's Ministry of Economic Affairs and Labour
established a special "central exchange office for labour allocation"
(Zentralausgleichstelle für Arbeitseinsatz). This special agency was
in charge of all aspects of recruitment and controlled the activities of the 19 labour offices in Bohemia and Moravia.
RECRUITMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL

Recruitment was organised by the Labour Allocation Section
'(Abteilung Arbeitseinsatz) of the Labour Department of the Germ a n administration. The section controlled the labour départements of the regional administrative offices for the regions of
Cracow, Lublin, Radow, Warsaw and Lwow, to which in turn 20
labour offices with 63 branch offices were subordinated. Although
•the labour offices were autonomous German agencies, they formed
part of the administration of the districts and had to keep the chief
•of the district administration (Kreishauptmann) informed, "especially if measures of a political nature were taken".
The actual recruitment of agricultural and industrial workers
was undertaken by the labour offices. But since only a small percentage of the number needed was reached through the labour
offices, the deportees had in the main to be recruited by motorised
flying columns, consisting only of German recruiting agents, "from
those members of families in the small peasant population who
•could be spared". The main emphasis was later put on the
establishment of a large network of "strong points" (Stützpunkte)
¡from which the recruitment was organised. These strong points
1
This appendix is based on a monograph by Dr. TIMM,
Ministerialdirigent
"in the Reich Ministry of Labour, which originally appeared in the Reichsarbeits• blatt, and was reprinted as a separate publication in 1942. Although it occasionally
refers to conditions in the early part of 1942, the survey mainly describes conditions in the summer of 1941. It must therefore be borne in mind t h a t it deals only
with an early stage of German recruitment policy. (It makes no reference to the
•German campaign to recruit Soviet workers, which started a t t h a t period.)

RECRUITMENT METHODS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

257

were under the command of about 100 German recruiting agents
who were assisted "by a considerably larger number of Poles specially trained for the purpose. In addition, Polish workers who had
already worked in Germany before were used as auxiliary recruiting agents." The recruitment was greatly facilitated by a general
register of all small agricultural holdings up to 20 hectares, or
approximately 8 acres (of which there were more than one million
in the Government-General). The register included data on the
size and crops of the holdings and on all persons living on them.
Before being sent to Germany, the labour recruits were deloused
and medically examined in special reception camps established in
Cracow, Warsaw, Lublin and Czenstochow.
RECRUITMENT IN ITALY

The German labour administration established a special branch
office in Rome {Dienststelle Italien); after the nomination of the
Commissioner-General for Manpower the Rome branch office
came under his direction. This German agency collaborated closely
with the Italian authorities. The highest Italian authority organising the recruitment of Italians for Germany was the Commissariat for Internal Migration and Colonisation {Commissariato per
le Migrazioni e la Colonizzazione), which was a separate department of the Duce1 s office. The Commissariat "examines the availability of all workers who are to be employed abroad, both from
the standpoint of their training and their health. One of its prerogatives is to exempt certain regions of Italy from the recruitment
programme. Otherwise it regulates the emigration of Italian
workers in consultation with the Italian Department of Foreign
Affairs." The task of the German branch office in Rome was to
"assist the Italian authorities in recruitment and to arrange the
transportation of workers from Italy to Germany. It has special
reception camps in Milan, Como, Verona and Treviso." The German office in Rome had also to make all the administrative preparations. In particular, "it has to keep files of the labour contracts
and to make excerpts from these contracts in Italian, which the
worker signs when he enters into the contract and a copy of which
he receives instead of a labour contract".
The four Fascist workers' confederations (of agricultural workers, of industrial workers, of commercial workers and of workers
in banking and insurance) continuously received reports from the
various parts of Italy upon the workers available, and decided
from which provinces the required workers should be recruited.
The actual recruiting was, with the exception of metal workers,
undertaken by the provincial unions of these confederations, "in
the closest collaboration with the political and Government authorities of the province, which exercise considerable influence in matters
of labour conscription".
For the recruitment of metal workers special commissions were
formed, "consisting of one German metal expert as chairman, one
representative of the German metal industry, and when necessary,
an interpreter. The activities of these commissions extend to all
available workers, even if they are still employed." The provincial

258

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

unions presented Italian metal workers to this German commission,
which examined them and sent special lists of recruited metal
workers daily to the German agency in Rome. On the basis of these
lists, the agency in Rome organised special workers' trains and
notified the Fascist Confederation of Industrial Workers of the
decisions taken by forwarding to it a list of names. The German
agency in Rome also notified all authorities concerned in the Reich,
as well as the Italian and Swiss railway administrations, of the
composition of the transports.
The actual recruiting of agricultural workers was entirely in the
hands of the Fascist Confederation of Agricultural Workers.
The German reception camps kept a special register of those
workers whose re-entry into Reich territory was undesirable and
who were therefore excluded from the transports.
RECRUITMENT IN SLOVAKIA

After the formation of the State of Slovakia in March 1939, the
recruitment of workers remained, as it had been since the end of
1938, in the hands of the branch office of the Reich Ministry of
Labour for Austria, but early in 1941 a special branch office of the
Reich Ministry of Labour was established for Slovakia, with its
seat in Bratislava. It worked in close collaboration with the Slovak
authorities for the employment in Germany of "the prescribed
number of Slovak workers".
On the Slovak side the Central Labour Office, organised under
the Slovak Ministry of the Interior, supervised 60 labour offices.
"During the recruiting season German recruitment agents are
assigned to the Slovak labour offices, which, in collaboration with
them, carry out the recruitment."
"The partly unfavourable communication system of the rural
regions of Slovakia are detrimental to recruitment. In the absence
of sufficient transportation, workers from these districts have to
march long distances on foot. This is a complication... particularly
since the time for the recruitment drives can, as a rule, only be
announced by drummers and posters on Sundays when the people
go to church."
RECRUITMENT IN HUNGARY

Agricultural

Workers

The Hungarian authorities notified the Reich Ministry of Labour
of the number of available agricultural workers. The Ministry
assigned these workers among the German regional labour offices,
which in turn sent the employment applications through the regional
labour office of Lower Austria to the German branch office (Dienststelle) in Budapest. The German agency in Budapest distributed
the applications among the various Hungarian recruitment areas.
After the Hungarian Council of Ministers had determined the contingents to be furnished by the various areas, the provincial (Komitat) agencies informed the various villages as to the number
of recruits they had to furnish. The quotas of the poorer villages
had preferably to be greater than those of other villages.

RECRUITMENT METHODS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

259

A few days before a particular recruitment drive began, the
Hungarian Minister of Agriculture notified the provincial administration, which made preparatory arrangements together with
the representatives of the Reich Ministry of Labour, who had
travelled to the spot. A representative of the Hungarian agricultural
inspection service also had to be present.
The actual recruitment procedure was described as follows.
"The unemployed (selected by the communities according to their
degree of need) are assembled in the town hall. The German recruiting agent selects those who appear suitable and, after they have
been found fit by the doctor, receives their undertaking to abide
by the labour contracts which he has before him. These contracts
give the day and hour of the departure of the transport, and the
reception camp (from which the transport is to start) at which the
recruits have to appear."
Industrial Workers
Appeals to industrial workers to go to Germany were made to
the unemployed by the Hungarian employment offices. Applicants,
after a medical examination, were interviewed by the German
recruitment agents with the collaboration of representatives of
German industry. The register of the Hungarian employment
office concerned was used. On the day of the departure of the train,
the workers received their passports, a banking certificate to be
used for the transfer of wage savings from Germany to Hungary
and a handbook in Hungarian, which, in addition to other information, contained the full text of the model working contract. The
original working contracts were left with the leaders of the respective groups and each worker was informed that he was free to copy
from that contract details, such as wage scales, into his own handbook. Every handbook also showed the name and place of the
German firm for which the Hungarian was hired.
RECRUITMENT IN BULGARIA

"The organisation and the structure of the branch of the German
labour administration in Bulgaria (Dienststelle Bulgarien) were to
an extraordinary extent influenced by the political events in the
Balkans. In general, recruitment was carried out on the basis of
a treaty between the Royal Bulgarian and the Reich Governments."
The German Dienststelle collaborated with two Bulgarian
organisations, namely: (a) the Labour Department and the labour
inspectorates of the Bulgarian Ministry of Commerce, and (b) the
Association of Workers' Syndicates, the official Bulgarian trade
union organisation. The latter was responsible for preparing lists
of Bulgarians willing to go to Germany, for examining their qualifications and for forwarding this information to the German Dienststelle. The registration data for recruitment were tentatively fixed
by the German agency; the Bulgarian Labour Department was
then notified and, if it did not object, the registration days were
communicated to the labour inspectorates, the administrative

260

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

agencies of the respective regions (Okolisko Upravitel), which in
turn informed the mayors, and the local trade union organisations.
The population was notified by drummers. At the same time employment conditions such as wages, duration of contract, housing
and feeding, were made public.
The recruitment commission was composed of the German
recruitment agents, a representative of the Reich Labour Department or labour inspectorate, and a Bulgarian public health doctor;
and sometimes also of a representative of the German employing
firm, a representative of the Bulgarian trade union organisation,
and, if workers for German mines were recruited, of a German
physician.
For every recruited worker an individual contract was made
out in four copies, for the worker, the German employer, the Bulgarian Labour Department, and the recruitment agency respectively. To be valid, every contract had to be countersigned by the
Bulgarian labour inspector. On the basis of the contract the recruited worker had to apply to the provincial authority for a passport,
and the German recruitment agent had to apply to the police headquarters in Sofia for an exit visa. Bulgarian workers travelled in
mass transports on the Danube. The expenses of the journey to the
port of departure had to be borne by the recruits, but were, if
neediness was proved, refunded by the German unemployment
insurance fund. Recruitment in Bulgaria "suffered extraordinarily
from the political and military events in the winter and spring of
1941". Bulgarian mobilisation restricted the available manpower,
and transportation on the Danube proved very cumbersome, since
it came to a standstill during the winter months.
RECRUITMENT IN SERBIA

In the German-occupied part of Serbia, supervision of recruitment was in the hands of a commission (Stab des Generalbevollmächtigten für die Wirtschaft in Serbien) which, while belonging to the
German military administration, received its instructions from
Reich Marshal Hermann Goring, as Commissioner for the FourYear Plan. After 1 July 1941, special recruitment agents were employed. Since the "largest part of the population of the rump
State of Serbia are small and medium peasants who cling to their
soil and never furnished migratory workers, the rural districts had
to be discarded and recruitment could only be carried out in the
cities and larger villages". But "appeals to the unemployed population to seek work in Germany had [only] varying degrees of success.
In the Banat interest was greater." In view of this failure, the
German authorities decided to introduce in the occupied Serb
territories the principles of German labour conscription. As far as
possible, conscripted workers were employed in Serbia proper for
the German war effort, and thus, for example, Serb miners could
not be recruited for Germany.
For other categories of workers, energetic propaganda was
maintained by posters and leaflets which compared the conditions
in Serbia with those in Germany. Serb newspapers reported daily
on the possibilities of finding work in Germany, the head of the

261

RECRUITMENT METHODS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

recruitment department of the German occupation authority
and the Serb central employment office made frequent radio appeals,
etc.
RECRUITMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS

' After the German occupation of the Netherlands, the SecretaryGeneral of the Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs, by an Order
of 24 September 1940, created a new system of public employment
offices. Thirty-seven district employment offices with 144 branch
offices were placed under the supervision of a central employment
office, which was a section of the Ministry of Social Affairs.
"The recruitment of Netherlands workers is hampered by the
mentality of the population. Netherlands workers are people who
are firmly attached to their land and—as experience before the
war had already taught—would seek work elsewhere only in a
situation of extreme emergency."
"The health of many Netherlanders is not good, especially that
of women. Dental and intestinal sicknesses are particularly frequent. The Netherlands employment offices have therefore, under
German supervision, carried out systematic group examinations
by German and Netherlands doctors. The result of the examinations shows that the percentage of persons of impaired working
capacity is considerably higher in the big cities than in the small
cities and rural areas."
RECRUITMENT IN BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE

When the Germans occupied Belgium "almost the entire personnel of the Belgian employment offices and of the central employment office had fled. The buildings of these offices were partly
destroyed, damaged or devastated. The Director-General of the
central employment office ordered the destruction of the files,
registers and indexes, but parts of them were found among the
refuse and dung heaps and put back into working condition. . .
The German military administration, with the help of German
labour administration experts, started work immediately and soon
secured the necessary technical equipment and staff for the
rehabilitation and extension of the work of the employment offices.
In the meantime they have become useful for the direction of
Belgian labour."
At first, 120 experienced German recruitment agents were
assigned to the various German military authorities in Belgium
and recruitment of Belgians was exclusively in their hands. In
due course, after one or several Germans had been assigned to every
Belgian employment office, those offices were also used.
In northern France, the two Departments {Nord and Pas de
Calais) were also found in complete disorganisation. For the
planned use of manpower the German authorities established,
until November 1940, 16 district labour offices which had to
recruit workers for Germany. In these regions, recruitment was
exclusively in the hands of German officials. Both in Belgium and
northern France, for the recruitment of metal workers and railway workers, engineers from German aircraft factories and from

262

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

the German railways were assigned to the recruitment commissions, as were technical advisers for the textile and chemical industries. "The recruitment [of all types of workers] at first met
with certain difficulties which were, however, overcome within
a comparatively short period. Once a large number of workers
from Belgium and northern France had gone to Germany and had
told their families and friends in letters and on their vacation
visits the real state of affairs in Germany, propaganda against
work in Germany was doomed to failure."
RECRUITMENT IN THE R E S T OF F R A N C E

The Reich Ministry of Labour assigned the task of recruiting
French workers to the branch offices of the German Military
Commander in France. The military authorities were assisted by
officials of the German civilian labour administration, who worked
as recruiting agents. After February 1941, the. district and local
German military commanders were also included in the recruitment
machinery. "Periodically, special recruitment columns are sent
to those districts where workers of a special type, for example,
foundry workers and dock workers, can be recruited or where unsatisfactory results have to be improved."
"The assistance given to the German organisation by the
French labour administration in general was confined to putting
their statistical information at the disposal [of the Germans]; for
the French employment offices can only be used for collaborating
in the planned distribution of workers within France, because their
staffs are small and an extension of their functions is hampered by
geographical and personnel difficulties."
Recruitment drives were supported by extensive propaganda
through posters, leaflets, pamphlets, newspaper articles, broadcasts and films. In addition, "appropriate French workers who have
already been in the Reich are used for recruitment within the
plants".
For every recruited worker, a transfer certificate (Überweisungsschein) was made out containing excerpts from the working
conditions which applied. One copy of this certificate was handed
to the recruit, one sent to the German employer, one to the German
labour office in France which had recruited him, one to his home
sickness insurance fund, and one (obviously for purposes of further
control) to an undisclosed authority. After medical examination,
the workers were transported in special trains which left three
times a week from Paris and twice a month from Dijon.
"As the foregoing shows, the French worker at first responded
only reluctantly to German recruitment. It is difficult for him to
forget anti-German propaganda which began even in the school
room, and in the last few years reached unheard-of dimensions,
and it is a difficult decision for him to leave his family and the
milieu to which he is accustomed. . . unless compelled by the most
extreme want, he prefers to continue starving instead of getting a
higher income through a step which, to his mind, is quite out of the
ordinary."

RECRUITMENT METHODS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES

263

"The French employer is anxious to keep the workers in the
country and therefore uses all his economic and moral influence.
He is afraid that once Frenchmen return from the Reich they will
make demands concerning humane treatment, the equipment of
the plants and social care, which would create complicated problems. His desire [to keep French workers in France] is furthered
by the extensive subcontracting of German production to France,
which not only permits French economy to maintain its manpower
but also secures them German help in procuring raw materials."
"At the end of March 1941, the French Ministry of Labour
announced its consent to the German recruitment drives and
ordered its agencies to observe a loyal attitude towards these
activities."
RECRUITMENT IN DENMARK

Recruitment was carried out "in complete independence of the
Danish employment offices" (Arbejdsanvisningskontorer) and was
exclusively in the hands of the German recruitment organisation.
On 24 May 1940, the German Embassy in Copenhagen announced
in the Danish press the opening of the "German Employment
Office in Denmark", which at first was active only in the capital.
Later, branch offices were established in Apenrade for northern
Slesvick, in Aarhus for central Jutland, in Odense for the Island
of Funen and in Aalborg for northern Jutland. In addition, two
flying recruitment agencies visited other regions from time to time.
"All Danes, before being sent to Germany, are as far as possible
examined with regard to their political reliability and criminal
record. Investigations are also made to discover whether they
have been in Germany before and for what reasons they left. Workers who have previously broken their contracts in Germany without
sufficient reason are excluded. This scheme, which is carried out
with the assistance of the Danish police, has proved successful."
Transportation was at first by steamer from Travemunde;
later, in order to save expenses, by rail. "For various reasons a
reception camp had to be established in Flensburg." Although 436
transports were organised altogether up to 31 August 1941, "recruitment in Denmark met, especially in the first months [after the
German occupation], with considerable difficulties. In particular,
certain differences in the conditions of life between the two countries proved to be an obstacle. Moreover, propaganda in the Danish
press, which is periodically repeated and promises great work
projects [in Denmark] makes many Danish workers hesitate to
accept employment offers from Germany."

APPENDIX IV
AN ESTIMATE OF FOREIGN LABOUR EMPLOYED IN
"GREATER GERMANY" IN JANUARY 19441
1. From Czechoslovakia:
(a) "Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia":
civilian workers
(b) Slovakia: civilian workers.
2. From Poland: civilian workers
employed prisoners of war
3. From Norway: civilian workers
4. From Denmark: civilian workers
5. From the Netherlands: civilian workers
6. From Belgium: civilian workers
employed prisoners of war
7. From France (except Alsace-Lorraine): civilian
workers
employed prisoners of war
8. From Yugoslavia:
(a) except Croatia: civilian workers
employed prisoners of war
(b) from Croatia: civilian workers
9. From Greece: civilian workers
10. From the U.S.S.R.:
(a) except the three Baltic Republics:
civilian workers
employed prisoners of war
(b) from Lithuania: civilian workers
(c) from Latvia : civilian workers
(d) from Estonia: civilian workers
11. From Italy: civilian workers
employed prisoners of war
12. From Hungary: civilian workers
13.1 See
From
Bulgaria:
civilian
workers
"The
Mobilisation
of Foreign
Labour by Germany", in

230,000
118,000
1,400,0002
56,0003
2,000
23,000
350,000
500,000
30,000
1,100,0004
870,0005
70,000
95,000
200,000
20,000
2,000,000
1,000,000
90,000
60,000
15,000
180,000
170,000
25,000
35,000
International

Labour Review, Vol. L, No. 4, Oct. 1944, p. 470 (based on information communicated to the I.L.O. by Dr. Eugene M. Kulischer, with the co-operation of Dr.
J. B.
Schechtmann), where an explanation of the figures is given.
2
Excluding Ukrainian workers from eastern Gallicia, but including workers
from the Government-General and the incorporated Polish provinces, as well as
Polish
prisoners of war working under the status of "free workers".
3
Total number of prisoners, including those not actually employed.
*6 Including 250,000 prisoners of war converted into "free workers".
Excluding 250,000 prisoners of war converted into "free workers".

FOREIGN LABOUR EMPLOYED IN "GREATER GERMANY"

14. From Rumania: civilian workers. . .
15. From Spain: civilian workers
16. From Switzerland: civilian workers.

265

6,000
8,000
18,000

Total estimate of foreigners working in "Greater
Germany" in January 1944:
civilian workers
employed prisoners of war
Total

6,450,000
2,221,000
8,671,000

In estimating the displacement of population caused by Germany's mass recruitment of foreigners and its impact upon the
countries concerned both during and after the war, an important
aspect is the occupational background of the labour recruits. Information on this subject has been very scarce. However, for
Netherlanders working in Germany, Belgium and France, statistical data are available. The following table, compiled by NetherOCCUPATIONAL

BACKGROUND OF GERMAN-EMPLOYED
NETHERLANDERS
Allocated for work

Occupational group

between 20 June 1940
and 31 Dec 1943 in
Germany
frontier
workers

Ceramic industries, including
brickmakers
Wood

others

3,996
19,835
1,313
1,831
1,839
6,750
6,669
20,339

2,815
73,831
7,358
5,105
3,816
2,693
80,189
5,560
18,648
29,663
7,849
49,127

6,811
93,666
8,671
6,936
5,655
9,443
86,858
25,899
22,246
40,740
8,299
51,969

9
34,555
23
13
11
1
939
11
73
47
61
588

3,598
11,077
450
2,842
1,048
2,135

24,740
12,122

25,788
14,257

80
4

15,382

78,114

93,496

1,931

348
738

1,329
8,729

1,677
9,467

3
31

100,190

411,688

511,878

38,380

Food, drink, and similar inAgricultural undertakings. . . .
Public services and other
"white collar" workers

total

between 28 Dec.
1940 and 31 Dec.
1943 in Belgium
and France

Unskilled factory workers and
Other occupations, except factory workers and journeyUnspecified occupations
* .

Total

266

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANT

lands authorities during the German occupation, indicates the
occupational distribution in their own country of 550,258 Netherlanders (511,878 working in Germany, and 38,380 working in
German-occupied Belgium and France) who were recruited up to
31 December 1943. Of the 511,878 working in Germany, 130,159
had, according to the same statistics, for various reasons returned to
the Netherlands by 31 December 1943.1
On the basis of these official statistics showing that, during the
period under consideration, 130,159 Netherlanders had returned
from Germany, the number of Netherlanders still employed there
at the end of 1943 (511,878, minus 130,159) would, therefore, have
amounted to approximately 382,0002, the great majority of whom
were skilled workers.
*

After January 1944, the German recruitment drives and various
other measures to increase manpower supply continued unabated.
According to the clandestine radio transmitter "Free Lithuania",
on 20 February 1944, the German occupation authorities arranged
for the transfer of 100,000 more Lithuanian labourers to the Reich
at the rate of 5,000 per week, beginning on 5 March 1944.
Similarly, at the end of January 1944, further train loads of
Estonian boys and girls were reported as being sent to Germany. 3
The Turin Stampa of 26 July 1944 reported that, during a visit
to Hitler's headquarters, Mussolini made arrangements for 710,000
Italian soldiers who, following Badoglio's armistice with the Allies,
had been put to work in Germany as prisoners of war, to continue
working there as "free workers". The paper added that these
Italians would work better as "free workers" and that in any case
it would have been impossible to demand their return to Germandominated Italy, since "there was no certainty at all that, after
their return, the men would not sooner or later take the path
leading to the Maquis and swell the ranks of the rebels".
The number of Hungarians deported to the Reich increased
greatly after the German occupation of Hungary in the spring of
1944."
On 17 February 1945, the Paris newspaper Le Monde published
the following estimate of the number of French men and women
still held by Germany:
Prisoners of war
Prisoners of war whose status had been changed into "free
workers"
Recruited civilian workers

750,000
220,000
708,000

. 1 Maandschrift van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 1943, No.11-12,
p. 284.
2
This figure differs slightly from t h a t given in the table on p. 265 which is
an estimate based on this and other sources.
3
Aftontidningen (Stockholm), 27 Jan. 1944; Arbetaren, 1 Feb. 1944.
4
The first programme of the German occupation authorities called for the
conscription of 150,000 Hungarian workers for Germany (La Suisse, Geneva,
29 Mar. 1944).

FOREIGN LABOUR EMPLOYED IN "GREATER GERMANY*'
Political deportees
Racial deportees
Persons from Alsace-Lorraine 1
Total

267

400,000
115,000
300,000
2,493,000

If must again be emphasised that the estimates of the number
of foreigners working within "Greater Germany" are far from representing the sum total of foreigners employed by the Third Reich,
because so many of them had to work outside the frontiers of
"Greater Germany".
In general, it may be assumed that the number of foreigners
inside the Reich increased considerably after January 1944, since
the Germans continued their practice of taking foreign workers
with them when they had to give up occupied territory. For example, after the great German retreat from the Soviet Union
began in 1942, transportation of Soviet citizens to the rear was
carried out on a huge scale. These evacuated persons were not
always brought at once into the Reich proper; large numbers of
them were put to work east of the Reich frontier in the territories
still under German occupation. Continued German defeats in the
East only served to stimulate the policy of mass displacement. 2
Similarly, in the liberated regions of western and south-eastern
Europe, the Allied armies found only small contingents of Germanemployed foreign workers, such as members of the Todt Organisation, who had been left behind by the retreating Germans. It
appears that the bulk of the foreigners whom the Germans had employed abroad were removed either to the Reich or to territories
which the Germans still held. Until the latest stages of the war
the Germans still controlled wide areas outside the Reich and
were thus able to continue the employment of foreign labour outside the Reich on a large scale. The proportion of those moved into
the Reich increased as the territories held by the Germans diminished.

1
The first group of French civilians employed in the Reich came from AlsaceLorraine; official German reports gave their number as 24,500 for July to November 1940. After the incorporation of these territories in the Reich, German
sources ceased to include persons deported from there in statistics of foreign
workers employed in Germany.
* A German officer who had been on the Eastern Front wrote in the Berliner
Börsen-Zeitung (quoted by Slockholms-Tidningen, 20 Oct. 1943): "To evacuate a
district is easier said than done . . . the majority of the population must be taken
along".

APPENDIX V
MODEL LABOUR CONTRACTS
M O D E L CONTRACT FOR ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL WORKERS

(Supplement to the German-Italian State Treaty of 17 March 1939,
concerning the Employment of Italians in Germany)
The most important clauses of the model contract read as
follows :
The duration of the employment is limited. T h e labour contract comes into
force on the day after the worker arrives a t the place of employment and remains
in force for . . . months (if possible 12, and a t least 6 months).
By agreement between the employer and the worker, this contract can be
renewed for a specific period of time. Such agreement must be put in writing.
But if the employment is renewed either by oral agreement or tacitly, beyond
the time agreed upon in written form, such renewal shall be for a period of 3
months a t a time. Until further changes, the total duration of the employment, as
laid down in an agreement between the German and Italian authorities, must,
however, not exceed IS months.
The German employer has the right to dismiss the worker, after giving due
previous notice, before the termination of the contract, in the following cases:
(a) within the first month after the beginning of the employment if the
worker is unfit for the work;
(6) if it appears necessary to transfer the worker to another employment,
where the worker would work under parallel conditions.

"As minimum conditions", the collective rules (Tarifordnungen)
decreed by the German authorities or, in theirabsence, the usual local
wage and working conditions were to apply. As a general rule, the
German-employed Italian "shall receive the same wage as a comparable German worker".
"If the employer so desires, the workers must do piece work
or premium work." For piece work, a wage increase, expressed as
a percentage of the hourly rates and based on the output which
was normal at the undertaking in question, was to be guaranteed.
Concerning "working time and the method of its computation",
the model contract merely stated that these questions "shall be
determined by the regulations which are in force at any given time".
The individual labour contract was, however, to contain indications of the daily and weekly working hours and to guarantee
a minimum number of working hours. Overtime, as well as night,
Sunday and holiday work had to be done within the .framework
of existing regulations except on 29 June (St. Peter's and St. Paul's

MODEL LABOUR CONTRACTS

269

Day) and 8 December (Feast of the Conception). Pay increases
for this work had to be the same as for comparable German workers.
Six days in the year which were not legal holidays in Germany,
were to be considered as. such for Italians: the Epiphany; Corpus
Christi; the Ascension of the Virgin; All Souls' Day; the anniversary of the Foundation of Rome (21 April) ; and the anniversary
of the March on Rome (28 October).
The model provisions also stipulated that the individual
contract was to indicate the manner of wage payments. It had
to specify whether or not the worker was to receive board and
lodging; and, if so, at what prices.
Travelling expenses from the worker's home to the frontier
had to be borne by the worker, and thence onwards by the employer, who also paid the fees for the employment permit, the
labour permit and the residence perrnit.
Married workers were entitled to family furlough after continuous employment in Germany for at least six months (unmarried workers, after one year) ; the furlough was to be granted
within the next six months (unmarried workers, within the next
year). But if the worker so desired, or if it was urgently required
by the public interest, two successive half-yearly furloughs were
to be combined into one. The date of the home furlough was to be
determined by the employer with due consideration for the transport situation and the needs of the undertaking, in agreement
with the labour office, the German Labour Front, and the Fascist
Federation of Italian Workers.
Home furlough was to last seven days, exclusive of travelling
time. Travelling expenses to and from the frontier were to be
borne by the employer. Otherwise, the German general regulations
concerning home furloughs (21 October 1940) had to be applied.
I t was permissible to transfer the worker to another working
place provided that the conditions of the contract applied there
too.
If the worker had duly terminated his contract, the employer
had to pay his travelling expenses to the frontier, including a fair
amount for food.
MODEL

CONTRACT FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS FROM
(PERMANENT WORKERS) 1

ITALY

The following are the main provisions of a model contract for
Italian agricultural workers who were permanently employed on
German farms (not on large estates) :
Every worker was obliged to sign an individual labour contract
which had to conform to the conditions laid down in the model.
The contract had to' contain the name of the German employer,
who also had to sign. Married women needed the consent of their
husbands, minor workers the consent of their parents or guardian.
1
The date of the German-Italian agreements containing model contracts for
Italian agricultural workers was not divulged; it appears that they were negotiated early in 1941. (Agreement Va 5770-2.41-C 0996, Italiener 5a; Ausländische
Arbeiter, pp. 606, 615 et seq.)

270

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

By the act of signature the worker bound himself not to leave his
place of employment until a certain date. He declared himself to
be in good health and without physical impediments which would
incapacitate him for work, and to be familiar with all usual field
and stable work. Women had also to declare that they were not
pregnant.
The monthly wage for May to September was fixed for men at
55 RM and for women at 45 RM, and from October to April
at 53 RM and 43 RM respectively. "These rates also cover work
done in excess of the usual working time as well as work performed
on Sundays and holidays. Workers are entitled to aggregate rest
periods of at least 2 hours a day."
Apart from these specific regulations, the model contract merely
contained a provision that "working time, payment, etc., shall
be determined by the collective rules (Tarifordnungen) which are
in force at the place of work". In addition to wages, workers were
entitled to free board, heating and light. "Accommodation must
conform to hygienic standards."
"As far as labour protection, public social services, social insurance and the regulation of working conditions, including labour
disputes, are concerned, the Italian worker enjoys, as a matter
of principle, the same protection as the German worker, unless
German legislation provides differently for foreigners in general."
"Travelling expenses from the worker's home to his place of
work as well as the cost of the employment permit, labour permit
and residence permit are paid by the employer. After the worker
has duly fulfilled his obligations he is to receive a free ticket from
his place of employment to the same frontier station at which he
had entered Germany (Brennero)."
"Delegates of the German Ministry of Labour, the district
labour offices and the labour offices have at all times right of access
to the working and living places of workers." They must try to
straighten out difficulties arising between employers and the
Italians. "Wherever possible, complaints should be settled in an
informal way on the spot. If litigation results from the labour
contract, the case shall come under the jurisdiction of the local
German courts of law."
MODEL

CONTRACT FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS FROM
(SEASONAL WORKERS)

ITALY

The model labour contract for Italian seasonal agricultural
workers varied from that for permanent agricultural workers in
several respects, and was much more detailed. The main provisions,
as far as they differed from those just mentioned, were as follows1:
No specific wage was promised; instead, it was stated that
migratory Italian workers would receive the same wages as their
German fellow workers. Piece-work rates, in the absence of official
regulations, were to be so fixed as to assure, for average output,
a wage at least 30 per cent, higher than the hourly rates. As much
use as possible was to be made of piece rates. Foreigners were
1

Agreement Va 5770-1.41-C 0996 Italiener 5 {ibid., pp. 606, 618 et seq.).

MODEL LABOUR CONTRACTS

271

entitled to a threshing bonus if such a bonus was given to German
workers. If they were asked to do non-agricultural work, they were
to receive extra payment.
The employment ended on completion of the harvest work,
but not before 1 November or 15 December.
If weather or other conditions did not allow work in the fields
the labourers had to do "substitute" work {Füllarbeit). If no
"substitute" work was available, they had within the next 30 days
to work up to two hours a day without pay, until the number of additional hours equalled the number of hours they had been idle.
Whatever portion of the idle time was not made up within 30 days,
was to be cancelled without loss of pay.
Unless the general regulations were more favourable, Italians
were entitled to two hours' rest for breakfast, lunch, and afternoon meal. The time spent in reaching the fields, and in returning
from the fields, was considered as working time. In emergencies,
the workers had to work overtime, to be remunerated according
to German regulations.
During the first six weeks a "deposit" of 3 RM weekly, and
during the following 9 weeks a deposit of 2 RM weekly, was to be
deducted from the wage. These amounts became due only at the
time of the worker's departure on the completion of his obligations. Deductions were also to be made for taxes, sickness insurance and accident insurance. Further deductions were foreseen for
absence from work without good reason or without permission.
In the latter case, the employer was also expressly entitled to
make a proportionate reduction in the amount of food supplied.
Seasonal agricultural workers from Italy were entitled to receive
a wage account at every payment. Complaints concerning alleged
discrepancies between the account and the amount paid could be
considered only if made immediately, and complaints concerning
the computation of the number of hours or the piece rates had to
be made within 14 days.
The regular weekly food supply was to consist of:
6
7
4}^
1
\i
Yi
\i
\i

kg potatoes
quarts skimmed milk (1 quart daily)
kg bread
kg wheat flour
kg fat (150 grams butter and 100 grams lard or bacon)
kg meat
kg sugar
kg salt

But whenever German regulations forbade the supply of any
of these foodstuffs, equivalent substitutes were to be given, but
always in kind, never in money. The workers were to receive
"decent collective accommodation", containing tables, chairs,
washing facilities, a wardrobe provided with a lock, a common
stove for cooking and washing, cooking, eating and washing utensils, good water for drinking and cooking purposes, sufficient fuel
and, for each worker, one bedstead with straw sack, one pillow,

272

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

two sheets and two woollen blankets. Men and women might
not be accommodated in the same buildings.
The food was to be cooked by women appointed by the employer in consultation with the Italian gang leaders (one cook to
every 15 workers). The cook also had to clean the quarters and
peel the potatoes. She was entitled to the wage of other Italian
female workers.
Both the employer and the worker had the right to terminate
;the labour contract without notice for serious reasons. It was expressly stated that "trade union activity" must not be considered
as a serious reason entitling the employer to dismiss an Italian
worker. This applied, of course, only to the official Fascist confederations and corporations.
If the worker fell sick he was entitled to the services of the sickness insurance fund. Whenever he was incapable of work on account of sickness or for other reason, he was not entitled to wages
or food, but had to rely on sickness pay from the sickness insurance
fund.
*
*
*
Government agreements concerning Italian agricultural workers
(permanent and seasonal) in Germany included the following additional rules 1 :
Any stoppage of work is prohibited both by German and Italian legislation
and therefore punishable. Even while disputes are under examination it is most
severely prohibited.
The employer shall have the bedding of migratory workers washed every
four weeks . . . Arrangements have been made to supply Italian agricultural
workers with soap or other cleaning material . . . Italian seasonal workers are as
far as possible given land on which they can grow their own kitchen herbs.
Supervision and care of Italian workers is, on the German side, entrusted to
the labour offices and the agencies of the Reich agricultural organisation (Reichsnährstand).
On the Italian side, supervision and care of Italian agricultural
workers in Germany is in the hands of the diplomatic and consular representatives
and of the delegates of the Fascist Association of Agricultural Workers (C.F.
L.A.).
M O D E L CONTRACT FOR AGRICULTURAL WORKERS FROM B A L E A N
COUNTRIES

The model contracts for Croat, Slovak and Hungarian permanent and seasonal agricultural workers (all dating from 1941)2
followed the pattern of the Italian agreements. The food arrangements were, however, different. Croat, Slovak and Hungarians
were to receive the same food as their fellow German workers. 3
The weekly standard supply was given as :
T}4 kg potatoes (for Slovaks, 12}^ kg)
7
quarts of skimmed milk or 3J^ quarts full milk
1

Agreement Va 5770-1.41-C 0996 Italiener 5 (ibid., pp. 625 et seq.).
'Ibid., pp. 607-608.
3
Ibid., pp. 632-633, 643, 653.

MODEL LABOUR CONTRACTS

273

^Yi kg bread
1 kg of peeled barley, or cream of wheat, or groats or legumes (Hülsenfrüchte)
% kg corn flour or % kg wheat flour
M kg fat
M kg salt

Meat, butter, bacon and sugar, which were mentioned in the
Italian agreement, were left out. It was also provided that "if at
any given period, owing to [German] regulations, these rations cannot be furnished, the workers are to receive cash instead". In other
cases, the employer was entitled, "if the worker consented", to substitute a sum of money (computed on the basis of official ceiling
prices for producers or, failing these, the market prices) except
for potatoes, milk and bread, which, under the model contracts,
had always to be furnished in kind. The workers were to be supplied
with a bedstead, straw sack, one pillow and one woollen blanket,
but no sheets.

APPENDIX VI
FOOD RATIONS
A.

I N THE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL

In the Government-General, the following food rations for nonGerman workers came into effect on 1 October 19431:
Monthly Food Rations for Non-German Workers (over 14 Years of Age)
Bread
9,000 grams
or flour (in the ratio of 750 grams of flour to 1,000
grams of bread) up to
3,375
Nährmittel*
200
Coffee substitute
125
Sugar
300
Jam
500
Meat up to
400
Potatoes (100 kg per year)
8,330

"Privileged consumers" (Bevorzugte Versorgungsberechtigte), namely,
(a) persons employed (Bedienstete) in offices and institutions functioning under public law, and (b) wage earners and salaried employees of enterprises entrusted with special tasks in the German
interest, whose efficiency and trustworthiness deserved special
reward, were entitled monthly to:
Additional meat ration
Additional fat ration
Additional potato ration (per year)

500 grams
200 "
200 kg

If these "privileged consumers" were fed in canteens, so-called
"canteen additions" (Betriebsküchenzulagen) were granted, consisting of 250 grams of Nährmittel, 250 grams of flour, and 125
grams of sugar per head per month.
On application by the managements of undertakings to the
local labour offices, additional rations could be granted to workers
whose "regular daily work requires continuous physical exertion
in excess of the effort demanded from ordinary workers" (Zusatzver sorgungsb er echtigte) :
1
Decree of 22 September 1943, issued by Naumann, head of the Department
of Food and Agriculture in the Government-General, published in the local
German-language press on 26 Sept. 1943.
* The Decree did not specify the items of which the Nährmittel should consist.

275

FOOD RATIONS
Additional

Rations per Month

Bread (or an equivalent amount of flour)
Nährmittel
Coffee substitute
Jam
Sugar
Meat
Fat
Potatoes (per year)

for
heavy work

for
very heavy work

2,400 grams
250
"
125 "
250
"
125 "
800
"
600
"
200 kg

5,600 grams
250
"
125 "
250
"
250
"
1,200
"
900
"
200 kg

The supplementary ration for heavy work was, as a matter of
general policy, made to depend on individual output. In December
1943, for instance, Struve, Commissioner for Manpower in the
Government-General, introduced three types of food rations for
non-German workers: class A for those whose output was below
the average; class B for those whose output was comparable to
Reich standards; and class C for output above the average. Only
persons engaged in "heavy" or "extra-heavy" work and classified
in categories B or C were granted additional food.
B.

GERMAN

CONCENTRATION

CAMPS AND POLICE

PRISONS

It may be of interest, for purposes of comparison, to give the
official food rations in German concentration camps and police
prisons in force in the spring of 1941 1 :
Normal Rations for Prisoners per Person per Week
(grams)
Meat or meat products

Fats

Curds (Quark)

320 ("if meat from uninspected slaughterhouse (Freifleischbank), increase
up to 50 per cent, permissible")
200 (of which 150 margarine or 120 oil,
and 50 pork fat (Schweineschlacht• fett) or 40 pork lard (Schweineschmalz))
100 (or 50 cheese made from skimmed
milk (Magerkäse))
2,740
80 (plus 40 if no jam is issued)

Bread
Sugar
Nährmittel
(groats, cream of
wheat, cream of maize, grain
oats, potato flour, pastes, sago,
etc.)
150
Flour or flour mixture (Mehle
oder Mehlgemische)
225
Coffee substitute or coffee supplements (Kaffee-Ersatz oder
Kaffeezusatzmittel)
84
1
Decrees by the Reich Ministry of Food and Agriculture, of 16 January 1940, .
5 April 1940, and 30 May 1941 (Kommentar 'zur Reichsverleidigungsgesetzgebting,
Vol. V, pp. 241 et seq.). The potato ration is not mentioned.

276

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Additions (in grams) for certain categories of inmates of concentration camps and police prisons were as follows:
(a) additional rations for " h e a v y " work (Schwerarbeiter) per day: meat and
meat products ("if meat from uninspected slaughterhouse, increase up to
50 per cent, permissible") . . . up to 320; f a t . . . up to 100—of which up to
75 margarine or up to 60 oil, and up to 25 pork fat (Schweineschlachtfett)
or up to 20 pork lard (Schweineschmalz) ;
(2>) additional rations for prisoners working during long night shifts (lange
Nachtarbeiter) per week : meat and meat p r o d u c t s . . . 160 ; m a r g a r i n e . . . 20 ;
bread . . . 600;
(c) additional rations for prisoners performing agricultural work, per week:
meat and meat products . . . 160; margarine . . . 20; bread . . . 600.

APPENDIX VII
SOCIAL INSURANCE PROVISIONS
GERMAN-EMPLOYED ITALIANS

On 20 June 1939, Germany and Italy concluded a treaty concerning social insurance questions which, however, was not ratified until
Italy had entered the war, namely, on 2 August 1940. It came into
effect on 1 September 19401, and was amended by an agreement
between the Reich Minister of Labour and the Italian Minister
of Corporations of 31 March 1941.2 The chief provisions of this
treaty were as follows: Italian workers moving to Germany with
transplanted Italian undertakings remained insured under the
Italian social insurance system if their stay in Germany did not
exceed six months. Otherwise, they were insured in the country
in which they were employed, and were to be treated in the same
way as the nationals of that country. The treaty covered all
branches of social insurance in force in either of the two countries,
including, by virtue of a supplementary agreement of 20 June
1939, unemployment insurance.
The German policy of removing from German soil all foreigners
not capable of working was also applied to Italians. An important
provision was therefore included that the Italian social insurance
funds must, against repayment by the German social insurance
institution, take care not only of the dependants while the head
of the family was working in Germany or German-held territory,
but also of the Italian worker himself, if he was sent back to Italy
when sick or disabled.
Thesickness insurance of German-employed Italians'dependants
living in Italy was covered by a special agreement of 31 Maçch 1941,
which provided that the social insurance fund of the country in
which they were employed (which received the social insurance
contributions) should pay a lump sum to the social insurance fund
of the other country, which would grant sickness insurance benefits
to the dependants left in their own countries. These lump sums
were fixed as follows for the period between 1 June and 31 December
1941 : for every calendar month during which the worker worked
at least 15 days in an industrial undertaking where social insurance
was obligatory, 1.08 RM or 8.25 lire; and under the same conditions
for agricultural workers, 0.65 RM or 5.00 lire.3
If an Italian worker returned to Italy on account of illness,
with the consent of the German sickness insurance fund, the latter
was to credit the Italian social insurance fund (which was to take
care of the sick worker) with the following amounts (provided al1
Decree by the Reich Minister of Labour, of 17 September 1940; Ausländisciie
Arbeiter, p. 577.
* Reichsarbeitsblatt, 1941, Part II, p. 137.
• Aiwländische Arbeiter, p. 584 (German-Italian Agreement of 4 August 1941).

278

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

ways that the sickness rendered him incapable of working; otherwise, no reimbursement could be claimed): (a) for medical treatment, including expenses for medicines, bandages and other medical
supplies, 145 lire (for an agricultural worker, 140 lire); but if he
fell sick while on leave in Italy, 75 lire (for an agricultural worker,
70 lire); (b) if ambulatory treatment in an Italian hospital was
granted, 72.50 lire (for an agricultural worker, 70 lire); (c) in case
of hospitalisation, the regular daily rates for regular Italian patients,
plus a lump sum for medical and surgical expenses ranging from
80 to 110 lire.
On 6 August 1942, these financial provisions were superseded
by an amendment which came into force retroactively as from
1 January 1942.a A much lower, flat lump-sum rate was established
to cover all expenses incurred by the social insurance fund of the
country concerned. The German social insurance fund undertook
to credit the Italian fund with 0.85 RM per month for every Italian
working in German industrial or other non-agricultural undertakings covered by compulsory social insurance, and, under the same
conditions, with 0.60 RM for every Italian in German agricultural
employment. The Italian social insurance fund in its turn was to
credit the German fund with 6.47 lire or 4.57 lire per month for
every German working respectively in an Italian industrial
or other non-agricultural undertaking or in Italian agriculture.
Members of the Fascist Corporation of Commercial Employees were
covered by special provisions. 2
Although these agreements were of a reciprocal nature, Germany
gained considerably from them, because the number of Italians
deported to Germany, and paying compulsory social insurance
contributions in Germany, was very much greater than the number of Germans working in Italy. 3
A N EXAMPLE FROM THE ANNEXED TERRITORIES:

LUXEMBOURG

In territories which, after occupation by Germany, were incorporated in the Reich, German policy, as far as social insurance
was concerned, was to place existing institutions under German
administration and to introduce, in principle, German social insurance legislation. One result of this scheme was, of course, to
put the assets of the foreign institutions at the disposal of the Germans.
As a rule, German regulations concerning the transition from
the pre-annexation to the annexation régime provided that, from
the beginning of the German administration, benefits and contributions were to be in accordance with German legislation. The latter
was in some cases more, and in some cases less, favourable than
the legislation of the annexed territories. If the insured person
1

Ausländische Arbeiter, p. 584 (3), supplement, 20 May 1942.
Ibid., p. 585 (5), supplement, 15 Oct. 1942.
Similar, though less detailed, arrangements were made between Germany
and Rumania (Provisional Agreement of 23 August 1941, in force from 1 September 1941 and promulgated by Decree of the Reich Minister of Labour, of 13
February 1942; ibid., p. 584 (pp. 13 et seq.) and Hungary (Treaty between the
German Reich and the Kingdom of Hungary, concluded in Budapest on 20
March 1941: Reichsgesetzblatt, 1942, Part II, p. 135, as amended by agreements
of the same date, and of 24 July 1941; ibid., p. 176).
2
3

SOCIAL INSURANCB PROVISIONS

279

had acquired, under the pre-annexation régime, more advantageous
rights than those provided for under German legislation, he continued, as a rule, to be entitled to these rights. On the other hand,
when German legislation was more advantageous to the insured,
he was entitled to the higher benefits from the time that German
legislation came into force. In other words, the change in the
administration was, at least according to the letter of the law, to
the advantage of the insured, on the whole, although it must not
be forgotten that the German contributions were often higher.
This was a propaganda device, used to impress the inhabitants of
the newly annexed territories who, in the National Socialist doctrine,
were ethnically Germans. On the other hand, this measure of
generosity cost Germany nothing; it simply meant that the foreign
funds which were taken over had in some instances to grant higher
benefits, although their reserves had been computed for lower
benefits. The concession did not prevent Germany from depleting
the assets of the "annexed" social insurance institutions and from
reaping large financial advantage from the reorganisation of the
social insurance systems in the annexed territories, e.g., by depleting
their assets and crediting them, instead, with Reichsmark claims.
An example of the impact of German wartime policy upon the
social insurance system of territories which were incorporated into
the Reich, may be taken from the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. 1
For a short periodj after the invasion of Luxembourg on 10 May
1940, it was considered as enemy territory and placed under German
military administration, with a Luxembourg administrative commission, acting under the German commander's control, in charge
of civilian affairs; the Luxembourg social insurance legislation
remained in force. In July 1940, Adolf Hitler ordered the military
administration to be terminated, and placed the country under
Gustav Simon, Gauleiter of the German district of Moselland. From
1 October 1940, Luxembourg social insurance legislation was declared to be superseded by German legislation, and the administration of the Luxembourg social insurance institutions was taken
over by, or transformed into, corresponding German institutions. 2
Whether employed in Luxembourg or in Germany proper,
1
This information is based on preliminary investigations carried out by the
Luxembourg Government after the liberation of the country, and communicated
to the I.L.O. in January 1945.
'Order of 30 September 1940 (Verordnungsblatt für Luxemburg, 1940, p. 22).
The sickness insurance funds were ordered to amend their by-laws by 1 Jan.
1941 in accordance with German legislation. Some of them had to change their
names. The miners were taken out of the sickness insurance system and put
under a new insurance scheme which was administered by the Miners' Insurance
Fund in Aachen (Aachener Knappschaft) and, later on, also included the Luxembourg metallurgical workers. The pension insurance fund for salaried
employees became a branch office (Amtsstelle) of the Reich Insurance Fund for
Salaried Employees (Reichsversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte) in Berlin, the
invalidity and old-age insurance fund for workers became a branch office of
the State Insurance Fund for the Rhine Province (Landesversicherungsanstalt
Rheinprovinz) in Düsseldorf, the industrial accident insurance fund was made
into a branch office of the Trade Accident Insurance Association for the
Machine Making and Light Engineering Industries (Berufsgenossenschaft für
Maschinenbau und Kleineisenindustrie) in Düsseldorf, and the agricultural
accident insurance fund was attached to the Rhenish Agricultural Trade Accident
Insurance Association (Rheinische Landwirtschaftliche Berufsgenossenschaft)
in Düsseldorf.

280

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

Luxembourgers were henceforth under the same social insurance
system and were insured under identical conditions, except that
the new regulations safeguarded the rights acquired by insured
persons under Luxembourg legislation before 1 October 1940, in
so far as those rights were more advantageous to the beneficiary
than German legislation would have been.
Various measures were taken by the Germans which diverted
social insurance contributions from the Luxembourg to the German
social insurance institutions. For example, contributions for insured persons employed at a Luxembourg branch of an undertaking
which had its head office in Germany proper went, after 1 July
1942, to the Reich Insurance Fund for Salaried Employees in Berlin,
whereas they should have been paid to the Luxembourg fund. On
the other hand, German funds were relieved of some obligations,
at the expense of Luxembourg funds. For instance, when intensified
air warfare against the Reich caused many German workers to
remove their families from target areas to safer regions, there was a
considerable influx of evacuees into Luxembourg. The German
authorities ordered the social insurance funds of the places to
which these persons were evacuated—in this case, the Luxembourg
institutions—to grant them the benefits due to them under German
legislation, although the contributions covering such benefits continued to be paid into the social insurance funds at the place where
their breadwinners were employed. The German regulations merely
provided that a settlement concerning a refund of these payments
would be made at a later date.
The value of a social insurance system is always determined
by the actual application of the rules and regulations. According
to all indications, the German administration severely reduced the
benefits to which Luxembourg insured persons were theoretically
entitled, by adopting very rigorous criteria in deciding whether
a person was sick or unable to work.
Luxembourg was liberated on 10 September 1944. The preliminary information so far available does not suffice to provide a
picture of the development of the sickness insurance institutions
under German rule. However, in respect of the other branches
of the social insurance system, a comparison can be made between
their assets on 10 May 1940 and 10 September 1944. The following
figures, resulting from preliminary investigations, are tentative,
but the final figures are not likely to differ greatly.
A ssets of the Luxembourg Pension Insurance Fund for Private
Salaried Employees {Luxembourg francs)

Cash
Current accounts
Bonds of the State of Luxembourg or of a similar category, and bonds of Luxembourg
local authorities
Luxembourg industrial securities
Belgian securities

10 May 1940

10 Sept. 1944

205,000
1,325,000

—1
—l

58,650,000
5,305,000
1,905,000

44,644,000
1,491,000
1,849,000

SOCIAL INSURANCE PROVISIONS
Mortgage loans
Forests
Various outstanding claims
Total

281

78,904,000
3,995,000
1,996,000

17,654,000
3,995,000
—*

152,285,000s

69,633,000'

The net diminution of the available assets of this institution
was thus 82,652,000 francs, or 54 per cent. When the Germans
left the country, the pension fund had, however, on its books, a
credit of 17,066,000 RM (6,453,000 RM as the nominal value of
German Government loans and 10,613,000 RM in cash, current
accounts, etc.). According to the official German exchange rate
of 10 francs = 1 R M , this credit would amount to 170,660,000
francs; after deduction of 82,652,000 francs, 88,008,000 francs
would remain to cover the new liabilities which originated under
the German régime. The Luxembourg authorities calculate t h a t
this sum would not suffice to cover the new liabilities.
The situation of some of the other Luxembourg social insurance
funds changed, in proportion, even more drastically under the
German régime, as can be seen from the following figures (in Luxembourg francs) :
Available assets
Luxembourg fund and type of asseta

Difference
10 May 1940

10 Sept. 1944

Invalidity and old-age insurance
fund for industrial workers:
Luxembourg and Belgian securities and outstanding claims.. 132,837,000
54,372,000

52,560,000
54,372,000

80,277,000

187,209,000» 106,932,000»
Employment injury (accident)
insurance fund for industrial
workers:
Securities and outstanding
Real estate

93,022,000
2,907,000

39,835,000
2,907,000

95,929,000»

42,742,0002

9,235,000
285,000

2,340,000
285,000

9,520,000

2,625,000

53,187,000

Employment injury (accident)
insurance fund for agricultural
and forest workers:
Securities and outstanding
6,895,000

1
Plus nominal 562,035 RM Young Plan Loan.
• Plus 15,137 RM in German loans.

1
By Order of the Chief of the Civilian Administration in Luxembourg, of 29
January 1941, the cash assets, current accounts and various outstanding claims
were converted into Reichsmarks, at the exchange rate of 10 Luxembourg francs =
1 Reichsmark.
1
To these figures must be added the value of the real estate owned by the
Fund (on 10 May 1940, it amounted to 8,490,000 francs).

282

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

In other words, at the end of the German rule, the available
assets of these three branches of the Luxembourg social insurance
system in Luxembourg francs had decreased, respectively, by 43
per cent., 55 per cent., and 73 per cent. These institutions, when
the Germans left, also had Reichsmark credits on their books which
were t o offset these differences and to provide the reserves for the
liabilities which had originated during the German régime. These
assets amounted to 16,757,000 RM, 7,502,000 RM and 880,000
RM, or, at the official German exchange rate, to 167,570,000
francs, 75,020,000 francs, and 8,800,000 francs, respectively. In
order to determine whether these assets would suffice to make up
for the losses suffered by the funds and to provide the reserves
needed, under Luxembourg legislation, to carry out the obligations which originated during the German régime,, it will be necessary to ascertain the extent to which the obligations assumed by
the German administration on behalf of the Luxembourg institutions exceed those which would have been incurred under Luxembourg legislation.
For a final evaluation of the effects of the German administration of the Luxembourg social insurance system, three additional
points will have to be taken into consideration.
The value of the immovable assets (buildings and forests)
owned by the institutions was smaller at the end of the German
rule than it had been before the German invasion, partly as a
result of depreciation of these assets and partly as a result of war
damage. Moreover, much additional war damage was caused
during the short second German invasion of Luxembourg in
December 1944. None of these losses appears in the tables above.
Secondly, in consequence of the diminished purchasing power
of the currencies in the annexed territories during German rule,
the social insurance systems of these countries will be forced to increase the amounts of the benefits if they wish to keep them at
the pre-war level.
Thirdly, the war casualties suffered by the insured population
and the difficult conditions under which the insured persons had
to live and work during the war will, in many respects, increase
the burden of the social insurance systems of the territories annexed
by Germany during the war.
*
*
*
This brief description shows the complexity of the problems
created by German wartime measures in the annexed territories
whose populations were, according to National Socialist doctrine,
considered "ethnically German" and were, therefore, ruled with
less severity than the occupied "foreign" territories.
It should also be noted that Luxembourg was one of the most
favoured of the annexed territories. From the information so far
available, it appears, for example, that the damage done by the
German administration to the social insurance system of the Sudeten region will be relatively greater and that the situation of the
social insurance funds in the Polish provinces annexed by the
Reich is even worse.

APPENDIX

VIII

THE DEPORTATION OF BELGIAN WORKERS
IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR
In the earlier phases of the First World War Germany exercised
considerable pressure on Belgian workers to induce them either
to work for the German occupation authorities in Belgium or to
move to the Reich and accept employment in German war industry
or agriculture. But, owing to the resistance of the Belgians, this
scheme proved unsatisfactory to the occupying Power.
On 2 March 1916, the Reich War Ministry informed General
von Bissing, the German Commander in Belgium, that it desired
the transfer of 400,000 Belgian workers to Germany. (The German
Commander in Belgium administered part of the country, called
the Government-General, while the rest of German-occupied
Belgium, called the zone d'étape—zone in the rear of the front—
was administered by the Fourth German Army.)
General von Bissing realised that such a step would be contrary
to the commitments entered into by Germany when it signed and
ratified the "Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land" adopted by the International Peace Conferences at the
Hague in 1899 and 19071; he therefore "peremptorily rejected the
1
The "Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land",
annexed to the IVth Hague Convention, regulate, in Section I I I , the rights of
the "Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State". The relevant
articles provide:
Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate Power having actually passed
into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to
re-establish and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
Art. 46. Family honour and rights, the lives of individuals and private
property, as well as religious convictions and liberty of worship, must be
respected.

Art. 52. Neither requisitions in kind nor services can be demanded from
communes or inhabitants except for the necessities of the army of occupation.
They must be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such
nature as not to imply for the population any obligation to take part in
military operations against their country.
These requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of
the Commander in the locality occupied.
In 1907 the Second International Peace Conference a t the Hague added the
following provision to Article 23 in Section II ("Hostilities") of the Regulations:
A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the nationals of the adverse
party to take part in t h e operations of war directed against their country,
{Footnote continued overleaf)

284

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

idea of the mass transportation of Belgian workers by force". 1
In his reply of 14 March 1916, to the German Deputy War Minister
he pointed out that such action would create "great dissatisfaction
in America and in the neutral countries generally", and emphasised
that "it would be particularly difficult to avoid a flagrant violation
of the Hague Convention". By letter of 12 April 1916, he also
notified the Reich Chancellor of his opposition, and subsequently
the plan was "unanimously" dropped 2 , but only for a short time.
Quartermaster-General Ludendorff informed him on 14 September
1916 that "all objections based on social considerations and international law must absolutely yield" to the necessity of using all
available manpower. 3 General von Bissing still objected strongly,
maintaining that he had to abide by the Hague Convention, and
even intimated that he would have to resign unless his view prevailed 4 , but he obeyed because the Emperor sided with the Supreme
Command. When the forced deportation of Belgian workers was
finally ordered on 3 October 1916, the Decree was issued, not on
behalf of General von Bissing, but of the Quartermaster-General.
This Decree deeply shocked world opinion. In the ensuing
weeks, the famous protest by Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of
Malines, was followed by similarly emphatic declarations, signed
. by Belgian authorities, trade unions, public figures, bishops, and
scientists in occupied Belgium itself. The Belgian Government in
exile at Havre, in a note sent to the Belgian Ministers in Rome
and Madrid, for transmission to the Holy See and Spain, called
the deportation a crime de lèse-humanité.6
The first neutral Power to intervene officially with the German
Government (10 November 1916) was Spain, as the protector of
Belgian rights vis-à-vis Germany, and the Holy See declared its
support of Spain's attitude. Switzerland, the United States of
America, the Netherlands and Brazil followed suit. The protest
of the United States of America called the action "in contravention
of all precedent and of those human principles of international
practice which have long been accepted and followed by civilised
even when they have been in his service before the commencement of the war.
In addition, the preamble to the Fourth Hague Convention stipulates:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war can be issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it expedient to declare that in cases not included
in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as
they result from the usages established between civilised nations, from the
laws
of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.
1
Ludwig von KÖHLER: Die Staatsverwaltung der besetzten Gebiete, Band I:
Belgien (Stuttgart-New Haven, 1927), p. 149 (translated by W. R. DITTMAR: The
• Administration of the Occupied Territories, reproduced by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with preface by Phillip Jessup, Washington, D.C.,
1942).
* KÖHLER, op. cit., p.

150.

* According to J. PIRENNE and M. VAUTHIBR (La législation et l'administration
allemandes en Belgique, Paris-New Haven, 1925, p. 56), the German Supreme
Command
demanded at that time 300,000 Belgian workers.
4
H. PIRENNE: La Belgique et la guerre mondiale (Paris-New Haven, 1928),
p. 188.
6
The Note of 13 November 1916 is reprinted in Revue générale du droit international public, Vol. 24 (1917), Documents, p. 49.

THE DEPORTATION OF BELGIAN WORKERS

285

nations in their treatment of non-combatants in conquered territory". 1
The protests were not confined to non-Germans. On 2 December
1916, two leaders of the Social Democratic opposition urged the
German Government in the Reichstag to end at once the deportation of forced labour from occupied territory, especially from
Belgium, and accused the Government of infringement of the
Hague Convention. As a sign of protest, the Social Democrats
declined, for the first time since the beginning of the war, to vote
for the budget. 2 The German trade unions, from which knowledge
of the scheme had been withheld as long as possible, also made
strong efforts to have the measures rescinded.
In view of the general indignation, the German Government
yielded. By the middle of February 1917, deportations from the
part of Belgium administered by General von Bissing stopped.
The repatriation of deportees who did not volunteer to continue
work in Germany was to be completed by 1 June 1917. However,
the recruitment of Belgians for work either within Belgium or in
northern France continued, especially in the zone d'étape. These
labour recruits were forced to work for the German occupation
authorities in so-called "civilian workers' battalions".

After the First World War, the question arose whether Germany,
in addition to paying indemnities for the deportation of workers
into Germany proper, was also liable to pay indemnities for those
Belgians whom it had forcibly removed, not to the Reich, but to
other regions of their own country or to northern France, then
partially occupied by Germany.
The Belgian Government stated in its memorandum submitted
to the Reparations Commission 8 : "workers who had been compelled
to do forced labour and were removed either into the interior of the
country or from Belgium into France, as was the case in the border
regions, are considered as falling into the same category as those
deported to Germany". The Belgian Government therefore reached
a total figure of 160.0004 deportees. Having established that the
deportations averaged seven months in duration, of which an
1
Quoted by Green Haywood HACKWORTH, in Digest of International Lava,
Vol. VI (Washington, 1943), p. 399. For a fuller discussion of the actions of the
neutrals, see Fernand PASSELECQ: Déportation et travail forcé des ouvriers et delà
population civile de la Belgique occupée (1916-1918) (Paris-New Haven, 1927),
pp. 1 286-308.
P. UMBREIT and CH. LORENZ: Der Krieg und die Arbeitsverhältnisse (BerlinNew1 Haven, 1928), p. 123.
Mémoire sur les dommages de guerre subis par la Belgique, Ch. VI, Part I,
entitled "Rémunération aux déportés", quoted in the case of Jules-Hector Loriaux
c. Etat allemand, in Recueil des décisions des tribunaux mixtes (Paris, 1924-25),
Vol.4 V, p. 684.
The figure of 160,000 left out only "the Belgian deportees of the first period
of the German invasion and the political deportees" (ibid.). The German figure
of "approximately 60,000" (KÖHLER, loe. cit.) only took into account Belgians
removed from Belgium into Germany. On the basis of Belgian investigations,
PASSELECQ, op. cit., p. 398, reached a figure of 58,500 workers transported to
Germany.

286

EXPLOITATION OF FOREIGN LABOUR BY GERMANY

average of five months was spent in forced labour, and assessing
at six francs the "just remuneration" which the Treaty of Versailles
"\ granted to the deportees 1 , the Belgian Government calculated the
liability resulting to Germany at 144 million francs (namely 160,000
deportees X 150days X 6francs). Altogether, the Belgian claims
submitted to the Reparations Commission for compensation for
civilian victims and their dependants and legal successors amounted
to 492,131,000 Belgian francs. This sum was accepted by the
Reparations Commission, although it was not fully included in
the final computation of the German reparation debt of 132,000
million gold marks. In arriving at this latter figure, the Reparations Commission made deductions from the sum total of the
claims of the Allied and Associated Powers, without however
questioning the legal or factual justification of the amounts originally claimed. 2
In both World Wars it was the policy of the German authorities, whenever possible, to make the conscripted foreign worker
sign a labour contract in which he agreed to being displaced
and to being employed in or for Germany. In a test case in which
the plaintiff was a former Belgian wartime deportee who had been
forced by German authorities to sign a labour contract, the German-Belgian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, set up under the Versailles
Treaty, declared (decision of 3 June 1924) : "The labour contracts
have, in fact, their origin and source in acts of violence which,
systematically exercised on an entire portion of the civilian population, constitute the gravest violation of the law of nations". 3 If
the signing of the contract was a genuinely voluntary act on the
part of the worker, no violation of the provisions intended to protect non-combatant civilians in territories under wartime occupation was involved. But in the great majority of cases, the workers
had signed under coercion. Evidently, if a "contract even when
expressed in writing, is based primarily on violence systematically
exercised on whole portions of the civil population", such a document cannot be considered as expressing the free will of the coerced
person and therefore does not legitimise deportation.

1
In assessing the claim at 6 francs per day of forced labour, the memorandum
of the Belgian Government to the Reparations Commission declared that it considered itself "permitted not to take into account the wage paid by the German
authorities"
(Mémoire sur les dommages de guerre subis par la Belgique, op. cit.).
2
In July 1925, the German Government agreed with a federation representing
former Belgian deportees to pay a lump-sum indemnification of 24 million francs,
subject to the approval of the Belgian-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal set up
under the Treaty of Versailles. This payment was to be independent of the
German reparation payments (The Times, London, 14 July 1925, quoted by
Arnold J. TOYNBEE: Survey of International Affairs, 1924 (London 1926), p. 401;
cf. L. OPPENHEIM: International Law (5th edition, ed. by Lauterpacht, Cambridge, 1935), Vol. 2, p. 352).
s
Case of Loriaux c. Etat allemand.

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