INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE STUDIES AND REPORTS Series B (Economic Conditions) No. 35 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT It IC ITA IX PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 3480 University Street, Montreal, Canada Published in the United Kingdom for the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE by P. S. King & Staples, Ltd., London. Distributed in the United States by the INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, Washington Branch, 734 Jackson Place, Washington, D.C. r PREFACE This study is an attempt to analyse the problems of production, distribution and consumption of food in Great Britain during the present war, and the measures which have been adopted to solve those problems. It is concerned with the actual operation of Government planning on a comprehensive scale which, starting in a very limited way, has been extended until it affects closely almost all processes from the growing of crops, the raising of animals, and the importation of foods, at one end, to the actual consumption of food at the other. The establishment of effective controls has necessitated a vast number of administrative orders. Since this study aims at analysis rather than mere description or cataloguing, not all of these have been included. The more important orders, however, are listed chronologically in Appendix III under subject headings. The International Labour Office was directed by the 1941 Conference of the International Labour Organisation to plan its work for the purpose of fulfilling a resolution which declared that "the close of the war must be followed by immediate action, previously planned and arranged . . . for the raising of standards of living throughout the world" and affirmed the "desirability of associating the International Labour Organisation with the planning and application of measures of reconstruction". Nutrition is one of the most important elements in any standard of living program, and a nutrition program is concerned with the production and distribution of food. The present report is an analysis of the work of one Government in controlling food production and distribution. The circumstances are abnormal, to be sure, but the results are not without their lessons for the future. British food control in this war has, to a much greater extent than in the war of 1914-1918, resulted in an accumulation of experiences likely to be of considerable value after the war. Hence the final section deals with the post-war significance of the results of wartime control. This is a study that can be useful in linking the experiences gained in one aspect of war organisation to one part of post-war policy. iv PREPACE It includes a considerable amount of detail that is of interest only to those concerned with the administration of food policy, and some concerning war developments that is only of transitory interest, but it is above all an analysis of the problems arising in a particular experiment in state control. The study was prepared in Montreal and London by Edith Tilton Denhardt of the Economic and Statistical Section of the International Labour Office. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of all those who read the manuscript and gave valuable advice and who assisted in the preparation of it, especially to Dr. E. F. Penrose, Economic Adviser to the International Labour Office, for his rigorous criticism and helpful suggestions. MARCH 1942. CONTENTS Page PREFACE CHAPTER I : iii Tiie Problem of Food Control Dependence on Imports Production of Food The Demand for Food Prices Education of Consumers Organisation of Food Administration CHAPTER I I : Agricultural Policy The Changing Character of Agriculture since 1914 Wartime Policy Increase of Domestic Production Plough Policy Land Productivity and Farming Efficiency Mechanisation and Labour Supply 'Land Tenure Credit Facilities Planning Agricultural Production Adjustment of Relative Prices Subsidies Rationing of Feeding Stuffs Miscellaneous Provisions Results CHAPTER I I I : Control of Supplies and of the Channels of Distribution. . . . Co-operation with Traders Use of Normal Trade Machinery Importance of Trade Organisation Allocation of Supplies Standardisation of Trade Customs Transport and Storage Application of Control over Supplies and Distribution.. Cereals and Cereal Products Meat and Meat Products Milk and Milk Products Oils and F a t s Eggs Fruit and Vegetables Fish Sugar Miscellaneous Distribution under "Emergency" Conditions 1 2 7 7 8 11 13 17 17 24 24 24 26 34 36 37 38 42 49 49 56 56 58 61 64 67 70 73 73 74 75 78 82 89 91 93 97 99 100 101 vi FOOD CONTROI, IN GREAT BRITAIN Page CHAPTER IV: Rationing and Priority Distribution Introduction The Development of Rationing Bacon Butter, Margarine, and Cooking Fats Sugar Meat Tea Cheese Preserves Points Rationing Differential Rationing Priority Distribution—Milk Milk in Schools General Scheme of Supply Other Priorities Communal Feeding Communal Kitchens and Feeding Centres Regulation of Catering Establishments School Canteens Canteens for Industrial and Agricultural Workers. . Emergency Feeding CHAPTER V: Food Price Control Policy Introduction Food Subsidies Course of Food Prices Methods of Controlling Prices Determination of Prices Enforcement CHAPTER VI : Conclusion APPENDIX I : APPENDIX I I : APPENDIX I I I : APPENDIX IV: APPENDIX V: APPENDIX V I : APPENDIX VII : INDEX 106 106 • Ill 114 114 115 115 116 116 117 117 119 121 122 124 127 128 131 135 137 138 143 145 145 148 149 155 157 164 171 General Administrative Policy Control of Supplies and Distribution Control of Demand Control of Prices Nutrition and Education Food Control and the War Economy Post War Implications Nutrition Production and Distribution Food Consumption in the United Kingdom Foodstuffs for Human Consumption in the United Kingdom. Chronology of Food Control 172 173 174 176 178 179 179 180 183 191 192 194 Development of Rationing 1. Retail Food Price Indices 2. Retail Prices of Food in the United Kingdom Commodities Controlled by Maximum Price Orders— 8 January 1942 Conclusions of the Report of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Food to examine the Cost of Milk Distribution (Perry Report), H.M.S.O., 1940 241 253 256 258 261 262 CHAPTER I THE PROBLEM OF FOOD CONTROL The welfare of the workers in wartime is affected by the organisation of food supply and distribution as much as by the organisation of industrial production and military activity, and the ability and desire of the people to stand the strain imposed upon them in wartime depends to a great extent on the quantity and kind of food available to them. The anarchic condition of food distribution in the closing years of the last war was one of the principal causes of growing industrial unrest, which finally forced the British Government to establish a wide measure of food control. 1 In peace-time the demand for food has been met by an extensive and complicated system of production and trade, created and run chiefly by the enterprise of individuals acting in their own interests. The possibilities of profit largely directed the activities of those engaged in the importation, production and distribution of foodstuffs. As a result of the experience of the last war it was realised even before the outbreak of the present war that in wartime this system based on private enterprise must give way to an organised system of production and distribution controlled by the Government. From the beginning of this war food controls have therefore been an accepted part of the British Government's wartime administration, and it is the purpose of this study to analyse the food production and distribution policy of that Government. No sufficiently large-scale investigations have yet been made to permit an analysis of the effects of the war upon the consumption of food by different groups of workers, although the Ministry of Food has examined the diets of several groups of children and is carrying out a survey of the diets of several thousand families. Results so far show no measurable decrease in physical well-being due to food shortages. The most important influence on the amount of food consumed by many workers is their money income, and 1 "The Ministry of Food was instituted in the third year of the war as a reluctant sacrifice on the altar of industrial unrest." Frank H. COLLER: A State Trading Adventure (Oxford University Press, 1925), p. 1. 2 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN over this the Minister of Food has no control, although by means of subsidisation and price control he can make these incomes worth more in terms of food than they would have been in the absence of controls. He can subsidise and control food prices and he can distribute some foods free, but these measures only go part of the way. His power is limited to seeing that there is food available for everyone to buy and that its price is "reasonable"; he cannot ensure that everyone is able to buy or will buy enough of the food thus provided to obtain a nutritionally adequate diet. DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS Before the war Great Britain depended on imports for a very large proportion of its food supplies. The submarine and air campaign has reduced the shipping capacity available for imports and the need for increased supplies of munitions and industrial raw materials has reduced the proportion of this capacity available for food imports. Furthermore nearly all nearby sources of supply are in enemy hands. There must therefore be a reduction in the total amount of food imported into Great Britain. Even in wartime "British farming like British economic life as a whole, has evolved on lines which assume the continuance of large-scale imports of agricultural products" 1 , and food and agricultural policy are determined by the capacity to import. 2 The increase of the population of England, Scotland and Wales from 41 million in 1913 to 46 million in 1938, the increase of per capita consumption of food3, the changes in the collection of foods consumed and the consequent change in agricultural production and the progressive cheapening of imports resulted in increasing imports of food for both men and livestock in this period. The total value of food, drink and tobacco imported for domestic consumption was £418 million in 19384, of which over £300 million was accounted for by imports of grain and flour, feedstuffs, meat, dairy products and fresh fruits and vegetables. Wheat, wheat meal and flour accounted for 58 per cent, of the imports of grain and flour, and maize, maize meal and other milled 1 Viscount ASTOR and B. Seebohm ROWNTREE : British Agriculture (London, 1938), p. 17. 1 See statement by the Minister of Food, in the House of Lords, 18 February 1941: "Not only the food policy of this country but the agricultural policy of the country must be governed and is in fact governed by our importing capacity". Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. 118, col. 351. * See Appendix I. 1 Imports of £430 million less exports of imported food, drink and tobacco of £12 million. (Figures from the Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom, 1939, Vol. II.) 3" THE fROBLEM Oí FOOD CONTROL TABLE 1. VALUB OP CERTAIN POOD IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1938 £ million Total grain and flour Dairy products Meat and animals (living) for food Fresh fruits and vegetables 74 80 100 38 Source: Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom (H.M. Stationery Office, 1939). products of maize for 27 per cent. The value of bacon was onethird of the total value of meat imports. Of the £80 million spent for imported dairy products, £51 million went for butter, £12 million for eggs in the shell and £10 million for cheese. The following table summarises the relative importance of imports and home production of the most important groups of food. These estimates are based on the results of a study made by the Market Supply Committee for 1934 and 1935 and have been revised in consultation with the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Agriculture. 1 "The chief elements of uncertainty in estimates of total food supplies are the allowances to be made for milk used on the farm, for eggs, fruit and vegetables produced in private gardens and on holdings of less than one acre, and for home grown food consumed in the farmers' household." 2 TABLE 2. FOODSTUFFS FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM {Average of the two years 1934 and 1935.) Commodity Per cent. home produced Total (000 tons) Per cent. imported 4,427 3,062 953 910 253 37 888 203 430 2,432 4,629 2,425 1,958 87 51 12 13 49 l 88» 1001 38 11 92 69 39 77 3 25 73 621 Flour from wheat and other cereals M e a t (including bacon) Fish (excluding freshwater fish). . Milk (million gallons) Milk, condensed and dried Cream Fats (butter, lard and margarine). Cheese Eggs Fruit Potatoes Other vegetables Sugar '. 89 l 81 31» 61' 23 97 75 27 1 Partly dependent on imported feeding-stuffs. * After allowing for herrings exported. produced fish means British takings landed by British vessels. Home Source: MINISTRY OF HEALTH ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUTRITION; First Report (H.M.S.O., 1937), p . 13. 1 See Appendix I I for the detailed figures. 1 M I N I S T R Y OF H E A L T H ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUTRITION : (H.M.S.O., 1937), p. 13. First Report 4 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN The invasion of the Scandinavian and Low Countries and the capitulation of France created a sudden and unexpected dislocation in food supplies. An important proportion of Britain's food imports came from enemy or enemy-occupied countries, and the loss of these nearby sources of supply added to the already excessive demand on shipping. In 1938 over one-half of the total imports of eggs in the shell came from Denmark and the Netherlands. Denmark alone sent half of the bacon and a quarter of the butter imports. A large part of the milk products and fresh fruits and vegetables came from European countries. Over half of the imports of lemons and limes was from Italy. A considerable part of the imports of salad greens came from the Netherlands, France and Italy, and broccoli and cauliflower from France and the Netherlands. Onions came primarily from the Netherlands, which also supplied 306,000 out of the total imports of 353,000 cwts. of carrots. The Channel and Canary Islands together supplied 2.5 million out of a total of 2.8 million cwts. of imported tomatoes in 1939.1 Over 75 per cent, of the imports of potassic fertilisers came from Germany, Alsace and Belgium. Imports from these areas, except the Canary Islands, are cut off by the war. The alternative sources of supply are much farther away and the demands on shipping space are correspondingly greater. The greater demands upon British shipping resulting from the loss of continental supplies could not at once be met. Shortages of many commodities—eggs, onions, bacon, cheese, fresh fruits and vegetables and potash fertilisers—became acute. Much of the confusion in agricultural policy in 1940 resulted chiefly from the fact that it was necessary to make radical and rapid changes to meet the new war conditions. Before the war our agricultural policy was based on two assumptions, both reasonable a t the time. One was t h a t France would remain our Ally and the other was t h a t modern methods newly developed would keep the submarine menace more or less within control. N o one could reasonably have been expected to foresee the conditions in which we actually found ourselves last June. I t was then clearly necessary to have a change of policy which would have a profound effect on agriculture. 8 Radical changes are difficult to make in agriculture, and rapid changes are almost impossible since most agricultural production must be planned at least a year ahead and should be planned in terms of cycles of production covering several years. 1 Figures from the Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom, 1939, Vol. I I . 2 Minister of Agriculture, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 3 April 1941, Vol. 370, cols. 1217-18. THE PROBLEM OF FOOD CONTROL 5 Shortly after the outbreak of war, controls over food imports were established. Practically all the imports of human and animal food are now purchased by the Ministry of Food. For some foods bulk contracts are made with oversea Governments or producers by the Ministry of Food. A large part of the imports of wheat, sugar, meat, bacon, dairy products, tea and cocoa is purchased in this manner. Other products—for example, oil seeds and nuts— are bought by agents of the Ministry of Food in the markets of the exporting countries. A small proportion of less important foods is still imported by private firms under Government regulations. Britain's food imports must make up the deficiency between domestic production and consumption needs in almost every category of domestic production and, in addition, provide certain foods, such as tea and oranges, that are not produced at all in the country. Emphasis was laid in the beginning upon acquiring large supplies of cereals, oil seeds, meat, bacon, tea and sugar, and later upon milk products and other "protective" foods. The Dominions send large quantities of meat, wheat, dairy products, eggs, fruit juices and canned and dried vegetables. The Ministry of Food has pointed out that although the "supplies of food likely to come from the United States under the Lease-Lend Act will constitute only some 5 per cent, or 6 per cent, of the United Kingdom's total consumption of food, home-grown and imported, their value is considerably greater than would appear from these figures. They include concentrated proteins such as cheese, canned milk, dried milk, eggs, canned fish and canned meat. In the case of some of these, e.g. canned milk, the supplies from the United States represent a very considerable proportion of our total supply. The supplies under the Lease-Lend Act are restoring the balance in the British diet; making it more varied; improving both wellbeing and morale and so sustaining the war effort." 1 As we shall see in the course of this study, plans for emergency feeding in Great Britain have suffered from the fact that stores of non-perishable foods rich in proteins and vitamins were inadequate. Canned foods are virtually the only non-perishable source of such foods, and British stocks of canned foods have been low. Canned fruit and vegetables are, of course, extremely bulky products to store. The Ministry of Food, considering it more economical to limit the varieties of fruit imported, has encouraged the importation of oranges because of their high vitamin C content but not of other fresh fruits. To conserve shipping space the Ministry of Food has requested that South American beef suppliers bone 50 per cent, of butcher's beef and 100 per cent, of manu1 MINISTRY OF FOOD: Press Notice, No. 1287, 10 September 1941. 6 tfOOD CONTROL ÍN ORE A t BRÍTAÍÑ factured beef before shipping it to the United Kingdom. 1 The supplies from the Dominions are boned to the capacity of the boning plants. The prices paid by the Ministry of Food for imports are not usually given. The Chancellor of the Exchequer on 9 April 1941 stated: " I can assure the Committee that the f.o.b. prices which the Ministry of Food is paying for its imported foodstuffs are generally very close to the pre-war level." 2 The c.i.f. prices are of course considerably higher, since shipping and insurance costs have risen. The total value of food, drink and tobacco imports has fallen, as can be seen from the following table: TABLE 3. FOOD, DRINK AND TOBACCO IMPORTS OP THE UNITED KINGDOM ( Values in millions of pounds) 1939 1 1940 i i Jan. 35.0 35.2 46.0 46.3 Feb. 30.2 33.9 37.9 41.0 Mar. 35.7 36.5 43.7 44.8 Apr. 30.3 33.3 42.1 46.2 May 33.6 33.9 39.8 40.1 June 36.1 37.2 35.5 36.7 July 32.9 34.3 30.2 31.4 Aug. 34.6 36.4 35.2 37.1 Sept. 23.0 23.2 29.2 29.5 Oct. 29.8 25.5 32.6 27.9 Nov. 38.6 34.4 26.7 23.8 Dec. 42.8 38.7 25.0 22.6 Normal seasonal change removed. Source: London and Cambridge Economic Service, February 1941. There was a marked decrease in the concluding months of 1940 associated with intensified submarine warfare. The higher values during the first half of 1940 were in part due to higher prices and in part to purchases of large stocks. 1 This has created some difficulties for Argentine shippers. The boned meat packs closer than the unboned meat and thus weighs more per cubic metre. As a result many ships designed to transport chilled and frozen unboned beef become overloaded, while there still remains considerable unfilled space. See editorial in The Times of Argentina, Buenos Aires, 31 March 1941. 2 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 Apr. 1941, Vol. 370, col. 1659. THE PROBLEM OP FOOD CONTROL 7 PRODUCTION OF FOOD The kinds of food produced at home in wartime are largely determined by the kinds of food that were produced before the war and by the limitations of soil and climate and productive factors. Because of the limited supplies of labour, capital equipment, fertilisers and feeding stuffs available for agricultural production it is important that the collection of foodstuffs to be produced should be determined by the nutritional value of each food in itself and in relation to the total food supply as well as by the cost in terms of labour, land, shipping space and capital equipment required for production. The problem of the Minister of Agriculture is twofold—to increase the total amount of food produced and to influence the character of production in line with the food policy enunciated by the Government. He must work through a large number of farmers over whom control is extremely difficult and who must be allowed considerable independence of action. The broad outlines of the work of the Ministry of Agriculture are sketched in chapter II. Costs of production as well as of imports have increased, and consequently the wartime food supply is more expensive than the peace-time supply. But the food problem is complicated not only by the fact that the food supply is smaller and more expensive but also by the fact that it is composed of a collection of commodities different from the pre-war collection, in which imported foods played a major part, and which was influenced more by demand than by nutritional needs. The total food supply in wartime is, therefore, determined partly by deliberate policy and partly by conditions over which the Government has little control. T H E DEMAND FOR FOOD Similarly, the demand for food is determined partly by the action taken by the food authorities and partly by circumstances over which they have no control. The Ministry of Food should know the nutritional needs of the people and should ensure that these needs are adequately met. 1 However, the demand for food is governed far more by income and taste than by nutritional needs. Taste must not be ignored in the formulation of food policy, since food is of doubtful value to anyone who will not eat it, but people's tastes can be modified by education and are influenced 1 " I t ' s my business to arrange what food is brought into this country and what food is grown in this country, in order to secure t h a t you'll eat those foods t h a t are health-giving. I t isn't my business to provide for your tastes so much as your necessities." Broadcast of the Minister of Food, 8 July 1940 in MINISTRY OF F O O D : Bulletin, No. 42. ' 8 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN by the foods available. 1 It is the effect of consumers' income on the demand for food that creates the most difficult problems of food control. The total purchasing power of consumers and the distribution of this purchasing power are outside the control of the Minister of Food but are the biggest factors in the demand for food. By a comprehensive system of rationing, however, the Minister of Food can control the total purchasing power for food. By price control, rationing and subsidies, he can modify the effects of the maldistribution of purchasing power. A really complete system of food control involves tremendous administrative problems, especially in obtaining control over demand, but it is now being approached in Great Britain. PRICES The reduced supply of food on the one hand, and the greater money incomes of the population as the result of higher wage rates and larger numbers of workers in industry on the other, result in a greater demand for food than the shopkeepers can meet unless food prices rise. Since the supplies of many commodities are reduced, their prices are raised, in the absence of adequate control, until they are so high that only a few people can afford to buy them. Between the producer or importer and the final consumer lies a complicated distributive network, and attempts to control food supplies will be ineffective unless control covers the distribution of food. If in wartime the supply of food is reduced, competition between food distributors can only result in a progressive increase of prices, since distributors are not only in competition with each other as sellers but also as buyers, and they will bid up the prices of the goods they buy in an effort to obtain a share of these goods. Price control therefore must be imposed not only on retail prices but on prices all along the line and competition must give way to co-operation under Government control. Some rise in food prices is justifiable when costs of production, importation and distribution increase, and in agriculture prices 1 See Sir John ORR and David LUBBOCK: Feeding the People in Wartime (London, 1940), Chapter 5: " I t is sometimes asserted t h a t food habits are so rigid t h a t it is almost impossible to get people to change their diet. Although it is true t h a t people tend to continue to eat the kind of food to which they have been accustomed, their dietary habits do change. This is proved by the remarkable change in the national dietary of Great Britain in recent years. As a matter of fact, food habits are determined not so much by likes and dislikes as by the kind of food available. The differences in the kind of diet in different classes in civilised countries are not so much correlated with likes and dislikes as with purchasing power. "The two factors which effect a change in diet are price and propaganda. Price is the more effective among the poorer half of the population. Propaganda is more effective among the wealthier half." (P. 36, author's italics.) THB PROBLEM OF FOOD CONTROL 9 are frequently used as an incentive to producers—they are raised above the level necessary to cover costs plus a reasonable profit in order to encourage producers to expand output. On the other hand, they may be lowered to discourage production. In manufacturing it is more effective and less expensive to eliminate the "incentive" function of prices and to set them at levels which cover costs including profit for the quantity of goods desired and to turn the manufacturer's production into the desired channels by directly controlling raw materials, transport, and the labour supply. If the Government wishes to keep prices below the cost of production some form of subsidisation is obviously necessary. But if food prices rise higher than is justified by the increased costs, some groups in the community are making excessive profits, while other groups are unable to purchase the necessaries of life. High profits as an inducement to increase supply are not only ineffective but are socially undesirable in wartime. It is clear, moreover, that if high prices are set for what is wanted, and low prices for what is not wanted, the reaction of the consumer will be in the opposite direction to that which the Government desires, since high prices discourage demand and low prices encourage demand. This is an additional reason for avoiding the manipulation of prices to regulate supply and relying as far as possible on "direct" controls—rationing of raw materials, etc. Furthermore, it is not desirable that increased prices should be widely used to discourage demand, especially for commodities consumed by all income groups. For this purpose techniques of rationing have been developed. If supplies are controlled rationing is not always necessary to enforce maximum prices but it is necessary to prevent queues if supplies are very short. Yet no matter how widespread rationing is, it will not ensure equitable distribution among all income groups unless prices are low enough to enable everyone to buy his ration. Prices of goods, especially of rationed goods, should therefore be related to the purchasing power of the lowest income groups. If costs of production, importation or distribution rise, the remuneration to the producers must be raised to cover them, but it is not always desirable that prices to the consumer should be raised in proportion to the increased costs. Prices may therefore be set in accordance with the low-income consumer's "ability to pay", while taxes are set in accordance with the higherincome taxpayer's "ability to pay". If a food is subsidised, however, it is important that it should be subsidised enough to bring the price within the reach of the lower income groups. If the subsidy is not sufficient to accomplish this purpose it is a waste of public funds—better to double the subsidy if necessary or drop it entirely. 10 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Demand for any commodity is not, however, a function only of the price of that commodity and of the consumers' incomes; it is also a function of the prices of other commodities. If a larger proportion of the consumer's income must be spent for some other commodity than food, the total demand for food will be decreased and the prices of food will accordingly be affected. Similarly, if more of a consumer's income must be spent for any particular food, the demand for other foods will be decreased, unless the consumer's income increases, and with it the total amount spent for food. Whether consumers will spend more or less of their incomes on any food when its price rises depends on the elasticity of demand for that food, which is in turn affected by the prices of substitute foods. Therefore the price of any food bears a close relation to the prices of other foods so that a rise in price of one food may lead to a greater demand for and a consequent rise in the prices of other foods. In this way a general rise of food prices can result from the shortage of only a few foods. One of the chief duties of the food authorities in wartime is to protect the interests of consumers and of those distributors whose competitive power is weak under the changed conditions, and to safeguard the economic organisation of the country in general by preventing food prices from rising to unjustified heights. The simple solution of making illegal and subject to drastic penalties the selling of food at prices above those specified as reasonable is no solution at all if the demand is much greater than the supply. It results in a disorganised rush on the part of consumers for the available supplies, in queues and in injustice to those who, because of their occupation or other reasons, are unable to be among the early arrivals in the market. The shopping population is increased, adding to the problems of the retailer since it is sometimes necessary for purchasers to visit the shops two or three times a day to obtain the supplies they want. The imposition of price control without rationing or control of distribution frequently results in the apparent disappearance of the food concerned from the market. This occurs for three reasons —the food may be bought up close to the source of supply and therefore never reach the more distant markets; it may be bought by catering establishments and other institutions whose selling price is not controlled and who can therefore pay the maximum retail price unless they are required to buy wholesale and subject to wholesale price restrictions; or it may be bought by those consumers who reach the market first, and the food then disappears early in the day. Furthermore, evasion of the legal price is extremely profitable and difficult to control and innumerable ingenious THE PROBLEM OF FOOD CONTROL 11 methods of evading the letter or spirit of the regulations are discovered by retailers and wholesalers. To meet their customers' demands, retailers will sometimes pay high prices for some foods which they sell at a loss, making up the loss by raising their margins on other foods. There are only two ways of meeting this problem: increasing supply or decreasing demand. 1 If the first is not adequate, as it frequently is not in wartime, the second must be resorted to. In addition to general measures of controlling incomes, the Government can effectively control the demand for food only by rationing the consumer—by requiring that the consumer possess specific authorisation to buy the rationed food. Rationing of some foods is likely to "increase the scarcity of the non-rationed foods and itself create the necessity of extending rationing to other foods because those consumers who can afford to supplement their rations with non-rationed substitutes will do so. If the ration of any particular food is very small, this tendency on the part of the well-to-do consumers will increase the demand for some nonrationed foods, increasing the shortage relative to demand, sending up the price and making rationing of these foods necessary. EDUCATION OF CONSUMERS Not the least of the duties of the Ministry of Food is the education of the consumer. Not only is this important in order that consumers shall make better use of food to meet their nutritional requirements than they did in peace-time but also that they shall know the general food policy of the country, what foods are most abundant and how best to prepare available foods—especially those that they perhaps had not used much in peace-time. In addition, it is necessary to inform consumers what they must do in order to obtain their share of the food supply, for example in regard to rationing procedure. Early in the war the "Kitchen Front" was created and the Minister of Food launched a big campaign to "mobilise" women on this "front". Newspapers, posters, booklets, broadcasts, films, exhibitions, demonstrations, travelling vans, classes and lectures are used as mediums for propaganda and education. Every morning 1 " D e m a n d " as used in this study means effective demand, which is defined as demand backed by purchasing power. In wartime the power to purchase any commodity a t a given price may be limited not only by the consumer's income but also by the necessity of possessing a specific authorisation to purchase it. Thus purchasing power and hence effective demand may be reduced by nonmonetary means—i.e., rationing. 12 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN after the 8 o'clock news, the B.B.C, devotes a few minutes to food problems, recipes and advice. In August 1940, a weekly newspaper advertisement of the Ministry of Food called Food Facts was started, designed to instruct housewives about food policy and food preparation. Approximately £570,000 was spent by the Ministry on advertisements of various kinds from October 1939 to 31 August 1941. Food Advice Centres have been established in various parts of the country. Officers of the Public Relations Division are sent out to the different centres to give advice and to collect information about the people's difficulties. These centres are not only valuable education centres but also provide the Ministry of Food with a direct means of obtaining suggestions from the consumer and information about his difficulties. Food selection and food preparation receive the most emphasis in the Ministry's propaganda. Diet charts have been prepared and housewives are instructed regarding the functions of different classes of foods, the elements of a balanced diet, the special needs of children and how these needs can be met with the foods available. The public Relations Division of the Ministry of Food also checks recipes submitted by women's magazines and editors of the women's pages in newspapers and periodicals to see that they do not recommend the use of foods in short supply. The Board of Education issues a series of pamphlets called Food Education Memos, which give recipes and ways of preparing food to the best advantage. The Ministry of Food's demonstrations, exhibitions and films are largely devoted to instruction regarding food preparation. The nutritional importance of proper cooking has never been adequately emphasised in Great Britain, and wartime propaganda has heavy arrears to make up. One of the most important functions of the Ministry of Food's propaganda is the education of the consumer in the economics of food control—especially regarding the difficulties that arise from rationing and price control. Unless the consumer understands why foods tend to become scarce when maximum prices are imposed (apparently a most difficult thing to explain to the satisfaction of consumers) and why all foods cannot be rationed, the Ministry will have to meet a considerable body of hostile opinion among consumers, whose co-operation it needs. Hostility to food control, even though it arises from a misunderstanding, leads to attempts to evade food regulations, while the belief that control is adequate, equitable and properly administered will make administration immeasurably easier. THE PROBLEM OF FOOD CONTROL 13 T H E ORGANISATION OF FOOD ADMINISTRATION The task of ensuring adequate supplies of food to the people of the United Kingdom is in the hands of the Ministers of Food and Agriculture. 1 The former controls food imports and food distribution and the latter is concerned with the production of food within the United Kingdom. In theory, the Minister of Food advises the Minister of Agriculture as to what foods should be produced and the Minister of Agriculture is responsible for the production of these foods up to the point at which the produce leaves the farm; the Minister of Food is responsible for its distribution. In practice, however, co-operation between the two Ministries is hampered by the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture is primarily concerned with demands of the farmers, and the Ministry of Food with the demands of distributors and consumers; and the interests of the groups frequently conflict. It is not necessary for the purposes of this study to describe in detail the internal organisation of the Ministry of Food, but a general picture of the functioning of this organisation will facilitate an understanding of the working of the various food controls. In December 1936 the Government established a Food (Defence Plans) Department inside the Board of Trade to study the food situation of the United Kingdom in the event of war. Shortly after the outbreak of war a separate Ministry of Food was established on the nucleus of this department and the reserves of essential foods accumulated in 1938 and 1939 under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Reserves Act of 1938 were transferred to the Ministry of Food. The administration of food control is characterised by a considerable degree of decentralisation. Divisional Food Officers are appointed for large areas corresponding to the regions of the Special Commissioners under the General Government Plan. Each Divisional Food Officer is responsible for the supervision of every branch of the Ministry's activities in his Division. In emergencies the Divisional Officer can assume full responsiblity for the food organisation in his Division. In addition there are area commodity officers for each major food. The boundaries of the commodity areas vary with the commodity concerned and overlap the divisional food areas. The co-ordination of the work of these two groups of officers has been a difficult administrative problem in Great Britain. There are also local Food Control Committees appointed in the area of every local authority 2 , responsible for 1 The Secretary of State for Scotland is responsible for administering agricultural policy in Scotland but works with the Ministry of Agriculture. 1 Two or more areas may combine to form a joint food control committee. 14 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN supervising the arrangements for retail distribution, the local administration of the rationing schemes, the licensing of retailers and for generally safeguarding the interests of local consumers. They are composed of fifteen members, of whom two must be women, one a labour representative 1 , and five "trade members", one representing retail grocers, one retail butchers, one retail co-operative societies, and two representing other retail trades. Most of the work of each committee is done by its Food Executive Officer who is the active and responsible person in charge. Food Executive Officers work with the Divisional Food Officers rather than with the headquarters of the Ministry of Food in order to minimise administrative delays. An Inspector General of the Ministry's divisional organisation has the duty of inspecting the work of all branches of the Ministry in the country and of ascertaining how the different branches maintain liaison with each other and with headquarters. There are in addition to the administrative organisation numerous advisory committees to the Ministry. Special relations with the workers are maintained through a Trades Union Congress Committee of five persons, which advises the Minister and may originate proposals. This Committee has made proposals on such questions as extra rations for heavy workers, the sugar ration for fruit preserving and price controls over specific commodities. In June 1940 a Scientific Food Committee was appointed by the Lord Privy Seal, as Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Food Policy, to "consider and advise upon problems of national food requirements and of home food production with special regard to the shipping and foreign exchange likely to be available for imports of food and animal feeding stuffs and the labour and other resources likely to be available for home production". This Committee has paid particular attention to the working out of a minimum diet required for maintaining health and energy under war conditions. There is no general consumers' advisory council attached to the Ministry of Food to-day as there was in the last war. The Consumers' Council of 1918 was a purely advisory body but its advice was given serious consideration by the food control authorities. The Ministry of Food to-day considers itself sufficiently able to look after the interests of consumers 2 , and in practice the Public Relations Division of the Ministry is particularly con1 "The Trade Union Movement is represented . . . in each Local Food Control Committee in areas where a Trades Council or other sufficiently representative local Trade Union organisation exists, and has informed us of a desire for representation." Sir Walter CITRINE: The T.U.C, in Wartime, May 1941, p. 15. 1 See below, p. 83, note 3. THB PROBLEM OP POOD CONTROL 15 cerned with consumers' complaints and keeps a close watch on consumers' reactions to the controls. The administration of agricultural policy is similarly decentralised. Under the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, the Minister of Agriculture is given wide powers of control over agriculture. He can, for example, prevent agricultural land from being used for purposes other than agriculture (except defence); he can regulate the cultivation, management and use of agricultural land, and if his orders are not followed or if the land is not cultivated according to the rules of good husbandry, he can, if the land is held by a tenant, proceed to terminate the tenancy and, if necessary, he may take possession of any land. On 1 September 1939, the Minister of Agriculture delegated much of his power to the County War Agricultural Executive Committees 1 , and they can, on their own initiative, exercise extensive authority over farmers. Before the outbreak of war plans had been made for the creation of these Committees, which met for the first time on 25 August 1939. The members of the Committees serve voluntarily. They act as the agents of the Minister of Agriculture in the local administration of agricultural policy and are responsible for the execution of his orders. 2 There is therefore a considerable degree of local autonomy in agricultural administration. Instructions to the local committees are usually in very general terms, and they are allowed considerable discretion in applying them to local conditions. The Agricultural Executive Committees work through a large number of District Committees, also composed of people rendering voluntary services. About 4,000 persons are serving on these various committees. The county and district committees are assisted by staffs of experts drawn from the educational and advisory services of the Ministry, from the universities, from commercial firms and from the ranks of farmers and land agents. Liaison between the local organisations and the Ministry is maintained through the county land commissioners, through the labour advisory officers, and veterinary and livestock officers, and through specially appointed personal liaison officers. These officers keep the county committees informed of general policy and keep the central Ministry in touch with the progress of production and the problems that arise in the various counties, and they advise the Ministry on general problems of agriculture. 1 Hereafter referred to as the Agricultural Executive Committees. * "Their function is to organise food production in the light of the general principles and orders issued from Whitehall; and as a counterpart it is their duty to inform me through various channels of the difficulties which they encounter in carrying out their tasks." Statement of the Minister of Agriculture, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1941, Vol. 376, col. 421. 16 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN The Development of Food Control The first food control order was the Acquisition of Food (Excessive Quantities) Order, made just before the outbreak of war, which made it an offence for consumers to acquire more than one week's supply of food. This remained the only restriction on consumer demand until the introduction of rationing on 8 January 1940. During 1940 one product after another came under some form of control. Licensing of traders, prescribing of maximum prices, rationing and controls over farm products were extended but were for the most part confined to "essential" foods. The free and cheap milk scheme—one of the most important social measures adopted in Great Britain during the war—was started in July 1940. Comprehensive control over all classes of foods did not make real headway until the beginning of 1941, but during that year food control made great strides. In January 1941 the prices of some 30 foods or classes of food previously uncontrolled were restricted to the level prevailing on 2 December 1940, and subsequently most of them, and a few more, were made subject to prescribed maximum prices. The end of 1940 saw also the beginning of the most rapid development of the communal feeding campaign as a social rather than as an emergency measure. In August 1941 orders preparing the way for the extension of an almost universal system of licensing food traders at all stages of distribution were issued. In 1941 also rationing was extended to some of the "less essential foods"—preserves, dried fruits, cereals and canned goods—and consumer registration and priorities were instituted for milk and eggs. The year 1942 promises to be one in which ' the controls over the mechanism of distribution will be increasingly tightened and in which drastic reorganisation of the channels of distribution will take place in order to economise transport and release labour. A far-reaching reorganisation of transport is the chief measure already announced to come into effect and additional steps have been taken to suppress more effectively illegal trading. There still remains much to be done to improve food distribution but the foundations are laid and the outlines are clear. From now on, food control will be extended to fill in gaps and add relatively minor extensions to the existing framework to bring distribution processes and food' prices more completely into line with the needs of consumers and the general war effort. CHAPTER II AGRICULTURAL POLICY T H E CHANGING CHARACTER OF AGRICULTURE SINCE 1914 British agriculture was in some respects in a less favourable position to supply the food needs of the nation at the outbreak of the present war than it was at the outbreak of war in 1914. But the war of 1914-1918 had disclosed the vulnerability of Britain's food supplies in a modern war and consequently Government plans were more developed and Government controls more quickly adopted in 1939 than they were in 1914. Offsetting this advantage is the fact that the submarine has been a menace from the beginning of the present war, although the assistance of the United States fleet came more quickly than it did in the last war. Since 1890 the area under cultivation in Great Britain has been declining as imported foods have become cheaper and industrial employment has become more profitable for the British worker. Between 1891 and 1913 about 45,000 acres per annum went out of cultivation in Great Britain, of which about half went into rough grazing. Since 1913 about 100,000 acres annually have gone out of cultivation, of which a little over half has gone to rough grazing. I t is not clear from the inadequate statistics available whether there has been a great increase in yield per acre over the period, in spite of many new developments. A smaller quantity of labour as well as a smaller quantity of land is devoted to agricultural production to-day than before the war of 19141, and, as can be seen from table 4,. the proportion of the occupied population engaged in agriculture as well at the number of workers on holdings over one acre has declined. The steady reduction in the agricultural labour force took place in spite of the fact that wage rates almost doubled. The average wage rate of ordinary male labourers in agriculture rose from 18s. a week in 1914 to 34s. 7d. in 19382—an increase of 1 ! Viscount ASTOR and B. Scebohm ROWNTREE: op. cit., p. 43. As computed by the Ministry of Agriculture; includes the value of certain allowances in kind. Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom, 1927 and 1940. 18 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN 92 per cent. Heavier "labour costs have forced farmers to employ more mechanised equipment on their farms and to reduce production of those crops requiring much labour in relation to the value of the crop—for example, animal feeding stuffs such as peas, beans, turnips, swedes and mangolds. TABLE 4. PERSONS ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE IN GREAT BRITAIN Year Total number aged 10 and upwards Per cent, of occupied population 1911 1921 1931 1,429,000 1,307,000 1,194,000 7.8 6.8 5.7 Males Per cent, of total occupied male population 1911 1921 1931 1,301,000 1,198,000 1,120,000 Total number of workers employed on holdings of more than one acre 1 996,081 829,073 Males 10.0 8.8 7.6 836,968 711,073 1 Includes casual labour. Source: Statistical Abstract of the United Kingdom, 1940 and 1934. Fewer young men were entering agriculture in this period and consequently there was a larger proportion of older workers in 1938 than in 1911. The number of regular male workers under 21 years of age engaged on agricultural holdings of more than one acre in Great Britain declined by 32.3 per cent, between 1925 and 1938, while the number 21 years of age and over declined by only 12.4 per cent. 1 The progressive cheapening of imports and the changing demand of the people of Great Britain as a consequence of increasing industrialisation and the higher level of income accompanying it have forced the British farmer to increase his production of milk, eggs, vegetables and fruits at the expense of cereals, root crops and cheaper meats. Market vegetable growing and dairy farming have become of greater importance in British agriculture. The dairy industry is, however, essentially a processing industry and requires a large supply of raw material .in the form of feedstuffs. Not only must livestock be supplied with food in both winter and 1 Calculated from data given in t h e Statistical Abstract of the United 1924 to 1938. Kingdom, AGRICULTURAL POLICY 19 summer but they must also be given a balanced diet. Home-grown grass provides summer feed, but winter feeds—cereals, roots, silage, oil cakes—are more expensive to produce. The bulky winter feed is grown at home, but most of the oil cake, grains and cereals necessary for winter feed and for a properly balanced diet are imported. TABLB 5. ACREAGB UNDBR CULTIVATION BY CROPS IN GREAT BRITAIN (Thousands) Crop Wheat Other corn 1 Turnips and swedes. Mangolds 1913 1919 1926 1932 1938 1,756 2,301 1,646 1,340 1,923 5,166 6,070 4,579 3,904 3,471 1,486 1,410 1,158 929 746 421 399 340 231 218 130 256 336 610 4 Sugar beet 591 630 641 653 3,970 3,662 3,987 3,922 3,361 245 234 242 248 253 Total arable 14,360 15,717 13,742 12,413 11,861 Permanent grass. 17,567 15,782 16,627 17,416 17,410 Total cultivated. 31,927 31,499 30,369 29,828 29,271 Potatoes Rotation grasses. .. . Orchards Rough grazing (England and Wales) 1 5,615 Includes barley, oats, mixed corn, rye, and beans and peas for stock feeding. Source: MINISTRY OP AGRICULTURB AND FISHERIES: Agricultural Statistics. Since 1871-5 the area under permanent grass has increased by almost 35 per cent, in Great Britain, while arable acreage has decreased by 40 per cent, in England and Wales and by 17 per cent, in Scotland. Sir Daniel Hall writes that "the total loss, human and cattle food together, may be estimated at something in the order of 20 per cent". 1 An analysis of the acreage under each of the field crops reveals that the only significant increases occurred in the acreage under wheat and sugar beets. In both cases increase was the result of Government assistance. The wheat acreage began increasing in 1932 and 1933 as a result of the Wheat 1 Sir A. Daniel H A I L : Reconstruction and the Land (London, 1941), p. 92. 20 FOOD CONTROL, I N GREAT B R I T A I N Act of 1931, which guaranteed prices to the wheat farmers. The production of sugar beets was subsidised by the Government beginning in 1924, and the acreage expanded from 22,000 acres in 1924 to 56,000 in 1925 and 130,000 in 1926. As shown in table 5, it reached 336,000 in 1938. On the other hand, acreage under certain vegetables has tended to increase in recent years. Although these crops require considerable labour per unit of area, their value per acre is high and they fit well into mixed farming. TABLE 6. ACREAGB UNDER CERTAIN FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, ENGLAND AND WALES Crop 1913 1929 1933 1938 10,018 10,269 12.868 15,517 3,966 2,448 1,941 1,693 26,715 35,890 41,280 13,863 20,695 19,876 32,352 33,101 43,207 5,297 5,614 7,348 6,450 6,457 7,192 8,175 7,218 Cabbage (for human consump- Source: Agricultural Statistics. Acreage under all these crops has increased in the last ten years with the exception of onions, which require a larger amount of labour, are more subject to import competition, were not protected by import duties 1 and are not so perishable as most of the others. Acreage under these crops fluctuates from year to year since they are in many cases marginal crops in a mixed farming system and sowing is sensitive to market anticipations. Although the numbers of livestock have increased, the production of fodder crops other than hay and grass has declined since costs of production have risen steadily, while the cost of imported feeds has decreased. Fodder production has also been affected by changes in the system of rotation so that the proportion of rotation grasses to the total crops has increased, while that of roots and cereals has declined. Feed produced on grass lands and imported feed have tended to become cheaper than feed produced on arable land in Great Britain, and consequently Great 1 Carrots and broccoli and cauliflowers were subject to specific import duties before the war. AGRICULTURAL POUCY 21 Britain grows only about half of the food other than fresh grass consumed by the livestock of the country. The total numbers of livestock in Great Britain have increased since the last war, especially the dairy herds and poultry flocks. The number of fowls is understated in table 7 as it omits fowls on holdings of less than one acre. TABLB 7. NUMBBR OP LIVESTOCK IN GRBAT BRITAIN (Thousands) Kind 1913 1933 193S 3,166 3,439 3,576 4,269 4,024 4,475 4,454 23,931 23,661 25,901 25,882 2,509 3,236 3,822 52,283 73,835 64,053 Cows and heifers in milk or in calf 2,695 Other cattle. Sheep 2,234 Pigs Poultry 1929 1 35,229 s 1 On holdings exceeding one acre. In addition there are substantial numbers on smaller holdings, private gardens and backyards, estimated for England and Wales in 1930 to be about 27 per cent. of those covered by the annual returns. • 1908, from Sir A. Daniel HAU.: op. cit., p. 104. Source: Agricultural Statistics, 1913 and 1938. In spite of the decline in area shown in table 5 between 1908 and 1936, gross agricultural output, as estimated by the Ministry of Agriculture, increased 22 per cent. The estimated value of gross output in England and Wales for 1937-38 was £224,220,000, of which nearly 70 per cent, was attributed to livestock products, chiefly milk and dairy products. Since this figure represents the gross value of output, the large quantities of imported feedstuffs and store stock must be deducted to obtain the net value of British agriculture, which is therefore considerably less—how much less is uncertain. Agriculture has, furthermore, received substantial subsidies from the State. Wheat and cattle payments alone amounted tö £4,610,000 in 1937-38 in England and Wales—£2,820,000 to cattle and £1,790,000 to wheat. 1 Sir Daniel Hall points out that subsidies, direct or indirect, amounted before the war to 20s. to 30s. per acre of cultivated land—an average grant of £100 a year to all farmers "or, since small-holders receive little of the assistance, to upwards of £200 a year to all holdings above 50 acres". 2 He estimates that the annual output of British agriculture could have been obtained in the world market at £60 million less cost to consumers. 8 1 Agricultural Statistics, 1939, p. 63. » Op. cit., p. 135. « Ibid., p. 88. 22 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN Imported raw materials for agriculture attain added importance in wartime. Feeding stuffs are the most important as we have seen—especially protein feedstuffs for winter feeding. I t is difficult to estimate the amount imported before the war, since feedstuffs are derived from various sources not appearing separately in the statistics, for example offals from imported wheat and residues of oilseeds imported for the manufacture of human food and for industrial purposes. The effect on British agriculture of a reduction in the supplies of imported feedstuffs as a result of the war is serious, as we shall see below, and the effort to increase domestic production is a major part of wartime agricultural policy. British agriculture also uses large amounts of imported fertilisers, and much of the domestically manufactured fertiliser is produced from imported raw materials. The census of industrial production for 1935, the last year for which details of home production of fertiliser are available, gave the following figures: TABLE 8. PRODUCTION OP FERTILISERS, EXCLUDING LIME AND CHALK, IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1935 {Thousand tons) Sulphate of ammonia 430 Other nitrogenous fertilisers 92 Basic slag 320 Superphosphate 447 Compound manures 509 Bone meal 28 Total 1,826 Source: AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RBSBARCH INSTITUTS: Agricultural Register, 1938-39, pp. 234-5. I t was estimated by the Agricultural Economics Research Institute at Oxford that the total available supplies of fertilisers in 1938, excluding lime, were about two million tons, of which 33 per cent, was imported—around 678,000 tons. 1 All potassic fertilisers were imported, almost entirely from Germany and France. Since the last war potash production has been developed in the United States, the Soviet Union, Poland, Spain and Palestine. Spain and Palestine still supply small amounts to Great Britain, which accumulated considerable stocks before the war under the Essential Commodities Reserves Act. 2 The United States pro1 Agricultural Register, 1938-39. * Manchester Guardian, 19 M a y 1941. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 23 auction is large and has been substantially increased so that it can meet some of the needs of Great Britain. In a long war, however, there may be some difficulty in obtaining sufficient potash to meet the needs of British agriculture. In the last war the same difficulty arose, and it is stated that "the harvest of 1913 must have been prejudiced by a deficiency of potash. I t was remarked after harvest that some of the grain crops did not thresh out in accordance with expectations. Experiences of this sort are of a kind that might be expected to result from ill-balanced manuring." 1 Potash is particularly important for such crops as potatoes, sugar beets, mangolds and market garden crops, especially peas and beans. Since the war of 1914-1918 there has been a striking increase in the amount of potassic fertilisers used in Great Britain. As shown in table 9, the total quantity consumed has tripled and the amount per acre has increased slightly over four times. TABUS 9. CONSUMPTION OF POTASSIC FERTILISERS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND (in terms of K2O.) 1913 Tons of K 2 0 used K2O per acre of arable land 23,400 2.7 lbs. 1927-8 41,860 5.8 lbs. 1938 75,000 11.6 lbs. Source: Figures taken from an article by Sir E. J. Russau., Director of the Rothamsted Experimental Station. "On Economising Potash'*, in Agriculture, Journal of the Ministry of Agriculture, September 1940, p. 109. One of the quantitatively most important fertilisers manufactured in Great Britain is superphosphate of lime. The raw material for superphosphate is imported in the form of mineral phosphate of lime, of which 410,454 tons were imported in 1938. Over half of the imports of mineral phosphate of lime came from Tunis and over one-fourth from Algeria and Egypt. The United States is a large producer and "in 1941 shipped some 50,000 tons of triple superphosphate under the Lend-Lease arrangement. In 1942 it will probably triple this figure. Phosphorus is also obtained in basic slag, a by-product of the Bessemer steel and open hearth processes. It is a low grade fertiliser, but as can be seen from table 8 is produced in a considerable quantity. The most important nitrogenous fertiliser is sulphate of ammonia, which is obtained as a by-product of the coke industry or by combining sulphuric acid with ammonia (NH 3 ) obtained by a process of nitrogen fixation from the air, and sufficient quantities are domestically produced. 1 T. H. MIDDLETON: Food Production in War (Oxford, 1923), p. 229. 24 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN WARTIME POLICY The war has cut deeply into Britain's power to import food and, since imports of feeding stuffs and fertilisers are needed for domestic agricultural production, it has also diminished the capacity to produce food. This does not mean, however, that the United Kingdom is unable to increase the total quantity of food produced. On the contrary, it can be increased greatly, for there was a large amount of unused land available for agricultural production before the war. Much of this can now be turned to producing food, but there will inevitably be many changes in the kinds of food produced, and the increased scarcity of both imported and domestic resources, because of the transport problem and the demands of other industries on the nation's resources, make it important that a carefully planned agricultural policy should be devised to use the resources that remain for agricultural production to the best advantage. British agricultural policy is concerned with obtaining increased amounts of food from the land first by bringing grass and derelict land into cultivation and second by increasing the productivity of existing cultivated land. In addition, it is concerned with influencing the collection of human and animal foods produced on the land and with the allocation of animal feedstuffs among the different kinds of livestock. The two outstanding results of British agricultural policy are the vast extension of land under the plough and the livestock policy which emphasises the production of milk and feeding stuffs. Although the plough is the most outstanding factor in the Ministry's policy for increasing production, efforts are made to increase labour supplies, extend mechanisation and drainage, distribute fertilisers, eliminate pests of various sorts, improve the treatment of diseases and extend information and educational facilities. Credit is also advanced to the farmers, although this aspect of policy is relatively unimportant. The livestock policy dominates the planning of agricultural output. The production of feedstuffs and "dual purpose" crops, the emphasis put on increased milk production and the reduction in the numbers of beef cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry are the keynotes of agricultural policy. Increase of Domestic Production Plough Policy. One of the most obvious ways of increasing domestic production of food is to put the plough to grassland, since in most cases more food for men and animals can be produced per acre on arable AGRICULTURAL POLICY 25 than on grassland. One of the sharpest controversies in Great Britain during the last war raged around the "plough or not plough" issue, and the relative advantages of grass and tillage were hotly discussed. During the war some three million acres of grassland were ploughed up in the United Kingdom. These three million acres, and nearly two million more, had gone back to grass or other uses by 1938. Even before the outbreak of war in 1939 the Minister of Agriculture called for an increase in the land under plough. A subsidy of £2 per acre was granted by the Government after the beginning of the war, for the ploughing up of seven-year grassland and bringing it into cleanliness and fertility. A quota of 1,500,000 acres of grassland to be brought under the plough in the 1939-40 season was set for England and Wales, and by 15 May 1940, 1,542,336 acres of grassland had already been ploughed 1 —over two million acres in the whole of the United Kingdom. In this first year the selection of the land ploughed was determined by the local committees but each farmer had to plough up part of his land. This led in some cases to the ploughing of land that would have been better left unploughed. New land should not be brought under the plough if a greater total production can be obtained by using the available supplies of labour, machinery and fertiliser to increase the productivity of existing arable land than by using part of them on existing arable and part on newly ploughed land. Since, for this reason, it is impracticable to plough up all available land in the United Kingdom, it is obviously of great importance that the land actually ploughed should be carefully selected. A detailed farm survey was made to furnish the basis for the selective plough policy and to facilitate the planning of agricultural production generally. On the basis of the farm survey results each county committee was asked to make an estimate of the land available for ploughing in the county. These estimates were studied by the Ministry of Agriculture and each county was given a minimum quota of acreage to be ploughed. The Minister of Agriculture stated in the House of Commons on 3 April 1941 that an additional 3,750,000 acres would be under crops during the spring, raising the percentage of the cultivated area under crops, which stood at 29 per cent, in September 1939, to 42 per cent., and in November he was able to state that "the total area under crops, as a result of the new ploughing up, was 45 per cent, above the peace-time figure".2 There are at present 1 Each farmer was expected to plough an area roughly equal to 10 per cent. of his unploughed land. * Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1941, Vol. 376, col. 415. 26 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN about 16,000,000 acres in cultivation. At the same time the Minister stated that the plough-up programme was substantially completed. He called for additional acreage in 1942 to bring the area under the plough to 50 per cent, above the peace-time figure, and he added: "After this year I do not think that we can contemplate any substantial increase of our arable land, having regard to the existing supplies of labour, machinery and fertilisers". 1 Besides promoting the large-scale ploughing up of land, the Ministry of Agriculture has taken measures to encourage the growing of food by the non-agricultural population on small plots of land called allotments. Allotments and kitchen gardens are important sources of fresh vegetables and use much land that would otherwise be lost to food production. In September 1939 the Minister asked for half a million new allotments and in September 1940 he asked for an additional three million. A grant of £2 an acre is made to enable the local authorities to use for allotments land acquired by them for other purposes. The Agricultural Executive Committees have also the power to take over and cultivate derelict land. In the larger towns horticultural advisory committees are established by local authorities to assist allotment holders. Instruction is given in the growing of vegetables and in many towns professional gardeners are available for advice on the problems of the allotment holders. The various gardens and allotments committees have developed programmes for organising allotment production in the whole country. They assist in the acquisition of land for allotments, help the allotment holder to acquire and use seeds and fertiliser, spread information and encourage advisory services. Although after the last war the number of allotment holders in England and Wales reached 1,300,000, it had dropped heavily by the beginning of this war. From the outbreak of war to 15 April 1941 the estimated number of allotments had risen by 541,000 and at the present time has reached 1,500,000. Land Productivity and Farming Efficiency. The ploughing campaign is only one aspect of the general campaign to increase domestic production. It is equally important that the quality of the remaining grassland should be improved, the productivity of existing arable land increased and the standard of farming efficiency raised. The first two of these depend to a large extent on the success of measures taken to improve the fertility of the soil. Most of these measures are now well under way although they were late in getting started. Farmers are encouraged to drain 1 Ibid, col. 418. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 27 their land and restore or improve existing drainage - systems. Over £2,500,000 has already been spent since the beginning of the war on drainage schemes which have benefited nearly 2,000,000 acres of land. 1 Grants are made for the improvement of minor arterial watercourses 2 for field drainage, for the improvement of upland farms by connecting these with water supplies, and for other minor drainage works. Government advances covering the whole cost of some drainage works are made to the local drainage authorities, 50 per cent, of which is regarded as an outright grant and the remainder recoverable over a period of five years from the district drainage board. -The Government can recover its expenses in carrying out drainage work from the landowners or from the drainage boards, but it does not propose to attempt to recover more than 50 per cent, of the cost from the owners.8 In the autumn of 1940 it was decided that the Ministry of Agriculture should itself buy excavating and ditching machinery for the Agricultural Executive Committees to hire to farmers, and by 7 October 1941 some £250,000 of new drainage machinery was already in use with more on order. In Scottish hill pastures much land is lost to grazing because of bracken, and damage is done to crops and herds by the pests it harbours. Fifty per cent, of the cost of the elimination of bracken is paid by the Government in order to encourage farmers to free their land of this nuisance, and 150 bracken-cutting machines have been ordered by the Scottish authorities, of which 50 had been delivered by July 1941. 4 Maximum production will not be obtained on any land unless it is adequately fertilised. It is a waste of labour and materials to plough and seed land so deficient in the chemical elements necessary for plant growth that the crop fails to develop properly. Fertiliser consumption has increased since the last war largely because of scientific developments in soil analysis and the improved distribution of the results of scientific experiments to farmers. Also "decreasing quantities of town stable manure have compelled market gardeners to use more fertilisers of all kinds and particularly potash". 6 Animal manure is an important source of potash, and the decrease of livestock accompanying a shortage of feedstuffs will increase the need for potash fertilisers, which are in shortest supply. 1 See debate on the Agriculture (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1152. a Schemes costing more than £1,000,000 for the improvement of minor watercourses have been approved since the outbreak of war. Ibid. » Ibid., col. 1154. 4 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 30 July 1941, Vol. 373, col. 1498. 6 Sir E. J. R U S S E U . , loc. cit., p. 111. 28 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Even before the war the Government offered free soil analysis and other scientific advice to the farmers in order to encourage them to use fertilisers in their effort to increase production. Under the Land Fertility Scheme of 1937 subsidies for lime and basic slag were granted which reduced the cost of lime to the farmer by 50 per cent, and that of slag by 25 per cent. The subsidy on lime has been extended to 31 July 1944. l Supplies of lime this year are expected to be 75 per cent, greater than they were in 1940-41 as a result of the erection of new plant either privately or State financed. State assistance is concentrated on plants in areas where the need of lime is greatest as a result of the ploughing up campaign and where existing firms do not possess sufficient resources to expand. The subsidy on basic slag was removed in the fall of 1941. Basic slag and superphosphates are distributed in the areas nearest the point of production in order to save transport. Hence farmers are not able to order the type of phosphate they prefer but must take that produced nearest their farms. Reserves of phosphates are held by the County Agricultural Committees and loans to finance the acquisition of fertilisers can be made to farmers under the Agricultural Requisites Assistance Scheme.2 The Government has stabilised the prices of fertilisers and has set a uniform price of basic slag for the whole country with the assistance of an Exchequer grant. The scarcity of potash has made necessary a reduction in consumer's supplies but has not yet led to rationing, although priorities, are established in distribution. In August 1940 the total stocks of potash in the United Kingdom were about 80,000 tons— about one-half of normal supplies and less than one-third of the requirements of the expanded agricultural programme. Each manufacturer was given about half of his 1938-39 supplies. However, in July 1941, the Minister of Agriculture stated that unless very bad luck overtook the phosphate shipments supplies should be available considerably in excess of the pre-war supplies. 8 Potassic fertilisers may be used only for potatoes, carrots, onions, sugar beet and flax, and only if the farmer can show a serious potash deficiency in the soil and possesses a certificate from his Agricultural Executive Committee. Fertiliser compounds containing potash are required to contain at least 5 per cent, potash, in order to prevent a deterioration of the quality of the compounds as a 1 This subsidy is expected to cost a t least £1,500,000 in 1941 and more in the following years. See Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 October 1941, Vol. 374, loc. cit., col. 1150. s See below, p. 37. ' Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 24 July 1941, Vol. 373, col. 1092. AGRICULTURAL POUCY 29 result of maximum price regulations and because a smaller percentage of potash is relatively ineffective and supplies must be used to best advantage. The supply of nitrogenous fertilisers is large, and the Minister of Agriculture has urged the farmers to make more use of these fertilisers.1 In order to encourage even deliveries and prevent a spring glut, a rebate of 28s. a ton was given by the Government for orders placed in July 1941. In addition to assistance in securing drainage and fertilisers, the Government's widespread organisation is concerned with making the results of technical agricultural research available to all farmers and with improving the standard of farming by increasing the knowledge of the farmer. During the last two hundred years the increased productivity of land and livestock has been largely the result of scientific research. Such research is still of great importance in improving agricultural production. The functions of the Agricultural Research Council, a Government body concerned with research into the fundamental problems of agriculture, have been extended and its funds increased. Investigations of the effects of wireworm infestation on crop yields have recently been made by the advisory entomologists in co-operation with the Statistical Department of the Rothamsted Experimental Station and the Plant Pathological Laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture. These investigations were concerned with crops grown on newly broken grassland and the wireworm population of many fields was analysed. Up to the end of 1940 details of cropping had been collected for 287 of these fields, covering an area of 4,310 acres. The purpose of the investigations is to enable the Ministry to advise farmers what crops to grow or not to grow on fields with given wireworm populations. Equally important, however, is the spreading of information among the men who work the soil.2 The Agricultural Executive Committees all have scientific advisers— men who are responsible for seeing that modern knowledge is available to every farmer. 1 " . . . in view of the importance and value of these fertilisers for securing an increased yield from grass and many farm crops, I am very disappointed at the meagre response t h a t farmers have made to repeated appeals to take up all the supplies t h a t are available. I have sent out a circular asking committees to make this still further known to farmers." Mr. R. S. HUDSON, Minister of Agriculture, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 3 April 1941, Vol. 370, col. 1215. 2 "We have indeed been impressed by the statements of certain witnesses that what is required in order to improve the standard of British farming is not so much further research work and the development of new scientific methods, as the translation into practice of certain simple lessons already clearly taught by scientific study and by the experience of progressive farmers." Sixth Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, 1940-41 Session (H.M.S.O., 1941), p. 23. 30 FOOD CONTROL IN GRßAT BRITAIN Soil analyses are given by Government-employed scientists, and aid in combating pests and in dealing with the diseases of plants and livestock is offered. Special efforts are made to control diseases of livestock, especially those affecting dairy cattle. About 11,000 milch cows and heifers have been slaughtered since the outbreak of war as a result of foot and mouth disease, for which £650,000 has been paid in compensation to farmers. The carcases of about 6,500 of these animals have been salvaged for human consumption, but some 2,175 tons of meat have been lost. It is not possible to estimate the loss of milk.1 A scheme has been worked out by the National Veterinary Medical Association whereby farmers, upon payment of a flat annual fee, may have their stock examined quarterly and given any necessary treatment, since much of the damage done by diseases is a result of delayed detection. Such a scheme should reduce the seriousness of disease when contracted and improve the care given to animals. The scheme is being favourably considered by the Ministry of Agriculture, but the Ministry has not taken the responsibility for actually pushing it. According to the Farmers Weekly2, only a few small details now remain to be settled . . . While the Ministry is not actually supervising the plan or taking responsibility, it is making available certain facilities—such as laboratories free of charge—to veterinary surgeons having contract work for farmers. They will also supply vaccine free of charge and provide a new drug for use in treatment of mastitis at greatly reduced cost. The Ministry has also agreed that veterinary surgeons engaged on panel work for farmers shall be placed on their Panel "A". This means that they will also be employed as part-time inspectors for inspection of dairy herds for mastitis and abortion. At the outset the scheme will apply only to dairy herds. Later it is hoped to extend it to sheep and pigs. The Government has also agreed to provide funds for the training of veterinary surgeons in problems of bovine infertility. At the annual meeting of the National Veterinary Medical Association, the President said: I suggest that this aspect of preventive medicine is the joint concern of the State and of the stockholder. We appeal to the Ministry of Agriculture to evolve a more comprehensive and farsighted policy, and while we are aware of some of the difficulties with which it is beset, we confidently look for more evidence of that body's acceptance of its responsibilities with regard to animal health and the control of animal disease.' 1 Information given by the Minister of Agriculture, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 16 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1514. 1 8 August 1941, p. 23. • As reported in the Farmers Weekly, 19 September 1941, p. 22. AGRICULTURAL POUCY 31 Agricultural Improvement Councils have been appointed both in England and Wales and in Scotland with the following terms of reference: "to devise methods for seeing that promising results of research are applied as rapidly as possible to the problems of agriculture and are incorporated in ordinary farming practice; and to advise from time to time concerning agricultural problems which appear to require scientific investigation". 1 These councils are designed to meet one of the criticisms made by the Select Committee on National Expenditure in its Sixth Report, which suggested that a closer connection was needed between scientific research and practical farming 2 , and to deal with what the Minister of Agriculture considers the major problem —"to adapt each of the different varieties of farming systems to national war needs in the light of modern scientific knowledge and the use of modern agricultural implements". 8 Information about the proper use of fertilisers, the best diet for livestock and other problems of the farmer is freely available from Government agencies. The Ministry of Agriculture publishes two series of information and advisory leaflets: a "Grow-more" series for farmers and a "Dig for Victory" series for allotment holders and gardeners. In addition films are distributed to both general and specialised audiences for propaganda purposes and to illustrate proper techniques for persons unacquainted with the new duties they are asked to undertake. The Government co-operates with farmers to reduce the ravages of pests of various sorts. In addition to the measures taken against bracken and the wireworm mentioned above, the Agricultural Executive Committees assist in the destruction of rats and rabbits. The latter animal has caused a great deal of controversy. The Minister of Food controls the prices of rabbits but agriculturists prefer an uncontrolled price to encourage the elimination of rabbits, although even within the agricultural groups there is a difference of opinion since many farmers feel that high prices encourage trappers to abstain from killing all the does so that the following year's supply will not be too greatly reduced. The price allowed for rabbits appears to be sufficiently 1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 12 June 1941, Vol. 372, col. 336. "It would seem desirable to secure closer co-ordination for ensuring that research is directed to meeting the needs cf agricultural policy and practical farming and, on the other hand, that the results of research are made known and applied to the improvement of farming efficiency." Op. cit., p. 17. * Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1941, loc. cit., Vol. 376, col. 424. 1 32 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN remunerative 1 but the controversy rages unabated. Farmers are well aware of the damage done to their crops by rabbits and it is doubtful whether large price incentive is needed to persuade farmers to kill them. These efforts of the Government to improve farming efficiency will be of little use to incapable farmers. One of the chief features of the Farm Survey made by the Ministry of Agriculture was a classification of farms into three groups: (A) well farmed; (B) moderately farmed; and (C) badly farmed. The Agricultural Executive Committees are endeavouring to eliminate (C) and improve (B). The effectiveness of the work of these committees depends greatly upon the quality of their personnel, and there are wide differences in the competence of the committees in the different areas. Best results will be obtained in the execution of any programme if the Government can obtain the voluntary co-operation of all groups concerned, although sometimes the cost is high. The planning of agricultural production is extraordinarily complicated. Not only must the quality of the land, the availability of labour, machinery and fertilisers and the rotation cycle practised on each farm be considered, but also the willingness of the farmer to produce any particular crop. Co-operation from the farmers must be obtained if the food production programme is to be successful. The power to compel producers to act in the national interest must, however, be given the agricultural authorities even though it is not frequently exercised. The Agricultural Executive Committees have the right of entry on all farms and the power to remove inefficient farmers. They can compel the farmer to follow their directions, and they have the power, with the consent of the Minister of Agriculture, to take over badly farmed land 2 , of which 1 Rabbits have more than a food use, however. T h e F u r Trade Export Group recently announced a plan for trapping millions of live rabbits and breeding tame ones to increase supplies of both food and pelts. The value of our exports last year of raw rabbit skins and in the form of hatters' furs was approximately £930,000. Exports for the first six months of this year amounted to over £920,000, and seemed likely to be over £2,000,000 by the end of the year. The rabbit catch in this country last year was about 60,000,000, a figure it was hoped to surpass this year. Mr. James Bradley, chairman of the Rabbits and Moles Committee, announced t h a t pamphlets on the best way to trap and skin rabbits and moles would be sent by the group to women's institutes, rabbit clubs, and similar bodies who applied for them. The demand of the American markets for the skins was much greater than the supply, and this offered a chance to exploit two products of our land. The Times, 1 November 1941. 2 The Minister of Agriculture stated on 24 July 1941 that the Committees had taken possession of 150,000 acres of uncultivated or badly cultivated land in England and Wales. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 24 July 1941, Vol. 373, col. 1092. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 33 the State can acquire ownership. 1 Directions are frequently issued to the farmer regarding the harvesting and disposal of his crops and he is required to take proper care of the crops after harvesting. For failure to do so he can be fined. The Government sometimes finds it necessary to issue instructions to farmers requiring them to change traditional ways of doing things in the interest of efficiency or to facilitate the carrying out of some specific project. Compulsion is sometimes necessary since aversion to change is deep-rooted and in wartime many changes must be made. A criticism frequently levelled at British policy is that farmers are given too much leeway in the execution of Government directions as to drainage, ordering of fertilisers, use of feedstuffs, care of crops, etc. Co-operation is most freely given when the farmers have confidence in the policy and fairness of the Government. One of the chief points emphasised in the Sixth Report of the Select Committee was "the need to establish a spirit of confidence in order to get the maximum productive effort out of the farming industry". Lack of confidence and a consequent hesitancy in acting arise partly from doubts about long-range policy. Some farmers are afraid that the radical changes they are asked to make in order to adjust themselves to the war will be reversed in peace-time and that they will be left in a worse position than before. Only the most shortsighted farmers, however, could allow these fears to influence their war effort and account must be taken of the fact that without these changes the United Kingdom might be in danger of losing the war. In that event there is no doubt that the farmers would be worse off. It is possible that the fears of farmers regarding post-war policy have some effect on wartime output, and they are the mainspring of the agriculturist's demands for an official statement on post-war policy regarding agriculture. The Government's policy must be as just and as equitable as possible and the purpose of each action should be clearly explained unless there are military reasons for secrecy. The extension for one year after the war of the system of guaranteed prices and markets is an important measure for obtaining the farmers' cooperation since it safeguards them against the loss they would face if the war ended while they had large quantities of products on hand for which there would be no peace-time market, and the Minister of Agriculture has recently stated that the Agricultural Executive Committees can plan for the harvest of 1945. 1 See below, p. 37. 34 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Mechanisation and Labour Supply. The extensive use of mechanical equipment on the farm will not only reduce the number of workers needed for a given output but will also enable the work to be done more quickly. The number of workers on the land at the outbreak of the present war compared with the period before the last war does not accurately represent a difference in productive capacity because of the larger amount of mechanical equipment on the land at the beginning of this war. The value of machinery in reducing labour requirements in agriculture and making possible a greater output with a given labour supply has led the Government to build up reserves of agricultural equipment—especially tractors—so that farmers without equipment and labour adequate to handle the increased acreage should be able to hire equipment when needed. Between June 1939 and July 1940 there was a net increase of between 17,000 and 18,000 tractors in Great Britain. By the end of 1941 over 100,000 tractors were operating in Great Britain, as compared with 45,000 before the war, and production and imports totalled around 1,000 a week. The outbreak of war in the Far East, however, and the increased strain on American industry forced a modification of the original import plans. The Government is considering ways of making greater use of existing resources and the possibility of using a centralised Government agency to deal with machinery. An Agricultural Machinery Development Board has been set up to help to improve existing machinery, standardise parts, and perfect new machinery. Considerable quantities of machinery and farm implements have been imported from the United States under the Lend-Lease Act and are being sold to farmers by the Ministry of Agriculture. Ordinary trade channels are being used for the distribution of this machinery. Importers, wholesalers and other dealers act as agents of the Ministry and are paid a commission.1 Farmers must obtain a certificate of need from the Agricultural Executive Committees before they are allowed to purchase any new tractor. The War Office also assists farmers by lending military transport vehicles for the harvest. The farmer is charged an hourly rate which includes the vehicle, driver and petrol. Labour remains, however, one of the most serious shortages hampering British agriculture. Measures have been taken therefore to prevent the drain of workers from the land, to restrict the calling up of agricultural workers for military service and to get new workers in agriculture. A minimum wage in England and 1 Farmers Weekly, 26 September 1941, p. 21. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 35 Wales of 48s. a week for male agricultural labour was announced on 7 June 1940. This measure to improve the remuneration of agricultural workers was taken at the same time as the Government's order preventing anyone engaged in agriculture from leaving the industry was made. The Undertakings (Restriction on Engagement) Order, effective 10 June 1940, made it an offence to employ men in any other industry who were normally engaged in agriculture or coalmining, unless the worker was recommended by a local employment agency as suitable, and male farm workers over 18 years of age employed by the Agricultural Executive Committees are tied to their jobs under the Essential Work Order. In November 1941, the national minimum wage for regular adult male agricultural workers was raised to £3 a week by the Agricultural Wages Board. There is no national minimum for women workers except for members of the Women's Land Army. The minimum for the Women's Land Army is considerably below the wage for male workers. Additional measures taken by the Government have encouraged the return of former agricultural workers to the land, the increased employment of women in agriculture, for which purpose the Women's Land Army was created, and the use of conscientious objectors in agriculture; and labour gangs and labour pools have been organised for drainage, harvesting and other purposes. Special hostels have been built by the Ministry of Works and Buildings to house the mobile labour gangs and members of labour pools. Some groups travel around the countryside in small mobile trailers in which they live. Soldiers of the British Army are also available for agricultural work on the land. The "number of troops made available on a day to day basis during August 1941 was not far short of 10,000 a day". 1 In addition, Italian prisoners of war are being used in agriculture. About 7,000 are already in agricultural camps and another 21,000 are to follow.2 Schoolchildren help with the harvesting and many schools in agricultural areas have lengthened their holidays to allow the children to work in the harvest. In September 1941 the Board of Education urged local education authorities and school governors to encourage and assist schoolboy harvest camps, which housed some 10,000 schoolboys during the harvest of 1941, to remain open longer to finish the harvesting. 3 Agricultural Executive Committees have wide powers of control 1 Statement of the Secretary of State for War, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 30 September 1941, Vol. 374, col. 436. 1 The Times, 8 December 1941. Some prisoners with good conduct records are allowed to live on the farms and work for the farmers (Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, 3 January 1942). • Farmers Weekly, 5 September 1941. 36 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN over the calling up of skilled workers. In 1941 the calling up of some 10,000 workers under 25 years of age from the farms into the army, originally scheduled for early autumn, was postponed until after the harvest. The skilled worker is extremely important in agriculture and not easily replaceable and it is therefore of the greatest importance that he should not be taken from the land. Dilution is much more difficult in agriculture than in industry and skilled agricultural workers are not trained in a short time. The workers called up were carefully selected by the Agricultural Executive Committees as those who could be spared from agriculture with the least interference with food production. No women working full time on the land will be called up. The organisation of the Women's Land Army has been hampered by the difficulty of predicting demand for female farm labour and by the reluctance of the farmers to employ women. Training is financed by the Government but enrolment is voluntary. At the end of 1941 some 24,000 women were enrolled. The regular members of the Women's Land Army are enrolled for the duration of the war, but there is also the Women's Land Army Auxiliary Force composed of women volunteering to do seasonal work for at least four weeks in the spring, summer or autumn. Land Tenure. When a tenant's position is insecure, it may have serious effects on agricultural production, and in wartime land speculation, unless controlled, may develop menacing proportions. Speculators not only acquire land for quick turnover but also to exploit the sitting tenant by forcing him either to pay higher rents or buy his farm at a high price. Just after the last war this method of exploiting tenants became serious in some areas, and it has been developing during this war. In response to widespread demands, the Government has decided to control this form of speculation. 1 The power of the purchaser to give effective notice to quit to the sitting tenant is now restricted. Any notice to quit to a tenant on any agricultural holding subject to a contract of sale made since the outbreak of war or sold under a contract made since that date, such notice expiring after the end of 1941, is null and void, unless the consent of the Minister of Agriculture (or the Secretary of State for Scotland) is given in writing. Since at least 12 months' notice to quit must be given to most tenants under the existing laws, these new regulations cover all contracts of sale made since the outbreak of war where notice to quit has been given since 31 December 1940. 1 See statement of the Minister of Agriculture, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 11 November 1941, Vol. 374, cols. 2044-5. AGRICULTURA!, POLICY 37 The Agricultural Executive Committees have the power, as noted above, to take possession of badly farmed and derelict land with the consent of the Minister of Agriculture. They may then let this land to suitable tenants or farm and improve it themselves. The question of the ownership of this land therefore arises and especially the question who is to benefit by the improvements made. Under a recent Act 1 the Government was given power to acquire ownership of land taken over by the Agricultural Executive Committees. The land is acquired at its value when possession is taken and within five years after the war it must be offered back to the original owner at a price determined by agreement or arbitration if the Minister of Agriculture believes that the land will be properly managed and cultivated. Thus there is no obligation on the Government to offer the land back to bad farmers or owners. These provisions are not only a simple method of protecting the Government's investment in improving the land but also allow the Government to make long leases to tenants willing to take over, since the leases granted by the Government are not affected by changes in ownership. Credit Facilities. The actual execution of the Government's programme of increasing production rests in the hands of individual farmers. These men must have funds with which to buy or rent the equipment and labour they need on their farms, and this equipment and labour must be made available. The ploughing up of additional land resulted in an increased demand for agricultural credit. The system of guaranteed prices and markets, on the other hand, makes the industry a better risk. All the joint stock banks decided during the first weeks of the war to liberalise their policy of agricultural loans. This liberalisation of bank loans to farmers still left unsolved the problem of the bad, or a t best doubtful, credit proposition, with which the agricultural industry abounds. If the national emergency demanded t h a t credit risks be taken in promoting the campaign to grow more food it seemed reasonable to expect the community, through the Government, to shoulder those risks. 2 The Government therefore set up an Agricultural Requisites Assistance Scheme to enable farmers to procure Government loans for specific purposes. The chief reason for the scheme was to facilitate the ploughing up of land. Loans are made at 5 per cent. for short periods and are administered by the Agricultural Execu1 Agriculture (Miscellaneous Previsions) Act, 1941. » The Economist, 5 October 1940, p. 431. 38 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN tive Committees. The scope of the scheme was extended in October 1940 to include loans to finance ditching, field drainage, manuring and the purchase of goods required for farming operations. 1 This scheme does not attempt to meet all requirements for agricultural credit, and the commercial banks are still the most important sources of credit. The Minister of Agriculture has arranged that the banks shall be represented on the Agricultural Executive Committees, and to their representatives, known as the Farm Credit Liaison Officers, are submitted farmers' credit difficulties. Complaints that lack of credit has been a serious factor depressing agriculture are widespread among those interested in agriculture, but the Select Committee has stated that "The evidence that we have received does not support the conclusion that lack of adequate credit facilities has been a substantial factor in hampering the agricultural industry". 2 Planning Agricultural Production The general programme of increasing arable acreage, improving soil fertility and animal productivity, and supplying credit, equipment and labour to agriculture, still leaves largely untouched the problem of diverting agricultural activity into the production of the commodities most necessary for the proper feeding of the nation in wartime. This is accomplished by regulation of relative prices, granting subsidies, rationing raw materials and conducting educational campaigns. I t is particularly important that whatever changes are introduced should be part of a long-term policy and that continuity of policy should be maintained as far as possible. The select Committee on National Expenditure stressed this point, as follows: What we do feel entitled to emphasise is that there is bound.to be waste of national resources if there is uncertainty about policy; that the policy of agricultural production cannot, without waste, be changed from season to season, but should cover a definite cycle or rotation; and that with the increasing experience and factual knowledge gained by the County Committees the aim ought to be to work up to a more definite programme, covering not merely a single season but a cycle of production.' That such a programme for agriculture is of first importance in the war effort of the United Kingdom is denied by none, but the 1 The Minister of Agriculture stated on 13 February 1941 that up to 11 February 1941, £130,000 had been lent to 1,200 farmers under the Requisites Scheme. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 13 February 1941, Vol. 368, col. 1520.s Sixth Report, op. cit., p. 33. • Sixth Report, op. cit., p. 26. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 39 difficulties inherent in creating and executing a plan for agriculture are very great. Ideally, a carefully worked out food policy would precede the formation of an agricultural policy. The quantity required of each of the basic foods in the national diet would be determined as accurately and as early as possible and for as long a period as possible, since changes in one part of the food policy may have a wide effect on the production of other foods. A change in the programme for slaughtering livestock, for example, affects the whole cropping programme. Furthermore, many decisions once made cannot easily be reversed. In so far as unforeseen changes in the military situation cause such alterations of policy, they are, of course, unavoidable. Once a food policy for the nation is worked out in detail, the Ministry of Agriculture should work out a programme of agricultural production in conformity with this policy. At this point arises one of the chief difficulties. A tremendous amount of detailed information is needed. Without this information only the most general instructions can be issued to farmers. Lack of adequate information has been an important reason for the vagueness of British agricultural policy. A hurried farm survey 1 was carried out in 1940 and the Minister of Agriculture was in a better position the following year to plan production. During 1941 a new survey was started to provide a detailed record and map of every farm. Speaking of this new survey, the Minister of Agriculture said: We . . . now . . . require a more extensive and uniform survey on which to base our long-range policy as well as our policy for immediate problems. In addition to ensuring t h a t each farm produces the maximum volume of food during the war, we must collect the information necessary for the formation of a sound, post-war agricultural policy. T h e survey now being carried out will include the preparation of a map of every farm. I t is interesting to note t h a t about half the leases of the farms in this country have no maps attached to them. The information about each farm will include its natural potentialities, the characteristics of the soil, its present state of cultivation, acreage of the various crops, the animal population, and the condition of farm buildings. I t is quite clear t h a t when this war is over what we have to do is to have sufficient labour and building materials earmarked to provide the cottages required to rehouse the rural population and also to put the farm buildings in order. I am quite sure myself t h a t one of the most important steps t h a t can be taken to raise the standards of the agricultural worker will be to see t h a t he is in a position to pay an economic rent for his cottage. Therefore this survey which we are now making is an important foundation.* 1 Speaking of the Survey, the Minister of Agriculture said in the House of Commons on 3 April 1941: " I t is the most important single thing we have done". 1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1941, Vol. 376, cols. 422-3. 40 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Agricultural planning must be carried out within the limits established by the scarce factors of production. It must therefore be integrated into the entire national war economy, since the supply of agricultural factors of production, including raw materials, is to a large extent determined by the demands for them from other segments of the economy. Industry and the army compete with agriculture for, among other things, land, labour, mechanical equipment, shipping space for imports, petrol, oil and transport facilities. The chief problems in planning do not arise in the working out of the "master plan" but in the integration of all the subsidiary "plans" necessary for the execution of the larger scheme. The problem presented above is nothing less than the utilisation of scarce resources in the optimum manner and must be solved with reference to the whole production programme of the country. The optimum use of those resources set aside for agricultural purposes depends on the development of the most efficient techniques of production in relation to the output wanted. For example, land fertility can be maintained by using artificial fertilisers, by keeping livestock on land and by planting crops in certain rotations. Which combination of these is adopted depends not only on the needs of the soil and the custom of the farmers but also on the contribution made to the total agricultural output. The kinds of feedstuffs produced depend not only on what happens to imports and what the land can most easily produce, but also on the diet for dairy cows which will enable them to produce the largest amount of milk. The ploughing campaign should be a selective one, and this requires that all land capable of food production shall be carefully classified. It has been suggested by Sir Thomas Middleton that "Possible future, as well as immediate, requirements for more tillage could be met by arranging the land examined in classes to be 'called up' for active service in food production as needs dictate". 1 The kind and amount of food each piece of land could produce and the amount of labour, equipment and fertiliser required to produce it must be the basis of any classification. The organisation of agricultural activities in line with all these considerations would not, given sufficient knowledge of conditions, be such a difficult job as it is if it were simply a matter of working out plans and decreeing their execution. The greatest difficulties arise because of the necessity of obtaining the production planned from the voluntary activity of a large number of farmers, without modifying too greatly the existing institutional framework. 1 "How to Increase Food Production", in Scottish Journal January 1941, p. 87. of Agriculture, AGRICULTURAL POLICY 41 The Minister of Agriculture has available fairly detailed information concerning farms and farmers on over 15 million acres of arable land. The actual production programme for this land is laid down in general terms and in accordance with the food policy outlined by the Ministry of Food in collaboration with the Food Policy Committee of the Cabinet and the Scientific Food Committee. So far the food policy is also stated only in the most general terms. Maintenance of the milk supply, self-sufficiency in feeding stuffs, and an increase in cereals, sugar beet, potatoes and other vegetables, are the cornerstones of the policy. In the last war agricultural policy was concentrated on producing cereals and potatoes to stave off starvation. Less attention was given to milk supply, and livestock were relatively neglected. To-day, milk production is in the forefront, and other livestock products are given some emphasis. Farmers are urged to grow the so-called "dual purpose" crops—those crops suitable for both human and animal food, although wheat and sound potatoes are not allowed to be used for animal feeding. Wheat, in the opinion of the Minister of Agriculture, is "the sheet anchor of the nation in wartime" and he urges the farmers to "sow all you can". 1 Other cereals receive less stress but next to wheat comes barley and then oats. Rye should, according to the Minister of Agriculture, be sown only in the lighter and poorer soils. The Minister asked farmers to plant more sugar beets: "Sugar factories must be filled to capacity next year". 2 A large increase in potatoes is contemplated. As to milk, "Every gallon counts. Do everything in your power to maintain production this winter." 3 Soft fruits, with the exception of black currants, which are an excellent source of vitamin C, are not encouraged. In the case of vegetables, emphasis is put on carrots, onions and cabbages. The effect on soil fertility of repeated cash crops is not forgotten, however, and the general policy now is to give encouragement to one-year leys (fallow) where the fertility of the land has been lowered by one or more cash crops. Re-seeding to grassland is allowed with the permission of the Agricultural Executive Committees and the Committees may, if necessary, compel farmers to lay down part of their land to leys. Stocks of approved strains of grass seeds will be available for farmers next spring. 1 Speech of the Minister of Agriculture a t Norwich, as reported in Farmers Weekly, 24 October 1941, p. 18. » Ibid. » Ibid. 42 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Adjustment of Relative Prices. The farmer's net money income is determined primarily by the profit obtained from the sale of his produce. He will therefore tend to produce those commodities which seem likely to yield him the highest profit. The conditions necessary for the profitable production of any particular crop do not exist on all farms. The character of the soil and climatic conditions limit the range of crops that can be grown successfully on any particular farm. The capital equipment on many farms is specialised for the production of certain crops and a change to the production of other crops would involve a loss to the farmer. The knowledge and experience of the farmer himself will affect the type of production he engages in. This is strikingly illustrated in the case of livestock. The rotation system in use is another factor limiting the choice of the farmer as to the crop he shall produce. In addition farmers who are primarily engaged in mixed farming rarely know how profitable any particular crop is. Nevertheless, within these limits, the farmer will tend to produce for sale those crops for which the difference between cost of production and selling price is greatest. Since the costs of production of a particular crop are different for different producers on similar land and for the same producer on different qualities of land, only that part of the crop produced at lowest cost will be profitable when prices are low. On the other hand, if the price is high previously marginal land and less efficient farmers can be profitably brought into production. Furthermore, the returns from the crop of one year have an important effect on the production of the following year, since the returns from one year's crop are used to finance the next year's production. Since agricultural production is influenced by the relative profitability to the farmer of different crops, which is in turn determined by the relative price-cost relationships of alternative products, the British Government has relied to a large extent on the fixing of relative prices to call forth the production desired. Such attractive prices are fixed for most agricultural products, however, that' it is difficult to get the farmer to reduce his production of anything in favour of something else. Beef prices, especially, are probably not low enough compared to milk prices to encourage dairying as an alternative to beef production to a sufficient extent, and the rationing of feedstuffs has been used to supplement relatively ineffective price differences. The same price is offered to all farmers, and since the price is set to cover the cost of producing that part of the product produced AGRICULTURA!, POLICY 43 on third-class farms, the total cost to the consumer of purchasing the product is greater than the total cost to the agricultural community of producing it. The alternative to paying the same price to all farmers is some form of negotiated contract with each farmer paying him a price that would cover his average cost of production plus a reasonable profit. Even this has its disadvantages 1 and is impracticable in agriculture, where cost accounting is hopelessly defective and where there is a very large number of small producers. The method of inducing the farmer to produce the required products in the appropriate quantities by fixing prices to cover the highest production costs has several disadvantages particularly important in wartime, which special measures should be taken to offset. In the first place, in so far as it is necessary to offer a higher price for a greater output, those products most urgently needed to feed the people will be highest in price. When the Government is the purchaser of food it can, as the British Government does for many commodities, sell to the consumer at a lower price than it pays. This form of subsidy offsets the higher agricultural costs and helps to stabilise the cost of living. In the second place, higher prices allow increased profits to those producers whose average costs of production are low and who therefore make excess profits which have no necessary relation to their own efforts. Since excess profits are particularly undesirable in wartime, methods of taxation have been devised to catch such profits in agriculture as well as in industry. Nor is reliance on the profit motive a thoroughly efficient method of increasing production. Farmers do not always know what will give them the greatest profits and, contrary to the behaviour.of the "economic man", they do not always care. High profits may actually encourage inefficiency since the farmer is not forced to be as efficient as possible in order to make a profit. In the 19141918 war many farmers gave little attention to efficient production since agricultural prices in some instances were allowed to rise to levels that assured a profit to the most negligent farmer. The Government can control agricultural prices more effectively if consumers' demand is not allowed directly to influence firsthand prices. This is best accomplished by making the Minister of Food the sole buyer of agricultural food products. A food policy based upon the nutritional needs of the nation and designed to distribute equitably a limited supply of food will require different quantities of each food from those quantities that would be required if unregulated consumer demand were the chief influence on agri1 Under this system there is little incentive to reduce costs and, on the contrary, padding of cost statements would probably result. 44 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN cultural production. Consumers' demand is affected by grossly unequal income distribution, which allows the richer members of the community to influence the agricultural output of the nation in such a manner that luxury foods for one group of the population are produced and not enough basic foods for the rest of the people. The free and cheap milk scheme effective since the war in Great Britain 1 furnishes a striking example of what happens when an essential food is made available to all groups in the population, and if it were possible to increase milk production during the war there would, without doubt, be a great increase resulting directly from the Government's policy of facilitating the translation of consumers' needs into effective demand. On the other hand, consumers' tastes frequently run counter to their needs, and in wartime it is the duty of the Government to do its best to influence these tastes so that nutritionally important foods shall be substituted for others less important. A production policy designed to make these foods cheap and abundant will help to influence tastes. British Price Policy. In the United Kingdom the prices of most agricultural products are fixed for each season and the market guaranteed for the duration of the war and for a year afterwards. The prices fixed in order to call forth increased production are calculated, according to the Minister of Agriculture, to provide the possibility of adequate returns on third-class farms. This naturally leaves an excess profit to farmers on the more efficient farms. Farmers before the war were allowed to pay their income tax on the basis of the annual value of their farms, but now farmers with an annual value exceeding £100 are assessed on their annual profits, as are other forms of business activity. 2 Furthermore the excess profits tax is applied to farmers. In the determination of prices, consideration is given not only to the wartime rise in costs of production which of course varied as between different commodities, b u t to the fact t h a t the general financial position of agriculture before the war was unsatisfactory and t h a t the production of several commodities was unprofitable except on the more favoured farms. This, according to the Ministry, explains the relatively small percentage increase in the price of potatoes—the production of which was one of the more profitable parts of the farming enterprise in pre-war years—and the relatively large increase in the 1 See below, pp. 121-122. Until recently the dividing line between those who must pay income tax on the profit basis and those who could still choose to be assessed on the rental basis was fixed at £300; and at this figure it was estimated that probably not more than 5 per cent, of farmers would be assessed on their annual profits (The Times, 16 June 1941). s AGRICULTURAL POLICY 45 price of such commodities as fat cattle, oats and barley, and wool which before the war were, generally speaking, among the least profitable products except under unusually favourable conditions.1 The price of beef is intended to provide for increased costs of production and also for seasonal variations in costs. The special price for "quality" animals 2 was abolished in July 1940. The Ministry of Food does not want to encourage this type of animal because of the increased cost of feeding it and the need for conservation of feed concentrates. For a limited period in 1941 the special grade was reintroduced and the price for this grade set higher than that for the next grade in order to encourage the early marketing of the higher-grade cattle. The same procedure will be followed for a limited period in 1942. The seasonal variations in price are wider than in peace-time to furnish an incentive for the winter feeding of beef cattle and sheep and to prevent excessive marketing in the autumn. In the autumn of 1940 too many cattle were offered for sale and there was a glut on the market, so that the Ministry of Food had to restrict the numbers purchased. Prices are set to encourage greater marketing of beef in summer and to keep a reserve on the hoof during the winter. In April 1941 the Ministry of Food announced increased prices for lean cattle. To induce farmers to sell their cattle as soon as they are moderately fit for killing, the prices of steers, heifers and cowheifers killing out 3 at 50-52 per cent, were increased substantially. Less grazing remains for cattle this summer and with the need for using more arable crops for direct human consumption coupled with the reduction in supplies of imported feeding stuffs for next winter, it is clearly sensible from every point of view to make a heavy clearance of beef cattle during the next few months. In the new schedule of cattle prices the Ministry of Food will pay more for lean and unthrifty cows which would not in ordinary times be considered fit for the butcher without further feeding.4 1 Sixth Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, op. cit., p. 12. From March to July 1940 the price for cattle estimated to yield a carcase return of 60 per cent, or more was 4s. 6d. per live cwt. more than the price for standard grade A animals. The elimination of the premium for quality beef caused much disappointment among breeders of quality cattle. These breeders maintain t h a t high quality cattle production does not necessarily involve the use of heavy supplies of concentrates. " T h e yield of quality beef in large proportion is an inherent property of certain types of cattle t h a t have been specially bred for beef producing properties." Fine bones and quality meat are bred in these animals and are not a question of feeding. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Food contends t h a t a premium on cattle yielding a high percentage of meat to live weight would encourage the use of concentrated feeding stuffs to fatten cattle whose quality is not the result of breeding. See correspondence between the Aberdeen-Angus Cattle Society and the Ministries of Food and Agriculture, in Scottish Farmer, 25 January 1941, p. 328. 3 The "killing o u t " percentage represents the relation between the meat obtained from an animal and its live weight. 4 The Times, 28 April 1941. 2 46 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN This was done to encourage the dairy farmers to cull the pooryielding cows from their herds. In November 1941 these special prices for low-grade cattle were dropped, since the culling process was deemed to be completed. Steers, heifers, cow-heifers and bulls killing out at less than 49 per cent., and cows at less than 47 per cent., are now ineligible for grading and if sent to collecting centres are treated as rejects and paid for at 4d. per pound estimated dressed carcase weight fit for human consumption, plus an allowance for the hide. The prices of the various grades of pigs and of poultry were set for 1940 and part of 1941 to encourage producers to cull their herds, but were readjusted in 1941 when the number of pigs required no further reduction. The relative prices of baconers and porkers favour the production of baconers. Prices of higher-grade sheep have been raised relatively to those of the lower grades to encourage the winter feeding of sheep on arable land in the interest of land fertility. Potato prices for the 1940-41 crop were fixed to give farmers a substantially increased return per acre compared with 1939, and maximum prices were 5s. per ton higher than the minimum prices. The Ministry of Food has agreed to buy any surplus and is accumulating a large stock for end-of-season use to prevent a shortage such as took place in 1941, and prices are fixed to encourage farmers to sell potatoes to the Ministry for delivery in June and July. In 1941-42 potato growers were paid a fixed price on the quantity grown and £10 an acre. Thus the potato crop is paid for in two ways—a price per ton and a payment per acre. The total amount received by the grower is greater than the total price paid for the crop by consumers, and there is thus an element of subsidy, but it is not equivalent to £10 per acre. Prices are set for wheat, oats, rye and barley for feeding1 and the Government will purchase any surplus. The prices of all these products are appreciably above the pre-war prices. Before the outbreak of war in the Far East wheat and oat prices increased during the winter months to cover costs of storage and to encourage farmers to market their produce at an even rate throughout the winter. But the strain thrown on shipping space by the war has made it necessary for the Government to reduce its wheat imports and draw on home reserves. Prices to farmers have therefore been altered to encourage them to deliver their wheat earlier 1 The price of barley for brewing was long left uncontrolled, and it was said t h a t some farmers shifted to barley from wheat because malting barley prices made production profitable. Some of the finest pale ale barley sold as high as £ 6 to £7 a quarter (The Times, 27 November 1941). In March 1942 maximum prices of malting barley were established. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 47 than was at first planned. To speed up threshing operations wheat farmers are to have priority in the allocation of threshing tackle. The Ministry of Food purchases the carrot and onion crops and any surplus of edible threshed peas. The "pool price" of milk to the farmer has been raised several times and the monthly prices guaranteed during 1941 and 1942 are appreciably higher than the 1938-39 prices, part of the increase resulting from the increased labour costs due to the increase to £3 a week of the minimum wage. The Ministry of Food has announced its willingness to review the prices for the winter period ending 3 March 1942, if "the producers claim . . . that the average increase in costs of production in that period of six months over the costs in the corresponding period of the basic year 1938-39 exceeds the average increase in producers' returns as compared with the same period". 1 The increase in prices is also designed to give "farmers an added incentive to ensure the maximum output at the period of the year when milk is most needed". The Ministry gave a similar undertaking for the 1940-41 prices, and upon the application of the Milk Marketing Board and the National Farmers' Union for a review of milk prices during the six months ending 30 September 1941, on the ground that the costs of production exceeded the average return to the producer, the Ministry of Food granted a retrospective increase in producers' prices. The pool price to producers varies in different regions, and premiums for tuberculin-tested and accredited milk are paid, while milk below standard is penalised. Regional variations were originally designed to allow for the varying proportions of milk going into the liquid and the manufacturing markets in the different regions, since the two markets commanded different prices. During the winter all milk goes into the liquid market, and consequently the existence of regional variations in price no longer has the same justification; there are rumours in the press that they will be withdrawn. Prices for agricultural products are fixed by a Cabinet Committee including the Ministers of Food and Agriculture. The demands of farmers' organisations are considered. No standardised system of costing has ever been introduced in agriculture, and costs of production are therefore largely an unknown quantity, although the Ministry has a Farm Management Survey which existed before the war and a milk costings scheme which has been 1 Press Notice No. 818, 12 February 1941. 48 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN in operation on a national uniform scale for several years. 1 Costs of milk production are, therefore, fairly well known. In addition sugar beet costs can be fairly accurately computed as a result of the close relation between the Government and producers under the pre-war subsidy scheme. Prices are, however, determined in the last analysis by bargaining between the farmers' representatives and the Government. There are wide variations in the efficiency of different farms and farmers in Great Britain 2 , and an average cost of production, even if it could be ascertained, would be of little help. 3 Little is known of the relation between prices and costs, although enough information is available for the Government to make a fair estimate. The level of price must be largely a compromise between the farmers' demands based on self-interest and the Ministry's proposals based on what they consider fair except for those few foods which are considered least essential and for which therefore low prices are set to discourage production. There are extremely few foods, however, if any, for which a frankly unremunerative price is fixed. The necessity therefore of offering extra inducements to get farmers to produce the foods the Government wants badly results in a high general level of agricultural prices. Prices of some foods are set at different levels for différent uses and are designed to direct the foods into the desired use. For example, the prices of soft fruits encourage producers to sell them to the jam factories rather than for direct consumption, pig prices favour bacon pigs, and in order to get as much wheat as possible for human food non-millable wheat that could be made millable may be sold at the price for millable wheat less a reasonable charge for reconditioning. On the other hand, sometimes prices tend 1 "So far milk is the only commodity for which any full system of costing has been attempted. Apart from this the Ministry is continuing and carefully watching its 'Farm Management Survey' which has been going on for several years. Figures are being collected showing the profits made in each of a wide range of different types of farming and the percentages of expenditure represented by the various factors—fertilisers, seeds, labour, etc." Sixth Report from Select Committee on National Expenditure, op. cit., p. 10. 2 See Sir A. Daniel H A L L : op. cit., pp. 50-56. 8 The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food in answer to a question on egg prices said: "Owing to the very great diversity of methods and conditions of production and of marketing, an analysis of books would not yield useful results. T h e Eggs and Poultry Reorganisation Commission for England and Wales, in their report issued in January 1935, in dealing with this question stated: 'While we recognise the difficulties of ascertaining the real costs of egg production we have been impressed by the wide variations in the figures of costs t h a t have been submitted, even when those costs- related to apparently similar types of production units in the same district. We have come to the conclusion t h a t it is quite impossible, having regard to all the difficulties, to calculate a representative cost of egg production either for t h e industry as a whole or for the general farmer and the specialist producer separately'." Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 25 July 1940, Vol. 363, ccl. 1003. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 49 inadvertently to favour certain uses undesired by the authorities. For example, before control was imposed on meat food for animals, meat classified as unfit for human consumption was sold for dog meat at higher prices than meat for human consumption and some farmers therefore sold good meat as dog meat to get the higher prices. Although this was not quantitatively important, it illustrates the necessity of controlling prices for even the minor uses of a product. Subsidies. In addition to the general subsidy of £2 an acre for newly ploughed land, the eradication of bracken subsidy and the drainage and fertiliser subsidies, mentioned above, the Government grants direct subsidies to certain producers. Beef cattle producers are subsidised under the pre-war scheme, under which £4,921,230 was paid in 1938.l The subsidy is covered by the prices charged for beef. Hill sheep producers received 2s. 6d. for each breeding ewe in flocks in 1941, but in December 1941 this subsidy was raised to 7s. 6d.2 A subsidy of £2 on every breeding cow is paid in respect of highland cows grazing on the hills at least 8 months of the year. The subsidy is confined to Galloway and Highland cattle and their first crosses with a Shorthorn bull. Sugar beet prices are fixed and the losses of sugar beet factories are fully met by the Government. The suspension of the wheat quota, embodied in the Agricultural (Miscellaneous War Provisions) Act, provides that deficiency payments to farmers will no longer be limited by acreage restrictions or the total quantity of wheat ranking for the subsidy. Only the restriction as to quality remains. Under the Wheat Act deficiency payments were limited to the anticipated supply of wheat in any cereal year. Rationing of Feeding Stuffs. Even though the Government controls prices and is the chief buyer of many foodstuffs, its regulation of agricultural policy can be made more effective by direct restrictions on production, by rationing raw materials, and by establishing priorities in the distribution of raw materials, labour and equipment. In general the British Agricultural programme is designed to increase production, but in some branches of agriculture a decrease in production is •See Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 11 April 1940, Vol. 359, cols. 703-4. * A Committee has recently been appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland to study the problems of the hill sheep industry. 50 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN necessary because it is ho longer possible to import adequate supplies of raw materials. The shortage of imported concentrates and cereals for livestock production is especially serious in Great Britain, and it has therefore been necessary to decrease the number of livestock in the country. The nation's food policy gives preference first to dairy herds, then to beef, sheep, poultry and pigs in that order. Therefore the limited supplies of feeding stuffs must be distributed among the different producers according to what they produce. There are two methods by which the Government can accomplish this purpose, depending on the degree of shortage that exists. If the supply is adequate to all the requirements of those farmers who are producing the commodities considered essential in the food production programme, the simplest method of ensuring that these producers obtain the available supplies is to cut out the demand for raw materials for the production of the less essential products. This can be done by setting the prices of those products of which a decrease in production is desired so low in relation to the cost of the feedstuffs needed to produce them that only that part of the product produced under the most favourable conditions will be forthcoming, or none at all. If, however, the supply is so short that a reduction is necessary in the consumption of the raw material for all uses, some form of rationing must be introduced. In the absence of rationing, the Government, which is the sole seller, has the choice of setting the price of the raw material so high that only the very lowest-cost producers can continue producing at a profit, or setting the price so low that the amount demanded will be greater than the supply. In the first case the Government will be deliberately increasing the cost and reducing the production of food in an extremely haphazard manner. In the second case, there will be a mad scramble for the available supplies, great discontent among those who came into the market too late to obtain a share of them and an even more haphazard decrease in food production. Rationing of raw material can be used to spread the decreased supplies in a selective manner, giving preference to those producers whose products are most urgently desired. For example, while dairy producers in the United Kingdom receive rations for their entire herds, egg producers were forced to reduce their flocks. Rationing is the most effective way of controlling demand and of ensuring that each producer gets his share of the total supply. If, however, equal rations are given to all producers in the same industry, a uniform reduction in output is forced on all of them without reference to the efficiency of individual producers, or to the AGRICULTURA!, POLICY 51 size of the farm and scale of production. 1 A large-scale poultry or livestock producer has a considerable capital investment in his farm. If he is forced to reduce his flock or herd so far that part of his buildings and equipment are unused, he must work at less than full capacity, and even if he is a most efficient producer, he must make a higher profit on each unit« produced, if he is to avoid a fall in income. This method of rationing raw materials may lead to a higher price for a smaller output than would be necessary if the same output were produced on fewer farms. A waste of land and labour and a higher price to the consumer is the result—a result that may be serious in a country engaged in a total war. If, therefore, the total supply of any particular product is to be obtained at lowest cost to the nation, it is desirable in some cases to discriminate between different producers of the same product in the allocation of limited supplies of raw materials. Any reduction in output should, so far as is practicable, take place at the expense of that part of the total product which is produced at highest cost. In other words, it would be desirable to apply the principle of "concentration of production" to certain branches of agriculture if scarce raw materials are to be used to the best advantage. Ideally, reduction in total output should be made almost entirely at the expense of the less efficient units, whether the differences in efficiency are the result of the size of the farm, the ability of the farmer, or other factors. 2 This would undoubtedly work great hardships on many producers for which the State could compensate them. If the farmer himself is inefficient he can be removed and someone else put in charge of production. If the size of the unit is too small to use labour and equipment most effectively, it may be possible, through co-operation on the part of several farmers, to increase the working size of the unit, irrespective of ownership. 3 The investigations of Lord Astor and Mr. Rowntree 1 An interesting suggestion was made in the House of Commons on 24 July 1941, t h a t tuberculin-tested herds be given special treatment and exempt from any reduction in numbers which might be required. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 373, col. 1099. J In wartime, efficiency, defined in this way, is not the sole criterion of what concentration should take place. Military exigencies, availability of labour supply and special problems of transport must be considered as well. ' The Agricultural Executive Committees have sometimes used their powers to take over land not being properly cultivated for the purpose of taking over land divided into a large number of small holdings where "the tenure itself has been t h e main reason for the poor cultivation. For example, one committee took possession of an area of 150 acres which was divided into 61 separate fields ranging from 0.6 of an acre to 4.5 acres. New ditches were cut and the whole area redivided into a smaller number of larger fields. See Statement of the Minister of Agriculture, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1159. 52 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN led to the conclusion that a flock of less than 400 to 500 birds does not provide full-time employment for one man. When, therefore, several poultry farmers must reduce their flocks far below these figures and are unable to diversify their farms, it is obviously uneconomic to allow all these farms to continue producing at high cost. When poultry is run on mixed farms the same problem is not presented. The suggestion that the authorities should give some attention to the relation between the scale of production and output when it is necessary for them to plan a decrease in production in any branch of agriculture is not made without a full realisation of the tremendous difficulties involved—difficulties more formidable than those encountered in a similar programme in industry. Probably the most serious drawbacks are the inadequate knowledge of costs of production in agriculture, since the relation between cost of production and the total output is the chief criterion of efficiency1, and the effect such a drastic programme would have on the attitude of the farmers. The detailed knowledge of local conditions rapidly being gathered by the Agricultural Executive Committees will facilitate the planning of decreases in the production of some agricultural products and increases in others along the most efficient lines. The programmes must be executed by a judicious use of compulsion and co-operation. The rationing of feedstuffs in Great Britain is not, however, related to the differences in efficiency of various farms but solely to the kind of product produced. This is partly because the predominance of mixed farming in British agriculture makes it possible for livestock producers to grow a large proportion of their own requirements of feeding stuffs. When Mr. Hudson became Minister of Agriculture in June 1940, the farmers were warned that the reduced supply of feeding stuffs would go first to maintain the milk supply and secondly for winter feed for beef cattle and sheep. Pig and poultry producers not producing their own feedstuffs were advised to reduce their livestock by two-thirds. In December 1940 and January 1941 dairy farmers received increased supplies of oil and compound cakes, but the actual rationing of concentrated foods began on 1 February 1941. The pig and poultry rations were 1 "If there is to be a war plan for encouraging agricultural production and, still more, if that is to be followed by a permanent policy in peace-time, it is allimportant that encouragement should not degenerate into protection of inefficiency. In fixing prices in relation to costs, therefore, it is obviously necessary to have costs established according to standards of reasonable efficiency." Sixth Report from Select Committee on National Expenditure, op. cit., p. 10. AGRICULTURAL POLICY 53 based on one-third of the numbers existing in June 19391, while the rations for beef cattle, dairy cows, sheep, farm horses and goats were issued on the basis of the total number of animals on the holding on 4 December 1940. An amount equal to the grain produced on the farm was subtracted from the ration. 2 Cows in milk and in calf received extra rations, and 1 cwt. per month additional ration was given for each 32 gallons of milk in excess of 13^ gallons per day per cow in milk or in calf.8 On 1 October 1941 the winter ration scheme was announced. Farmers had been warned to make themselves as self-sufficient as possible in feeding stuffs. In a joint announcement of 12 October 19404, the Ministry of Food and the Department of Agriculture had urged farmers, in the interest of herd preservation, land fertility and future food supply to retain as far as possible dairy animals suitable for milk production; pedigree stock, the slaughter of which is not necessary on grounds of disease or otherwise; ewes, gimmers and ewe lambs necessary to flock maintenance; yearling beef cattle suitable for further feeding; and heifer calves likely to make useful dairy or beef animals. Again in June 1941 farmers were told that: Supplies of imported feeding stuffs next winter will be very short—so short, in fact, t h a t every milk and beef producer must aim a t making his farm selfsupporting, either by the growing of fodder crops or by making plans for converting aftermath and roughage into silage. There will be a certain quantity of by-products from wheat and a limited tonnage of cake from imported oil seeds. But these must be regarded as "bonuses". I t is for this reason t h a t Mr. Hudson, the Minister of Agriculture, impresses on every farmer the vital need for making his farm self-contained. With this in mind the Minister urges t h a t every inferior animal should be culled—not in the autumn, b u t at once. No animal incapable of showing an adequate return for its keep must be retained. 6 A g r i c u l t u r a l policy is d e s i g n e d t o a v o i d t h e m i s t a k e m a d e i n t h e l a s t w a r of k e e p i n g a l i v e l i v e s t o c k w h i c h c o u l d n o t b e p r o p e r l y 1 Arrangements were made for safeguarding sound pure-bred foundation breeding stocks of poultry from heavy reductions in the rations. Accredited and approved stocks coming under this arrangement are required to be bloodtested a t the veterinary laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture. s T h e requirements of rationed feeds by the stock of any one farm are less if the farm produces any of its own feed. If a farm produced more grain than was necessary for its own stock it was classed as a "surplus" farm a n d the farmer was granted no ration coupons until he had sold the surplus grain. He was then entitled to receive coupons for a weight of protein equal to t h a t of any additional grain he sold. A farmer whose production of feed was less t h a n the requirements of his stock was classed as a "deficit" farmer and received ration coupons to make up t h e deficiency. * Ration Schedule for February and March 1941. 1 Scottish Farmer, 19 October 1940. 6 Scottish Farmer, 14 June 1941. 54 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN fed and which, therefore, produced neither meat nor milk. " I t is far better, in our opinion, to keep a rather smaller head of cattle alive, reasonably well fed and producing milk and meat than to have them, as a farmer put it to me, walking about doing nothing but growing old." 1 In accordance with these warnings, under the new rationing scheme only dairy cows, calves, goats and female kids, pigs and poultry in certain cases, since they eat little grass, and working horses on holdings where grain is not grown, are granted feed rations. Thus beef producers must feed their herds from their own produce, although farmers who have a surplus of oats and a deficiency of protein, or who have grown wheat which they are unable to use for feed, now are allowed to sell their surplus and are given some protein feed in exchange. Farmers are expected to produce enough cereal on their farms for the maintenance of their dairy cows and for the first half gallon of milk from each cow, and they are given feed rations for the cows on the basis of the amount of milk sold or converted into butter and cheese for sale. Concessions are made to farmers who have been unable to grow sufficient feed for the first half gallon of milk, but they are required to take steps to produce fodder crops before next year. Farmers who want to use rationed feeding stuff compounds for the whole of their milk production are given enough coupons provided that they sell to an approved buyer not less than 4 cwt. of feed grain for each cow they own. Poultry producers receive rations on the basis of one-sixth of their pre-war flocks, and commercial poultry keepers will be allowed supplementary rations for chick rearing from January to April 1942 that should enable them to rear chicks up to one-third of their normal pre-war replacements. The proportion of protein in the basic rations for both pigs and poultry has been increased from one-tenth to one-eighth of the total. Poultry keepers with 13 to 50 head of poultry are entitled to purchase feed on the same basis as keepers with more poultry. Those with 12 or fewer birds are only entitled to purchase a specially prepared poultry "balancer meal" which is supplemented by kitchen waste. Tame rabbit keeping is also an economical method of producing meat in wartime, since rabbits can be fed on waste vegetable material from gardens and allotments and on greenstuff from hedges. Domestic Rabbit Clubs have been formed under the general direction of the Domestic Poultry^Keepers Council in England and Wales and of the Scottish Gardens and Allotments Committee 1 The Minister of Agriculture, in Parliamentary 3 April 1941, Vol. 370, col. 1219. Debates, House of Commons, AGRICULTURAL POLICY 55 in Scotland. Domestic rabbit producers breeding rabbits for flesh or fur receive a ration of 7 lbs. a quarter for each breeding doe if they belong to an organised rabbit club. To obtain the ration, clubs are required to sell not less than 50 per cent, of the rabbit meat produced to the common pool, either through retailers, British Restaurants or school and factory canteens. The keeping of pigs on a small scale by all kinds of organisations has become popular and is a method of using large quantities of food otherwise wasted. 1 I t is frequently pointed out that in wartime the production of pigs is undesirable because they compete directly with man for food, but on the other hand they can eat much food grown for man but which man discards as waste and therefore they may be valuable for converting such waste into food. Rations for all livestock are provided from a national pool of feeding stuffs made up of the by-products of manufactures such as milling offals, oil cakes, brewers' and distillers' grains and salvaged wheat, beet sugar residues, dried potatoes, rye and rye products and such quantities of grain as growers may sell. The pool is independent of supplies of imported feed.2 Domestic supplies of feeding stuffs are exploited as fully as possible. The Ministry of Agriculture has put much effort into instructing farmers about the making and use of silage from fresh grass, and the 1941 production of silage is estimated at 2,000,000 tons. 8 The treatment of straw with caustic soda, known as the straw pulp process, will produce a starch food nearer a concentrate and able to replace sugar beet pulp and roots. A campaign among farmers to increase production of straw pulp is conducted along lines similar to the silage campaign. Kitchen waste is collected in most of the towns and converted into swill for feeding pigs. Farmers have recently been urged to make more use of wet brewers' grains and this is one of the few feedstuffs that do not require ration coupons. In addition, they are permitted to use any grain they produce, except unliable wheat, rye and rye products to feed any livestock on their holdings. 1 " T h e Secretary of the Small Pig Keepers' Council reports excellent progress with the formation of pig clubs in England and Wales, and since the Council launched its campaign for pig clubs in May last year, over a thousand have been registered—the 1000th being for members of the Royal Household a t Windsor Castle—and these have over 25,000 members. Already, states the secretary, this movement for converting food, which is usually wasted, into pig meat is producing over 2,000 tons of pig meat a year, and he anticipates t h a t in the very near future, the rate of production will be increased to 30,000 tons a year, which would provide one week's ration for three-fifths of the population. . . . Returns to date indicate t h a t 60 per cent, of the pigs kept by the clubs are sold to the Ministry of Food." Scottish Farmer, 31 May 1941. • Farmers Weekly, 29 August 1941, p. 23. . » Farmers Weekly, 24 October 1941, p. 18. 56 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Miscellaneous Provisions. Supplementing the regulation of relative prices and the system of rationing and priorities is a variety of Government orders, appeals and requests. Propaganda campaigns are conducted among the farmers to acquaint them with the nation's needs and to urge them to produce to meet these needs. The Minister of Food places restrictions on the use of certain products such as those on homegrown millable wheat, rye and maize. The growing of certain crops is directly restricted or prohibited by the Ministry of Agriculture; for example, all glasshouses used for producing crops for sale must be wholly devoted to tomatoes at least six months of the year unless they are planted with permanent crops. Further planting of permanent crops in glasshouses is prohibited, and fruit and flowers must be under-cropped with tomatoes. The area under permanent flower crops must be reduced to 25 per cent, of the pre-war acreage. RESULTS It is not possible at the present moment to evaluate with precision the results of the policy described in this chapter. Figures of production and trade are not published. The few figures given by Government spokesmen indicate that a considerable increase in total production has taken place. Sixteen million acres are now in arable cultivation, and yields in most cases were good in 1941 largely because of the favourable autumn weather. The most outstanding achievement has been the maintenance of milk production at an unexpectedly high level, but in spite of this the distribution of milk is regulated and individual consumption restricted, since demand far exceeds supply, primarily as a result of the free and cheap milk scheme. 1 The following table compares the production and consumption of liquid milk in 1938 and 1941 in England and Wales 2 : September October Production Consumption (Millions of gallons) 1938 1941 1938 1941 89.5 89.0 62.5 80.5 87.5 86.5 64.5 84.0 November 79.5 78.0 1 December 78.0 75.0 1 Year 1,076.0 1,053.0 1 1 Estimated. These figures are probably high. 1 63.5 64.3 754.0 a ^ J S d-$£? d 945.0 1 P See below, pp. 121-122. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1941, Vol. 376, cols. 415-6; together with more recent figures supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture 2 AGRICULTURAL POLICY 57 Thus there has been an increase in liquid milk consumption of nearly 200,000,000 gallons, and the Minister of Food estimated that instead of consuming only 78,000,000 gallons in November the country might have taken over 90,000,000 gallons had this amount been available. 1 The high production in 1941 is particularly remarkable since in the winter of 1940 the picture was most unpromising. In November 1940 the consumption of milk was 18 per cent, greater than that of the previous year, while production had gone down by 14 per cent. 2 Although the numbers of dairy cattle have increased slightly, the numbers of beef cattle, pigs and sheep have declined. Part of the reason for the decrease in beef herds has been the ban on the import of store cattle from Ireland, which kept out store cattle for the greater part of 1941 and was imposed because of a serious outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Ireland. The only cattle imported from Ireland during this period were for immediate slaughter. As a result, British feeders were denied their usual source for the replenishment of their stock, and this affected the number of cattle and the meat supply. Poultry flocks have also declined, although not nearly by two-thirds. The. output of cereals and straw in 1941 was 50 per cent. greater than in peace-time, and the production of potatoes in England and Wales was 50 per cent, above the peace-time figure.8 The output of root crops is estimated to be above the average for the last ten years, although a low yield of sugar beet resulted in an estimated output below average. 4 The production of some vegetables has also increased ¡'tornato supplies in 1940 were one-third greater than in peace-time, and a further 20 per cent, increase was expected in 1941. The 1941 carrot crop was 40 per cent. greater than the previous year's crop. » Ibid. * See statement of Lord Woolton at his Press Conference, 26 November 1940, reported in MINISTRY OF FOOD: Bulletin No. 62, 29 November 1940. 8 The Director of Potato Supplies in the Ministry of Food claims t h a t the consumption of potatoes increased by 10 per cent, in the 1940-41 season and will be even greater in the next season. Daily Telegraph, 3 December 1941. 4 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1941, loc. cit., col. 415. CHAPTER III CONTROL OF SUPPLIES AND OF THE CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION The key to successful food control lies in obtaining control over supplies at their source and over the channels of distribution. Without control over and planned allocation of food supplies no system of price control or rationing is feasible. Control over supplies should therefore be the first step in the execution of a food policy. The problem of controlling supplies at their source varies with thé kind of food and the conditions under which it is produced. Imported foods, home grown foods, and foods manufactured from imported and from domestically produced raw materials, must all be handled differently since the problems inherent in establishing control of these different classes of food vary. Immediately after the outbreak of war the British Ministry of Food set about obtaining control over the supplies of basic foods. Serious shortages had not yet arisen, but it was realised that the maintenance of stocks and the prevention of price dislocations were possible only if control was imposed before serious shortages occurred and prices began to get out of hand. Control over home-produced foods developed very slowly, however, and in the first four months of war control of supplies was only extended to certain imported foods, stocks of dried fruits, cereals and cereal products, butter in cold stores or produced in factories owned by the various Milk Marketing Boards and certain manufactured or processed foods including margarine, cooking fats, bacon and ham. By the end of the first year of war, however, some measure of control over the supplies of all important foods had been established by the Ministry of Food, with the exception of eggs, fish and fresh and canned fruits and vegetables. By the end of the second year of war, eggs, some fresh fruits and vegetables and canned fruits and vegetables had also been drawn under control. No extensive scheme has been devised for controlling supplies of poultry, most CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 59 fresh fruits and vegetables, and fish.1 The extent and type of control varies as between the different foods and in some cases is still unsatisfactory. Although the importance was recognised of establishing control over supplies before they became short and the market disorganised, and before prescribing maximum prices, the administrative difficulties of controlling supplies have hindered the establishment of control over certain types of food even when the need for regulation was great. Extremely perishable foods and foods produced by a multitude of small producers are difficult to control and were left to the last. It must be admitted that these foods presented stiff administrative problems, but it is also clearly demonstrated by the history of food control both in this war and in the war of 1914 that the longer the imposition of control is delayed the more difficult the administrative problems become. 2 Great Britain's policy is largely explained by the necessity of taking "first things first" and therefore of getting complete control of the basic foods before moving to the "less essential" foods. It was not practicable to start controlling all scarce foods at once and consequently things which ought to have been done were left undone chiefly because of practical necessity. In some cases, for example milk, the necessity for an extensive reorganisation of existing distributive channels before effective Government regulation in the interests of the consumer could be established, and the danger of breaking down distribution by this reorganisation, have influenced Government policy, while in other cases, notably meat, the Government has boldly reorganised the whole trade. Whether reorganisation was undertaken or not was to some extent determined by the effectiveness of normal trade channels under war conditions. Under the pre-war conditions of meat distribution, control and orderly distribution would have been impossible in wartime, while, on the other hand, milk distribution was successfully carried out under the most difficult of war conditions. 1 Food control in this war has extended to many products which were not controlled in the last war, but the foods t h a t have caused the Ministry of Food most difficulty to-day are those which caused most difficulty in 1918. " T h e control of domestic agricultural produce proved much the most difficult part of Lord Rhondda's task. Certain schemes, such as the various attempts to establish control of pigs, were admitted to be failures; others, such as the control of eggs, and home produced butter, only partially succeeded; and in t h e case of many commodities from poultry to fresh vegetables, (excluding potatoes), no thorough scheme for controlling supplies and distribution was ever attempted." E. M. H. LLOYD: Experiments in State Control at the War Office and the Ministry of Food (Oxford, 1924), p. 331. 2 For example, when sugar was finally rationed, the following editorial appeared in a trade journal: " T h e general feeling is t h a t the rationing of sugar started too late. Stocks which were to be held over for emergencies were drawn on shortly after the outbreak cf hostilities. Now, valuable shipping space has to be taken up in the transport of sugar for the making up of these stocks." Food Manufacture, 12 April 1940, p. 1. 60 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Control over supplies cannot be separated from control over the channels of distribution, since control over the latter is, in fact, one method of controlling the former. Existing channels of distribution could be left relatively intact in well organised, highly concentrated and reasonably efficient industries, but in many industries organisation was loose or non-existent before the war, and the units of production were small and numerous. In these industries it was necessary for the Ministry of Food to reorganise drastically some part of the distributive process and to create a "bottle-neck" through which it could control the supplies of the commodity concerned. Thus, packing stations have been instituted in the egg distributive chain, and farmers are compelled to sell their eggs to them; meat slaughtering houses are controlled by the Ministry of Food; a vegetable marketing board has been set up as the chief buyer of certain vegetables; a bacon board has been created as the sole buyer of bacon. "Bottle-necks" easily taken over already existed in many trades. For example, flour millers are the "bottle-neck" in the cereal and cereal product trade, and the Milk Marketing Boards in the milk trade. Most imported foods are under the control of the Ministry of Food before they leave the exporting country. Tea, for example, is bought under direct Government contract with producers overseas. Imports of products for which no central importing board has been created are allocated to c.i.f. buyers in proportion to their share of these imports in pre-war days. An Order was made in March 1940 prohibiting the import, except under licence, of foodstuffs not covered by previous Orders. Licences to import foodstuffs are granted on the recommendation of the Minister of Food, so that all such imports may be limited as required by the interests of the country as a whole, particularly in accordance with the need for economy in shipping and foreign exchange. Control over the supplies of agricultural products is generally secured by the licensing of buyers. Control over manufactured and processed food products, however, operates through the licensing of manufacturers and through the control exercised by the Minister of Food over imports and the raw materials of the food manufacturers. Control over supplies of agricultural products, manufactured food, imported food and fish is, however, only the beginning of food control. In times of security it is the sine qua non of any effective food policy, but in addition the food must be sent from the docks,, warehouses, cold stores, slaughtering houses, packing stations, mills and factories to the final consumer with the mini- CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 61 mum of waste. Stocks and supplies coming forward must be estimated in advance so that arrangements for storing and transport can be made. The amount and location of consumers' demand for each product must be accurately known so that all parts of the country will be treated equally and one area will not have a surplus going to waste while in another area housewives are queuing (waiting in line) for scarce supplies. Perishable products must be handled with the utmost speed, yet producers in the most distant parts of the country must be treated equally with the rest. CO-OPERATION WITH TRADERS The work of distribution in peace-time is carried out by private importers, brokers, wholesalers and retailers, most of whom, by virtue of long experience, have a thorough knowledge of their trades. It seemed, therefore, to the food authorities that if the men and women who were accustomed to handling the problems of wholesale and retail distribution could be used as agents of the Ministry of Food to carry on their work in the public interest it would place at the Government's disposal the experience of the food trades as no other system could. Food control, as envisaged before the war by the Food (Defence Plans) Department, was to be a control "exercised through machinery operated, so far as practicable, by food traders themselves and before each plan is completed care will be taken to see that it is understood and regarded as workable by the trades concerned". 1 This was the policy of Lord Rhondda in the last war2 and it is the policy adopted to-day. 3 1 Report of the Food {Defence Plans) Department (H.M.S.O., 1938), p. 9. ' "Generally . . . Lord Rhondda insisted that it was more important to preserve continuity of supply and distribution and to let each trader work with and through the men whose ways he knew, than to bring about social reforms in wartime." Sir William BEVERIDGE: British Food Control (London, 1939), p. 74. ' " T h e intention is t h a t the task of food distribution shall remain in the hands of traders; men who know it from A t o Z and who merely become agents of the Government, which is another way of saying the agents of the public." Broadcast of Mr. W. A. Morrison, Minister of Food, 29 September 1939, quoted in MINISTRY OF F O O D : Bulletin No. 4, 4 October 1939. " I , as you know, am only prepared to exercise control in business where it is absolutely necessary to the public interest. I want the traders of this country to go on doing the jobs t h a t they have done before, feeling as free as possible to do that. B u t some form of Government assistance and Government intervention is necessary. T h a t being the case, I, as Minister of Food, am most anxious t h a t Government intervention shall be carried out in the closest possible co-operation with the trades t h a t it is going to affect. I t is my ultimate business to look after the public interest, b u t I know, too, that I can rely upon you to look after the public interest." Statement of Lord Woolton, Minister of Food, at a meeting of the Food Manufacturers' Federation in May 1940, as reported in The Grocer, 25 M a y 1940, pp. 27-8. 62 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN The policy of working closely with the trades concerned in creating and administering control schemes seems to be sound. It is clear that no Government department could possibly replace all or even a major part of the traders by civil servants and expect to maintain the distributive mechanism without serious breakdown. It is equally clear that any large-scale breakdown in distribution, even for a few days, would seriously inconvenience a great industrial country. Furthermore, the distributive system will function much more smoothly if the traders and the Ministry of Food work in co-operation than it would if the Ministry of Food were constantly employing coercion to force the traders to act against their will. The policy of using the knowledge and experience of those previously dealing in food has led to the appointment of men to act as controllers for the commodities in which they had previously dealt. The majority of the commodity controllers are thus drawn from the trades they now control. 1 Much criticism in the press 2 and in Parliament has been directed at this aspect of the food administration, and it may cause a certain amount of uneasiness and distrust in the public mind. In the beginning "trade" controllers were chiefly advisory, and all important negotiations with traders were handled by civil servants. In evidence before the Select Committee on National Expenditure it was emphasised by the Ministry of Food that the responsibility for ultirnate decisions in questions of manufacture, 1 The controllers cannot, however, maintain an executive interest in their trade. " I t is a condition of appointment . . . t h a t holders should not exercise executive control of any business connected with food importation, manufacture or distribution. While it is recognised t h a t occasionally contact with their busmess interests may be necessary, the over-riding principles which have been laid down are: (¿) t h a t in all circumstances their private trade interests must be secondary to and not conflict with their official duties and responsibilities; (it) t h a t they must give no ground for any suggestion t h a t their firms or businesses are obtaining or are likely to obtain an advantage either during or after the war as a consequence of their appointment." Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1 November 1939, Vol. 352, col. 1946. They need not, however, be divorced entirely from any activity in the trade. " I n a t least one case, an important 'Trade' official has been, simultaneously with performing his official duties in the Ministry, engaged as a Trade representative in negotiating with the Ministry as regards the operating margins to be allowed to his own trade." Fourth Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure (H.M.S.O., 1940), p. 29. 2 Cf. The Economist in discussing the question: "There is no need to assume any deliberate partiality; unquestionably all the controllers are deeply anxious to serve the public interest. But they have an unavoidable bias towards seeing things through the particular spectacles of the interest from which they come. There are a large number of instances where the controller's power has been used to enforce changes in price or in trade practice (such as terms of contract, et cetera) which, whether or not that was their purpose in the controller's mind, have undoubtedly had the effect of benefiting the section of the industry from which he comes a t the expense of its consumers." 9 December 1939, p. 364. CONTROL OP SUPPLIES 63 processing, wholesale and retail distribution, margins and prices "does not, in any case, rest with the 'Trade' Directors concerned and that, in fact, the function of the Trade Directors is no more than advisory". 1 The recommendation of the Select Committee was that: Policy and general plans for achieving it should be clearly settled by the Minister and his civil service staff. Once that has been done full value can be made of the Trade Directors by allowing them discretion in executing the Minister's plans. Apart from this, it is particularly important that no suspicion should be created that individuals interested in a particular trade have been able to exert an influence inside the Ministry on the profit margins to be allowed to such trade.' In a memorandum on the recommendations of the Select Committee, the Ministry of Food stated that: There is a clear distinction of functions between Trade Directors and Administrative Staff. In each Division there is an Assistant Secretary, who is responsible for seeing that the Minister's policy is carried out and for submitting recommendations on questions of policy. The Trade Directors are responsible for carrying out the Control Schemes.* In May 1941, however, certain changes were made in the organisation of the Ministry of Food which were designed to place "more definite responsibility on the Heads of Commodity Divisions". 4 The effect of this reorganisation was to place the trade directors in an executive capacity and the civil servants in an advisory capacity in the commodity controls. With very few exceptions all the commodity directors bearing the "more definite" responsibility are now drawn from the trade they control and their influence over both the formation and the execution of policy is enhanced, although final decisions on policy rest with senior civil servants and the Minister of Food. It does not follow that these directors have a free hand, however, since they are under close observation. The Press, Parliament and officials of the Ministry of Food know from what trade and firm each director is drawn, and some directors are unduly rigorous in avoiding any suspicion that they are aiding their trades directly or indirectly. There is reason to believe that many of them are increasingly looking at their work as a public service and are acting accordingly. 1 Fourth Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, op. cit., p. 29. *Ibid. * Memorandum by the Ministry of Food in Eleventh Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, 1939-1940 Session, p. 12. « Press Notice No. 1027, 20 May 1941. 64 POOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN The policy of maintaining as far as possible the existing channels of trade is an extension of the policy of working with and through the food traders. Subject to the right cf the public to fair distribution of food at reasonable costs and to the need for the greatest possible economy in the use of transport and man-power, it is the policy of the Ministry to avoid interference with the normal machinery of food distribution. 1 In more than one case, as we shall see, the "normal machinery of food distribution" was inefficient and wasteful and consequently resulted in excessive cost to the consumer. In a few cases drastic reorganisation was called for in the interests of the public, but the interference with the normal machinery necessary was so great that the Ministry of Food approached it with great reluctance. The Minister of Food does not believe that the general question of reorganisation of the distributive trades should be taken up in wartime, in spite of the fact that if waste and inefficiency exist in retail distribution they act as an offset to the food subsidy policy.2 The question involved is indeed how far social reform should be carried in wartime. There have been far-reaching changes in the distribution of many commodities, but these have been almost invariably effected slowly and under public pressure. The basic principles followed in the organisation of control over supplies and distribution are therefore: (a) the principle of obtaining control of supplies at first hand by outright purchase or by the licensing of buyers, importers and producers; and (b) the principle of using the peace-time channels of trade and the peace-time personnel as far as possible. U S E OF NORMAL TRADE MACHINERY Efficient and smooth distribution in peace-time depends upon what are called "trade connections". These connections are built 1 Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary of t h e Ministry of Food in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5 August 1941, Vol. 373, col. 1797. 2 In a debate in the House of Lords on 19 June 1940, Lord Woolton, Minister of Food, stated t h a t two recommendations of the Committee on National Expenditure had not been adopted : the appointment of a tribunal to control margins and profits, and of a committee to consider the reorganisation of the distributive trades. The first would take up too much time of many competent men and officials; and the second would better be taken in hand when the war was won. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, Vol. 116, col. 639. The Committee appointed by the President of the Board of Trade to investigate the conditions of retail trade left out food distribution a t the request of the Minister of Food. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 65 up from the demand of the final consumer; for, paradoxicallyenough, distribution must start with the consumer. Commodities may flow from producer to consumer, but it is the consumers' demand that sets the process in motion. To meet the requirements of over 46 million people in Great Britain, housewives and buyers for innumerable types of catering establishments demand food from retailers or wholesalers. Each retailer has a more or less steady clientele upon which he relies. He bases orders to his wholesalers upon his experience with this 'demand. Similarly, wholesalers depend upon the demand of the retailers regularly buying from them in making estimates of the quantities they order from brokers or primary suppliers. Groups of buyers and sellers come to know each others' habits. Relations based on confidence in each other's integrity are established and credit is freely given so that transactions frequently become almost automatic—the buyer having confidence in the products of the seller and the seller having confidence in the integrity of the buyer. The trader's reputation—the "goodwill" accorded him—becomes a recognised business asset. On these foundations "the existing channels of trade" are built. Frequently traders will suffer financial losses with less perturbation than they will suffer interference with their trade connections, often built up slowly over a long period of years —easily damaged and exceedingly difficult to restore. These trade connections facilitate the smooth working of distribution, and even in wartime the Government is loath to interfere. Yet the Government must interfere. War itself interferes with the usual sources of. supply; expected ships come in at different ports, or do not come in at all; and shortages develop which make it impossible for suppliers to fulfil their orders. In order to ensure fair distribution the Ministry of Food must take over and pool the supplies of many important products. Thus, retailers who are accustomed to handling imported bacon found themselves unable to continue in business without help when the bacon imports into Great Britain were cut off. The Ministry of Food therefore requisitioned part of the domestic supplies—sometimes as much as 50 per cent.—in order that available supplies should be distributed among all dealers irrespective of the kind of bacon they handled in the past. Shortly after the outbreak of war the Ministry of Food requisitioned and pooled1 stocks of imported supplies of cereals and cereal products, tea, imported canned meat, imported meat, imported 1 "Pooling" does not necessarily mean the production of a standard product, b u t usually means that available supplies are treated without reference to ownership or quality for the purpose of distribution. 66 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN bacon and hams, dried fruits, sugar, butter, imported pork in cold store, imported lard, oilseeds, vegetable oils and fats and marine oils, and margarine and cooking fats. Sometimes the Ministry of Food had to interfere with normal trade practice in order to protect food from enemy action. Thus, stocks of tea were taken over because they were concentrated around the port of London and for reasons of security it was necessary to scatter them more widely over the country. As shortages arise and maximum prices are imposed to prevent the exploitation of the consumer, distribution tends to become uneven and commodities disappear from the areas farthest removed from the source of supply, since transport costs are higher when food is sent to more distant areas. In this war, the extensive shifts of population further disrupt the "existing channels of distribution". As the war goes on and economic organisation becomes tighter, existing channels of trade must be increasingly interfered with, and the process is by no means finished. We have seen the importance of the ties binding wholesalers and retailers together. Yet beginning in June 1942 the purchases of retailers will be confined to wholesalers in their own district. This is a drastic interference with normal trade channels made necessary by the importance of economising transport. When the Government introduces food control it must not only impose restrictions on traders, but in most cases must "take over" certain industries and itself direct the activities of the industry. When the Government "takes over" an industry or a firm, it does not, as a rule, interfere with the internal organisation of the firm but simply assumes the responsibility for decisions as to buying and selling. The private traders are then employed as agents of the Government and they buy and sell on behalf of the Government in accordance with its instructions. These traders are licensed to act for the Government, and instead of buying and selling for profit they operate on a commission basis or subject to specified margins. It is frequently not possible or desirable, however, to leave the distributive structure substantially unchanged, and the Government has set up a distributing company of its own to deal with many commodities. Nevertheless, even in these cases the Government companies are largely staffed by men experienced in the trade. Administration is consequently left in the hands of traders as far as possible. Similarly, when the Government requisitions stocks of food, it does not take the food away from the traders but simply assumes control over the disposition of the stocks. The most common form of requisitioning order decrees that persons CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 67 owning, having power to dispose of, or in possession of, stocks of the commodity concerned above a specified minimum situated in the United Kingdom at the time of the order in any bonded, general or other public warehouse are required to put them at the disposal of the Ministry of Food and to deliver them on order of the Ministry of Food. If imported products are covered by the order, persons owning or having power to dispose of stocks of the product above a specified minimum arriving in the United Kingdom after the order, or situated outside of the United Kingdom, are required to transfer ownership of the products to the Ministry of Food. The orders only apply to food in merchantable condition and fit for human consumption. Dealers are required to give returns of their stocks to the Ministry of Food and to report the location of the food. Dealings outside the United Kingdom are generally prohibited. Orders along these lines have been made for many products including cereals and cereal products, oils and fats, butter, imported lard, margarine and cooking fats, dried fruits, imported meat, cheese, tea, sugar, bacon and ham. Importance of Trade Organisation. Wherever possible the Government relies on the members of each trade to solve the vast number of administrative problems that arise, but the more integrated the internal organisation of the industry, the easier it is for the Ministry of Food to make arrangements for the industry as a whole, and the easier it is for those in charge to ensure that these arrangements are carried out. 1 It is a simpler matter for the Ministry of Food to come to an agreement with two or three large firms than with a multitude of small ones. When the industry concerned is composed of many small dealers, the Ministry of Food encourages and sometimes requires the dealers to get together in a larger organisation for the purpose of appointing representatives to deal with the Ministry. I t is recognised in the field of labour that collective bargaining between employers and employees of an entire industry cannot be conducted satisfactorily unless both sides are organised. The principle is exactly the same when it comes to collective bargaining between the Government and the firms or shops in industry. 1 "The achievement of an ordered plan depends on central organisation; but the centralisation need not necessarily be in the hands of the Government. The more any trade was organised the less Government intervention was needed ; and the more individualistic the methods and traditions of any trade the more bureaucratic and highly centralised became the emergency organisation." E. M. H. LtOYD: op. cit., p. 370. 68 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Many Orders of the Ministry of Food would be impossible to carry out without the co-operation of the trade, and to obtain this co-operation it is necessary to find men sufficiently representative of the trade to act for it. In the war of 1914-18, although the powers which could on paper be exercised by the Government were despotic, in practice the Food Controller was a constitutional monarch who could only govern with the support and approval of any particular trade. The voluntary co-operation of traders and manufacturers was at least as important as the wide compulsory powers conferred by the Defence of the Realm Act: all the innumerable Boards, Councils, Associations, and even Advisory Committees which were associated with the work of the controlling departments, functioned to some extent as representative governing bodies of the trade or industry concerned. Some of these bodies merely bargained and negotiated, others advised on policy, some acted as courts of appeal for disputes between traders or between the Government and individual traders; others took on more definite administrative functions, such as the rationing of raw materials or the allocation of orders; but all of them, even the least effective and most ephemeral, shared some of the responsibility for the working of control and contributed to the smoothness or friction with which it was administered. They all illustrate to a greater or less degree that limitation and devolution of power alone made control possible.1 In food control to-day, trade representatives and trade associations are performing similar functions. The associations serve as forums for the discussion of problems of food control by the traders, and their representatives on the food control committees and advisory committees are thus in a better position to reflect the opinion of the trade as a whole. 2 There are five trade members on each of the local Food Control Committees, and trade representatives sit on all the commodity advisory committees. Thus the distribution of tea, for example, which is based upon the normal trade machinery, is controlled by the Tea Control Committee, with whose assistance the original control scheme was drawn up. This Committee is composed of three sections: one section represents producers, who advise on purchase ; another represents brokers, who form the "selling section" and arrange grading and the allocation of tea to blending and packing firms; the third is composed of representatives of the distri1 ! Ibid., pp. 352-3. The experience outlined in a report presented to the annual conference of the Scottish Federation of Grocers' and Provision Merchants' Associations is a common one. ". . . Representatives of the Federation have served since January 1938 upon Retailers' Advisory Committees of the then Food (Defence Plans) Department, now the Ministry of Food. Throughout the year, and particularly since the outbreak of war and the coming into force of food control, still closer consultation has been maintained with the Ministry of Food, which has since set up various Advisory Committees for different commodities. Upon those Advisory Committees representatives of the Federation have served, involving constant attendance at meetings in London as well as in Scotland." The Grocer, 8 June 1940, p. 21. CONTROL OP SUPPLIES 69 butors. Under control, the responsibility of the Ministry of Food must start with the primary suppliers and go right down to the consumer. Effective organisation, however, requires that at each stage the co-operative functioning of all or a majority of the traders in that stage should be obtained. This co-operation can best be effected if the traders concerned are organised. Therefore, bakers' associations, millers' associations, butchers' associations, grocers' associations, wholesale meat supply associations, etc., are created if they do not already exist. Mr. Lloyd observes that the form of organisation adopted in the last war, which is similar to that adopted in this war, "has points of resemblance both to the horizontal cartel and to the vertical trust. The logical form of organisation to which it approximated might be defined as a vertical combination of horizontal associations." 1 One problem arises from the extensive use of trade organisations and trade personnel. It is not unnatural for any firm or industry to refrain from doing anything not absolutely necessary that might prejudice its post-war position. Nor is it unnatural for a firm or industry to take advantage of any opportunity that might arise to improve its post-war position. This is an aspect of the food situation which must be carefully watched. It is difficult to tell how successful the Ministry of Food in Great Britain has been in preventing some firms and industries from taking advantage of their position in this manner. I t is frequently alleged that British food control unduly favours the larger organisations. The question of the position of the small trader is a peculiarly vexing one. Criticism of the Ministry of Food for hurting the small man not infrequently comes from the same people who also criticise the Ministry for putting as much emphasis as it does on maintaining the existing channels of trade and for thereby failing to organise food distribution in the most efficient manner. To some extent the most efficient organisation of distribution is in conflict with the existence of many small traders. From the point of view of the war effort the less waste in distribution the better, but the social and political effects of driving many small men out of business are not to be ignored. The policy of the Ministry undoubtedly represents a compromise between these two aspects of distributive organisation, and in several respects food policy is deliberately designed to help the small trader. One reason for requiring consumers to register for commodities at a particular shop was that it was felt that if they were thus assured of their supplies from the local grocer they would register with him and buy from him if they normally had done so instead of preferring the larger shop 1 E. M. H. LLOYD: op. cit., p. 351. 70 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GRBAT BRITAIN with its greater stocks and perhaps greater certainty of supplies. On the other hand registration was not required for points rationing 1 because this ration covered a variety of goods and the consumer would probably register with the large shop for that reason. The ability of the consumer to purchase without registration gives the small man a chance to get some of the custom even if the variety of goods he carries is less than that of the big shops. ALLOCATION OF SUPPLIES Since under control commercial incentives no longer regulate distribution, it is necessary for the Ministry of Food to adopt other criteria for the guidance of those in charge of buying and selling foodstuffs. Demand is no longer equated to supply by the movements of prices, and the reduced supply must therefore be allocated as fairly as possible among the various distributors on some other basis. For whatever method of allocation is adopted, a large and competent statistical organisation within the Ministry of Food is required. The uncertainty attached to all forecasts must be minimised, since mistakes have more serious consequences in wartime than in peace-time. Calculations as to profit to be made on any transactions are replaced in the books of distributors by statistics showing the location and amount of demand, which are ultimately based for the more important commodities on the registrations of consumers. Rationed foods and foods for supplies of which consumers are required to register are distributed in accordance with the consumer's registrations, with the exception of tea, which is distributed to retailers on the basis of the supplies received immediately prior to rationing and those foods rationed in accordance with the points scheme. The first allocation of these last-mentioned foods was done on the datum period principle with certain modifications, and subsequently they were distributed on the basis of the coupons turned in by retailers. As the number of foods included in this scheme was extended, the problem of allocation became increasingly more difficult because, although each retailer can be given a collection of foods equal in "point value" to the coupons he has turned in, there is no way of determining the distribution of his consumers' purchases among the different foods. So long as the foods included in the ration were close substitutes both nutritionally (i.e. chiefly proteins) and from the standpoint of consumers' tastes, the pro1 See below, p. 117. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 71 portion of each food to the whole was less important. 1 When, however, dried fruits, sago, tapioca, rice and some other cereals were added to the points ration, which originally included primarily canned meat and fish, the difficulties of allocation were increased, since the substitutability of all foods in the ration is diminished. If a consumer requires prunes, he will not be content with fish. It would seem that if a differential marking of the coupons valid for the different classifications of food—i.e., proteins, cereals and fruit—could be adopted this difficulty would be mitigated. Unrationed commodities are distributed on the datum period principle. 2 Each wholesaler is allocated a certain proportion of the supplies that he handled in the basic period selected for the calculation—generally a pre-war period. The wholesaler is supposed to supply retailers with the same proportions of the amounts they bought from him in the basic period. Dealers in controlled foods must apply for buying permits from the agents of the Ministry of Food before supplies can be allocated. The datum period system has many serious disadvantages, but in the absence of some form of limitation on demand it is an easily adopted, rough and ready method of allocating supplies. When the datum period is used as a basis for allocation of supplies no account is taken of changes in the existing channels of trade. In fact, if the datum period is strictly adhered to, changes are prevented and existing inefficiency and waste are preserved. There is no assurance to any individual consumer that he will get his supplies, and if a proportionate reduction is forced on rich and poor alike the reduction will bear harder on the poor, since their consumption is lower and consequently each unit of the product is more important, even necessary, to them. 8 Nor does allocation according to a datum period make allowances for changes in the distribution of population. This has been of particular importance in the United Kingdom in the present war, and manufacturers and distributors are supplied with figures of the movement of population to help them adjust their allocation of unrationed foods.4 Efforts are made to prevent dealers in food from changing their buying habits as a result of control. For example, catering 1 Unless, however, each retailer receives the foods in the same proportions as other retailers, there is a p t to be disatisfaction. For example, some retailers complained in the first distribution that they received little salmon while others received salmon up to as much as 50 per cent, of their total supplies of the "points" food. 1 Until dried fruits were rationed, however, they were distributed according to the distribution of the sugar registrations. ' See Sir William BEVERIDGE: op. cit., pp. 184-5. 4 These figures are estimated from the statistics of consumers' registration for sugar. 72 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN establishments and public institutions are encouraged to take meat from retailers and not from wholesalers if they did this before the war. Supplies are granted only to established firms and only if they were dealing before the war in the particular commodities concerned. In principle, licences to retail specified commodities are only granted if the retailer handled the commodities before the war *, but they must have been granted rather freely, however, since in July 1941 it was considered necessary to withdraw supplies of any rationed commodity from shops with fewer than 25 customers registered for that commodity. 2 This step was taken because the number of shops with rationing registrations was found to be greater than the number of retail food traders before the war, and large numbers of these shops had only a few registrations. " I t was clear that it had become the practice for retailers in one kind of trade to branch out into another kind in order to get their household supplies at wholesale terms." 8 Any retailer was entitled to plead hardship as a result of the enforcement of this order and have his case examined by the Food Control Committees. No automatic transfers take place until this examination is completed. 4 Although licences to trade by retail have been required since the beginning of the war for all the principal foods and to trade by wholesale in those foods of which the Ministry of Food desired to obtain complete control, it was not until August 1941 that a really extensive licensing system was started for most foods at all stages of distribution. At this time the Food (Restriction on Dealings) Order was issued which prohibited, from a date to be announced later, wholesale dealings in some sixty foods except under licence. During the autumn of 1941 one food after another was brought under the Order, until, by the end of December, trading in virtually every food listed in the original Order and a few more was subject to wholesale licences. On 26 November catering establishments were required to obtain licences for the purchase of some eighty foods, and at the end of December an order came into force extending the list of foods for which a retail licence must be obtained to cover all foods coming under the order applying to catering establishments. By the end of 1941, therefore, no food of any importance could be dealt in at any stage of distribution except under licence. 1 2 8 Exceptions are made, however, when the consumers' interest requires it. MINISTRY OP F O O D : Bulletin No. 96, 25 July 1941. Ibid. T h e Parliamentary Secretary t o the Ministry of Food stated in the House of Commons on 30 September 1941 t h a t 13,343 shopkeepers in t h e United Kingdom could no longer get rationed supplies because they had no more t h a n 25 registered customers, b u t t h a t 7,991 others in the same category continued to receive supplies on t h e ground of "hardship" if these supplies were c u t off. 4 CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 73 STANDARDISATION OF TRADE CUSTOMS Enforcement of control over some foodstuffs necessitates the standardisation of trade customs so that the forms in which any particular food appears in the market will be less diverse. For example, the variety of cuts of bacon is reduced and only the standardised cuts are authorised to be sold; only two qualities of magarine are permitted; flour extraction rates are specified; standard regulations are set forth regarding wrapping of food, prepacking, size of cans containing vegetables and fruits, meat content of sausages, etc. The co-operation of the trade in the enforcement of these orders is necessary, and trade associations can fulfil important and useful functions in the governing of their respective industries. This standardisation has necessitated great changes in the food industry, and the Ministry of Food has reorganised food manufacturing and processing in accordance with the general policy covering imports, production, processing and manufacturing. The reorganisation of the chocolate industry to increase supplies of slab and low-priced chocolate, emphasis on standardised jam production instead of other methods of preserving fruit, and co-ordination and standardisation of margarine production, are all cases in point. 1 TRANSPORT AND STORAGE To ensure uniform prices throughout the country and to prevent unnecessary movement of goods, the Ministry of Food must have control over the transport of food. For many foods transport costs to all parts of the country are equalised, the Ministry having special financial arrangements with the railways. The Ministry assumed in October 1941 2 complete authority over the transport of all food. Either the movement of food and feeding stuffs can be prohibited, or the Minister of Food can direct the route they must follow, the time of despatch and the destination. Thus congestion of food at particular points can be prevented, timing of shipments can be better controlled, and all unnecessary movement eliminated. The transport schemes for each industry are drawn up with the assistance of the trades, and compulsion is used as sparingly as possible. Directions have been issued by the Ministry regarding the transport of potatoes, and the movement of 1 See below, pp. 100-101, 95-96 and 90 respectively. ' S.R. & O. 1941, No. 1694. 74 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN potatoes between certain specified destinations has been prohibited except by sea. Potatoes coming under the order and delivered to a carrier for transport must be accompanied by a written statement of their destination and the name and address of the consignee. Beginning 29 June 1942 a scheme to economise transport of goods from wholesalers to retailers will be put into effect. The country has been divided into sections and each retailer will have to draw his supplies only from the wholesalers in his section. In every food division there are Assistant Divisional Food Officers for Transport. These officers work in co-operation with Port Food Movements Officers and the Food Movement Control Section at the headquarters of the Ministry and are ready to assist any trader in regard to the problem of moving his produce. Special arrangements have been made to assist farmers in securing the transport of their cattle to the collecting centres. If farmers indicate on the forms used to notify the Ministry of the animals they are sending that transport is required, the district chairman of auctioneers will arrange transport for them with the representative of the local hauliers. The determination of charges is left to be settled by local bargaining. The scheme is designed to eliminate overlapping and duplication of routes by hauliers with a consequent waste of fuel. Immediately after the outbreak of war the Ministry of Food issued an order requiring that all deliveries into and out of cold stores be subject to licence, and providing for the keeping of records and for inspection of premises. Later orders gave the Ministry complete control of the management of cold stores and of the charges imposed. The Ministry keeps large supplies of food in cold stores and warehouses throughout the country. The general storage policy is governed by the need for decentralisation, and stocks are therefore scattered as widely as is practicable. APPLICATION OF CONTROL OVER SUPPLIES AND DISTRIBUTION The important foods produced by the British farmer are cereals, meat, milk, eggs, vegetables and fruits. Control of all of these foods must start with the farmer, and machinery must be set up for obtaining control over farm products when they leave the farmer's hands. The primary manufactured and processed food products in Great Britain are oils and fats (chiefly butter, margarine and cooking fats), cheese, condensed milk, bacon and ham, meat products, cereal products, sugar, jams and preserved fruits, canned fruits and vegetables, and canned and processed fish. For these CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 75 foods control must begin with the manufacturer or processor. The only other home-produced food of importance is fresh fish, and control over this product must start with the first landing of fish. Imported foods are controlled from the time they enter the country. The raw materials for the production of many commodities, of which margarine and cooking fats are among the most important, are imported by the Ministry of Food, and the manufacturers operate as its agents. Control of these products starts with the importation of the raw material and extends through its manufacture and distribution. There are a variety of methods of inducing farmers to sell their products to the agents of the Ministry of Food. Control starts with the licensing of firsthand buyers and the prohibition of any sale except to a licensed buyer. Sometimes subsidisation of the price paid to the producer is used as an incentive, not only to increase production, but to encourage farmers to sell their products to the agencies appointed by the Minister of Food. The marketing of some products, for example wheat, milk and potatoes, was regulated under pre-war marketing Acts, and the problem of obtaining control over the supplies of these products was simplified since machinery for drawing farmers' products into the desired hands already existed. In the following pages the important measures taken to apply the general principles outlined above to the main groups of foodstuffs are described. Cereals and Cereal Products The marketing of wheat was regulated before the war under the Wheat Act of 1932. Consequently, it could be fairly easily brought under control. Furthermore, the greatest demand for wheat comes from the flour mills, and when the Government took over these mills it became the biggest buyer of wheat. The first home grown wheat control order was issued in November 1939. This order prohibited the sale of wheat except to flour millers or other approved buyers, unless by special permission of the Ministry of Food and under certain restrictions. Approved buyers were permitted to buy only from growers registered under the Wheat Act, except under licence. Later orders provided that all millable wheat, except that used for seed, must be used for human food, and specified the proportion of millable wheat that could be used for purposes other than flour milling. Immediately after the outbreak of war the Government issued 76 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Orders 1 requisitioning all stocks of cereals2 and cereal products 8 in the country, and all cargoes on arrival, prohibiting the operation of all dealings in cereals, except under a licence of the Minister of Food, and controlling and licensing flour mills. The importation, purchase and disposal of all cereals is controlled by the Cereals Division of the Ministry of Food, and the members of the trade act on its behalf. An agreement covering the first year of war was made in June 1940 between the National Federation of Corn Trade Associations and the Ministry of Food, whereby the firms in the trade agreed to place their staff and offices and the staff and offices of the Port Corn Trade Associations at the disposal of the Ministry, in return for which the Ministry agreed to pay the Federation for subdivision among members of the trade a sum equivalent to 2s. 7J^d. per ton of all wheat and other cereals imported into the United Kingdom, subject to a maximum payment of £ l M million for the first year of war. 4 The country is divided into eight port areas, and a Port Area Grain Committee was appointed by the Board of Trade for each area. All persons other than millers were required shortly after the outbreak of war to furnish details of stocks to the Port Area Committees, to place their stocks (if they exceeded 50 tons) at the disposal of the Port Area Committee in the area, and to deliver these stocks on its order. 6 Under another order every miller is required to furnish details of his business, including its address, output, capacity and facilities for grain intake. Detailed records must be kept and all premises must be open for inspection by agents of the Ministry. Each miller must obtain a licence from the Ministry of Food, and this licence may be granted subject to any conditions the Ministry sees fit to impose, including provisions regarding the kinds and quantities of cereals the miller may mill, the cereal products he may produce, the management and use of any mill or any plant or machinery at any mill, regulations as to any work or as to the engagement of any worker and regarding deliveries into or out of any mill. 6 » S.R. & O. 1939, Nos. 1035, 1037, 1038 and 1039. 2 Cereals include wheat, maize, barley, oats and rye, millet, canary seed, dari, Kaffir corn, peas, lentils and beans (other than soya beans) and all pulse and grain (other than rice). 8 Cereal product means any product produced by the milling of any cereal. 4 Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 June 1940, Vol. 362, col. 260. 6 See S.R. & O. 1939, No. 1035. « See S.R. & O. 1939, No. 1037. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 77 Up to 23 March 1942 flour millers were allowed to produce National Straight Run flour, National Wheatmeal flour1 and certain proprietary self-raising flours, but were required to give priority to the production of National Wheatmeal flour to meet all demands. On 11 March the Minister of Food announced that no flour other than National Wheatmeal flour and certain proprietary brown flours could be manufactured after 23 March. Since stocks of white flour had to be used up, millers were allowed to deliver white flour if they delivered at the same time three times as much Wheatmeal flour, and bakers were allowed to use up to 25 per cent, of white flour in bread. The introduction of this change at a time when summer was approaching made it unnecessary for the Minister of Agriculture to alter the winter feedstuffs ration schedule. Control orders have been applied to oats, dried peas, beans and lentils, barley, rye and threshed peas, along lines similar to those followed in the order for wheat. The use of rice otherwise than as human food is prohibited except under licence of the Minister of Food. The manufacture of bread, biscuits, cereal breakfast foods and oat products is controlled by licensing, and special regulations as to the marketing of bread have been made. The sale of bread is prohibited except in four specified shapes, and with certain minor exceptions the sale of sliced banded or wrapped bread is forbidden.2 No person is permitted to manufacture any bread from dough containing more than two pounds of fat (including oil) to each 280 pounds of flour. From 6 April no white bread will be sold except under licence, and from 20 April the manufacture of food containing flour will be prohibited unless 75 per cent, of the flour contained in it consists of flour of not less than 85 per cent, extraction. Retailers and wholesalers are required to obtain a licence to deal in bread, biscuits, breakfast cereals, oat products and rice and other cereal products. Thus the manufacture and distribution of cereal products is rigidly controlled by a system of licensing of producers and dealers. The key to wheat control lies in the control of the flour mills. Wheat is the most important of the cereals for human food. Oats and rye are consumed by human beings to a lesser extent but are primarily used for animal feeding stuffs, as is barley, although 1 An extraction rate of between 75 and 85 per cent, was prescribed for National Straight Run flour and of 85 per cent, for National Wheatmeal flour. In November 1941 only 4.2 per cent, of the total quantity of wheat milled in the United Kingdom was converted into National Wheatmeal flour. 2 The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Pood has stated that £1,000,000 annually is expected to be saved by the prohibition of the wrapping of bread. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 8 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 997. 78 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN barley is used also in the brewing industry. Wheat offals are an important feedstuff, the production and distribution of which are controlled by the Ministry of Food. Meat and Meat Products Meat is imported by the Minister of Food, and early in September 1939 stocks of imported meat were requisitioned and dealers required to obtain a licence. A Meat Importers' National Defence Association was organised and began operations in December. This association includes every meat importing firm in the country and buys for its members, but acting on a fee basis, as an agent of the Ministry of Food. Control over home-produced meat supplies 1 was obtained by taking over the slaughterhouses, but this was delayed until the middle of January 1940, notwithstanding criticism in the press2 and Parliament. Meat policy and prices went through a confused series of changes between the outbreak of war and the imposition of full control. In January 1940 a series of orders established full control over slaughtering, sales and wholesale and retail prices, and created a co-ordinated scheme for the collection and distribution of livestock. The slaughter of livestock for human consumption is prohibited except under licence from the Ministry, and all livestock must be sold to the Ministry or its agent. All stock must be registered with the Ministry of Agriculture and all slaughtering accounted for. When livestock is ready for sale the farmer must notify the Ministry of Food. The livestock is then brought to fixed marts for grading, which is done on a live weight basis by a district chairman of auctioneers appointed by the Ministry. Slaughtering is done at Government-controlled abattoirs at fixed rates. Commissions are paid to the auctioneers who run the collecting centres, and the contract of the slaughterhouse contractors is based on a per capita charge on the animals handled. There is, of course, a certain amount of unauthorised slaughtering, but the extent of this is insignificant. The most far-reaching change in the meat distributing structure has been the enforced 1 " M e a t " in the following discussion excludes rabbits, poultry, game, horseflesh and goat meat. 8 The Economist wrote on 14 October 1939 (p. 64): " A t the moment, trade in fat livestock is continuing on normal lines within the limits of the maximum prices laid down by the Ministry of Food. When prices a t auctions are bid up to these levels animals are allotted on a basis of the purchaser's previous requirements, or sometimes by the toss of a penny. These mathods are not above criticism from the farmers, and it is hoped t h a t the Ministry of Food will soon be able to enforce the full war scheme of State purchase through recognised agents." CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 79 centralisation of slaughtering. Before the war, large numbers of one-man slaughterhouses existed which made centralised control very difficult, but the number of slaughterhouses has been reduced by 95 per cent, since the Ministry took over the killing of fat stock. 1 Much waste was thereby eliminated, since the full-time operation of most slaughterhouses is now possible. There has been considerable opposition from the farmers to the practice of buying on a live weight basis, i.e. on the estimated killing out percentage of the animal, but the administrative difficulties of keeping track of each farmer's animals separately in order to pay for them according to their actual dead weight are too great to permit the adoption of that system. In November 1941 maximum prices of goat meat were established and the cuts and description of goat meat on sale by retail were specified. At the same time provision was made in another order for control of the sales and prices of horseflesh fcr human consumption, wholesale dealings were made subject to licence, and the manufacture and sale of meat products containing horse flesh was prohibited. The sale of horseflesh for human consumption on premises where other meat is sold for that purpose or where horseflesh is sold not for human consumption is also prohibited. The transport of meat to the wholesale depots was originally carried out by the Wholesale Meat Transport Association. Imported meat was distributed from the ports and from the cold stores by a pool of meat vehicles operated by the Wholesale Meat Transport Association. Meat transport, however, has recently been taken over by the Ministry of War Transport in order to save fuel and vehicles. The country is divided into eight Wholesale Meat Supply Areas and in each area the principal meat wholesalers have combined into Wholesale Meat Supply Associations. These associations have power to organise practically all activities of the meat trade in their respective areas as agents of and under the direction of the Ministry of Food. A commission based on a percentage of the turnover is paid to the Meat Supply Associations. The allocation of meat from the Wholesale Meat Supply Associations to the butcher is made through butchers' retail buying committees who appoint their own executives as allocation committees. The latter buy meat from the Wholesale Meat Supply Associations and allocate it to the butchers. The Select Committee on National Expenditure 2 was critical 1 Before the institution of control there were 16,000 slaughterhouses, and a t the time of writing only 779. ! Fourth Report, 1939-40 Session, op. cit. 80 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN of the high cost of the Ministry of Food's meat distribution scheme l and in its Fourth Report recommended that a study of distributive costs of the meat and livestock control scheme as well as other distribution schemes be made. After the publication of this Report the Ministry of Food examined the scheme closely and made several improvements which were published in a memorandum appended to a later Report of the Committee. 2 A large percentage of the pigs in Great Britain are reared for bacon, since porkers are now not so profitable. Pigs can be sold only to authorised buyers, except under licence, and slaughtering is prohibited except with the consent of an agent of the Ministry of Food. An owner of pigs may obtain a licence to slaughter and cure a maximum of two pigs a year for consumption in his own household if he has fed them on his premises for not less than two months. He may not slaughter any pigs he is feeding for someone else. The Pigs Marketing Scheme and the Bacon Marketing Scheme have been virtually suspended under "modification and suspension" orders, but the register of producers under the schemes is maintained. Since these schemes controlled the major part of the domestic cured bacon and production of pork, they furnished a basis for control by the Ministry of Food. Before the war, imports of bacon were also controlled and restricted, on the advice of the Bacon Reorganisation Commission, to about 533,000 tons annually. About 72 per cent, of the total supply was imported. Large quantities come now from Canada and the United States to replace supplies from Denmark and Holland. A Bacon Importers' National Defence Association has been formed which is a combination of the pre-war importing firms and which now imports bacon on behalf of the Ministry of Food. The Ministry of Food took over the curing of bacon between June and August 1940, but since August bacon curing has been done by registered curers under licence from the Ministry who operate in accordance with directions issued by the Minister. Provision is made for inspection of factories, for the keeping of records, and for the testing of quality by the Ministry of Food. The conditions under which producers' licences are issued include regulations regarding the efficiency of manufacture, the cuts and kinds of bacon authorised to be produced, and the disposal of the product. Detailed directions regarding methods of manufacture are set forth. Area Bacon Distribution Officers have been appointed to give directions on behalf of the Minister relating to storage, transport and distribution or disposal of bacon. 1 2 Ibid., pp. 22-23. Sixth Report, 1940-41 Session, p. 47. CONTROL Oí SUPPLIES 81 Bacon and ham producers were brought under control in the second month of the war, but canned meat producers were not controlled until June 1941, when an order 1 was issued prohibiting, except under licence, the manufacture and sale by wholesale of canned meat products with certain specified exceptions. This order also laid down certain quality standards for the canned meat products it covered. Since September 1939, retailers dealing in meat products have been required to obtain a licence. The meat content of sausages is regulated, a minimum of 30 per cent. and a maximum of 45 per cent, by weight being prescribed. Canned meat imports are handled through the Association of Canned Meat Importers—a firm composed of all firms importing canned meat before the war. Since December 1941 canned meat has been rationed, but the Ministry has avoided interfering with the existing channels of trade as far as practicable and all shops and butchers and cooked meat dealers who dealt in canned meats before the war are allocated rations. Although price regulation of poultry and rabbits has existed since November 1940 and January 1941, respectively, no control over supplies or distribution was imposed until the latter part of 1941. In September the sale of rabbits by collectors (those who receive rabbits from the first owner) or by wholesalers was prohibited except under and in accordance with the terms of a licence from the Ministry of Food. Live rabbits, canned rabbits and cooked rabbits sold as part of a meal are not included in the control. In October 1941, wholesale dealing in live poultry (except for breeding, laying or rearing) was made subject to licence. 2 The control over meat supplies and distribution is thorough and complete; only its production by the farmer and its ultimate use by the consumer are outside the sphere of the Ministry of Food. Under control, by-products of slaughter are utilised more fully than in the past. The production of dried blood for animal feed and the utilisation of animal glands for pharmaceutical purposes have increased. The total cost of administration, including the distribution of imported meat, is about £32,000,000 a year. It was the policy of the Ministry of Food in the beginning to distribute fresh and frozen meat in approximately equal proportions to all areas, but in order to lower the costs of distribution, smaller urban areas near producing centres are now supplied entirely with fresh meat 1 S.R. & O. 1941, No. 808. ' Owners of less than 50 head of live poultry and members of registered domestic rabbit clubs are exempt from the necessity of requiring a licence to sell by wholesale. 82 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN when important economies can be made in this way. Supplies of home-produced meat are not evenly distributed throughout the year, and cold stores of frozen meat and canned corned beef are used to offset these fluctuations and to ensure that the ration will at all times be met. Canned meat is rationed separately under the points scheme. 1 Milk and Milk Products Before the war, control over milk supplies was centred in the Milk Marketing Board, which was set up under the Milk Marketing Scheme of 1933. This Board is composed of 17 members, of whom 12 are regional members elected by the producers in each region; 3 are special members elected by the producers in general meeting; and 2 are persons co-opted to the Board by the elected members. Thus it is entirely a producers' board. The Milk Marketing Scheme was originally designed to regulate the flow of milk into the manufacturing and liquid markets and was operated in the interests of the producers. In peace-time, manufactured milk products are subject to competition from imports, while liquid milk, by its very nature, is protected from such competition. As imported dairy products became cheaper during the inter-war period, the price of milk for manufacturing fell and farmers began to withdraw their milk from the manufacturing market and put it in the liquid market. This threatened to upset the price structure of the liquid market, and as a consequence the Milk Marketing Scheme was enacted and the Milk Marketing Board 2 established, under which the receipts of all milk sold in Great Britain are pooled in each of eleven regions and divided among the farmers on the basis of their production of milk, irrespective of the market in which their milk was actually sold. This average return to the producer is called "the pool price". The Milk Marketing Board's control is exercised through its ability to fix the terms of the contract under which the producer is allowed to sell. Producer-retailers are, of course, outside the scheme, but they pay a levy to the Board on the basis of the milk they sell. Producer-retailers deal with 17-25 per cent, cf total retail milk supplies, the co-operative societies handling some 25 per cent. and the large distributors and proprietary firms 50-55 per cent. 1 See below, p. 117. • There are actually four Milk Marketing Boards in Great Britain—a board for England and Wales, for Scotland, for Aberdeen and district, and for the North of Scotland. The discussion here refers to England and Wales, but the constitution, functions and wartime changes are substantially the same for all the boards, although administration differs in many respects. 2 CONTROL OP SUPPLIES 83 Producer-retailers compose, however, about two-thirds of the total number of retailers, although since the war there has been a tendency for their numbers to fall.1 The Milk Marketing Board's powers to protect the producer extended to the fixing of minimum prices in the retail market and consequently of the distributor's margin. From 1 April 1940 the price of milk has been under the control of the Ministry of Food, but the Milk Marketing Board has been maintained. In September 1940 the Minister of Food conferred sweeping powers over the sale, distribution and price of milk on the Board and empowered the Board to terminate or vary any contract to which it is a party. 2 Consumers' interests are assumed to be adequately safeguarded by virtue of the control exercised by the Ministry of Food over the activities of the Board. 8 The price of milk has been raised several times since the outbreak of war, and although the higher price of milk is not due primarily to distributors' margins, the cost of distribution has been one of the chief targets for critics of the milk policy of the Ministry of Food. The loss to the consumer as a result of unnecessary costs in the process of distribution has been commented on by many committees, official commissions and private bodies investigating the milk situation in Great Britain 4 , but no public 1 The Children's Nutrition Council suggests t h a t this fall may be as great as 10,000 from the pre-war level of 70,000. Wartime Nutrition Bulletin, March 1941. In connection with this tendency of the number of producer-retailers to fall, see the statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food (House of Commons, 20 August 1940): "There has been a reduction of the number of producer-retailers of milk during the last eighteen months of 1,736 (2.8 per cent.) . . . due in the main to the sale of businesses, b u t . . . accounted for to some extent by producer-retailers entering into contracts for the sale of milk through the Milk Marketing Board instead of direct to consumers. The quantity of milk sold by producer-retailers in July 1940 was over one million gallons more than the quantity sold in July 1939." »S.R. & O. 1940, No. 1716. 3 "Proper regard for the interests of consumers and distributors of milk in connection with the powers which have recently been conferred upon the Milk Marketing Board will be ensured by reason of the fact t h a t the powers will be exercised under the general supervision of my Noble Friend, and subject to his specific directions where necessary." Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 23 October 1940, Vol. 365, col. 1049. 4 See the following reports: Report of the Reorganisation Commission for Milk (Grigg Commission). Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Economic Series No. 38. H.M.S.O., 1933. Report of Reorganisation Commission for Great Britain (Cutforth Commission). Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Economic Series No. 44. H.M.S.O., 1936. Report of the Committee of Investigation for England on complaints made by the Central Milk Distributive Committee and the Parliamentary Committee of the Co-operative Congress as to the operation of the Milk Marketing Scheme (Whitehead Committee). H.M.S.O., 1936. Report by the Food Council to the President of the Board of Trade on Costs and Profits on Retail Milk Distribution in Great Britain. H.M.S.O., 1937. 84 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN action has ever been taken to improve the organisation of milk distribution. The widespread demand for improvement in distributive methods led the Minister of Food to appoint another committee to examine the subject. The Ministry then resisted all criticisms of milk distribution pending the submission of the committee's report. 1 This report 2 was submitted at the end of September 1940, and the conclusion reached was the same as that reached by each of the other committees—that the existing system of milk distribution was needlessly elaborate and wasteful. The recommendations were, however, rejected by the Ministry of Food on the ground that conditions had changed since its publication. 3 I t is the Ministry's policy in this as well as in other problems of distribution to utilise as far as possible the "existing channels of trade", and although producers have in some instances voluntarily reorganised distributive methods for the purpose of reducing costs, Government intervention has been slow in coming. It is self-evident that little would be gained if attempts to improve distributive methods caused so much dislocation that the complicated system of distribution ceased to function. 4 The consensus of impartial observers is that some interference would be desirable. The Select Committee on National Expenditure pointed out 6 that: War conditions, when centralised control is necessary for public purposes, create an unique opportunity for studying and improving the processes of marketing as well as wholesale and retail distribution. We have been greatly impressed by the report . . . of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Food to examine the Cost of Milk Distribution . . . We refer particularly to the proposal for rationalisation of distribution by restricting milk deliveries in any district to two organisations . . . and also to the proposal for fixing the margin allowed for distributive services . . . " 1 " . . . M y Noble Friend . . . has no intention of instituting any changes in present methods of milk distribution until he has considered fully the report, just published, of the Committee which he appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Perry to advise him on this matter." Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5 November 1940, Vol. 365, col. 1231. 2 Report of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Food to examine the Cost of Milk Distribution (Perry Report). H.M.S.O., 1940. See below, Appendix VII, for the conclusions of this report. 3 "Owing to the altered conditions obtaining since the date of the report of the Committee over which Lord Perry presided, His Majesty's Government have decided t h a t it is not possible for them to adopt the recommendations made." Parliamentary Secretary to t h e Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 2 April 1941, Vol. 370, col. 1004. 4 Lord Rhondda once remarked, referring to the reorganisation of meat distribution in the last war, t h a t the problem was similar to t h a t of rebuilding a bridge without interfering with the traffic. This simile is equally applicable to all attempts to reorganise distribution. 6 Sixth Report, 1940-41 Session, op. cit., p. 11. CONTROL OP SUPPLIES 85 The cost of milk distribution came to the fore during the last war because "Only in the economies to be effected . . . in the costs of collecting and distributing milk did there seem to be any hope of reconciling the demands of producers for high prices and of consumers for low ones". 1 In 1917 a committee was appointed to examine and report on a variety of problems connected with milk production and distribution. In 1918 it forwarded a resolution to the Ministry of Food recommending that the Ministry take over direct control of the wholesale collection, utilisation and distribution of milk. In October 1918 orders were issued giving the Ministry of Food unlimited power over the distribution of milk and providing that all manufacturing and wholesale milk business should come under the control of the Minister of Food and be worked on his account. The control, begun in October, was never carried through because the armistice intervened and the political situation thereupon changed. 2 The high cost of milk distribution is thus not a new problem in Great Britain. However, distributors' costs have risen steadily under the system of fixed retail prices established by the Milk Marketing Board. Competition between distributors, no longer allowed on a price basis, is only possible by increasing services offered the consumer. More and better service means greater costs of distribution. The committee on the cost of milk distribution appointed by the Minister of Food in 1940 considered that price competition among retailers should be restored and for that reason recommended that no retail, semi-retail or wholesale prescription of prices besides the fixed margin should be adopted. The Ministry has, however, extensively intervened to regulate milk distribution. Since the middle of 1940 the delivery of milk in the larger urban areas has been prohibited before 6.30 in the morning. The effect of this restriction is to prevent large retailers from making more than one delivery a day, thus saving transport and fuel. Traders selling milk must hold a licence from the Ministry. Late in 1941 a Milk Movements Branch of the Milk Control in the Ministry of Food was established. "The function of this organisation is to redirect supplies in England and Wales as may be necessary to secure economies in transport and to bring the quantities of milk available in each area into line with changes in demand resulting from wartime population movements, and the Ministry's control of retail distribution." 3 The control of retail 1 2 Sir William BEVERIDGE: op. cit., 263. Wholesale distribution of milk is, of course, controlled in this war through the 8Milk Marketing Boards. Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 14 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1252. 86 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN distribution referred to is the Scheme of Supply created in October 1941 which makes provisions for distribution in accordance with certain priority classifications of the population. 1 In December an order was issued requiring all suppliers to comply with directions issued by the Ministry of Food regarding the acquisition and disposal of milk. Retailers, including producerretailers, were required to make returns stating (a) the quantity of milk they had available for sale in the previous week, showing as separate items the milk produced by them, the milk bought under Milk Marketing Board Contracts, and milk purchased by wholesale other than on Milk Marketing Board Contracts, and (6) their anticipated requirements of milk. This order was designed to locate local surpluses and enable directions to be given to transfer surpluses from one region to other regions where milk supplies were short. Before this order came into operation, producerretailers in rural areas were allowed to sell their surpluses direct, and consequently rural consumers near producers received more than urban consumers. The new scheme will require these producers to give up part of their surpluses to meet the needs of other areas. There has been a considerable increase in milk consumption since the war2 due partly to the enforced restriction of condensed and dried milk supplies, of which over one-third of the total consumption was imported before the war, and partly to the cheap milk scheme described below. It was met by diverting larger quantities of milk from the manufacturing to the liquid market, and during the winter of 1941 no milk was used for manufacturing. The use of milk in the manufacture of some foods is prohibited, and the manufacturers of still other foods are restricted to a specified percentage of their previous consumption. The Ministry is also concerned with improving the quality of milk and has worked out a scheme whereby periodical tests of milk for sourness will be made and advisory visits paid by experts to farms where the milk produced does not reach the required standard, in order to help farmers meet the Ministry's requirements. Milk unsuitable for the liquid market might still be suitable for manufacturing, but since all milk now goes into the liquid market the total production must be up to standard. 8 In contrast with liquid milk, milk products were imported in large quantities before the war and, as noted above, the price of home-produced milk destined for the manufacturer was largely determined by the competition of these imports. In spite of the 1 2 8 See below, pp. 121-127. See above, pp. 56-57. See report in Farmers Weekly, 31 October 1941, p. 19. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 87 fact that since the outbreak of war imported supplies of milk products and the quantity of home-produced milk for manufacturing purposes have been reduced, control of these products developed" very slowly. Although British owners of imported and domestic stocks, both at home and abroad, of Cheddar and Cheshire cheeses were required on 30 December 1939 to give the Ministry of Food full details of these stocks, control over the manufacture of cheese was not imposed until July 1940.' From 1 October 1940, British and imported cheeses have been distributed by the Ministry of Food. Before cheese was rationed allocations were made to the Ministry's agents for distribution through the trade to retailers and caterers and institutions buying from wholesalers, or at first hand on a pro-rata basis in proportion to their sales or purchases during each datum month of 1939, subject to adjustment for the movement of population. Supplies could be obtained only against permits granted by local Food Control Committees and only from nominated suppliers who had to be suppliers from whom supplies were customarily purchased in the datum year. 2 Since the introduction of rationing in May 1941 distribution has taken place against the ration registrations. The reduction in the imports of condensed and dried milk led to an increase in the demand for liquid milk, which in turn further reduced the supply of milk available to condensed and dried milk manufacturers. In September 1939 maximum prices for condensed milk were fixed and retailers dealing in condensed milk were licensed. In June 1940 orders were issued restricting the monthly deliveries of condensed milk and milk powder by manufacturers and importers to 50 per cent, of the total milk solids content of condensed milk or milk powder delivered in the corresponding periods of 1938, and manufacturers of chocolate, confectionery or ice cream, and other trade users except manufacturers of bread 8 or infant or invalid food, were restricted during any specified period in their use of condensed milk or milk powder to 50 per cent. of the total milk solids content in any product manufactured by them in the corresponding period of 1938. In August, each trader was required to furnish condensed milk at the request of retailers who purchased milk from him in the "basic period"—! April 1939 to 31 March 1940. The amount of 1 This order (S.R. & O. 1940, No. 1367) did not control soft, curd, cream or processed cheese. The manufacture of processed cheese was controlled in M a y 1941. » MINISTRY OP FOOD: Press Notice, 7 August 1940, No. 471. » s Bread was placed on the restricted list in September 1940, and the use of cream in ice cream was prohibited, together with t h a t of milk, except under licence, in November. 88 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN milk to be delivered to these retailers each month was set at onetwelfth of the percentage of the deliveries in the basic period which the Ministry of Food specified.1 In October 1940 manufacturers of condensed milk and milk powder were prohibited from operating without a licence, and the milk content of full-cream unsweetened condensed milk was specified. The use of milk and milk products is prohibited in the manufacture of biscuits, bread 2 , buns, pastries, cakes, rolls, scones and similar articles, ice cream, sweetmeats and synthetic cream. The Minister of Food announced in the winter of 1941 that no milk would be diverted to manufacturing until the demand for liquid milk was satisfied. There is consequently very little milk being used for manufacturing in Great Britain, imports making up an overwhelming proportion of the supply of cheese and condensed milk. The full Canadian production of condensed milk available for export is purchased by the Ministry of Food and large amounts are obtained under the Lend-Lease arrangements from the United States. Special provisions have been made for the distribution of American condensed milk. This milk may be sold to retailers only under a permit of authority issued by the Ministry of Food or a Food Control Committee. Retailers and other dealers must nominate in writing their primary supplier, and milk may be obtained only from the supplier nominated. Traders may nominate only one supplier and can change suppliers only with authorisation of the Ministry of Food or a Food Control Committee. 3 Dairymen must restrict their sales to registered non-priority consumers. Retail trade in this condensed milk is conducted entirely by the retail dairymen, subject to directions of the Ministry of Food. United States evaporated milk will be handled by the normal trade channels accustomed to deal in condensed milk, except a t the point of sale to the consumer. The decision t h a t it should be sold through the retail dairyman rather than the retail grocer was taken solely to ensure t h a t it is distributed to non-priority consumers in direct association with liquid milk. There is no question of compensation for loss of turnover, as the whole of the supply of liquid milk available 1 S.R. & O. 1940, No. 1606. The specified percentage for September and October was 75 per cent, for full-cream sweetened, 50 per cent, for full-cream unsweetened and 50 per cent, for skimmed condensed milk. In November these percentages were reduced to 50, 25 and 25; in December to 40, 25 and 20. In January 1942 the specified percentages stood at 40, 25 and 20. 2 Bakers are now permitted to use skimmed milk powder which, although below the standard for distribution to the consumer, is still perfectly good for baking purposes. 3 S.R. & O. 1941, No. 1718. CONTROL OP SUPPLIES 89 during the winter will continue to be handled by the wholesale and retail milk distributors. 1 The distribution of milk is closely bound up with the scheme of priority distribution described elsewhere in this book. It is thoroughly controlled, but there is evidence that the use of existing channels of trade results in a cost of distribution higher than is necessary. Since milk is distributed to large sections of the population free or at a reduced price—the difference being borne by the Ministry of Food—inefficient organisation of milk distribution is a direct cost to the Government. Oils and Fats Oils and oilseeds are imported by the National Association of Oil and Oilseed Brokers Ltd., who act as agents of the Ministry of Food. The oil and seeds remain the property of the Ministry through all stages of manufacture. The oilseeds are supplied to crushing mills which produce crude oil and cake as agents of the Ministry. The oil cake is transferred to the Animal Feedingstuff Control and the crude oil is passed to the refineries. The bulk of the refined oil is allocated to the margarine and cooking fat factories and to the soap factories. Animal oils and fats were brought under control immediately after the outbreak of war. Imports and manufacturing were prohibited except under licence, stocks of imported lard were requisitioned, and price control established. In October 1939, stocks of oilseeds, vegetable oils and marine oils were requisitioned and manufacturers and dealers licensed. Orders requisitioning the stocks and controlling the manufacture of margarine and cooking fats were issued, but in November the control was abandoned, except for imports, since the supply position was good and the Minister of Food decided that control was unnecessary. 2 1 Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 21 October 1941, Vol. 374, cols. 1619-20. This distribution of American unsweetened condensed milk was discontinued on 15 March 1942, when additional liquid milk was made available for non-priority consumers. 2 " T h e control assumed early in September by the Ministry of Food over the oil refining and crushing industry was designed to work on the 1918 model in 1918 conditions of scarcity. I n fact, however, the ample stocks of whale oil and the sufficient, if somewhat irregular, arrivals cf imported seeds and nuts have made unnecessary the detailed control originally enforced. Consequently, the pooling of margarine has been suspended and manufacturers will again be a t liberty to market their branded goods. To diminish the complexity of the present system of distribution and permit licences, supplies of oils and oilseeds from the Ministry of Food will be made to the Edible Oil Association, which will be responsible for redistribution to its members on the basis of their purchases last year. Prices remain under the direction of the Oils and Fats Controller." The Economist, 18 November 1939, p. 266. 90 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN After the decontrolling of manufacture, the Ministry of Food still controlled the raw materials, but the conditions of manufacture, sale and distribution were determined by agreement between the Ministry and the margarine manufacturers. In June 1940, however, a new order was issued, again requiring manufacturers to place their stocks at the disposal of the Ministry of Food and prohibiting the manufacture or sale by wholesale of margarine, except under licence. In accordance with an announcement in June of the Margarine Manufacturers' Association, all manufacturers' supplies of margarine and compound cooking fats are pooled, and the manufacturers operate under the single name of Marcom Ltd. 1 This company is responsible for the expenses of the producers composing it, and profits from the manufacture of margarine are allocated among the different producers on a pre-war through-put basis. Only two brands of margarine are sold—a standard brand at 5d. a pound and a special brand at 9d. No longer does each firm supply its brand all over the country, but each factory serves the area near it, thus reducing costs of transport. Trade users 2 are prohibited from buying animal lard, cooking fats, dripping, edible oils and margarine, except under the terms of a permit from the Ministry of Food. A licence is required for the production, manufacture or refining of lard and for wholesale dealing in lard. The manufacture and distribution of animal fat is also controlled. In 1941 lard producers were brought into the firm of Marcom Ltd. The edible fat melting industry has been subjected to a concentration scheme designed to secure economy in transport, manpower and coal consumption. Nucleus firms were selected by the Ministry of Food, and concentration was carried out in co-operation with the members of the industry. Stocks of butter in cold stores were requisitioned in September 1939, and producers of butter in factories owned by the Milk Marketing Boards or in factories approved by these Boards were required to place their butter at the disposal of the Minister and to deliver it to his order. The licensing of manufacturers was not required until January 1940. Butter is the one important milk product for which there is a good, cheap and home-produced substitute, and consequently the production of butter is not considered very important, and the butter ration to the consumer is low. The manufacture of margarine and cooking fats was not difficult to bring under control since the producing units were few and could 1 In October 1941 there were 27 firms making margarine. Any person using any of the specified oils and fats in the course of his business in the manufacture, preparation or treatment of any article, other than any of such specified oils and fats. 2 CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 91 combine easily, and all the raw material is imported. The firm of Marcom Ltd. handles the entire trade in margarine, cooking fats and lard. Quality requirements are prescribed for margarine and the product is standardised. All margarine sold to the domestic consumer contains vitamins equal to the vitamin A content of butter and double the amount of vitamin D in butter. Eggs In June 1941 the Ministry of Food announced a scheme designed to control the supplies and prices of eggs. Previous to this order the history of the Ministry's efforts to control prices and influence distribution was largely one of failure. Four things complicate the problem of controlling egg supplies: (a) eggs are easily retailed by the producer; (b) they are produced by a multitude of small producers; (c) they are perishable and not easy to transport; and (d) they are in extremely short supply. In these circumstances, price control without control over supply cannot be expected to work satisfactorily. The evasion of price orders is easy and profitable, and an extensive "black market" is inevitable. The Minister of Food does not appear to have anticipated the results of the first egg controls. The progressive occupation of the continent by Germany cut off some three-quarters of Great Britain's normal imports of eggs. The reduction in imports of feeding stuffs and the low place in the priority list allotted to feeding stuffs for poultry had caused producers to kill many of their birds (although not so many as might have been expected from the reduction in feedstuffs), thus diminishing the supply of home-produced eggs. The total supply of eggs, therefore, was drastically reduced in a very short time. In such circumstances the mere fixing of retail prices simply aggravated the difficulty. Costs of production were rising and producers found it more profitable to retail their eggs privately in the surrounding areas since there was little incentive under these conditions for them to bring their eggs to market. Not only could they obtain the retail price by selling eggs direct, but the short supply also encouraged customers to come to the farm for them, thus saving producers the trouble of marketing them. Consequently, eggs virtually disappeared from the towns. As producers' prices approach retail prices the wholesaler's margin is so diminished that he has little interest in trying to obtain eggs. Furthermore, when the retail price is controlled some buyers other than those buying for their own consumption, for example caterers whose selling price is not controlled, are in a position to offer the producer higher 92 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN prices than retailers whose selling price is controlled. 1 Obviously if the retailer must pay the producer the maximum retail price for his eggs he will have no margin on which to operate. In the autumn and winter of 1940 the first food queues appeared in the towns and these were for eggs.2 It was therefore necessary in August again to raise the maximum retail price of eggs and to introduce a wholesale maximum price. This was followed by a new schedule of prices which allowed a higher price for "marked" eggs—eggs which had been marked and graded at an authorised packing station. By this device it was hoped to attract eggs to the packing stations where the Ministry of Food could get control of them and from which they could be distributed to the towns, but it did not work very successfully and the egg supplies in the towns grew progressively worse. As was inevitable in the circumstances, an extensive "black market" in eggs appeared. The Ministry of Food was requested in Parliament and by the press to ration eggs but held the view at that time that rationing was "almost impossible". 3 The impossibility, however, of controlling prices and trying to influence distribution solely by the manipulation of prices, in the presence of such an extreme shortage of a commodity over the supply of or demand for which the Ministry had practically no control, eventually forced the Ministry to take more comprehensive action. Eggs were considered essential articles of diet by the people, if not by the Ministry of Food 4 , and the public anger could not be ignored. In June 1941, therefore, the Minister produced a scheme 6 designed to secure a measure of control over both supply and demand. On the supply side, all producers, except poultry keepers with 50 birds or less (at first this exemption was as low as 12 birds) are required to sell all their eggs, except those retained for domestic consumption, to authorised packing stations or licensed buyers, who collect for the packing stations. In order to eliminate any incentive for producers to evade this requirement, prices higher than the permitted retail prices are paid for eggs sold to the packing 1 Two orders were issued in March 1941 designed to prevent this practice. Under these orders no person may sell or buy more t h a n 5 dozen eggs in any one week a t a price exceeding the appropriate maximum wholesale price. S.R. & O. 1941, Nos. 374 and 375. s The Economist, 30 November 1940, p. 665. * " I t is not intended to introduce a scheme for the rationing of eggs . . . I t is almost impossible from the point of view of distribution and also from the point of view of supply." Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 June 1940, Vol. 362, col. 158. * See the report in the Bulletin of the Ministry of Food (No. 42), 12 July 1940, of one of the Ministry's Press Conferences. " . . . If prices soared farmers would be encouraged to produce eggs, which are not essential from a nutrition viewpoint, a t the expense of more vital foods." 6 S.R. & O. 1941, No. 888. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 93 stations or authorised buyers", the difference being covered by a Government subsidy. The Ministry of Food through the agency of the National Egg Distributing Association Ltd. buys all the eggs from the packing station and distributes them to retailers. On the demand side consumers are required to register with the retailer, who in turn nominates a wholesaler or licensed packer as his distributor and furnishes him with the number of his registered customers. Supplies are allotted to retailers on the basis of consumers' registration. A complete schedule of maximum prices at all stages is included in the scheme. Producers with 50 birds or less were exempt from the scheme, since "backyard" poultry producers could not easily be included. After the adoption of this scheme egg supplies in the towns increased and regular allocations were made possible. Egg supplies are extremely short, however, and allocations varied from seven eggs per person in July to one in December. Imported and cooking eggs are outside the control scheme. Eggs in the rural areas became scarcer after the introduction of the scheme, and this led to many complaints from these areas. Since the purpose of the scheme is to draw eggs from the country to the cities, this is hardly an objection to it, although the rural population may not be able to obtain the same variety of unrationed foods as the urban population, and has not the same access to canteens and catering facilities. Fruits and Vegetables No effective control over the supplies of most home-grown fresh vegetables and fruits has been obtained. This has not been serious, except in the case of fruits and vegetables in short supply, where price control has led to the disappearance of the product from the market and its appearance only in expensive restaurants. Of this class of vegetables, onions have caused the Ministry of Food the most trouble. They are a good source of vitamins C and B! and are widely eaten in sandwiches especially in rural areas. In addition they are important in cooking as a flavouring agent to make more palatable an otherwise dull diet. The demand for onions is therefore great. Before the war a considerable proportion of the total supplies of onions was imported, primarily from the Netherlands, Egypt and Spain. With these imports cut off, the scarcity of onions in the United Kingdom was so great that evasion of price control was common. The Ministry of Food finally realised that if the price of onions was to be kept reasonable, and if distribution was to be at all fair to consumers, control over the supplies of onions had to be obtained. Accordingly, in July 1941 an order was issued which 94 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN prohibited the sale of onions by a grower, except to an authorised agent of the Ministry of Food. The policy of the Minister of Food as regards vegetables may conveniently be divided into two parts, the first concerned with potatoes, and the second with other vegetables. Fresh vegetables are extremely difficult to control because of their great variety, the highly seasonal character of their production, the perishability of many of them, and the great variations in week-to-week supplies that may occur because of comparatively small variations in weather conditions. Furthermore, the distributive structure is very complex. Potatoes occupy a place half way between cereals and vegetables, and are, like cereals, a bulky and important staple article of diet. Control over the production and distribution of potatoes is rendered easier because the product is fairly uniform, widely consumed, not highly perishable, and can be produced in large quantities, so that extreme scarcity does not complicate distribution as it does with many other vegetables. Furthermore, potatoes were the only vegetable the marketing of which was regulated before the war under a Marketing Act. Potato prices have been controlled since the beginning of the war; growers are required to sell only to licensed buyers or through licensed auctioneers 1 , and all persons dealing with potatoes, with minor exceptions, are licensed and required to keep records, and their premises and potatoes are subject to inspection by authorised persons. The Ministry of Food has guaranteed the growers' price of potatoes and has agreed to buy any surplus. In order to finance the handling of surpluses, a potato fund maintained by a levy imposed on potato dealers has been set up. The rates payable on the 1940 crop of ware2 potatoes were: unlicensed potato merchants, 5s. per ton; licensed grower-salesmen, 6s. per ton; licensed potato buyers, 7s. 6d. per ton. Rates are also fixed for holders of special licences. The rate on all sales of seed and thirds is 2s. 6d. per ton. Certain minor exceptions from the levy were provided for. 3 1 They may, however, sell to their employees for their own consumption, or in lots of one cwt. and less to unlicensed buyers up to an aggregate of one ton. 2 Potatoes for human consumption, as distinct from seed potatoes. 3 S.R. & O. 1940, No. 1388, dated 31 July 1940. The following summary of the operation of the potato fund for the 1939 crop was given in the House of Commons on 1 August 1940: "Except to the extent of 5,2S0 tons, purchased out of the Potato Fund for disposal to potato factories and owners of livestock, and 8,666 tons purchased for the British Expeditionary Force or sold to the French Food Mission, the whole of the 1939 crop found its way into consumption through ordinary market channels. The total amount of levy collected t o date is £257,389 9s. 3d. of which £223,710 1 Is. 8d. was collected from merchants and the remainder from other licensees. After allowing for the cost of administration and the losses sustained on the potato purchases, it is estimated t h a t a net amount of approximately £194,000 will stand to the credit of the Fund, as a t the 31st of July 1940. This balance will be carried forward in accordance with the provisions of the Potato (1939) Crop (Charges) Order, 1940, to be applied, if necessary, towards the disposal of any surplus of this year's crop." Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 363, col. 1428. CONTROL OP SUPPLIES 95 These charges were substantially reduced for the 1941 ware crop, being Is. per ton for a licensed grower-salesman, and 2s. 6d. for a licensed potato buyer. Vegetables may be classified under two general headings— perishable and non-perishable. In April 1941 a National Vegetable Marketing Company, in which the Ministry of Food is the sole shareholder, was formed to handle the marketing of vegetables. It is concerned so far only with non-perishable vegetables and is the sole buyer of onions and carrots with the exception of growerretailers, who may sell carrots by retail if they are licensed to sell vegetables by retail, and who may sell bunched carrots other than by retail. The only other vegetable of which the supply is controlled is tomatoes. A grower may sell his tomatoes, except under licence, only to specified classes of buyers. It is in the production of vegetables that the small gardener and allotment holder can make his contribution to the nation's food supply, and the Ministry of Food's policy encourages him in every way. In 1940 a scheme for collecting surplus vegetables was operated in some areas with the assistance of the County Federation of Women's Institutes. In Scotland local Garden Produce Committees have been established to handle vegetable and fruit surpluses of allotment holders. Allotment holders and gardeners are not encouraged to produce surpluses because of the difficulty of collecting them, which involves much labour and transport. However, the disposal of unavoidable commercial vegetable surpluses has been facilitated by the appointment of Fruit and Vegetable Area Intelligence Officers who report continuously on supplies coming forward, so that arrangements can be made for their distribution. To meet complaints that the Army was using canned vegetables when local growers could not dispose of their crops, the Ministry of Food has made arrangements to assist the Army in purchasing fresh vegetables locally. The surplus produce from allotments is put, so far as possible, into the ordinary channels of distribution. Furthermore, occupiers of gardens or allotments not primarily engaged in retail trade can sell by retail any fresh fruit and vegetables, honey, eggs, poultry and rabbits which they produce in their gardens or allotments. Sales by growers of only two home-grown fruits are controlled. Home-grown plums may be sold only to licensed buyers, and home-grown apples to specified classes of buyers. The sale of other fruits, particularly soft fruits, direct to the public is not encouraged and prices are fixed so that there is an incentive for the grower to send his fruits to the jam manufacturers. In the order controlling home-grown plums there is a provision requiring growers 96 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN to sell first to licensed preservers who may require plums from them for the purpose of manufacturing jam or fruit pulp for sale. Canning of fruit is discouraged, and manufacturers are urged to turn all fruit into jam rather than can it. The manufacturers of jam, marmalade, fruit pulp, fruit juice, or preserved fruit, are required to obtain a licence, and quality standards are prescribed for the products. Preservation of vegetables and the manufacture of specified vegetable products are also controlled, and various regulations are set out concerning the type, size and content of the containers in which the vegetables are preserved. The sale of fruit pulp is prohibited except to licensed preservers, and quality standards for fruit pulp are prescribed. In 1940 the Ministry made special arrangements to facilitate the preserving and canning of fruit by housewives, and individuals were allotted extra sugar for jam making, but the Ministry found that the amount of jam bore no relation to the amount of sugar applied for, and consequently in 1941 no sugar was released for individuals to make jam from the soft fruit crop, although extra sugar was released to housewives for the 1941 hard fruit crop. A system of communal preserving centres was set up in 1940 by the Ministry of Food and is operated under the auspices of the National Federation of Women's Institutes in rural areas, and by Garden Fruit Committees in urban areas. In 1940, 2,600 rural centres preserved 1,792,000 pounds of fruit. In 1941 there were 5,168 rural centres which preserved 2,271,522 pounds of fruit. 1 The preserving was done by voluntary workers who are not allowed to retain any of the jam produced. All the jam is of Fresh Fruit Standard, the highest grade of jam, and contains 60 per cent, sugar and 40 per cent, fruit. "The amount of canning accomplished has only been possible owing to the generosity of American women who have sent, as a gift, 500 canning machines which have been distributed throughout England and Wales". 2 The co-operation of the gas and electric companies has also contributed greatly to the success of the scheme. These voluntary preserving centres use a great deal of fruit produced in the rural areas which would otherwise be wasted. School children, day schools and other children's groups are organised to pick berries and take them to the preserving centres. The jam produced by the Preserving Centres is sold in accordance with the rationing order and is available only through the usual retail channels. 1 Details of output: 133,160 pounds of chutney; 72,694 bottles of fruit; 111,266 cans of fruit and tomatoes; 18,656 pounds of preserves such as fruit pulp and syrup; 3,465,280 pounds of j a m and jelly. 2 MINISTRY OF F O O D : Bulletin, No. 116, 12 December 1941. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 97 Special vouchers are issued to retailers to enable them to stock jam from the centres in addition to their normal commercial stocks. The only fruit the increased production of which is urged on growers is the black currant, since it is the most concentrated source of vitamin C in popular use. Early in September 1939 stocks of dried fruits were requisitioned and pooled. A few months later, however, the pooling arrangement was discontinued, but the allocation of dried fruits remained with the Ministry of Food. Dried fruits are allocated to dealers in accordance with their sugar registrations, and a special Christmas allocation was made in November 1941 of 12 ounces for each ration book to all retailers who applied for it. Bakers are restricted to 50 per cent, of their pre-war usage. Since 26 January 1942 dried fruits have been rationed in the points scheme. Imports of all fresh and canned fruits were drastically reduced in 1940, only oranges being allowed to come in in large quantities. Imports of oranges were not controlled until some time after the outbreak of war, but all oranges are now purchased by the Ministry of Food and allocated to dealers in accordance with the child population of each district. Before oranges were reserved for children the Ministry directed supplies to specified destinations and arranged transport charges so that there was no profit incentive to send oranges to one place rather than to another. Distribution was on the basis of population, but normal channels of trade had to be interfered with. Commission agents who in peacetime handled surpluses have been eliminated, and large organisations are prevented from buying direct from importers. The Ministry of Food is the sole buyer of all imported canned and bottled fruit and vegetables and imported fruit pulp. Panels of brokers and primary buyers are formed through which purchases of these goods are distributed. Primary buyers to whom canned fruits and vegetables are allocated are responsible for ensuring that the food passes smoothly through the existing channels of trade. A new company has been created for the distribution of canned beans, and includes all the pre-war manufacturers and canners. Fish No food industry has presented the Ministry of Food with more problems than the fishing industry. Control over the supplies of fish has not, so far, been adopted, primarily because of the administrative obstacles involved. In the Report of the Food (Defence 98 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN Plans) Department 1 , no mention was made of plans to control the fishing industry. Preliminary plans were prepared for cereals, flour and bread, meat and livestock, sugar, edible fats, tea, milk, potatoes, canned goods, and animal feeding stuffs, but fish is not included in the list of schemes of control. Nevertheless, when war broke out, plans had been made for the decentralisation of the distributive side of the fishing industry. These plans, made on the assumption that there would be heavy air raids on the ports, called for the setting up of inland centres for the distribution of fish, with which merchants and buyers would be registered, and for the closing of the great auction markets. This scheme was a complete failure because it was inadequately planned 2 and brought into operation without sufficient preparation, and because of problems associated with the sudden commandeering of trawlers by the Admiralty. I t was abandoned after having been in operation about a fortnight, and the auctions were reopened. All the control that remained was the regulation of fishing boats and the power to control prices. The entire Scottish herring catch for 1940 was taken over by the Ministry of Food. The greater part of the cured herrings was exported to Germany and Poland before the war, and after the loss of these markets the domestic curers were uncertain of their market and were unwilling to cure herrings unless they were assured that they would be able to sell them. The Ministry of Food therefore agreed to take over the catch and pay the curers for curing them. 3 In June 1940 orders were made requiring licences for the sale or purchase of herrings on the first landing in Great Britain and for curing them. Since the failure of the attempt to control the industry in 1939, the Ministry of Food has gone no further than price control orders —except for the prohibition in March 1941 of the sale by wholesale of all sea and fresh water fish, except herrings, without a licence. 1 2 Op. cit. "This was the one major disaster t h a t the Ministry of Food met with in the early days of the war. I t was partly due to inadequate planning and partly due to bad luck. The inadequate planning can be p u t in this way : our Meat Scheme, which has stood up to practical test, took a full three years to plan. T h a t means t h a t in every market there were people actually selected and appointed to be there as our representatives. All these slaughterhouse managers and so on had been seen, appointed and given their instructions. In the case of the Fish Scheme, it was not begun until a few months before the outbreak of war. As the Committee will understand, we had to take essential commodities in our preparations in some kind of order; we could not do t h a t all a t once; a t the beginning, we concentrated on the most essential items, and fish did not come in until a few months before the outbreak of war." Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee of Public Accounts, Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, Evidence of Sir Henry L. French, Secretary to t h e Ministry of Food, 13 M a y 1941 (H.M.S. O. 1941), p. 198. s See announcement in MINISTRY OP FOOD: Bulletin, No. 38, 14 June 1940. CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 99 A complete system of price control was introduced in June 1941 x and was intended to be the first of two stages in the adoption of control of the fishing industry and to be succeeded by a complete scheme of control over supplies and distribution. However, the Ministry of Food is satisfied with the results of price control, and "so long as the existing system of price control continues to function satisfactorily, it is not proposed to introduce the more drastic scheme of control for the industry". 2 A system of allocating fish at the ports to the different buyers was introduced with the maximum prices order, but the industry's statistics provide no record of the movement of fish after it has been sold at the port. "Statistics are now being collected and the whole question of allocation is under close review at the present time." 3 In July 1941, the canning of any fish or the sale of any canned fish was prohibited except under licence and subject to the directions of the Minister of Food. Canned fish is rationed under the points scheme, and all home-canned herrings are now sent to the Forces and are therefore not available for the home market. With the co-operation of the Ministry of Food a new food industry has been created in Britain. The shortage of fresh smoked haddock led to some experimental tests, carried out by arrangement with the Ministry, on Icelandic wet salted cod. When desalted and smoked by a carefully controlled process, smoked salted cod is an attractive and palatable substitute for smoked fresh haddock. The production and price of smoked salted cod are controlled by the Ministry of Food. Sugar Before the war Great Britain imported more than one half of its supplies of sugar, most of which was refined in the country. In addition, it produced an average of 43,000,000 cwt. of refined sugar a year from 1935 to 1939, or almost 20 per cent, of the total domestic supply of sugar in these years. 4 The British Sugar Corporation refines the entire domestic production of sugar, and one firm dominates the refining of cane sugar in the country. Sugar refining was therefore easy to control. In September 1939 stocks 1 See below, pp. 150-151. * Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 15 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1368. 8 Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 11 November 1941, Vol. 374, col. 2054. 4 Imported sugar is subject to customs duty and home grown sugar to an excise tax. These figures are taken from the Report of the Commissioners of Customs and Excise for tlw year ending 31 March, 1939 (H.M.S.O., 1939). 100 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN of sugar were requisitioned and dealings made subject to directions of the Ministry of Food. In June 1940 sales by refiners, manufacturers or wholesalers were prohibited except under licence. Almost 40 per cent, of the total sugar supply goes into manufacturing in peace-time, and the Ministry of Food has restricted the utilisation of sugar for many manufacturing purposes. A scheme of allocations of sugar for manufacturing purposes has been drawn up by the Ministry of Food, and supplies of sugar for domestic use have already been restricted considerably below the country's normal consumption. Miscellaneous In addition to the control exercised over the chief food products consumed in the British Isles, the manufacture and distribution of a variety of lesser products are controlled. Although tea is the most important of the beverages controlled, beer, spirits, cocoa and coffee have not been overlooked. Thus, the manufacture of potable spirits from a mash of cereal grains, and the purchase of cereals for steeping, and of malt, are prohibited except under licence. Although the output of beer is permitted up to 100 per cent, of the 1939 level, its specific gravity has been reduced by 15 per cent, to conserve malt. Brewers may still choose their own methods of brewing. Raw cocoa beans held in the United Kingdom may not be bought or sold without a licence, and retailers dealing in cocoa and coffee must acquire a licence. Owners of more than one ton of coffee are required to make returns to the Ministry of Food. Coffee is imported solely by the Ministry of Food, and the pre-war method of first-hand distribution by public auction is superseded by direct allocation by the Ministry. Supplies are allocated to registered dealers (dealers who paid duty before the war on more than 50 tons of coffee) on the basis of their purchases in a datum period. The manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery, of pickles and sauces, of starch food powders, of glucose and invert sugars, starch and dextrine, and of canned soup, is licensed and controlled. The manufacture and sale of vitamins A, Bi, and C are similarly controlled. The scheme for controlling chocolate and sugar confectionery was worked out by the manufacturing firms in conjunction with and subject to the approval of the Ministry of Food through specially created associations of manufacturers on the governing bodies of which sit representatives of the Ministry. The associations have classified the various confectionery into 101 CONTROL OF SUPPLIES "product groups", and maximum prices are prescribed for each group. Each retailer must clearly mark on a wrapper or ticket attached to his products the name of the product and the maker, the price and the product group. The War Time Associations supervise confectionery distribution and the distribution of the raw materials to ensure that they are used "for the lower price categories of confectionery rather than for non-essential luxuries". 1 The shortage of certain foods, particularly milk and eggs, gave rise to a lucrative trade in the manufacture and distribution of substitutes, many of which were misleadingly labelled, and some of which were injurious. Accordingly, in October 1941 an order was made requiring manufacturers of food substitutes to obtain a licence and subsequent sellers to sell the substitute only in the original container and under the label and description under which it was sold by the manufacturer. 2 The Minister of Food announced that in the granting of licences a "distinction would be drawn between old established substitutes and new bogus articles. The sale of the latter would be prohibited, but it was not intended to discourage invention, and new products would be tested by the Ministry." 3 By the end of October, 1,127 forms of application for licences had been issued, but only 255 had been returned to the Ministry. Of these 176 had been granted. In nearly every case it was necessary to impose some condition as to the name of the product, the claims made for it and the price. 4 No milk substitute had been licensed except for bakers' use in improving the texture of bread. DISTRIBUTION UNDER "EMERGENCY" CONDITIONS Special plans have been made and the ground work laid for food distribution in the event of large scale disorganisation of "the existing channels of trade" as a result of invasion or extremely heavy air raids. Of necessity, exact details of these arrangements must be kept secret, but the broad outlines have been published by the Ministry of Food. The Ministry had been instructed by the Prime Minister to have all arrangements for the emergency distribution of food ready by 1 September 1941. Elaborate plans have therefore been 1 MINISTRY OP F O O D : Bulletin, No. 76, 7 March 1941. Filled chocolates and other luxury products have been almost entirely eliminated. 2 S.R. & O. 1941, No. 1606. 3 MINISTRY OF F O O D : Bulletin, 10 October 1941. * Manufacturers of substitute foods need not list the ingredients on the outside of the packages. A requirement to this effect would probably be desirable in the interest of consumers. 102 tfOOD CONTROL IN ORE AT BRITAÎN drawn up with the close collaboration of the Army authorities, who decided what quantities of food would be needed in particular areas and how long they would be needed. The plans assume a widespread breakdown of communications, and the chief work of the Ministry has been to add a big reserve to the existing wholesale and retail stocks of food, thus creating what the Minister of Food described as a "shadow larder". In the event of an invasion, shops in the invaded or threatened districts will be closed and a rapid inventory of stocks taken so that food officers may know exactly what food is available. Each householder is expected to have one week's reserve. The reserves in bulk belonging to the Ministry of Food are distributed in accordance with military advice. The following is a summary of the main outline of the Ministry's plans, taken from the Ministry of Food's Bulletin.1 The essential features of the plans to meet invasion and air attack are flexibility and decentralisation. Food stocks have to be dispersed. The man on the spot has to be prepared to use his initiative. The Ministry has operated since the outbreak of war through 18 Divisional Food Officers, working in the defence regions, and having very considerable powers of action without consulting Headquarters. In time of emergency when communications between the Division and Headquarters might be interrupted, each Divisional Food Officer is entitled to act on his own in his Division and, in fact, will perform the functions of "Minister of Food" in relation to his Regional Commissioner. The Divisional Food Offices have been grouped under 5 Chief Divisional Food Officers for the purpose of liaison with t h e Military Commands. Under the Divisional Food Officers are 1,500 Local Food Offices, and in rural areas, where there is a possibility t h a t small communities may in the event of invasion be isolated and cut off from communication with the nearest Food Offices, voluntary Food Organisers have been appointed. These organisers would in emergency take charge of food supplies in t h e village and distribute them fairly until communications with the local Food Office could be restored. Since the ports and the large centres of population are favourite targets of the Luftwaffe, it has been necessary to remove food stocks from these places so far as possible. The country has been divided into over 100 areas, each of which now contains sufficient food stocks t o maintain its inhabitants for a reasonable period. In London special measures have been taken owing to the peculiar nature of the problem, b u t the general principle of subdivision has been followed. In addition to this localising of supplies, each Divisional Food Officer has a mobile reserve of food under his direct control, which he can move to any part of his division where the need is urgent. Small stocks of specially packeted foods are being placed in many small villages and towns under the control of the voluntary Food Organiser. After heavy air raids in urban districts, there is often difficulty in re-establish1 No. 100, 22 August 1941. CONTROt OP SUPPLIES 103 ing retail trading rapidly. Mutual Assistance Pacts 1 , under which one trader goes to the assistance of his neighbour, have proved valuable b u t are often too localised in their membership. There is a possibility t h a t all members of a Mutual Assistance Pact might be put out of action together. Plans are therefore being made in the more vulnerable towns for emergency shopping centres and mobile shops. . . . A reserve of weighing equipment, e.g. scales, weights, etc., is being built up to meet possible shortages immediately after a raid. The possibility of erecting mobile Food Offices to issue emergency ration cards immediately after a raid to homeless people or those about to be evacuated is being considered. In some areas these would be of great assistance in avoiding the necessity for long journeys to a local Food Office. The Ministry has in operation a comprehensive salvage organisation covering the whole country. Its object is to recover and recondition the maximum possible amount of human or animal food t h a t has been damaged by air raids. One of the main problems of the salvage officials is the drying of cereals, oil seeds and oil cake t h a t have been affected by water through fires. The ideal arrangement is to dehydrate these materials in a local drying plant, thereby avoiding the transport of the water-soaked grain over long distances. Various types of drying plants have been pressed into service, such as those of the fish meal processors and the crop-driers. At certain times of the year, it is also possible to use plant owned by the brewers, distillers and maltsters. The possibility of using other drying plant employed in brick making, timber processing, etc., is still under investigation. The facilities already existing, however, generally make it possible to handle any food t h a t may be wetted as a result of an air raid. The main weapon against gas attacks is a clear knowledge of its possibilities and limitations. Between two and three thousand Local Government officials have attended the Ministry's special courses of instruction a t which they learned the methods of detecting poison gas, protecting food stuffs from its action, and decontaminating the food after it had been in contact with the poison gas. These local officials will co-operate with public analysts and other trained chemists who are often available in the research laboratories of industrial firms. Stocks of gas-resisting tarpaulins with which to protect food in transit are being set up throughout the country. The first line of defence after an air raid is the Queen's Messenger Food Convoys with their attendant mobile canteens. These can be rushed to the 1 These Mutual Assistance Pacts have been worked out for many important commodities. The following scheme has been devised for bacon and ham distribution under emergency conditions. Every wholesaler (or multiple shop or cooperative society) nominated by a retailer in an area other than the area in which his warehouse or depot is situated, must accept the liability and responsibility of supplying, under all conditions, every retail shop which has nominated him as a supplier. If necessary, the wholesalers, multiples or co-operatives must either establish a depot or depots in areas other than the one in which their warehouses or depots already are, so t h a t in an emergency every registered retailer may draw his supplies from a wholesale depot either in the same area or an adjacent area, or make arrangements with a wholesaler in the same area or in an area adjacent to that in which the retail shop is situated to supply bacon/ ham to such retail shops during the emergency. These wholesalers must be provided with a list of the customers concerned, and the amount of their buying permits. The names and addresses of every depot which may be established must at once be registered with the Area Bacon Distribution Officer for the area in which the depot is situated. 104 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN raided town at short notice to provide hot soups, drinks, as well as solid food within a few hours. Twenty-two convoys are now at action stations. Supporting these are the Emergency Meals Centres, operating with solid fuel cookers so as to be independent of gas and electricity. They are placed in schools or other halls on the outskirts of the towns, and can produce soups, stews, puddings and hot drinks in considerable volume. They carry reserves of food, sufficient to keep them operating for several days until further supplies can be brought up. The emergency arrangements have been completed in larger provincial towns with a population of over 50,000 and in smaller towns in vulnerable areas. In greater London, in addition to similar arrangements, special provision of mobile canteens has been made to deal with the possibility of large numbers of people moving about. The emergency feeding arrangements provide for 10 per cent, of the population, except in London where provision is made for 25 per cent. The equipment set aside for the Emergency Feeding Centres includes 1 million spoons and 1 million half-pint mugs. The food reserves include 5 million tins of various kinds of food, as well as biscuits, condensed milk, margarine, rice, sugar and tea. The basis of the emergency meals arrangements is being shifted from the towns themselves to the outskirts. Cooking depots are being established well outside the target areas so that meals can be sent in heat-retaining containers to any point within a radius of about 15 miles. Preparations are made for 162 of these depots, and they form what has been aptly called a "Food Grid" system. The idea of the "Food Grid" began in Sheffield, after a very severe attack, in which many of the city's restaurants and cafés were destroyed . . . The Community Feeding Officer for the North-Eastern Division . . . took over a school about four miles out and had meals brought into the city by car. The backbone of the emergency arrangements is the British Restaurant. Eight hundred restaurants are now in operation and plans for 300 more have been approved. Many of them can now be run on solid fuel, and independent of the gas and electricity supplies. In many towns, the Ministry has made, through the Local Authorities, arrangements for feeding in public air raid shelters. These, with the Rest Centres run by Public Assistance Authorities under the Ministry of Health, form two further lines of defence. Should the above measures be insufficient, local authorities have been given power to call upon caterers in their districts to provide meals on the maximum possible scale. These powers will however be exercised only in the last resort. T h e London C o u n t y Council has m a d e detailed a r r a n g e m e n t s for emergency feeding t o be used if large-scale b o m b i n g is resumed. T h e plans include t h e use of c a t e r i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t s of all kinds as well as i n d u s t r i a l canteens where practicable. T h e s e plans will b e p u t into force only when t h e a u t h o r i t i e s consider t h e emergency t o be really grave a n d only in those p a r t s of t h e capital where d a m a g e t o buildings a n d t o gas, electricity, w a t e r a n d t r a n s p o r t services makes emergency feeding essential. T h r e e h u n d r e d volu n t a r y officials will organise a meals service t o m e e t almost a n y emergency. S t a n d a r d m e n u s will be a r r a n g e d , a n d t h e public CONTROL OF SUPPLIES 105 will be asked to take their own dishes and cutlery to these feeding centres. If a district is badly bombed, but the conditions do not warrant the operation of the emergency plans, local catering organisers will be able to call for supplies of hot stew in bulk from establishments with equipment and facilities for preparation on a large scale. 1 1 The Times, 30 October 1941. CHAPTER IV RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION The introduction or extension of rationing in wartime is not necessarily an indication of weakness in a nation's economic system or of diminishing resources. Total war requires the mobilisation of the largest possible quantity of the nation's resources in the national effort, and therefore, unless the rations are so low as to impair the health or morale of the people, extensive rationing may be an indication of a well organised and well controlled and consequently a stronger and more effective economy than would have existed in the absence of rationing. There is little doubt, for example, that the food situation in Great Britain would have been immeasurably better in the closing years of the last war if food control and rationing had been introduced much earlier than they were. In any specified period of time the total supply of goods and services is limited, and the most effective war organisation will be that organisation in which the largest amount of goods and services is used for purposes contributing to the war effort. When consumption of any commodity is greater than is necessary for the wellbeing of consumers, rationing can be used to reduce this consumption and release transport and productive factors for more necessary goods. Thus rationing may be a technique for organising the resources at the disposal of a country in the most efficient manner to achieve a given end. The control exercised over demand facilitates the enforcement of maximum price orders and, if sufficiently extensive, acts as a check to general inflation, although for this purpose specific rationing is not easy to administer and, since it is not likely to cover enough commodities to be sufficiently effective, should be supplemented by a drastic reduction of general purchasing power. One purpose of rationing is control over demand and the other is equitable distribution of supplies. When it is considered necessary to reduce supplies of any commodity to release shipping, labour, or other factors for more essential work, or when supplies are cut off RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 107 by force majeure, the resultant inequities of distribution may produce great psychological unrest and impair both the ability and the will of a people to fight a war. Rationing can be used to ensure fair distribution and thus may be a technique for maintaining the efficiency and morale of the people. Rationing is necessary for the equitable distribution of commodities in short supply, partly because of inequalities of income and partly because of inequalities of shopping opportunity between different consumers. A given price for a given commodity does not mean the same to a rich as to a poor person. The poor man, having less money, makes a greater sacrifice than the rich man when he spends part of it, since each dollar or shilling is more important to him. He will therefore go without what he wants or needs sooner than the rich man when the price rises. If supplies are extremely short the rich man can afford to bid very high for them and thus push the price far beyond the poor man's reach. 1 Nor is the mere imposition of maximum prices under these conditions practicable because the pressure of effective demand on supplies is too great a temptation to evasion. I t has been argued, therefore, that equalisation of incomes would do away with the necessity of rationing because there would then be no rich to bid up prices and all consumers would start from an equal level. Since absolute equality of total income is not politically attainable under present conditions, it has been suggested that consumers' income available for the purchase of "necessities" be equalised by the rationing of purchasing power.2 This could be accomplished by making "value coupons" available to everyone in equal quantities and selling necessities only against these coupons. Such a scheme would be useful to restrict purchasing power generally for commodities the supply of which is not extremely short, to facilitate the transfer of factors of production from the consumers' goods industries to war industries, and to assist in the enforcement of maximum prices. I t would not, however, eliminate the necessity and desirability of rationing of those goods in very short supply and in great demand. In the first place, even with 1 High-income consumers have another advantage over low-income consumers in t h a t they frequently have better storage facilities (refrigerator, rat-proof pantries, abundant cupboards, etc.) and can therefore buy perishable food and other stocks before they are ready to consume them. a See J. J. POLAK: "Rationing of Purchasing Power to Restrict Consumption", in Economica, August 1941, pp. 223-238, and articles by M. KALECKI in the Bulletin of the Oxford Institute of Statistics. Mr. Polak argues t h a t his scheme would do away entirely with the need for commodity rationing, while Mr. Kalecki admits that some degree of specific rationing would be desirable under his scheme. Mr. Kalecki's scheme does not completely equalise purchasing power as between rich and poor, while Mr. Polak's does. 108 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN equal incomes not all people are in an equal position to obtain supplies. Some people are able to shop earlier and more frequently than others. Working women especially are unable to obtain their share in a competitive market. Consequently, extremely scarce foods for which the demand is inelastic would have to be sold at an excessively high price in relation to the total allowable purchasing power if the "first-come-first-served" method of distribution were not to lead to the first comers being the only ones served. Moreover, since no commodity is infinitely divisible, it is quite conceivable that when only one or two units of a commodity in great demand, e.g. eggs, could be allotted to each person in a relatively long period the effort to adjust supply and demand by price movements would fail unless the price of each unit were set at an extraordinarily high level. The chief advantage claimed for a free price method of distribution is the increase in "satisfaction" resulting from free choice and from the fact that those who most want any commodity will be the ones to obtain it. 1 There are objections even in normal times to the theory that maximum "satisfaction" resulting from freedom of choice must in all cases take precedence over maximum physical wellbeing from an objective point of view, but in wartime the objections gain even greater force. It is well known that individuals frequently do not want what they should want and nowhere is this more important than in food consumption. In wartime, the efficiency of the war effort is affected by the physical efficiency of the people. When the variety and amount of food available is diminished, malnutrition is likely to result more quickly from a wrong selection of food. While it is agreed that people should not be forced to eat what they do not want, there are strong arguments in favour of adopting any distribution mechanism that will influence people to make a more balanced and nutritionally sound choice of foods. Rationing, by making available a minimum amount of the more important foods to everyone, is more likely to influence people to buy these foods than would a "free choice" system of distribution. 2 In the latter case, moreover, those with the best developed knowledge of food values and the most enlightened food habits would demand more of the nutritionally important foods and would have the least elastic demands for them. It would, therefore, be more difficult for others to obtain these foods, and 1 " I t is obvious t h a t rationing involves a loss, since it deprives consumers of free choice." J. J. POLAK: lot. cit., p. 225. 2 " . . . In fact some do not want the milk, b u t it is a funny thing that, if you give a ration, you can depend upon it t h a t people will take it." Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 30 April 1941, Vol. 371, col. 468. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 109 since their demand is less "informed" they would go without more easily. Consequently, this system would have an effect opposite to that of rationing on the food consumption habits of the population. We must, therefore, conclude that rationing is not only desirable to offset the effect of inequality of income and of shopping opportunity but also because of its effects on the food habits of the people. In addition, the control exercised over demand makes easier the enforcement of maximum price orders and the transfer of resources from consumer's goods industries to war industries. The supply of any food may become short because the Government wants to reduce it; because other adverse conditions, e.g. weather, interfere; or because a mistake in forecasting temporarily upsets the plans made for that food. Thus the chief reason for the extreme shortage of cheese, eggs and some vegetables in the middle of 1940 in Great Britain was the failure of the Government's food policy to allow for the swift conquest of the continent by Nazi Germany. On the other hand, the Government may want to reduce consumption in order to build up stocks or to make the most efficient use of the transport facilities and productive factors in the war effort. Thus tea and sugar were rationed early in 1940 in order to reduce consumption and conserve stocks. 1 Eggs, meat and butter are short because the Government wishes to reduce to a minimum imports of feeding stuffs and food and because the longer time taken in transport as a result of enemy action reduces the supplies that can be transported in any given time. On the other hand, it is the Government's policy to keep in abundant supply potatoes, carrots, some other vegetables and bread. Wheat is the most important of the cereals and bread is the most important of the manufactured products. A supply of bread sufficient to meet all demands at a reasonable price is a basic part of British food policy. The production of flour for human consumption takes precedence over all competing uses of wheat, and in an economy where most other foods are in short supply bread is abundant and cheap. It is abundant because wheat supplies in oversea countries are large and the British Government has arranged for the importation of enough wheat from these countries to meet all demands for human consumption in Great Britain. It is cheap because its price is subsidLsed. When other foods become scarcer and more expensive, while bread remains cheap and plentiful, the consumption of bread tends to increase. During the war of 19141918 weekly per capita consumption of wheat and diluents as flour, 1 "I want to build up in this country every possible ounce of food as an emergency supply. We ration tea in order t h a t we may still further increase our stocks." Lord WOOLTON in a broadcast, 8 July 1940, quoted in MINISTRY OP FOOD: Bulletin, 12 July 1940. 110 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN as estimated by Sir William Beveridge, rose from 4.25 lbs. in 1914 to 4.80 lbs. in 1918.1 In these circumstances the quality of the bread is of first importance. In July 1940 the Ministry of Food announced its intention to "fortify" flour for bread with vitamin B! and calcium salts, but by the end of 1941 only about 25 per cent, of the white bread and flour consumed in the United Kingdom was being fortified with vitamin Bi and its distribution was restricted to a few areas. The Ministry says that the chief obstacles in the way of the universal adoption of fortified flour are technical difficulties hindering the large-scale production of the vitamin and the necessity of using up large stocks of white flour already stored throughout the country, which it would not be practicable to treat. To overcome the first difficulty the Ministry has arranged for extension of plant and the creation of new factories for the production of Bp The proposal to add calcium salts was still not accepted by January 1942—a year and a half after the first announcement. A National Wheat Meal loaf has been introduced that contains 85 per cent, of the wheat berry instead of the usual 72 per cent. 2 The contents and nutritive standards of National Wheat Meal are standardised to specifications worked out in conjunction with the scientific advisers of the Ministry. This loaf was not at first compulsory and was not very popular, since only about 7J^ per cent, of the total consumption of bread consisted of wheat meal. Even in the forces it made up only about 25 per cent, of the bread used. All the bread consumed in prisons, however, was wheat meal and the Minister of Health recommended its use in hospitals. The Ministry of Food spent £29,000 on advertising National Wheat Meal up to December 1941 in an attempt to increase its popularity. The small demand up to this time was not due to any defect in the quality of the bread, which was high, but to a conventional prejudice against "brown bread" widely held by the British people. Since 23 March 1942, however, flour millers have been permitted to manufacture only the National Wheat Meal flour and certain proprietary brown flours; and once existing stocks of white flour have been used up only bread made from these high extraction flours will be obtainable. 8 The lengthened extraction means that more flour is obtainable from a given amount of wheat, since more of the wheat is used in 1 Sir William BEVERIDGE: op. cit., p. 362, table X X I . This was the minimum extraction rate for wartime white flour. The prewar minimum was 75 per cent. • Cf. p. 77 above. 2 RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 111 flour and less is left as wheat offals available for animal feedstuffs. A considerable saving in shipping space can thus be made since wheat is the major food imported into the United Kingdom. The reduction in the supply of feedstuffs may affect the production of eggs and dairy products but it is difficult to see how this could be avoided. T H E DEVELOPMENT OP RATIONING At the present moment in Great Britain a wide variety of official and unofficial rationing procedures have been adopted for scarce foods. The Government allocates to each person a fixed quantity of margarine and butter, cooking fats, bacon, sugar, tea, cheese and preserves. Meat is rationed by value; and canned food is rationed by the points system. Consumers are required to register for eggs, onions and milk, and supplies are distributed to retailers on the basis of these registrations. Retailers are supposed to supply registered consumers without discrimination or in accordance with whatever priority directions have been given by the Ministry of Food. Once in a while a special allocation of unrationed foods is made against the registration for rationed foods; for example, two ounces of block suet were allocated against the fat registrations just before Christmas to assist housewives in preparing their Christmas puddings. In addition to the official rations many shops, in particular the co-operative stores, ration their customers informally for many of the officially non-rationed foods. Thus, for example, co-operative customers were rationed for dried fruits, cereals and biscuits long before these were officially rationed. The co-operative societies have been in the vanguard of those urging early and widespread rationing of all scarce foods1, and they pressed for the preserves ration long before it was adopted. 1 " . . . Co-operative officials saw the dangers which would arise from delay in rationing commodities in short supply, and the Committee pressed the Government to adopt its comprehensive recommendations as early as the first week following the outbreak of war. Retailers were required to distribute controlled supplies according to an unreal datum line rendered useless by evacuation and other changes in population when, at the same time, the consumer was free to hoard what he could get. " . . . For a long time the Government was content to ration a very limited range of foods, although supplies of others were fast becoming scarce and were most unfairly distributed. The Committee made representations to the Ministry of Food as early as September 1940, urging a compulsory Order to meet the situation. Societies in reception areas so far failed to obtain their fair share of biscuits, jam, chocolate, eggs, cheese, dried fruit and other commodities, t h a t there was a real danger of having to close their membership lists. Undoubtedly, the constant expression of co-operative opinion on the urgency of more extensive and equitable rationing has a t last led to its application to preserves, cheese, and eggs." CO-OPERATIVE UNION LTD.: Wartime Work of the Co-operative Union (1941), p. 28. 112 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Although the supplies of some national foods to catering establishments are rationed in accordance with the number of meals they .serve, their customers need not give up coupons for meals. This is part of the general food policy of the Ministry of Food and has aroused considerable controversy in Great Britain. The Ministry of Food contends that communal feeding is the least wasteful method of utilising food supplies and that it should therefore be extended and encouraged. 1 Since, furthermore, many restaurants serve a particular type of clientele, food supplies can be diverted to those restaurants serving the people to whom the supplies are desired to go, e.g. to workers' restaurants. 2 It is also true, however, that expensive restaurants charging high prices for their meals can afford to buy at high prices all the unregulated commodities for their customers. This type of catering establishment is one of the greatest offenders in the black market. The rationing of food in Great Britain is based upon the Rationing Order of December 1939.8 This order is in five parts covering general restrictions, rationing of households, rationing of establishments, ration documents and miscellaneous provisions. Under this original order, bacon, butter, meat and sugar were designated as rationed foods and provisions made for rationing them. The order did not, however, set the day on which rationing was to begin, since the "appointed day" for the coming into force of the order in relation to any food is set by the Minister of Food in a separate order. The Food Control Committees are empowered to deration temporarily any food in the hands of persons within their areas if the food is perishable and liable otherwise to spoil. I t is provided that rationed food for household consumption may be supplied only against ration coupons which must be detached and kept by the retailer. 4 The household consumption of any trader may be supplied by him but only under the rationing restrictions. Home producers may supply their own needs outside of the restrictions. Catering establishments and institutions are required to register with retailers or other dealers in order to obtain rationed foods, and to present official order permits for the foods. In this order provision was made for customers of a catering establishment and 1 See below, pp. 128-142, for a further discussion of this point. The Minister of Food has not acted entirely in accordance with his statement of 25 February 1941, when he said t h a t his powers as Minister of Food had been given to him to protect food supplies, not to achieve social justice. (Press conference reported in MINISTRY OF FOOD: Bulletin, 28 February 1941, No. 75.) ' S. R. & O. 1939, No. 1856, dated 27 December 1939. 4 Under later orders, cancellation of the coupons was allowed. 2 RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 113 persons in institutions to give up coupons for meat or bacon as part of their meals and for other rationed foods if they reside in the catering establishment or institution for any period. Similar provisions were applied to residential establishments, but rationed food for these establishments can only be obtained by means of the ration books of the persons residing therein. Persons who supply their own requirements of butter are prohibited from obtaining more butter on their ration coupons and must detach and retain the relevant coupons and present them to a Food Control Committee when so required. Food Control Committees are empowered to issue instructions limiting the number of persons who may be registered with any retailer and limiting the number or class of establishments which may register with any retailer or other dealer; transferring a registered person or establishment from one retailer or dealer to another; and requiring any retailer to accept or reject any particular person or class of persons or establishments or class of establishments as a customer. Rationing from the time of this order has been provided for by applying the terms of the order to different foods and amending it accordingly. Under an order dated 8 March 1940, the provision in the original rationing order requiring coupons to be given up for meals including meat and bacon was revoked, and these foods are now allowed to be served as part of a meal free of the ration, but no catering establishment may serve rationed foods except as part of a meal or sandwich. For all rationed commodities, except tea, the consumer must register, but he may register with only one retailer for each rationed food and must register with the same retailer for his butter and margarine rations, and similarly for his sugar and preserves rations. Tea, sugar and cheese may be obtained for any week during a four-week period in any week in that period. Other rationed foods, except meat, may be obtained during the week following the week for which the coupons are issued. There are at present eleven different kinds of ration books in the United Kingdom. 1 We are here concerned only with the general and child's ration book, since all the others are issued either for emergency purposes or to seamen or to His Majesty's forces, and are of little concern to the whole community. The Rationing Order came into force for butter, bacon and sugar on 8 January 1940, for meat on 11 March 1940, for tea on 9 July 1940, for margarine and cooking fats on 22 July 1940, for 1 See Appendix IV, table IX. 114 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN cheese on 5 May 1941, for preserves on 10 June 1941, for certain canned goods on 1 December 1941, and for dried fruits and certain cereal products on 26 January, 1942. * Bacon Bacon is of particular importance to the British people, and bacon production is therefore favoured over pork production in the Government's agricultural policy. It was among the first of the foods to be rationed. Bacon and ham together were at first rationed at 4 oz. per person per week, but it was soon found that at prevailing prices large numbers of people were unable to consume their full rations and stocks arriving from overseas began to accumulate in distributive channels. From 17 January 1940 certain types of bacon and ham were freed from the ration and from 25 January the ration was doubled and prices were lowered, but even at the lower prices many could not buy their entire rations. Bacon stocks were reduced, however, and the spread of the war to Denmark and Holland limited imported supplies so that from 10 June 1940 the bacon ration was reduced to 4 oz., where it has remained. The amount of the ration does not always indicate the amount of bacon and ham of all kinds available to consumers because of changes in the definition of the ration which are not insignificant. Butter, Margarine and Cooking Fats Butter was rationed long before margarine and cooking fats, primarily because the supplies of the latter were adequate while butter was becoming increasingly scarce. Rationing of butter was started at 4 oz. per person per week. From 25 March to 3 June this was raised to 8 oz. The increase was primarily due to the fact that even before the war many of the people in the United Kingdom did not consume 4 oz. of butter a week and the price rise from an average of Is. 4j^d. per lb. for fresh butter on 1 September 1939 to Is. 7d. on 1 March 1940 brought even more people into this category. From 3 June to 21 July the ration was again reduced and on 22 July butter and margarine were rationed jointly. The proportion of butter in the ration and the size of the ration have fluctuated with changes in the conditions of supply. An increase in the rations of both margarine and cooking fats was announced for the winter of 1941-42, the additional fats allowing an increase in calorie consumption during the colder months, but as a result of the increased shipping difficulties due to the outbreak of war in 1 See Appendix IV for tables showing the development of rationing for each rationed food. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 115 the Far East it was not possible to maintain the increase and it was abandoned on 12 January 1942. The use of butter and margarine in catering establishments is limited to a specified amount per person per meal served. The amount of butter in the total butter-margarine ration is restricted in the same way as it is in the householders' ration. Vitamins A and D are added to margarine to bring it up to the vitamin content of butter, and since January 1942 the vitamin D content of margarine has been doubled, making it twice as valuable in this vitamin as butter. When first rationed, cooking fat was defined as animal lard or compound lard, but was later redefined to include any shortening, confectionery or other fat suitable for human food or for use in the preparation, manufacture or treatment of human food, made wholly or partly from one or more vegetable or animal oils or fats (including fish or marine animal oils or fats). I t does not include butter, vegetarian butters, margarine, suet, dripping, the products known as hard butters or any cooking oil. Sugar Rationing of sugar to the consumer began in January 1940 at 12 oz. per person per week. I t was reduced to 8 oz. in May, partly because of the poor West Indian crop, and sugar supplies for manufacturing purposes were also cut. The ration was raised for the Christmas season of 1940 and in the summer of 1941 to facilitate the domestic preserving of fruit. An increase for the winter of 1941-42 was allowed from 17 November but had to be abandoned in January 1942 as a result of the Far Eastern war. Meat One of the most severe reductions in the food consumption of the higher income groups has been that of meat. Unfortunately, this has coincided with a shortage of other high-quality animal proteins. The Minister of Agriculture stated in July 1941 that the war is causing a shift in the British diet from animal to vegetable sources of protein, although the shift is less than was expected. 1 This change is not a beneficial one from the standpoint of nutrition. Meat has been rationed since 11 March 1940. It is rationed by value instead of by weight because of the great differences in quality, bone content, fat content, etc., of different cuts of meat, which differences in the prices of the various cuts reflect to some extent. Rationing by value is the only way to take account of these differ1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 24 July 1941, Vol. 373, col. 1083. 116 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN enees. The weekly ration was originally set at Is. lOd. and included beef, veal, lamb, mutton and pork. Offals were unrationed. Pork was soon derationed because supplies were ample. In September 1940 canned corned beef was included in the ration 1 to meet deficiencies in the supply of fresh meat in areas where the war caused dislocation in distribution or storage. The meat ration has been varied in accordance with the state of supply and its content changed. Since 29 December one-seventh of the meat ration has consisted of corned beef. Manufactured meat, rabbits, poultry and game are not included in the meat ration, and since the middle of June 1941 offals have been off the ration. There is therefore some choice of meat outside the ration but much of it is at a relatively high price. It was stated in December 1940 that the meat ration was not entirely taken up 2 , but at this time it stood at its highest point (2s. 2d.), with pork and offals excluded. Sausages, which contain a maximum of 45 per cent, meat, are a popular substitute for meat. Tea Although tea is of no importance nutritionally, it is of tremendous importance to the Briton's psychological wellbeing. It is most frequently consumed with milk and sugar, and many adults, and even children, drink milk only in their tea. Tea has been rationed since 9 July 1940 at 2 oz. except for the one week ending 22 December 1940, when it was raised to 4 oz. The cut to 2 oz. per person per week involved a reduction of some 25 per cent, in the pre-war average consumption. Cheese The next food to be rationed was cheese. In the latter part of 1940 and the beginning of 1941 cheese was becoming progressively more scarce, and there was considerable agitation in the country for rationing, which was resisted by the Minister of Food on the ground that cheese was too scarce to ration. The Minister requested the general public to reduce their consumption voluntarily in order to save supplies for those who needed them 3 but did not introduce rationing until 3 May 1941, after 20 months of war. At 1 The value of corned beef allowed was, however, limited. See statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 17 December 1940, Vol. 367, col. 1098. * See statement of Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 22 January 1941, Vol. 368, col. 198. s RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 117 this time cheese was extremely scarce and the ration was 1 oz. per week per person, 8 oz. being allowed for vegetarians, agricultural workers and underground miners. By 30 June 1941 supplies had improved and the ration was raised to 2 oz. and in August to 3 oz. Preserves Informal rationing of preserves on a "minimum share" principle was experimented with before statutory rationing was introduced. In March 1941, consumers were required to register for their share of jam, marmalade, syrup and treacle, and a minimum share of 8 oz. per person per month was announced of these four foods together. After the first two months of the scheme retailers were allowed to distribute any surplus among the registered customers. The scheme was administered by the trade, and the ration was not a statutory one. The "sweets spread" scheme was abandoned in favour of the full rationing procedure in June, at which time the ration was half a pound of jam, marmalade, syrup and treacle. In July this was raised to one pound, where it has remained. Mincemeat was included in the ration in October. Under this scheme stocks of jam fell relatively to those of syrup, and consequently in December 1941 it was found necessary to allocate more syrup and less jam against the ration. Points Rationing A technique of food rationing never used before in Great Britain came into operation on 1 December 1941 for some 25 kinds of canned food. It is called the "points rationing scheme", and its purpose is to make available a fair share to all consumers of a number of foods which could not easily be rationed separately, not only because of differences in taste on the demand side, but also because of the tremendous administrative machinery and additional red tape that would be required. To each consumer was issued a supplementary ration book which contained three types of coupons, each worth a specified number of points, making a total of 16 points for four weeks. Each rationed food was declared to be "worth" a specified number of points per pound, and consumers are allowed freedom to choose the foods on which they will "spend" their points. 1 1 See Appendix IV for foods rationed and the points required for each per pound. 118 tfOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN The importance of distributing Lend-Lease supplies from the United States as equitably as possible was one of the primary reasons for the introduction of the scheme. I t was originally designed to come into operation on 17 November 1941, but the task of distributing 80 million pounds of food to some 250,000 retailers took longer than had been anticipated. Most of the supplies covered are imported from the United States, British Dominions and South America. When the scheme came into operation, consumers rushed to the shops and some spent all their points on the first day. Some areas reported rapid reduction of stocks and impending shortage of foods popular in the area. The sale of the foods included in the rationing order had been prohibited since 29 October in order to facilitate the building of stocks, but this also resulted in a considerable "backlog" of demand. The Minister of Food stated that if there was a heavy run on any one food its points value would be raised, while the points value of foods selling slowly might be lowered. The first points rationing period ended on 15 December 1941, and for the second period it was found necessary to increase the points value of salmon from 16 to 24 points a pound and to reduce United States canned pork sausage meat and pork sausage bulk from 16 to 8 points a pound. 1 Canned pork sausage meat is a new product in the British market and demand for it was slow, while canned salmon is extremely popular. This adjustment of price to equate supply and demand does not, however, prevent the first shoppers from having a wider choice than the later ones. The foods included in the original ration are closely related, and there was therefore a high degree of substitutability between them. Many of the foods were not well known to the British public, and in some areas the conservatism of the housewife showed itself in the avoidance of exotically labelled foods of a brand with which she was unfamiliar. The press gave considerable space to explaining the contents of the cans labelled "Spam" 2 , "Mor" 3 , "Pork Sausage" that was not sausage 4 , etc. The sale of canned fruit, tomatoes and peas was prohibited from 12 January 1942 in preparation for the inclusion of these goods in the points rationing scheme, and in February they were formally rationed. From 26 January dried fruits, sago, tapioca, 1 From 9 March 1942 another extensive readjustment of the points value of different foods had to be made. The points value of salmon, sardines and certain meat products was increased and that of canned and dried beans and dried fruits was lowered (see table viri, Appendix IV). 2 Spiced, sugared ham. • Minced pork shoulder. 4 Pork with jelly and fat. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 119 whole rice, dried peas, dried beans and lentils were included in the ration. DIFFERENTIAL RATIONING So far we have discussed only the general ration allowed for the various foods. There are, however, some groups in the population which receive special treatment in the rationing programme. These include children, invalids and persons suffering from particular diseases, vegetarians, and certain classes of workers. Children get the same ration as adults for all foods except meat, the meat ration for children being half that of adults. Diabetics get extra rations of butter-margarine and meat but must give up their sugar coupons, and if they are vegetarians they also get extra rations of cheese but must give up their meat and bacon coupons for it. Persons suffering from hypoglycaemia obtain extra sugar; those suffering from kidney diseases with gross oedema and gross albuminuria extra meat ; and those suffering from steatorrhoea extra meat, for which they must give up their butter-margarine coupons. Those suffering from certain other diseases have priority for milk and eggs.1 Vegetarians obtain extra rations of cheese but must give .up their meat and bacon coupons. A special ration of 12 oz. per week of cheese is given to agricultural workers, underground miners, county roadmen, forestry workers, land drainage and catchment board workers, members of the Women's Land Army, certain types of agricultural industry workers, certain types of railwaymen, canal navigation maintenance men, charcoal burners, and scale repairers. The British rationing policy, unlike that of Germany, has rested primarily on the principle of equal rations for all rather than special rations for different groups. 2 The classes of workers enumerated above receive extra cheese rations primarily because canteen facilities for providing them with a substantial noon meal are inadequate or cannot be provided owing to the nature of their work.. Cheese is therefore granted them since it is a first-class protein consumed without additional preparation. The Ministry of Food emphasised that it is this aspect of their work rather than the degree of "heavy labour" involved that is the reason for the extra ration. 1 See below, p . 128. * "Certain foods are rationed, and it is the considered policy to allow the maximum possible ration to all rather than differential rations to particular categories. I am satisfied t h a t the diet t h a t can be obtained under existing conditions is adequate . . . no scientific investigation has been made in regard to iron rations by the Ministry, b u t plenty of information is available." Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 7 May 1941, Vol. 371, col. 850. 120 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN The policy is in accord with the advice 1 and desire of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, which is represented on a Food Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Food : One of the most ticklish of food problems came to the fore in January, when there was a reduction in the meat ration, and a diminution in the supply of cheese and eggs. A number of unions then made claims, on quite good grounds, for supplementing rations for workers engaged in heavy industries or for long hours. Now the Food Advisory Committee had to bear in mind that, apart from t h e difficulty in differentiating between " h e a v y " and "light" work, supplementary rations on a large scale could only be provided a t t h e expense of t h e domestic ration, already a t a low level. In these circumstances both the Committee and the Ministry were agreed t h a t it would be a mistake to depart from a recent decision of our General Council, which was all against the idea of trying to distinguish between different classes of workers for rationing purposes. T h e Committee will, however, consider claims for extra supplies of a particular foodstuff for defined clashes of workers, and the Ministry has in fact been advised t h a t the claims of certain sections of railwaymen (for tea), miners and agricultural workers (for cheese) should be met . . . I t should be made clear t h a t the concession granted to miners and agricultural workers has nothing to do with the nature of their work; it is due to the fact t h a t they are the principal classes in respect of whom it is impracticable to provide canteen facilities. 2 As is suggested in this statement, the chief reason for not adopting differential rations for workers according to the character of their work is the difficulty of classifying workers into heavy and light workers. This clearly cannot be done on a trade or industrial basis since most trades • and industries include many classes of workers. Once the principle of granting extra rations to heavy workers was adopted it would be difficult to see where it would end, and the process of drawing the line between heavy and light work would create much resentment in those groups excluded from receiving extra rations. Instead of differential individual rationing, communal feeding centres and canteens are used to direct extra food to workers who need it because of the nature of their work. 8 Extra allowances of tea, sugar and margarine were granted during the harvest season to farmers to enable them to furnish "tea" to workers in the fields. Permits for extra tea are granted to employers and occupiers of business premises so that they can serve tea to groups of fire watchers on duty. 1 " T h e question of supplementary rations for particular classes of workers is a highly contentious one, on which I have sought and accepted the advice of t h e T.U.C." Lord Wooi/roN, Minister of Food, in a letter to The Times, 7 July 1941. 2 Sir Walter C I T R I N E : The T.U.C, in Wartime, May 1941, pp. 15 and 16. • See below, pp. 140-141. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 121 PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION: M I L K The primary aim of the Government's milk policy is to increase as far as possible the consumption of liquid milk, especially by those who need it most. Milk is' a commodity of particular importance in the diet of children and nursing and pregnant women. The Ministry of Food, acting on the principle that these groups in the population should be able to obtain cheap milk, and in order to prevent any diminution in the milk consumption of this group on account of rising prices, introduced one of the most important social measures developed in Great Britain since the outbreak of war. A National Milk Scheme was adopted on 1 July 1940 (the first deliveries began on 21 July), under which one pint of liquid milk at 2d. a pint is supplied daily to each child under five and each nursing or pregnant mother applying under the scheme. The milk is supplied free if the income of the parents falls below 40s. per week, this minimum being raised 6s. per week for each non-earning dependant. An equivalent amount of dried milk is supplied for children under one year if medical certificates are given showing that liquid milk is unsatisfactory. The milk powder is full-cream powder with a standard fat content of 26 to 27 per cent. The entire cost of the scheme is borne by the Government. In adopting this scheme the Government accepts in principle responsibility for the nutritional condition of the mothers and children of the nation and subsidises their milk consumption irrespective of income. The subsidy is greatest for those whose income is below a minimum level and for whom milk is supplied free. The Children's Nutrition Council comments that " . . . the Ministry of Food, by adopting one national income scale, has given the public the first official indication of the standard of wealth below which the Government considers a family to be in need of help if it is to be adequately fed". 1 If malnutrition and undernourishment are to be prevented, some form of subsidisation of the products consumed by low income groups is necessary in the absence of family allowances or other means of guaranteeing the regular receipt of a minimum money income. This is recognised by the Ministry of Food in its "free and cheap milk" scheme. The scheme was received with widespread approval, and by 18 July 25 per cent, of those entitled to apply under it had done so. By the end of July 1940, 1,787,844 permits had been issued— 1 CHILDREN'S NUTRITION COUNCIL : September 1940, p. 6. Wartime Nutrition Bulletin, No. 6, 122 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 25 per cent, for free milk and 75 per cent, for milk at 2d. a pint. 1 At the end of November 1941, 3,121,839 mothers and children— about 80 per cent, of those entitled to milk—were receiving milk under the scheme; 27 per cent, of these were taking free milk.2 The annual cost is estimated at some £13,500,000. Milk in Schools The most serious criticism of the free milk scheme is the failure to require that the milk delivered under it shall be pasteurised milk if possible. While it is undoubtedly true that in a few areas' pasteurised milk could not easily be provided, there are many areas where no difficulty exists, and in these areas it should be made compulsory for producers or distributors operating under the scheme to deliver pasteurised milk. In any event local authorities should be allowed to require that the milk shall be pasteurised if they so desire. The opposition of producers seems to be the chief difficulty in the way of compulsory pasteurisation of milk under the scheme. In addition to this program, milk is supplied below cost to children in schools under the pre-war milk-in-schools scheme, which provides for the distribution of milk in one-third-pint bottles at a cost of Is. 2d. per month to the child. Necessitous children receive milk free. Until October 1941, the definition of a "necessitous child" in England and Wales 4 was a child showing symptoms of malnutrition. Since malnutrition can do great damage to a child's development long before positive symptoms of malnutrition are apparent, this definition prevented many children from receiving milk who needed it badly. This unfortunate situation has now been remedied, and the Board of Education stated in a circular 5 to local education authorities of 21 October 1941 that "Since the aim . . . is to maintain a high standard of nutrition and to prevent malnutrition, rather than to remedy it after symp1 3 MINISTRY OF F O O D : Bulletin, No. 44, 26 July 1940. Idem, No. 118, 26 December 1941. ' T h e Milk Diversion Order (see p. 86) of t h e Ministry of Food, under which surplus milk from rural areas is taken to urban areas, eliminates some of this difficulty since pasteurisation can easily be done in t h e urban areas. 4 T h e Scots have been behind the English in this respect. "Scots law presently permits food to be provided for necessitous children only when the individual child is unable, by reason of lack of food, to take full advantage of t h e education provided." However, t h e Secretary of State for Scotland added to this statement: " B u t malnutrition should be prevented, and a short Bill, designed to give education authorities power to supply food free of charge to necessitous cases without waiting for evidence of malnutrition, will be introduced in t h e near future". A Bill has been prepared for this purpose. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 21 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1616. »No. 1567. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 123 torns have appeared, Authorities may in the future base their provision of free milk and free or part-payment meals solely on evidence of financial need". This is an important advance, but since the "evidence of financial need" is determined by local authorities on the basis of the "parents' resources in relation to income scales appropriate to the local circumstances" there is considerable variation between different localities. The Ministry of Food has adopted a national income minimum for its distribution of free milk under the free and cheap milk scheme, and it would probably be desirable that the Board of Education should also adopt a minimum in the administration of the milk-in-schools scheme. The provision of milk in schools has been hampered by lack of equipment, shortage of labour, and in some areas by lack of co-operation on the part of distributors. Shortages of onethird-pint bottles and of straws have sometimes prevented children from receiving milk, since distribution in bulk presents many difficulties in the provision and washing of cups and adds an extra burden to the work of the teachers. In many schools there are no facilities for heating water to wash equipment, and if water is available it sometimes is difficult to get labour, since children must not be allowed to handle boiling water. Some farmers have refused to supply milk to schools in their area because it was not profitable, and many retailers object to supplying milk in one-third-pint bottles. The distributive margin was increased early in 1941 to cover the financial objections of producers and distributors to providing school milk. Every effort is made to supply the milk in one-third-pint bottles, but when this cannot be done pint or quart bottles are used if possible, and the Board has issued special instructions to local authorities concerning the distribution of milk received in bulk. Any extra expense will be met by a grant from the Board. The Milk Supply Scheme ensures priority milk to the schools, and the Board of Education has repeatedly emphasised in its circulars to the local education authorities the importance of extending the milk programme in the schools: The scheme must now be regarded . . . as an essential part of the national arrangements for distributing milk to children, and an obligation rests on every grant-aided school to enable its pupils to participate in the scheme and also to persuade each pupil to do so . . . No school . . . should rest satisfied until it has persuaded practically every pupil to join the scheme.1 . . . It is of the highest importance . . . that every school should now arrange for its pupils to drink milk at school.' In spite of the difficulties confronting the extension of this 1 Circular No. 1565, 25 September 1941. » Circular No. 1564, 25 September 1941. 124 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN scheme in wartime, much progress has been made. By May 1941 approximately 2,700,000 children were receiving milk under the scheme in public elementary schools in England and Wales—an increase of some 600,000 children over March 1940. If children in schools other than public elementary schools are included, more than three and one-half million are receiving milk. 1 By December 1941 about 60 per cent, of the pupils attending grant-aided 2 schools were taking milk. In some areas this percentage is as high as 70 to 90 per cent. In other areas, therefore, the percentage of children taking milk is considerably below 60 per cent. The increase in the Board of Education's grant for school milk to 100 per cent, of the cost to local authorities from 1 October 1941 removes all financial obstacles to the provision of free milk to necessitous children, and every effort is made by the Board and by the Ministry of Food to assist any locality in overcoming its difficulties. Necessitous children may receive two-thirds of a pint a day, and by January 1942 over 164,000 of these children were getting two-thirds of a pint. The one-third of a pint allowed for other children is insufficient, but under present conditions there is little likelihood of increasing it and if all children attending schools are given this quantity it will be a great advance over previous conditions. Under the priority milk scheme described below, each child under six is assured one pint a day and this, together with the third of a pint allowed in the schools, though below the optimum, is reasonably adequate. General Scheme of Supply The milk policy of the Ministry of Food must make allowance for seasonal variations in supply. During the summer of 1941 the Ministry arranged for a reduction in milk consumption of approximately 15 per cent., and the milk thus withdrawn from the liquid market was diverted into manufactured products for winter consumption when the supply of liquid milk is reduced. Dairymen were asked to reduce their deliveries to each household by oneseventh of the amount delivered in March 1941. 3 The national priority classes—hospitals, nursing and maternity homes, invalids, 1 Statement of the Parlimentary Secretary to the Board of Education in the House of Commons, 2 October 1941. s Schools recognised for a grant by the Board of Education. The Milk in Schools Scheme applies to public elementary schools, grant-aided secondary schools, pupils under 18 a t any other grant-aided full-time schools, centres or courses, elementary schools recognised by the Board as efficient, junior instruction centres, the Duke of York's School, Dover, elementary schools under the War Office, residential Poor Law schools, and pupils under 16 a t occupation centres for mentally defective children. * Retailers were requested not to make this reduction by means of milkless days because of the consequent hardship on families without refrigeration. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 125 people suffering from certain diseases 1 and mothers and children benefiting under the free and cheap milk scheme—were exempt from the restriction. At least 40 per cent.of the total milk supply goes to these groups. It was immediately pointed out that this scheme was most unfair to those who could afford only small amounts of milk before the scheme was adopted, since a one-seventh reduction in their consumption was much more serious than the same reduction in the consumption of those who were taking more than they needed previously. Consequently, to prevent such hardship, the Ministry of Food issued instructions that no reduction should be made if the household took one pint or less a day. This concession reduced the amount of milk expected to be saved under the scheme. The increasing consumption of milk, accompanied by a decreasing supply during the winter months 2 , finally made it necessary for the Ministry of Food to introduce a comprehensive scheme to ensure equitable distribution. Accordingly, on 12 October 1941 an extensive national scheme was put into operation. Consumers are required to register for milk supplies, and certain groups in the population are given priority in the distribution of milk (see table 10). The balance of the milk is divided among the rest of the population. Up to 15 March 1942 non-priority adults were allowed two pints of milk a week if supply conditions permitted. This was raised during March to three pints a week. The amount of milk given to non-priority consumers depends upon the dairyman's surplus after he has supplied his priority consumers. Until January 1942 producer-retailers were outside the scheme and were allowed to sell all their surpluses after supplying priority consumers. In January these producers were required to make returns of their surplus so that it could be directed to urban areas. 3 American canned milk is distributed by retail dairymen so that it will be issued in conjunction with the scheme of supply for liquid milk to non-priority consumers. 4 Milk powder and homeproduced and Empire canned milk are sold through the ordinary food retailers, however, and distribution is not controlled to give preference to priority classes. Approximately one tin of national 1 These diseases were the following: active tuberculosis; silicosis; conditions in which t h e patient is unable to swallow food by reason of an affection of the mouth, throat or gullet; gastric, duodenal or anastomatic ulcer; illness characterised by high and prolonged fever; post-operative conditions after major operations. No more than two pints daily, however, was allowed to persons suffering from these illnesses. » Between 25 October and 9 November 1941 milk sales were cut 15 per cent. by order of the Ministry. * See above, p. 86. 4 Thirty million tins of condensed milk were issued to dairymen in November, and 40,000,000 tins in December. The quantity of milk released each month depends on the liquid milk supplies. 126 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN household milk to each family was distributed in December 1941 and in January 1942. Household milk powder is to be distinguished from national dried milk for infants. The former is skimmed milk powder and is not suitable for infants, and the latter is distributed in accordance with the National Milk Scheme adopted from 1 July 1940 and given statutory recognition on 18 April 1942. TABLE 10. PRIORITIES IN MILK DISTRIBUTION Group Priority Consumers: Children under 6 years Children 6 to 18 years Expectant mothers Infants between 1 and 12 m o n t h s . . Invalids 1 Priority Establishments: Hospitals, maternity homes, convalescent homes, sanatoria, etc. Schools, orphanages and similar residential establishments for children and adolescents, school canteens and feeding centres, and non-residential nurseries Others: Grant-aided schools, grant-aided nursery schools and grant-aided non-residential wartime nurseries and certain centres eligible for milk under the Milk in Schools Scheme* Private and other non-grant-aided schools, including any place where children regularly attend for intruction Workers in workshops and factories subject to provisions of Factory and Workshop Act of 1901 3 1 Amounts (Pints) 7 per week 3 H P e r week 7 per week An additional 7 per week W h a t doctor prescribes up to 14 per week 7 per resident per week (a) 7 per week for each resident child holding child's ration book (b) 2% per week for each resident child holding a general ration book and who is under 18 years of age (c) 2 per week for each other resident () an illness characterised by high and prolonged fever; (c) a post-operative condition after a major operation; (d) an illness of a child not attending school; (e) one or more of the following illnesses: active tuberculosis of all types; silicosis; affection of the mouth, throat or gullet, or organic nervous disorder causing interference with swallowing; gastric; duodenal or anastomatic ulcer; dyspepsia due to conditions other than ulceration of the stomach or duodenum; colitis; diabetes mellitus; thyrotoxicosis; nephritis; and hyperemesia gravidarum, chorea of pregnancy. acute yellow atrophy occurring during pregnancy, albuminuria of pregnancy and eclampsia which are of sufficient severity to entail total confinement to bed. * A larger daily quantity may be obtained in those cases where such is provided by a local education authority, and grant-aided nursery schools and non-residential wartime nurseries may be authorised to obtain a maximum of one pint per child per day. • These include workers engaged in certain processes, e.g., lead processing, for whom milk is considered a protection. Since April 1942 milk for industrial workers is granted only on medical grounds. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 127 This scheme makes provision for a wider range of sick persons than did the previous scheme1, and besides giving priority to the classes enumerated in the free and cheap milk scheme it also allows children between 6 and 18 years of age priority of half a pint per day upon payment of the full retail price. Thus children in this group who receive milk in school are guaranteed at most only five-sixths of a pint per day—a far too small amount. These quantities of fresh milk are supplemented by small quantities of dried and condensed milk. During the winter, as has been stated, milk allocations are low, and the "unprecedented demand is so far ahead of supplies that the gap (between production and consumption) is the widest in the country's history". However, the Minister of Food stated: There is no reason for gloom. A family of six, with two children under six and two under 17, will have about 25 pints of liquid milk a week, excluding the amount obtained in school; a family of two adults and two children under six will have about 14 pints; a small family with one small child 10 pints. In addition, there are now available supplies of American condensed milk equal to about two pints of milk a month for each adult, and next month there will be household powdered milk for cooking equal to four pints a month for each family. Further, condensed milk produced at home and in the Empire will be available a t all grocers.' The shortage of milk has created difficulties for small dairies, which have had their trade reduced to a level that makes it hard for them to cover their overhead costs, and for "milk bars", which are no longer able to serve milk and milk shakes. These "bars" serving a variety of milk drinks were becoming increasingly popular before the war, and their trade depended to a large extent on the milk they obtained. They now have practically become tea and coffee bars, and even the serving of coffee has been restricted because of the shortage of milk. OTHER PRIORITIES In addition to milk priorities, children have been given priority in the distribution of oranges, and receive free allowances of codliver oil compound and fruit juices. As late as October 1941, oranges were being distributed on a non-priority basis, and this was so unsuccessful that a priority scheme was adopted. Oranges arriving in Great Britain are reserved first for children under six, 1 There is some evidence t h a t doctors' certificates qualifying persons to receive extra milk have been issued a little too freely, and the Ministry of Food has threatened to investigate the situation. s Reported in The Times, 21 November 1941. 128 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN and in October one lb. for each child was distributed. When supplies are not sufficient to allow distribution over the whole country, distribution is limited to specified areas in rotation. On the first five days when oranges are available they may be bought only for children at the rate of one pound a week. After the fifth day, oranges may be sold without restriction, but retailers are encouraged to give preference to children and to schools. Beginning on 8 December, a new scheme came into operation for the distribution, free of charge, of black currant juice or puree, orange juice and cod-liver oil to all children under two. The distribution is made through the Maternity and Child Welfare centres and the Local Food Offices. All children under two years of age receive cod-liver oil, those under six months receive black currant juice, and those between six months and two years receive black currant puree. In the first few weeks of the scheme the response was disappointing, since only about one-third of those eligible under the scheme had taken advantage of it. By the middle of January, however, between 75 and 80 per cent, of the children under two were receiving their cod-liver oil and fruit juices. In January the free' issue of cod-liver oil was extended to include all children under six. The Ministry of Health organised a campaign in 1941 for the collection of rose hips—an excellent source of vitamin C. School teachers, boy scouts, girl guides and the Women's Voluntary Service, women's rural institutes and other voluntary organisations collected some 200 tons which were converted into 600,000 bottles of rose hip syrup. This syrup is on sale through ordinary retail channels, and although no priorities are established in distribution most of it will probably be used for children. Priority in the distribution of eggs is allowed to children under six, to nursing and expectant mothers and to invalids suffering from certain diseases.1 Four eggs are allowed to these groups for every allocation of one to the ordinary consumer. COMMUNAL FEEDING Not only is the extension of communal feeding a basic part of the British food policy, but it is also an increasingly important aspect of the general war organisation of the country. The needs 1 Gastric, duodenal and anastomatic ulcers; post-operative conditions after operations on the stomach, duodenum or small intestine; diseases or injuries to the mouth, throat or gullet or organic nervous disorders interfering with mastication or the swallowing of solid food; typhoid and paratyphoid fever and amoebic or bacillary dysentery under treatment in hospitals, et cetera. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 129 of industry and of the Army for increasing personnel have necessitated the mobilisation of women on a large scale. If women are to enter industry, however, they must be freed from the necessity of providing meals for husbands and children. The extension of canteens in schools and factories accomplishes this purpose. Meals for large numbers of people can be prepared and served at a lower per capita cost in terms of food, fuel and labour when they are provided communally than when they are provided in private homes. Thus the extension of communal feeding results in a more efficient use of shipping, resources and labour. Longer hours of work, frequently under tense and difficult circumstances, increase the importance to the workers of an adequate noon meal at a reasonable price. This can be assured if well managed canteens are installed in or near the factories. Canteens can be used even more satisfactorily than differential rationing to direct extra food to the groups in the population who need it most. If extra food is allowed to children or particular classes of workers on their ordinary ration books, there is no guarantee that it will not be consumed by other members of the family. This possibility is eliminated if canteens in schools and factories are reponsible for distributing this extra food. Increasingly large numbers of people are, therefore, eating at least one meal communally each day. This meal is "off the ration" and is intended to supplement the ration. Much criticism has been directed against the Ministry of Food's policy of allowing restaurants to serve rationed food without requiring coupons. The critics claim that this policy favours the higher income groups. The extension of subsidised industrial canteens and communal feeding centres, however, brings "eating out" within the means of practically every income group. 1 The criticism loses considerable force in face of the fact that a well cooked meal consisting of one or two vegetables, potatoes, meat or fish and a dessert can be obtained for about fifteen pence. The chief weakness is the small number of these establishments. The non-rationing of meals 1 "During the last twenty-five years one of the great changes t h a t has taken place in this country has been the development of the system of eating out. Well-to-do people have always practised this, b u t the great change which has taken place is t h a t it has now become the common practice of people who are not well-to-do. I t was for this reason t h a t we have based our food control on the assumption t h a t it was necessary to provide food not only for domestic consumption in the home b u t for consumption in catering establishments. We found, however, t h a t these catering establishments were quite inadequate for the provision of meals for working-class people on the very large scale. They were inadequate in number, and they were inadequate to provide those meals a t prices t h a t the people of whom we were talking could afford to pay. They were also inadequate in point of position, in so far as very many of them were a long way away from the places a t which people work." Minister of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 2 December 1941, Vol. 121, col. 150. 130 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN consumed in catering establishments is not, therefore, a result of administrative laziness, as has frequently been charged, but a deliberate policy designed to save labour, fuel and food, improve the feeding of the people, and facilitate the transfer of women into industry. The importance of a sound knowledge of nutrition and of the proper preparation of foods on the part of those in charge of communal feeding establishments in these circumstances is self-evident. The Ministry of Food maintains a staff of experts to advise canteen managers and others on these questions and publishes brochures to assist those planning menus and in charge of the preparation of food. Special efforts are made to instruct them in different ways of using abundant, cheap and nutritious foods, e.g., potatoes and carrots, in order to increase consumption yet avoid monotony in the menus. Carefully managed communal feeding can, therefore, be used to modify conservative food habits and to develop a more efficient utilisation of available food supplies. The supply of trained canteen cooks has been unable to keep pace with the rapid extension of communal feeding, and a training scheme has been arranged by the Ministry of Labour in cooperation with the Board of Education and the Scottish Education Department. Training is given in Technical Institutes which have the necessary equipment and in selected canteens. Courses vary in length up to six weeks. Trainees in technical colleges receive an allowance of 33s. a week and a free mid-day meal, or, if the meal cannot be provided on any day, lOd. in place of it. In canteens they receive 38s. a week and make their own meal arrangements. Transport expenses are paid. Before the war, the only important form of communal feeding was the ordinary restaurant. A great variety of these restaurants catered for all income classes, but the standards of many of the cheaper restaurants left much to be desired and prices were frequently high for the meals served. Wartime communal feeding policy includes the ordinary restaurant but is aimed at the development of school canteens, factory and pithead canteens and public communal feeding centres. In addition there are special arrangements for supplying hot meals in emergency conditions. Large numbers of people are fed by means of (a) communal kitchens designed to feed evacuated people and others requiring regular meals for whom ordinary restaurant facilities are inadequate; (b) cook houses intended to supply mobile canteens and individuals who wish to buy ready-cooked meals to take away; (c) canteens in schools, factories, and other places where large numbers of people are congregated without suitable restaurant facilities; and RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 131 (d) mobile canteens for supplying food in emergencies and to scattered groups of people who are unable to come to the feeding centres. The canteens are stocked from cook houses or other supply kitchens. Communal Kitchens and Feeding Centres The responsibility for the creation of community feeding centres rests primarily with local authorities, but the Ministry of Food will finance the construction of premises, cover losses on running expenses, and provide specially trained people to give advice and assist in solving any problems that arise. The Ministry has also established a central pool of kitchen and dining equipment which it has placed at the disposal of the local authorities for equipping their feeding centres. The term "British Restaurant" has been widely adopted for these communal feeding centres. 1 They are intended to be established only when suitable catering facilities are not otherwise available 2 , and in the beginning arose primarily for the purpose of feeding the population in bombed areas, Civil Defence Workers and other similar groups. Their value for all groups in the population was soon realised, however, and the scope of communal feeding was extended accordingly. The provision of feeding facilities for people wherever they were congregated became the goal of the Ministry of Food's communal feeding policy. An extensive official communal feeding drive was not begun until the middle of 1940, primarily for emergency purposes, and in September of that year a Director of Communal Feeding was appointed in the Ministry of Food. By December only ten cities and towns outside of London had reported that arrangements were being made. The London County Council was more progressive in this respect, and its Leader was able to announce on 8 October 1940 that within a week after the beginning of the program 20 feeding centres had been established and "at the present time, about three weeks since we started, we have some 60 centres 1 Other terms are frequently used, however. One local area with a population of 25,000 to 30,000 has five such restaurants which are called "Civic Cafés". This area has an especially energetic and progressive local council. 1 The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food stated on 11 November 1941 that "British Restaurants arc established where, in the opinion of the local authority, facilities ought to be provided for the supply of hot, nutritious and cheap meals, and where such facilities are not otherwise provided, or are inadequate. I t is the expressed wish of my Noble Friend that, before a decision is taken to establish a British Restaurant, full account should be taken of facilities provided by existing catering establishments. "Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Vol. 374, col. 2058. 132 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN from which we are serving about 3,000 hot meals a day". 1 Most of the restaurants are managed by former domestic science teachers. The frequency and intensity of the bombing of the various areas affected the speed with which the feeding centres were set up, and since London was a heavily bombed area from the beginning, the authorities in London acted more quickly in this respect and attempted to establish a Londoners' Meals Service wherever it was needed. Organisation in London is on an area basis. Twelve areas were established, each in charge of a head teacher. Wherever the need is found, a centre is opened. A continuous survey is carried on through the educational officers and agents, and through voluntary associations and settlements, and wherever information is collected, indicating that a service is wanted, immediate steps are taken to open a centre.2 After a slow start, however, the numbers of these centres throughout the country grew rapidly. In May 1941 there were 489 British Restaurants operating in Great Britain, 65 of which were in the Greater London Area. 8 By 31 October, this figure had grown to 1,148. The difficulty of obtaining suitable premises, adequate equipment and sufficient labour has hampered the establishment of the British Restaurants. Closed-down restaurants, town halls and other suitable buildings are used. In some areas where facilities for school feeding existed before the war, these facilities have been extended for community feeding. No priority for building materials or labour supplies is granted to local authorities for establishing feeding centres. Equipment has been purchased wherever possible, and the Ministry of Food assists in supplying it. Specialised equipment for large centres is more difficult to obtain, and the size of the feeding unit is frequently kept below the optimum for this reason. The labour problem has been eased by the large-scale use of voluntary workers. British Restaurants are not charity institutions and are patronised by all classes of the population. The atmosphere is not that of a bread line; the rooms are, for the most part, clean, cheerful, and frequently as attractive as many of the best catering establishments, and they have been popular with the public in every area where they have been set up. The restaurants are expected to pay their current costs, although no consideration of loss is allowed to interfere with the rendering of a needed service. 1 Quoted from MINISTRY OP FOOD: Bulletin, 11 October 1940. Ibid. See statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 28 May 1941, Vol. 371, col. 1870. 2 3 RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 133 Local authorities are required by the Ministry to conduct British Restaurants on a fully self-supporting basis. T h e prices charged for meals should be sufficient to cover overhead expenses, including amortisation of capital expenditure, and a small margin for contingencies. The capital expenditures involved in establishing British Restaurants varies, mainly according to the structural adaptations which may be necessary in each case. Running expenses also vary. It is not possible to fix a standard price for meals . . . Speaking generally, however, prices in British Restaurants are lower (than those of comparable catering establishments) and this is no doubt due to the fact that, as previously stated, these Restaurants are conducted on a self-supporting b u t not a profit-making basis. 1 British Restaurants do, however, use a considerable proportion of voluntary labour. Plans for these restaurants must be approved by the Ministry of Food, and there has been some criticism of delay by the Ministry in granting approval after schemes are submitted. I t is probable that arrangements could be made for speeding up the Ministry's approval of the schemes of the local authorities. The Ministry maintains a staff of experienced catering officers who are charged with the inspection of British Restaurants throughout the country to ensure that they are conducted efficiently and meet the requirements of the areas in which they are situated. These inspectors cooperate with the Food Advice Officers, who give advice to the managers of British Restaurants on the best use of foods most abundant from time to time and also furnish suitable menus. In addition to British Restaurants, cooking depots and community kitchens have been set up by the Ministry of Food. These are primarily for emergency purposes, and cooking depots have now been turned over to local authorities and can be used to supply school canteens and other needs. They had previously been standing idle waiting for the emergency for which they were designed, but their new use will not interfere with their use in emergencies. Although the Ministry of Food distinguishes between emergency and community feeding facilities, in practice they dovetail into each other. The British Restaurant remains open during air raids for emergency feeding and may prepare food to be taken out in mobile canteens. Many of these restaurants and cooking depots are independent of local fuel supplies, having supplies of solid fuel, and are therefore able to operate when public utility services have been interrupted. Cash-and-carry service is also supplied by school canteens. Community kitchens are set up primarily for the preparation of hot meals which are distributed by mobile canteens or vans. These are of first importance during and after heavy raids but have also been employed experimentally in rural areas. 1 Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 1 October 1941, Vol. 374, cols. 599-600. 134 tfOOD CONTROL ÎN GREAT BRITAIN Community feeding in rural areas must in some respects be handled differently from community feeding in urban areas. Rural shops are sometimes less well supplied with unrationed food than urban shops, and supplies may arrive more irregularly. It is frequently necessary for the people to travel to the nearest urban shopping centre to obtain supplies of some unrationed foods. Where the rural areas have been designated as reception areas, the difficulties are intensified, since the geographical allocation of food has not caught up with the movements of the population, and evacuation areas are frequently over-supplied relatively to the reception areas. Progress in supplying rural areas with adequate feeding centres had been very slow, but the Ministry of Food is experimenting with several different methods. In some rural areas "cash-andcarry" kitchens have been established where people may buy cooked meals for consumption elsewhere. In others, vans go out from central kitchens to small villages and even to the workers in the fields with hot meals and hot drinks. 1 If meals are transported long distances after being cooked, adequate facilities for keeping food hot—sometimes for a considerable time—are required. Special investigations have been made regarding the effects of heating and of keeping food hot for a long time on the nutritional elements of food. Meals are sometimes cooked at 7 a.m. for example and not consumed until noon. Not only will the nutritional value of food be affected, but also in many cases its palatability and appearance. Some foods can stand this treatment better than others, and research into this question is extremely important. The Children's Nutrition Council has criticised existing research on this problem as being unrealistic and failing to consider the conditions under which food is prepared and distributed in practice. Whatever methods we may be compelled to adopt in war, we must when peace returns sanction only such schemes as are scientifically satisfactory. We need laboratories equipped to investigate every aspect of this large-scale preparation, heating and conveying food; and we have no evidence that the present lines of research are either realistic or adequate. 2 1 "Inquiries are being made as to the nature of the service best suited to the varied conditions in different parts of the country and, a t present, it would appear t h a t small British Restaurants, or Cash and Carry Kitchens, in the more populous rural areas, supplemented where necessary by Mobile Canteen Services, would meet the requirements . . . The nature of further developments will depend on the experience gained a t these centres and on the results of the general inquiries now being made." Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5 August 1941, Vol. 373, cols. 1782-3. 2 War-time Nutrition Bulletin, September 1941, pp. 1-2. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 135 The communal feeding system is supplementary to ordinary restaurant facilities. There has been, of course, some criticism by those interested in commercial enterprises. In January 1942 a deputation of commercial caterers urged the Minister of Food to slow down the opening of British Restaurants on the ground that they compete unfairly with private establishments, and the Ministry was accused of ruining small caterers. They drew from the Minister the assurance that before any more British Restaurants were opened the catering trade would be consulted, and furthermore that "British Restaurants had been brought into existence solely to meet a wartime need, and he saw no reason to anticipate their.continued existence after the emergency". 1 I t is not intended, however, to discourage the establishment of British Restaurants where they are needed. There is no doubt that many people go to British Restaurants who would otherwise have gone to an ordinary catering establishment. Meals are cheaper and frequently much better, and there is no income qualification for patrons. These restaurants are, however, subject to the same regulations as other catering establishments and clearly fulfil a community need. Through them the food authorities can influence the dietary habits of the people and help to secure the most efficient utilisation of the country's food supplies. There is a vast difference between ordinary commercial catering and catering for the purpose of feeding the people as well and as cheaply as possible. There is little doubt that the nutritional standard of the meals served in British Restaurants is superior to the standards of the general run of low-priced catering establishments. Regulation of Catering Establishments The food supplies, especially those which are rationed, of all catering establishments, including British Restaurants and canteens, are subject to certain restrictions, and the size and content of meals served are regulated. Under an order dated 3 November 1939, every Food Control Committee was required to keep a register of all catering establishments in its area seeking to obtain bacon, ham or butter. Meat and sugar were included in December 1939. Under the rationing orders the amount of these foods allowed to catering establishments was prescribed. Not until 10 March 1941, however, were the number and content of courses of meals served in catering establishments regulated. At this time catering establishments were prohibited from serving 1 The Times, 13 January 1942. 136 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN in any one meal more than one main dish and one subsidiary dish, or more than two subsidiary dishes. A main dish was defined as any dish containing any meat, poultry or game (excluding soup containing less than 5 per cent, by weight of meat, poultry or game), or a dish containing 33l/3 per cent, or more by weight of fish, cheese or eggs (excluding eggs as an omelette, or scrambled eggs). A subsidiary dish was defined as a dish (excluding soup) which contains less than 1/3 by weight of fish, cheese or eggs. The only meals excluded from these restrictions were those served to patients in hospitals, sanatoria or nursing homes. In October 1941 cheese was removed from the classification as a main dish and any amount of cheese, was allowed to be served in a subsidiary dish. At the same time as the restriction on meals went into effect, local authorities were given the power to issue directions to catering establishments regarding : (1) (2) (3) (4) The serving of meals at any hour or on any day; The nature of the meals; The price charged for meals; The cooking of food in any catering establishment for consumption elsewhere; (5) Use of vehicles owned by, or the method of transport at the disposal of, any catering establishment; (6) The employment of the staff of any catering establishment to carry out the directions issued. These powers were granted for extreme emergency use only, and instructions issued to authorities stated that any directions given under them were to be withdrawn as soon as the emergency ceased. A more comprehensive registration of catering establishments, residential establishments and institutions was adopted in November 1941, when these establishments were required to acquire licences in order to obtain some 63 specified foods. All establishments and institutions were required to obtain a licence to carry on their businesses, and control by the Ministry was thereby tightened. Buying permits must be obtained from the Ministry of Food by these establishments in order to obtain all rationed and manyunrationed foods, and they must state the number of meals in each of four classifications—breakfast, main meal, subsidiary meal and tea. Allowances are based on the number of meals served in each category. When the milk reductions took RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 137 place, catering establishments were given 50 per cent, of their milk quota in evaporated or dried milk.1 School Canteens On 21 October 1941 the Board of Education issued a circular 2 to local education authorities which began: The President of the Board of Education and the Minister of Food have been considering what further measures are necessary to secure and maintain a high standard of nutrition among school children under war conditions. Insofar as school facilities are concerned, this object can be secured in two ways, viz:— (*') by the provision of school meals on a much larger scale than at present; (ti) by an increase in the number of children taking school milk from the present figure of 60 per cent, to as near 100 per cent, as may be possible. T h e President desires to impress on all Authorities t h a t His Majesty's Government attach the highest importance to the rapid achievement of these aims. School feeding existed before the war but was primarily for "necessitous" children. Wartime school feeding is designed for all children, partly because of the need of getting women into industry, but largely because it is realised that growing children have special dietary needs that are frequently not met in the home, especially when many important foods are rationed under a system that does not take into consideration the special needs of children. As early as October 1939, the Ministry of Food issued a memorandum urging the development of canteens for the feeding of children in school and giving practical advice on the establishment and running of canteens. Nevertheless, the provision of school meals has proceeded extremely slowly, and in October 1941 only 300,000 out of 5,000,000 school children were getting midday meals in the school, but this was a 100 per cent, increase over 1940.8 From 1 October 1941, the minimum grant to public elementary schools by the Board of Education on the cost of providing school meals was raised to 70 per cent. The maximum grant is 95 per cent, of the cost. Most local authorities have initiated some sort of scheme for school meals, and the rate at which new centres are put into operation is increasing rapidly, but as late as September 1941 the Children's Nutrition Council doubted that "more than 15-20 per cent. 1 See Appendix IV for Table of Allowances of Food to catering establishments. In April 1942 the Government announced an impending decision to limit the prices which might be charged for meals in hotels and restaurants. » No. 1567. 8 See statement of the Minister of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 21 October 1941, Vol. 374, cols. 348 and 351. 138 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN of the local education authorities could boast of providing meals for a tenth of the elementary school children in their areas". 1 The method of providing meals varies according to the conditions in each locality. Some large urban schools have their own kitchens; other schools depend on outside kitchens or restaurants. The Ministry of Food has encouraged the extension of cooking depots set up and operated by the County Councils and local authorities, each of which is capable of supplying about 3,000 mid-day meals daily. Arrangements have been made for these depots as well as the British Restaurants to prepare and deliver meals to schools. From 17 November 1941, school canteens were registered as priority establishments and were thereby assisted in obtaining supplies of cocoa powder, starch food powders, rice, suet, pulses and oatmeal. Allowances of meat and sugar are doubled, and that of preserves nearly doubled. A special allowance of milk is given for cooking purposes. 2 The Board of Education emphasises that the nutritional value of school meals is of greatest importance and that adequate and balanced meals will not be cheap, b u t it is not the cost of the meal b u t its nutritive value t h a t should be the paramount consideration. Parents look to the school dinner to furnish the main meal of the day for their children, and this expectation can be realised only by the provision of a first-rate meal. Unfortunately, there have been, and still are some instances where the authorised allowances of food have not been bought in full owing to a well-meant b u t mistaken effort to keep the price of the school dinner very low or even to make a profit for sports funds, etc. The Government's policy is frustrated by such practices. Economy should be studied n o t by reducing the quantity or quality of the food and staving off hunger with liquids such as soup, b u t by avoiding waste by skilled buying, and by good cooking . . . If it is found t h a t some parents cannot pay the full cost of the food the remedy is not to give a poorer meal, b u t to adjust the income scales so as to provide for meals on part payment, as well as for free meals in cases of greater necessity. Whether such adjustments are called for or not, it is essential t h a t the arrangements should be such t h a t no child is debarred from participating in the meals through inability of his parents to contribute to the cost. 8 Canteens for Industrial and Agricultural Workers Slowly the principle of feeding people where they are congregated has grown and spread. It was early applied to the feed1 War-Time Nutrition Bulletin, September 1941, p. 3. See Appendix IV for the allowances for school canteens registered as priority catering establishments for public elementary schools, day special schools, nursery schools, secondary schools, and those technical schools serving mid-day dinners mainly for students under 18. « Circular No. 1571, 12 November 1941. 2 RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 139 ing of factory workers, and special allowances of food to such centres on a comprehensive scale were introduced late in 1941. In the beginning canteens were too often places where a choice of a few "snack" foods could be obtained, but they have gradually developed into full-fledged feeding centres. The number of canteens in the factories, at the pit-heads of mines and near the fields where agricultural workers are employed is being increased. Largescale transfers of workers, many of whom are living in billets, means that noon meals can no longer be obtained in the accustomed manner and that what catering establishments there are will be overcrowded. Workers who have to travel long distances to their work must be provided with nearby feeding facilities. Night shifts make necessary the provision of meals in factories at unusual hours. The welfare work of the Ministry of Labour has long been concerned with factory canteen facilities. The policy of the Ministry of Food in collaboration with the Ministry of Labour is that every worker should be able to obtain at least one full meal at his place of work. In July and August 1940 a survey of the capacity of catering establishments was carried out in order to obtain information regarding the need for special factory canteens and communal feeding centres. All employers were urged to set up canteens for their workers and the Ministry of Food agreed to assist them. The Ministry of Labour and National Service determines where canteens are needed, and the Ministry of Food co-operates in establishing them. Under powers1 granted by the Minister of Labour, a factory inspector can compel an employer who employs more than 250 workers, and who is engaged on Government work, to arrange for the establishment in his factory of a canteen serving hot meals. Similarly, dock authorities and employers • engaged in works of construction can be compelled to provide canteens. 2 Factories with less than 250 workers are considered too small for the general provision of inside canteens to be practicable. In some cases a number of factories of this sort have voluntarily joined together to form a common canteen. In other areas where there is a large number of small factories, British Restaurants have been set up to serve them. Some of the factories thus served have made arrangements to bring cooked food in bulk from the British Restaurants in the area to the factories, where it is served in factory mess rooms. 8 1 Factories (Canteen) Order, 1940. ' Docks (Provision of Canteens) Order, 1941, and Building Operations and Works Engineering Construction (Welfare and Safety Provisions) Order, 1941. * This arrangement seems to be particularly widespread in Birmingham. 140 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN By the end of July 1941, there were canteens selling hot meals a t approximately 4,000 factories, including shipbuilding yards, b u t excluding other canteens and refreshment houses a t docks and canteens a t building sites. In addition such canteens were being established a t about 750 factories. Canteens a t building sites numbered 460; and dock canteens, insofar as they could be distinguished from other refreshment houses a t docks, were reckoned a t 70, with 37 more in course of establishment. . . Factory canteens have recently been coming into actual operation a t the rate of about 100 a month. 1 In December 1941, the Minister of Food stated that there were 11,269 registered canteens in the country, including those in factories, at pit heads, at building sites, dock estates and in schools. 2 The creation of canteens for miners presented special problems, since cooking facilities cannot be used underground and the miners cannot always get to a central canteen. The Ministry of Food has sought the co-operation of the Minister of Mines and the Miners Welfare Commission in arranging feeding facilities for miners. In some districts miners are supplied with meat sandwiches which form the "snapping" that they take down into the mine. Pithead canteens are being provided for the larger mines and "snack bars" at smaller ones. The responsibility for the provision of facilities in the mining industry has been assumed by the Miners Welfare Commission, while the Ministry of Food takes care of the provision of food. The latter has placed at the disposal of the industry a staff expert in the organising of canteens.* The Miners Welfare Commission has funds which can be used for equipping canteens. By 27 January 1942, 667 collieries had canteens serving sandwiches, meat pies or snacks, and 152 more collieries had canteens in preparation. About 590,000 men were employed by these collieries. Only 49 collieries had canteens providing full meals, but 312 had canteens in preparation. 4 These collieries employed nearly 350,000 workers. The program for feeding miners envisages the setting up of 856 canteens feeding 680,500 miners—about 93 per cent, of the miners in the country. 6 Until the latter part of 1941 catering establishments of all kinds were treated equally in respect of food supplies, with the 1 Statement of the Minister of Labour and National Service, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 2 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 696. 2 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 3 December 1941, Vol. 121, col. 152. * See letter from the Minister of Food in The Times, 7 July 1941. 4 Most of these canteens in preparation served sandwiches and snacks and are thus included in the figures for those canteens. 6 This will involve an estimated expenditure of £1,250,000 in the twelve months following the beginning of December 1941. See statement of the Minister of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 2 December 1941, Vol. 121, col. 154. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 141 exception of canteens serving heavy workers or workers who worked for long hours and who were engaged on essential production. Extra allowances of cheese and meat were given to these establishments and priority was assured them in obtaining their ordinary requirements'. In October 1941, however, the Ministry of Food issued the following announcement: T h e rations of industrial workers will be supplemented by increasing the allowances of food to canteens and other catering establishments serving industrial workers. All catering establishments, private and public, will be divided into three categories. Category A will comprise canteens and certain other approved catering establishments (such as dock-side restaurants) serving meals to workers in a small number of heavy industries of great national importance, including mining, quarrying, docks, iron and steel, and metal extraction. Category B will include all other industrial canteens and private establishments catering wholly or mainly for workers in factories or other industrial works. 1 Category C will consist of all other catering establishments.* Increased allowances of food, determined in consultation with the Ministry of Labour, are assured to the priority categories A and B. s Category C continues to receive the ordinary allowances. It is true that under these arrangements some individuals who are not priority workers, but who happen to take meals in priority establishments, receive extra foods. The number of these individuals is not large, however, in relation to the numbers of priority workers, and it is doubtful whether any practicable system could be devised which would eliminate all anomalies of this sort. In addition to priority allowances for canteens, extra food is given to certain recreational clubs for war workers and to clubs at Headquarters of the Air Training Corps to enable them to provide light refreshments. Youth Service centres, which are established by the local education authorities or voluntary bodies for young working people, are similarly allowed extra food to enable them to provide light refreshments for young people who attend the centres after work in factories and other industrial establishments. Youth Service centres with adequate cooking facilities and which are open at least five nights a week are given a special allowance of milk and the normal catering allowance of other foods. Centres without cooking facilities open at least three nights a week and with a normal attendance of 30 receive the normal catering allocation of sugar, preserves and fats and a special allocation of milk and cheese. Assistance in obtaining rationed foods is also given to roadside cafes serving transport workers. 1 Commercial catering establishments, 60 per cent, or more of whose patrons are industrial workers, are included in this category. » Press Notice 1395, 25 October 1941. • See Appendix IV, table x n . 142 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN The extension of communal feeding of all sorts thus provides a supplementary allowance of food above the domestic ration, which is based on the "average domestic need of the average household". 1 These supplementary allowances are to some extent based on the nutritional needs of different groups of the population. The full development of the programme will go far towards establishing a well-founded system of differential feeding of different groups based on needs and not on income. The provision of food by catering establishments "off the ration" does, however, discriminate in the beginning against low income groups, against individuals in reception areas where such establishments are too few to meet the demand, and against workers in areas whose population is swollen by an influx of workers for recently expanded or established war industries. The rapid provision of feeding centres reduces this discrimination, but unfortunately the feeding programme has been very slow in getting under way. I t is moving rapidly, but there is still a long way to go before the entire working and school population is adequately catered for in cheap and good public restaurants and canteens. Until this goal has been reached criticism of "off the ration" feeding in catering establishments retains much of its force. There are great differences between different localities, depending on the energy and progressiveness of the local authorities and on the influence of the local catering trades, which generally oppose the British Restaurants. Some areas having large influxes of evacuees are insufficiently provided with Communal Feeding Centres, and there the congestion in the existing catering establishments is acute. One area, ïor example, whose population is swollen from a peace-time figure of about 60,000 people to over 80,000 has no British Restaurants although it has a few lunch rooms and canteens. The evacuees, who suffer most in these cases, have no voice in local affairs, and it is the local authority which decides whether a British Restaurant should be established. If enough British Restaurants are not provided the policy of encouraging communal "off the ration" feeding is seriously impaired, because as restaurant prices rise public criticism of what amounts to a discrimination in favour of the higher income groups increases. This might cause more restrictions on, or even rationing of, restaurant meals. The British Restaurant idea is undoubtedly a good one, but the restaurants must be scattered generously throughout the country if the general policy of which they are the backbone is not to break down. 1 Minister of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 2 December 1941, Vol. 121, col. 150. RATIONING AND PRIORITY DISTRIBUTION 143 EMERGENCY FEEDING Community kitchens and cooking depots are the backbone of the emergency feeding programme. British Restaurants, many of which can operate independently of the city fuel and light supplies, are open during air raids. For towns that are heavily bombed, however, fleets of mobile canteens with independent cooking facilities are rushed to the critical areas. "Food convoys" for every Food Division in the country have been created. Each convoy is a complete unit, equipped with food, water, solid fuel and utensils. It generally includes eight vehicles—one 350-gallon water tanker, two lorries carrying food for 6,000 meals of tea, bread, margarine and vegetable stew, two kitchen lorries, and three mobile canteens to distribute the food. Motor-cycle despatch riders are attached to each unit to maintain liaison between the components of the convoy and with the local authorities. People in the bombed towns are informed where food can be obtained by means of a loud-speaker van. The Trades Union Congress also maintains a fleet of mobile canteens for emergency service. Canteens have been established in public air-raid shelters by the local authorities and by voluntary bodies. Except in the canteens of local authorities, the sale of food in public air-raid shelters is permitted only under licence from the Ministry of Food. In London, by December 1940, over 1,000 shelters had regular arrangements capable of feeding over 200,000 people each night in addition to the 121,000 people fed nightly in the tube stations by the London Passenger Transport Board. Meals provided in shelters could not be so well balanced on the whole as those of canteens and other establishments, since the unpredictable demand made perishable foods wasteful to handle and meant that only foods fairly easily stored could be used. Canned foods which would have met the requirements of both storage and nutrition were not available in sufficient quantities. Emergency feeding facilities are closely associated with the general emergency distribution programme which has already been discussed.1 The contribution of voluntary groups and especially of voluntary workers to the development of the communal feeding facilities of all sorts must not be overlooked. The Women's Voluntary Services have been especially active in this field, and many school and factory canteens owe much to the labour they have freely offered. In addition, voluntary groups publish pamphlets designed to give information regarding the setting up of canteens and restaurants and suggestions regarding suitable menus to those » See pp. 101-105. 144 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN who were working to establish such undertakings. For example, in 1940 the W.V.S. issued a 70-page pamphlet on Community Feeding in War-time.1 Fire watchers and other A.R.P. Services have in many cases been fed while on duty entirely by women working voluntarily. Many employers have voluntarily set up and run canteens for the workers in their factories; this is clearly in the interest of employers, since increased output and improved morale not infrequently follow the establishment of a good canteen. The Minister of Food spoke with praise of the work of the voluntary organisations in helping to provide dockside feeding facilities : I think it would be appropriate . . . to pay tribute to the work of some of the voluntary organisations in this matter. When we first became aware of the necessity of increasing these dockside canteens, there was obviously going to be a delay before we could bring the new machinery into existence, and a number of voluntary bodies, many of them women's bodies, including the Women's Voluntary Service and the Y.W.C.A., came along with their mobile canteens and went to the dockside day after day, regularly providing meals for the dock workers. That was a very valuable piece of war work, for which I am grateful.' This is only one example of the work these groups are doing all over the country. 1 1 Second edition, 1941 (H.M.S.O.). Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 2 December 1941, Vol. 121, col. 153. CHAPTER V FOOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY Food prices contribute 60 per cent, to the Ministry of Labour's cost-of-living index in Great Britain. This index to a large extent determines the course of wage rates in the country. When it rises, demands for increased money income follow from many sections in the population. If it rises far these demands must be granted if morale, efficiency and health are to be maintained among the people, but incomes do not always rise as fast as prices, and severe injustice is done to the recipients of low and fixed money incomes since they suffer a fall in their real income as prices rise. Furthermore, in wartime even if money incomes kept pace with prices real income must fall since the supply of consumers' goods is not being increased but rather reduced. Prices may rise in response to increased demand, but there is little tendency for them to call forth greater supplies, and the well-known "vicious spiral" results. Control of prices therefore is a central part of financial policy, and especially control of the prices of those goods bulking in the cost of living. The stability of the cost-of-living index is considered important, partly because the wages of over 2 j ^ million workers are linked directly to it, but also because it is widely believed to measure the effect of the war on costs of living and thereby on the material wellbeing of the people. The index, however, measures changes from 1914 in the cost of buying a particular collection of goods and services. The cost of this composite commodity is assumed to represent the cost of living for the average worker's family.1 The index simply represents the changes in the cost of buying this collection. When it stands at 165, for example, it means that the cost of buying the collection of foods consumed in 1914 and included in the index is 65 per cent, higher than it was in July 1914. It is 1 The collection of goods and services included in the index was selected on the basis of a family budget enquiry of 1904, and the proportion of total expenditure on each item or group of items in the budget determines the weight given in the index to each item or group of items. 146 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN obvious, therefore, that apart from whatever changes occurred between 1914 and the outbreak of the present war in the composite commodity consumed by the average working-class family, the index is unreliable as an index of the cost of food to the average family in wartime. Rationing has considerably altered the kinds and amounts of foods bought by the people. Goods are no longer available in the same quantities as before the war, and the cost of living in wartime is the cost of buying a different collection of goods from that bought previously. Seventy-one per cent, of the food prices index is made up of foods that are now rationed, if milk and eggs are included in this category, and consumption of rationed goods is restricted in most cases below the pre-war level. The Economist1 has pointed out that rationing has so reduced the quantities of foods available that "the increase in the average household's expenditure on the items included in the index cannot have been as big as its rise since the outbreak of war". This may be true, but the index excludes all fresh fruits and vegetables, canned goods, jam, fats other than butter and margarine, sweets and preserves, and other miscellaneous items. The deficiencies resulting from decreases in the amounts of rationed food that can be bought must be made up from other sources which are not included in the food prices index. The cost of an adequate diet has probably increased as a result of the increased prices and partial disappearance of fruits and vegetables and the necessity of purchasing more of the more expensive unrationed commodities that do not carry sufficient weight in the index or are not included in it. 2 The proportion of the total family expenditure on food that is included in the food prices index is less than before the war, and the index is consequently a less reliable measure of the cost of food to the average family. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Labour's cost-of-living index is the only official measure of cost of living in use in the United Kingdom. The index which stood at 155 (July 1914 = 100) on 1 September 19393, rose to 187 on 1 September 1940, and to 199 on 1 September 1941—a rise of only 28 per cent. During 1941 the index was remarkably steady—fluctuating within a range of 5 points. Approximately 18.8 per cent, of the increase over September 1939 was due to the purchase tax and additional taxes on sugar, tea, tobacco, matches and cigarettes. 1 31 M a y 1941, p. 732. See Bulletin of the Institute of Statistics, Oxford, 5 April 1941, Vol. 3, No. 5, p. 92, and 30 August 1941, Vol. 3, No. 12 (Supplement I). 8 The price and index figures given for any month in the following discussion refer to the first of the month, and therefore represent the situation in the previous month. 2 147 FOOD PRICE CONTROL POUCY T A B L E 1 1 . COST-OF-LIVING I N D E X O F T H E MINISTRY O F LABOUR (July 1914 - 100.) 1939 Month Index on 1st of e a c h month January.. February. , March April May June July August.. .. September October.. . November. December. 155 155 153 153 153 153 156 155 155 165 169 173 Source: Ministry of Labour 1941 1940 Per cent. increase over S e p t . 1939 9 UH Index on 1st of e a c h month 174 177 179 178 180 181 187 185 187 189 192 195 Per cent. increase over Sept. 1939 12 14 15^ 15 16 17 21 19 21 22 24 26 Index on 1st of e a c h month Per cent increase. over Sept. 1939 196 197 197 198 200 200 199 199 199 199 200 201 26 27 27 28 29 29 28 28 28 28 29 29M Gazette. Thus the policy of stabilising the cost of living as measured by this index has been extremely successful—owing in no small measure to the stabilisation of the food prices index. The index of retail food prices in the United Kingdom stood at 138 on 1 September 1939 and at 166 on 1 September 1941—a rise of 20 per cent., which is substantially less than the rise in the total costof-living index. During 1941 the index actually fell from 172 to 165. TABLE 12. I N D E X O F R E T A I L FOOD P R I C E S OF T H E M I N I S T R Y OF LABOUR (July 1914 - 100.) 1939 Month January. . February.. March April May June July August. . . September. October.. . November. December. Source: Ministry Index on 1st of each month P e r cent. increase over S e p t . 1939 138 135 135 135 134 139 137 138 150 154 157 of Labour 1941 Gazette. 9 12 14 Index on 1st of e a c h month 157 161 161 158 159 158 168 164 166 169 172 173 Per cent. increase over S e p t . 1939 14 17 17 14^ 15 14^ 22 19 20 22 25 25 Index on 1st of e a c h month 172 171 169 170 171 170 167 167 166 165 165 165 Per cent. increase over S e p t . 1939 25 24 22 23 24 23 21 21 20 20 20 20 148 FOOD CONTROL IÑ GREAT BRITAIN FOOD SUBSIDIES The chief reason for the stability of this index is the Government's subsidy policy. The food prices index rose sharply after the outbreak of war, as is shown above, and in December 1939 the policy of subsidising certain foods was started in order to prevent their prices from rising too quickly. For the first seven months of the war, coming within the financial year ending 31 March 1940, the deficit in the Ministry of Food's trading accounts amounted to £19,500,000, of which a little more than one-half was used to subsidise bread and flour, one quarter to subsidise meat, and the balance for liquid milk and bacon. 1 On 31 January 1940 the Chancellor of the Exchequer disclosed that the annual subsidy on food was amounting to about £50,000,000 a year. 2 The weekly subsidy on bread and flour was £480,000, on milk £235,000, on meat £320,000, and on bacon £80,000. These subsidies had prevented a rise of an additional 12 points in the food prices i n d e x — 7 ^ points in the cost-of-living index. 3 In the fiscal year 1940-1, the rate of subsidy was considerably higher, and in April 1940 the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed . . . to continue and extend the policy of stabilisation in an endeavour to prevent any further rise of the Cost-of-Living Index Number, apart from minor seasonal changes, above the present range of 125-130 in terms of the pre-war level . . . I have included in my estimated expenditure a margin to provide for important extensions of the principle of subsidising essential goods and services.4 At the present time subsidised foods account for approximately 75 per cent, of the food price index 6 , and subsidies are being paid at the rate of some £102,000,000 a year, excluding the pre-war 1 Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 13 November 1940, Vol. 365, col. 1207. 1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 31 January 1940, Vol. 356, col. 1155. » See debate on Food Prices in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 8 February 1940, Vol. 357. 4 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 7 April 1941, Vol. 370, col. 1321. 6 In the food prices index subsidised foods receive weights of 228 out of a total of 334. The weights for each food are as follows: •Beef 48 »Bread 50 Cheese 10 •Mutton 24 "Tea 22 Margarine 10 Bacon 19 Sugar 19 *Eggs 19 Fish 9 »Milk 25 »Potatoes 18 »Flour 20 Butter 41 »Subsidised food. Source: MINISTRY OP LABOUR: The Cost of Living Index Number, Method of Compilation (H.M.S.O., 1931). 149 POOD PRICE CONTROL POUCY cost of the cattle and sugar beet subsidies 1 which have been continued. The various foods are subsidised as follows2: Million £ Flour, bread, oatmeal and feeding stuffs Meat Milk, tea, eggs, potatoes National Milk Scheme Total 50 23 12 17 102 In addition, the cost of transport of many foods is borne by the Ministry of Food, involving a subsidy of £20,000,000 annually. 8 This subsidy of more than £100,000,000 a year may be expected to become larger as costs rise. The recent increase in the wages of agricultural workers, the increased difficulties of ocean transport as a result of the hostilities in the Far East, and the continued rise of other costs, will raise the amount of subsidy required if retail prices of food are to be kept down in accordance with the policy enunciated above. COURSE OF FOOD PRICES The prices of the different foods have followed widely different courses since the outbreak of war. Most of them have risen, but a small part of the rise is the result of the elimination of the cheaper brands of many foodstuffs, which raises the average price. Greater seasonal fluctuations in prices occur when imports from different climates are cut off, since the seasons of the year occur at different times in different parts of the world. This is an important factor for fruit and eggs. The prices of some foods have been affected more by the German occupation of the continent than others, and the home production of most foods has been hampered by the shipping difficulties, which caused a shortage of fertilisers and feeding stuffs, and by a shortage of labour. The prices of flour and bread have remained steady as a result of the subsidy. Flour prices were lower on 1 September 1941 than they were on 1 September 1939, although they rose sharply during October 1941 as a result of a change in policy which reduced the subsidy on flour and increased it on bread, the price of which was lower on 1 November 1941 than on 1 September 1939.4 Flour and bread, therefore, played no part in contributing to the rise 1 Amounting to about £6,750,000 annually before the war. See statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 9 September 1941, Vol. 374, col. 50. » Ibid., 14 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1241. 1 See Appendix V for the individual food prices and indices on which this discussion and the discussion of other foods which follows it are based. s ISO ÍOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN in the food prices index. Tea rose from an average price of 2s. 4d. on 1 September 1939 to 2s. 6d. on 1 May 1940, where it has remained as a result of control. The price of sugar has fluctuated slightly, but in December 1941 it stood at the same level as before the war. Thus bread, flour, sugar and tea have been kept at approximately the pre-war level. On the other hand, prices of meat, bacon, fish, milk, eggs, cheese, butter, margarine and potatoes have risen markedly. Fish showed the greatest percentage of increase between 1 September 1939 and 1 September 1941, having risen 56 per cent. During the first seven months of 1941 the prices were even higher, the index on 1 May reaching 455 (1914 = 100) compared with 206 on 1 September 1939-an increase of 121.1 per cent. During this period fish prices were not controlled, with the exception of herrings, Icelandic cod and imported cod fillets, and the extravagant heights to which prices rose caused great public discontent, manifested in the newspapers and Parliament. Control of fish prices is difficult because during the war fishing is extremely hazardous and the men who go to sea must be adequately recompensed for the risks they run. The Admiralty has requisitioned for minesweeping about 75 per cent, of the trawlers usually engaged in the trade, thus reducing normal fish supplies by approximately the same amount, and demand is far greater than the reduced supply. Furthermore, fish is an extremely perishable commodity. Before imposing control the Ministry of Food entered into negotiations with the fish trade to try to develop a voluntary scheme for controlling the industry. When Lord Woolton announced in the House of Lords on 25 June 1941 the imposition of a complete system of price control in the fishing industry, he said: I sought the assistance of the trade some months ago, and asked them to put their house in order and to put themselves right with public opinion. M y negotiations with t h e trade have been long and they have been patiently conducted with its many branches and ramifications. I have now received proposals regarding what they consider to be the proper prices for the public to pay. I reject these proposals. When I invited the trade to put its house in order, I did not invite it to perpetuate extravagant prices which I am told have met with the stern disapproval of many who value the good name of their trade. 1 Early in 1941 the sale of fish by wholesalers was prohibited except under licence and maximum prices for all fish except shellfish, salmon, trout and pickled herrings were prescribed. Prices of fish were controlled at the quay, in the shops and at all intermediate stages. 1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 25 J u n e 1941, Vol. 119, col. 512. FOOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 151 A special effort is made to protect the remuneration of fishing crews. . . . It is a custom of the British fishing industry for the crews of trawlers to be paid on a profit-sharing basis. These men who seek our food in dangerous waters must be adequately rewarded for the risks that they run. In the fishing industry two types of people take risks, but the risks are entirely different in character. There are the men who go down to the sea in ships and sail daily and nightly among the mines; their risk remains and must be rewarded. There are others who control the industry from the comparative security of the land. They take the commercial risk, which indeed is considerable in peace-time but in wartime is greatly reduced. In commercial practice, the cost of labour and the cost and profit on management both go to fix the price of goods to the consumer. But there is no reason why the profits of the owners should be automatically increased by the fact that under war conditions an additional inducement has to be given to the crew. I have, therefore, decided to include in the Order a provision requiring that whenever the firsthand price reaches the maximum, one shilling a stone shall be reserved exclusively for the crew. By this means we shall secure that the remuneration of the fishermen will be on the same basis as if I had accepted the level of maximum prices which were recommended by the Trade Committee.1 Since fishing crews are paid in relation to the value of the catch, the result of the order referred to is to raise the value of the catch for the purpose of remunerating the fishermen, and owners are required to settle with the men, if the maximum prices are reached (which occurs 90 per cent, of the time), on a higher value basis than the maximum prices would give for the catch. For fish previously uncontrolled the prescribed prices were substantially below the prevailing prices. The fish prices index fell promptly to 337 on 1 July, and subsequent reductions in the prescribed prices of certain fish brought it down to 305 on 1 October. The prices of other first-class proteins also rose considerably between 1 September 1939 and 1 September 1941 but less than fish prices, since they were better controlled and, with the exception of cheese, the shortage was not so severe. Furthermore, they are all rationed, and, most important, all of them are subsidised. The cheese prices index rose 29.3 per cent., and the milk prices index 30.7 per cent. The entire increase in cheese prices took place before June 1940. After the maximum price order of May, the average price of cheese published in the Ministry of Labour Gazette fell 10 per cent. Before the imposition of price control, the Ministry of Food tried to regulate the price of cheese by releasing imported supplies at its own price, although the Minister of Food was not the sole importer of cheese, and did not purchase » Ibid., col. 513. 152 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN home supplies. The loss involved in this transaction was at the rate of £600,000 a year. 1 Retail milk prices are subject to seasonal and regional variations. They were raised sharply in June 1940 to cover increased producers' and distributors' costs, but at the same time the National Milk Scheme was introduced, which offset this rise for the priority classes.2 They were raised again in December 1940 to an average of 9d. a quart, around which level they have since fluctuated seasonally. Egg prices have gone through somewhat the same history as fish prices, increasing scarcity sending prices up to a peak during October and November 1940. The progressive occupation of the continent by Germany cut off supplies of Dutch and Danish eggs, and this augmented the existing scarcity. The index on 1 December 1940 stood at 314 compared with 228 in 1939 and 200 in 1941. The history of the Ministry of Food's attempts to control egg supplies and prices is discussed above. 3 As may be seen from the index of prices4, it was not until the introduction of control in June 1941 that egg prices were stabilised. In addition a subsidy was paid on them and they fell from an average of 2%d. each on 1 June to 23^d. for large eggs and 2%d. for small eggs on 1 July. Meat policy and prices went through a confused series of changes from the outbreak of war until the middle of January 1940. In September 1939, provisional prices were established for home-killed meat, stocks of canned meat and imported meat and pork were requisitioned, and control set up over importers. Then in December price control was abandoned and a free market in home-produced meat and fatstocks was restored. The Economist5 commented as follows: The reason given was t h a t marketings of fat stock will be sufficient in the next few weeks to offset the shortage in supplies of imported meat caused by the demand of t h e Army. But to the working-class urban housewife, high quality British beef and pork are not a substitute for the standard cuts of imported meat. British and imported meat serve very different markets and they are only interchangeable if the Ministry has control over all supplies and allocates meat, irrespective of origin to the butchers a t standard prices. The policy pursued by the Ministries of Food and Agriculture in regard to the prices paid to the farmers for the various kinds of livestock has been discussed above. The prices that the Ministry 1 Fourth Report from the Select cit., p. 26. 2 See above, pp. 124-126. 3 pp. 91-93. * See Appendix V. 8 9 December 1939, p. 369. Committee on National Expenditure, op. FOOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 153 considers itself justified in charging the consumer leave a trading loss in the accounts of the Ministry, which is, of course, a subsidy on meat. Meat is rationed by value, and consequently prevailing prices directly limit the quantity that may be obtained on the ration. This form of rationing has also resulted in a greater relative increase in the prices of the cheaper cuts than in those of the more expensive cuts. The more expensive cuts of home-produced meat have risen less in price than the corresponding cuts of imported meat, while the cheaper cuts of home-produced meat have risen more than those of imported meat. This is partly the result of the method of rationing adopted, which results in smaller demand for the more expensive cuts. The supply of the latter cannot be decreased in relation to that of the cheaper cuts because they are joint products, and therefore the prices of the more expensive cuts must be reduced in relation to those of the cheaper cuts. The demand for the more expensive imported cuts will increase at the expense of the demand for the corresponding domestic cuts because the prices of the former are considerably lower than those of the latter. In September 1939, for example, home-produced beef ribs sold at an average price of Is. 2j^d. per pound, and leg of mutton at Is. 3j^d. per pound, while the corresponding cuts of chilled and frozen meat sold at 93^d. and l O ^ d . respectively. This difference induced people to demand more imported meat in relation to home-produced meat, and the price rose from 9%á. to Is. 0%d. per pound for chilled and frozen beef ribs, and from lOj^d. to Is. for frozen leg of mutton, while home-produced corresponding cuts rose only from Is. 2j^d. to Is. 3%d., and from Is. 33^d. to Is. 5j4d. respectively. On the other hand, the price of the cheaper cuts of home-produced meat has risen more in relation to the price of the corresponding cuts of imported meat because, although the difference in price is great, many people who were accustomed to buying expensive home-produced meat would buy the cheaper cuts of domestic meat rather than turn to imported chilled or frozen meat. The preference for domestic meat is marked in the cheaper price range. The index of fresh butter prices rose 15 per cent, in the period concerned, and that of salt butter 25.2 per cent. There is now only one grade of butter sold—National Butter—at Is. 7d. a pound. Since the price of fresh butter on 1 September 1939 was Is. 4 ^ d . per pound, and that of salt butter Is. V/Ì6.., the rise in price is greater for the cheaper butter. However, the price of butter is of less importance on account of the predominance of margarine in the ration and because margarine as manufactured in the United 154 FOOD CONTRO!, IN GREAT BRITAIN Kingdom to-day is more than an adequate substitute for butter since it contains as much vitamin A and twice as much vitamin D as butter. The margarine price index has risen 12 per cent., but this index is an average of the two grades, one of which sells at 9d. per pound and the other at 5d. The pre-war average price was 63^d., and consequently the present price of the standard brand is lower than the pre-war average price, but it is not lower than the cheapest brand available before the war. For five months in the beginning of 1940, margarine prices rose to an average of 7J4d. P e r pound because of an increase in the prices of the higherpriced brands resulting from decontrol by the Ministry of Food in this period. In July 1940 margarine was rationed and the grades standardised, and the price has not changed since then. Bacon prices rose 35.6 per cent, in this period. They increased from an average of Is. 3d. a pound in September 1939 to Is. 8j^d. in February 1940, when they were lowered to Is. 6 ^ d . , involving the Ministry of Food in a trading loss of about £80,000 a week. They were, however, still 3 ^ d . above pre-war prices. This subsidy was severely criticised in many quarters, partly because bacon is not one of the most essential foods and partly because a considerable section of the public was unable to buy its full ration of bacon even at the lower price resulting from the subsidy. This meant, of course, that the subsidy was not actually going to those who needed it. With the removal of the subsidy in February 1941, average bacon prices were raised. The price of potatoes—the only other food included in the food prices index—rose 36.8 per cent, in the period under consideration. This rise was due to the increased price granted to producers in order to encourage production and to cover increased costs. Prices during 1942 will remain at the level prevailing in December 1941, although the maximum growers' prices have risen seasonally since January 1942. The difference between the fixed growers' prices in December and in each subsequent month is met by a subsidy. Prices of potatoes are normally subject to seasonal variations and are highest in June, when the new crop is replacing the old crop. The most important foods not included in the food prices index are fruits, vegetables, canned goods and oils and fats other than butter. There are few fresh fruits available in the towns— fewer in winter than in summer—and prices are high. There are some dried fruits, of which prices are controlled and supplies are rationed to consumers. Vegetables are more expensive than before the war and there is less variety. Carrots and potatoes are the most abundant and are the only cheap vegetables. All canned goods FOOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 155 are very expensive compared with the pre-war situation. There is no reliable measure of the wartime increase in the prices of these foods. Price controls have been applied to many of these foods. The prices of carrots are not controlled, but these are bought first-hand by the National Vegetable Marketing Company, an agent of the Ministry of Food. The abundance of carrots makes price control unnecessary. With the rationing of meat, greater importance is attached to poultry, rabbits, sausages, offals and vegetable proteins such as dried peas, beans and lentils, all of which are controlled by maximum price orders. Horseflesh and goat meat are not included in the ration and the prices of these foods have recently come under control. METHODS OP CONTROLLING PRICES Prices of food are controlled either by prescribing fixed or maximum prices or under a current prices order which limits prices to those ruling in some base period for the same or similar goods sold under similar conditions. Current prices orders were issued for most commodities before specified maximum prices were set, but they were in most cases followed by maximum price orders. In January 1941, the Ministry of Food brought a large number of previously uncontrolled foods1 under a current prices order which limited prices to those prevailing on 2 December 1940. This move was the beginning of an almost completely comprehensive extension of price control. I t was done, according to the Minister of Food, . . . to spike the speculator's guns. Investigation had shown that a swarm of new middlemen and option buyers were infesting the food trade, who, while rendering no service to the nation, were profiting out of a market in which they could not lose money. . . Stabilisation at December levels was only the first stage of control. . . All the foods comprised in the stabilising Order would come under maximum price orders during the coming month.* Retail prices are composed of the first-hand price paid to growers or to oversea exporters, plus the costs of processing and distribution. In Chapter II the prices paid to growers of agricultural products were discussed. In this chapter we shall discuss the additions to growers' prices which determine the level of retail prices. These additions are the margins received by processors, manufacturers and distributors of all kinds. 1 See Appendix III, table I. * MINISTRY OF FOOD: Bulletin, No. 68, 10 January 1941. 156 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Effective control of prices must be preceded in general by control of supplies (in order to control first-hand prices) and of the channels of distribution (in order to control distributive margins) and, in cases of extreme scarcity, by control of demand. We have seen in Chapters I I I and IV how and to what extent, the British Government has established control over supply and demand. Although in wartime prices lose many of their functions and much of their meaning, they still represent the terms on which money is exchanged for goods and services, and the retail price of any commodity must therefore bear a relation to the amount of money people are willing to give for it. I t is frequently alleged that any analysis in terms of supply and demand is irrelevant for a war economy. On the contrary, even in wartime, the prices of consumers' goods must bear a relation to the supply of and demand for these goods. They cannot be arbitrarily fixed. It is quite possible to set the price of any commodity so high that all units of the commodity cannot be sold1 or to set it so low that people form long queues waiting to buy. In most cases it is not desirable to use prices as the regulator of demand because of the discrimination against low income groups that this involves2, and since prices cannot be set without reference to the total amount that will be demanded at any given price it may be necessary to establish control of demand. On the other hand, the conditions of supply must be considered, since the price to the producer must furnish sufficient incentive for him to produce the amount desired. Retail prices are divorced from supply conditions only when they are subsidised and demand is controlled by rationing. Prices can, therefore, be set without reference to supply conditions if the State is willing to subsidise production, but in no circumstances can they be set without reference to demand conditions if they are to perform any distributive function. Price control must in many cases be preceded by the classification of the commodities concerned into a few standardised grades, since any price must apply to one commodity or group of commodities sufficiently alike to be sold at the same price, and the tremendous variation in kinds, qualities and brands common in peace-time would, if separately priced, so complicate price schedules as to make them unworkable. Butter, margarine, cuts of bacon 1 This may be assumed to have happened, for example, when the entire ration of any food universally consumed is not taken up, since the ration is presumably the amount of t h a t food the Ministry of Food desires to sell, yet because of the price not all groups can buy their share. The early stages of rationing of meat and of butter furnished examples of prices set so high t h a t demand and supply were not balanced. ! Even with equality of purchasing power, there would be strong reasons for rationing certain goods. See above, pp. 106-109. FOOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 157 and of meat, sausages, jams, canned goods, potatoes, bread and condensed milk are all subject to regulations classifying them and standardising each class, partly in some cases to eliminate waste and inefficient methods of production and distribution, and partly to simplify price control. , The price control regulations applied to chocolate and sugar confectionery present a good example of the need as well as the effectiveness of classifying an extremely unstandardised collection of products. The products were classified into "product groups" by War Time Associations of the Industry, specially set up by the Ministry of Food, and maximum prices were set for each group. The schedule of maximum prices then became quite simple. It is divided into two parts; the first prescribes a flat maximum price for all unclassified products and the second prescribes maximum prices for 16 groups. Each retailer is required to display a ticket over each product showing the maximum prices and the product group to which it belongs. An outstanding example of a price control order applying to unstandardised foodstuffs is the pickles and sauces order, which prescribes prices for some 200 different items, many of them primarily differentiated by brand only. A considerable amount of the retailer's time is taken up in searching through the order for the price of the particular brand of pickled onions or meat sauce which his customer demands. In peace-time it is not a serious matter if the retailer charges the "wrong" price, but in wartime it is a serious and perhaps costly- offence against the Defence Regulations. 1 It is therefore important that the tables of maximum prices should be as simple as possible; at best they can never be very simple, especially when they cover practically all foodstuffs on the market. Every general food retailer devotes at least six square feet of wall space to the price notices of the Ministry of Food. DETERMINATION OP PRICES The prices and margins of controlled foods are determined by the Ministry of Food upon the recommendation of its Margins Committee. The Trades Union Congress Advisory Committee is generally consulted when any major increase in prices is contemplated. The prices adopted by the Ministry of Food are in general maximum prices and are, in principle, fixed at a level which will 1 For example, one retailer said to the writer that she would rather give her customer a shilling than charge him a halfpenny too much; it would be cheaper in the long run. 158 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN cover costs of production plus a reasonable profit for producers and distributors. If the Ministry sells the food directly, it charges, in principle, a price that will cover cost plus administrative expenses. In practice, costs furnish only the roughest guide for fixing margins, since consideration must be given to changes in turnover as a result of the war and to the great variation in costs between different distributors. Before the war arrangements had been made for local accountants to investigate the costs of firms handling foodstuffs in different localities and the Ministry relies to a large extent on its costing investigations. Margins are set in the last analysis, however, by bargaining between the interests concerned and the Ministry of Food, using the pre-war situation as the basis for the wartime margins as far as possible. Pre-war margins are examined, and the estimated increases in the trader's costs are added to them. However, pre-war margins are not always a guide because of the wide-spread changes caused by the war in the distributive structure. 1 Distributive margins have been set with the objective of disturbing existing channels of trade as little as possible. This has sometimes complicated the picture since established channels are in some cases more tortuous than is necessary. In certain cases, however, existing trade customs are incompatible with effective price control. This is often true of the methods of first-hand sale. For example, if the custom is to sell by auction, e.g., fish, tea, meat, the problem of allocation is difficult when the price reaches the maximum, and some modification of existing channels must be made; or if there is extreme scarcity and producers can easily sell direct to consumers, as was true of eggs, price control is difficult without some modification. The Select Committee on National Expenditure 2 saw "certain definite disadvantages in the method of fixing margins to be allowed for various operations by a process of bargaining with the trade interests concerned". It is pointed out that this method took a large part of the time of important officials which should have been spent on "constructive planning and administration"; and that it "may fail to provide a foundation for absolute confidence in business circles that there is complete equality of treatment 1 " . . . I think there have been times when we have fixed an excessive margin, because the circumstances in which business has been carried on since the war have not always been identical with those existing before the war and we have had no basis to guide us; for instance, I have already spoken about the centralising of slaughterhouses, which completely changed the whole character of the distribution. Therefore, we have not always been able to base ourselves on pre-war experience." Evidence of Sir Henry French before the Committee of Public Accounts, in Minutes of Evidence, op. cit., p. 196. » Fourth Report, op. cit., p. 30. POOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 159 in all cases ; and may rather tend to create suspicions that powerful trade interests or skilful and hard bargainers are likely to obtain more consideration than others". The Committee accordingly recommended the setting up of a special tribunal to review the terms accorded the various trades and either confirm them or require their modification. The Ministry of Food rejected this proposal, maintaining that it would constitute a complex form of machinery which would not lighten the duties of the Ministry of Food and for which no need is felt within the Ministry and no demand has been made by food traders generally. The circumstances of each trade are so varied t h a t it is impracticable to lay down an exact formula in regard to remuneration which can be applied throughout. T h e only basis which the Ministry has found it possible to work on is t h a t payment should be made for services rendered and t h a t the quantum of the remuneration should be ascertained by reference to pre-war experience modified where necessary to provide for exceptional factors. . . Although there are many different margins and processing fees concerned, the Ministry has on the whole experienced no great difficulty in arriving a t agreement by negotiation with the appropriate trade interests, and the work involved would not be reduced b u t would, it is felt, be increased by reference to a tribunal. 1 The results of the negotiations with traders are frequently checked by the costings department of the Ministry and are subject to the final approval of the Treasury. A co-ordinating committee has been set up within the Ministry to review each arrangement before it is passed on for the Treasury's approval. All the important foods are bought directly by the Ministry of Food or by licensed importers, wholesalers or processors operating under controlled prices or margins, with the exception of fresh fruits and vegetables (other than home-grown apples, lemons, oranges, bananas, onions, leeks, potatoes, tomatoes and carrots) and margarine and cooking fats. All the foods imported or purchased domestically by the Ministry of Food are allocated to wholesalers and retailers on the basis of a pre-war datum period corrected for population movements or according to ration requirements. By virtue of its control of supplies and the channels of distribution, the Ministry of Food can lay down the margins received by all who handle the controlled foods. The most important fact about the Ministry of Food's method of determining prices and margins is the close co-operation with the traders that it entails. Whether the Ministry of Food has let the traders dominate the picture unduly cannot be determined at 1 Memorandum by the Ministry of Food, in Eleventh Report from the Select Committee on National Expenditure, op. cit., p. 12. 160 POOD CONTROt IN GREAT BRITAIN present. There are examples of failure to give adequate consideration to consumers' interests, and in general the assumption that existing channels of trade should not be upset more than is necessary, together with the strong representation of traders in the Ministry, has led to much consideration being given to the traders' interests. Processing Margins Processors' margins are determined by negotiation with the processors and are checked by costing investigations of the Ministry. As pointed out above, bacon curing is done under licence and the Ministry specifies methods of production and types of product as well as the selling prices of the curers. Both imported and domestic pig carcases are sold to the curers at a price designed to give them a sufficient curing margin. Under an agreement made in November 1941 between the Ministry of Food and the Flour Millers Association, the terms of remuneration for flour millers were determined for the three years ending 29 August 1942. The agreement provides that the margin per sack of flour paid to the millers by the Ministry shall be the average rate of profit per sack earned by all millers on flour milling only during a defined pre-war period. There is a provision for a maximum payment so that the total pre-war profits cannot be exceeded even though pre-war production is exceeded. Payments are disbursed through a pool company which represents all sections of the millers and includes the Co-operative Wholesale Society. 1 Sugar refiners are paid a margin which allows for changes in overhead costs on different scales of output. Wholesale Margins Wholesale margins may be fixed directly by prescribing specified additions to the first-hand price. For example, first-hand maximum prices of soft fruits are fixed, and the wholesaler may add 5 per cent. for his margin as well as the cost of transport to the buyer's premises. Consequently, the wholesale price varies with the distance between the wholesaler's and buyer's premises. The maximum wholesale price of jam is fixed, and the firsthand price is determined by deducting 7 ^ per cent, from the wholesale price, making the wholesaler's margin a little more than 73^ per cent, of the first-hand price. Under earlier price orders 1 See MINISTRY OP FOOD: Press Notice, No. 1450, 16 November 1941. POOD PRlCB CONTROL POLICY 161 many prices were "built up"—that is, the maximum price was calculated from specified additions to basic prices. This procedure has been abandoned for several foods in recent orders and inclusive maximum prices prescribed. For example, the wholesale margin for dried fruits was an addition of 6s. 6d. a cwt. plus transport charges to the first-hand price. This arrangement was superseded in January 1942 by fixed maximum prices for three specified groups. Certain kinds and packages of fruit were given special treatment. Fruit from one price group may not be mixed with fruit from another price group except under licence. This method of fixing wholesale margins through the operation of maximum first-hand and maximum wholesale prices is the method applied to most of the controlled foods. The full margin in these circumstances is not obtained unless the retailer pays the maximum price. Multiple shops buying first-hand and distributing from their own warehouses may receive both the wholesale and the retail margin, although sometimes first-hand prices are set higher to multiple shops. Multiple shops can, for example, buy butter at first-hand prices and are thus sometimes able to sell below the maximum price. 1 Multiple stores in wartime retain for many commodities the advantages they possessed in peace-time of buying first-hand and thus eliminating the costs of a separate organisation for wholesale distribution. There is no uniformity in price controls regarding the incidence of transport charges. Some wholesale prices are set excluding transport from the quay, wharf or warehouse where the goods are lying when the sale is made, so that the buyer pays transport from where the goods are to his premises. Other wholesale prices include all transport charges except those from the wholesaler's premises to the buyer's premises. Still other wholesale prices include all transport charges. Wholesale prices of fruit pulp, canned fruit, honey, jam, lard, lemons, cheese, bacon, goat meat and horseflesh, canned meat products, canned vegetables, poultry and hares, for example, include transport charges, while those of oranges, pepper, most home-grown fruits and vegetables, and canned fish, exclude them. The Government bore the costs of fresh fish transport for the 1 At the May 1940 meeting of the Newport Grocers' Association the Secretary explained to the Association, which had complained of multiple shops selling cheaper, that "For years past the multiple shops had sold butter at lower prices and this policy had recently been publicly declared. It was not a wartime problem. These people bought at first-hand price. The butter was taken into their own warehouses and packed by them, and the handling and transport costs were borne by them. There the multiples had a case for the services which they rendered. The Government would not step in to make conditions as between one retailer and another." The Grocer, 11 May 1941. 162 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN first three months after the introduction of the fish scheme, thus assisting in overcoming local scarcities due to transport costs. 1 Later a levy was placed on the first-hand sales of fish landed to provide a fund to meet transport charges on fish and thus prevent them from interfering with wide distribution. The levy was originally collected from those who sold the fish first-hand, and the maximum prices were raised by the amount of the levy to prevent it from being passed on to the fishing crews. Owners were not allowed to deduct the levy from the price when they settled with the men. The owners strongly objected to this arrangement, and at the end of December 1941 the levy was transferred from the first-hand seller to the first-hand buyer and maximum prices were reduced by 6d. a stone. Where costs of transport are apt to prevent commodities from being sent to the more distant areas, additions are allowed to the wholesale price in specified areas. Thus maximum prices of rabbits, hares and poultry are higher in certain areas. An attempt was made to influence the distribution of eggs by offering higher prices for eggs sold to the packing stations, but it failed as a result of the acute shortage. The Government itself bears the cost of transporting meat. Additional transport charges of feeding stuffs due to ships coming in at unexpected ports are met by a pool fund raised on other feeding stuffs. Bacon margins vary with the transport distance. Wholesalers sell at fixed prices, and a system of rebates and charges results in primary wholesalers receiving smaller margins on sales to secondary wholesalers and multiple shops. The latter receive more than the retail margin because they handle bacon at their own depots. Thus the gross margin on wholesale sales depends on the channels of distribution through which the bacon passes—whether from wholesaler to nominated or to non-nominated secondary wholesaler, multiple shop or retail shop. Retail Margins Retailers' margins are either fixed directly by allowing specified additions to the wholesale price or by means of fixed maximum selling prices. Retailers subject to maximum price orders may sell under the maximum price. Since this price is set not only to cover the cost of the least efficient method of distribution but also of the most expensive circumstances in which the food is dis1 This represented a subsidy to the industry of some £2,000,000 a year. See statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 11 November 1941, Vol. 374, col. 2101. FOOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 163 tributed, it naturally allows higher profits to the more efficient and better-placed distributors, who may, if they wish, sell at a lower price. 1 Not very many products, however, are sold below the maximum price. Retail maximum prices do not apply to sales by catering establishments as part of a meal. If the wholesale prices do not include transport costs and no special provision is made for them, as for fish and meat, the retailer must bear the cost. If the cost of transport is paid by the retailer there is no incentive for the wholesaler to sell locally. There appears to be some tendency to compensate retailers for reduced turnover by allowing higher margins. The retail prices of margarine are not fixed by order, but the Ministry of Food has an agreement with the producers and prices are marked on the wrappers, which ensures that retailers will not sell at higher prices. A profit is made on the sale of the higherpriced brand of margarine and is used to subsidise the cheaper brand. The price of the cheaper brand would have to be raised if the special brand were withdrawn. Until January 1941, when the meat content of all sausages was made uniform, this same technique was applied to hold down the price of the sausages with lower meat content. There are two maximum prices for coffee, and the retailer may sell at the higher price if he has coffee available and on display at the lower price. Retail bread prices are lower after two years of war than they were at the outbreak of war. Wheat overseas is abundant and has been bought in large quantities by the Ministry of Food. Furthermore, both bread and flour are subsidised. Shortly after the outbreak of war the Government adopted the policy of selling wheat to millers at a price below that at which it bought the wheat, thus subsidising the price of flour. Approximately 40 per cent, of the flour produced is used for other purposes than bread, and therefore a considerable proportion of the total subsidy thus given to flour was not devoted to bread. In December 1940 a direct bread subsidy was announced to run for three months, and it was later extended, continuing to 6 October 1941. Bakers were demanding an increased price for bread to cover rising costs, which the investigations of the Director of Costings in the Ministry of Food showed to be justified. To prevent this rise in the retail price of bread the Ministry gave a rebate of 4s. a sack on the price of flour to bakers selling bread at 8d. per quartern (4 lb.) loaf or less. To qualify for the subsidy, bakers were required to have National 1 "We do attach great importance to the principle of a maximum price, which means that . . . there is a chance of underselling . . . " Evidence of Sir Henry French before the Committee of Public Accounts, Minutes of Evidence, op. cit., p. 197. Í64 FOOD CÓNTRO!, IN ÓRE AT ÉRÍTAÍÑ Wheatmeal Bread on sale at or below the prices of subsidised white-flour loaves of the same weight. The subsidy was equivalent to a reduction of J^d. per quartern on bread. In February 1941 an order was issued freezing bread prices at the level existing on 2 December 1940. In October 1941 part of the subsidy on flour was transferred directly to flour for bread making and the price of flour was raised from 25s. 6d. to 33s. 3d. per sack of 280 pounds, but the price of bread was lowered to 8d. a quartern as a result of the additional subsidy. In sparsely populated rural areas or in areas where the population has been reduced by more than 40 per cent, bakers may apply for a licence permitting them to sell bread by retail at higher prices. Retail milk prices are based upon permitted increases over the 1938-9 prices of each retailer with the exception of the milk supplied under the National Milk Scheme. Before the war, retail prices were set by the Milk Marketing Boards, which still prescribe minimum prices, while the Ministry of Food prescribes maximum increases over the pre-war level. Prices vary in the different regions of the country, and consequently formal maximum price schedules would be extremely complicated. Tuberculin-tested and accredited milk sells at a higher price than ordinary and pasteurised milk. 1 ENFORCEMENT Violations of food orders are offences against the Defence Regulations and up to 17 December 1941 were liable, under Regulation 92, to a maximum penalty of £100 or imprisonment not exceeding three months, or both, in a court of summary jurisdiction, and in a higher court to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or a fine of £500, or both. In December 1941 the regulations were stiffened. The new regulations provide for a maximum fine in a court of summary jurisdiction of £100 plus a sum equal to three times the value of the goods sold. This step was taken because a few large-scale dealers in the black market were making such high profits that a paltry £100 fine was no deterrent. The new provision adding three times the value of, not profit on, the goods sold means, for example, that a man who offers goods at £1,500 when the legal price would be £ 1,000 is subject to a fine of £4,600 in the lower courts. In addition, the authorities are empowered to seize goods on suspicion and if necessary to sell them at controlled prices, the profits from the sale being held for the owner if not convicted or to apply to his fine if he is convicted. 1 For an extensive discussion of milk distribution and prices, see above, pp. 82-86. tfOOÒ PRÍCE COfcTROt POIJCV Í65 In March 1942 additional penalties were authorised in response to an increased demand from the press and from Parliament that the black market operators be dealt with more severely. Magistrates are now required to fine the "black marketeer" a sum equal to the amount by which he benefited from the transaction. This is the minimum fine; the maximum fine is an addition of three times the value of the goods sold. Furthermore, twelve months' imprisonment can now be imposed by the lower courts and fourteen years' penal servitude by the higher courts. The Ministry of Food has, in addition, the power to remove the trading licences of the violators of food orders. This power had not been widely exercised up to August 1941, when it was decided to use it more ruthlessly* and to extend the scope of licensing by the Ministry. 2 Early in 1941 the Food Price Investigation Committee of the North Midland Region urged the extension and tightening of the licensing system and maintained " t h a t the adoption of the committee's suggestion that traders be licensed, subject to such licence being revoked, would have far more effect in preventing breaches of the law than any number of prosecutions".* The London and Liverpool Chambers of Commerce expressed a similar request in a letter to the Ministry of Food in July 1941 : While we are quite in favour of the introduction of maximum prices orders, where appropriate, we are unable to agree t h a t this method, by itself, is proving effective in preventing speculation; it is, in fact, creating a black market. T h e interloper, of whom we have complained, cannot live in competition with the legitimate trader while selling a t the maximum prices fixed under the orders, b u t so long as he is permitted, legally, to acquire foodstuffs he will continue to find ways and means to dispose of them a t prices in excess of the orders. T h e problem of control would become manageable if those whose whole livelihood depended upon retaining their licences and their good name were alone permitted to buy and sell foodstuffs. Maximum prices orders could then be made really effective. . . T h e two Chambers are a t a loss to understand the grounds upon which t h e Ministry are unwilling to take this further step to eliminate from the food trade —which is the most vitally important of all—the intervention of speculators who 1 "Since the outbreak of war it has not been the practice to revoke to any considerable extent licences which have been issued to traders in foodstuffs. I t has, however, now been decided t h a t further steps must be taken to ensure t h a t the provisions of maximum price and rationing orders were obeyed. Practically all important foodstuffs with t h e exception of certain perishable and luxury articles, are the subject of price control and, with a view to ensuring t h a t the provisions of all orders will be carried out, my Noble Friend has decided t h a t in future the licence shall be withdrawn from any trader, whether wholesaler or retailer, who is guilty of conduct which renders him an unsuitable link in the chain of distribution. This will come into operation as from 15th August." Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, 6 August 1941, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons,,Vol. 373, col. 1949. s See pp. 70-72 . • Manchester Guardian, 14 June 1941. 166 tfOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN are not members of the trade, have no reputation or good will in the trade to maintain, are rendering no service, and are intervening for the sole purpose of holding the community to ransom. 1 Since the adoption of this policy in August 1941 a considerable number of licences have been revoked, and it is reasonable to assume that the policy will assist in deterring dealers from violating the laws. Adequate enforcement of the great variety of food orders in all their bewildering detail, and effective control over the thousands of consumers, retailers, wholesalers, first-hand sellers, brokers and other dealers, could not possibly be obtained solely by means of the legal powers of the Ministry of Food and the courts. 2 The co-operation of the traders is the deciding factor, and many of the better organised trades police their own members. The Ministry of Food, as has been seen, works hard to obtain the good will of the traders, and for the most part the traders strive to obtain the good will of the Ministry of Food. 3 It is chiefly for this reason that legal powers to secure observance of the food orders have not had to be invoked on a large scale. 4 The Ministry maintains, of course, a staff of investigators and inspectors. In October 1941 there were 805 Enforcement Inspectors employed by the Ministry of Food in the United Kingdom. . . Most of the retail maximum price orders require every retailer to display a notice clearly visible at all times to customers showing the maximum prices of the foods concerned. 6 Purchasers are equally guilty with the retailers if the maximum price orders are violated. Wholesalers, manufacturers, processors and others who figure in the distributive chain are generally required to keep accurate 1 The Times, 14 July 1941. In his discussion of food control in the 1914-18 war, E. M. H. Lloyd remarks: "If maximum prices had had to depend for their enforcement merely on Orders of the Food Controller and on prosecutions in the courts, they would have been laughed out of existence in a week." E. M. H. LLOYD: op. cit., p. 287. 3 " . . . Lord Woolton had made it perfectly clear t o t h e trade t h a t he intended to provide cheaper food for the poorer people and t h a t he meant to do this by working on grocers' average prices. The Government had all the necessary data before them and knew the prices being charged by the average trader. The Federation had been fighting all along for fair profits and the Government were now seeing to it t h a t traders kept within the law. They must all be very careful not to get the Food Controllers up against them. If they show t h a t they are trying to act in conformity with regulations imposed they would fare better in the long r u n . " Statement made a t the May meeting of the Leicester and District Grocers' Association, as reported in The Grocer, 11 May 1940, p. 35. 4 I t is, however, necessary to possess these legal powers and to make statutory regulations controlling prices. In a few cases, the Ministry of Food has tried to check prices by announcing a "fair" price and requesting consumers not to pay more. This method has not been successful, and statutory regulation has proved necessary in all cases. 6 Since 7 April 1942 retailers have not been required to display separate price notices. They must, however, indicate prominently t h a t a maximum price list is available for inspection. 2 POOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 167 records of their dealings in the controlled foods. These records must show the persons from whom the food is bought and to whom it is sold and particulars of quantity, description and prices charged and all additions to the maximum price allowed under the regulations. These records are open to the inspectors of the Ministry of Food. Investigation of the prices being charged for uncontrolled foods was more important earlier in the war than it is now, since the uncontrolled foods at present are very few. Arrangements were made in 1940 with the Board of Trade for its local Price Regulation Committees to become Food Price Investigation Committees and to investigate the prices of uncontrolled foods. Excessive prices were reported to the Ministry of Food. If, after investigation, price control was found to be desirable, a recommendation was submitted to the Central Price Regulation Committee, set up under the Price of Goods Act, 1939, and the Goods and Services (Price Control) Act, 1941. In addition, in November 1940 the Minister of Food arranged with several trade associations 1 to create their own committees for the investigation of alleged excess prices being charged for packed and canned goods. When the investigations of the Ministry showed the need for price control, maximum price orders were issued where practicable. Not until 1941 did the Ministry of Food begin to control the prices of so-called "luxury" foods on a large scale. 2 Exorbitant prices for this kind of food became so common, and public protest so vehement, however, that the Ministry finally decided to bring these prices under control, and during 1941 one uncontrolled food after another was brought under control. Appendix VI gives a list of the controlled foods as on 8 January 1942 and the stages at which prices are controlled. Over eighty foods or groups of foods are listed. The Ministry of Food publishes monthly figures of prosecutions for violations of food orders. Until the middle of 1940 prosecutions were well under 1,000 a month. They have risen gradually since then and in 1941 were under 2,000 in February only, reaching 1 The Food Manufacturers' Federation, the National Federation of Grocers' Associations, the Multiple Grocers' Association, The Retail Distributors' Association, the Parliamentary Committee of the Co-operative Congress, the National Federation of Wholesale Grocers' Associations, the Wholesale Distributors' Association and the North of England Wholesale Grocers, Inc. See MINISTRY OF FOOD: Press Notice, No. 653, 24 November 1940. * "My Noble Friend does not consider it desirable to fix maximum prices for semi-luxury articles such as turkeys and geese. In order, however, to give a guide to the consumer, he has issued a notice stating the maximum retail prices for turkeys which he would regard as reasonable at the peak of the Christmas trade, and which should not be exceeded." Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 7 December 1940, Vol. 367, col. 684. 168 POOD CONTROI, IN GREAT BRITAIN a peak in October of 3,130. The total number of prosecutions from October 1939 to the end of October 1941 amounted to 34,572, of which 92.6 per cent, were successful. Only 183 of these prosecutions dealt with people who had previously been prosecuted. In December 1941 successful prosecutions were divided among the different offences as follows: Offences against maximum price orders Supplying or obtaining foodstuffs without correct authority Failure to display prices False declarations Trading without licence Illegal slaughter, etc Imposing conditions of sale Other Total 727 828 191 351 96 57 19 483 2,752 Source: MINISTRY OÏ FOOD: Press Notice. No. 1621, 3 January 1942. Offences against the maximum price orders were the second most numerous category. The following figures were given in October 1941 analysing the prosecutions and penalties imposed since the beginning of control for this type of offence. Total prosecutions were 8,486, of which 7,751 were successful. Number of cases Fines Under £1 and dismissals under the Probation of Offenders Act £1 and under £3 £3 and under £5 £5 and under £10 £10 and under £20 £20 and over • 2,513 2,880 692 1,004 436 217 Imprisonment Varying terms 9 Total 7,751 Source: Statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 16 October 1941, Vol. 374, col. 1524. Seventy per cent, of the penalties were fines of less than £3 and were therefore presumably imposed for minor offences, some of which may easily have been inadvertent, since a small mistake of a clerk as to price may lead to a prosecution. I t is true that there are a number of traders who deal regularly in the "black market" and who are serious offenders. Furthermore, large numbers of offenders probably escape detection—what percentage it is of FOOD PRICE CONTROL POLICY 169 course impossible to say. Whether the steadily increasing number of prosecutions results from better methods of detection or from the greater complexity and multiplicity of food orders, or simply from an increasing rate of violations, it is also impossible to say; most probably it is due to the combination of all these factors. But there is reason to believe that the Minister of Food was substantially correct when he said: . . . we are, I think, fortunate in having in this country a high standard of commercial morality, and it is patently unjust that those who, both from pride in their own business standards and from a patriotic desire to carry out the wishes of the Government, should find themselves placed at a commercial disadvantage with regard to their competitors whose standards are lower and below the standard of the law.1 Black market operations present a welcome opportunity for sensational journalism and are frequently given importance far beyond their real significance when viewed against the background of control as a whole. They do, however, take up a considerable amount of the time of officials of the Ministry. 2 In some areas, in some commodities and at some times, illegal transactions do attain considerable importance. Canned foods, for example, provided a lucrative "racket" for some traders before they were brought under control, and illegal dealings in sugar were one of the reasons for controlling the chocolate and sugar confectionery trades. Alternative uses for a particular food, of which one is more profitable than the other, will furnish an incentive to evade price regulations in order to tap the more lucrative market. So long as confectionery was uncontrolled the temptation to manufacturers to offer high prices for sugar was great. Unscrupulous managers of office and factory canteens would claim sugar rations for more employees than they actually catered for and sell the extra sugar to manufacturers at high prices. On the other hand, holders of illicit sugar would sometimes sell at a loss in return for supplies of sweets which they could buy at factory prices and retail at a big profit. 8 Cases of outright stealing of large quantities of food from docks, warehouses and railway yards have also occurred. Although these are sufficiently sensational to receive considerable notice in the Press they are not so important as the space allotted them would imply. 1 8 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 17 December 1941, Vol. 121, col. 316. "We have had to spend much time trying to circumvent the scoundrels operating on the 'black market' and have met with some success. We have made life more difficult for them and some are having a diet in Wormwood Scrubs." Lord Woolton, as reported in the Daily Telegraph, 7 January 1942. ("Wormwood Scrubs" is a noted English prison.) * Daily Telegraph, 12 December 1941. 170 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Speculation is one of the chief evils of the black market, and title to goods sometimes changes hands several times before final disposal. The Chairman of the Food Price Investigation Committee of the North Midlands region stated in January 1941: Speculation is rampant; goods are changing ownership many times like stocks and shares without even leaving the warehouse; people who render no service in distribution are enriching themselves at the expense of the consumer; prices to the public have in consequence risen out of all reasonable proportion, and contributed considerably to an increase in the cost of living, with inevitable discontent.1 A large number of the complaints investigated by this committee referred to canned goods, which were later controlled. As mentioned above, the prices of foods sold as part of a meal in catering establishments are not controlled. There is therefore a tendency for the catering establishments, especially those catering for the higher income groups, to buy up the uncontrolled foods at high prices. The prices of meals in most establishments have risen markedly as a result of increased costs, and the choice of food is very small compared with the pre-war choice. It was necessary, in order to prevent catering establishments from paying retail prices at first-hand sales and thus obtaining an advantage over retailers, whose selling price is controlled and who would be unable to handle the foods if no margin between the wholesale and retail prices were possible, to prohibit the purchase or sale of more than five dozen eggs in any one week at a price exceeding the maximum wholesale price and to insert in the poultry maximum prices order a provision to the effect that any sale by auction at which a person buys more than two birds for purposes other than resale shall be deemed to be a wholesale sale and subject to the maximum wholesale price. In April 1942 announcement was made of an impending decision to extend price control to the prices of meals served in catering establishments. i The Times, 5 January 1941. CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION The purpose of food control in wartime is first to obtain an even and adequate flow of food into the channels of distribution and secondly to distribute these foods equitably to all individuals and to all classes in the community. The task is immense and the pitfalls many, but on the whole British food control has been successful in accomplishing these ends. Mistakes have been made and more will be made, but mistakes as well as successes are not without their lesson for the future. The mistakes and successes discussed in the following pages illustrate many principles important for the successful administration of food control. Most striking perhaps is the number of things generally considered administratively impracticable which, when attempted, have proved extraordinarily successful. The first requisite of any Minister of Food is courage. Secondly the early realisation that the consumer is the raison d'être of food control should be kept in the forefront of food policy. From this it follows that plans for the creation of food controls must treat demand on a plane of equality with supply; information must be collected on what people eat, what they should eat, and what changes can be made with the minimum of public discontent. It is nutritionally absurd, to be sure, but in Great Britain supplies of tea and jam must be safeguarded as much as those of cheese. Public taste cannot be ignored. 1 The problems of food control may be classified under five headings: (1) general administrative policy; (2) control of supplies and distribution; (3) control of demand; (4) control of prices; and (5) nutrition and education.. In addition the relation of food policy to general economic policy must be considered. 1 Public taste was also one of the chief reasons for not making wheatmeal bread compulsory. It is not conclusively proved, however, that morale would be lowered by sacrifices of this nature if they helped the war effort and if people were convinced that they did. The Government in this and in other fields has perhaps been too timid in demanding sacrifices of the people which they would willingly give if asked, 172 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY In Great Britain the formation of food and agricultural policy is centralised, its administration and enforcement decentralised. 1 The Food Executive Officers of the local food control committees have a large measure of control over the administration of food policy in their areas. County agriculture committees have been delegated wide powers of control over agricultural activities. These local bodies are the agents of the Ministries of Food and Agriculture and carry out their orders. They are responsible for the translation of policy into practice. The work of the Food Executive Officers is concerned primarily with consumers, catering establishments and retailers, since a large number of the food manufacturing, importing and wholesale firms are of a national character and cannot be controlled locally. A more controversial administrative principle is the maintenance, as far as is practicable, of the existing channels of trade and the use of trade personnel in executive positions in the food controls. These practices arise out of the need for obtaining the cooperation and experience of the trade in the administration of food control, but they give rise to some criticism from the public and sometimes from sections of industry who feel themselves treated badly. The policy of the British Government in this, as in other controls, has been to interfere with existing interests only when necessary and not to introduce changes for the sake of social reform, but only when they are necessary for the efficiency of the war effort. The exigencies of war—especially the increased demand for labour—force extensive changes, but these changes, with some notable exceptions, are adopted slowly in the food trades; for the most part extensive reorganisation to improve the efficiency of distribution has not taken place except as the result of necessity. The policy of the Ministry of Food in this respect is only a reflection of the general Government policy of refusing to make social changes in wartime unless they are required for war purposes. It is important, therefore, in discussing this aspect of food policy to remember that it is part of a general policy for which the Ministry of Food is not solely responsible. There is much to be said for and against the policy of making general reforms in wartime, but the burdens of war should be distributed as equitably as possible and the perpetuation of waste during wartime simply because it existed in peace-time helps neither the war effort nor the winning of the 1 The separation of the Ministry of Agriculture from the Ministry of Food has complicated British food control, and it is almost universally agreed that a single body concerned with all aspects of food policy would be infinitely preferable if it were politically possible. CONCLUSION 173 peace. On the other hand, changes that will dislocate existing methods of production and distribution without immediately creating effective new methods are not practicable in wartime. The use of trade executives in positions of control over the trades from which they are drawn is similarly a hotly debated question. That men who are experienced in handling the problems of production and distribution are indispensable to the Government in establishing control over these spheres cannot be denied. Trade officials may be used widely for advisory purposes or they may be used in an executive capacity in controls affecting trades other than those from which they were drawn. In Great Britain, however, trade officials have executive authority in controls affecting the trades from which they were drawn and they have much influence. Perhaps the most that can be said is that great care should be taken to prevent these officials either deliberately or as a result of unconscious bias both from giving special advantages to the section of industry from which they come and from administering control in the interests of producers and distributors rather than of consumers. 1 CONTROL OF SUPPLIES AND DISTRIBUTION Control of supplies and distribution is more easily applied and more likely to be effective if it is introduced before shortages occur and prices begin to get out of hand. Furthermore, control of only the so-called basic foods is not enough. On the surface it might seem that control should be started with these foods and only applied to other foods when it becomes urgently needed. This procedure was generally followed in Great Britain, largely for administrative reasons but partly as a matter of policy. It had three undesirable results. In the first place it caused much public discontent, since the majority of the population is not willing to be restricted by its limited purchasing power to a few "basic" foods while high income groups can consume a much greater variety. In the second place it gave rise to extreme profiteering which because of its sensational character not only gave food control a bad reputation but also ' ' "The only real public safeguard against abuses is that these men should increasingly feel a loyalty to the public interest which transcends their loyalty to their firms, and that has undoubtedly been happening. Anyone who wishes to see monopoly capitalism transformed into Socialism must welcome this as a desirable and essential step in the process. . . " P. Lamartine YATES: "The Ministries of Food and Agriculture", in Political Quarterly, July-September 1941, p. 258. 174 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN encouraged evasion of food regulations : for example, the attaching of conditions of sale. The atmosphere created by uncontrolled trading in a large number of foods in short supply is not conducive to public respect for food control. In the third place, the delay in applying control made the task much more difficult when it was finally tackled. Control should be applied very early to all important foods likely to become scarce. There are, of course, a few foods that can safely be ignored. Control of supplies may be obtained either through direct purchase by the Ministry of Food or through the licensing of firsthand buyers. Control of distribution may be acquired by licensing traders, by employing traders as agents or by setting up a new trading organisation. British experience demonstrates the importance of licensing at a very early stage all traders dealing in foods controlled in any manner. If traders are licensed, speculation is easier to control and the enforcement of other regulations, such as the keeping of records, is simpler. The possibility of losing his licence to trade is a strong deterrent to a trader. Control of traders is easier if the assistance of some authoritative organisation representing the traders concerned can be obtained and if the policy proposed is accepted and approved by such an organisation. This does not mean, however, that policies not so approved should not be adopted if they are in the public interest. Trade associations can be especially useful in the work of standardising and classifying commodities which is necessary for applying control. CONTROL OF DEMAND Control of demand for any important food in short supply is necessary if the distribution of the food is to be regulated. It can be obtained for particular foods only by requiring some form of authorisation for their purchase. Rationing is desirable not only because it reduces the effects of unequal income distribution and unequal shopping opportunities but also because it can be used to reserve a fair share of nutritionally important foods for all consumers, thus encouraging each to buy his share. Control of demand, like control of supplies and distribution, should be established early before shortages have arisen. If the existence of shortages and impending control are announced, hoarding will be encouraged if the food is not perishable. This may have disastrous effects on stocks and in addition it favours the higher-income consumers since they can afford to buy larger quantities than other consumers. When the continuous flow of supplies is precarious, stocks must be jealously guarded. A pro- CONCLUSION 175 hibition of retail sales may accompany an announcement of impending control if the food is not perishable and if it is not a daily necessity. There appears to be little objection to frequent changes in the size of the ration in so far as they are administratively practicable. The ration may be changed not only by varying the quantity included in it but also by altering the definition. For example, "meat" may or may not include offals, pork, rabbits, etc., and "bacon" may be defined to include or exclude a large number of items coming under the general term. The question whether special rations should be given to different groups of workers has been debated widely in Great Britain. Since it is difficult to classify workers according to the nature of their work, individual workers are not given special rations based upon whether their work is light or heavy. Increased supplies of certain foods, however, are directed to canteens and restaurants primarily serving industrial workers. Canteen facilities cannot be provided for some classes of workers because of the nature of their work, and special cheese rations are granted to them and to vegetarians. Children receive a smaller ration of meat than adults, and persons suffering from certain diseases receive extra rations appropriate to their illness. Effective demand can also be regulated by requiring consumers to register for certain foods and by announcing a minimum quantity of each foo'd to be distributed to each registered person. Although not formally a ration, this procedure has a similar effect and is considerably more flexible, especially if retailers are allowed to distribute their surplus freely. This method of distribution is especially useful for foods of which the supply fluctuates greatly, e.g. milk and eggs, and for which therefore a statutory ration would be difficult to administer. ' A formal ration once imposed should always be met if it is to be effective in eliminating queues, and should not result in an undue amount of waste. These requirements would be difficult to fulfil for milk and fresh eggs, and the registration system serves as a reasonably efficient alternative to regulate distribution. The amount of milk or of eggs allowed to registered consumers is announced so that the consumer knows what to expect. Considerable imagination has been displayed by the Ministry of Food in the administration of rationing. Four general types of rationing are used for the civilian population: ordinary rationing of a fixed amount in a fixed period for each person; rationing of a fixed amount in any proportions of a group of foods—e.g. jam, syrup, treacle—and as a variation of this the butter-margarine 176 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN ration, which prescribes a maximum amount of butter; rationing of a group of foods on a "points" basis, which allows the consumer freedom of choice in spending his points within the ration ; and the registration system described above. In addition small amounts of other foods are issued at irregular intervals either against the ration registrations for a particular food or against particular ration documents—e.g. suet against the fat ration and dried fruits against the sugar ration at Christmas and oranges against the child's ration book. In most cases it is desirable to "tie" consumers to particular retailers (whom they may choose in the first instance) and to require retailers and wholesalers to "nominate" suppliers in order to facilitate distribution. However, this is not always necessary, and in Great Britain consumers are able to buy both tea and rationed canned foods from any retailer. CONTROL OF PRICES Price control has two aspects—determination of prices and enforcement of prices. The former requires a compromise between estimated costs of production and distribution and the demands of producers and distributors. The incentive function of prices cannot be ignored, but it is probably more necessary in agriculture than in industry, since direct controls can be applied more effectively in industry than in agriculture. The importance' of the influence of relative prices on agricultural output has already been demonstrated in Great Britain and has therefore been made a basic part of agricultural policy. Prices to the farmers are high, but it is almost impossible to say whether they are higher than is necessary to obtain the output wanted. A large increase in output has resulted in a steep rise of marginal costs which must be covered by the prices offered. Whether prices have risen faster or higher than marginal costs is impossible to determine under existing conditions. The necessity of keeping relative prices in delicate balance, however, may force the general level of agricultural prices up since the price of each product is fixed by trial and error to a large extent and by bargaining with the farmers. This may, and frequently does, result in a price that encourages farmers to shift to the production of the crop concerned at the expense of others the production of which is equally or more important. I t then becomes necessary either to lower the price concerned or to raise the other prices. Since it is more difficult to reduce prices than to raise them, the result frequently is an enhanced price for all products. There is reason to believe that CONCLUSION 177 this process has had some effect in raising the general level of agricultural prices in Great Britain somewhat above the level necessary to obtain the output actually produced. In addition, arguments for higher prices based on the alleged unprofitability of, and shortage of capital in, agriculture in the past are very common. It seems likely that agricultural prices have risen more than agricultural costs, but the pressure for still higher prices is great. To keep the higher agricultural prices and the higher costs of imports from raising retail prices of certain foods the Government has resorted to extensive subsidies. These have been confined to the most important foods—milk, eggs, meat, bread, potatoes, tea, and cod-liver oil, orange juice and black currant puree and juice for children. It is important that if a food is subsidised it should be subsidised enough to keep the price within the reach of the lower income groups. It is a waste of public funds to pay large sums to reduce the price of food which even after the subsidy is only available to the relatively higher income groups. Low income groups are generally hit by the standardisation of foods necessary for applying price control and rationing because standardisation generally results in the elimination of the low-priced brands as well as the high-priced brands, thus raising the average price to lower income groups who previously bought the cheaper qualities. The "price stop" is useful as a preliminary measure, but if costs are increasing price changes will have to be made and most price stop orders will have to be followed by maximum price orders. The Ministry of Food in Great Britain has on several occasions frozen prices at levels prevailing earlier, in order to embarrass speculators. The enforcement of maximum prices requires the co-operation of traders and consumers as well as the possession of legal powers to fine and imprison violators. If supplies are short however, the Government must have control of supplies and especially of the channels of distribution to make control effective—this has been conclusively demonstrated by the experience of Great Britain. In Great Britain traders are required to keep records of their dealings in controlled foods, which are open to the Ministry of Food, and all traders dealing in controlled foods are licensed. The licensing of traders has been found indispensable for the enforcement of food regulation. Retailers are generally required to display prominently a notice giving the legal maximum prices for the foods they sell. British experience has shown that a fine of £100 ($400) in a court of summary jurisdiction is inadequate to deter large-scale 178 POOD CONTROL ÎN GREAT BRÍTAÍN dealers in the black market since their profits are high, and the Government found it necessary to increase the fine to £100 plus three times the value of the goods sold, thus effectively confiscating all profits. Before this measure was enacted a few dealers would make profits of several thousand pounds, pay their fine if caught, and remain better off than they were before. A fine imposed for black-market trading that does not bear a close relation to the size of the operation has little deterrent effect. Trade association can be useful in assisting in the enforcement of food regulations and in drawing up schemes for their respective trades but they must be carefully supervised by Government representatives to protect the interests of consumers. The importance of obtaining the good will of traders must not be underestimated. NUTRITION AND EDUCATION The nutritional condition of the people is an important factor for both morale and efficiency, and the Government's responsibility does not stop short of actual measures to improve nutrition. In Great Britain four methods have been adopted for this purpose besides the measures taken to keep down prices and increase supplies of the important foods. The most important of these methods is the milk distribution scheme, whereby mothers and children are given a prior claim on the supply of milk and receive it at a reduced price; if the family income is low they receive it free. Allied to this is extension of the pre-war milk-in-schools and school-feeding program, which ensures better nutrition for the children benefiting under it. Secondly cod-liver oil, orange juice and black currant juice or puree are supplied free to young children. The third group of measures for improving nutrition includes the addition of vitamins A and D to margarine and of Bi to bread, as well as the attempt to increase the consumption of wheatmeal. Finally the Ministry of Food is conducting an educational campaign among consumers stressing the nutritional value of different foods and the needs of the body and instructing housewives in the best method of preparing foods. Consumers' education along these lines is of particular importance in wartima when food supplies are restricted. Advertising is a powerful arm of food policy but must be used with caution, and the intelligence of the people must not be underrated. The Ministry of Food in Great Britain has rightly stressed the value of those foods of which supplies are abundant but has tended to stress them to such an extent that the impression is rjONCtuáiON m sometimes given that these foods are sufficient for an adequate diet. The emphasis placed on advertising the value of any food has sometimes tended to vary with the supply. The consumer has naturally become suspicious and the value of the Ministry's propaganda has been impaired. British experience has demonstrated the importance of explaining the economics of food control to consumers—especially the effect of price control on distribution and the apparent tendency for commodities to disappear from the market as soon as maximum prices are imposed. FOOD CONTROL AND THE W A R ECONOMY Food policy must be formed with reference to the rest of the national economy and within the limits of supply imposed by the needs of the other sectors of the economy—especially as regards labour and transport. In Great Britain, however, food policy has been operated to increase the supply of labour by freeing large numbers of women from the necessity of cooking a mid-day meal. The extension of school meals, factory canteens and other communal feeding centres results in a more economical use of food, fuel and labour, improves in many cases the mid-day meal for thousands of workers, children and others and frees many women for work in industry. It has proved extremely successful in Great Britain and the demand for additional facilities has not nearly been satisfied. The provision of factory canteens is compulsory for large employers. The Ministry of Food in co-operation with the Ministry of Labour and other bodies is endeavouring to increase the number of canteens and other communal feeding facilities for miners, rural areas, schools, small and large factories, docks and white collar workers—wherever people are congregated. Meals provided in communal feeding centres are in addition to the ration and canteens for certain types of workers receiving extra rations of certain foods. Communal feeding is one of the most notable war measures adopted in Great Britain, and when good and cheap centres are available to all groups of the population it will not only result in a more economic utilisation of food supplies and in the freeing of thousands of housewives but it will also be a great advance in human welfare. POST-WAR IMPLICATIONS The discussion of British food and agricultural policy contained in this study, though concerned entirely with wartime developments, is not without relevance for post-war conditions 180 FOOD CONTROL ÍN GREÁ¥ BRÍTAÍN and policy. Sir William Beveridge concluded his classic discussion of British food control in the last war with the opinion that it had little, if any, value for the years of peace. . . . as an administrative experiment its teaching seems mainly negative . . . the direct lessons from the Ministry's work are small. In other fields—of chemistry or optics or metallurgy or engineering or aeronautics—experiments made in war have materially advanced man's peacetime mastery over nature. From food control at highest but little can be learned of permanent application. . . It opened no ways of permanent advance; its record is that of one small aspect of the human spirit in its five years' prison, but here upon a tread-mill that has ground no corn.1 The same thing cannot be said of food control to-day. Among the tangled and sometimes knotted threads of food control schemes and orders are some of a different colour from the rest, standing out in sharp relief. These threads will not be cut off with the end of the war; for they represent a social policy desirable both in peace and in war. From the confusion of ideas and argument about the nature of the world to be built up after the horror of war has passed, two conceptions appear to be emerging that have captured the imagination and aroused the determination of almost all classes of men. One has been happily expressed as "freedom from want". Underlying this conception is the idea that the community through a democratically elected government should take direct and active responsibility for the welfare of all its members. The other conception is not easy to define—indeed it is as yet only imperfectly and loosely expressed—but it is concerned with the belief that a government democratically elected should and can consciously organise the economic resources of the community in the interests of the whole community. Both these principles were widely supported before the war and both have been given an impetus by the war. The very organisation of a democratic country for modern total war makes it necessary that these principles should be adopted and applied, and in this process much that is of value for peacetime emerges. NUTRITION We have seen in the previous pages that the British Government has gone beyond the mere acceptance of responsibility for the food supply of the" country and accepted a large measure of responsibility for the nutritional condition of the people. Adequate nutrition depends on the foods available, on the possibility of obtaining them in adequate quantities, and on a sufficient knowledge of nutrition among consumers. The Government in wartime 1 Op. cit., p. 344. eofíctúáióií 181 has attacked on all three fronts, and the ground gained on the last two fronts will set new peace-time frontiers. A nutrition program in peace-time must push these frontiers further. It should be concerned with influencing food production so that the most nutritionally valuable foods will be abundant; it should be concerned with increasing the efficiency of production and distribution so that food will be cheap ; it should be concerned with subsidising or distributing free those foods which are most necessary in diet but which are beyond the reach of lower income groups; it should be concerned with school meals, school milk, factory canteens and other communal feeding centres; and it should be especially concerned with advancing the consumers' knowledge of nutrition and the proper methods of preparing food. The two outstanding wartime developments in this field are the free and cheap milk scheme and the communal feeding programme. The consumption of milk in the United Kingdom, as in most countries, was even in peace-time far below the optimum, and the wartime increase, although due in some measure to the scarcity of other foods, is largely due to the free and cheap milk scheme and will outlast the war. This milk scheme is a definite recognition by the Government of its responsibility for the health of the children and, in addition, of an income level below which their health is endangered because of inability to obtain milk— the birthright of all children. There seems to be little doubt that it will remain as a permanent part of British social policy, and already many are urging that its scope should be extended. 1 The extension of communal meals, especially in the schools, in the factories and in the mines, has provided for decent mid-day meals facilities that will not be scrapped when the war is over. The Minister of Food has spoken of the extension of factory canteens and of their future in these words: . . . the Government have made great strides in this task of feeding the worker at his work. I have known something about industrial conditions in this country over a number of years, and when I remember the conditions under which the working people of this country used to eat their mid-day meals, in dull and often dirty mess rooms, or sitting on the window ledges of the works eating cold sandwiches from paper packages, and when I look now at the vast 1 Cf. Viscount ASTOR: "Let us recognise the fact that the noble Lord (the Minister of Food) has taken a step forward whereby the State recognises that it is its duty and obligation to provide necessary, adequate and essential food for expectant and nursing mothers and for young children where the family income is of a low level. Let us see to it that that conception of public service is put in the same category as our conception of public service in terms of sanitation, housing and education, and that it becomes part of the recognised Government machinery and administration. If we do that, and if we extend that principle so that it shall apply not only to children below thè age of five but also to children above that age we shall have made a very substantial contribution to a new and better order for this country." Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 19 February 1941, Vol. 118, No. 17, col. 422. 182 ÏO0D CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN extension of canteens, clean and bright, managed by trained and competent women and providing food that gives pleasure as well as sustenance, I do not hesitate to say that a great industrial revolution has silently taken place without our noticing that it was happening. The work that has been done already in the mines is of inestimable value to the health and the happiness of the miners. We have great and permanent progress in our industrial outlook and in our industrial practice, and when peace comes we must never go back on this standard.1 A similar silent and little-marked revolution has taken place in connection with the provision of milk and meals for children in school. As noted above, the indefensible definition of a necessitous child as one showing symptoms of malnutrition has finally been superseded in England and Wales by a definition with reference to income. This is a great and permanent advance ; for it is unthinkable that the old definition will ever be re-established. The feeding of children in the schools may influence children's nutrition habits beyond the school period. The opportunity for forming a taste for the proper food is unparallelled, and in some school canteens special studies are made of children's tastes, the conditions under which they have been formed and the best methods of persuading children to select and prefer the proper foods. 2 This is an aspect of school feeding that should be extended after the war as a foundation for proper nutrition habits of the adult population. Bad nutrition is in a sense self-generating. Children's food habits are largely formed by the home environment, and since it is much more difficult to change adult tastes bad habits are only slowly eliminated. The process can be speeded up if nutritional education takes its place beside other forms of education in the schools. The possibilities of increasing the nutritional value of some foods widely consumed have not been neglected in wartime although there is still a large scope for improvement. The adding of vitamins A and D to margarine is a good example of what can be done, and this development should not be dropped so long as margarine is consumed as a substitute for butter. The deficiency of vitamin Bi in the ordinary diet of the people led the Government first to adopt a policy of adding this vitamin to white bread and of making National Wheatmeal bread (85 per cent, extraction) available everywhere at the same price as ordinary white bread; and in recent months the use of the National Wheatmeal flour has been made compulsory and white flour may no longer be produced. The significance of these measures lies in the fact that the Ministry of Food has taken special action to improve the nutri1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 2 December 1941, Vol. 121, col. 155. ' See discussion in the War-Time Nutrition Bulletin of the Children's Nutrition Council, No. 13, October-November 1941, p. 1. CONCLUSION 183 tional content of foods forming a large part of the diet of low income groups. Private manufacturers are obliged to conform to government regulations not only in relation to margarine and bread, but in relation to a variety of other foods—for example, jam, some canned goods and milk powder—although provisions for inspection are inadequate. In other words, quality standards are laid down. Some countries before the war imposed quality standards on milk producers and also in regard to injurious substances in food. These measures were taken to prevent foods containing harmful substances from being sold to the consumer. The wartime measures have developed beyond this preventive stage and imposed regulations on manufacturers requiring them to improve the nutritional value of their products. It would be desirable if most of these measures were continued in peace-time and others, such as the irradiation of canned milk, added. During this war the British public has probably been bombarded with more sound nutritional information than in all the rest of its history. It has been made "nutrition conscious", and it is not unreasonable to assume that the end of the war will not cause a relapse into unconsciousness. The war experience should leave permanent traces on the food habits of the British people, although some valuable foods, particularly stressed during the war, e.g. carrots, may suffer a slight reduction in popularity. It is true that the shortage of meat and fruits has caused considerable substitution of other foods less desirable from the standpoint of nutrition, but there is little reason to think that after the war, when these products are again available in abundant quantities, people will not want to consume them just as much as, if not more than, they did before the war. ' Not only is the British housewife gaining a better knowledge of the elements of nutrition but she is also gaining a better insight into the proper preparation of food. The wartime advance may be small compared with the size of the task to be accomplished, but it is a beginning that will open the way to greater things. PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION Measures taken directly to improve the nutritional condition of the people are only one side of the Government's wartime food policy. Equally important is the responsibility assumed by the Government for the production and distribution of food and the consequent control established over the organisation of the community's resources for these purposes. If post-war economic policy is to be characterised by a greater degree of Government control 184 ÏOOD CONTROI, IN GREAT BRITAIN over production and distribution of essential foods than existed in the past, many of the techniques of control evolved during the war, and especially the information and statistics collected, will be of great value. Indeed, without these basic data no food policy in peace or in war can be fully effective. The reorganisation of agriculture holds a prominent place in all discussions of post-war reconstruction in the United Kingdom. Even before the war the State was taking an active part in influencing agricultural production and State funds were spent to assist the industry. After the war the role of the State will not be less important, and the knowledge gained during the war about British agriculture will provide a sound basis in fact for a reconstruction policy. Nor is this aspect of wartime policy unrecognised in Great Britain at the present time. The Minister of Agriculture, in speaking of his farm survey, said: The Farm Survey has a two-fold object—to assist in the prosecution of the war and at the same time to collect information for use in the preparation of our post-war agricultural policy. . . What I am most anxious to avoid is that we should reach the post-war period of reconstruction without that body of factual information which to-day is non-existent and which, in my view, is essential to the formulation of an equitable and stable post-war agricultural policy.1 It is difficult to overestimate the importance from the standpoint of post-war policy of the information which is being gathered. For the first time in the history of Great Britain the Government will have a fairly accurate knowledge of the state of agriculture. The Select Committee on National Expenditure suggested t h a t : One useful line of procedure at any rate would be for the Ministry to collect and prepare adequate material to be issued in due course in a White Paper so that when the appropriate time comes Parliament would have before it the basis for a comprehensive plan for giving effect to the purpose declared in the Ministerial statement of November 26 "of maintaining, after the war, a healthy and well-balanced agriculture as an essential and permanent feature of national policy". It is only by continuity of policy that confidence can be created and waste avoided . . . It is most important that full advantage should be taken of the organisation and experiences of the County War Committees for this purpose—to ensure, on the one hand, that no opportunities are missed and, on the other, that such encouragement as may be given (financial or otherwise) is directed with precision to the spots where it is needed. To read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the mass of detailed records which will be available to the County War Committees so as to reduce such records to manageable conclusions will be a difficult task. It will be particularly important to use the available data so as to establish what in varying conditions are reasonable standards of efficiency both as regards yields and working costs, so that any measures of assistance given to agriculture (e.g. in the way of price protection or subsidies) may not be pitched at a level which will shelter inefficiency.* 1 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 26 June 1941, Vol. 373, col. 1120. * Sixth Report, op. cit., p. 9. CONCLUSION 185 There are many other aspects of wartime agricultural policy that merge into post-war policy. The power to reorganise agriculture now in the hands of the Minister of Agriculture is being used to put the industry in a sounder position than ever before. His control over farming operations and agricultural prices, and the excellent position he is in to obtain voluntary services, scientific assistance and the co-operation of the farmer, creates an unprecedented opportunity for the use of this power not only for the purpose of winning the war, but also to effect a lasting improvement in British agriculture. Measures developed and action taken to improve drainage, eradicate bracken, extend fertilisation and liming, develop mechanisation, improve worn-out grassland, reduce the effects of animal and plant diseases, and improve the remuneration and conditions of agricultural workers, have longterm effects. Many of them are capital investments that will only carry maintenance charges after the war; all of them increase the efficiency and productivity of agriculture. The production of some commodities encouraged for war purposes ought undoubtedly to be contracted with the coming of different conditions, while that of others, notably milk, will increase. This is not the place to discuss post-war agricultural policy, but it is clear that these wartime measures will affect post-war agriculture regardless of the policy adopted. . The increase to £ 3 a week of the wages of agricultural workers if maintained after the war will in itself force a certain reorganisation if huge additional subsidies to producers are to be avoided. It was pointed out in Chapter II that the production of those agricultural products in Great Britain requiring a large amount of labour in relation to their value tended to decrease, in the absence of subsidisation, because of the relatively high cost of labour involved. Labour costs will be even higher if the increased wages are maintained, yet it is clear that two things are desirable : a decent wage for workers and cheap food for consumers. In the last analysis the primary purpose of production is consumption, not the remuneration of producers, but both purposes can be fulfilled if the productivity of each worker is high and if he is producing a product of high value in relation to the amount of labour employed to produce it. Wartime improvements in agricultural technique and capital equipment go a long way to accomplish the former. The latter involves the question of reorganisation of output, which is not germane to this study but which must be considered in the light of the changes in labour costs which have taken place during the war. Agricultural efficiency is also being improved as a result of the 186 POOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN control over farming exercised by the Agricultural Executive Committees. In view of the knowledge and experience gained during the war by the members of these Committees, it is more than likely that they will play a prominent part in post-war policy and, if increased State control of agriculture is part of the post-war policy in line with the general trend of ideas outlined above, the Committees will form the administrative backbone of this control in peace as they have in war. Some bad farmers have been dispossessed by these Committees and their land taken over by the State. There is no obligation on the State to return this land to the original owners after the war if there is reason to believe that it will not be properly farmed, and if similar control of bad farming in continued after the war it will do much to raise the level of farming efficiency. Before the war the organisation of the dissemination of the results of agricultural research to the farmers was lamentably defective. Although advisory centres staffed with agricultural scientists existed in each county, they could not go to the assistance of farmers unless their services were requested by the farmers. Since the war the staffs of the agricultural education classes have been distributed over the country and a technical officer has been attached to most district committees. For the first time . . . in the history of this country men with technical qualifications are entitled to go with members of the district committees to a farm and examine the farmers' system of running it. Instead of waiting until they are asked they can now give advice or in extreme cases, can issue directions with the committee's consent . . . For the first time farmers who never asked for any technical assistance, and who affected to believe that the technical man could not teach them anything at all, are now finding as a result of conversations with the technical advisers that they are deriving real assistance and getting better crops and livestock.1 This increased control over agriculture by the county committees can be used and is used to assist the farmer actively in raising his own standards of farming not only by giving him a better knowledge of new techniques but also by giving him what help he needs in applying them. Although State control of agriculture has effected long-run changes in agricultural efficiency, developed techniques of control, and provided vital data for an agricultural program, it is not clear that control over the distribution of food will improve the prewar distribution structure, although it has undoubtedly resulted in the collection of important information about the distribution 1 Minister of Agriculture, in Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 19 November 1941, Vol. 376, cols. 423-24. CONCLUSION 187 of food. * It is hardly possible at the present time to evaluate the changes that have taken place or to predict what changes will add a positive contribution to human welfare in the post-war world. The policy of preserving existing channels of trade as far as possible has prevented a thorough-going reorganisation of distributive processes, and it is indeed doubtful how far such a reorganisation to meet the necessities of State-directed distribution in wartime would meet the needs of peace if private enterprise and the profit motive continue to be the chief forces in the distribution of food in the future. The stimulus given to vertical as well as horizontal organisation in the food manufacturing and distributing industries may after this war, as it did after the last war, lead to a greater amount of amalgamation or cartelisation and to an increased tendency for one or a few large firms to dominate each branch of industry to a greater extent than before. Additional measures may then be necessary after the war to control monopolistic practices. 1 A. R. BURNS, in his investigation of the activities of American industry, found that: "The fog of secrecy and often of deception that hangs heavily over the activities of large corporate units is a serious barrier to accurate analysis." (The Decline of Competition, p. vi.) There is little reason to expect conditions in Great Britain to be much more favourable in this respect. APPENDICES APPENDIX I FOOD CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM CONSUMPTION PER HEAD PER WEEK, 1 9 0 9 - 1 3 , Item 1 9 2 4 - 8 AND 1 9 3 4 - 5 1909-13 1924-8 1934-5 Increase ( + ) or decrease ( — ) of 1934-5 compared with 1909-13 1924-8 per cent. per cent lb. lb. lb. Meat (including poultry, etc) 2.58 2.56 2.81 + Cereals (including wheat and flour) 4.45 4.11 4.04 - 9 — 2 Potatoes 4.68 4.43 4.25 - 9 — 4 Other vegetables 1.38 1.81 2.22 + 61 + 23 Milk and cream pts 3.46 1 pts 3.35 1 pts 3.26 - 6 — 3 Condensed milk lb. 0.05 lb. 0.14 lb. 0.23 +360 +64 Eggs, in shell no. 1.93 no. 2.34 no. 2.90 + 50 +24 Butter lb. 0.30 lb. 0.31 lb. 0.49 + 63 +58 Margarine 0.11 0.23 0. 15 + 36 — 35 Cheese 0.14 0.18 0. 19 + 36 + 6 Lard 0.08» 0. II a 0. 18 Sugar 1.52 1.60 1.79 + 18 + 11 Fish 0.79 0.80 0.87 + 10 + 9 Fruit 1.19 1.75 2.23 + 87 +27 Tea 0.12 0.17 0.18 + 50 + 6 9 + 10 j 5 1 s These estimates for milk may be somewhat too high. Lard made in the United Kingdom is included in meat. • Not comparable. These figures include wastage in distribution and in the home and consumption by domestic animals. Source: MINISTRY OP HEALTH: ADVISORY COMMITTOR ON NUTRITION: First Report (H.M.S.O. 1937), p. 16. APPENDIX II FOODSTUFFS FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AVERAGE OF THE TWO YEARS 1934 AND 1935 (Products manufactured from imported materials, e.g. flour, margarine and chocolate, are treated as imported.) Commodity Home production Thousand tons Cereals: Wheat flour 500 25 50 Per cent. of total supply Imports less total exports Per cent. Thousand tons 11.9 45.5 50.0 Other cereals (e.g. macaroni, etc.) 3,693 30 50 50 57 Total quantities available for consumption Thousand tons 4.123 1 55 100 50 57 42 42 575 12.8 3,922 4,427» 635 255 217 153 107 86 50 52.8 43.0 79.2 27.5 41.3 79.6 72.4 1,201 594 274 557 259 108 69 1,503 49.1 566 339 57 404 152 22 19 1,559 3,062 Other fish, fresh or cured. Shell fish6 128» 702* 8 100.0 94.2 72.7 43 3 69 128 745 11 69 Total fish 838 88.0 115 953 910 92 100.0 92.0 53 13 53 63 33 19 41.4 52.0 10.0 31.0 89.3 10.0 4,700 67.1 (262) 67.1 Meat: Beef and Veal* Pork« Rabbits Total meat Fish: t Milk and Dairy Produce: Milk, fresh (million gallons) Milk, condensed whole. . Milk, condensed skimmed Butter Cheese Cream Margarine Eggs in shell (millions). . (Eggs in shell) (thousand tons) Eggs, liquid, dried and 8 910 100 75 12 476 140 4 181 1 169 2,307 (128) 128 25 529 203 37 200 169 7,007 (390) -40 40 FOODSTUFFS FOR H U M A N Home production Commodity Thousand tons 193 CONSUMPTION Per cent. of total supply Imports less total exports Per cent. Thousand tons Total quantities available for consumption Thousand tons Fruit: Nuts 315» 49.9 43.6 7.2 316 499 324 298 64 175 192 14 631 499 324 528 69 175 192 14 230 s 5 22.6 1,882 2,432 — 28 28 4,500 s 97.2 129 4,629 15 200» 10.2 99.5 132 1 147 201 1,600» 78.8 432 45 2,032 45 530 27.9 1 2.50 1,368 32 24 3 1,898 32 24 4 195 15 195 15 68 68 • Canned fruit Desiccated coconut Total fruit 550" Fruit Pulp — Vegetables: Dried beans, peas and Other vegetables (including tomatoes a n d rhubarb) Preserved vegetables.. . . Sugar, etc.: Sugar (in terms of re- Beverages: Tea Coffee Cocoa, chocolate powder and cocoa p r o d u c t s . . . — i Excludes 70,000 tons of wheat flour estimated to have been used for industrial purposes which cannot be distributed between home production and imports. 1 Tinned meat and edible offals included in "other meat". « Net landings after allowing for net exports of fresh or cured herrings and making further allowance for weight of containers of cured herrings. * No estimate for fresh water fish has yet been made. B Estimated edible portion only. 8 Included in fish above. » Includes 65,000 tons of imitation lard manufactured in the United Kingdom from imported raw materials. * Includes allowance for allotments and private gardens. 9 Included in fresh fruit or vegetables. Source: MINISTRY OK HEALTH: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUTRITION: First Report (H.M.S.O., 1937), p. 33. A P P E N D I X III CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL The following tables do not list all food control orders. They are designed to show the development of general food control and of control over the major groups of foods. Only the more important orders are listed, and amendments to the principal orders have been omitted unless they are of a fundamental nature. The first orders controlling the price of each food and the first orders rationing any food are listed, but subsequent changes are generally omitted. The date given is the date of the order and not the date on which it came into force. Control of animal feedstuffs is not covered in this appendix. The appendix is divided into the following sections: I. General II. Cereals and cereal products I I I . Meat and meat products IV. Oils and fats V. Milk VI. Cheese VII. Eggs VIII. Vegetables IX. Fruits and preserves X. Fish X I . Sugar, glucose and invert sugar X I I . Tea X I I I . Miscellaneous CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROI, 195 Table I. General 1939 31 Aug. Title S.R.&O. No. Acquisition of Food {Excessive Quantities) Order, 1939 991 Acquisition of food b y any person except a food trader, in excess of the normal quantity required for a week, prohibited. 1 Sept. Food Control Order, 1939 Committees {Constitution) 1019 Local Food Control Committees constituted. 2 Sept. Cold Storage {Restriction) Order, 1939 1027. Prohibition of deliveries into or out of any cold store except under licence; provision made for the keeping of records and inspection of premises of cold stores. 6 Sept. Food {Conditions of Sale) Order, 1939 1103 Prohibition of the attaching of conditions relating to the purchase of any other article on the sale of any article of food. 21 Sept. Food Control Committees {England and Wales and Northern Ireland) Enforcement Order, 1939 1250 Food Control Committees given the power of enforcing the orders of the Ministry of Food in their areas. 29 Sept. Food Control Committees {Local tion) Order, 1939 Distribu1312 Every retailer of foodstuffs and every person engaged in the catering trade required to be registered and licensed for the sale of the following specified foods: bacon, biscuits, bread, breakfast cereals, butter, cakes, cheese, chocolate and sugar confectionery, cocoa, coffee, compound lard, cream (fresh or preserved), edible and cooking fats, eggs, fish (wet or dried or in cans, glasses, etc.), flour, fruit (fresh, dried, preserved, canned or bottled), ham, honey, jam, lard, margarine, meats (including cooked meats, canned and preserved meats and meat pies), milk, (fresh, canned or dried), potatoes, poultry, game and rabbits, rice, sausages, sugar, syrup, tea, vegetables (fresh, canned or dried). 3 Nov. Food Control Committees {Registration of Establishments) Order, 1939 Food Control Committees required to keep a register of all catering establishments, institutions and residential establishments which require bacon and ham and butter. 1553 196 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1939 27 Dec. Title S.R. & O. No. 1856 Rationing Order, 1939 This order sets out the general restrictions on obtaining or supplying rationed foods except as specifically authorised; it prescribes the procedure for households, catering establishments, institutions and residential establishments, and deals with the issue and custody of ration documents and with the authority of the Food Control Committees. 29 Dec. Order appointing the day on which the Rationing Order, 1939, is to come into force in relation to Bacon, Butter and Sugar 1891 Rationing of bacon, butter and sugar to begin on 8 January 1940. 1940 6 Jan. Directions under the Rationing Order, 1939 13 Directions concerning the amounts of rationed foods to be issued for household consumption or in catering establishments. 8 Mar. Order amending the Food Control Committees {Registration of Establishments) Order, 1939 323 Only those clubs which regularly serve meals permitted to register as catering establishments. 14 Mar. Food {Inspection 1940 of Undertakings) Order, 378 Food undertakings required to keep such books, accounts and records as the Ministry may direct; authorised officers permitted to enter and inspect premises. 11 May Order amending the Food Control Committees {England and Wales and Northern Ireland) Enforcement Order, 1939 in Sub-Committees appointed under the Food Control Committees (Constitution) Order, 1939, given the powers possessed by Food Control Committees of enforcing orders within their area. 24 May Order amending the Food Control Committees {Constitution) Order, 1939 Provisions made for the inclusion of trade union representatives in Food Control Committees; it is provided t h a t where the Minister, after consultation with the Trades Union Congress, notifies an appointing authority that a trade union representative is to ¡be included in a Food Control Committee, the authority concerned shall, on the next 788 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1940 Title 197 S.R. & O. No. vacancy occurring among the members representing the general public (other than women members), appoint a trade union representative to fill t h e vacancy after consultation with such local trade union organisation as the Minister shall designate. 3 June General Licence under the Food Control Committees (Local Distribution) Order, 1939 876 An occupier of a garden or an allotment, not carried on solely or mainly for the purpose of trade or business, authorised to sell by retail any fresh fruit and vegetables, honey, eggs, poultry and rabbits produced in his garden or allotment. 5 Aug. Waste of Food Order, 1940 1424 This order prohibits any person from wasting food or causing or permitting any food to be wasted. 19 Nov. Food {Conditions of Sale) Order, 1940 2012 Revocation of Food (Conditions of Sale) Order, 1939 (S.R. & O. 1103); conditions relating to the purchase of any other article in connection with the sale or proposed sale of any article of food prohibited; a retailer, however, may impose a condition t h a t he will sell an article of food only to persons or establishments registered with him. 3 Dec. Food Control Committees (Destruction of Rats and Mice) Order, 1940 2069 Food Control Committees in England and Wales empowered to give any directions affecting any undertaking in their areas for the prevention of damage to food by rats and mice. 1941 8 Jan. Food (Current Prices) Order, 1941 The sale of specified foods prohibited, except under licence, a t a price exceeding t h a t at which specified food of substantially similar description was sold on substantially similar terms on 2 December 1940. The "specified foods" listed in the Schedule to the order are: coffee (including coffee and chicory); coffee essence (including coffee and chicory essence); cocoa powder; cocoa butter; chocolate for use as a beverage; canned and bottled vegetables; canned pork and beans; honey; meat, fish and poultry and other edible pastes; meat and other edible extracts; shredded suet; dead poultry; rice; tapiocas and sagos; macaroni, spaghetti and vermicelli; biscuits, rusks and crisp breads; soups— tinned, bottled and powdered; processed cheese; pickles, sauces and relishes; custard and blancmange powders; table jellies; edible nuts. 23 198 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1941 Title S.R. & O. No. 11 Jan. Cold Storage {Control of Undertakings) Order, 1941 37 Every undertaker of a cold storage undertaking required to comply with directions issued by the Minister of Food. 28 Jan. Local Authorities {Community Kitchens and Sale of Food in Public Air Raid Shelters) Order, 1941 103 Local authorities required, after consultation with and subject to directions of the Minister of Food, to set up community fcod centres and to supply food in public air-raid shelters within their areas. 22 Feb. 5 Mar. Food {Restriction on Meals in Establishments) Order, 1941 Local Authorities {Directions to Caterers) Order, 1941 229 298 Local authorities given the power of giving specified types of directions to persons conducting catering establishments. 20 Aug. Food {Restriction on Dealings) Order, 1941 1234 Wholesale dealings in the following specified foods, except under licence of the Minister, prohibited from a date to be announced later by the Ministry of Food: apples, bacon, bananas, biscuits rusks and crisp breads, bitter oranges, bottled vegetables, canned fruit, canned vegetables, cereal breakfast foods, cheese, coffee, coffee essence (including coffee and chicory essence), condensed milk, cornflour, blancmange powder and custard powder, dried fruits, egg products, flour, frozen eggs, home-produced canned meat roll, home-produced canned prepared meals, imported canned meat, jam, lemons, macaroni, spaghetti and vermicelli, marmalade, milk powder, meat and fish pastes, national butter, oatmeal and oat flakes, onions (including green onions), oranges, pickles and sauces, plums, processed cheese, rice, sago and tapioca, semolina, soft fruits, soups (canned or desiccated), soya flour, sugar, syrup and treacle, table jellies, tomatoes. 10 Sept. Order amending the Food {Restriction Dealings) Order, 1941 on 1580 Chocolate, chocolate confectionery and sugar confectionery added to the list of foods to which the Restriction on Dealings Order applies. 11 Oct. Food Substitutes {Control) Order, 1941 T h e manufacture of food substitutes by way of trade, except under licence or authority of the Minister, prohibited. 1606 CHRONOLOGY OP FOOD CONTROL 1941 Title 18 Oct. Order amending the Directions dated January 6, 1940, made under the Rationing Order, 1939, as amended, and amending the Tea (Rationing) Order, 1940, and the Cheese (Rationing) Order, 1941 199 S.R. & O. No. 1635 This order provides for the purchase of sugar and tea rations during four-week periods and makes certain new arrangements for the purchase of weekly seamen's rations; the ration of sugar and tea, as well as that of cheese, for the four weeks' period beginning 20 October 1941 and any subsequent period of four weeks may be obtained or supplied at any time during the four weeks' period. 28 Oct. The Food Transport Order, 1941 1694 This order provides for the control of the transport of food and forage in Great Britain ; every person carrying on or in control of or employed in connection with a food undertaking must comply with directions to be given by the Minister under the order on the transport, or consignment for transport, of food or forage, produced, treated, stored, moved, disposed of, acquired or used in connection with the undertaking. 25 Nov. Food Control Committees (Licensing of Establishments) Order, 1941 The Food Control Committees (Registration of Establishments) Order, 1939, as amended, revoked and provision made for licensing instead of registering residential establishments, catering establishments and institutions; any establishment of this sort requiring to obtain any of some 63 specified foods must be licensed; the specified foods are: bacon and ham, uncooked; bacon and ham, cooked; biscuits, rusks and crispbreads; blancmange powder, cornflour and custard powder; bread; butter; cakes; canned beans; cereal breakfast foods; cheese (including processed cheese); chocolate and sugar confectionery; cocoa; coffee; coffee essence (including coffee and chicory essence); edible and cooking fats; edible egg products; eggs; fish, wet; fish, cured or dried; fish, in cans, glasses or other airtight containers; fish pastes; flour; fruit, bottled or canned; fruit, crystallised; fruit curds; fruit, dried or evaporated; fruit, fresh; game; honey; jam and marmalade; lard and compound lard; macaroni, spaghetti and vermicelli; margarine; meat, chilled, fresh or frozen; meat, canned or preserved, other than corned beef, canned corned mutton, and canned corned pork; meat, cooked; meat pastes; meat pastries (including sausage rolls) and meat pies; meat products, manufactured or canned meat not in airtight containers; meat roll or galantines, canned; milk, fresh; milk, canned; milk, dried; mincemeat; nuts; oatmeal and oat flakes; pickles and sauces; potatoes; poultry (including turkeys); rabbits; rice and edible rice products; 1887 200 1941 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Title S.R. & O. No. sago and tapioca; sausages; semolina; soups, canned or desiccated; soya flour; sugar; syrup and treacle; table jellies; tea; vegetables, bottled or canned, other than canned beans; vegetables, fresh (other t h a n potatoes); vegetables, dried. 25 Nov. Order amending the Food Control Committees {Local Distribution) Order, 1939 1888 Substitutes a new schedule for the schedule to the Order (S.R. & O. 1939, No. 312); this schedule is to extend the list of foods which can be sold only by retailers licensed for those foods and to include all those foods listed in the schedule to the Food Control Committees (Licensing of Establishments) Order, 1941 (S.R. & O., No. 1887). 4 Dec. Order prescribing an Appointed Day for the purposes of the Food {Restriction on Dealings) Order, 1941 1958 On 29 December the Principal Order comes into effect for: biscuits, rusks and crispbreads; bottled vegetables; canned fruit; canned vegetables; cereal breakfast foods; coffee; coffee essence (including coffee and chicory essence); condensed milk; cornflour, blancmange powder and custard powder; dried fruits; egg products; flour; frozen eggs; home-produced canned meat roll; home-produced canned prepared meals; imported canned meat; jam; macaroni, spaghetti and vermicelli; marmalade; milk powder; meat and fish pastes; oatmeal and oat flakes; pickles and sauces; processed cheese; rice; sago and tapioca; semolina; soups (canned or desiccated); soya flour; sugar; syrup and treacle; table jellies. 9 Dec. Order in Council amending {General) Regulations, 1939 the Defence 1981 The maximum penalty which can be imposed by the Courts for infringement of statutory orders made by the Minister of Food is increased; the Minister has also powers to seize and sell articles in respect of which an offence is believed to have been committed. 10 Dec. Order amending the Rationing Order, 1939 1992 This order permits the supply of household rations for community meals and charity functions; rationed food obtained for household consumption may now be supplied by the person obtaining it to any other person with whom he shares it as p a r t of a meal or on a particular occasion and to any sale, meeting or entertainment or other function held for a charitable or philanthropic object. 10 Dec. Infestation Order, 1941 The Minister of Food is empowered to give directions regarding the storage and transport of food or forage to prevent its infestation by vermin. 1993 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1941 16 D e c . 201 Title Order amending the Food Dealings) Order, 1941 S.R. & O. No. {Restriction on 2025 Liquid milk added to thè list of foods coming under the Principal Order. 1942 8 Jan. Order amending the Food Dealings) Order, 1941 {Restriction on 34 This order adds home-produced canned tongues to the list of specified foods set out in the schedule to the Principal Order. Table II. Cereals and Cereal Products 1939 Title ' 3 Sept. Cereals and Cereal Products Control) Order, 1939 {Requisition S.R. & O. No. and 1035 Requisition and control of stocks of cereals and cereal products; returns of stocks required; prohibition of dealings outside the United Kingdom, except under licence. 3 Sept. Flour {Prices) {No. 1) Order, 1939 1036 Wholesale prices fixed for straight run and imported flour. Licences required for buying or selling flour at any price other than the prescribed price. 3 Sept. Control of Mills Order, 1939 {Flour and Provender) No.l 1037 General Licence {Provender Millers) 1038 General Licence 1039 {Flour Millers) Flour mills licensed and brought under control; returns required from millers showing actual and potential output of mills and intake facilities; general licence granted to millers to mill and deliver cereals and cereal products. 30 Oct. Wheat {Prices) Order, 1939 Prices set for millable wheat sold by a grower registered under the Wheat Acts; maximum prices set for wheat used for animal feeding and flour milling sold by persons other than registered growers; maximum price for. non-millable wheat. 1527 202 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1939 23 Nov. Title S.R. & O. No. Home Grown Wheat (Control) Order, 1939 1685 Marketing of the home-grown wheat crop controlled ; registered growers required to sell to approved buyers. 23 Nov. General Licence under the Home Grown Wheat (Control) Order, 1939 1686 General licence prescribing the maximum proportion of millable wheat which can be sold during any one calendar month for purposes other than flour milling. 1940 27 Jan. Home Grown Oats (Control and Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum 117 Sale and distribution of home-grown oats controlled and maximum prices for oats of the 1939 crop, except when sold for seed, established. 27 Jan. General Licence under the Home Grown Oats (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 118 All millers who mill oats for human consumption and all persons who are authorised to issue wheat certificates under the Wheat Acts licensed as approved buyers of home-grown oats. 17 Apr. General Licence under Control of Mills (Flour and Provender) No. 1 Order, 1939 568 Revokes previous General Licence (S.R. & O. 1939, No. 1039); flour millers authorised to mill any cereal or cereal product provided t h a t they do not produce, except under authority of the Minister, any flour other t h a n national straight run flour and do not make or deliver, except under licence of the Minister any wheat by-product other than fine wheatfeed and straight run bran. 1 May Milled Wheaten Order, 1940 Substances (Restriction) 641 Sale, purchase or use of any milled wheaten substance for any purpose other than as food for human consumption prohibited except under licence of the Minister. 1 May General Licence under the Milled Wheaten Substances (Restriction) Order, 1940 The sale, purchase or use of certain milled wheaten substances for feeding to livestock or in the preparation of food for livestock authorised. 642 CHRONOLOGY OP FOOD CONTROL 1940 3 June 203 S.R. & O. No. Title Bread (Prohibition of Exchange) Order, 1940 865 Any baker or seller of bread prohibited from exchanging any bread for other bread which he has sold or delivered except under licence. 17 June Order Revoking the General Licence dated 16 March 1940 under the Home Grown Oats (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1005 Growers permitted to sell oats only to persons licensed as approved buyers under the Control Order. 28 June General Licence under the Home Grown Oats (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1112 Growers of oats authorised to use as food for livestock any oats bought by them for seed and not required for t h a t purpose. 15 July Dried Peas, Beans and Lentils (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1283 The purchase for the purpose of canning and the canning or milling of varieties cf dried peas, beans and lentils specified in the order prohibited, except under licence ; sale or purchase of these products prohibited except under licence or except by a retailer in the course of his business; maximum growers' and wholesale prices for different varieties of peas, beans and lentils prescribed; maximum millers' and wholesale prices for split peas and lentils prescribed. 30 July Home Grown Oats (Control and Prices) (No. 2) Order, 1940 Maximum 1375 Prohibition, except under licence, of the sale of oats by a grower, except to an approved buyer; monthly returns of particulars of sales required of approved buyers; maximum prices for oats, except seed oats, established; revocation of Home Grown Oats (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 117), and S. R. & 0., No. 145. 31 July Home Grown Barley (Control and Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum 1398 Regulations for the control and sale of barley provided; sale cf barley above the maximum price permitted to food manufacturers for the manufacture of human food. 7 Aug. Home Grown Rye (Control and Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum The sale of rye by a grower prohibited, except to an approved buyer, except under licence; other provision made for the control of home-grown rye and maximum prices established, except for rye sold as seed. 1440 204 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 8 Aug. Title Bread (Restriction on Sales) Order, 1 940 S.R. & O. No. 1457 The sale of bread prohibited, except in four specified shapes. 28 Aug. Threshed Home Grown Peas (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1572 Provision made for the control of threshed homegrown peas and maximum prices established. 28 Aug. General Licence under the Control of Mills (Flour and Provender) (No. 1) Order, 1939 1570 Flour millers permitted to produce and sell "proprietary self-raising flour" and "proprietary brown flour" both of which are defined; these are "speciality flours" for the purpose of the Flour (Prices) Order, 1940. 26 Sept. Barley (Control Order, 1940 and Maximum Prices) 1737 Additional regulations for the control of homegrown barley; maximum prices established. 26 Sept. Oats (Control and Maximum 1940 Prices) Order, 1738 Additional regulations made for the control of home-grown oats; maximum prices established. 12 Dec. Oat Products (Control and Maximum Order, 1940 Prices) 2118 The milling, manufacture, production, packeting, sale or purchase of specified cereal products prohibited except under licence; maximum prices established for these products. 24 Dec. Cereal Breakfast Foods (Control and Provisional Prices) Order, 1940 The sale of any cereal breakfast food a t exceeding t h a t at which it was sold under conditions on 2 December 1940 prohibited; facture of cereal breakfast food prohibited under licence. 2180 a price similar manuexcept 1941 8 Jan. Food (Current Prices) Order, 1941 Sale of rice, tapioca and sago, macaroni, spaghetti and vermicelli, biscuits, rusks and crispbreads prohibited, except under licence, a t a price exceeding t h a t a t which food of a similar description was sold on 2 December 1940. 23 CHRONOLOGY OP FOOD CONTROL 1941 3 Feb. Title 205 S.R. & O. No. Bread (Current Prices) Order, 1941 150 The sale of bread a t a price exceeding t h a t a t which bread of a substantially similar description, quality and quantity was sold in the ordinary course of business on substantially similar terms and • conditions on 2 December 1940 prohibited, except under licence. 11 Mar. Wheat (Prices) Order, 1941 318 Revokes, and subject to certain changes consolidates the provision of the Wheat (Prices) Order, 1939 (S.R. & O., N o . 1527), and its amendment. Prices apply now to sales by all growers, not as before only to growers registered under the Wheat By-Laws, 1932. 11 Mar. Home Grown Wheat (Control) Order, 1941 319 Home-Grown Wheat (Control) Order, 1939 (S.R. & O., No. 1685), as amended, is revoked, and revised provisions for controlling sales of home-grown wheat established. 2 Apr. Rice (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 464 Maximum prices for specified varieties of rice fixed. 8 Apr. Rice (Control) Order, 1941 501 The use of rice for other t h a n human food or other t h a n in the manufacture, production cr preparation of human food prohibited, except under licence. Provision made for the keeping of records and accounts. 14 May Tapioca and Sago (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 675 Maximum prices for all varieties of tapioca and sago prescribed. 3 July Biscuits (Licensing and Control) Order, 1941 961 Manufacture of biscuits prohibited, except under licence of the Minister. 9 July Bread (Licensing of Producers) Order, 1941 980 Provides that, except under authority of the Minister, no one may produce any bread a t any premises without a licence from the Food Control Committee for the area in which the premises are situated. 30 July Oats (Control and Maximum 1941 Prices) Order, Provisions made for the control of sales and prices of oats of the 1941 crop. 1130 206 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1941 Title S.R. & O. No. 30 July Home Grown Wheat (Control and Prices) Order, 1941 1132 Provisions made for the control of sales and prices • of wheat of the 1941 crop. 27 Aug. Flour (Control and Prices) Order, 1941 1291 Consolidates the provisions of previous orders controlling flour and flour prices and makes certain new regulations for the control of the manufacture and prices of flour and wheat by-products. 27 Aug. Barley (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1292 Barley (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 1737), as amended, revoked, except for Northern Ireland, and new provisions made for the control of sales and prices of homegrown and Manx barley in Great Britain. 10 Sept. Home Grown Rye (Control and Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum 1398 Home Grown Rye (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 1440), revoked except for Northern Ireland and provision made for the control of sales and prices of home-grown rye in Great Britain. 24 Sept. Order amending the Flour (Control and Prices) Order, 1941 1478 T h e definition of National Straight R u n Flour in the Principal Order amended so as to prescribe a maximum rate of extraction of 85 per cent, as well as a minimum rate of 75 per cent, for this kind of flour; except under licence flour millers may now produce only National Straight R u n or National Wheat Meal flour. 1 Oct. Bread (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1542 New provisions for the control of the prices of bread made; restrictions on bread manufacture imposed and with certain exceptions the wrapping, slicing and banding of bread prohibited. 8 Oct. Macaroni and Similar Products Prices) Order, 1941 (Maximum 1577 Prescribes maximum prices for macaroni, spaghetti, vermicelli, noodles and similar products. 15 Oct. Cereal Breakfast Foods (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Revokes the Cereal Breakfast Foods (Control and Provisional Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 1620 CHRONOLOGY OP POOD CONTROL 1941 Title 207 S.R. & O. No. 2180), and makes new provision for the control of the manufacture and prices of cereal breakfast foods; manufacture, production or packeting of cereal breakfast foods prohibited, except under licence; maximum prices for specified cereal breakfast foods prescribed. 8 Nov. Directions under the Oats {Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1765 Directions for the sale and use of oats by approved buyers revised in order to give priority to sales to oatmeal millers and feedstuff for horses within the ration. 10 Dec. Soya Flour {Control and Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) 1994 Manufacture, sale and prices of home-produced and imported soya flour controlled. 23 Dec. Order amending the Home Grown Wheat {Control and Prices) Order, 1941 2085 Amends the Principal Order in order to vary the fixed and maximum prices for millable wheat during the period January to July 1942 and makes new regulations for the sale and certification of non-millable wheat. 31 Dec. Dried Peas, Beans and Lentils {Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 2139 New provisions made for the control of manufacture, sales and prices of dried peas, beans and lentils; the order prohibits soaking and makes changes in the price schedules; maximum retail prices are now fixed a t an inclusive figure instead of being calculated with reference to a basic sum. 31 Dec. Oat Products {Control and Maximum {No. 2) Order, 1941 Prices) 2140 Revokes the Oat Products (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 (S.R. & O., No. 1531), and makes new provisions for the control, manufacture and sale of oatmeal, oat flour and oat flakes; maximum retail prices made inclusive with no additions allowed to the schedule of prices. 1942 24 Jan. Order amending the Food {Points Rationing) Order, 1941 Rice, sago and tapioca, dried peas, beans and lentils included in the points rationing scheme. 130 208 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Table III. 1939 3 Sept. Meat and Meat Products Title S.R. & O. No. Pigs {Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 1061 Prices are fixed on a deadweight basis for the sale of pigs for slaughter (revoked from 1 December 1939). 4 {Sept. Meat {Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 1040 Price control established for fresh, imported and canned meat, and also for sausages and edible offals; price of the meat specified must not exceed the average for meat of a similar description during the week ending 25 August (revoked from 4 December 1939 except as regards chilled or frozen meat). 5 Sept. Imported Canned Meat {Requisition) Order, 1939 1076 Imported meat requisitioned; returns and licences required of dealers. 9 Sept. Fatstock {Provisional Prices) {No. 2) Order, 1939 1130 Maximum prices set for various descriptions of fatstock (revoked 1 December 1939). 9 Sept. Imported Meat {Requisition) Order, 1939 1131 Imported meat requisitioned and dealers required to obtain a licence. 9 Sept. Meat {Provisional Prices) 1939 {No. 2) Order, 1132 Revokes the Principal Order so far as it relates to the sale of meat by wholesale and prescribes by schedule the maximum wholesale price which may be charged for fresh meat and imported meat (revoked from 4 December 1939 except as regards chilled and frozen meat). 15 Sept. Imported Bacon and Hams Order, 1939 {Requisition) 1199 Imports of bacon and ham requisitioned with the exception of shipments from Northern Ireland and Eire. 23 Sept. Imported Pork {Requisition) Order, 1939 1275 Imported pork in cold stores requisitioned. 30 Sept. Order amending the Imported Bacon and Hams {Requisition) Order, 1939 Exceptions made in Principal Order regarding Northern Ireland and Eire cancelled. 1335 CHRONOLOGY OF POOD CONTROL 1939 2 Oct. Title Bacon {Licensing of Producers) Order, 1939 209 S.R. & O. No. 1337 Production of bacon, except under licence, prohibited; records required of licensees and their premises made subject to inspection. 4 Oct. 17 Oct. 27 Nov. Home-produced Bacon {Distribution) Order, 1939 Bacon importers required to sell their homeproduced bacon through a Ckivernment agent or the Bacon Importers, National Defence Association Ltd. ; applies only to traders registered under the Bacon Marketing Scheme. Bacon and Hams {Borax Packed) {Returns) Order, 1939 Returns required from owners of bacon or hams packed in borax. Bacon {Control of Production) Order, 1939 1370 1443 1711 Production of hams or bacon with some exceptions prohibited except under licence. 30 Nov. Fatstock, Home-Killed Pork, Meat and Pigs {Provisional Prices) {Revocation) Order, 1939 1730 Removal of existing controls over the marketing of home-produced meat (revokes Nos. 1040, 1061, 1130, 1132, above). 29 Dec. Home Produced Bacon {Distribution) {No. 2) Order, 1939 Provides that except under and in accordance with the terms of a licence granted by the Minister of Food no person shall sell any bacon produced by him in Great Britain except to a person authorised by the Minister to produce on his behalf. 1889 1940 6 Jan. Bacon {Prices) Order, 1940 12 Fixed wholesale prices and maximum retail prices for bacon and ham prescribed. 6 Jan. Directions under the Rationing Order, 1939 13 Bacon ration prescribed. 2 Jan. Meat {Maximum Retail Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum retail prices for all qualities and cuts of meat, both home-killed and imported, established. 37 210 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 12 Jan. Title S.R. & O. No. Pigs {Sales) Order, 1940 38 Sale of pigs for slaughter, except a t prescribed collecting centres, prohibited. 13 Jan. Livestock {Sales) Order, 1940 40 All livestock required to be sold a t collecting centres to a Government buyer, with the exception of cattle slaughtered under the Diseases of Animals Acts and by self-suppliers. 13 Jan. Livestock {Restriction on Slaughtering) Order, 1940 41 Under this order the Minister of Food becomes the sole purchaser of all fatstock for slaughter for human consumption. 13 Jan. Meat {Prescribed Wholesale Prices) Order, 1940 42 Wholesale prices for home-killed and imported meat fixed. 8 Mar. Order amending the Rationing Order, 1939 324 Provides t h a t the Rationing Order shall come into force on 11 March 1940 for meat; exempts from rationing canned meat or canned meat products, cooked meat, galantines, luncheon sausages, meat pastes, brawn or jellied veal; other manufactured meat products freed of the ration if they contain not more than 50 per cent, of meat by weight. 8 Mar. Order amending the Directions Rationing Order, 1939 under the 325 Meat ration fixed a t Is. lOd. a week for adults and l i d . for children. 8 Mar. Order amending Meat Prices) Order, 1940 {Maximum Retail 326 Butchers required to sell meat in accordance with specified descriptions or cuts; they are not permitted to sell any description or cut mentioned in the schedules unless it has been cut in accordance with the practice ordinarily followed in the butcher's district; sausages and sausage meat removed from maximum retail prices order. 8 Mar. Order amending the Meat {Prescribed Wholesale Prices) Order, 1940 Offal prices removed from the schedule of prescribed wholesale prices. 327 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1940 , 16 Mar. Title Order amending the Livestock {Sales) Order, 1940 New grades of various classes of livestock introduced; killing-out percentages may be determined, if an inspector of the Ministry so requires, by the ascertained deadweight after slaughter. 211 S.R. & O. No. 387 18 Mar. Sausages {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 All sausages and sausage meat required to be sold only in three grades, which are defined according to meat content; maximum wholesale and retail price for each grade established; sausages with meat content of less than 30 per cent, are prohibited. 394 21 Mar. Order amending the Rationing Order, 1939 Sausages and all kinds of manufactured meat products freed of the ration. 415 Directions under the Rationing Order, 1939 526 9 Apr. Pork freed of the ration. 5 June Order amending Bacon {Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum retail price for bacon trimmings (boneless) prescribed; the order further provides that bacon must be sold, both wholesale and retail, only under the descriptions and cuts specified in the Principal Order, as amended. 896 5 June Directions under the Rationing Order, 1939 Bacon trimmings to be supplied free of the ration. 897 15 Aug. Livestock {Import from Eire and the Isle of Man) Regulations, 1940 These regulations prohibit, except under licence of the appropriate Minister, the importation of livestock from Eire and the Isle of Man, except at specified ports or by specified routes; transportation of livestock from the point of entry into Great Britain prohibited until examined by an authorised officer. 10 Sept. 1 Nov. Canned Corned Beef {Retail Prices and Control) Order, 1940 Prohibits the sale by a butcher, and the purchase by any person, of canned corned beef, except at the price of Is. 2d. per lb. net weight; canned corned beef made subject to rationing order for meat. Rabbits {Retail Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum retail prices for rabbits prescribed; do not apply to live rabbits or rabbits bred in captivity, canned rabbits, or cooked rabbits for sale as part of a meal. 1500 1645 1935 212 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 16 Dec. Title Turkeys {Maximum S.R. & O. No. 2148 Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum prices for certain descriptions of turkeys prescribed. 1941 4 Jan. Order amending the Rationing Order, 1939, and the Directions dated January 6, 1940, made thereunder, and revoking the Directions dated April 9, 1940, made thereunder 15 Rationed edible offals removed from the list of foods which may be sold free of the ration; meat ration reduced to Is. 6d. retail price; caterers prohibited from supplying rationed foods, except as part of a meal or hot beverage. 8 Jan. Food (Current Prices) Order, 1941 23 Sale of dead poultry prohibited, except under licence, at a price exceeding that at which it was sold on 2 December 1940. 9 Jan. Rabbits (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 27 Revokes the Rabbits (Retail Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O. 1940, No. 1935), and prescribes wholesale as well as retail prices for rabbits. 15 Jan. Sausages (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 62 New schedule of maximum wholesale and retail prices for sausages and sausage meat prescribed; previous Order (S.R. & O. 1940, No. 394), revoked; only sausage and sausage meat with a meat content of not less than 30 per cent, and not more than 45 per cent, may be manufactured or sold. 25 Jan. Poultry (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 93 Maximum producers', wholesale and retail prices for special classes of poultry prescribed; order does not apply to sales of poultry for the purposes of breeding, laying or rearing. 12 F e b . Home Produced 1941 Bacon (Distribution) Order, 181 Prohibits, except under licence or instructions of the Minister, any person from selling or delivering any bacon produced by him in Great Britain. 17 F e b . Order amending the Livestock (Restriction Slaughtering) (No. 2) Order, 1940 on It is made an offence for any person to trade in meat for human consumption or to buy meat derived from livestock slaughtered in Great Britain, except • from the Minister or his agents. 199 CHRONOLOGY OP FOOD CONTROL 1941 3 June Title Order amending the Rationing Order, 1939 213 S.R. & O. No. 786 All rationed edible offals, except ox skirts, freed of the ration. 7 June 3 July Canned Meat Products (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Manufacture of meat products, with certain specified exceptions, prohibited, except under licence; sales by wholesale of meat products packed in airtight containers, with certain specified exceptions, prohibited, except under licence; quality standards laid down for canned meat products; maximum prices prescribed for home-produced canned meat products. Imported Canned Meat (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum importers', wholesale and retail prices for several varieties of imported canned meat precribed. 10 Sept. Meat (Addition of Preservative) Order, 1941 Except under authority of, or in accordance with, the directions of the Minister, no-one may add preservative to meat, or treat meat with preservative. 16 Sept. Rabbits (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Rabbits (Maximum Prices) (No. 2) Order (S.R. & O. 1941, No. 228) revoked and new schedules of maximum prices for both wild and tame rabbits prescribed; provision made for licensing certain traders. 16 Sept. Hares (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum wholesale and retail prices for brown and mountain hares prescribed. 28 Oct. Canned Goods (Prohibition of Retail Sales) Order, 1941 Between 29 October and 16 November 1941, the retail sale of specified canned goods prohibited; these canned goods are tongues, briskets, Australian minced meat loaf, Australian or New Zealand canned rabbit, Eire stewed steak, U.S.A. luncheon meat, U.S.A. canned pork sausage meat or pork sausage bulk, canned fish of any description and canned beans in sauce or gravy. 29 Oct. Poultry (Maximum Prices) (No. 2) Order, 1941 New provision for the control of sales and prices of poultry made; previous Maximum Prices Order 808 956 1395 1441 1442 1693 1701 214 1941 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Title S.R. & O. No. revoked and new maximum prices for poultry prescribed; from a date to be fixed by order of the Minister, poultry may be sold by wholesale only under licence of the Minister; the order does not apply to the sale or purchase of poultry for breeding, laying or rearing. 12 Nov. Food (Points Rationing) Order, 1941 Provides for the rationing of certain specified foods including a large variety of canned meats and fish. 1808 19 Nov. Goat Meat {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Provisions made for control of the sales and prices of goat meat. 1851 20 Nov. Horseflesh (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Provisions made for control of the sales and prices of horseflesh for human consumption. 1862 Order prescribing an Appointed Day for the purposes of the Food (Restriction on Dealings) Order, 1941 1 December fixed as the day on which the prescribed order comes into force for bacon. 1871 Order amending the Poultry (Maximum Prices) (No. 2) Order, 1941 Provision made for increasing maximum prices of poultry in certain areas. 1907 Order amending the Rabbits (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Provision made for increasing the maximum prices of rabbits in certain areas. 1908 22 Nov. 26 Nov. 26 Nov. 3 Dec. 15 Dec. Order amending the Hares (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum first-hand wholesale and retail prices prescribed for hares; provision made for increasing prices in certain areas. Canned Meat and Canned Soup (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Provisions made for control of the manufacture, sale and prices for canned meat products and canned soup and consolidating the provisions of previous orders and adding certain amendments. 1953 2021 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 215 Table IV. Oils and Fats 1939 4 Sept. 4 Sept. Title S.R. & O. No. Marine Oils (Provisional Control) Order, 1939 Prices of specified marine oils restricted to current price. Oilseeds, Vegetable Oils and Fats sional Control) Order, 1939 1072 (Provi1073 Prices of specified oilseeds and oils and fats restricted to current level; dealers required to obtain a licence; returns of stocks required. 4 Sept. 4 Sept. 11 Sept. Animal Oils and Fats (Provisional Control) Order, 1939 Prices of specified animal oils and fats restricted to current price; dealers required to obtain a licence; returns of stocks required. Margarine and Cooking Fats (Provisional Control) Order, 1939 Prices of specified fats restricted to current price; manufacturers and wholesale dealers required to obtain a licence. Returns of stocks required (revoked 11 November 1939). 1074 1075 Oilseeds, Vegetable Oils and Fats (Provisional Control) Amendment Order, 1939 1151 Marine Oils (Provisional ment Order, 1939 1152 Control) Amend- Animal Oils and Fats (Provisional Control) Amendment Order, 1939 1153 These orders provide that, except in accordance with the terms of a licence to be granted by the Minister of Food, no person shall, after 11 September buy or sell any of the specified oils situated outside of the United Kingdom in excess cf a specified gross weight; no person on or after 25 September shall, except under licence, engage in crushing, refining, etc., or use any of the oils, except for the purpose of human or animal food. 13 Sept. 22 Sept. Butter (Provisional Maximum Prices) Order, 1939 Maximum wholesale and retail prices of butter set. Butter (Requisition and Control) Order, 1939 Stocks of butter requisitioned and dealers required to be licensed. 1172 1255 216 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1939 23 S e p t . Title Butter (Maximum S.R. & O. No. 1274 Prices) Order, 1939 Maximum prices of butter of all kinds set; previous orders superseded. 23 Sept. General Licence under the Oilseeds, Vegetable Oils and Fats (Provisional Control) Order, 1939 1279 Use of certain oils (castor oil, linseed oil, etc.) other than for the purpose of the manufacture of food, authorised. 23 S e p t . General Licence under the Animal Oils Fats (Provisional Control) Order, 1939 and 1280 Authorises butchers to manufacture dripping. 29 S e p t . Imported Lard (Control) Order, 1939 1332 Imported lard requisitioned; maximum retail prices set. 4 Oct. Oilseeds, Vegetable Oils and Fats and Oils (Control) Order, 1939 Marine 1371 Revocation of Orders Nos. 1073, 1151, 1152, 1072; supplies of the specified oilseeds, oils and fats requisitioned and dealers required to be licensed; the order provides for records and inspection (revoked 11 November 1939). 7 Oct. Margarine and Cooking Order, 1939 Fats (Requisition) 1384 Stocks of margarine and cooking fats requisitioned and dealers and manufacturers required to obtain a licence. 20 Oct. Animal Oils and Fats (Provisional (No. 2) Order, 1939 Control) 1480 Maximum prices prescribed for home melt bone grease and home melt technical tallow. 11 N o v . Order revoking the Margarine and Cooking Fats (Provisional Control) Order, 1939 and amending the Margarine and Cooking Fats (Requisition) Order, 1939 Manufacture of margarine and cooking fats decontrolled, but manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of these products still required to obtain a licence. 1613 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1939 Title 11 Nov. Order amending the Oilseeds, Vegetable Oils and Fats and Marine Oils {Control) Order, 1939 217 S.R. & O. No. 1614 Revocation of Principal Order (S.R. & O., No. 1317) which required the ownerships of stocks of specified oilseeds, oils and fats to be transferred to the Ministry of Food. 29 Dec. Cod Liver Oil {Control of Production) Order, 1939 1885 Manufacturers of cod-liver oil or of mixtures of cod-liver oil with any vegetable oils and fats or with marine oils required to obtain a licence from the Ministry of Food. 1940 1 Jan. Butter {Licensing and Control) Order, 1940 4 Prohibition of the manufacture of butter for sale, except under licence; this restriction does not apply to manufacture by a farmer on his farm pi émises of butter from milk produced by that farmer, or to the manufacture of butter not for sale. 6 Jan. Directions under the Rationing Order, 1939 13 Butter rations prescribed. 25 Apr. Dripping {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 606 Maximum wholesale and retail prices for dripping established. 9 May Lard {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 704 Maximum first hand, wholesale and retail price prescribed for all kinds of animal lard; revocation of t h e Imported Lard (Control) Order, 1939 (S.R. & O. 1939, No. 1332). 5 June Margarine {Pre-packing) Order, 1940 898 Prohibition, except under licence of the Minister, of the pre-packing of any margarine except by the manufacturer or by a retailer for sale on his own premises. 8 June Margarine, Cooking Fats and Edible Oils {Control of Sales) Order, 1940 Prohibition of the sale to or purchase by a trade user except under permit of certain oils and fats specified in the order; these are animal lard, cooking fats, dripping, edible oils and margarine (a " t r a d e user" is a person using any of the specified oils and fats in the preparation of any article, other than any of such specified oils and fats). 926 218 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 Title 14 June Margarine (Addition of Borax) Order, 1940 Manufacture, sale and storage of margarine containing added borax permitted under licence. 28 June Margarine and Cooking Fats (Requisition) Order, 1940 Manufacturers of margarine and cooking fats required to place all stocks of margarine or cooking fats in their possession and all margarine and cooking fats produced after 14 July at the disposal of the Minister of Food; prohibition, except under licence, of the manufacture or sale by wholesale of margarine or cooking fats; revocation of the Margarine and Cooking Fats (Requisition) Order, 1939 (S.R. & O. 1939, No. 1384). 13 July Order amending the Rationing Order, 1939 and the Directions dated 6 January 1940, made thereunder and appointing the day on which that Order is to come into force in relation to Margarine and Cooking Fats Certain provisions of the Rationing Order to come into force in relation to margarine and cooking fats on 22 July 1940; rations of butter and margarine and cooking fats prescribed. S.R. & O. No. 982 1107 1272 1941 15 F e b . Animal Oils and Fats (Saponification and Splitting) Order, 1941 Prohibits, except under licence, the saponification or splitting of any of the home melt greases or home melt technical tallows specified in the order. 4 Sept. Lard (Licensing) Order, 1941 Provides that no-one may produce, manufacture or refine lard, or sell it by wholesale, except under licence. 11 Nov. Order prescribing Appointed Days for the Purposes of the Food (Restriction on Dealings) Order, 1941 Fixes 1 December 1941 as the date on which the Principal Order shall come into force for national butter. 195 1343 1790 Table V. Milk 1939 Title 18 Sept. Condensed Milk (Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 Maximum wholesale and retail prices fixed for condensed milk. S.R. & O. No. 1212 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1940 31 Jan. Title Milk {Retail Maximum 219 S.R. & O. No. Prices) Order, 1940 150 Schedule of maximum retail prices for liquid milk prescribed (revoked 8 February). 8 Feb. Milk {Provisional Retail Prices) Order, 1940 197 Maximum retail prices of all grades of liquid cow's milk fixed a t the level a t which such milk was sold in the week ending 31 December 1939; revokes Milk (Retail Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 150) (revoked 30 April). 30 Apr. Milk {Provisional Retail Prices) and Wales) Order, 1940 {England 638 Retail price of milk in any district in England and Wales must not exceed the price which ruled one year earlier for the same kind or description of milk in the same district; revocation of Milk (Provisional Retail Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 197). 30 May Milk 1940 {Retail Delivery) Restriction Order, 847 Retail delivery of milk prohibited before 6.30 a.m. in the Metropolitan Police district, the City of London and all towns in England and Wales with a population exceeding 250,000. 12 June Condensed Milk and Milk Powder {Control) Order, 1940 957 This Order restricts deliveries of condensed milk and milk powder by manufacturers and importers during any specified period ; restriction does not apply to the sale of condensed milk in containers not exceeding 20 ounces or to the sales of condensed milk or milk powder for use in bread and infant or invalid foods, or for use in hospitals and welfare institutions; manufacturers of chocolate, confectionery or ice cream and other trade users, except manufacturers of infant or invalid food, are restricted during any specified period in their use of condensed milk or milk powder to 50 per cent, of the total milk solids content in any product manufactured by them during the corresponding period of 1938. 27 July Cream {Control) Order, 1940 1357 Manufacture of sterilised cream prohibited; sale and purchase of any cream a t a price exceeding the average price during May 1940 prohibited. 31 Aug. Condensed Milk {Distribution) Order, 1940 Requires every trader in condensed milk to deliver in any calendar month, a t the request of any customer who purchased condensed milk from him during " t h e basic period", not more than a specified percentage of one-twelfth of the quantity of condensed milk of each description delivered during the basic period. 1606 220 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 Title S.R. & O. No. 4 Sept. Order amending the Condensed Milk and Milk Powder (Control) Order, 1940 1621 The restrictions upon the use of condensed milk and milk powder for manufacturing purposes imposed by the Principal Order are extended to bread. 4 Sept. Condensed Milk (Bulk) (Maximum Order, 1940 Prices) 1623 Schedule of maximum prices for bulk condensed milk prescribed. 25 Sept. Cream (Production and Sales) Order, 1940 1714 Manufacture, sale or purchase of any cream, or of any cream cheese or ice cream containing cream, prohibited. 25 Sept. Milk Marketing Board Functions) Order, 1940 (Modification of 1716 Pcwers of Milk Marketing Board extended and its activities enlarged, subject to the direction of the Minister of Food. Analogous Orders (Nos. 1717, 1718 and 1719) apply to the Scottish Milk Marketing Board; the Aberdeen and District Marketing Board; and the North of Scotland Marketing Board. 4 Oct. Condensed Milk Order, 1940 (Licensing and Control) 1788 Manufacture of condensed milk prohibited, except under licence. 26 Oct. Condensed Milk (Milk Content) Order, 1940 1896 Prohibits, except under licence, dealings in fullcream unsweetened condensed milk for human consumption, unless it contains not less than 7.8 per cent, by weight of milk fat nor less than 25 per cent. b y weight of all milk solids including fat. 30 Oct. Milk Powder (Licensing and Control) Order, 1940. 1912 Manufacture of milk powder prohibited, except under licence. 18 Nov. Order amending the Milk Restriction Order, 1940 (Retail Delivery) 2006 Hour changed to 7.30 a.m. and scope extended to towns with a population exceeding 10,000. 23 Nov. Ice Cream (Restriction) Order, 1940 The use of milk in the manufacture for sale of ice cream prohibited, except under licence. 2028 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1940 4 Dec. Title 221 S.R. & O. No. Synthetic Cream (Restriction) Order, 1940 2089 Prohibits use of milk or milk products, except under licence, in the manufacture for sale of synthetic cream, and the sale or purchase of milk or milk products for use in such manufacture, and the sale or purchase of synthetic cream containing milk or milk products. 1941 26 Feb. Milk Powder (Prescribed Price) Order, 1941 259 Except under licence, the sale or purchase of milk powder, except a t the prescribed prices, is prohibited. 27 Mar. Use of Milk (Restriction) Order, 1941 431 The use of milk, milk powder or condensed milk in the manufacture of biscuits, bread, buns, pastries, rolls, scones and other similar articles, ice cream, soft and curd cheese, sweetmeats (including sugar confectionery and chocolate) and synthetic cream, prohibited. 9 Apr. Sale of Milk (Restriction) Order, 1941 503 Provision made for a cut of one-seventh in the supplies of milk to non-priority consumers. 18 Apr. Milk (National Scheme) Order, 1941 541 Statutory provision made for the working of the National Milk Scheme. 9 May Order amending the Use of Milk Order, 1941 (Restriction) 657 Cakes added to the list of bakers' products in which the use of milk, condensed milk or milk powder is prohibited. 2 July General Licence under the Use of Milk (Restriction) Order, 1941 946 This licence authorises the use of milk, except condensed milk or milk powder, in the manufacture of soft cheese and curd cheese. 11 Oct. Milk (Scheme of Supply) Order, 1941 1604 Sale of Milk (Restriction) Order (S.R. & O. 1941, No. 503), as amended, revoked, and provision made for t h e supply, sale and purchase of milk in Great Britain in accordance with a prescribed scheme. 1 Nov. Condensed Milk Order, 1941 (American) Distribution Provision made for control of the sales of American condensed milk in Great Britain. 1718 222 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1941 12 Nov. Title S.R. & O. No. General Licence under the Use of (Restriction) Order, 1941 Milk 1809 Bakers authorised to use skimmed milk powder in manufacturing biscuits, bread, buns, pastries, rolls, scones, cakes, or similar articles. 19 Nov. Milk Powder 1941. {Maximum Prices) Order, 1853 Revokes the Milk Powder (Prescribed Prices) Order, 1941, as amended, and extends control of the prices of milk powder. 16 Dec. Order amending the Food {Restriction on Dealings) Order, 1941 2025 Liquid milk added to the list of specified foods in the Principal Order. 27 Dec. Milk {Diversion) Order, 1941 2126 This Order requires all suppliers to comply with the directions of the Ministry on the purchase, sale and disposal of milk ¡returns are required from suppliers setting forth their past supplies and anticipated needs of milk. Table VI. Cheese 1939 30 Dec. Title Cheddar and Order, 1939 Cheshire S.R. & O. No. Cheese {Returns) 1893 Returns required of stocks of specified cheeses of persons in possession of aggregate quantity of 25 tons or more. 1940 22 May Cheese (Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 772 Maximum first-hand wholesale and retail prices prescribed for home-produced and imported cheese. 27 July Cheese (Licensing and Control) Order, 1940 1367 Manufacture of specified cheeses prohibited except under licence; "specified cheese" is any cheese produced in the United Kingdom other t h a n soft, curd, cream or processed cheese. 1941 8 Jan. Food {Current Prices) Order, 1941 Sale of processed cheese prohibited, except under licence, a t a price exceeding that a t which similar food was sold on 2 December 1940. 23 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1941 3 May Title 223 S.R. & O. No. 626 Cheese {Rationing) Order, 1941 This Order declares cheese to be a rationed food under the Rationing Order, 1939 (S.R. & O., No. 1856); cheese ration set a t 1 ounce per week. 17 May Processed Cheese {Control and Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum 697 Controls the manufacture of and fixes maximum prices for processed cheese; manufacture of processed cheese is prohibited, except under licence. 2 July Soft Cheese and Curd Cheese Retail Prices) Order, 1941 {Maximum 945 Maximum retail prices for soft cheese and curd cheese prescribed. 24 Oct. Order amending the Food {Restrictions on Meals in Establishments) Order, 1941 1672 Amends the definitions in the Principal Order so as to exclude cheese from the specified foods which may be served as part of a main dish; it permits cheese to be served as part of a subsidiary dish in any quantity. 11 Nov. Order prescribing Appointed Days for the purposes of the Food {Restriction on Dealings) Order, 1941 1790 1 December 1941 fixed as the date on which the Principal Order shall come into force for cheese. Table VII. 1939 13 Sept. Eggs Title S.R. & O. No. Eggs {Maximum Prices) Order, 1939 1170 Wholesale and retail prices for eggs prescribed. 20 Oct. Eggs {Maximum Prices) {No. 3) Order, 1939 1477 New maximum wholesale and retail prices for eggs prescribed; in addition, the maximum prices which may be charged by an importer of eggs to a wholesaler are established. 20 Dec. Order amending the Eggs {Maximum {No. 4) Order, 1939 Prices) Maximum prices prescribed for home-produced eggs withdrawn. 1840 224 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 Title S.R. & O . No. 18 Mar. General Licence under the Acquisition of Food {Excessive Quantities) Order, 1939 393 Persons authorised to acquire eggs for domestic preservation notwithstanding the Acquisition of Food Order. 21 Mar. Frozen Eggs {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 417 Maximum prices for frozen eggs, frozen whites of eggs and frozen yolks of eggs imported into the United Kingdom prescribed. 13 July Imported Eggs {Licensing and Control) Order, 1940 1269 Sale or purchase of imported eggs prohibited except under licence. 1941 1 Jan. Egg Products {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 4 Maximum prices for specified egg products prescribed. 29 Jan. Home Produced Eggs {Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) 117 Consolidates the provisions of the previous order and its amendments controlling the prices of homeproduced eggs, reduces the maximum prices of homeproduced fresh hen eggs and fixes, for the first time, the maximum prices for home-produced duck eggs. 29 Jan. Imported 1941 Eggs {Maximum Prices) Order, 118 Consolidates the provisions of the previous order and its amendments controlling the prices of imported eggs, reduces the maximum prices of Eire fresh hen eggs and fixes, for the first time, maximum prices for . imported duck eggs. 19 Mar. Order amending the Imported Eggs mum Prices) Order, 1941 {Maxi375 This Order provides t h a t no person may sell to any other person and t h a t no person may buy an aggregate of more than five dozen eggs during any week a t a price exceeding the appropriate maximum wholesale price. 20 June Eggs {Control and Prices) Order, 1941 Revocation of previous Egg Control Orders and new provisions made for the control of sales and prices of both home-produced and imported eggs; establishes a comprehensive scheme for obtaining control over egg supplies and distribution. 888 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1941 22 Oct. Title 225 S.R. & O. No. Egg Products {Control and Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) 1655 Revokes the Egg Products (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 (S.R. & O. 1941, No. 4) and makes new provision for the control of the sale and prices of egg products. 1 Dec. Order amending the Eggs {Control and Prices) {No. 3) Order, 1941 1935 The Principal Order is amended to provide for control of the sale and prices of home-produced eggs preserved before 4 December 1941. Table VIII. Vegetables 1939 9 Sept. Title S.R. & O. No. Potatoes {Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 1149 Maximum prices for potatoes sold for human consumption prescribed. 29 Nov. Seed Potatoes ' {Maximum 1939 Prices) Order, 1724 Maximum prices for seed potatoes prescribed and compulsory top and bottom riddles fixed. 13 Dec. Potatoes {Sales by Growers) Order, 1939 1806 Certain of the regulatory powers exercised by the Potato Marketing Board are taken over by the Minister of Food; growers required to observe regulations of the Ministry of Food and must sell only to licenced buyers. 1940 8' Feb. Potatoes {1939 Crop) {Control) Order, 1940 192 Maximum and minimum growers' prices for ware and seed potatoes, maximum wholesale and retail prices for ware potatoes and maximum wholesale margins for seed potatoes, specified; Potatoes (Provisional Prices) Order, 1939, Seed Potatoes (Maximum Prices) Order, 1939, and Potatoes (Sale by Growers) Order, 1939 (S.R. & O. 1939, Nos. 1149, 1724 and 1806) revoked. 10 Feb. Potato {1939 Crop) {Charges) Order, 1940 This Order provides for the establishment of an insurance fund to be used to ensure a reasonable return to potato growers; certain specified charges on sales will be made to make up the fund. 203 226 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 Title S.R. & O. No. 2 Apr. Imported Potatoes {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 473 Maximum wholesale and retail prices for imported potatoes from any source other than the Channel Islands prescribed for specified periods. 30 Apr. New Potatoes 1940 {Maximum Prices) Order, 637 Schedules of maximum growers', wholesale and retail prices for new potatoes grown in the United Kingdom and of maximum wholesale and retail prices for new potatoes grown in the Channel Islands. 26 June Fruit and Vegetables {Canning) Order, 1940 1077 Requires canners to pack prescribed minimum filled weights of fruit and vegetables in specified containers, the dimensions and capacities of which are set out in the order; minimum weights of different varieties of fruits and vegetables, respectively, which may be packed in each of the specified containers are set out in the order; syrup densities for canned fruit prescribed. 30 July Potatoes {1940 Crop) {Control) Order, 1940 1384 Provision made for the control of the 1940 potato crop and prescribed schedules and prices set up. 31 July Potatoes {1940 Crop) {Charges) Order, 1940 1388 Prescribes the charges to be levied on sales of potatoes of the 1940 crop in order to maintain the Potato Fund. 28 Oct. Onions {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1904 First-hand, wholesale and retail prices for onions prescribed. 1941 8 Jan. Food {Current Prices) Order, 1941 23 Sale of canned and bottled vegetables prohibited, except under licence, a t a price exceeding t h a t a t which they were sold on 2 December 1940. 7 Apr. Imported Tomatoes {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 489 Maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for imported tomatoes prescribed. 30 Apr. Canned Vegetables {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for specified varieties of canned vegetables prescribed. 605 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL, 1941 10 May Title New Potatoes 1941 {Maximum 227 S.R. & O. No. Prices) Order, 659 Maximum growers', wholesale and retail prices for new potatoes prescribed; maximum prices are reduced from time to time as the season advances. 17 June Home Grown Tomatoes {Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) 858 Maximum prices for home-grown tomatoes on sale by growers, primary and secondary wholesalers, and retailers, prescribed. 17 July Green Onions 1941 {Maximum Prices) Order, 1031 Prices of green (or salad) onions controlled. 22 July Potatoes {1941 Crop) {Control) Order, 1941 1060 Control of the 1941 potato crop and maximum and minimum growers' and wholesale prices, and maximum retail prices, prescribed. 24 July Threshed Home Grown Peas {Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1081 This order provides for the control of sales and prices of threshed home-grown peas of the 1941 crop and of pea pickings. 28 July Home Grown Onions {1941 Crop) {Control) Order, 1941 1120 T h e sale of onions by a grower, except to an authorised agent, and the purchase of onions from a grower, except by an authorised agent, prohibited. 20 Aug. Order amending the Onions {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940, the Soft Fruits {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941, and the Home Grown Tomatoes {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1240 Imposes further restrictions on the sale of tomatoes and makes certain changes in the maximum price provisions for tomatoes and soft fruits and certain general amendments applicable to tomatoes, soft fruits, and onions; except under licence, a grower may sell his tomatoes only to specified classes of buyers. 27 Aug. Preservation of Vegetables and Vegetable Products {Licensing and Control) Order, 1941 Preservation of vegetables and certain specified vegetable products controlled. 1299 228 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1941 17 Oct. Title Potatoes {1941 Crop) {Charges) Order, 1941 S.R. & O. No. 1630 Provides for the imposition and recovery of certain charges in connection with the Potato Control Scheme contained in the Principal Control Order. 24 Oct. Drying of Vegetables {Licensing and Control) Order, 1941 1673 Drying of vegetables b y artificial means controlled. 28 Oct. Home Grown Carrots {1941 Crop) {Control) Order, 1941 1692 Sales of carrots of the 1941 crop controlled; growers authorised to sell only to authorised agents. 3 Nov. Home Grown Order, 1941 Leeks {Maximum Prices) 1723 Prices of home-grown leeks controlled. 6 Dec. Directions under the Food Transport Order, 1941 1971 Prescribes a route b y which potatoes going from certain specified areas to other specified areas must be sent. 1942 5 Jan. General Licence under the Home Grown Carrots {1941 Crop) {Control) Order, 1941 9 This licence authorises bunched carrots grown by the seller to be sold or bought otherwise than by retail, free from t h e restrictions imposed by t h e Principal Order. 7 Jan. Canned Fruit and Vegetables {Prohibition of Retail Sales) Order, 1942 22 Prohibits the sale of specified canned goods subject to directions, authorisations or licences by the Ministry. 15 Jan. Vegetables and Vegetable Products {Canning, Bottling and Freezing) {Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1942 Consolidates and amends previous orders controlling the canning, bottling and freezing of vegetables and vegetable products and the prices for canned vegetables; new regulations are made on the filling and contents of cans and new varieties added to the price schedules. 88 229 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL Table IX. Fruits and Preserves 1939 7 Sept. Title S.R. & O. No. Dried Fruits {Control) Order, 1939 1106 Stocks of dried fruits arriving in the United Kingdom requisitioned; returns required of stocks of dried fruit. 7 Sept. Dried Fruits {Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 1107 Prices of specified dried fruits restricted to current prices. 19 Sept. Dried Fruits {Maximum Prices) Order, 1939 1244 Wholesale and retail maximum prices for dried fruits fixed. 1940 22 J a n . Dried Fruits {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 . 93 Revocation of previous maximum prices orders (S.R. & O. 1939, Nos. 1479 and 1607); new scale of maximum prices fixed and provision made for retail price margins. 13 M a y Oranges {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 719 Prescribes a schedule of maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for oranges; oranges must be sold only by weight. 26 J u n e Fruit and Vegetables {Canning) Order, 1940 1077 Requires canners to pack prescribed minimum filled weights of fruit and vegetables in specified containers, the dimensions and capacities of which are set out in the order; minimum weights of different varieties of fruits and vegetables, respectively, which may be packed in each of the specified containers are set out in the order; syrup densities for canned fruit prescribed. 20 Aug. Jam {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1527 Quality standards prescribed for certain varieties of jams and sale of these varieties prohibited unless they conform to the specified standards; maximum retail prices prescribed for each of the varieties and quality standards. 28 Oct. Lemons {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1903 Maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for lemons prescribed. 2 Dec. Bananas {Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 Maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for bananas prescribed. 2063 230 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1940 14 Dec. Title S.R. & O. No. Apples (Home Produced) (Maximum Order, 1940 Prices) 2121 Maximum growers', wholesale and retail prices for apples grown in the United Kingdom prescribed. 1941 11 Jan. Canned 1941 Fruit (Maximum Prices) Order, 38 Maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for specified varieties of canned fruits prescribed. 11 Jan. Order amending the Food (Current Prices) Order, 1941 39 Marmalade added to the list of specified foods in the Principal Order. 13 Jan. Jam (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 41 Maximum retail prices for home-produced jam and maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for imported jam prescribed; all varieties of homeproduced jams brought under control. 12 Feb. Bitter 1941 Oranges (Maximum Prices) Order, 179 Maximum wholesale and retail prices for bitter oranges prescribed. 20 Feb. Marmalade (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 219 Maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for home-produced and imported marmalade prescribed; this order prohibits the sale of marmalade unless it conforms to one of three quality standards laid down in the order. 15 Mar. Jam, Marmalade, Syrup and Treacle (Control and Distribution) Order, 1941 353 Provides for registration of consumers for jam, marmalade, syrup and treacle. 28 Apr. Jam, Marmalade and Preserved Fruit censing and Control) Order, 1941 (Li- Manufacture of jam, marmalade, fruit pulp, fruit juice, or preserved fruit, prohibited, except under licence; exemption from this provision is given to anyone (a) using not more than 20 cwt. of fruit in the twelve months beginning 1 May 1941 or in any successive period of twelve months thereafter; (b) making cider or other apple juice products; or (c) making jam, marmalade, fruit pulp or fruit juice or preserving fruit otherwise than for sale. 591 CHRONOLOGY Of FOOD CONTROL 1941 30 Apr. Title 231 S.R. & O. No. Soft Fruits (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 607 Maximum growers', wholesale and retail prices for specified varieties of soft fruits prescribed; picking of specified fruits prohibited before a date to be fixed by the Minister of Food. 9 June Fruit Pulp (Control and Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) 814 Provides for the control of manufacture and sales of home-produced fruit pulp, and prescribes maximum prices for the different varieties. 9 June Preserves (Rationing) Order, 1941 815 Preserves declared to be a rationed food under t h e Rationing Order, 1939, as amended; "preserves" are defined as jam, marmalade, syrup and treacle. 7 Aug. Home Grown Plums Order, 1941 (Maximum Prices) 1177 Provides for the control of sales and prices of home-grown plums of the 1941 crop. 25 Aug. Order amending the Soft Fruits Prices) Order, 1941 (Maximum 1278 Provision made for the control of prices of blackberries; the use of blackberries and blackberry pulp or products prohibited, except under licence, for the preparation of other than human food. 2 Sept. Home Grown Apples Order, 1941 (Maximum Prices) 1339 New provisions made for the control of sales and prices of home-grown apples of the 1941 crop; revocation of Apples (Home-Produced) (Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 2121), as amended. 18 Oct. Imported Apples (Maximum 1941 Prices) Order, 1636 Makes provision for the control of sales and prices of imported apples. 18 Oct. Order amending the Preserves Order, 1941 (Rationing) 1638 Mincemeat included in the definition of preserves. 18 Oct. Mincemeat and Fruit Curd (Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Makes provision for control of the manufacture and prices of mincemeat and fruit curd. 1639 232 1941 4 Nov. FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Title Marmalade {Maximum Order, 1941 S.R. & O. No. Prices) {No. 2) 1735 Revokes the previous Marmalade (Maximum Prices) Order and prescribes maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for both home-produced and imported marmalade. 4 Nov. Jam {Maximum Prices) {No. 2) Order, 1941 1736 Revokes the previous Jam (Maximum Prices) Orders and prescribes maximum first-hand, wholesale and retail prices for both home-produced and imported jam; licences granted under the previous Control Order, as amended, continue in force; the provisions of the previous Control Order, as amended, are revised in minor respects, and standardised. 1942 7 Jan. 15 J a n . 21 J a n . 24 Jan. Canned Fruit and Vegetables {Prohibition of Retail Sales) Order, 1942 Prohibits the sale of specified canned fruits and vegetables from 12 January 1942. Fruit {Canning, Bottling and Freezing) {Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1942 Consolidates and amends previous orders controlling the canning, bottling and freezing of fruit and the prices of canned fruits and adds new regulations regarding the filling and content of cans. Dried Fruits {Control and Maximum Prices) Order, 1942 Revokes the previous orders as amended and makes new provision for the control of prices of dried fruits; maximum prices prescribed at all stages of sale; dried fruits classified into three price groups; prices are inclusive and replace the "built-up" structure of the previous orders. Order amending the Food {Points Rationing) Order, 1941 22 87 112 130 Dried fruits included in the Points Rationing Scheme. Table X. Fish 1939 6 Sept. Title Canned Salmon {Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 Maximum Maximum wholesale and retail prices of canned salmon established. S.R. & O. No. 1104 233 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1939 6 Sept. Title S.R. & O. No. Fish (Provisional Control) Order, 1939 1128 Wholesale dealings made subject to control of the Ministry of Food; retail sales prohibited except by a fishmonger registered with the White Fish Commission, a fish fryer similarly registered, or caterers serving fish as part of a meal; unreasonable charges prohibited (revoked 22 September). 22 Sept. Fish (Provisional Order, 1939 Conirol) (Revocation) 1254 Revokes Fish (Provisional Control) Order (S.R. & 0 . 1939, No. 1128). 14 Oct. Herrings (Maximum Prices) Order, 1939 1426 Maximum landing, coastal and inland wholesale and the retail prices of fresh, sprinkled, iced or roused herrings, and the maximum prices of kippered, bloatered, smoked or red herrings prescribed. 19 Oct. Canned Salmon (Returns) Order, 1939 1467 Returns of dealers other than retail dealers of canned salmon required. 22 Nov. Canned Fish (Returns) Order, 1939 1674 Returns required of stocks of specified canned fish. 1940 19 Feb. Fish (Chilled or Frozen) (Returns) 1940 Order, 223 Returns of stocks of chilled or frozen fish required to be made fortnightly by all persons holding such stocks in cold store and by all persons to whom such fish has been consigned or is in transit except where consigned to a retail shop. 19 June Herrings (Control of Sales) Order, 1940 1024 Prohibits, subject to directions issued by the Minister, and except under licence of the Minister, the sale or purchase of herrings on a first landing in Great Britain. 19 June Herrings (Licensing of Curers) Order, 1940 1025 Prohibits the curing of herrings, except under licence. 31 Oct. Cod Fillets (Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1927 Maximum prices for imported cod fillets prescribed. I 234 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1941 Title S.R. & O. No. 13 Jan. Order amending the Food (Current Prices) Order, 1941 43 Canned fish added to the list of specified foods in t h e Principal Order. 26 Mar. Fish Sales (Control) Order, 1941 417 Sale of fish by wholesale prohibited, except under licence; includes all sea and fresh water fish, except herrings. 29 Mar. Icelandic Cod (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 440 Maximum prices for Icelandic cod prescribed. 9 Apr. Imported Canned Pilchards and (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Herrings 502 Maximum prices prescribed for imported canned pilchards and imported canned herrings. 23 Apr. Canned Salmon 1941 (Maximum Prices) Order, 562 Revokes previous orders controlling prices of canned salmon and makes new provisions for price control; maximum wholesale and retail prices for different varieties of canned salmon prescribed. 14 May Canned Sardines (Maximum 1941 Prices) Order, 671 Maximum prices for canned sardines prescribed. 27 June Fish (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 924 Fixes maximum prices for all fish, except shellfish, salmon, trout and pickled herrings; prices fixed a t four stages of sale. 8 July Canned Fish (Control) Order, 1941 975 Canning of any fish or the sale of any canned fish by wholesale prohibited, except under licence. 25 Sept. Fish Sales (Charges) Order, 1941 1495 Provides for the imposition and recovery of certain charges in connection with the Fish Control Scheme. 12 Nov. Imported Canned Fish (Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) Revokes previous orders concerning canned fish of various kinds and makes new provision for t h e control of the prices of salmon, herrings and pilchards and brings certain other varieties of imported canned fish under price control. 1791 235 CHRONOLOGY OP FOOD CONTROL 1941 Title 12 Nov. S.R. & O. No. Foods {Points Rationing) Order, 1941 1808 Provides for the rationing of certain specified foods including several varieties of canned fish in accordance with the points scheme. 26 Nov. Order amending the Fish {Maximum {No. 2) Order, 1941 Prices) 1904 Provides for control of the prices of smoked salted fish. 26 Nov. Wet Salted Fish Order, 1941 {Licensing of Smokers) 1905 Makes provision for licensing and inspection of smokers of wet salted cod, haddock, ling, saithe, and tusk. 1942 3 Jan. Fish {Maximum Prices) Order, 1942 4 Revokes the previous Maximum Prices Order for fish and makes new provision for control of the sales and prices of all fish except shell-fish, sturgeon, salmon, trout, eels, smelt, shad and whitebait; consolidates and amends the provisions of the previous order. 7 Jan. Fish Sales {Charges) Order, 1942 16 Revokes t h e previous Fish Sales (Charges) Order and makes new provision for the imposition and recovery of certain charges in connection with the Fish Control Scheme. Table XI. Sugar, Glucose and Invert Sugar 1939 S.R. & o . No. Title 5 Sept. Sugar {Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 1047 9 Sept. Sugar {Maximum Prices) Order, 1939 1150 Maximum wholesale and retail prices set for sugar. 9 Sept. Sugar {Requisition and Control) Order, 1939 1129 Stocks of sugar requisitioned and dealers made subject to directions of the Minister of Food. 23 Sept. Liquid Glucose and Invert Sugar Wholesale Prices) Order, 1939 {Maximum Maximum wholesale prices for liquid glucose and invert sugar established. 1276 236 1939 9 Nov. FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Title Invert Sugar {Maximum Order, 1939 S.R. & O. No. Wholesale Prices) 1600 Price of liquid glucose decontrolled; new maximum wholesale prices for invert sugar prescribed; revocation of previous order. 1940 6 Jan. Directions under the Rationing Order, 1939 13 Sugar ration prescribed. 30 May Glucose {Control) Order, 1940 848 Manufacture or sale by wholesale of glucose and all dealings in any quantity of glucose exceeding 5 cwt. outside the United Kingdom prohibited except under licence; owners of any quantity of glucose exceeding 5 cwt. required to make returns of their stocks to the Ministry of Food. 30 May Glucose {Provisional Prices) Order, 1940 849 T h e sale of any glucose a t a price exceeding the average price during the four weeks immediately prior to the coming into force of this order prohibited, except under licence. 25 June Sugar {Control) Order, 1940 1068 Prohibits, except under licence, the sale, supply or purchase of sugar by a refiner or manufacturer of sugar, by a wholesaler or by any manufacturer using sugar. 11 July Sugar {Restriction of Use) Order, 1940 1237 Prohibits, except under licence, the placing of sugar on the exterior of any cake after baking; manufacture of candied peel or crystallised cherries prohibited, except drained or cut peel or glacé cherries. 30 Sept. General Licence under the Sugar {Restriction of Use) Order, 1940 1763 This licence permits, until further notice, any person to p u t sugar in the form of icing and cake ornaments and decorations on the exterior of cakes made for export; it further permits the use of these ornaments and decorations on the exterior of cakes made for consumption in the United Kingdom until 31 December 1940. 1941 13 Jan. Syrup and Treacle {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum retail prices for syrup and treacle prescribed. 42 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1941 10 Apr. 237 S.R. & O. No. Title Liquid 1941 Glucose {Maximum Prices) Order, 510 Revokes the Liquid Glucose (Maximum Wholesale Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., 1940, No. 2198), and fixes maximum prices for glucose a t various stages of sale in order to provide margins for distributing dealers. 15 Sept. Sugar Confectionery {Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) 1435 Provides for control of the sale and retail prices of sugar confectionery and for the marking of certain classified products. 8 Oct. Order amending Dealings) Order, the 1941 Food {Restriction on 1580 Adds chocolate and chocolate confectionery and sugar confectionery to the list of foods for which a licence to trade, except by retail, is required. Table XII. Tea 1939 5 Sept. Title Tea {Control) Order, 1939 S.R. & O. No. 1045 Stocks of tea requisitioned and importers made subject to directions of the Ministry of Food. 5 Sept. Tea {Provisional Prices) Order, 1939 1046 Prices of tea restricted to those current during the seven days ended 26 August. 1940 29 Jan. Tea {Provisional Prices) {Revocation) Order, 1940 131 Revocation of previous order stabilising tea prices (S.R. & O. 1939, No. 1046). 6 July Tea {Provisional Prices) Order, 1940 1180 Sale or purchase of any tea prohibited, except under licence, a t a price exceeding t h a t a t which tea of a similar description, kind or quality was sold under similar conditions of sale on 1 July 1940. 6 July Tea {Rationing) Order, 1940 The Rationing Order, 1939, and appropriate directions under the order applied to tea. 1181 238 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 1941 17 June Title S.R. & O. No. Tea (Current Prices) Order, 1941 859 Revokes the Tea (Provisional Prices) Order, 1940 (S.R. & O., No. 1180), and makes new provisions for the control of tea prices; sale of tea prohibited, except under licence, a t a price exceeding that a t which it was sold on 1 July 1940. 15 July Tea (Licensing and Control) Order, 1941 1022 Prohibits the sale of tea by wholesale, except under licence of the Minister. Table XIII. Miscellaneous 1940 Title 2 Apr. Potable Spirits (Licensing and Control) Order, 1940 S R . & o. No. 472 Manufacture of spirits from a mash of cereal grains prohibited except under licence from t h e Ministry of Food. 10 May Farina (Control and Provisional Order, 1940 Prices) 706 Prohibition, except under licence and at current prices, of all dealings in farina; farina is defined as starch made from potatoes. 9 Aug. Raw Cocoa (West Prices) Order, 1940 African) (Maximum 1458 Maximum price for West African raw cocoa beans prescribed. 16 Sept. Malt (Restriction) Order, 1940 1668 Provides that, except under licence, no maltster shall acquire any cereal for steeping, and no brewer shall acquire any malt. 2 Oct. Honey (Maximum Prices) Order, 1940 1770 Maximum prices prescribed for purchase by an importer of honey produced in certain Empire countries. 18 D e c . Starch and Dextrine (Control) Order, 1940 2144 Regulations providing for the control of starch and dextrine. 1941 29 Jan. Nuts (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum wholesale and retail prices for whole nuts, n u t kernels and desiccated coconut prescribed. 120 CHRONOLOGY OF FOOD CONTROL 1941 12 Feb. Title 239 S.R. & O. No. Vitamin Bi (Control) Order, 1941 183 The manufacture, production, sale or disposal of vitamin Bx prohibited; no person may mix vitamin Bi with wheaten flour or other substance except under licence; this order does not apply to the manufacture, production, sale or use of vitamin Bi for medical, pharmaceutical or scientific purposes. 15 Feb. Drinking Chocolate (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 196 Maximum prices for drinking chocolate on sale to a retailer and on sale by a retailer prescribed. 1 Mar. Coffee (Maximum Retail Prices) Order, 1941 272 Maximum retail prices prescribed for raw, roasted or ground coffee. 12 Mar. Cocoa Butter (Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 325 Maximum prices for cocoa butter prescribed. 16 Apr. Nut Kernels (Control and Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) 534 Maximum prices prescribed for packeted and processed nut kernels. 3 May Coffee (Returns) Order, 1941 627 Owners of more than one ton net of coffee required to make returns to the Minister of Food. 14 May Cocoa, Chocolate and Sugar Confectionery (Licensing and Control) Order, 1941 674 Prohibits, except under licence, the manufacture by way of trade or business of (a) sugar confectionery; (6) chocolate and chocolate confectionery; (c) cocoa and drinking chocolate; (d) chocolate couverture; and (e) cocoa butter. 14 May Vitamin C (Control) Order, 1941 676 Manufacture or sale of vitamin C prohibited, except under licence. 7 June Vitamin A (Control) Order, 1941 810 Manufacture or processing of vitamin A of specified potency and the use of any vitamin A prohibited, except under licence; this restriction does not apply to the use of vitamin A for medicinal, pharmaceutical or scientific purposes. 18 June Raw Cocoa (Control) Order, 1941 Sale or purchase of any raw cocoa beans held in the United Kingdom prohibited, except under licence. 865 240 1941 20 Aug. FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Title Honey {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 S.R. & O. No. 1242 Maximum prices for home-produced and imported honey prescribed. 23 Aug. Pickles and Sauces {Control and Prices) Order, 1941 Maximum 1263 Makes provision for control oí the manufacture and prices of pickles and sauces. 27 Aug. Pepper {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1298 Makes provision for control of the sales and prices of pepper. 15 Sept. Chocolate and Chocolate Confectionery {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1436 Provides for control of the sale and retail prices of chocolate and chocolate confectionery, and for the marking of certain classified products. 5 Nov. Starch Food Powders {Control) Order, 1941 1742 Makes provision for control of the manufacture and sales of cornflour, custard powder and blancmange powder.' 6 Nov. Order prescribing Appointed Days for the purposes of the Sugar Confectionery {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941, and the Chocolate and Chocolate Confectionery {Maximum Prices) Order, 1941 1754 Dates ranging from 17 November 1941 to 12 January 1942 on which the Principal Orders come into effect. 10 Dec. Starch and Dextrine {Control) Order, 1941 1991 New provisions made for control of the use, sale and purchase of starch and dextrine and for the keeping of records; the use of these products restricted for many purposes. 15 Dec. General Licence under the Food {Restriction on Dealings) Order, 1941 2022 All persons licensed by the Minister under the Starch Food Powders (Control) Order, 1941, to manufacture or blend cornflour, blancmange powder or custard powder may sell these products. 30 Dec. Saccharin {Control and Maximum Order, 1941 Prices) Provides for control of the manufacture, sales and prices of saccharin and dulcin. 2129 A P P E N D I X IV DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONING The following tables set forth the development of rationing for each important food, the food rationing situation on 12 January 1942 and the allowances of food granted to catering establishments, priority canteens and schools. The tables included are as follows: I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. Bacon and ham Butter, margarine and cooking fats Sugar Meat Tea Cheese Preserves Points ration Rationed foods (as on 12 January 1942) Allowances of food to catering establishments Allowances to schools Food supplies for priority canteens 242 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Table I. Bacon and Ham S.R. &o. No. Date i n Force Size of R a t i o n C o n t e n t of R a t i o n 1940 13 8 Jan. 3V2 oz. free of bone H a m 4 69 17 J a n . 110 25 J a n . (cooked) oz. free of bone (uncooked) and canned bacon and canned ham. Does not include chops or chawls, fore-leg knuckles hind leg knuckles or parts of shoulders known as "picnics". Cooked ham, cooked gammon, and fore hock and gammon hock freed of the ration. 7 8 oz. free of bone (cooked) oz. free of bone (uncooked) 324 8 Mar. Cooked shoulder meat excluded from ration. 897 5 June Bacon trimmings freed of ration. 903 10 June 1848 21 Oct. 1348 15 Sept. 3V2 oz. free of bone (cooked) 4 oz. free of bone (uncooked) Fore hock and gammon hock and cooked shoulder meat included in ration. 1941 4 oz. free of bone Cooked boneless streaked bacon and cooked boneless belly bacon derationed. Table II. Butter, Margarine and Cooking Fats S.R. &o. Size of R a t i o n Date in Force No. Changes in Definitions Catering establishments: per person per meal Butter Cooking fats Butter Cooking fats 1940 13 416 806 '8 Jan. 25 Mar. 3 June 272 Butter and margarine 2 oz. 22 July 6 oz. 4 oz. 8 oz. 4 oz. 1/6 oz. 1/3 oz. 1/6 oz. M oz. 1/6 oz. Margarine includes vegetarian butters (S.R. & 0 . , No. 1416, 18 August 1940). DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONING 243 Table II (continued) S.R. &o. Changes in Definitions Size of R a t i o n D a t e in Force Catering establishments: per person per meal No. Butter Cooking and mar- fats garine Butler \i oz. (1/6 oz. of butter) 1 Cooking fats 1591 2 Sept. 6 oz. 2 oz. (4 oz. of butter) 1 1/6 oz. 1735 30 Sept. 6 oz. 2 oz. (2 oz. of butter) 2146 23 Dec. 299 10 Mar. 2 oz. 6 oz. (4 oz of butter) M oz. 1/6 oz. (1/6 oz. of butter) 928 30 June 2 oz. 6 oz. (2 oz. of butter) (1/12 oz of butter) 1635 20 Oct. 1825 17 Nov. 41 12 J a n . \i oz. 1/6 oz. (1/12 oz of butter) Butter includes only butter manufactured from cows' milk. " M a r g a r i n e " does not include peanut butter. 1941 Moz. 1/6 oz. Margarine may be obtained instead of cooking fats. 7 oz. 3 oz. (2 oz. of butter) ]4, oz. 1/6 oz. (1/12 oz. of butter) Option to obtain margarine instead of cooking fats withdrawn. 1942 6 oz. 2 oz. (2 oz. of butter) Table III. Sugar S.R. &o. Size of R a t i o n Date in Force Per person No. C o n t e n t of R a t i o n Catering establishments: per person per meal 1940 13 8 Jan. 12 oz. 1/7 oz. plus 1/7 oz. for each Does not include invert hot beverage served to a sugar, glucose, molasses, customer excluding spir- syrup, treacle, or manuituous beverages. factured products containing sugar. 1 The butter-margarine ration can be taken in any proportion, providing t h a t the amount of butter taken does not exceed the specified amount. 244 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Table III (continued) S.R. &o. Date in Force No. Size of R a t i o n Per person C o n t e n t of R a t i o n Catering establishments: per person per meal Candy sugar from ration. 324 8 Mar. 757 27 May 8 oz. 2124 Week ending 22 Dec. only. 12 oz. excluded 1/10 oz. plus 1/lOoz. for each hot beverage served. 1941 ~~~^~ 928 30 June27 July only. lib. 1825 17 Nov. 12 oz. 1942 41 12 Jan. 8 oz. Table IV. Meat S.R. &o. Date i n Force No. Value of R a t i o n Retail Price Adult C o n t e n t of R a t i o n Child 1940 325 11 Mar. 415 26 Mar. Is. lOd. lid. Fresh, chilled, frozen or salted beef, mutton, lamb, veal and pork. Includes bones ordinarily sold. Does not include edible offals or any kinds of manufactured meat products containing 50 per cent. or less of meat by weight. Canned meat or canned meat products, cooked meats, galantines, meat pastes, brawn, jellied veal or sausages or any kind of manufactured meat products, including meat pies, meat pasties and meat puddings not included in ration. 526 9 Apr. Pork, cooked or uncooked, unrationed. 1645 11 Sept. Canned corned beef included in ration. 1735 30 Sept. 2s. 2d. Is. Id. 2123 16 Dec. Is. lOd. lid. 245 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONING Table IV {continued) S.R. &o. Date in Force Value of R a t i o n Retail Price Adult No. C o n t e n t of R a t i o n Child 1941 15 6 Jan. Is. 6d. 9d. 36 11 Jan. Is. 2d. 7d. 442 31 Mar. Is. Od. 6d. 786 9 June 964 7 July Offals included in ration. Pork included in ration. Offals, except ox skirts, derationed. Is. 2d. 7d. 1/7 of the ration met with canned corned beef. 29 Dec. Table V. Tea D a t e i n Force S.R. Ration &o. No. 2 oz. 9 July 1940 1181 4 oz. Week ending 22 December 1940 2124 Table VI. Cheese S.R. &o. Ratio n Date in Force Nonvegetarians No. Vegetarians and certain other persons1 Per resident per week in institutions and residential establishments Nonvegetarians 1941 626 5 May 1 oz. 8 oz. 1 oz. Vegetarians and certain groups of workers 8 oz. Soft cheese, curd cheese, blue vein cheese, processed cheese and cheese made from milk other than cows' milk excluded. » See table I X , p. 249 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN 246 Table VI (continued) S.R. &o. Date i n Force Ration No. Nonvegetarians 696 19 M a y 928 30 June 1261 25 Aug. 1992 10 Dec. Vegetarians and certain other persons1 Per resident per week in institutions and residential establishments NonVegevegetarians and certarians tain groups of workers Cheese produced in Argentina excluded. 2 oz. 3 oz. 8 oz. Catering establishments: per person per meal NonvegeVegetarian tarian 1/10 oz. 14 oz. Institutions per resident per week NonvegeVegetarian tarian 3 oz. 8 oz. 12 oz. Table VII. Preserves S.R. &o. No. D a t e in Force R a t i o n per M o n t h Content 1941 353 17 Mar. Non-statutory ration of 8 oz. announced. Consumers required to register for jam, marmalade, syrup and treacle. 815 10 June % pound Jam, marmalade, syrup and treacle. 1107 1638 28 July 20 Oct. 1 pound 1 See Table I X , p. 249 Mincemeat added to ration DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONING 247 Table Vili. Poh Points Ration S.R. &o. Date in Force No. 1941 1808 and 1823 1 Dec. Size of Ration 16 coupons C o n t e n t of R a t i o n 16 points per lb. net: Solid pack canned meats (other than corned beef, corned mutton and canned pork), including: tongues; briskets; Australian minced meat loaf; Australian or New Zealand canned rabbit; Eire stewed steak; U.S.A. luncheon meat; canned pork, canned pork sausage meat and pork sausage bulk; canned salmon, crawfish (or crayfish), lobster, crab, tunny, sardines. 12 points per lb. net: All other canned fish (mainly herrings and pilchards). 8 points per lb. net: All canned home-produced meat products (other than pastes and soups) and Eire ready meals; ready meals; meat rolls; galantines. 4 points per lb. net: Canned beans in sauce or gravy, home-produced and imported. 2015 15 Dec. 16 coupons 1942 130 26 J a n . 16 coupons Canned salmon increased to 24 points per lb.; canned pork sausage and pork sausage meat reduced to 8 points per lb. In addition to above foods 2 points per lb. net: Whole rice (excluding ground rice, flake rice and any other rice products), sago, tapioca. 2 points per lb. net: Imported dried beans (excluding seed beans), lentils and split lentils, split peas, any dry mixture comprised, in whole or in part, of dried peas, dried beans, lentils, split lentils a n d split peas. 4 points per lb. net: Imported dried peas (excluding seed peas), threshed home-grown peas (handpicked, b u t excluding seed peas). 248 ÍOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Table VIII {continued) S.R. &o. D a t e in Force Size of R a t i o n C o n t e n t of R a t i o n No. 1942 8 Feb. 23 Feb. 8 points per lb. net: All dried fruits, including evaporated fruits and dates. 20 coupons In addition to above, pointed according to size of can, approximately 16 points per lb. net: Canned fruit. 9 points per lb.. Canned tomatoes. 4 points per lb.. Peas. 9 March Alterations in points value: INCREASED: From 16 to 24 points per lb.: Tongue, brisket, Australian minced meat loaf, and Eire stewed steak, sardines. From 8 to 12 points per lb.: U.S.A. pork sausage meat or pork sausage bulk. From 12 to 20 points per can: U.S.A. luncheon meat in 12 oz. sizes (when sold sliced this meat remains a t 16 points per lb.). 9 March From 24 to 32 points per lb.: Canned salmon, grades 1 and 2 (red). REDUCED: From 4 to 2 points per lb.: Canned beans in gravy. From 2 to 1 point per lb.: Dried beans. From 8 to 6 points per lb.. Dried fruits. 249 DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONING Table IX. Rationed Foods (As on 12 January 1942) R.B. 1 R.B. 9 R.B. 7 Food R.B. 7A R.G. 33A Per week iacon and ham 4 oz. R.B. 2 R.B.9 R.B. 7 or 7A R.G. 33A (issued to child) R.B. 6 and Weekly Seaman's Per week Per week 4 oz. 6 oz. Jutter/margarine 6 oz. (not more than 2 oz. butter) Cooking fat* R.B. 8 R . B . 8A R . B . 8X R . B . 8R R.B.9 8 oz. Per coupon Per coupon Per coupon 4 oz. 2 oz. 4 oz. 15Moz. 6 oz. 3 oz. 6 oz. (any pro- (not more (not more: (not more portions) than 2 oz. than 1 oz. than 2 oz. butter) butter) butter) 2 oz. 2 oz. 2 oz. (may not be taken in any other form) 2 oz. 1 oz. 2 oz. (may not be taken in any other form) 'Vegetarians and Orthodox Jews only may take Vegetarian/ Kosher margarine in place of cooking fat. Sugar 8 oz. 8 oz. 30 oz. 8 oz. 4 oz. 8 oz. Meat Is. 2d. 7d. 120 oz. 7d. 7d. 7d. Tea retail price 2 oz. retail price 2 oz. 4 oz. retail price 2 oz. retail price 1 oz. Cheesef 3 oz. 3 oz. 4 oz. 3 oz. lj^oz. Per 4-week period Per 4-week period Per week Per week Per week Jam 8 oz. Syrup 2,oz. a t the rate of 4 oz. — Preserves (jam, marmalade, syrup, treacle or mincemeat) 1 lb. 1 lb. retail price 2 oz. 3 oz. Per 4-week period lib. (R.B. 1-general ration book; R.B. 2 = child's ration book; R.B. 6 - weekly seaman's ration book; R.B. 7 and R.B. 7A = emergency cards; R.B. 8. = 14day leave or duty card for H.M. Forces; R.B. 8A - 3-day leave or duty card; R.B. 8R - 4-week duty ration card for H.M. Forces; R.B. 8X = registration card for H.M. Forces, with monthly coupons; R.B. 9 - ration bock supplement, with monthly coupons.) tSpecial ration of 12 oz. per week for vegetarians, agricultural workers, underground miners, county roadmen, forestry workers, land drainage and catchment board workers. Women's Land Army, some railwaymen, some agricultural industry workers, canal navigation maintenance men, charcoal burners and scale repairers. 250 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Table X. Allowances of Food to Catering Establishments Food A m o u n t or Value Bacon and ham 1 For Category A 50 per cent, and for Category C 100 per cent, of average weekly quantity purchased in the 4 weeks ended 26 May 1940. New establishments or establishments showing increased demand may be authorised to obtain Category A on the basis of 4 oz. per 7 breakfasts ser e d . For Category C 2/7 oz. per person per meal served. For Category F 4 times the amount of Category A authorised. If little or no Category A authorised, such supplies as Food Executive Officer may think reasonable of Category F may be authorised. Butter/margarine M oz. (of which not more% than 1/12 oz. butter) per person per meal served. Cooking fats/margarine 1/6 oz. per person per meal served (in any desired proportions). Sugar 1/10 oz. per person per meal served, plus 1/10 oz. per hot beverage served. Meat Id. worth retail per main meal served. In establishments of a residential type whose residents habitually take only 1 meal daily in the establishment, each resident will be regarded as taking 7 additional main meals per week. Tea -. Based on previous consumption. New establishments allowed 1 lb. per 200 cups served weekly. Cheese 1/10 oz. per person per meal served (other than service canteens). For vegetarian establishments, J4 oz. per person per meal. Preserves 1/8 oz. per person per meal served. Eggs 1 consumer registration for average number of residents. Processed Eggs M lb. per 100 main meals served per 4-weekly period. Milk: Liquid For establishments able to state numbers of main meals and hot beverages served to nonresidents, 2 pints for each of the average number of residents, 2 pints for every 50 main meals (100 total meals for vegetarian establishments) and 2 pints for every 50 hot beverages served weekly to non-residents. For establishments unable to distinguish as above, 2 pints for each of the number of residents, or 2 pints for every 50 main meals and hot beverages served weekly, whichever is greater. each of the 1 Category A bacon consists of rationed bacon. Category C bacon consists of hams or gammons cooked or for cooking to be supplied free of the ration. Category F bacon consists of fat heavy bellies. Supplies of categories C and F are not always available. DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONING Food 251 A m o u n t or Value Milk: Evaporated 8.88 tins for each gallon of liquid milk authorised as above. Onions 1 consumer registration for every 14 main meals served or for each of the average number of residents, whichever is greater. For vegetarian establishments, one consumer registration for every 20 total meals served. Points Foods Establishments serving main meals: 1 point for every 3 main meals served : establishments serving subsidiary meals but not main meals: 1 point for every 6 subsidiary meals (subsidiary meals = M of the total number of meals); vegetarian establishments: 1 point for every 6 meals. Table XI. Allowances to Schools1 Food Quantity Meat 2d. (retail value) for each meal. Cheese 1/10 oz. per person per meal. Sugar 2/5 oz. per person per meal and 1/10 oz. for each hot beverage. Butter/margarine/cooking fats... . H oz. per person per meal (not more than 1/12 oz. butter and 1/6 oz. cooking fats). Preserves 1/5 oz. per person per meal. Milk for cooking 2 pints per 50 main meals with option to obtain a maximum of a further 8 pints. Canned meat, fish and beans 16 points per month per 50 meals. Cocoa powder 2 Starch food powder' 5 Rice 20 Oatmeal 10 Suet 10 Beans 24 Peas 12 . (or 6 lbs. peas and 6 lbs. lentils). Dried fruits 1 lb. per 50 main meals. Processed eggs 1 u n i t ' per 100 meals served. 1 lbs. per 1,000 main meals. Source: BOARD OP EDUCATION: Circular 1571, 12 November 1941. 2 Cornflour, custard powder and blancmange powder. • Units may be adjusted from time to time, b u t a t present 4 oz. - 1 unit. 252 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Table XII. Food Supplies for Priority Canteens Food Category A Category B Meat (per main meal served) 2d. (retail value) lMd. (retail value) Sugar (per meal) 1/5 oz. 2/15 oz. Sugar (per hot beverage) 1/5 oz. Butter/margarine (per meal) 3/8 oz. (not more than 1 / 4 oz. (not more than 1/8 oz. in the form of 1/12 oz. in the form of butter) butter) Cheese (per meal) 1/5 oz. 1/10 oz. Preserves (per meal) 1/8 oz. 1/8 oz. • 2/15 oz. Other rationed foods are allowed on the normal catering scale. Establishments in either category which, having no cooking facilities, do not serve cooked meals b u t serve previously prepared meals instead will not receive a meal allowance for sugar, b u t will receive 3/8 oz. of preserves per meal instead of the ordinary allowance. Establishments of this type in category B will also receive 1/5 oz. meal allowance of cheese instead of the normal allowance. All priority establishments can, in addition, obtain small quantities of coffee essence upon special application for use when normal coffee brewing apparatus is not available; 3 3/4 lbs. of sugar will be allowed for each gallon of coffee essence. APPENDIX V 1. RETAIL FOOD PRICE INDICES (July 1914 = 100) Meat, Bacon and Fish 1st of each m o n t h Beef, British Ribs Beef, chilled or frozen Bank Ribs Thin flank Mutton, British Mutton, frozen Bacon Legs Breast Legs Breast 1939: January.. . February.. March.... April May June July August.. .. September. October... November., December. 143 143 143 142 142 143 143 143 144 148 150 151 115 115 114 114 115 115 115 115 115 120 123 125 133 132 131 131 131 130 130 131 132 138 142 143 103 102 102 114 116 115 115 116 117 115 114 114 120 124 126 151 101 101 107 112 115 145 146 147 148 149 149 148 148 148 153 155 156 156 159 159 159 159 159 159 158 158 158 158 159 131 143 144 145 145 144 144 143 144 145 145 144 145 174 175 176 177 176 176 176 177 177 177 177 118 124 124 125 124 124 123 123 124 124 124 123 160 166 167 167 167 167 167 165 166 166 165 165 130 124 123 123 123 123 123 122 123 123 122 122 163 173 173 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 115 98 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 177 180 165 165 166 166 166 164 165 166 166 167 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 144 144 144 145 145 145 146 146 146 146 146 146 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 123 124 123 123 124 124 124 123 124 124 124 124 166 166 166 166 167 167 166 167 167 167 167 167 123 122 123 123 123 123 124 124 124 124 123 123 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 174 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 167 166 166 183 183 184 183 183 183 183 184 183 101 150 150 150 150 149 148 150 151 156 160 161 101 99 97 96 96 97 104 110 112 135 136 136 136 133 131 131 133 135 147 165 172 1940: January.. . February.. March.... April May June July August.. .. September. October... November. December. 1941: January.. . February.. March.... April May June July August.. .. September. October... November. December. 254 FOOD CONTROL IN GREAT BRITAIN Milk, Cheese and Eggs 1st of each month 1941 1940 Eggs, Eggs, Eggs, Milk Cheese Fresh Milk Cheese Fresh Milk Cheese Fresh January.. 198 February 195 March .. . 195 April .... 194 M a y .... 185 June .... 180 July .... 188 August . . 191 September 192 October. . 194 November 198 December 199 1939 125 125 124 122 121 115 114 115 116 121 126 136 199 198 197 196 195 181 219 220 221 225 227 227 175 159 118 106 109 108 133 136 158 188 210 228 144 155 162 163 161 150 148 149 149 149 150 150 204 211 222 148 177 173 182 210 232 267 312 314 255 253 252 252 244 240 247 249 251 253 255 256 293 271 231 227 227 227 200 200 200 200 200 200 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 151 150 Butter and Margarine 1940 1939 1st of each m o n t h MarMarMarButter Butter gargargarine Salt Fresh Salt i n e F r e s h Salt ine Butter Fresh January. . . . February. . . March April May June July August September. . October. . . . November. . December.. . 1941 114 116 117 115 113 109 110 112 113 127 129 129 107 111 111 110 107 102 105 107 107 127 131 132 91 91 91 92 92 92 92 92 92 93 85 94 130 130 130 129 129 128 128 128 128 129 129 129 132 132 132 132 132 132 131 132 132 132 133 133 94 94 102 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 133 133 133 133 133 133 133 134 134 134 134 134 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 Tea and Sugar (Granulated) 1st of each m o n t h January.. . February.. M a r c h . .. . April May June July August. . . September October.. . November. December. 1 1939 Tea 153 153 153 153 154 154 153 153 152 153 158 160 1940 Sugar 122 124 124 124 137 144 146 146 146 215 217 218 Tea 1941 Sugar 161 161 162 162 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 Rise in sugar since 1 September 1939 due to increased duty. 218 218 218 218 218 218 215 215 240 241 241 241 Tea 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 Sugar 1 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 255 RETAIL FOOD PRICES INDICES Flour and Bread 1939 1st of each m o n t h January.. . February.. M a r c h . .. . April May June July August. . . September. October... November. December. Flour 1940 Bread 131 131 131 130 130 130 130 127 126 130 130 130 147 147 146 146 146 146 146 143 142 145 146 146 Flour 1941 Bread 130 129 128 128 128 127 126 126 126 125 125 125 146 147 146 147 147 ' 147 147 147 146 146 146 146 Flour Bread 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 144 145 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 146 138 138 Potatoes 1st of each month April July 1939 1940 1941 118 120 121 128 135 135 200 151 133 135 138 137 138 146 150 163 167 167 296 188 161 163 171 173 176 181 185 188 190 194 199 195 182 175 168 169 Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette. 2. RETAIL PRICES OF FOOD . (Average price per lb. unless otherwise Beef, chilled Mutton, British Mutton, frozen and frozen Beef, British 1st of each month 1939: January. FebruaryMarch . April.. May. .. June. . July.. August September October. November December 1940: January... February.. March April May June July August.. . . September October. .. November. December. 1941: January. February March. April.., May. .. June. . July.. August, September October. . November December Ribs s. 2M 2Vi 2M 2M 2JÍ 2M 2M m 2M 2H 3 3 Ribs d. s. m iy m iy m m 2 2 iy 8 «M m m d. 9y2 9H 9y2 9H 9y2 9y2 9y2 9y 10 10JÍ 5 5 5 4M 4M 4M 4M 4M 4M 5M 10^ 10 Ji OM OH 9y2 m m 9% 9H 9y2 9y2 914 9y2 9y2 9y2 9y2 m 9lA 9y2 9y2 9y2 9y2 9y2 9Ì4 9U 9% 9% 9% 9% OH OH OH OH OH OH 3M m 3M 3M 3M 3M m 3M 3M 3M 3M 3JÍ 3M 3% 3~ Thin flank d. 3M 3% 1 Thin flank oM oM OH OH OH OH OH OH oH OH OH OH OH OH sy2 ¡y 5M 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Legs Breast Legs s. 3M 3JÍ 3M 3M 3M 3JÜ 3JÍ 3JÍ 3J^ 4 4 4M 4M 5M 5M sy2 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 10M 10M 10M 10M 10JÍ 10M iy2 10M 1V2 10M iy 10M 7M 8 10M 11 11 UM 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 m m m 1 0 1 0 s}-; 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 5M 1 1 1 1 1 Breast s. d. iy2 iy2 iy2 iy2 iy2 0 0 0 0 0 Bacon1 d. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4M 4^ 3 3M 3M 3M 3 2M 2M 3 3 4M 4 4 7M 8M 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 *y2 6y2 m (>y2 ey2 6y2 6M 6>i (>y2 (>y2 ty2 ¿y ey2 f>y2 m sy2 m sy2 sy2 m sy2 m The description of bacon specified for quotation is streaky, but where this kind was seldom being sold the returns relate to another kind locally representative. s Mostly Canadian or New Zealand cheese, but in some districts the returns relate to another kind locally representative. * Beginning August 1940, two brands of margarine, special and standard, were on sale at 9d. and 5d. each per lb. The figures for 1 September 1941 are averages calculated from the prices of various brands on sale at those dates. The figures of 1 July 1940 relate to prices of corresponding qualities. ìli »COIOVONONOCNNONONOND ^ ^? NONN ^^SN^V? ^ " ^ 0OWO0CNO\NCOOC0O (NI tN —' —< — — —< — ' ( N Í N C N C N ON ON « fOfOM O O N O M § VU V i V i VP* VN coNeoN CON i-ÎNr-ÎN NO) Vi i-î\ CON o o o o o o o o o o — ~- I-J\IH\ © ~ - (N CONCONCON ( N C N ^ - O O O — - ^ -< 43 Vi-Vi V i CON » N CON NO NO NO CON CON e o \ CON c o \ eoÑ CON CON co N NONONONONONONONONO t-^t->.r 3 rJ'ioiO'^'^i'rO'^^f^NONONO m fa V i V i V i \P* ViNpí V i V i V i £ 3 +•» w N^ONOOVONONONDNOVONN ss li« H i*«» r*. t-«. N^j*NjJ*N3J*N^iN^J< CO\C*^NCONcONçoN r>.NONOr>-r-.r>.ûOcoco Vi V coNco ONCOCO CN