

Quellengeschichte von Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“

Edited by

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Il progetto di una storia delle fonti (*Quellengeschichte*) della *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* prende le mosse da una duplice istanza che è indice di una scelta e di una mancanza, strettamente dipendenti l'una dall'altra.

Infatti, manca ancora una ricerca che studi, nella maniera più esauriente possibile, tutte le teorie e gli autori con cui Kant si è confrontato nel periodo della genesi e dello sviluppo della prima *Critica*; è questo un lavoro che si rivela tanto più necessario in quanto si iscrive nel silenzio kantiano in proposito. Come Kant stesso spiega nella *Reflexion* 5019, egli ha scelto di omettere dalle proprie opere tutto ciò che era a esse estraneo, reputandolo d'ostacolo alla propria autonomia intellettuale e preferendo pertanto seguire unicamente il corso delle proprie idee: „Ich habe niemand angeführt, durch dessen Lesung ich etwas gelernt habe. Ich habe Gut gefunden, alles fremde wegzulassen und meiner eignen Idee zu folgen“ (AA XXIII, 67). Se i rimandi esterni, per la cultura del tempo, potevano sembrare scontati e dunque anche permanere soltanto in *foro interno*, oggi proprio questo modo di procedere autorizza, se non addirittura legittima, la nostra opzione interpretativa, di rendere esplicito ciò che nel tempo è rimasto tacitamente presupposto e oggi quasi dimenticato.

Proprio per mostrare questo aspetto nascosto del testo kantiano, è necessario scorgere i riferimenti interni di un'opera, ricostruendo il dettato dell'autore nel quadro complessivo della sua produzione e nel rispetto della scansione temporale delle teorie. Da questo punto di vista, l'ausilio delle risorse informatiche consente oggi uno studio approfondito e anche il raggiungimento di una certezza epistemologica pressoché totale.

La comprensione, dal punto di vista dell'intensione e non solo dell'estensione, può risultare altresì favorita da una interpretazione della storia delle fonti, la *quellengeschichtliche Interpretation*, che mira a individuare non solo le occorrenze dei termini, ma anche le fonti esplicite o implicite da

cui il testo proviene – cioè autori, opere, teorie, concetti – e, pur conducendo a risultati che si attestano al livello della probabilità, apre, a nostro avviso, a nuove e più feconde possibilità di studio sulla formazione di un testo, che è lo spirito della filosofia e della sua storia, come hanno mostrato in merito i lavori pionieristici di Giorgio Tonelli. Collocandoci nella prospettiva della storia delle fonti, abbiamo pertanto scelto l'approccio epistemologicamente più rischioso e anche più debole, ma, a nostro avviso, l'unico capace di rendere conto dell'ampiezza e dello spessore del contesto culturale in cui l'opera ha conosciuto la sua gestazione, dei confronti critici e dei dibattiti ai quali il testo è rimasto intrecciato, delle domande e dei problemi a cui ha tentato di dare risposta, e ancora delle specifiche intenzioni dell'autore.

Alla duplicità dei moventi iniziali, la mancanza e la scelta di cui si è detto, corrisponde poi la duplicità degli scopi a cui il progetto mira: da un lato assicurare stabilità e rigore scientifico alle corrispondenze finora riscontrate, dall'altro aprire nuovi e originali orizzonti di indagine e di ricerca, mettendo a disposizione degli studiosi e degli appassionati un materiale utile a restituire vita e voce a un classico della filosofia in rapporto alla propria origine e, di conseguenza, alle proprie – sempre rinnovantesi – destinazioni.

Infine, per quanto riguarda il metodo della ricerca, condurremo la nostra analisi seguendo alcune categorie privilegiate di fonti: dichiarazioni dello stesso Kant, presenti nelle sue opere, nei compendi delle lezioni e nell'epistolario; fonti attestate in altri autori contemporanei; notizie provenienti dall'ambiente in cui Kant ha operato.

Per ogni fonte sarà precisato il luogo di reperimento nella *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, il passo dell'opera a cui Kant probabilmente si riferisce con le relative indicazioni bibliografiche, e da ultimo sarà svolta, a seconda dell'importanza della fonte in questione, un breve approfondimento storiografico della stessa.

L'edizione di riferimento delle seguenti note è quella dell'Accademia (*Kants gesammelte Schriften*, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Reimer e poi de Gruyter, Berlin-Leipzig 1902 ss.), abbreviata con AA (Akademie-Ausgabe) e leggibile anche in forma elettronica a cura dell'Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaften dell'Università di Bonn all'indirizzo <http://www.korpora.org/Kant/>.

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There are two main reasons for the present project of a *Quellengeschichte* of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*.

First, there are to date no exhaustive studies regarding the theories and the authors that Kant faced during the development of his first *Critique*. Given that Kant did hardly say anything on them, this project becomes more necessary.

As Kant himself explains in *Reflexion* 5019, he chose to leave out things that was extraneous to his works, because he found extraneous positions an obstacle to his own intellectual autonomy (AA XXIII, 67).

Many of them, however, are crucial for the understanding of Kant's philosophical development, and the absence of some in the *Kantforschung* might be the cause of erroneous interpretations.

That is the first reason why the aim of this *Quellengeschichte* is to provide a comprehensive collection of this hidden face of Kant's masterwork. In pursuit of this goal, our editors and scholars have attempted to follow several principles. In accordance with the high standards attained by Kant scholarship in Europe, they have pointed out the inner references of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* in order to restore the effective meaning of the extraneous source. From this point of view, the assistance of the computer resources allows nowadays to the level of epistemological certainty.

Besides, they have not only determined the occurrences of terms and syntagms, but also the explicit or implicit sources from which the text comes.

Even if it achieves only probable results, the *Quellengeschichtliche* interpretation opens the way to new and fertile investigations on the formation of the text. The second reason for the present project is that

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the most risky and weakest epistemological approach is the only one able to explain the size and the depth of the cultural context in which the work was born, the critical debates the text is referred to, the questions and the problems that it tried to solve and the author's specific purposes.

Our objective, then, is on the one hand to provide confidence and scientific rigour to the textual parallels noticed up to now, and, on the other hand to open new and original fields of inquiry, empowering instrument for giving a new meaning to a classical text in relation to its own origin and its always renovating purposes.

As regards the method of our undertaking, we have requested our contributors to give priority to sources such as (1) statements of Kant himself, taken from his works, from the synopsis of his lessons and from his letters; (2) sources certified in other contemporary author's works; (3) attestations from Kant's background.

Every source will have its own specific placement within the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, the quote Kant probably refers to with its bibliographical references, and at the end, according to the importance of the source analysed, an extensive explanatory and historiographic note.

The reference edition is the German Academy's Edition (*Kants gesammelte Schriften*, hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Reimer and de Gruyter, Berlin - Leipzig 1902 ss.), cited as AA (Akademie-Ausgabe). An electronic version was edited by the Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaften of the University of Bonn at the link <http://www.korpora.org/Kant/>

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Testo in originale: *KrV*, A VII-VIII, AA IV, 7, 2-17.

Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal in einer Gattung ihrer Erkenntnisse: daß sie durch Fragen belästigt wird, nicht beantworten kann; denn sie sind ihr durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, die sie aber auch nicht beantworten kann; denn sie übersteigen alles Vermögen der menschlichen Vernunft. [...] Dadurch aber stürzt sie sich in Dunkelheit und Widersprüche, aus welchen sie zwar abnehmen kann, daß irgendwo verborgene Irrtümer zum Grunde liegen müssen, die sie aber nicht entdecken kann.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, I, 1, 7, p. 47

I thought that the first Step towards satisfying several Enquiries, the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and sure Possession of Truths boundless Extent were the natural and undoubted Possession that most concern'd us, whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of *Being*, as if all that boundless Extent, were the natural, and undoubted Possession of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its Decisions, or that escaped its Comprehension. Thus Men, extending their inquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into those depths 'Tis no Wonder that they raise Questions and multiply Disputes, which never coming where they can find no sure Footing; 'tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions, and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect Scepticism. Whereas were the Capacities of our Understandings well considered, the Extent of our Knowledge once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the Bounds between the enlightned and dark Parts of Things; between what is, and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one, and imploy their Thoughts and Discourse with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A IX, AA IV, 8, 13-14.

Physiologie des menschlichen Verstandes.

Fonte: J.N. Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung*, vol. 1 (di 2), Leipzig, Weidmanns Erben und Reich.,

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1777, I, iv, 1, pp. 295-296.

Der Psycholog kann ben seinen Nachforschungen wohl nichts anders erwarten, als was dem Physiologen begegnet.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A XIV, AA IV, 10, 30-32.

Nur daß hier die Frage aufgeworfen wird, wie viel ich mit derselben, wenn mir aller Stoff und Beistand der Erfahrung genommen wird, etwa auszurichten hoffen dürfe.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, I, 1, 4, pp. 44-45.

If by this Enquiry into the Nature of the Understanding, I can discover the Powers thereof; *how far* they reach; to what things they are in any Degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use, to prevail with the busy Mind of Man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether; and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities. We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an Affectation of an universal Knowledge, to raise Questions, and perplex our selves and others with Disputes about Things to which our Understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or distinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happen'd) we have not any Notions at all. If we can find out, how far the Understanding can extend its view; how far it has Faculties to attain Certainty; and in what Cases it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this State.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A XXVIII-XXIX, AA IV, 12, 33-37.

Abt Terrasson sagt zwar: wenn man die Größe eines Buchs nicht nach der Zahl der Blätter, sondern nach der Zeit mißt, die man nöthig hat, es zu verstehen, so könne man von manchem Buche sagen: daß es viel kürzer sein würde, wenn es nicht so kurz wäre.

Fonte: J. Terrasson, *La philosophie applicable à tous les objets de l'esprit et de la raison*, Prault, Paris 1754, p. 146.

Je ne mesure pas la longueur d'une Livre par le nombre de ses pages, mais par le longueur du tems qu'il faut employer pour l'entendre. En ce sens il

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est assez souvent arrivé que l'ouvrage rendu un peu plus long, auroit été beaucoup plus court.

Marco Sgarbi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B X-XI, AA III, 9,7-18.

Die Mathematik ist von den frühesten Zeiten her, wohin die Geschichte der menschlichen Vernunft reicht, in dem bewundernswürdigen Volke der Griechen den sichern Weg einer Wissenschaft gegangen. Allein man darf nicht denken, daß es ihr so leicht geworden, wie der Logik, wo die Vernunft es nur mit sich selbst zu thun hat, jenen königlichen Weg zu treffen, oder vielmehr sich selbst zu bahnen; vielmehr glaube ich, daß es lange mit ihr (vornehmlich noch unter den Ägyptern) beim Herumtappen geblieben ist, und diese Umänderung einer Revolution zuzuschreiben sei, die der glückliche Einfall eines einzigen Mannes in einem Versuche zu Stande brachte, von welchem an die Bahn, die man nehmen mußte, nicht mehr zu verfehlen war, und der sichere Gang einer Wissenschaft für alle Zeiten und in unendliche Weiten eingeschlagen und vorgezeichnet war.

Fonte: Titus Lucretius Carus, *De rerum natura*, vv. 779-824.

Sed quibus ille modis coniectus materiai
fundarit terram et caelum pontique profunda,
solis lunai cursus, ex ordine ponam.
nam certe neque consilio primordia rerum
ordine se suo quaeque sagaci mente locarunt
nec quos quaeque darent motus pepigere profecto;
sed quia multa modis multis primordia rerum
ex infinito iam tempore percita plagis
ponderibusque suis consuerunt concita ferri
omnimodisque coire atque omnia pertemptare,
quae cumque inter se possent congressa creare,
propterea fit uti magnum volgata per aevom
omnigenus coetus et motus experiundo
tandem conveniant ea quae coniecta repente
magnarum rerum fiunt exordia saepe,
terrai maris et caeli generisque animantum.

Hic neque tum solis rota cerni lumine largo
altivolans poterat nec magni sidera mundi
nec mare nec caelum nec denique terra neque aër
nec similis nostris rebus res ulla videri,

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sed nova tempestas quaedam molesque coorta.
diffugere inde loci partes coepere paresque
cum paribus iungi res et discludere mundum
membraque dividere et magnas disponere partes
omnigenis e principiis, discordia quorum
intervalla vias conexus pondera plagas
concursus motus turbabat proelia miscens
propter dissimilis formas variasque figuras,
quod non omnia sic poterant coniuncta manere
nec motus inter sese dare convenientis,
hoc est, a terris altum secernere caelum,
et sorsum mare, uti secreto umore pateret,
seorsus item puri secretique aetheris ignes.

Quippe etenim primum terrai corpora quaeque,
propterea quod erant gravia et perplexa, coibant
in medio atque imas capiebant omnia sedes;
quae quanto magis inter se perplexa coibant,
tam magis expressere ea quae mare sidera solem
lunamque efficerent et magni moenia mundi;
omnia enim magis haec e levibus atque rutundis
seminibus multoque minoribus sunt elementis
quam tellus. ideo per rara foramina terrae
partibus erumpens primus se sustulit aether
ignifer et multos secum levis abstulit ignis,
non alia longe ratione ac saepe videmus,
aurea cum primum gemmantis rore per herbas
matutina rubent radiati lumina solis
exhalantque lacus nebulam fluviique perennes
ipsaque ut inter dum tellus fumare videtur;
omnia quae sursum cum conciliantur, in alto
corpore concreto subtexunt nubila caelum.
sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis aether
corpore concreto circum datus undique saepsit
et late diffusus in omnis undique partis
omnia sic avido complexu cetera saepsit.
hunc exordia sunt solis lunaeque secuta,
interutrasque globi quorum vertuntur in auris;
quae neque terra sibi adscivit nec maximus aether,
quod neque tam fuerunt gravia ut depressa sederent,
nec levia ut possent per summas labier oras,

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et tamen interutrasque ita sunt, ut corpora viva
versent et partes ut mundi totius extent;
quod genus in nobis quaedam licet in statione
membra manere, tamen cum sint ea quae
moveantur.

his igitur rebus retractis terra repente,
maxuma qua nunc se ponti plaga caerula tendit,
succidit et salso suffudit gurgite fossas.
inque dies quanto circum magis aetheris aestus
et radii solis cogebant undique terram
verberibus crebris extrema ad limina fartam
in medio ut propulsa suo condensa coiret,
tam magis expressus salsus de corpore sudor
augebat mare manando camposque natantis,
et tanto magis illa foras elapsa volabant
corpora multa vaporis et aëris altaque caeli
densabant procul a terris fulgentia templa.
sidebant campi, crescebant montibus altis
ascensus; neque enim poterant subsidere saxa
nec pariter tantundem omnes succumbere partis.

Sic igitur terrae concreto corpore pondus
constitit atque omnis mundi quasi limus in imum
confluxit gravis et subsedit funditus ut faex;
inde mare, inde aër, inde aether ignifer ipse
corporibus liquidis sunt omnia pura relictæ
et leviora aliis alia, et liquidissimus aether
atque levissimus aërias super influit auras
nec liquidum corpus turbantibus aëris auris
commiscet; sinit haec violentis omnia verti
turbatinibus, sinit incertis turbare procellis,
ipse suos ignis certo fert impete labens.
nam modice fluere atque uno posse aethera nisu
significat Pontos, mare certo quod fluit aestu
unum labendi conservans usque tenorem.

Principio genus herbarum viridemque nitorem
terra dedit circum collis camposque per omnis,
florida fulserunt viridanti prata colore,
arboribusque datumst variis exinde per auras
crescendi magnum inmissis certamen habenis.

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ut pluma atque pili primum saetaeque creantur
quadripedum membris et corpore pennipotentum,
sic nova tum tellus herbas virgultaque primum
sustulit, inde loci mortalia saecla creavit
multa modis multis varia ratione coorta.
nam neque de caelo cecidisse animalia possunt,
nec terrestria de salsis exisse lacunis.
linquitur ut merito maternum nomen adepta
terra sit, e terra quoniam sunt cuncta creata.
multaque nunc etiam existunt animalia terris
imbribus et calido solis concreta vapore;
quo minus est mirum, si tum sunt plura coorta
et maiora, nova tellure atque aethere adulta.
principio genus alituum variaeque volucres
ova relinquebant exclusae tempore verno,
folliculos ut nunc teretis aestate cicadae
lincunt sponte sua victum vitamque petentes.
tum tibi terra dedit primum mortalia saecla.
multus enim calor atque umor superabat in arvis.
hoc ubi quaeque loci regio opportuna dabatur,
crescebant uteri terram radicibus apti;
quos ubi tempore maturo pate fecerat aetas
infantum, fugiens umorem aurasque petessens,
convertebat ibi natura foramina terrae
et sucum venis cogebat fundere apertis
consimilem lactis, sicut nunc femina quaeque
cum peperit, dulci repletur lacte, quod omnis
impetus in mammas convertitur ille alimenti.
terra cibum pueris, vestem vapor, herba cubile
praebebat multa et molli lanugine abundans.
at novitas mundi nec frigora dura ciebat
nec nimios aestus nec magnis viribus auras.
omnia enim pariter crescunt et robora sumunt.

Quare etiam atque etiam maternum nomen adepta
terra tenet merito, quoniam genus ipsa creavit
humanum atque animal prope certo tempore fudit
omne quod in magnis bacchatur montibus passim,
aëriasque simul volucres variantibus formis.
sed quia finem aliquam pariendi debet habere,
destitit, ut mulier spatio defessa vetusto.

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mutat enim mundi naturam totius aetas
ex alioque alius status excipere omnia debet
nec manet ulla sui similis res: omnia migrant,
omnia commutat natura et vertere cogit.
namque aliud putrescit et aevo debile languet,
porro aliud < suc > crescit et < e > contemptibus exit.

Sic igitur mundi naturam totius aetas
mutat, et ex alio terram status excipit alter,
quod potuit nequeat, possit quod non tulit ante.

Piero Giordanetti

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B XXI, nota, AA III 14, nota.

Dieses Experiment der reinen Vernunft hat mit dem der Chemiker, welches sie mannigmal den Versuch der Reduction, im Allgemeinen aber das synthetische Verfahren nennen, viel Ähnliches. Die Analysis des Metaphysikers schied die reine Erkenntniß a priori in zwei sehr ungleichartige Elemente, nämlich die der Dinge als Erscheinungen und dann der Dinge an sich selbst. Die Dialektik verbindet beide wiederum zur Einhelligkeit mit der nothwendigen Vernunftidee des Unbedingten und findet, daß diese Einhelligkeit niemals anders, als durch jene Unterscheidung herauskomme, welche also die wahre ist.

Fonte: G. Galilei, *Lettere intorno alle macchie solari*, *Le opere di Galileo Galilei*, Firenze, 1890-1909, vol. V, p. 187.

O noi vogliamo specolando tentar di penetrar l'essenza vera ed intrinseca delle sustanze naturali; o noi vogliamo contentarci di venir in notizia d'alcune loro affezioni.

Fonte: G. Galilei, *Considerazioni intorno al discorso apologetico di Ludovico delle Colombe*, *Le opere di Galileo Galilei*, Firenze 1890-1909, vol. IV, p. 521.

Il non aver mai in se stesso provato, né osservato in altri, che cosa sia il dedurre la ragione d'una conclusione dai suoi principj veri e noti, fa che molti nelle prove loro commettono gravissimi errori; supponendo bene spesso principj men certi delle conclusioni, o prendendogli tali, che sono l'istesso che si cerca di dimostrare, e solo differente da quello ne' termini, e ne' nomi, ovvero deducendo esse conclusioni da cose, che non baimo che fare con loro, e per lo più servendosi, ma non bene, del metodo risolutivo (che bene usato è ottimo mezzo per l'invenzione) pigliano la conclusione come vera, e in vece d'andare da lei deducendo questa, e poi quella, e poi quell'altra conseguenza, sino che se n'incontri una manifesta, o per se stessa, o per essere sta-

ta dimostrata, dalla quale poi con metodo compositivo si concluda l'intento; in vece, dico, di bene usare tal gradazione, formano di loro fantasia una proposizione, che quadri immediatamente alla conclusione, che di provare intendono, e non si ritirando indietro più d'un sol erado quella prendono per vera, benché falsa, o egualmente dubbia come la conclusione, e subito fabbricano il sillogismo, che poi senza guadagno veruno ci lascia nella prima incertezza: avviene, che bene spesso, massime in questioni naturali, i trattati interi letti che si sono lasciano il lettore pieno di confusione, e con maggiore incertezza, che prima, e ingombrato di cento dubbj, mentre da un solo cerca-va di liberarsi.

Fonte: I. Newton, *Optics, or a Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflexions and Colours of Light*, London, 1730, Query 31.

As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis, ought ever to precede the method of composition. This analysis consists in making experiments and observations, and in drawing general conclusions from them by induction and admitting of no objections against the conclusions, but such as are taken from experiments, or other certain truths. For hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental philosophy. And although the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the induction is more general. And if no exception occur from phenomena, the conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any exception shall occur from experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced with such exceptions as occur. By this way of analysis we may proceed from compounds to ingredients, and from motions to the forces producing them; and in general, from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, till the argument ends in the most general. This is the method of analysis: And the synthesis consists in assuming the causes discovered, and established as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from them, and proving the explanations.

Silvia De Bianchi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 1-2, AA III, 27, 5-21.

Daß alle unsere Erkenntniß mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein Zweifel; denn wodurch sollte das Erkenntnisvermögen sonst zur Ausübung erweckt werden, geschähe es nicht durch Gegenstände, die unsere Sinne rühren und teils von selbst Vorstellungen bewirken, teils unsere Verstandes-

tätigkeit in Bewegung bringen, diese zu vergleichen, sie zu verknüpfen oder zu trennen, und so den rohen Stoff sinnlicher Eindrücke zu einer Erkenntnis der Gegenstände zu verarbeiten, die Erfahrung heißt? Der Zeit nach geht also keine Erkenntnis in uns vor der Erfahrung vorher, und mit dieser fängt alle an. Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es könnte wohl sein, daß selbst unsere Erfahrungserkenntnis ein Zusammengesetztes aus dem sei, was wir durch Eindrücke empfangen, und dem, was unser eigenes Erkenntnisvermögen (durch sinnliche Eindrücke bloß veranlaßt) aus sich selbst hergibt, welchen Zusatz wir von jenem Grundstoffe nicht eher unterscheiden, als bis lange Übung uns darauf aufmerksam und zur Absonderung desselben geschickt gemacht hat.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, II, 1, 23-24, p. 117-118.

If it shall be demanded then, *When a Man begins to have any Ideas?* I think, the true answer is, When he first has any *Sensation*. For since there appear not to be any *Ideas* in the Mind, before the Senses have conveyed any in, I conceive that *Ideas* in the Understanding, are coeval with *Sensation*; which is such an Impression or Motion, made in some part of the Body, as produces some Perception in the Understanding. 'Tis about these Impressions made on our Senses by outward Objects, that the Mind seems first to employ it self, in such Operations as we call *Perception, Remembering, Consideration, Reasoning*, etc. In time, the Mind comes to reflect on its own *Operations*, about the *Ideas* got by *Sensation*, and thereby stores it self with a new set of *Ideas*, which I call *Ideas of Reflection*. These are the *Impressions* that are made on our Senses by outward Objects that are extrinsical to the Mind; and its own *Operations*, proceeding from Powers intrinsical and proper to it self, which when reflected on by it self, become also Objects of its contemplation, are, as I have said, the *Original of all Knowledge*.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 5-6, AA III, 30, 8-12.

Lasset von eurem Erfahrungsbegriffe eines Körpers alles, was daran empirisch ist, nach und nach weg: die Farbe, die Härte oder Weiche, die Schwere, selbst die Undurchdringlichkeit, so bleibt doch der Raum übrig, den er (welcher nun ganz verschwunden ist) einnahm, und den könnt ihr nicht weglassen.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, II, 4, 1, p. 123.

That which thus hinders the approach of two Bodies, when they are moved

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one towards another, I call *Solidity*. I will not dispute, whether this acceptance of the Word *solid* be nearer to its Original Signification, than that which Mathematicians use it in: It suffices, that I think, the common Notion of *Solidity* will allow, if not justify, this use of it; but if any one think it better to call it *Impenetrability*, he has my Consent. Only I have thought the Term *Solidity*, the more proper to express this *Idea*, not only because of its vulgar use in that Sense; but also, because it carries something more of positive in it, than *Impenetrability*, which is negative, and is, perhaps, more a consequence of *Solidity*, than *Solidity* it self. This of all other, seems the *Idea* most intimately connected with, and essential to Body.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 8, AA IV, 20, 34–21,1.

Nun ist hieraus klar 1) daß durch analytische Urteile unsere Erkenntnis gar nicht erweitert werde, sondern der Begriff, den ich schon habe, aus einander gesetzt, und mir selbst verständlich gemacht werde.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 8, 7, p. 614.

He trifles with Words, who makes such a Proposition, which when it is made, contains no more than one of the Terms does, and which a Man was supposed to know before: v.g. *a Triangle hath three sides*, or *Saffron is yellow*. And this is no farther tolerable than where a Man goes to explain his Terms, to one who is supposed or declares himself not to understand him: and then *it teaches only the signification of that Word*, and the use of that Sign.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 10/B 13-14, AA IV, 22, 5-8.

Die analytischen sind zwar höchst wichtig und nötig, aber nur, um zu derjenigen Deutlichkeit der Begriffe zu gelangen, die zu einer sicheren und ausgebreiteten Synthesis, als zu einem wirklich neuen Erwerb, erforderlich ist.

KrV, B 16-17, AA III, 38, 8-12.

Einige wenige Grundsätze, welche die Geometer voraussetzen, sind zwar wirklich analytisch und beruhen auf dem Satze des Widerspruchs, sie dienen aber auch nur, wie identische Sätze, zur Kette der Methode und nicht als Prinzipien, z. B. $a = a$, das Ganze ist sich selber gleich, oder $(a + b)$ größer als

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a, d. i. das Ganze ist größer als sein Theil.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 7, 11, pp. 601-602.

As to these *General Maxims* therefore, they are as I have said of great *Use* in Disputes, to stop the *Mouths of Wranglers*; but not of much *Use* to the Discovery of unknown Truths, or to help the Mind forwards, in its search after Knowledge. For whoever began to build his Knowledge on the General Proposition, *What is, is*; or, *It is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be*: and from either of these, as from a Principle of Science, deduced a *System* of Useful Knowledge? Wrong Opinions often involving Contradictions, one of these Maxims, as a Touch-stone, may *serve* well to shew whither they lead. But yet, however fit, to lay open the Absurdity or Mistake of a Man's Reasoning or Opinion, they are of very little *Use* for enlightening the Understanding


Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 15, AA III, 37, 12-27.

Der Begriff von Zwölf ist keinesweges dadurch schon gedacht, daß ich mir bloß jene Vereinigung von Sieben und Fünf denke, und ich mag meinen Begriff von einer solchen möglichen Summe noch so lange zergliedern, so werde ich doch darin die Zwölf nicht antreffen. Man muß über diese Begriffe hinausgehen, indem man die Anschauung zu Hülfe nimmt, die einem von beiden correspondirt, etwa seine fünf Finger oder (wie Segner in seiner Arithmetik) fünf Punkte, und so nach und nach die Einheiten der in der Anschauung gegebenen Fünf zu dem Begriffe der Sieben hinzuthut. Denn ich nehme zuerst die Zahl 7, und indem ich für den Begriff der 5 die Finger meiner Hand als Anschauung zu Hülfe nehme, so thue ich die Einheiten, die ich vorher zusammennahm, um die Zahl 5 auszumachen, nun an jenem meinem Bilde nach und nach zur Zahl 7 und sehe so die Zahl 12 entspringen. Daß 5 zu 7 hinzugethan werden sollten, habe ich zwar in dem Begriff einer Summe = 7+5 gedacht, aber nicht, daß diese Summe der Zahl 12 gleich sei. Der arithmetische Satz ist also jederzeit synthetisch.

Fonte: Johann Andreas Segner, *Elementa arithmeticae et geometriae*, Cunon, Göttingen 1739, tavole finali

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Marco Sgarbi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 16-17, AA III, 38, 1-7.

Eben so wenig ist irgend ein Grundsatz der reinen Geometrie analytisch. Daß die gerade Linie zwischen zwei Punkten die kürzeste sei, ist ein synthetischer Satz. Denn mein Begriff vom Geraden enthält nichts von Größe, sondern nur eine Qualität. Der Begriff des Kürzesten kommt also gänzlich hinzu, und kann durch keine Zergliederung aus dem Begriffe der geraden Linie gezogen werden. Anschauung muß also hier zu Hülfe genommen werden, vermittelst deren allein die Synthesis möglich ist.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 8, 8, p. 614.

We can know then the Truth of two sorts of Propositions, with perfect *certainty*; the one is, of those trifling Propositions, which have a certainty in them, but 'tis but a *verbal Certainty*, but not instructive. And, secondly, we can know the Truth, and so may be *certain* in Propositions, which affirm something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex *Idea*, but not contained in it. As that *the external Angle of all Triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal Angles*, which relation

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of the outward Angle, to either of the opposite internal Angles, making no part of the complex *Idea*, signified by the name Triangle, this is a real Truth, and conveys with it instructive *real Knowledge*.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 24/B 38-39, AA III, 52, 32–53, 2.

Man kann sich niemals eine Vorstellung davon machen, daß kein Raum sei, ob man sich gleich ganz wohl denken kann, daß keine Gegenstände darin angetroffen werden. Er wird also als die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Erscheinungen, und nicht als eine von ihnen abhängende Bestimmung angesehen.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, II, 13, 21, p. 176.

Those who assert the impossibility of *Space* existing without *Matter*, must not only make Body infinite, but must also deny a power in God to annihilate any part of Matter. [...] Whoever then will allow, that God can [...] annihilate either this Book, or the Body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a *Vacuum*. For it is evident, that the Space, that was filled by the parts of the annihilated Body, will still remain, and be a Space without Body.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 127, AA III, 105, 18-22.

Der berühmte Locke hatte, aus Ermangelung dieser Betrachtung und weil er reine Begriffe des Verstandes in der Erfahrung antraf, sie auch von der Erfahrung abgeleitet, und verfuhr doch so inkonsequent, daß er damit Versuche zu Erkenntnissen wagte, die weit über alle Erfahrungsgrenze hinausgehen.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, II, 21, 60, pp. 273-274; III, 11, 16, p. 516; IV, 3, 18, p. 549; IV, 4, 14-15, pp. 569-571; IV, 10, pp. 619-630; IV, 12, 8, pp. 643-644.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 128, AA III, 106, 6-9.

Der erste dieser beiden berühmten Männer öffnete der Schwärmerei Tür

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und Tor, weil die Vernunft, wenn sie einmal Befugnisse auf ihrer Seite hat, sich nicht mehr durch unbestimmte Anpreisungen der Mäßigung in Schranken halten läßt.

Fonte: J.N. Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung*, Weidmanns Erben und Reich., Leipzig 1777, I, i, 1, p. 7.

Ich kann mit Condillac, und noch weiter mit dem hrn. Bonnet auf eine lange Strecke fortkommen; aber auf den Stellen, wo sie von dem Gefühl und Empfinden zum Bewußtwerden oder zur Apperception und zum Denken überschreiten, und dieses aus jenem erklären, was einen der wesentlichsten Punkte ihres Systems ausmacht; da deucht es mich, die Phantasie habe einen kühnen Sprung gewagt, wo der Verstand, der sich über die Gränzlinien der Deutlichkeit nicht hinauswaget, zurückbleiben muß.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 132, AA III, 108, 19-22.

Das: *Ich denke*, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches eben so viel heißt, als die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein.

KrV, A 117, nota, AA IV, 87.

Alle Vorstellungen haben eine notwendige Beziehung auf ein mögliches empirisches Bewußtsein: denn hätten sie dieses nicht, und wäre es gänzlich unmöglich, sich ihrer bewußt zu werden; so würde das soviel sagen, sie existierten gar nicht. Alles empirische Bewußtsein hat aber eine notwendige Beziehung auf ein transzendentes (vor aller besondern Erfahrung vorhergehendes) Bewußtsein, nämlich das Bewußtsein meiner selbst, als die ursprüngliche Apperception. Es ist also schlechthin notwendig, daß in meinem Erkenntnisse alles Bewußtsein zu einem Bewußtsein (meiner selbst) gehöre. [...] Der synthetische Satz: daß alles verschiedene empirische Bewußtsein in einem einigen Selbstbewußtsein verbunden sein müsse, ist der schlechthin erste und synthetische Grundsatz unseres Denkens überhaupt. Es ist aber nicht aus der Acht zu lassen, daß die bloße Vorstellung Ich in Beziehung auf alle andere (deren kollektive Einheit sie möglich macht) das transzendente Bewußtsein sei.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, II, 27, 9, p. 335.

Person [...], I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is

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inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present Sensations and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself; that which he calls *self*. [...] Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that which makes every one to be what he calls *self*, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists *personal Identity*, i.e. the sameness of a rational Being.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 208-209, AA III, 152, 25-32.

Man kann alle Erkenntniß, wodurch ich dasjenige, was zur empirischen Erkenntniß gehört, a priori erkennen und bestimmen kann, eine Anticipation nennen, und ohne Zweifel ist das die Bedeutung, in welcher Epikur seinen Ausdruck *προληψις* [*sic*] brauchte. Da aber an den Erscheinungen etwas ist, was niemals a priori erkannt wird, und welches daher auch den eigentlichen Unterschied des Empirischen von dem Erkenntniß a priori ausmacht, nämlich die Empfindung (als Materie der Wahrnehmung), so folgt, daß diese es eigentlich sei, was gar nicht anticipirt werden kann.

Fonte: Diog. Laert., *vit. philos.*, X 33.

Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἷονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τουτέστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος, οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ῥηθῆναι ἄνθρωπος εἶθὺς κατὰ πρόληψιν καὶ ὁ τύπος αὐτοῦ νοεῖται προηγουμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων. παντὶ οὖν ὀνόματι τὸ πρῶτως ὑποτεταγμένον ἐναργές ἐστι. καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐζητήσαμεν τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ μὴ πρότερον ἐγνώκειμεν αὐτό· οἷον τὸ πόρρω ἐστὼς ἵππος ἐστὶν ἢ βοῦς; δεῖ γὰρ κατὰ πρόληψιν ἐγνωκέναι ποτὲ ἵππου καὶ βοῦς μορφήν. οὐδ' ἂν ὀνομάσαμεν τι μὴ πρότερον αὐτοῦ κατὰ πρόληψιν τὸν τύπον μαθόντες. ἐναργεῖς οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ προλήψεις.

Fonte: Cic., *ND*, I 17 43-45.

Ea qui consideret quam inconsulte ac temere dicantur, venerari Epicurum et in eorum ipsorum numero de quibus haec quaestio est habere debeat. Solus enim vidit primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. quae est enim gens aut quod genus hominum quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quandam deorum, quam appellat *πρόληψιν* Epicurus id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intellegi quicquam nec quaeri nec disputari potest. quous rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo caelesti Epicuri de regula et iudicio volumi-

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ne accepimus. quod igitur fundamentum huius quaestionis est, id praeclare iactum videtis. cum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensus, intellegi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus; de quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est; esse igitur deos confitendum est. Quod quoniam fere constat inter omnis non philosophos solum sed etiam indoctos, fatemur constare illud etiam, hanc nos habere sive anticipationem, ut ante dixi, sive praenotionem deorum (sunt enim rebus novis nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus ipse πρόληψιν appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat) – hanc igitur habemus, ut deos beatos et immortales putemus. quae enim nobis natura informationem ipsorum deorum dedit, eadem insculpsit in mentibus ut eos aeternos et beatos habereamus. Quod si ita est, vere exposita illa sententia est ab Epicuro, quod beatum aeternumque sit id nec habere ipsum negotii quicquam nec exhibere alteri, itaque neque ira neque gratia teneri, quod quae talia essent inbecilla essent omnia.

Francesco Verde

Testo in originale: *KrV*, B 274-275, AA III, 190, 25-30–191, 1-16.

Der Idealismus (ich verstehe den materialen) ist die Theorie, welche das Dasein der Gegenstände im Raum außer uns entweder bloß für zweifelhaft und unerweislich, oder für falsch und unmöglich erklärt; der erstere ist der problematische des Cartesius, der nur Eine empirische Behauptung (*assertio*), nämlich: Ich bin, für ungezweifelt erklärt; der zweite ist der dogmatische des Berkeley, der den Raum mit allen den Dingen, welchen er als unabtrennliche Bedingung anhängt, für etwas, was an sich selbst unmöglich sei, und darum auch die Dinge im Raum für bloße Einbildungen erklärt. Der dogmatische Idealismus ist unvermeidlich, wenn man den Raum als Eigenschaft, die den Dingen an sich selbst zukommen soll, ansieht; denn da ist er mit allem, dem er zur Bedingung dient, ein Unding. Der Grund zu diesem Idealismus aber ist von uns in der transscendentalen Ästhetik gehoben. Der problematische, der nichts hierüber behauptet, sondern nur das Unvermögen, ein Dasein außer dem unsrigen durch unmittelbare Erfahrung zu beweisen, vorgiebt, ist vernünftig und einer gründlichen philosophischen Denkungsart gemäß: nämlich, bevor ein hinreichender Beweis gefunden worden, kein entscheidendes Urtheil zu erlauben. Der verlangte Beweis muß also darthun, daß wir von äußeren Dingen auch Erfahrung und nicht bloß Einbildung haben; welches wohl nicht anders wird gesche-

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hen können, als wenn man beweisen kann, daß selbst unsere innere dem Cartesius unbezweifelte Erfahrung nur unter Voraussetzung äußerer Erfahrung möglich sei.

Fonte: Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, AT VII, p. 25, 2-5; 10-13.

Sed mihi persuasi nihil plane esse in mundo, nullum cœlum, nullam terram, nullas mentes, nulla corpora; nonne igitur etiam me non esse? Imo certe ego eram, si quid mihi persuasi. [...] Adeo ut, omnibus satis superque pensitatis, denique statuendum sit hoc pronuntiatum, *Ego sum, ego existo*, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur, necessario esse verum.

Fonte: Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, AT VIII, pp. 6-7, 31-9.

Sic autem rejicientes illa omnia, de quibus aliquo modo possumus dubitare, ac etiam falsa esse fingentes, facile quidem supponimus nullum esse Deum, nullum coelum, nulla corpora; nosque etiam ipsos non habere manus, nec pedes, nec denique ullum corpus; non autem ideo nos, qui talia cogitamus, nihil esse: repugnat enim, ut putemus id quod cogitat, eo ipso tempore quo cogitat, non existere. Ac proinde haec cognitio, *ego cogito, ergo sum*, est omnium prima & certissima, quae cuilibet ordine philosophanti occurrat.

Manuela Mei

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 235-236/B 294-295, AA III, 202, 12-22.

Wir haben jetzt das Land des reinen Verstandes nicht allein durchreiset, und jeden Teil davon sorgfältig in Augenschein genommen, sondern es auch durchmessen, und jedem Dinge auf demselben seine Stelle bestimmt. Dieses Land aber ist eine Insel, und durch die Natur selbst in unveränderliche Grenzen eingeschlossen. Es ist das Land der Wahrheit (ein reizender Name), umgeben von einem weiten und stürmischen Ozeane, dem eigentlichen Sitze des Scheins, wo manche Nebelbank, und manches bald weschmelzende Eis neue Länder lügt, und indem es den auf Entdeckungen herumschwärmenden Seefahrer unaufhörlich mit leeren Hoffnungen täuscht, ihn in Abenteuer verflucht, von denen er niemals ablassen und sie doch auch niemals zu Ende bringen kann.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, I, 1, 6-7, pp. 46-47.

‘Tis of great use to the Sailor to know the length of his Line, though he cannot with it fathom all the depths of the Ocean. ‘Tis well he knows, that it is long enough to reach the bottom, at such Places, as are necessary to direct his Voyage, and caution him against running upon Shoals that may ruin him. Our Business here is not to know all things, but those which con-

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cern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures, whereby a rational Creature put in that State, which Man is in, in this World, may and ought to govern his Opinions, and Actions depending thereon, we need not to be troubled that some other things escape our Knowledge. [...] Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and sure Possession of Truths, that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of *Being*; as if all that boundless Extent, were the natural, and undoubted Possession of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing exempt from its Decisions, or that escaped its Comprehension.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 355, AA IV, 224, 5-7.

[...] der vermeintliche Cartesianische Schluß: *cogito, ergo sum*, in der That tautologisch ist, indem das *cogito (sum cogitans)* die Wirklichkeit unmittelbar aussagt.

Fonte: Descartes, *Discours de la méthode*, AT VI, p. 33, 16-19.

Et ayant remarqué qu'il n'y a rien du tout en cecy: *ie pense, donc ie suis*, qui m'assure que ie dis la verité, sinon que ie voy tres clairement que, pour penser, il faut estre.

Fonte: Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, AT VII, p. 27, 7-14.

Cogitare? Hic invenio: cogitatio est; haec sola a me divelli nequit. Ego sum, ego existo, certum est. Quando autem? Nempe quando cogito; nam forte etiam fieri posset, si cessarem ab omni cogitatione, ut illico totus esse desinerem. Nihil nunc amitto nisi quod necessario sit verum; sum igitur praecise tantum res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus.

Manuela Mei

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 368, AA IV, 231, 11-16.

Also ist das Dasein eines wirklichen Gegenstandes außer mir [...] niemals gerade zu in der Wahrnehmung gegeben, sondern kann nur zu dieser, welche eine Modification des inneren Sinnes ist, als äußere Ursache derselben hinzu gedacht und mithin geschlossen werden.

Fonte: Descartes, *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, AT VII, p. 34, 1-6.

[...] nam cum mihi nunc notum sit ipsamet corpora, non proprie a sensibus, vel ab imaginandi facultate, sed a solo intellectu percipi, nec ex eo per-

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cipi quod tangantur aut videantur, sed tantum ex eo quod intelligantur, aperte cognosco nihil facilius aut evidentius mea mente posse a me percipi.

Manuela Mei

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 502-503/B 530-531, AA III, 345, 12-33.

Der eleatische Zeno, ein subtiler Dialektiker, ist schon vom Plato als ein muthwilliger Sophist darüber sehr getadelt worden, daß er, um seine Kunst zu zeigen, einerlei Satz durch scheinbare Argumente zu beweisen und bald darauf durch andere, ebenso starke, wieder umzustürzen suchte. Er behauptete, Gott (vermuthlich war es bei ihm nichts als die Welt) sei weder endlich noch unendlich, er sei weder in Bewegung noch in Ruhe, sei keinem andern Dinge weder ähnlich noch unähnlich. Es schien denen, die ihn hierüber beurtheilten, er habe zwei einander widersprechende Sätze gänzlich ableugnen wollen, welches ungereimt ist. Allein ich finde nicht, daß ihm dieses mit Recht zur Last gelegt werden könne. [...] Wenn zwei einander entgegengesetzte Urtheile eine unstatthafte Bedingung voraussetzen, so fallen sie unerachtet ihres Widerstreits (der gleichwohl kein eigentlicher Widerspruch ist) alle beide weg, weil die Bedingung wegfällt, unter der allein jeder dieser Sätze gelten sollte.

Fonte: Johann Jakob Brucker, *Historia critica philosophiae*, Breitkopf, Leipzig 1742, 1, pp. 1169-1170.

Impossibile est, ut si aliquid sit, id genitum sit, vel fiat; cum enim quicquid gignitur, vel ex similibus, vel ex dissimilibus gignatur, neutrum fieri potest; in illis enim, omnia eundem ad se invicem respectum habent; in his nihil ex non ente, vel minore vel deteriore, ens, majus vel melius oriri potest. II. Ergo unum tantum ens est, et hoc Deus est. III. Ens hoc excellentissimum est, adeoque aeternum, et unum tantum. IV. Unus itaque Deus est, isque gubernat omnia, gubernari enim haut potest, quia esset alio inferior, ec posset facere, quae vellet. V. Cum unus sit, omni quoque parte similis sibi est, videndo pariter et audiendo, et reliquorum sensuum quovis. VI. Cum omni parte similis sit, rotundum esse portet, neque enim parte una hanc, aliam parte altera figura prae se serre potest. VII. Quia aeternus est, et unus, et rotundus, neque finitus est, neque infinitus. Unum enim neque enti, neque non-enti simili est. VIII. Cum tale unum sit Deus, neque moveri potest, neque immobilis est, illud enim rebus multis convenit, hoc non-enti. IX. Neque locus est, neque motus.

Marco Sgarbi

Testo in originale: Kant, *KrV*, A 604-606/B 632-634, AA III, 404, 30–405, 32.

Wenn etwas existirt, so muß auch ein schlechterdingsnotwendiges Wesen existiren. Nun existire, zum mindesten, ich selbst : also existirt ein absolutnotwendiges Wesen. Der Untersatz enthält eine Erfahrung, der Obersatz die Schlußfolge aus einer Erfahrung überhaupt auf das Dasein des Notwendigen. Also hebt der Beweis eigentlich von der Erfahrung an, mithin ist er nicht gänzlich a priori geführt, oder ontologisch [...]. Um seinen Grund recht sicher zu legen, fußt sich dieser Beweis auf Erfahrung und gibt sich dadurch das Ansehen, als sei er vom ontologischen Beweise unterschieden, der auf lauter reine Begriffe a priori sein ganzes Vertrauen setzt. Dieser Erfahrung aber bedient sich der kosmologische Beweis nur, um einen einzigen Schritt zu tun, nämlich zum Dasein eines notwendigen Wesens überhaupt. Was dieses für Eigenschaften habe, kann der empirische Beweisgrund nicht lehren, sondern da nimmt die Vernunft gänzlich von ihm Abschied und forscht hinter lauter Begriffen: was nämlich ein absolut notwendiges Wesen überhaupt für Eigenschaften haben müsse.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 10, 2-6, pp. 619-621.

I think it is beyond Question, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being*; he knows certainly, that he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt, whether he be any thing or no, I speak not to, no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince Non-entity, that it were something. [...] In the next place, Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare *nothing can no more produce any real Being*. [...] If therefore we know there is some real Being, and that Non-entity cannot produce any real Being, it is an evident demonstration, that from Eternity there has been something; Since what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning, must be produced by something else. Next, it is evident, that what had its Being and Beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too. All the Powers it has, must be owing to, and received from the same Source. This eternal Source, then, of all being must also be the Source and Original of all Power; and so *this eternal Being must be also the most powerful*. Again, a Man finds in himself *Perception*, and *Knowledge*. We have then got one step further; and we are certain now that there is not only some Being, but some knowing, intelligent Being in the World. [...] Thus, from the Consideration of our selves, and what we infallibly find in our own Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, That *there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being*.

Davide Poggi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 739/B 767, AA III, 484, 24-29.

Denn da diese eben sowohl dogmatisch sein wollen, obzwar im Verneinen, als jene im Bejahen: so findet eine Rechtfertigung *κατ' ἀνθρώπων* statt, die wider alle Beeinträchtigung sichert und einen titulirten Besitz verschafft, der keine fremde Anmaßungen scheuen darf, ob er gleich selbst *κατ' ἀληθειαν* nicht hinreichend bewiesen werden kann.

Fonte: Paul Rabe, *Dialectica et analytica*, Schlechtiger, Berlin 1703, pp. 59-63.

Cfr. Anche Christian Thomasius, *Introductio ad philosophiam auiicam*, Thomasius, Leipzig 1688, pp. 177-180. Adolf Friedrich Hoffmann, *Vernunft-Lehre*, Hoffmann, Leipzig 1737, pp. 5-6, 573, 992-993 Christian August Crusius, *Weg zur Gewissheit*, Gledtisch, Leipzig 1747, pp. 64-66, 939-940. Samuel Christian Hollmann, *Philosophia rationalis quae logica vulgo dicitur*, Vandenhoeck, Göttingen 1767, p. 650.

Marco Sgarbi

Testo in originale: *KrV*, A 854-855/B 882-883, AA III, 551, 22-29.

Wenigstens verfuhr Epikur seinerseits viel konsequenter nach seinem Sensualsystem (denn er ging mit seinen Schlüssen niemals über die Grenze der Erfahrung hinaus), als Aristoteles und Locke (vornehmlich aber der letztere) der, nachdem er alle Begriffe und Grundsätze von der Erfahrung abgeleitet hatte, so weit im Gebrauche derselben geht, daß er behauptet, man könne das Dasein Gottes und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele (obzwar beide Gegenstände ganz außer den Grenzen möglicher Erfahrung liegen) eben so evident beweisen, als irgendeinen mathematischen Lehrsatz.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, II, 21, 60, pp. 273-274.

Their aptness therefore to conclude, that they can be happy without it, is one great occasion, that Men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest absent *good*. For whilst such thoughts possess them, the Joys of a future State move them not; they have little concern or uneasiness about them; and the *will*, free from the determination of such desires, is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels in its want of, and longings after them. Change but a Man's view of these things; let him see, that Virtue and Religion are necessary to his Happiness; let him look into the future State of Bliss or Misery, and see there God, the righteous Judge, ready to *render to every Man according to his Deeds; To them who by patient continuance in well-doing, seek for Glory, and Honour, and Immortality, Eternal Life; but unto every Soul that doth Evil, Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguish*. To him, I say,

who hath a prospect of the different State of perfect Happiness or Misery that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behaviour here, the measures of Good and Evil that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For since nothing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life, can bear any proportion to the endless Happiness or exquisite Misery of an immortal Soul hereafter, Actions in his Power will have their preference, not according to the transient Pleasure, or Pain that accompanies, or follows them here, but as they serve to secure that perfect durable Happiness hereafter.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, III, 11, 16, p. 516.

I am bold to think, that *Morality is capable of demonstration*, as well as Mathematics: Since the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly Known; and so the Congruity, or Incongruity of the Things themselves, be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect Knowledge.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 3, 18, p. 549.

The *Idea* of a supreme Being, infinite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the *Idea* of our selves, as understanding, rational Beings, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered, and pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place *Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demonstration*: wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to any one that will apply himself with the same Indifferency and Attention to the one, as he does to the other of these Sciences. The *Relation* of other *Modes* may certainly be perceived, as well as those of Number and Extension: and I cannot see, why they should not also be capable of Demonstration, if due Methods were thought on to examine or pursue their Agreement or Disagreement.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 4, 14-15, pp. 570-571.

Without doubt it will be asked, If *Changelings* are something between Man and Beast, what will become of them in the other World? To which I answer, 1. It concerns me not to know or inquire. [...] But, *Secondly*, I answer, The force of these Men's Question (*viz.* will you deprive *Changelings* of a future state?) is founded on one of these two Suppositions, which are both false. The first is, That all Things that have the outward Shape and Appearance of a Man, must necessarily be designed to an immortal future Being, after this Life. Or, secondly, That whatever is of human Birth must be so. Take away these Imaginations, and such Questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire then those, who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themselves and *Changelings*, the Essence in both being exactly the same, to consider, whether they can imagine Immortality annexed to any outward shape of the Body; the very proposing it, is, I

suppose, enough to make them disown it. No one yet, that ever I heard of, how much soever immersed in Matter, allow'd that Excellency to any Figure of the gross sensible outward parts, as to affirm eternal Life due to it, or a necessary consequence of it; or that any mass of Matter should, after its dissolution here, be again restored hereafter to an everlasting state of Sense, Perception, and Knowledge, only because it was moulded into this or that Figure, and had such a particular frame of its visible parts. Such an Opinion as this, placing Immortality in a certain superficial Figure, turns out of doors all consideration of Soul or Spirit; upon whose account alone some corporeal Beings have hitherto been concluded immortal, and others not. This is to attribute more to the outside than inside of Things; and to place the Excellency of a Man more in the external Shape of his Body, than internal Perfections of his Soul.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 10, pp. 619-630.

Fonte: Locke, *Essay*, IV, 12, 8, pp. 643-644.

This gave me the confidence to advance that Conjecture, [...] That *Morality is capable of Demonstration*, as well as Mathematicks. For the *Ideas* that Ethics are conversant about, being all real Essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another; so far as we can find their Habitues and Relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general Truths; and I doubt not but, if a right method were taken, a great part of Morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering Man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the Truth of Propositions in Mathematics, which have been demonstrated to him.

Davide Poggi