KRONOS

PHILOSOPHICAL JOURNAL

VOLUME VI / 2017 / ISSN 2392-0963

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free at www.kronos.org.pl

Published by Fundacja Augusta hr. Cieszkowskiego
ul. Mianowskiego 15/65, 02-044 Warszawa, Poland

ISSN 2392-0963 (print)
ISSN 1899-9484 (online)

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

A teacher who expects continuous approval and docile subservience from his students is not a good teacher. Also, a student who wants to remain a disciple, still digesting his master's ideas, does not reciprocate the efforts the latter put into him. Thus, the risk of apostasy is embedded in teaching – the more eminent the thinker, the more likely is the desertion of his closest disciples whose careers might follow a variety of paths. They do not have to swim as one school; they can be divided by individual businesses, values or aesthetic preferences. Their reasons for breaking with the master are usually different: some reject his attitude as not radical enough and prefer to seek their own solutions, while others, contrarily, consider it an exaggerated or unnecessary radicalism. However, what binds them together, what determines the fact that they can be seen as one, is their idiosyncrasy about the master. If they talk about him, they most often remember him badly, constantly denying whatever they owe him. They try to think themselves up from scratch, to recreate themselves from the ashes of the old world, the scraps of recollected and distorted conversations or images. They hold a "witches' Sabbath", inviting their own students and drumming into their heads the simplified version of the master's teachings. They are unable to think of the old times without regret. Although resentment constitutes a powerful weapon in their fight against the demons of the past, the dynamics of generational conflict makes them overlook a very important thing: that they cannot discard what they have learned and that, whether they want it or not, it somehow belongs to them, even if they try to disown it. They attribute the clumsiness of their own thinking to the teachings of their master, blaming him for all the evil of the world as well as for their personal disappointments and creative failures. At the same time, they happen to be extremely petty and scrupulous. With their calumnies and untimely doubts about the eminence of the master's work, they contribute to h i s ideas, h i s concepts. But their own work (and this feature seems common to all of them) lacks the fusillade of thoughts that they found in the writings of their teacher; it lacks that thrilling atmosphere of complications in which the first intuitions and understatements begin to hatch. Their books suffer from hopeless secondariness. They always cross the finish line second, just behind the tortoise that they cannot overtake.

The apostates use the rhetoric of independence. Underlying their will to shun good advice or to free themselves from the burden of authority is the desire to overthrow that authority or at least to "undermine" it. They tend to ignore the warnings coming from everywhere, forgetting that, in fact, they are cutting the branch they are sitting on. Because authority is "*more than advice and less than command, an advice which one cannot safely ignore*" (Hannah Arendt).

The articles collected in this volume of *Kronos* and devoted to the work of Martin Heidegger differ in the attitude the authors take towards Heidegger's thought. Some point to the ambivalent dimension of his work, whilst others can be regarded as an apology or a "repetition". There is plenty to choose from. Taken as a whole, they are a gesture of προσκύνησις and a great tribute paid to the most outstanding philosopher of the twentieth century.

Piotr Nowak
Deputy Editor-in-Chief

Amsterdam/New York, NY 2014. XIV, 104 pp. (Value Inquiry Book Series 271)
ISBN: 978-90-420-3820-2 Paper €27,-/US$38,-
ISBN: 978-94-012-1067-6 E-Book €24,-/US$34,-
Online info: http://www.rodopi.nl/senj.asp?BookId=VIBS+271

Ernst Jünger

SKULLS AND REEFS

1

"What sort of foolishness are you up to, monsieur Ludovico?" Such was the question Cardinal Ippolito d'Este asked his protégé, Ariosto, upon reading his *Orlando Furioso.*

Along with Byron's poetry, Ariosto's *Furioso* was one of my favorite works as a youth. I became acquainted with it at fourteen or fifteen years of age through the impressive folio edition illustrated by Dore. Hermann Kurz did the translation. I was less satisfied with the pocket-size Reclam edition I carried along later, translated by Gries. I read it in the spring of 1917 on the Hindenburg Line and brought the two slim volumes back home with me too. I seem to remember reading more in war years than at other times – and I was not alone in this.

Reading Ariosto is dangerous – Cervantes knew this too. Above all, a literary education creates standards that reality cannot meet; the playing field is too large.

The skeptical question posed by Ippolito d'Este is not only a cardinal's question; it is also a question of cardinal importance. I have often reflected on it, even while working on this text. Endless questions arise about why I have indulged myself in this or that matter – and about what one can expect to hear in response to such questions. And who bears the responsibility for them.

2

We hardly need to fear that, as they used to say, the Epicurean swine will break into the gardens of poppy and hemp. The Epicurean is not inclined to excess – it would interfere with enjoyment. He takes his time enjoying things and thus represents the opposite of the addict, who suffers over the passage of time. He has nothing in common with the

chain-smoker – he is more like the gourmet who concludes a good meal with an imported cigar. He masters his enjoyment and keeps it under control, less for the sake of discipline as for the expansion of enjoyment itself.

Old Chinese men enjoyed a bowl of opium now and then in a similar fashion, and they may still exist today. Imagine that after a meal of many courses we were not content with merely a stroll on the terrace or a walk in the park, but were to pass beyond the hedges of time and space and therefore enlarge the field of the possible. This is more than food and drink, more even than wine and good cigars; it leads much further.

From this perspective, after a certain age (say, from retirement on) we should no longer be restricted by boundaries: those approaching the boundless should set their boundaries much further afield. Not everyone can build like Faust in his old age, but we are all free to devise plans in that unmeasured space

This applies, above all, to that final stretch in which the *ultima linea rerum*, the finish line, approaches and becomes distinct. There are old vintners who live for months and even years on nothing but bread and wine. Konrad Weiss has paid homage to their lives.

To alleviate the pain of the dying person whose time is quickly coming to an end is understandable, though insufficient. To his lonely deathbed we should bring one last time the fullness of the world.

In the hour of death, narcotics are unsuitable. We should offer gifts that expand and sharpen consciousness. If we harbor even the slightest suspicion that there may be some form of continued existence – and there are reasons to believe this might be the case – we should remain alert. For we must assume that the passage has distinct qualities.

Leaving this aside, many people place special value on their individual death as well, and do not wish to be cheated of it. For the captain it is a point of honor to be the last man to abandon ship.

And finally, we should consider that painkillers may not only eliminate the pain of death, but also its euphoria. Perhaps the dying chords of consciousness include important messages: receptions, transmissions. Death masks retain their reflection.

Brightly colored is the plumage of Aesclepius' rooster.

3

A taste for spiritual adventure appeals to the highest and most sophisticated consciousness and is to be conceived independent of enjoyment. All enjoyment is essentially spiritual. It is there that the inexhaustible source rests, giving rise to desire that no satisfaction fulfills. "And in enjoyment I crave desire."[1]

Every advertisement knows this connection. When we receive our gardening catalogs in the winter, their images awaken a livelier satisfaction than do the summer flowers that bloom in their beds. In nature, as well, more artifice and cleverness is spent on the display than on its consummation. Witness the pattern on the wings of a butterfly or the plumage of a bird of paradise.

[1] J. W. v. Goethe, *Faust: Eine Tragödie*, line 3250.

Hunger of the spirit is insatiable – of the body, narrowly limited. If a Roman glutton like Vitellius devoured three large meals each day and rid himself of excess food by vomiting, we can assume discord between eyes and gullet, even if of a rather primitive variety. This discord has its scale; the eye cries to the spirit for help when the visible world fails to satisfy.

St. Anthony was more capable of enjoyment than Vitellius and others like him – this was not on account of his stronger physique or greater wealth, but rather a superior spirituality. In Flaubert's *Temptation*, his imagination fills tables with dishes that are fresher and more vibrant than the ones produced by gardeners and cooks, nay, even by painters. In his hut in the desert, Anthony caught a glimpse of the abundance overflowing from the source – it is there that such abundance instantaneously crystallizes into appearance. That is why the ascetic is richer than Caesar, master of the visible world though addicted to enjoyment.

4

I tried to depict the spiritual adventurer as a type like the figure of Antonio Peri: "Antonio was scarcely to be distinguished at first sight from the other artisans that one often saw busily at work throughout Heliopolis. Beneath this outward appearance was hidden something else – he was a dream-catcher. He caught dreams the way others hunt butterflies with nets. On Sundays and holidays he did not go to the islands, nor did he frequent the taverns on the waterfront at Pagos. He locked himself away in his studio and departed to the land of dreams. It is there that, according to him, every country and undiscovered island was woven into the tapestry. Drugs served as keys to enter the chambers and grottoes of that world.

"He also drank wine, but never for the sake of enjoyment. He thirsted after a cocktail, equal parts adventure and knowledge. He did not travel to settle in unknown regions, but as a geographer of those lands. Wine was merely one key among many others, one of the doors to the labyrinth.

"Perhaps it was only his methodology that allowed him to bypass catastrophes and deliria. He had many run-ins with such obstacles. He was convinced that every drug contained a formula that granted access to certain riddles of the world. What is more, he thought it possible to decipher the hierarchy of these formulas. Like the philosopher's stone, the highest must reveal the secrets of the universe.

"He was looking for the master key. But isn't the supreme mystery necessarily lethal?"

That it meant something else, this ceaseless quest for adventure, for remote and strange places, would not be revealed until the final attempt. Antonio fell into a radioactive net, was mortally injured with serious burns. In his torment he refused morphine. It was not enjoyment nor was it adventure that led him to make his departures. Curiosity, certainly, but a curiosity that was sublimated to the point where he finally stood before the right portal. Here a key is unnecessary: it opens of its own accord.

5

Every enjoyment lives through the spirit. And every adventure lives through the proximity to death around which it revolves.

I recall a painting I saw when I had scarcely learned to read, entitled *The Adventurer*: a sailor, a lone conquistador, steps ashore on an unknown island. Before him looms a frightful mountain, his ship in the background. He is alone.

That was roughly how it was. *The Adventurer* was at the time one of those famous canvasses constantly surrounded by a pack of admirers at exhibitions. It is a prime example of the art of narrative painting, which culminated in Böcklin's *Isle of the Dead* (1882).

The taste for this type of work has been lost; today this painting is gathering dust somewhere, if it has even survived. Its character was symbolic: the ship from which the man had disembarked, the beach upon which he steps, the tonal quality incorporating fear and expectation. Böcklin was more profound, and in Munch the same theme is already treated from a different perspective. An entirely different solution is on offer today. Now we possess a few great works in which the nearness to death is not directly portrayed, but rather saturates the work entirely.

I have retained only a few specific details concerning this *Adventurer*: the beach was strewn with the bones and skulls of those who shared in the same failed venture. I noted this and saw what the painter was getting at: that alighting here was indeed seductive, but dangerous. These are the bones of your predecessors, of your forefathers, and in the end they are your own. Time's beach is littered with them. If its waves bear us toward them, if we step ashore, we stride across them. Adventure is life concentrated; our breath quickens, death crowds closer.

6

The skull and crossbones was for a long time a legitimate symbol, not only on crypts and in cemeteries but in art as well. It was a favorite motif of the Baroque, along with the hourglass and the sickle. Today it would seem primitive to use it in this sense; its significance is rather like that of a traffic sign. Already the painter's use of it in *The Adventurer* shows him succumbing to the temptation of a literary allusion.

We wonder: how is it that an object such as the skull and crossbones was once used as a theme of high art, that it still makes sense to us today as such; yet this same object, when offered up to us by our contemporaries, no longer satisfies us and instead perhaps even strikes us as comical.

Here it is worth noting that every object can both gain and lose the force of a symbol. Its role is that of a scope through which the eye views its target. If the aim is true, the radiance of the target will be transferred to the sight. And this radiance persists as in images of old, "it glows for a long time after." Not only has the beauty of the meaning been transferred, but a shimmer of the imperishable as well. Aphrodite was not merely what the Beloved stood for – she was represented by her in the embrace, and in it made nameless.

Today, we are still deeply moved by the death's head depicted by the old masters. Through it, through its eye sockets death was seen – communicated by atoms.

The skull and crossbones of *The Adventurer* is, in contrast, a mere prop. There a symbol, here an ornament; there myth, here allegory. Approach there, distance here.

It is worth noting as well that the contemporary artist, even in terms of pure painting, does not achieve the mastery of the old masters, although he may be at the height of his craft. The satisfaction and the acknowledgement that the spectator gives to artistic

achievement, and on which the artist's fame depends, quickly disappears. Although he didn't know it, the poor fellow was a counterfeiter. The fake was accepted in good faith, but sooner or later the truth will out: there's nothing behind it. The bank note has no backing – here the pretense of paper, there the reserve of gold; here appearance, there reality.

Often enough, fakes succeed through deception, and only a few experts immediately see through them. "Seeing through" them in such cases means: recognizing that nothing stands behind them.

7

Attempting to achieve an effect with a skull became absurd around the advent of the x-ray. Here we should perhaps explain in more detail what we mean: we are commenting not on the physics of vision but on the fundamental nature of optics – to see a type of humanity that in its genesis is new and quasi-instinctive, The x-rays arise as an empirical consequence of a fluctuation in form.

Asserting itself in physics and its array of instruments, this fundamental alteration entails not only a rarified air in which it is difficult to breathe, but also a depth where matter becomes denser and more illuminating. Physics stands to gain from both.

More importantly, the relation to death also changes, and this change calls for expression in art and not merely faith and thought. This too explains why the skull and crossbones, like so many other symbols, is no longer "credible."

It is a question of perspective, not substance. "In itself," the power of the skull remains unbroken, yet we no longer see anything through the sight it affords. What's more, bear in mind that we are undergoing a general fading away of symbols. Only a few powers will withstand this – perhaps only Faust's Mothers.

Art must take this into account and it is in fact doing so – above all negatively (*ex negativo*), but with tentative feelers. The devaluation of the classic symbols is a characteristic of every change in style. In a Great Transition, however, it is not merely individual symbols that are at stake. It concerns the entire world of symbols. Here we are reminded of what has been said of "whitening" in my work, *Time's Wall*. It is not ultimately to be understood as a nihilistic act, but rather as a counter-offensive. White is not colorless; it is the refuge of the polychrome world.

8

Casting an eye back at our example, let us imagine one of the majestic limestone cliffs that looms over the French Riviera or the verdant grasslands of the Danube valley. Or we could think of the cliffs composed of cretaceous rock on the coast of Rügen or the coral reefs in the Pacific Ocean.

In such places, death no longer glares at us as an isolated skull, but as monstrous piles of sedimentation. All of this was the skeletal form of life: snails and clams, the shells of diatoms, corals that had been deposited for millenia before arriving at a higher degree of petrification. Primordial waters spun out forms that bore the stamp of terrestrial pressure more clearly, and that were annihilated when that pressure became a little too great. Then, breaking apart again with the surging and receding waters until the molecules, whose lives are being incessantly robbed, are resurrected in circles, spirals, and symmetries.

A game for the limestone mirror, only one among many. The carboniferous forest is layered over, and what it drank in of the sun it exhales in the fires of the technological world. That changes from eon to eon – like ice crystals formed at the moment of freezing, whether they melt or crystallize, they remain as similar as images in a mirror.

All of this slumbers in the limestone cliffs, waiting for art to imbue it with life.

9

A new relationship to death is looming. That is more important than all the achievements of the technological world. A Great Transition.

Not only is the limestone cliff alive, so too the desert. Moses knew it. The snake becomes a rod – the rod strikes water from the rock. In our deserts also there is a thirst for this water; they are filled with those who thirst. And this thirst becomes stronger when man is satiated.

Presently the State, that "dragon with a thousand scales," appears to be the only being still inhabiting the desert, which it furnishes with its mirages. The greatest monopoly is that of dreams; priests have known this since time immemorial.

10

It counts as a privilege of the gods to abide in the image world and only rarely to descend to the world of appearances. Then the reflection fills with color.

We have been granted less. We divine the richness of the image world in its colorful reflection and seldom step, as we do in dreams, from the world of appearances into that other one.

As a native of a landlocked country, I first became acquainted with the sea by hearsay. Seeing waves for the first time, I was not overly impressed. Whether they are high or the sea calm, a curtain generally hides the stage. It rises only with the prospect of a drowning, with the surge bearing down massively. Hokusai painted waves like these. That is how you have to view the limestone cliff.

When the "black man", about whom I will say more below, deflowered his girlfriend and asked her how she liked it, she responded: "I imagined it would be nicer". This bothered him, although it was to be expected.

Crime, too, has an imaginary allure. A bank robbery, like the ones depicted in novels or the movies, can seduce a mind that has a taste for finesse and clever ploys in which a plan must be executed precisely to the second. In actual practice, things go wrong or totally fall apart. After Raskolnikov had slain the old usurer, whom he thought of as some worthless vermin, her devoted sister appears in the hall, and he's forced to kill her too.

Moreover, it's one of the more brilliant aspects of the novel that the imaginary part of the crime is stripped of all guilt. Considering that the act consisted of a double murder, carried out in the basest fashion, "with an axe," the sentence is mild. This got under the other prisoners' skin – they thought the "young master" got off too easily.

11

In ecstasy, as well, disappointment does not fail to make an appearance. Disappointment is apparent less in the relation of guilt to sin than in the context of an expanded imputation

in which guilt and sin certainly still play a part. Ecstasy and crime are a neighboring, sometimes hard to isolate phenomena, especially at the margins.

In ecstasy, whether it has the effect of a narcotic or a stimulant, time is consumed in advance, governed differently, borrowed. It comes expected; the flood is followed by ebb, colors by pallor, the world becomes gray, boring.

It is still possible to integrate this into our understanding of physiology and psychology, although these fields are already threatened by catastrophe. At the same time, it could come down to a Promethean theft of light and image, a foray into the realm of the gods – time is there, as well, even if the strides are more powerful and longer and leave massive tracks. Dangers exist there, too; the statement, "Once, I lived like the gods," comes with a price.

12

The time I have given myself for this theme is up, even exceeded. It developed from an essay that I dedicated to Mircea Eliade on his 60th birthday ("Drugs and Ecstasy", 1968). A second part was supposed to address particular experiences; but it went in different directions. I could systematize it more clearly and I am thinking of doing so in view of a recurring series of concepts; for the reader it makes more sense to follow the text as it unfolds, page by page.

The topic could be expanded, though not exhausted – the title suggests as much. It stands for every (but especially musical) development and for life in general. The real work was directed less at writing a book as it was at constructing an apparatus, a vehicle whose passenger disembarks a different person from the one who climbed in. This applies to the author above all: meditations *ad usum proprium*, for his own use. Readers may take part according to their own tastes or needs.

translated by Joel Feinberg

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

The work from which this passage is drawn, *Approaches: Drugs and Ecstasy*, is a formally complex piece of writing, consisting of autobiographical reminiscences, reflections on the cultural, historical and scientific dimensions of drug use, and speculations of a more metaphysical and mythological nature. In describing the literary and thematic diversity of the work, one commentator[2] has noted that Jünger's descriptions of drug use and its associated cultures in the Orient & Occident, in East Asia and the Americas build upon one another through association and anecdote rather than the application of any system.

[2] U. Baron, "Jüngers Erzählung Besuch auf Godenholm (1952). Annäherungen an Drogen und Rausch (1970)", in *Ernst Jünger im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. H.-H. Müller, H. Segeberg (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1995), 203.

Perhaps most crucial for Jünger's discussion of drugs, intoxication, and ecstasy is the personal experiences he gained over many decades, and which found expression in numerous autobiographical passages throughout his writings. Already in his early essay, "War as Inner Experience" (1922), he speaks of gaining access to a hidden side of reality via dreams, bouts of ecstatic intoxication, and the experience of fright as a child. Decades of experience with alcohol, tobacco, marijuana, cocaine, opium, and LSD, amongst other drugs receive their fullest reflection finally in this work.

Approaches was first published in German in 1970 and grew out of a shorter essay originally published in the journal *Antaios* that Jünger co-edited with Mircea Eliade. This original short essay has been translated into English as "Drugs and Ecstasy," appearing in the Festschrift, *Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade*, edited by Kitagawa & Long, pp. 327-342 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969). In 2000, a further section entitled "The Plant as Autonomous Power" was translated by Stephen Slater and appeared in *The Entheogen Review*, vol. VIII/1, pp. 34-36. There is some variation in the way previous translators have rendered the key German term *Rausch* (ecstasy, intoxication, inebriation). In general, I have followed the unnamed translator of the original essay and have rendered it as 'ecstasy,' as this best captures the wide compass that Jünger gives this term.

Krzysztof Michalski

MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF TRUTH[1]

What is the being of being? – τί τὸ ὄν – this is a question that has been "asked for a very long time, and today, a question which will be asked forever, and will always worry us..."[2] The above conviction of Aristotle is, from Heidegger's point of view, an accurate prediction of the destinies of European philosophy. A philosopher, Heidegger says, is he who asks about being – even if he is unaware of it.

Ordinarily, however we understand the word "philosopher" otherwise; we apply it to someone who is searching for truth, who "loves wisdom." Heidegger's answer to the question: what is a philosopher?, seems to be different from the common one; yet, his reflection on the history of European philosophy concerns the same persons whom we usually call philosophers.

Then what is the relationship between the searching for truth and the searching for the sense of being?

We usually conceive the "searching for truth" as an attempt at arriving at true knowledge; in searching for truth we want to gain such knowledge which would show us a thing as it is. "Truth" is commonly believed to be a qualification of knowledge. It characterizes the knowledge that shows us reality as it is, that conforms to reality. We call

[1] We publish, for the first time in English translation, an article that Krzysztof Michalski originally wrote in 1974 for the journal *Studia Filozoficzne*. The translation into English was prepared by Lech Petrowicz, probably for the journal *Dialectics and Humanism*, but for unknown reasons never published. The translation is preserved as a typescript and part of Michalski's literary estate at the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) in Vienna. We would like to thank the IWM for granting permission to publish this translation.

[2] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1028b.

a person who maintains that "there is a picture hanging on the wall" truthful when there is really a picture hanging on the wall.

Thus, we most frequently understand "truth" as the conformity of knowledge with the things that it concerns. This concept of "truth" is commonly called the classical one. Aristotle was, as known, the first philosopher to formulate it.

In what manner, however, can knowledge conform to a thing? What is the character of this conformity? Let us see what the author has to say on the subject in *Sein und Zeit*.

Truth, conceived as the correspondence of knowledge with a thing, is by no means – Heidegger says – a relationship between two things: knowledge on the one hand, and a thing on the other. For knowledge is not a separate "thing," "similar" to or "corresponding" with the thing it pertains to; conversely, that thing is not something separated from knowledge. A thing and the knowledge of it are possible only in a mutual relationship. Knowledge, by its very nature, pertains to a thing, and is – as proved by Husserl – intentional, whereas the thing is merely its correlate. Therefore, one cannot sensibly speak of a thing in separation from our knowledge of it; nor can one speak of knowledge in separation from the thing it pertains to.

All knowledge is then inseparably linked with things. We cannot learn anything of a thing, abstracting from the fact that we are gaining knowledge, i.e. we cannot gain the knowledge of a thing in separation from knowledge of it, in order to compare the thing with this knowledge. On the other hand, we cannot know something, abstracting from the thing this knowledge concerns, for knowledge is precisely the relationship between us and the thing.

How, then, can we know whether the sentence "there is a picture hanging on the wall" is true, or not. The answer prompted by common sense will in this case be identical with the answer Heidegger would give – one should simply look at the wall and see whether there is a picture hanging there, or not. We decide the veracity of this statement, not by relating it to a separated thing, but by comparing it with another manner of its presentation, one thanks to which the thing given us is as it is. If we find out that the statement in question shows us the thing in the same way, we thereby ascertain its veracity.

The statement "there is a picture hanging on the wall" is related in its essence to the picture in question. This relation can be truth when certain conditions are satisfied, namely when it shows the thing as it is, or, briefly, when it discovers it.

The same applies, in Heidegger's view, to the truth of things in general. Knowledge, by its very nature, relates to things; a true relation is one that discovers a thing. "To say that [knowledge] 'is true' signifies that it uncovers the being as it is in itself."[3] So the truth of things does not consist in the "similarity" of knowledge alone to the transcendence of things, but is a characteristic of knowledge itself.

So far Heidegger's view on the question of truth is convergent with that of Husserl. In paragraph 44 of *Sein und Zeit*, devoted to an analysis of the phenomenon of truth, Heidegger cites the phenomenological theory of truth[4], contained in vol. 2 of *Logical Studies* (study no. 6). Like Heidegger, Husserl, too, views the correspondence we concern ourselves

[3] M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), 218.
[4] Ibidem.

with in analyzing the veracity of knowledge, not as the correspondence of knowledge and things separated therefrom, but as the correspondence of two manners of the presentation of a thing: an alleged thing and a "self-present" thing. For Husserls, as with Heidegger, the measure of true knowledge is also knowledge – strictly speaking, a certain scheme is different in either of them, but for both the question about truth is not a question about the possibility of reaching reality separated from knowledge, but about the conditions which knowledge has to fulfill in order to show the thing as it is.

Thus, according to Heidegger, the truth of knowledge amounts to discovering. Concrete knowledge is true when it carries out the "scheme of discovering" something. Accordingly, a thing, or a state of the thing, is unveiled – and in this sense we may call it "true" – when it appears in a manner prescribed by this scheme.

But can all knowledge be true? We usually regard as true (or false) – i.e. concordant (or discordant) with reality – only knowledge which states something, or denies something: briefly, a judgment, or a statement. But if we assume, as Heidegger did, that truth amounts to unveiling (or openness), then we shall consider all discovering behaviors as true. Such behaviors are by no means limited to knowledge in the form of judgment. Actions such as writing with a pen – speaking in the Heideggerian language, actions with the structure of preoccupation (*das Besorgen*) – also unveil something.[5] Furthermore, attitudes, too, discover in a specific manner. Thus, when we speak of "true knowledge" according to the Heideggerian concept of truth, we understand the word "knowledge" in this broad sense which enables us to say "I know" both when we are cognizing something and when we are doing something. For Heidegger, "knowledge" which may be classified as true encompasses also precognitive behaviors, such as practical actions, attitudes, etc. "Veracity" is therefore unconnected with either judgment, or statement, or even cognition in general, for not only a judgment, or cognition may be "true," but also fear, or chopping wood.

But in what way does behavior unveil? What is the "scheme of discovering" like, whose carrying out ensures the veracity of knowledge in the Heideggerian sense of the word?

In order to define this scheme it is first necessary, according to Heidegger,[6] to answer the question: how is the discovery of something possible at all? The discovery (otherwise: encounter) of something assumes that that which we discover is of concern to us beforehand, that we are already interested in it. *A priori* interest, Heidegger maintains, is a condition of discovering something. Hence, discovery always takes place because of something that interests us, in the aspect of our interest. Discovery always has the structure of purpose, for this structure is precisely a condition of its feasibility.

For example, we discover the pen because it serves to write, and thus is instrumental in a way. We discover it because of its instrumentality (*die Zuhandenheit*), as instrumental. The correct answer to the question: what is a pen?, is: a pen serves to write.

Now it becomes evident why one cannot speak of discovering a being, abstracting from the very act of discovering. Since a being – in accordance with the scheme of discovering in general – may be unveiled only as such or another, then that which is

[5] Ibid., 233.
[6] Ibid., chapter III.

discovered is neither "after" or "before" discovery – for it is only due to writing that the pen is discovered as a pen (i.e., as serving to write). Whereas for Husserl intentionality – the inseparable relationship between a thing and the knowledge of it – was a fact which is assumed, and not explained, Heidegger, pointing to the purposeful scheme of discovery, enables us to discern the conditions of its being possible.

Thus, veracity is characterized, according to Heidegger, first of all by a behavior satisfying the scheme of discovery; namely, a behavior which unveils something as something.

As it can be easily seen, this conception of truth is greatly different from the concept we usually adopt. For we tend to call true only a judgment, or a statement, such as the statement about a picture hanging on the wall. However, by calling an unveiling behavior true, Heidegger does not indicate a phenomenon which has nothing in common with what we usually regard as truth. For discovery is a condition of truth in an ordinary meaning; for in order for the statement showing us a picture hanging on the wall to be true, it is first necessary to be able to show this picture at all, to show it as such, and not as something different. It is only after something has been discovered as something at all that the possibility emerges of showing it in a judgment, or a statement, as it is, or different; and thus the possibility of truth and untruth in an ordinary sense. Only when a picture is being discovered at all as..., can we show it in a statement as hanging on the wall (true), or as not hanging on it (untrue).

Heidegger shows us the phenomenon of unveiling something as something as a phenomenon prior to truth in an ordinary sense. That is why he calls discovering (or openness) a "more primary truth."

Have we thus reached the sources of the phenomenon of truth? Is discovering (or openness), as a truth prior to the truth in common understanding, the most primary phenomenon of truth?

No, it is not, because discovery, as we remember, is possible due to the fact that that which we unveil is of concern to us beforehand. The phenomenon of *a priori* interest in what may be discovered is analyzed by Heidegger as a phenomenon of "participation in the word" (in-being, *das In-Sein*). As evidenced by this analysis, this participation is the ontological (existential) structure of human life. *A priori* participation in the word – openness to the word – is then the condition of the possibility of truth as discovery (or discoveredness); therefore, it ought to be termed truth in the original sense.

"That a statement is true means: it discovers a being in itself. It expresses, points to, 'makes it possible to see' a being in its discoveredness. To-be-true (truth) of a statement has to be understood as to-be-discovering. Truth by no means has the structure of concordance between cognition and an object in the sense of likening one being (object) to another (object).

To-be-true as to-be-discovering is in turn ontologically possible only on the basis of to-be-in-the-world."[7] To-be-in-the-world, openness to the world, which is the structure of the conscious being in general (and thus the being of man), is the condition of the possibility of truth as discovery (or discoveredness). "With and through (discoveredness),

[7] Ibid., 219.

discovery is made possible. Consequently, it is only with the openness of There-being that the original phenomenon of truth is attained (...). Inasmuch as There-being is really its openness, inasmuch as, being open, it opens and discovers, it is essentially 'true.'"[8]

However, There-being is not open in the same manner as is a window or a door. For an open window establishes a certain permanent relationship between the outlooker and the view; namely, if the external circumstances raise no obstacles, the view is always accessible in the same way to the viewer. On the other hand, the openness of There-being is by no means a permanent relation of There-being to that to which it opens. Speaking in philosophical terminology, openness is not the essence of human existence. That to which There-being opens is not always present for it. Rather, it is partly present, and partly it is not. This is not so because of external circumstances, but inalienably, "by nature." For There-being uncovers while covering. Writing, chopping wood, cognizing, it discovers pens, trees, meadows, and atoms, but at the same time it conceals, eclipses its own discovering, itself as existence. The openness of There-being is – using Heidegger's language – falling (*das Verfallen*). Hence, "There-being, because essentially falling, is, by reason of its constitution, in the 'untruth.'"[9]

Thus, the openness of There-being is not static, but – on the contrary – it is dynamic, it is a process. Heidegger says that it has to be constantly "wrested" anew from coveredness, that it has to struggle with it continuously. Speaking less illustratively, the openness of There-being is a constantly recurring tension between uncovering and covering up. From the point of view of There-being something may come to light only because something else remains in the dark. There-being is constantly "falling," i.e. discovering a being, thereby covering up its own Being, but it will never "fall" entirely; it is unable to fall into total forgetfulness of Being. For, in discovering a being, There-being is of necessity discovering also Being – though in an improper manner. Nor is it able to free itself wholly from "falling," for it can only discover Being indirectly, through the discovering of a being – and thus, falling.

The shortcomings and imperfections of disclosedness – which the human existence is – are not temporary. Disclosedness is not striving for fullness through the gradual elimination of obstacles. It is not happening. Incompleteness, limitedness are linked with it inseparably. The disclosedness of human existence is happening, and this is not only an accidental and temporary phenomenon accompanying it, but something that determines its sense. Briefly, the sense of the disclosedness of human existence lies in time.

We usually use the words "truth" and "time" in a sense that is to a certain extent opposite: time has nothing to do with truth. We usually believe that the sentence "two plus two gives four" is true if we accept as true the axioms of arithmetic, regardless of whether and when this sentence is pronounced. The same applies, as it seems, to the sentence "I can see autumn trees through the window" related to a situation when I am really looking through the window and seeing trees. Briefly speaking, we customarily believe that truth and falsity are in no way connected with time.

[8] Ibid., 219, 221.
[9] Ibid., 222.

Meanwhile, as we have seen, Heidegger attempts to have us use the word "truth" in another sense. By "truth" *sensu stricto* he means the disclosedness of human existence, whereas the sense of this existence resides precisely in time. Thus, contrary to the popular belief, time has something in common with truth. In fact, it has a lot in common with it, because it is its sense. This is not merely a change of the verbal convention. What Heidegger proposes here is a new look on the problem of truth, a new point of view which is to unveil to us the so far unnoticed deepness of the phenomenon.

This new point of view is – and we are still concerned with the problematic of *Sein und Zeit* – existential analysis. It is precisely thanks to this analysis, Heidegger believes, that we can reach the source of the phenomenon of truth, i.e. the sense of human way of Being, temporality. So not only the search for truth, but also truth itself, is a process, a road. Truth itself is happening. The "road to truth" as conceived by Heidegger turns out to be truth as a road.

In Heidegger, unlike in Husserl, an unobstructed view is no longer a model of truth. "In no case is There-being (...) set before the open country of the 'world-in-itself,' so that it just beholds what it encounters."[10] What matters is not to push aside all veils and perceive "with a clear eye" how things really are. On the contrary, the covering tendency belongs to truth itself. It is not a complete surmounting of coveredness, and thus of movement, time, happening, but a turning towards it that leads to truth. For covering, movement, time, happening- this is the very truth.

Heidegger's reflection on the phenomenon of truth in *Sein und Zeit* begins, as we remember, with a discussion of the common understanding of this phenomenon, i.e. the understanding of truth as the correspondence of knowledge and things. A similar approach has been adopted in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, a work wholly devoted to the question of truth. In it, however, he examines not only the concordance of knowledge and things, but also – conversely- the concordance of things and knowledge. For the word "true" is commonly used, not only in contexts of the type "this sentence is true", but also in other contexts, e.g. "this gold is true." In the latter case we also have to do with correspondence, namely, we assert that the gold in question corresponds to our knowledge of true gold. So here a thing is to agree with knowledge, whereas formerly knowledge was to agree with a thing. Also in this case the conception of truth as concordance remains valid. In both the first and the second instance we have to do with some predetermined formula: the thing itself (phenomenologically: given in an act of self-presentation), or the notion of thing. To the question: what makes possible the definition of the formula and agreement with it?, Heidegger, in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, gives the same answer he gave in his previous works: "[It is possible] only insofar as this definition was already in advance open unto (...) that which is manifest (...) Openness to a binding formula is possible only as the being-free of that which is manifest. Such to-be-free points to the so far incomprehensible essence of freedom. The open character of comportment as the external possibility of correctness is freedom. The essence of truth is freedom."[11] So concordance, agreement of knowledge and things (or reversely) is possible due to the fact that we are *a priori* open unto that

[10] Ibid., 169.
[11] M. Heidegger, "Wom Wesen der Wahrheit", in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), 81.

to which something whose truthfulness we decide is applicable. This, in turn, is possible thanks to our existential structure, which Heidegger, in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* and *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, calls freedom.

Strictly speaking, what is a being to be applicable to, whose truth (discoveredness) we decide? The measure of a being's discoveredness, Heidegger answers, is the world projected by consciousness. It determines and makes possible the discoveredness of a being encountered by us. The world is thus the foundation of a being's uncoveredness. We can discover a being because we are open beforehand unto the measure of its discoveredness – unto the world. The world is thus the measure of our freedom. In other words, freedom is a freedom towards the world.

The source of truth (discoveredness) is freedom, whose measure is the world. But what is the source of the disclosedness of the world?

This source is not the phenomenon which we so far have been calling, after Heidegger, primordial truth – the openness of a conscious being. For this openness is based precisely on the disclosedness of the world; the disclosedness of the world is its measure, the measure of freedom. So it turns out that the openness of consciousness is not – as it has seemed so far – truth in the primordial sense. The definition of "truth" as "discoveredness" leads us through human existence to a phenomenon lying at its root: the disclosedness of the world itself.

The expression "disclosedness of the world" may be a source of misunderstandings, for Heidegger uses the word "world" in a sense somewhat different from the common one. The term "world" by no means signifies a set of beings, or at least – referring to philosophy – a collective set. The world is not a being. It is a measure according to which beings appear, a definition of their discoveredness as beings. Thus, it is the Being of what appears, the Being of what we are conscious of. When Heidegger says that truth in the original sense, a discoveredness which is the source of discoveredness in general, is not the openness of consciousness, but the disclosedness of the world itself, he means the disclosedness of Being itself, the disclosedness of Being as such.

What results from the treatise *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, or – in other words – from the "turn" in Heideggerian thought first signalized in this treatise, is the indication of the disclosedness of Being itself as the real essence of truth. "The question about the essence of truth springs from the question about the truth of essence. The former question understands essence first of all in the sense of *quidditas* or *realitas*, and truth as a certain character of cognition. The question about the truth of essence understands essence (*Wesen*) verbally and means by this word, still remaining within the metaphysical way of presentation, Beon (*das Seyn*) as the prevailing difference of Being and being. Truth signifies clearing concealment as the basic feature of Beon (*das Seyn*)."[12]

What does "essence" mean, understood verbally? Heidegger says that it amounts to Beon (*Seyn*) conceived as the difference between Being (*Sein*) and a being. Heidegger calls this difference at another place ontological difference. The traditional language, Heidegger points out in the above quotation, may cause here some misunderstandings; Being and a being may seem to be two separate elements, whereas the third one – Beon

[12] Ibid., 96.

as ontological difference – may appear as mediation between the two former. In fact, Being and a being are for Heidegger merely inseparable elements of a certain entity, the difference between them. Being is not without a being, and, conversely, a being is not without Being. Being and a being are merely momenta of ontological difference. They differentiate, and there is no place for them outside this differentiation. In this sense Being is always mediation, reconciliation of itself "and" a being.

Mediation does not occur here between the two encountered elements (Being and a being), but, conversely, it is primary from a logical point of view; "Being" and "being" are merely the momenta of mediation, and if separated from it, make no sense. That is why in the previous sentence I put the conjunction "and" in inverted commas.

In what way do Being and a being differentiate? Being is not the same as a being. Thus, when a being reveals itself, Being thereby reveals itself only to the extent to which it is the Being of a being; it reveals itself from the point of view of a being. In other words, it does not reveal itself as such, as Being. When a being reveals itself, Being as such hides.

The differentiation of a being and Being, therefore, proceeds through the concealment of Being. Being always remains "beyond" a being which is disclosed every time. It escapes revealment, uncoveredness; it withdraws, hides. Hiddenness (*Verborgenheit*) is the medium of the mediation which is ontological difference.

Ontological difference therefore amounts to the concealment of Being as such. It is never fully manifest. Being and a being do not differ from each other in the same way as a pencil and a pen do. They differ from each other in that when one is disclosed the other is hiding in the shadow. The difference between them is happening,

"The truth of essence" means the same as "the truth of essencing," which in turn signifies uncoveredness which is hiding, the disclosedness of concealment. That is why Heidegger prefers to the word "truth" the Greek word ἀλήθεια, non-concealment, which points to the – in his opinion – primordial sense of the phenomenon of truth, the hiding disclosedness.

Heideggerian reflection therefore "leads the question about the essence of truth off the path of ordinary limitations in the common sense of essence and contributes towards reflecting over the fact whether the question about the essence of truth does not have to be at the same time and first of all a question about the truth of essence (i.e. truth of essencing – K.M.). In the sense of essence (essencing) philosophy thinks Being. The narrowing down of the inner possibility of the correctness of an assertion to freedom (...) as its 'basis', alongside the pointing to the beginning of the essencing of this basis in hiddenness (...) are to indicate that the essence of truth is not the empty 'commonness' of of an an 'abstract' generality, but that which is concealed and unique in the unrepeatable history of disclosing the 'sense' of that which we call Being, and which we have for a long time thought only as the being as a whole."[13]

So it turns out that for Heidegger the question about truth is the other side of the question about Being. In his concept both questions are aimed at the same thing: essencing, Being as non-concealment... Thus, the problem of the relationship between searching for truth and searching for the sense of Being finds its solution: we can think truth, Heidegger

[13] Ibidem.

would say, only when we attempt to think Being itself. We conceive of the phenomenon of truth at its source only when we attempt to think this clearing (*Lichtung*) which makes possible the appearance of anything.

Clearing – this is one more word, beside "essencing" and non-concealment, which names simultaneously Being and truth. "Clearing means to illuminate (the word 'lichten' also means to clear the land as in the forest, which also corresponds to Heidegger's intention of understanding this word; so 'Lichtung' can be also translated as a clearing), to drop the anchor, to grub... This does not mean, however, that where clearing illuminates (*die Lichtung lichtet*) it is bright. That which is cleared is that which is free, open, and at the same time that which is clear of that which is hiding. We must not understand clearing from the aspect of light (...) For light (...) can take place only in clearing... Darkness, though it is lightless, is illuminated."[14] Clearing – conceived by Heidegger as the "essencing of non-concealment" – does not originate from light, as it may seem at first glance; on the contrary, it is light that is possible due to clearing. Heidegger thus reverses the relationship prevalent in common thinking: it is not light that is the source of the clarification of something – it is precisely clarification that is more primordial than light.

Heidegger's reversal of the relationship of light and clarification (clearing) is not merely a new proposition of the use of words. It is something more than that. What is involved is not only an attack on one of the many verbal habits. To Heidegger "clearing" is truth conceived at its source. And light has for ages been a metaphor of truth.

In pointing to "clearing" as truth in the original sense, Heidegger destroys this traditional metaphor; light is no longer truth, but at most its derivative, just like gloom. So light and gloom can no longer express truth and untruth. "Namely, light can fall into clearing, into its Open and let there brightness and darkness play together. But light never creates clearing in the first place, only assumes it."[15]

What is hidden behind this change of metaphors? Why does Heidegger reject the metaphor of light? Or: what are the limits of the applicability of this metaphor? Where can one find it?

To us light is above all a symbol of absolute transparence. The metaphor of light can therefore be used only when the possibility of such transparence is assumed – in other words, the possibility of complete disclosedness. To Plato, for example, an idea is pure visibility, full revealment.

Thus, wherever truthfulness is conceived as full disclosedness, wherever that is "true" which is "fully disclosed," there is room for the metaphor of light. And that which is disclosed is nothing else than that which is, a being. A thought availing itself of the metaphor of light therefore assumes that the place of truth is a being, that it is a being, insofar as it is fully disclosed, that it primordially true.

That which makes a being a being – Being – is in this case its full disclosedness. So we can say, summing up: the condition of the occurrence of the metaphor of light is a concept of Being as full disclosedness, or in other words – permanent presence. Such an understanding of Being Heidegger calls metaphysics. Metaphysics in general, in the

[14] M. Heidegger, E. Fink, *Heraklit* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), 260.
[15] M. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1969), 72.

Heideggerian understanding of this term, is essentially inclined to use the metaphor of light – we can therefore call it also the metaphysics of light.

No wonder then that we encounter the metaphor of light so frequently and over such a long period of time – both at the dawn of European thought and in its modern form. We can come across the metaphoric of light whenever thought assumes the form of metaphysics.

Precisely for this reason an ideal is always present in European thought – rejected or accepted as utopia or as hope, as an unattainable goal or as a real possibility – the ideal of the final victory of light over darkness, the ideal of achieving absolute transparence of that which is. It was no coincidence that it was Hegel who expressed this ideal aloud: "The courage of truth, faith in the power of the spirit, is the primary condition of the study of philosophy; man ought to respect himself and regard himself worthy of the supreme. He cannot exaggerate, thinking of the greatness and power of the spirit. The closed essence of the universe has no force within itself which might put up resistance to the courage of knowing; (this essence) must open unto it, and spread before its eyes and enable it to use its richness and depth."[16]

Now Heidegger calls that ideal to question. He rejects the metaphor of light because the very condition of the possibility of its occurrence becomes problematic to him, because Being is no longer full disclosedness to him. According to Heidegger, reality itself no longer has to open unto us; on the contrary, it itself closes up, hides. For its truth is no longer light, but clearing, a disclosedness which is hiding.

Metaphysics is unable to reach the essence of truth thus conceived, or rather the truth of essencing. For to metaphysics, as we have seen, truth is the truth of a being. That is true which is disclosed, and insofar as it is disclosed. Hence truth turns out to be full disclosedness. It makes no difference whether we understand "truth" as a property of things or of the knowledge of them. For whether truth means the "discoveredness of a being as such" (and thus is conceived in the "ontological" sense), or whether it means the "discovering" of this being (and thus is "classically" conceived), it is always conceived because of a being.

To Heidegger, however, beginning from *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, truth in the primordial sense is the truth of Being itself, and not of a being. Being is no longer here the object of interest because of a being, but only because of itself; it is no longer conceived as the Being of a being, but simply as Being. In the search for the truth of Being truth is no longer conceived because of that which is disclosed, but because of itself. It turns out then that truth itself is by no means full clarity; it is clearing – a disclosedness which is hiding.

Heidegger's rejection of the metaphor of light as truth signifies a change of the point of view on the phenomenon of truth in general; whereas a thought which avails itself of this metaphor (or which by its nature can avail itself of it) essentially conceives truth as the truth of a being, Heidegger sees truth in the original sense in the truth of Being. The first of these points of view, called "metaphysical" in the Heideggerian terminology, implies the understanding of truth as absolute transparence (hence the comparison with

[16] G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures in the History of Philosophy*, Introduction.

light), the second one conceives truth as clearing, clarification – and thus as transparence and non-transparence at the same time.

It is therefore necessary first to overcome metaphysics in order to unveil truth as clearing. Or, rather, insofar as it is possible to overcome metaphysics, truth as clearing is perceivable. For the overcoming of metaphysics does not signify to Heidegger a simple rejection of the to-date tradition. Rather, the word "overcoming" has here a meaning which we imply when we say of somebody that he has "overcome pain," "gotten over a loss," having in mind, not only the gradual passing of pain, but also its conscious suffering. I have overcome pain, I have gotten over something, not when pain has passed, leaving no trace in me, but when I keep on suffering it – only I know how to face it consciously.[17]

Thus, the overcoming of metaphysics (*Überwindung der Metaphysik*) is to Heidegger an unending process; it is its continuous overcoming. This is so because metaphysics is not merely an accidentally chosen blind alley of European thought. Truth – the disclosedness of Being – is, as clearing, concealment; it is hiding behind that which is disclosed – a being. This is precisely the source of metaphysics. Metaphysics considers the world from the point of view of a being, from the point of view of that which is disclosed, regarding that which is not disclosed as a non-being, as nothingness. From that viewpoint, Being, conceived now as the truth of a being, turns out to be pure disclosedness.

Heidegger's very thought is the overcoming of metaphysics in the above sense. Although the reflection of the thinker of Schwarzwald was from the very beginning directed against metaphysics, this does not mean that it is free of it. Rather, it is directed against metaphysics in itself; it is a continuous and incessant struggle from freeing itself from the metaphysical point of view.

Precisely for this reason Heidegger's writings from the early period of his philosophical work seem to be equivocal in the light of his later writings. On the one hand, they still represent the metaphysical point of view; on the other hand, they attempt to free themselves of it. As a result of the existential analytic in the light of the question of truth, the new relationship of "truth" and "time", brought to light in *Sein and Zeit*, is tainted by this ambiguity. Time (as the temporality of *Dasein*) turned out to be the structure of truth as such, the structure of the coming-to-pass of human openness. In this way, however, there appeared the possibility of conceiving this structure – i.e. time – as the principle, the ground of coming-to-pass in general, and thus as the final foundation of something that is no longer corning-to-pass itself, as full revealment. Briefly speaking, the danger of metaphysics was inherent here. It is only the "reversal" – from truth as the openness of *Dasein* to truth as clearing – that eliminates this danger (strictly speaking, one of the forms of this danger). The change of the point of view makes it possible to see that time is not a "principle," or a "ground"; rather, it is an "abyssal ground" (*abgründiger Grund*); truth itself as Being is both covering-up and uncovering. There is no single structure of the coming-to-pass of truth; for truth comes-to-pass in such a manner that every time it "sends" (*sich schickt*) itself unto man, but neither the manner of "sending" nor fortune (*Geschick*) are predetermined.

[17] Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, *Hegels Dialektik* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr / Paul Siebeck, 1971), 83.

The ambiguity of Heidegger's early writings, exposed by his later works, is not – like metaphysics in general – accidental. The source of this ambiguity resides in the "ambiguity" of Being itself, in its revealing-concealing character. In other words, the ambiguity of Heidegger's thought results from the fact that his thought is the overcoming of metaphysics, that the overcoming of metaphysics is its fortune.

Therefore, Heidegger's reflection does not attempt to achieve a result in the form of a thesis of Being or truth. Its truth is its way. This way is precisely the overcoming of metaphysics. In other words, Heideggerian thought – and, in his conception, thought in general – is problematic. For it uncovers, whilst simultaneously covering up. However, this is not its shortcoming or defect, since its very "object" is problematic: it reveals itself, at the same time concealing itself.

Truth as the concealing revealment of Being itself – and thus as history – is not this process, separate from us, which should become the "object" of our analyses; it is rather a process in which we are included. What is meant here, therefore, is "truth" which escapes the objectively oriented methods of science, although – according to Heidegger – it determines us in the most primordial manner. For it *a priori* determines our opening-up, our consciousness towards everything that is – and thus towards ourselves.

In this way the knowledge which we have of ourselves shows its other side: for not only can it be conceived as the methodical study of a certain object (i.e. ourselves) – and thus as science – but it is also, as it turns out, a phenomenon of truth in the original sense, a manifestation of every single measure of our consciousness. This "other side" of our knowledge of ourselves is exposed by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his work *Wahrheit und Methode*. Analyzing the experience of tradition and art, he says: "Just as in the experience of art we have to do with truths which essentially go beyond the sphere of methodical knowing, so something similar happens in the humanities as a whole. In these sciences, our historic tradition in all its forms becomes the object of study, but at the same time it itself comes to the fore in its truth. The experience of historic tradition basically extends beyond that which is examinable therein. It is true or untrue not only in the sense in which historical criticism decides about that – (this experience) is constantly showing the truth in which it is necessary to gain participation (strictly speaking, we already *a priori* have participation in the 'truth' in question; nevertheless, this participation may assume various forms: it is possible to participate in the process of truth as truth, and it is also possible to veil its truthful character through this participation; here Gadamer has the first case in mind – K.M.).[18] Thus, the world we live in can only partly be expressed in theorems, examined and described in theses by means of scientific methods. Only a part of our true knowledge is "true" in keeping with the classical definition of truth. For only partly can the world be represented as an object, "from without". Another of its parts – the most essential one, Heidegger maintains – escapes such a description. It is too closely linked with us, with the very essence of our life, for us to be able to watch it from a distance. Meanwhile, it is precisely this part (and we already know that it is Being itself) that determines the horizon of our experience and imagination; it is a measure of what we may meet with and of our relation to that which we encounter. It is this part that is the basis of "truth" and

[18] H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr / Paul Siebeck, 1972), XXIX.

"falsehood" in the classical sense, even the condition of judging in general; therefore, we cannot judge it by means of the same notions.

Thus, according to Heidegger, truth comes-to-pass; it itself (and not only the process of arriving at it) is of a temporal character. Moreover, it comes-to-pass not beside us, but along with us.

At first glance this thesis does not seem to be new. The assertion of the historic character of truth has been appearing in the history of philosophy at least since Hegel. Heidegger's departure from tradition consists not so much in finding a new formula as in conceiving the old one in a specific manner. For, as indicated by our previous remarks, Heidegger offers a new conception of "history." In Hegel, and also, for example, in Husserl and other thinkers recognizing the historic character of truth, history is, strictly speaking, a logical process,[19] a materialization of some supra-historic whole. History as a whole does not come-to-pass; it is already full presence. From the point of view of the whole, nothing more can happen.

Whenever some whole is assumed, which is full presence, its coming-to-pass can be understood only as becoming, realization, whereas the individual moments of time become merely the stages of its materialization; their sequence ceases to be a sequence of events and is merely a sequence of steps; the movement of history, like the movement of proof, aims then at conclusion – fulfillment, closure.

Thus, when Being is understood as full (or permanent) presence, it "comes-to-pass" only insofar as it comes to fruition, becomes. The whole of a being strives for realization. In this case, we have to do with an obliteration of the ontological difference; a being is here wholly identified with Being. In other words, Being is conceived from the point of view of a being, and hence turns out to be full revealment. In the Heideggerian terminology this point of view is called metaphysics.

The metaphysical concept of history, which discriminates between history and Being, entails in effect a negation of the autonomous sense of coming-to-pass; for this sense resides in the supra-historic whole, or it does not exist at all. Since history is comprehensible only from the point of view of full presence, a negation of full presence must lead to incomprehensibility.

From the point of view of metaphysics, the historicity of truth is therefore unsustainable; since truth is conceived as full revealment, then either historicity or truth is impossible. Relativism is thus no escape from metaphysics; it is its branch.

However metaphysics conceives the whole that materializes in history – whether as a divine plan, or an absolute spirit, or a human project – this whole can encounter in history only itself. Hence "the absolute spirit eternally sees itself in something else"; hence the sense of history is the "autobiography of the spirit"; hence "the eternal return to the same." From the point of view of the whole, nothing new can appear in history.

Heidegger makes possible the avoidance of the seemingly inevitable choice between historicity and truth, between total lack of comprehension and comprehension "from the

[19] Cf. L. Kołakowski, "Rozumienie historyczne i zrozumiałość zdarzenia historycznego", in *Kultura i fetysze* (Warsaw: PWN, 1967); cf. also W. Marx, *Heidegger und die Tradition* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1961); F. Wiplinger, *Wahrheit und Geschichtlichkeit* (Freiburg-München: Karl Alber, 1961).

perspective of the whole." He points out that the disjunctive character of this alternative results from the metaphysical point of view. Thus alongside the overcoming of metaphysics, there opens a new possibility of understanding the history of truth.

These are the results of the Heideggerian way of thinking with respect to the phenomenon of truth. This thinking is the "thinking of Being." Confronted with the phenomenon of truth, it discovers therein a certain aspect so far not understood; namely, it discovers the source of the phenomenon of truth in "clearing", a specific manifestation of Being as such. As seen by Heidegger, the question about truth turns out to be identical with the question about Being itself.

This concept of the problem of truth enables us to understand something that we have not understood so far; it also enables us to see danger where we have not seen it so far. For it enables us to notice the basis of the problemacity of truth – in other words, to understand its historic character. It shows us that the very phenomenon of truth contains incomprehensible hiddenness, a secret from which "the knot of our nature derives its twists and coils (...); so that man is more incomprehensible without this secret than this secret is incomprehensible to man."[20] The realization that the very essence of truth is problematic enables us to avoid the danger of certainty. Such a danger really exists, considering that "authentic freedom is incessant questioning; more, it is constant doubting by a living soul. Certainty exists only in orderly ranks, the servient and delusive certainty of dead souls." What is more, Heidegger – pointing out that truth, by its nature, is of a historic character and possesses the problematic structure, and thus that it cannot be closed in certainty – shows us, as we have seen, the way of avoiding the dilemma: certainty, or the freedom of uncertainty; full understanding, or renunciation of understanding at all.

But are Heidegger's directions sufficient? Does the "thinking of Being" enable us to define the specificity of the phenomenon of truth?

The specificity of the phenomenon of truth is no doubt that which distinguishes it from everything that is not truth. Within the sphere of that to which we can sensibly attribute truthfulness, that which is not truth is falsehood. Thus, the specificity of truth is determined, first of all, by its opposition to falsehood. In other words, to the specificity of the phenomenon of truth inalienably belongs the fact that truth is of a regulative character.

Does the Heideggerian concept of truth do justice to truth understood in this way?[21]

Already at the starting point of his reflection on the question of truth Heidegger passes over this specificity. As we remember, to him truth amounts to discovering. "The Being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as Being-discovering."[22] Thus, according to Heidegger, the fact that knowledge (in this particular case: an assertion) discovers is sufficient for qualifying it as true; it is unimportant how it discovers. Meanwhile, even if we agree with Heidegger that the truthfulness of knowledge is based on its discovering character, we can regard as true (that is, not false) only such knowledge which discovers a being as it is, discovers something as it is. In order to be true, discovering must have measure in the being as such, as it is. Discovering is therefore a necessary

[20] B. Pascal, *Thoughts*, part 2, section 1, paragraph 7 (438).
[21] Cf. E. Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967).
[22] Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 218.

condition of truthfulness, but it is not a sufficient condition for knowledge (even in the broad sense given this word by Heidegger) to be true; knowledge must discover something that it pertains to as such.

Heidegger opposes "discovering" to "covering-up." False knowledge, as it were, covers up, in contrast to true knowledge, which uncovers. But, according to Heidegger, false knowledge – like all knowledge in general – also discovers, and only as such covers up. It is therefore uncovering and covering-up at the same time. The same applies to true knowledge: discovering is not possible without covering-up. Thus, the notions "covering-up" and "discovering" are not sufficient for saving the specificity of the phenomenon of true knowledge.

The situation is similar in the case of what Heidegger calls truth in the more primordial sense: the disclosedness of the conscious being. As we remember, discoveredness is possible precisely owing to this disclosedness; therefore, it is disclosedness that should be called truth in the more primordial sense than discovering. But since disclosedness in general is identified with truth, there cannot be true and false disclosedness.

The measure of disclosedness is, as we remember, the revealment of Being as such. It is in revealment that, according to Heidegger, we find the original phenomenon of truth; for Being itself makes possible discoveredness, and thus the "truthfulness" of anything. Being is manifest as "non-concealment," "clearing"; concealment is its constitutive element, as is revealment. Thus, also here the process of revealment does not find its measure in truth, but it itself is truth as a measure. Hence, neither here nor earlier there are any grounds to distinguish between true revealment and false revealment – every single manner of the appearance of Being is in itself reliable. Being may appear in various ways, and we cannot predetermine them; each of these ways in binding on us. Therefore, we cannot simply "reject" metaphysics as a point of view covering up Being, and thus as falsehood. For metaphysics is a manner in which Being appears, in which Being "sends" itself unto us, Europeans. Metaphysics, like fortune, cannot be rejected as untruth – this untruth rather belongs to truth itself.

Since the revealment of Being does not have its measure in truth, but it is itself this measure, truth can no longer regulate the revealment of something. In this way truth loses its regulative aspect. The Heideggerian point of view, which identifies the phenomenon of truth with the phenomenon of Being as such, deprives truth of this aspect, which otherwise would enable us to assess every time the revealment of Being. It deprives us of a system of reference, with respect to which this revealment could prove either true or false. Briefly speaking, the identification of the question about truth with the question about Being – and this is what Heidegger does – leads to disregarding for the specificity of the phenomenon of truthfulness in relation to falsehood.

Metaphorically speaking – in view of the Heideggerian criticism of the comparison of truth to light – Heidegger equalizes darkness and gloom (or falsehood and error) with light (or truth as their opposite). Given such a standpoint, it is impossible to find arguments which would permit to discriminate between covered-up "truth," and thus truth in which darkness and error prevail, and truth in which brightness and gloom are manifest as such.

Meanwhile, "not of night or darkness we are sons," but "of light and day."

Thus, Heidegger, through his "topological" analysis, points to the sources – otherwise, the necessary condition – of the phenomenon of truth: the inalienable revealment of Being as such. However, the identification of this revealment with truth itself entails another danger; namely, it leads to disregard for the phenomenon of truth as such – and thus truth in its opposition to falsehood, truth as the measure regulating the coming-to-pass of revealment.

In the light of the indistinguishableness of truth and falsehood in Heidegger's thought, is it possible to save the problematicity of truth indicated by him? Does the thinking of Being formulate the sufficient conditions for truth as a problem?

Also in this case the answer should be "no." For it is not enough that something was partly covered up, and only partly revealed, to regard it as a problem. It is a problem only when the point is to unveil it. It is not enough to say that truth appears by its very nature as a secret – to a certain extent, at least – to regard it as problematic; a secret becomes the source of a problem only when viewed from the angle of the effort of its revealment. Thus, in order to understand the problematicity of truth, it is not enough to point to the coming-to-pass of the revealment of Being itself; it is also necessary to consider this coming-to-pass from a certain regulative point of view; only then is it possible to see it as a conflict, as struggle.

The discovery of the historicity of truth is therefore indispensable, but not sufficient, for understanding truth as a problem; for the problematicity of truth assumes also its regulative aspect (and thus truth as opposed to falsehood).

As such, Heideggerian thought does not fully grasp the phenomenon of truth – it smashes against it. It is only here that we come across the source of the problematicity of this very thought. Only now can we understand this thought – seeing it from the angle of truth as a "regulative idea" – as struggle against the inexpressible, and thus as a problem.

In this way the question of truth turns out to be the hidden motive power of Heidegger's thought. The discovery of the – not accidentally, as we know – forgotten domain of the truth of Being, the essencing of Being, enabled Heidegger to point to the sources, and thereby to the limitations, of the metaphysical importance of the claims to the "possession of truth." "Thinking," Heidegger says, "cannot (...), as demanded by Hegel, reject the name "love of wisdom" in order to become pure wisdom in the form of absolute knowledge."[23]

But since thinking has the form of the unfulfilled love of wisdom, truth has to be for it also a regulative idea; it cannot be merely revealment every time, no matter what kind of revealment. It cannot be only the dialectic of coveredness and revealment as equally important factors. It must be "something" that is desired, struggled and striven for. The way Heidegger does it, heading towards the "star in the sky of the world."

translated by Lech Petrowicz

[23] M. Heidegger, "Brief über den Humanismus", in *Wegmarken*, 194.

Richard Capobianco

HEIDEGGER'S BEING AS ALETHEIA: "OLDER" THAN THE HUMAN BEING

Yet Being is never dependent upon existing humanity.
(Heidegger, "Recollection in Metaphysics," 1941)

The human being for itself has no power over truth, which remains independent of the human being.
(Heidegger, "Three in Conversation on a Country Path," 1944-45)

Our contemporary age remains dominated by an array of "subjectivisms," including the persistent Cartesianism and Kantianism of classical phenomenology as inaugurated by Husserl. Husserl's basic position was strongly inflected toward the dependence of "being" on human subjectivity: "It is a being (*ein Sein*) that consciousness in its own experiences posits, (...) but *over and beyond this*, is nothing at all" (*Ideas I*, § 49). The later Heidegger refused all such human-centric perspectives, and I have attempted to show the manifold dimensions of his critique in both *Engaging Heidegger* and *Heidegger's Way of Being*. His heralded turn to *Sein/Seyn* (henceforth, Being), as he worked this out over the course of his lifetime of thinking, represented a decisive turn away from all prevailing modern versions of the human being *as the measure of all things*.

At present, I would like to consider the matter afresh and highlight several of his signature themes along the way. In 1967, Heidegger delivered an address to the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Athens, Greece, under the title "The Provenance of Art and the Determination of Thinking." This lecture is not well-known, and it has not yet been published in Heidegger's *Complete Works* (*Gesamtausgabe*).[1] The address is one of several that he delivered in the 1960s that deal with similar themes, yet what is especially notable in this particular talk is his appeal to the figure of the Greek goddess Athena in order to highlight the core matter of "Ἀλήθεια" and how Ἀλήθεια is not only the "provenance"

[1] M. Heidegger, "Die Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens", in *Denkerfahrungen: 1910-1976*, ed. H. Heidegger (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983), 135-149. A recent English translation (by Dimitrios Latsis, amended by Ullrich Haase): "The Provenance of Art and the Destination of Thought (1967)", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 44:2 (2013), 119-128. References in the text follow this form: (English/German), but I have modified the English translation, especially in the last key line on Ἀλήθεια. The German text will be included in volume 80.2 of Heidegger's *Complete Works* (*Gesamtausgabe*) published by Vittorio Klostermann (Frankfurt am Main). All references to the *Gesamtausgabe* in the notes that follow are given as GA.

of "art," but also "older," "more primordial," and "more enduring" than the human being and all that is brought forth as "art" by the human being. In other words, Ἀλήθεια (as Being), although cor-related with the human being in the expanse of the time of human beings, is nonetheless *independent* of the human being. Yet let us approach this conclusion slowly by way of a careful consideration of the lecture text.

ATHENA SPEAKS

Heidegger opens the address by stating in a characteristic manner that the matter of the inception of the "arts and sciences" among the Greeks is not fundamentally a "historical" matter that lies in the distant past, but rather a matter – and an experience – that remains "present" to us. The task before us, he states, is to "meditate on the provenance of art in Hellas" (136/119). Note that he uses the word "Hellas," and not "Greece" (*Griechenland*), as he begins his reflection. This is his reminder, familiar to us from many other places in his work, that, in his view, we must peel back the layers of Romanized and Latinized thinking that have accrued over the centuries in order for us to arrive again at the originary matter for thought; thus, our seeking must find its way back not to Roman *Graecia*, but to *Hellas*. In the following line, he sets out the aim of the meditation: "We shall try to get a glimpse into the region (*Bereich*) that already prevails prior to all art and that first bestows to art its ownmost character" (136/119). This "region" that "prevails" and is "prior" to all art – and therefore "prior" to the human being – is "Ἀ-λήθεια," as he will tell us in due course, but at the outset he has already clearly signaled the destination of his thinking.

To proceed, he calls upon "the goddess Athena" for "counsel and guidance." This is not simply a polite rhetorical gesture to his Athenian hosts. The later Heidegger was deeply moved by the "invocation" to the gods or muses that opened the great poems of the ancient Greek poets such as Homer and Pindar. These ancient invocations honored the gods for their "wisdom" and expressed an abiding human humility to listen and learn – which Heidegger laments has been increasingly lost in the present "egoist" age.

The matter of the significance of "the gods" in the later Heidegger's thinking is complex, but we should at least keep in view that he always insisted that "the gods" are never mere projections of the human being; that is, "the gods," no less than we "mortals," emerge from Being, the temporal-spatial emerging/unfolding "way" (or ontological process) wherein and whereby all beings issue forth and come to be. Certainly, for Heidegger, the "gods" or "divinities" are not traditional onto-theological timeless entities; for they, too, are "temporal" as they emerge from the temporal way itself – Being – their "source." Some recent readings of Heidegger – which are no more than variations of Husserl's transcendental idealism – are entirely off the mark to suggest that for the later Heidegger the human being is the "source" of "Being," and, accordingly, these readings are also mistaken in trying to settle the matter of "the gods" in his thinking by claiming them for the human being; that is, by claiming that "the gods" are only insofar as the human being is. Heidegger – at every turn – upends this kind of position. In this talk, not only does he "invoke" the goddess Athena, but he adds that even as we look to her for counsel and illumination on the core matter for thinking, we must always keep in mind

that "we cannot penetrate into the plenitude of her divinity" (136/119). What is more, he states, "We are only attempting to explore what Athena says to us about the provenance of art." He recalls that our human task is to be attentive and *listen* to "what Athena says." In other words, it is not simply humans who "say" and "speak"; the goddess "says" and "speaks," too.

Admittedly, what and how "the gods" "are" as they emerge from the Being-way, and what and how "the gods" "say" and "speak," are considerations that remain for us to reflect upon further – and this only testifies to the continuing resonance of Heidegger's thinking. Even so, let us recognize that what he opens for our thinking in such passages is altogether closed off in every kind of reductive human-centric reading that insists on positing the human being as the singular "source" of all "saying." In other words, what is lost in these reductive human-centric readings is Heidegger's abiding call for us to be "open" to how all things "speak" to us. As he put this in a seminar in Le Thor a couple of years later, in 1969: "The Greeks are those human beings who lived immediately (*unmittelbar*) in the manifestness of phenomena – through the specifically ek-static capacity of letting the phenomena *speak to them*, [yet] modern man, Cartesian man, *se solum alloquendo*, speaks only to himself."[2] For us to be "open" in this Greek way is for us to be "open" to hearing how the sea, the trees, the animals – all that is, even "the gods" and "muses" – how *everything* "speaks" to us.[3] Yet it seems that we are no longer listening – or we are listening only for what we need and demand to hear.

Heidegger recalls that Homer names Athena πολύμητις, "the manifold counselor" (136/119), the one who helps in many and varied ways. It is Athena who "prevails" over everything that human beings bring forth, and it is she who "dispenses her special counsel to humans who produce tools, vases, and jewels." All who are skilled and masters at crafting may be called a τεχνίτης, but he cautions that "we understand this word in too limited a sense when we translate it as 'artisan.'" The τεχνίτης is one whose activity "is guided by a comprehension whose name is τέχνη," yet this word does not simply mean "a doing and making"; rather, τέχνη is fundamentally "a form of knowing." This "knowing" is a seeing in advance of what is to be brought forth, and what is to be brought forth is not simply a crafted chair or sculpture or building – but also "a work of science or of philosophy, of poetry or of public rhetoric." In this way, then, "art is τέχνη, but not *technicity* (*Technik*)," and "the artist is τεχνίτης, but not a technician or even an artisan" (137/120).

Thus "art," according to Heidegger, is a kind of τέχνη, and τέχνη is a "knowing" that looks ahead to the creation and completion of *any work*. This "knowing" as a "looking ahead" therefore requires "exceptional vision and brightness and clarity," and again he invokes the goddess Athena, who is not only the manifold counselor, πολύμητις, but is

[2] GA 15, 331; *Four Seminars*, trans. A. Mitchell, F. Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 38.

[3] In my *Heidegger's Way of Being* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), I point out the affinities of Heidegger's later thinking with American authors such as Walt Whitman, e.e. cummings, and John Muir. With respect to Heidegger's "gods," one may consider these lines from John Muir on being in the presence of Yosemite Falls at midnight: "How interesting does man become considered in his relations to the spirit of this rock and water! How significant does every atom of our world become amid the influences of those beings unseen, spiritual, angelic mountaineers that so throng these pure mansions of crystal foam and purple granite." From his letter to Mrs. Ezra S. Carr, April 3, 1871.

also well-known as the bright and shining one, γλαυκῶπις. He considers the Greek word "γλαυκός" and observes that this adjective usually refers to "the radiant gleaming (*das strahlende Glänzen*) of the sea, the stars, the moon, but also the shimmer of the olive tree" (137/120). The published translation opts for "lustre" to translate his word *Glänzen*, and this is acceptable, of course, but I think that the word "gleaming" gets us much closer to the "shining forth" that he always had in view. In Chapter 2 of *Heidegger's Way of Being*, I highlight and discuss how this word *glänzen* is widely used by Heidegger and one of his most favored words in speaking of the "shining forth" of beings and of the Being-way itself – and, not surprisingly, he himself had pointed out that this very word was widely used and highly favored by Hölderlin in the first place.[4]

Athena's "eyes" are γλαυκός, that is, "gleaming and illuminating." It is for this reason, he adds, that the owl, whose eyes are "fiery-blazing," has the name ἡ γλαύξ in Greek and is forever associated with her, "a sign of her essence." The owl's bright eyes are able to see at night as well, and, correspondingly, Athena's bright and gleaming glance is able to "make visible what is otherwise invisible" (120/137). Yet where is Athena's illuminating glance directed? What is the "invisible" she has in view? The clue, he says, is to be found on the sacred relief in the Acropolis museum where Athena appears as the σκεπτομένη, "the meditating one."

What follows is a familiar motif but is now unfolded in terms of Athena as the meditating one. Athena's glance is turned toward "the boundary stone, to the boundary." Athena's bright eyes watch meditatively over the "boundary" or "limit" of things, but this limit is not a mere limitation or marker for the end of something. Rather, "limit," understood in a genuinely Greek manner, is what determines something coming to be in its ownmost character and fullness. Indeed, something *cannot* come to be unless it enters into its limit or boundary; its boundary is its very *being*. In this sense, then, Athena does not cast a meditative look only upon that which is brought forth by humans, but more broadly – and "above all," Heidegger states – upon that which allows all things of the earth and sky that require *no* human action and production to come into their "limit" and, therefore, their being. This *that-by-which* all such beings come to be is what the ancient Greeks named φύσις. Again, characteristically, he warns of the narrowing of the Greek understanding of φύσις in the Roman appropriation of φύσις as *natura*, but his central point is that the Greeks recognized (and therefore we may recognize once again) that φύσις is "that which emerges from itself forth into its respective limit and therein lingers" (138/121).[5]

Indeed, even today, he observes, "we are able to experience the fullness of the mystery of φύσις in Hellas, where in an astounding yet at the same time restrained manner there appears a mountain, an island, a coast, an olive tree." He admits that there is something to be said for the exceptional Greek visible "light" that allows us this experience, but this visible light is itself granted by another kind of light that is much more difficult to see (and

[4] Capobianco, *Heidegger's Way of Being*, especially Chapter 2 "On Hölderlin on 'Nature's Gleaming.'" See also: R. Capobianco, "Heidegger on Heraclitus: *Kosmos*/World as Being Itself", *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20:2 (Spring 2016), 465-476.

[5] Yet, for Heidegger, Hölderlin's "Nature" (*die Natur*) does indeed name φύσις in the richest Greek way, see Chapter 2 of *Heidegger's Way of Being*.

for this reason is comparatively "invisible," which Athena, like the owl, is able to see). Yet before naming this unique light, he emphasizes that it was the Greeks who first recognized that φύσις – "the whole of the world" – always already addresses human beings and lays claim upon them so that human "knowing and doing" is compelled to cor-respond to this claim. Athena has her gleaming eyes upon φύσις, and as we know from the wealth of Heidegger's other reflections on the earliest Greek thinkers and poets, φύσις is another name for Being. Recall, for instance, his decisive statement in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935): "Φύσις is Being itself."[6] Accordingly, although he does not name Being in this address, we may say that it is Being as φύσις that ever rises up to us, opens us, and draws us into cor-respondence (*Entsprechung*). As I have expressed in *Heidegger's Way of Being*: "φύσις endlessly arising, and we endlessly astonished."[7]

Art, then, is a "cor-respondence" to and with φύσις, and this belonging together of *techne* and φύσις is but another way of characterizing the relation of the human being to Being. He returns to the primordial "light" by which and through which everything comes to be gathered into what it is. This is the "lightning-flash" (*der Blitz*) of which Heraclitus speaks in fragment 64: "But the lightning steers everything." The lightning brings everything into its "limit" and "steers" everything into place. From Heidegger's many other elucidations of this fragment we know that he reads this "lightning-flash" as another name for Being as "the primordial Λόγος" that lets be and gathers all that is, but here he does not restate this. He simply observes that the lightning is hurled by Zeus, "the highest god," and that Athena is Zeus's daughter. Athena alone knows where the lightning is kept, as she herself tells us in Aeschylus's *Eumenides*. Heidegger sums up by observing that it is precisely because Athena has this "knowing" that she is the manifold counselor, πολύμητις; the brightly seeing one, γλαυκῶπις; and the goddess who meditates on φύσις, σκεπτομένη. We must hearken to Athena if we are "to understand even a little of the mystery of the provenance of art in Hellas."

OPENING TO A-ΛΗΘΕΙΑ: "OLDER" AND "MORE ENDURING" THAN THE HUMAN BEING

What follows in the lecture is a disquisition on the perils of the contemporary age that is dominated by cybernetic and technological modeling and thinking. The age of unremitting calculative thinking has largely cut us off from that very "region" that is the provenance of art. The ground that he covers here is familiar; he had been making these same observations in much the same way throughout the 1960s.[8] This is not to say, of course, that the details of his critique in this particular lecture are not worth examining, yet I am more interested in distilling one crucial component of his critique in order to get to the heart of the matter.

To do this, let us restate in another way what we have already discussed. For Heidegger, τέχνη, all human making, doing, and thinking – all human creation of whatever

[6] GA 40, 17. In translation: *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. G. Fried, R. Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 15.

[7] Capobianco, *Heidegger's Way of Being*, 64.

[8] See especially his 1965 talk in honor of Ludwig Binswanger titled "On the Question Concerning the Determination of the Matter for Thinking", trans. R. Capobianco, M. Göbel, *Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 14:2 (Spring 2010), 213-23.

kind – emerges by virtue of our openness to that "region" in which all things emerge. We may call this "region," along with the ancient Greeks, φύσις. Our unfolding "belongs" with the unfolding of φύσις. We create along with φύσις. Our "artful" gathering cor-responds with the primary gathering of φύσις. We might say, then, that our creation of any kind of "work" is always a "working with" Athena (or the other gods); that is, it is a "working with" φύσις, which Athena always has her gleaming eyes upon. Ultimately, therefore, our "working with" entails that, on one level, we yield, give way, release ourselves to φύσις, which is beyond our making and control. So what is the fundamental problem in the present age? If we distill Heidegger's message, it is this: The thoroughgoing *subjectivism* in the contemporary age has cut us off from our "source," φύσις. Two statements from his lecture bring this into sharpest relief:

> Industrial society constitutes the ultimate elevation of egoity [*Ichheit*], that is, of subjectivity. In it, the human being rests exclusively on itself and on the domains of its lived world, reworked into institutions. (124/144)

> This is subjectivity resting only on itself. All objects are attributed to this subject. Industrial society arrogantly proclaims itself as the absolute norm of every objectivity. (125/145)

At root, then, is this assumption, this conviction, that we are the "source" of all that "is" that has so deformed and disabled us in the contemporary age by blocking us from entering into the fullness of our "essence" *in relation* to Being as φύσις. Heidegger specifically points to the dominance of "industrial society," but what he is assailing more generally is the insistence, embedded in our contemporary culture in manifold ways, that the human being measures out all that "is" and that "world" refers to no more than the sum of all human meaning and naming, interests and concerns, action and producing. We have become forgetful that any particular being (*ein Seiendes*) is always more than how it is measured out by the human being, and that Being (*Sein*), the ontological temporal way or process wherein and whereby all beings issue forth, is always more than this human measure as well. The contemporary insistence on the human perspective (including the phenomenological insistence on the "first-person perspective") is the chief impediment to our opening to Being as φύσις – as Ἀλήθεια.

Ἀλήθεια. Finally, we arrive at the other Greek *Ur*-word. He calls upon us to take a "step-back" from the prevailing "egoity" of the present age in order to enter again into the fullness of our existence. This means recovering and restoring our relation to "the open and free domain" that bestows and grants all things, and this domain was named by the Greeks "Ἀ-λήθεια." Ἀ-λήθεια or "un-concealment" is the primordial "openness" that "does not do away with concealment; rather unconcealment is invariably in need of concealment" (127/147). He adds the hyphen in the Greek word Ἀ-λήθεια in order to emphasize that the dimension of concealment and reserve – the λήθη dimension – is intrinsic to all unconcealment.

Yet we also note that he capitalizes the Greek word Ἀλήθεια*,* as he had done on many occasions in his earlier work, and especially in the brilliant lecture courses on

Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Anaximander in the early 1940s.[9] In those places, Heidegger repeatedly stated that Ἀλήθεια is another name for Being – and we recognize this as his truly original and distinctive position on "truth": "Truth" is in the first place the unending temporal unfolding, the radiant emergence, of all that is. To put this succinctly, "is-ing" is "true-ing."[10] The capitalization of Ἀλήθεια signals the continuity with the earlier work. Ἀλήθεια as Being (Being as Ἀλήθεια) is the "open and free" domain or region that grants all unconcealment and yet also holds back in reserve. Ἀλήθεια as Being is, in the first place, the locus of unconcealment and concealment – *not the human being*, whatever our own activity of unconcealing and concealing.

This tells us most clearly that all persisting philosophical positions that posit the human being as the "source" of Being – that is, as the "source" of all unconcealment and concealment – are simply symptomatic of the hubris and narcissism of the prevailing modern subjectivism that the later Heidegger identified again and again as blocking us from entering into the fullness of our *Da-sein*.[11]

The Greeks glimpsed the "region" that bestows all things, including human beings and their "art," and they gave the name ἀλήθεια (Ἀ-λήθεια) to this region – but also φύσις, provided that we keep in view the originary indication of this word. That is, insofar as φύσις names only the pure "light" or pure transparency of unconcealment as it came to be understood among the Greek philosophers (Plato's εἶδος or Aristotle's μορφή, for example), then this name is not yet fundamental. Nevertheless, the earliest Greek thinkers and poets, and especially Heraclitus, had in view φύσις in the richest and fullest sense as the unending temporal emergence from concealment that always shelters concealment. Heidegger cites Heraclitus's fragment 123, as he had so many times before, φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, or as he translates this saying here: "To emerging-forth from itself, self-concealing properly belongs." What Heraclitus already knew we are called upon to know – and experience – once again for ourselves in the present age.

With a series of concluding questions, Heidegger makes the point that for us to restore and embrace our relation with (Being as φύσις as) Ἀλήθεια is for us to experience once again "awe" and "wonder" and "humility" (all translations of *Scheu*) before the unending temporal-spatial unfolding of all things and what "cannot be planned or controlled,

[9] See especially GA 55 *Heraklit*. Although published in 1979, this volume has not yet been translated into English, but for translations and discussion of these brilliant lecture courses, see *Heidegger's Way of Being*, Chapters 5 and 6, as well as the article, cited above, "Heidegger on Heraclitus: *Kosmos*/World as Being Itself."

[10] For more on the matter of Being as "primordial truth," see *Heidegger's Way of Being*, esp. Ch. 4.

[11] Heidegger studies needs to be open to considering how the best thinking in contemporary theoretical astrophysics (which is by no means mere "scientism" or "technicity") may dovetail Heidegger's later thinking of Being as "time-space" (*Zeit-Raum*) as Φύσις and Ἀλήθεια. We should consider, too, the remarkable nearness *in spirit* of the later Heidegger's theme of *Gelassenheit* ("releasement") with several of Albert Einstein's broader reflections: "A human being is part of the whole, as called by us, 'Universe,' a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from the rest – a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty." From a letter Einstein wrote at age 70 (dated 4 March 1950) to Norman Salit (Einstein Archives, 61-226). See also a similarly worded letter by Einstein dated 12 February 1950 to Robert Marcus (Einstein Archives, 60-424/425/426. In document 60-425 (in German), he also states: "Not to nourish the illusion but to try to overcome it is the way for us to reach the attainable measure of inner peace." With thanks to Chaya Becker, Archivist, Albert Einstein Archives, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

or calculated and made" by us. In other words, our releasement to Being is a releasement from our subjectivist prisons, and this holds out the promise of our "dwelling" once more, of our finding our home again "upon the earth." A dwelling and abiding, he says, that is once again open to listening to "the voice" (*Stimme*) of Ἀ-λήθεια.[12] An openness that is not necessarily opposed to ontic mastering, but rather an openness, a releasement, that tempers and keeps humble these ontic efforts. He adds that while we do not know what will become of the present age, we do know that:

> the Ἀ-λήθεια that conceals itself in the Greek light, and which grants this light in the first place, *is older and more primordial and consequently more enduring* than every work and fabrication devised by human beings and brought forth by the human hand. (128/149; my italics)

This is the culminating statement. He maintains that Ἀ-λήθεια grants the Greek light in the first place. What does this mean? He appears to be speaking of the "Greek light" of sheer unconcealment (εἶδος, ἰδέα, μορφή), which was the focus of Plato and Aristotle and the later medieval metaphysicians (*essentia*, *quidditas*, *actualitas*). Yet recall that the primordial light of Ἀ-λήθεια (as unconcealment-concealment) was indeed glimpsed by the earliest Greek thinkers Parmenides, Anaximander, and Heraclitus; it is the "lightning" of Zeus that grants and "steers" all things, the "lightning" that is intimately known by Athena.

But to the crucial part of the line: Ἀ-λήθεια is "older, more primordial, and consequently more enduring" than the human being and the full spectrum of "art." Let us be clear on the significance of what he is saying: Ἀ-λήθεια, this ancient Greek *Ur*-word for Being, is not dependent upon the human being. Being as Ἀ-λήθεια is *independent* of the human being; in other words, the "is-ing" of all things unfolds both before and after the human being. The later Heidegger made this point in several places, not simply in this lecture, and it captures the fundamental thrust of his thinking after *Being and Time*.[13]

Thus, what is at issue here is not the cor-relation of Being and the human being in the expanse of the duration of human beings; indeed, Heidegger always highlighted this cor-relation. What is at issue, and what he is repudiating in this talk (and elsewhere in the later work), is any human-centric position – including a strict transcendental-phenomenological position – that holds that Being "is" only insofar as the human being is. To put this more pointedly: The later Heidegger is *not* a phenomenologist in this strict sense. Indeed, it is any understanding of the "cor-relation" *that makes Being dependent upon the human being* that is ruled out by his emphatic statement – and it must be ruled out if we are to take a step in thinking toward breaking free of the prevailing and unrelenting "egoity" or "subjectivism" that has taken hold of the modern and contemporary age and

[12] For more on "the voice" of Being as the primordial *Logos*, see Chapter 6 of *Heidegger's Way of Being.*

[13] See especially Chapter 1 of *Heidegger's Way of Being* and "Heidegger on Heraclitus: *Kosmos*/World as Being Itself." The later Heidegger "turned" away from his own transcendentally inclined statements about *Sein* in *Being and Time* and in other places in the early work; for example, in *Being and Time*, section 43(c). For more on this, see my "In the *Black Notebooks*: Heidegger's 'Turn' Away from the Transcendental-Phenomenological Positioning of *Being and Time* to the Thinking of Being as Ἀλήθεια and Φύσις", in *Zur Hermeneutik von Heideggers "Schwarzen Heften"*, *Heidegger-Jahrbuch* 11, ed. A. Denker, H. Zaborowski (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2017).

that has installed the human being as the measure of all things. We are called to recall, as he states in another place, that "[Being as] κόσμος is the measure-giving; the measure that κόσμος gives is it itself as φύσις."[14]

Being (as φύσις as ἀλήθεια as κόσμος) is the "measure" that is not made by us, and Heidegger is perfectly clear about this: "It [Being itself (*Sein selbst*)] is nothing made and has therefore also no determinate beginning at a point in time and no corresponding ending of its existence."[15] Yet this is so hard for us to understand and accept in the contemporary age – except most notably in the *best* thinking of theoretical physics and science (which cannot be dismissed as mere "scientism"). Accordingly, it is possible for us to consider (even if Heidegger did not) that his later thinking joins the reflections of theoretical science in this: setting all things free from our measure.

[14] "Heidegger on Heraclitus: *Kosmos*/World as Being Itself", 473; GA 55, 171.
[15] "Heidegger on Heraclitus: *Kosmos*/World as Being Itself", 470; GA 55, 166.

Krzysztof Ziarek

EVENT AND NOTHINGNESS

Three paragraphs from the conclusion of "What is Metaphysics?", Heidegger offers a summary of the significance of the disclosive force of the nothing in *Dasein*.

> Only because the nothing is manifest in the ground of *Dasein* can total strangeness of beings overwhelm us. Only when the strangeness of being oppresses us does it arouse and evoke wonder. Only on the ground of wonder – the manifestness of the nothing – does the "why?" loom before us. Only because the "why" is possible as such can we in a definite way inquire into the grounds and ground things. Only because we can question and ground things is the destiny of our existence placed in the hands of the researcher.[1]

> *Einzig weil das Nichts im Grunde des Daseins offenbar ist, kann die volle Befremdlichkeit des Seienden über uns kommen. Nur wenn die Befremdlichkeit des Seienden uns bedrängt, weckt es und zieht es auf sich die Verwunderung. Nur auf dem Grunde der Verwunderung – d.h. der Offenbarkeit des Nichts – entspringt erst das "Warum?". Nur weil das Warum als solches möglich ist, können wir in bestimmter Weise nach Gründen fragen und begründen. Nur weil wir fragen und begründen können, ist unserer Existenz das Schicksal des Forschers in die Hand geben.*[2]

It is thanks to nothingness that beings disclose themselves to us as beings in the first place and that we can experience their strangeness. Such aroused wonder leads to asking the question "why?", thus opening the inquiry into beings and, in turn, making science and knowledge possible. The significance and peculiarity of this question is that it also, and from the start, puts the questioner in question. The upshot of this paragraph, and of the whole essay, is the following: uniquely because of the nothing, that is, when the human being is held out into the nothing, hovers over it, and holds the site of nothingness in *Dasein*, is there questioning, thought, philosophy, culture, technology, etc.

The paragraph comprises five sentences, which, in the English translation, all begin with the adverb "only." In the German, however, only four of the sentences begin with the corresponding "*nur*," while the opening sentence starts with "*einzig*," which means that the

[1] M. Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?", in *Pathmarks*, ed. W. H. McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 95-96.
[2] M. Heidegger, "Was ist Metaphysik?", in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 120.

adverb *einzig* stands as the initial word of the passage. To maintain this difference in the English translation, the paragraph might begin, instead of "only," with "solely" or perhaps "uniquely." The difference is minor, even perfunctory, and I discovered it by comparing the German and the English texts only because what caught my eye while rereading the German original was the appearance of *einzig* in the same – crucial and summary – sentence together with the German term for the nothing: *das Nichts*. Once I noticed *einzig* figuring prominently as the opening word of the entire paragraph, it struck me as noteworthy and significant that in Heidegger's German the four subsequent sentences all begin with a different adverb, *nur*, which both links these four sentences to the initial statement and yet, at the same time, distinguishes them – perhaps deliberately – from it, and does so without abolishing or interrupting the cumulative sequence. The English translation, in which "only" begins all five sentences of the paragraph in question, erases the possible distinctness in resonance, if not meaning, between *einzig* and *nur*.[3]

Since the translation treated the difference between *einzig* and *nur* as insignificant in this particular context, the poetic inclination in my ear prompted me to reverse course, as it were, and try to explore this paragraph, in fact the entire essay, and even more broadly, the question of the nothing in Heidegger, specifically with a view to the potential significance of the discreteness of *einzig* and *nur*, even deliberately to amplify the difference, and probe where its importance could lie. Obviously, it is not the translation that is at issue here but rather the way it helps illustrate, through the ease with which it glides over the apparently miniscule semantic difference between *einzig* and *nur*, the issue of singularity as it signals itself in Heidegger's German. The translation can also be helpful in the context of this inquiry because it appears to proceed with the priority of meaning in view, rather than with primary attentiveness directed to the manner in which Heidegger thinks and writes. For, obviously, *einzig* and *nur* are two distinct words in German, even if their meanings as adverbs often tend to overlap.

I dwell on this point as an occasion to remark on the dominant tendency in philosophy, and in thought more broadly, to give priority to meaning over other aspects of language and expression; in other words, to draw attention to the precedence of signification and ideas over listening and the subtleties of sound, over particularities or idiomatics of expression. I do so primarily because the poetic in thinking, and thinking as poetic rather than as discursive or propositional thought, is so crucially important in Heidegger's work. Even if this approach to thinking is not yet explicitly thematized in "What is Metaphysics?," it is already signaled by the performative gestures of Heidegger's text. What happens if, in this context, we let our thinking be guided by the discreteness of *einzig* and *nur*, even if, on the surface at least, there seems to be no significant difference in meaning?

[3] Like the English version, the translation into Polish also effaces the distinction between *einzig* and *nur*, so that all sentences begin with *tylko*: "Tylko dlatego ze nasza przytomność opiera się na jawności nicości, opaść nas może cała osobliwość bytu. Tylko wtedy gdy trapi nas osobliwość bytu, pobudza on i ściąga na siebie nasze zdziwienie. Tylko na podstawie zdziwienia, to znaczy ujawnienia się nicości, może się pojawić „dlaczego?". Tylko dzięki temu, że „dlaczego?" jest możliwe jako takie, możemy w określony sposób zapytywać o podstawy, o zasady i uzasadniać. Tylko dlatego, że możemy zapytywać i uzasadniać, naszej egzystencji powierzony jest los badacza." Cf. M. Heidegger, "Czym jest metafizyka?", trans. K. Pomian, in *Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane*, ed. K. Michalski (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1977), 45-46.

In contrast to the English translation, the French rendering does reflect the distinction between *einzig* and *nur*, using "*C'est uniquement*" in the sentence opening the paragraph, and "*Ce n'est que*" in the following four sentences.[4] Yet the French translation slightly modifies the grammatical structure by beginning every sentence with the indefinite demonstrative pronoun *ce*, while the English preserves the inversion and the emphasis in the German by retaining "only" in the accentuated initial position in each sentence of the paragraph in question. Both of those details – the erasure of the distinction between *einzig* and *nur* in English and the undoing of the inversion, which displaces both *einzig* and *nur* from the initial syntactical positions by the French pronoun *ce* – are important to the issue at hand. The first is, one could say, a matter of semantics, the second, a matter of syntax. Together, both are a matter of language, not simply of linguistics but rather of the language, the saying, or perhaps the poetics, of thinking. For it is significant that in this crucial paragraph all five sentences place adverbs (*einzig* and *nur*), not nouns or pronouns, at the beginning, giving these adverbs an additional and, by the end of the passage, also a cumulative emphasis. Repeated five times, the adverbs starting the sentences stand out as the focal point of thinking.

Significantly, this focal point is not the subject, whether syntactical or logical. *Einzig*, and then *nur*, are not the grammatical subjects of the sentences, nor the subject-matter of the thinking gathered into the paragraph. Yet, despite these appearances, is this adverb not perhaps the very matter of this paragraph and thus of thinking, of poetic thinking, as the latter comes to prominence in Heidegger's subsequent writings? Should we perhaps be adventurous here and follow Gertrude Stein's prompt, who in her continually challenging writing emphasized precisely adverbs, certainly over static and "dead" nouns, but even over verbs? If we take Heidegger's point about poetic thinking seriously, take it – as we should – perhaps even beyond the scope of his own ways of exploring the poetic (*Dichtung*) in his readings of Hölderlin, Rilke or Trakl, then the question of prefixes, suffixes, prepositions, and, yes, adverbs and adverbial modifiers, assumes a decisive position. It becomes *the* matter of thinking. It provokes us to call into question the approach that, in the realms of truth and knowledge, philosophy – though this problem is certainly not limited to philosophical thought – tends to privilege ideas, meaning, statements, and, grammatically speaking, nouns, often disqualifying and excluding other ways of thinking, saying and writing. When Heidegger writes: "time times", "space spaces", "world worlds" or "*Das Ereignis ereignet*", it is to break, or at least to loosen, the exclusive hold of propositional grammar, and thus of nouns, meaning, and ideas, over the way of thinking, that is, to fracture the hold of what might be called the philosophical grammar of thought, which has been sedimented and solidified through centuries of practice. This is precisely why the end of his 1961 lecture "Time and Being" declares that the necessity of speaking in

[4] "C'est uniquement parce que le rien est manifeste au fond de l'être-là que peut venir sur nous la pleine étrangeté de l'étant. Ce n'est que si l'étrangeté de l'étant nous presse que celuici éveille et appelle à soi l'étonnement. Ce n'est que sur le fond de l'étonnement – c'est-àdire de la manifestation du rien – que surgit le « pourquoi ? ». Ce n'est que parce que le pourquoi comme tel est possible que nous pouvons d''une manière déterminée, questionner sur les raisons et fonder en raison. Ce n'est que parce que nous pouvons questionner et fonder en raison que le destin du chercheur est remis à notre existence." Cf. M. Heidegger, "Qu'est-ce que la métaphysique?", trans. R. Munier, in *Cahier de L'Herne nº 45: Martin Heidegger*, ed. M. Haar (Paris: Éditions de l'Herne, 1983), 56.

propositional statements is in fact an impediment to thinking, because it focuses attention on the meaning of statements rather than on the movement of language and the way of thinking. "The saying of event [*Ereignis*] in the form of a lecture remains an obstacle of this kind. The lecture has spoken merely in propositional statements."[5] By contrast, Heidegger's quasi-tautological phrases snare thinking to dwell between the subject and the predicate, to hover in-between these parts of speech and grammatical functions in ways similar to how he deploys hyphens to make one pause and linger between prefixes and stems of the key words of his thinking, instead of rushing over them, treating them as transparent and simply subsuming them into their meaning or guiding ideas. These deliberate phrasings let thought stay the sequential course of language and remain for a while in the empty space of the between. The empty spaces between subjects and predicates enclosed within the quasi-tautological locutions as well as the hyphens opening and spanning key terms in Heidegger, all recall the "originary" hyphen of his thought, the one splicing *Da-sein*. As such, they also all pivot attention specifically to the nothing that, as "What is Metaphysics?" puts it, manifests in the ground of *Dasein* as its own, proper abyss (*Abgrund*). "*Dasein* means: being held out into the nothing."[6] Abiding in these hyphens and tautological sayings actuates the while that temporally underwrites presence in its momentum of arising/disappearing. Lingering a while becomes the scansion of Heidegger's, and even more so of our, poetic thinking, as it metes out time and being in their play as the very matter of thinking. It is important not to forget that this scansion illustrates in fact the rhythm of the nothing.

The paragraph with which I opened this essay is constructed as a sequence of statements that all use the preceding sentence as the ground from which what they describe derives: from the nothing in *Dasein* unfolds the strangeness of beings, then wonder and the question "why?", then the possibility of ground and the grounding of beings, and, finally, the gesture of placing the destiny of existence in the hands of researchers. What further enhances this sense of aggregate derivation is the repetition of the syntactic inversion as the grammatical structure of all five sentences composing the paragraph. Only in the context of this cumulative repetition of inversion, the fact that in German Heidegger uses *einzig* and not *nur* in the opening assertion manifests its significance. To put it simply, the distinction between *einzig* and *nur* marks, employing Heidegger's early parlance, the difference between the ontological and the ontic level of analysis. The paragraph's first sentence pertains to the nothing pulsing in *Dasein*, and thus to the ontological dimension of being. Subsequent statements, all beginning with *nur*, refer to the ontic level of beings: their strangeness, the question of the "why?" of their existence, the inquiry into the grounding of beings, and the role of the human beings in this questioning. While it cannot be certain that this was all well thought-out or intended by Heidegger, given how careful and performative a thinker and a writer he was, it is hard not to see deliberateness in the construction of this pivotal paragraph: in its use of inversion, repetition, and the crucial, yet understated distinction between *einzig* (singularly) and *nur* (only). For this seemingly innocuous phraseological distinction in fact actuates the ontico-ontological difference, not

[5] M. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. J. Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 24.
[6] Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 91.

just conceptually but also by inscribing it within the very language forming the thought as it unfolds and takes shape. It thus introduces a more pronounced pause between the first and the following four statements, enticing thought to linger in the between and pay attention to the crucial turn from the ontological to the ontic. In this way, the paragraph highlights the incommensurability of the ontological irruption of the nothing, while both linking it to the statements about the ontic derived from it and disallowing its subsumption into the same line of questioning. "Nihilation will not submit to calculation in terms of annihilation and negation. The nothing itself nihilates."[7] This irruption takes place not only on the level of the concept or meaning but also within what could be called the language-way of thinking.

Before turning more directly to the question of the nothing and to the problematic of singularity, one more element of Heidegger's language needs to be addressed. In the paragraph under discussion, the adverb *einzig* and in two cases also the adverb *nur* are followed by the conjunction *weil*, translated into English as "because" and into French as *parce que*. Taken and translated this way, the conjunction becomes causal and in English it inscribes cause literally into its word-form: "be-cause," that is, by cause, by reason of. The statements thus appear to operate within the paradigm of cause and effect, according to which the nothing manifest in *Dasein* renders beings strange, and which then prompts the question "why?", and so on. And yet, in the context of Heidegger's rethinking of temporality and presence, the conjunction *weil* needs to be read, I would argue, not with regard to causation but in terms of abiding and lingering, which describe the momentum, and the scansion of the clearing of the time-space in which beings and their relations, including those of causality, become manifest. The conjunction *weil* cannot but be related in Heidegger to the idiom of abiding and lingering, that is, to scansion of the while: to *Weile* (a while), *verweilen*, or *jeweilig*. Etymology suggests that *weil* comes from the Old High German *hwīla*, used for example in *thiu hwīla sō* or *thiu wīla sō*, that is, *so lange wie*, "so long as." The cognate word, written with a "ch" as *chwila*, is the Polish word for a while or a moment. What is important is that *weil* indicates temporality, a span or an interval, before it becomes transformed into a causal conjunction. It concerns lasting, and in this sense, is akin to the German terms *währen* (to last) and *während* (during). However, its usage later moves from temporal to causal, which can be taken to be indicative of the slippage of thought from holding out into and hovering over the nothing to constructing causal or derivational chains of descent. This is why, whether Heidegger intended it or not, we need to read "*einzig weil*" not in the causative register as "only because" but rather in terms of the while: "singularly while": "Singularly while the nothing manifests in *Dasein*, can the total strangeness of beings overwhelm us." Translated this way, the sentence is not about the nothing leading to or prompting the experience of the strangeness of beings, but rather about how letting thought linger in the while of the nothing allows the strangeness of the fact that there are beings rather than nothing to manifest.

It is crucial to this way of thinking that "*weil*/while" be resonant in all its possible lexical and syntactical registers: as noun, verb, conjunction, and, above all, as adverb. Moreover, my analysis of the paragraph from "What is Metaphysics?" indicates that

[7] Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 90.

the question of the nothing rides on the ability not only to unfold the full scope of this resonance but also to anchor thinking, to let it abide, in the adverbial. Neither the nominal nor the verbal is primary here but precisely the adverbial: the nominal, the verbal, and the conjunctive arise from and, more often than not, congeal or conceal the adverbial. Thought from the event, from its nothing, "*einzig weil*" would not simply mean "solely or singularly while" but also emphasize the fact that each time the while is singular: it does not repeat, being only one time. The nothing's "while" is always singular *ein mal*, *einmalig*. As becomes evident in Heidegger's *Ereignis*-manuscripts, the understanding of *einzig* pivots on the notion of *Einmaligkeit* (one-timeness) and on *das Einst* (the once). This amplification of the resonance of the adverbial is perhaps what it would mean to think the nothing poetically, in terms of *Dichtung*, rather than conceptually, let alone in terms of negation or annihilation. To think the nothing not as the negative backdrop to beings but as inhering in and giving the momentum to the unfolding of beings: "The nothing does not merely serve as the counterpoint of beings; rather, it originally belongs to their essential unfolding as such. In the being of beings the nihilation of the nothing occurs."[8]

What Heidegger describes as *Nichten* or sometimes as *Nichtung*, as the nihilation of the nothing, transpires in the register of *Einmaligkeit*, of the singular as one-time or once only. The nothing, or more properly its nihilation, overwhelms not simply because of its sweeping pulse that repels all beings, but also because its irruption is always one-time, without repetition. It is like nothing else ever – and it is so because the nothing in Heidegger has an inceptual character: not only is it not negative or null, it in fact actuates each time the beginning. Describing the event as the counterturning of the departure (*Abschied*) and difference/scission (*Unterschied*), Heidegger remarks: "This counter-turning conceals the essential belonging of the nihilation, i.e., of the inceptual (not null) nothingness, to beyng [*Seyn*]."[9] It is through human attentiveness to nihilation in the event that "previously beingless beings" [*vormals seinlosen* {*Seienden*}] eventuate and manifest as beings.[10] What is inceptual about nothingness is precisely the refusal or denial (*Versagung*) of the beginning. In letting begin, the beginning, in its proper nihilation, mis-says (*ver-sagen*) itself.[11] Yet, mindful of the way the prefix *ver-* works in Heidegger's thought often against the dictionary meaning of words, this refusal is also a torqued way that *Nichten* "says" itself, and does so through an extreme way of saying, intensified and brought to the very edge saying, as the German prefix *ver-* suggests. This saying is not human, and not a matter of language. It is the voice (*Stimme*) of being that disposes and tunes (*Stimmen*) the human response and thus human languages. In this sense, the *Ver-sagung* is speechless, or, language-less, where this "lessness" becomes the most extreme or radical way of saying that marks the word of beyng, as Heidegger explains: "The event is the inceptual word, because its arrogation (as the unique adoption of the human being into the truth of beyng) disposes the human essence to the truth of being (...) the event-related

[8] Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 91.
[9] M. Heidegger, *The Event*, trans. R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), 128.
[10] Heidegger, *The Event*, 138; *Das Ereignis*, GA 71 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2009), 161.
[11] Heidegger, *The Event*, 144.

beginning (i.e., beyng as abyssal in its truth) is the inceptually disposing voice: the word. The essence of the word resides in the event-related beginning."[12] And: "We are still unable to apprehend that this claim [*Anspruch*] of the beginning is an addressing and a claiming that eventuates in what is speechless [*Sprachlosigkeit*/absence of language, release from language in the usual sense] (...).What appears to be the absence of language [*Sprache*; not "speech" as the translation has it], that is, the absence of signs and words [*der Wörter und des Wortes*], is, thought inceptually and essentially, only the pure event of the word as the disposing voice of beyng."[13] The disposition (*Stimmung*) of the voice (*Stimme*) that *is* the event is *jeweilig einmalig*: it only ever happens once, and is singular in the adverbial sense of being one-time and non-repeatable: *das Einst*. This "adverbial" thinking returns the dignity to beyng (*Seyn*), to each singular, semelfactive while of being, and thus, as Heidegger remarks, also to every and any being: singular not simply in their beingness but in each non-repeatable moment of their being.

It is this assignation to the beginning, which each time arises though the nihilation, that singularizes any and every being, not just humans, but non-human and non-living beings alike. "The essence of the event grounds the fact that every being is admitted into a uniqueness and is more proper the more essentially it is at any time the individual of a singling out as unique. Individuality in this sense is essentially distinct from the particularization and instantiation of the individual 'cases' which are set off against the 'universal.'"[14] Heidegger's use of *jeweilig*, translated as "at any time," indicates that the singling out and uniqueness discussed here are not thought on the level of "beingness" but in terms of being and its event, that is, with regard to the once of each while. This uniqueness, or better singularity, is always inaugural, a matter of beginning: it is *jeweilig* in its adverbial sense: at this sole time, in this sole while.

The analysis of the subtleties of Heidegger's use of *einzig*, *einmalig*, or *das Einst* prompts revising the way that singularity is understood. The unique as the singular in Heidegger does not obtain on the level of the beingness of beings, for such singularity would suggest that there are simply no other beings like the one in question. Rather, singularity pertains to being, to the event; that is, it is occasioned only ever one time. We could rewrite the first sentence of the paragraph with which I began my paper so that it starts with "*einst*" to underscore the semelfactivity at issue here. It is simply the fact that being-time is always singular in its momentum of turning into a while or a moment. The fact that it is always this moment as the only moment there ever is, or that it could ever only be this moment and not the next one, is due to the nothing of the event. Because of the nothing, that is, because of *Nichtung* (nihilation), the event transpires in the register of the once (*das Einst*). What can be extrapolated from Heidegger's use of *einzig*, *einmalig*, and *einst* is that singularity is not to be thought initially with regard to beings, as a noun or an adjective, that is, as a property or a characteristic of beings, as it has been most often debated. It is also not the fact that the singular is always already plural, as in Nancy's "singular plural," but rather that singularity works already, and first of all, adverbially.

[12] Heidegger, *The Event*, 145.
[13] Heidegger, *The Event*, 146; *Das Ereignis*, 172.
[14] Heidegger, *The Event,* 140; *Das Ereignis*, 164.

Singularity is a matter, or in fact *the* matter of modality; it is modal, adverbial, spanning ever only a while. It is the extension, the obtaining of the while, indicated for instance in Heidegger's use of the verb *Reichen* in "Time and Being," that occurs semelfactively. If the adjective *semelfactive* is used nowadays almost exclusively in linguistics to indicate an event that is punctual, perfective and complete in itself, and thus also atelic and non-iterative, I want to argue that semelfactivity as drawn out of Heidegger is not adjectival but adverbial. *The Event* describes the "that it is" of beyng in the following way: "But this "that it is" of beyng does not merely fall under the determination of uniqueness [*Einzigkeit*], as if there were a "uniqueness" existing in itself; instead, this "that it is" is the unique beginning of all uniqueness, which allows for the essential occurrence of the abyssal separation in relation to the nothingness of beyng and becomes the origin of all experience of beyng."[15] The uniqueness or singularity (*Einzigkeit*) occurs in truth as *Einmaligkeit*: as one-timeness. The nothing nihilates ever once, as *das Einst*. Other determinations of singularity: on the level of beings or their beingness, as the singular plural of being, etc., are determinations that are let be through the adverbial once of the event, whereby the scission of nothingness and being takes place, allowing "all experience of beyng."[16] *Semelfactive* here would characterize the yet non-temporal scansion of the while, of this only while, each time *jeweilig*. It would be a scansion that does not ever let itself be inscribed in the temporalization that it itself underwrites but works instead as what adverbially draws and holds past, present, and future with regard to one another. In terms of Heidegger's essay "Time and Being", the nearness or nearhood as the fourth dimension of temporality can be thought of as semelfactive in this sense. Singularity is of the dimension of the while, of this once only while and its intrinsic nothingness. Only because of the working of the nothing, of its singular, one-time "sense," is there singularity as a characteristic or a property, or as singular or unique beings, or even as singular circumstances or occurrences.

The eminently singular sense of the nothing needs to be thought not only with regard to being but in relation to both being and time, to time *and* being as the matter of thinking. "What is Metaphysics?" refigures the nothing by detaching it from the traditional binary of being and nothingness, and by freeing it from its determinations in terms of negation and annihilation. In this manner, the essay articulates the question of being through the prism of the nothing more forcefully than *Being and Time* does. By the same token, it still keeps the problematic of the nothing within the purview of being, and it is only with the subsequent writings on the *Ereignis* as well as the short late essay "Time and Being" and the seminar that followed it that the need to understand the nothing with regard to both time and being, perhaps even specifically in regards to the conjunction between them, to their "*Sach-Verhalt*", becomes evident. In the manuscripts devoted to the *Ereignis* and in the post-World War II essays, for instance, in "The Thing", nothingness is no longer thought solely or primarily in relation to being, for instance as its opposite, obverse, or negation, as has been the case in the metaphysical tradition of Western thought, but rather through the prism of the event and later in terms of the world as the fourfold. With the introduction of the event, it becomes manifest that the nothing needs to be thought

[15] Heidegger, *The Event*, 144-145.
[16] Heidegger, *The Event*, 145.

more inceptually, that is, *from* the event, as belonging *to* the event and being *of* the event. In other words, at that point at issue is the nothing of the event. It becomes the matter of the inception (*Anfang*), of the event as bringing, in each once opening time-space, what is beingless (*das Seinlose*) into being. Human beings, transformed into mortals through their "standing" (*Inständigkeit*) in *Dasein*, become the watchers or the guardians of the nothing, the only ones who can keep being in its spacing and temporalization in view of the nothing proper to the event.

Even if one insists that the nothing belongs originarily and without reprieve in the relation to being, its momentum, *Nichten* or nihilating, underwrites the "*es gibt*" (the there is/it gives) through which Heidegger describes the event in "Time and Being". Nihilating is the limen of giving through which the event takes place in the self-erasing figure of *es gibt*. Once again, we encounter a phrase in Heidegger that suspends the subject/predicate grammar, this time perhaps even more radically, since the grammatical subject "*es*" is a non-subject that empties itself in the very gesture of its non/inscription. This self-erasure or canceling is in fact a kind of emptying or voiding, a nihilation that lets what comes to be given manifest as time and being. In this manner nihilation insists in time and being. Even though time and being appear to be continuous, nihilation forms their proper interstice. It is an empty, inapparent between in the seemingly continuous unfolding into time and being. As the Latin source of the English interstice, *intersistere*, makes clear, the nothings nihilates (*das Nichts nichtet*) by standing in-between, voiding each moment of time and being from within. One could say that nihilating exists within, that is, insists, literally, in-stands (from the Latin *insistere*) in time and being, never separate from them nor identical with their manifestations as presencing and temporalization. Presence and temporalization owe their being given to nihilation, that is, to their being properly given in withholding, refusal, or emptying. In this manner, *Nichten* or nihilating under-lines both time and being, tracing their hold on each other, that is, their reciprocal bearing, as the very matter of thinking. The interchange, and the trading off of their reciprocal bearings constitutes the *Verhalt* of the *Sach-verhalt*, of the "fact" that is called "time and being", the fact that "there is time and being." In addition to intensifying the mutual bearing of time and being, the prefix *ver-* in *Verhalt* also shows the easy slippage, the potential mis-hold that makes being appear as presence and time manifest in the guise of a sequence of nows. This is why the morpheme *ver-* in *Verhalt* could perhaps also be said to bespeak the Janus-faced character of the event: *Ereignis* unfolds properly only as *Enteignis*. "Thought from the eventuating [*vom Ereignen*], this [that is, what is most proper to the event] means: it expropriates [*enteignet*; de-events] itself of itself. To event as such belongs the de-event."[17]

As event, the *Ereignis* does not offer itself in any positive manner, but precisely as its own ex- or dispropriation. It events by dis- or deventuating: *Ereignis* gives only as *Enteignis*; or there is *Ereignis* only as *Enteignis*. The German prefix *er-*, indicating the instantiation of occurrence and the bringing about of the proper, does so only at the cost, and at the bidding, of its instantaneous turning into its apparent opposite, *ent-*, thus voiding, pulling back, contracting and emptying presence, and even the giving that

[17] Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, 22-23; *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1969), 23.

instantiates it. The "disevent" (*Enteignis*) properly constitutes the event and it does so because of the nothing that pulses in it. In other words, the event "dis/events" through its proper *Nichten*/nihilating. To give what is proper to the event, being and time, the event can only do so in the manner of *Nichten*. The proper of the event, its time and being, manifests as a presencing (*Anwesen*) that withholds presence and as a nearness that, while letting past, present, and future unfold, never comes into time, never consents to be present. The event properly occurs as *Enteignis* because nihilation (*Nichten*) is eschatological; its rise is an eschatological turn into the going under, into disappearance. That turn is always one-time, singular, to the point of non-repetition. It is eschatological because it always ends the once and irrevocably, without recall or return. Finitude is always ever here, only now. It is not at the end of time, nor does it denote a limited stretch of time, just as it does not pertain to last things. Nihilation is eschatological in the sense of the once that is always the last. Only while *Enteignis* actuates *Ereignis*, while it properly voids what is proper to it – that is, nihilates the proper – is there the question of being and of beings, of time and being. Describing this singularity as a turn or a moment, or even as *Ereignis*, fails because at issue is not a something that could be captured through a noun, have its features or characteristics described with the use of adjectives, or even have its enactment be presented through a verb. For this singularity obtains adverbially: *einzig*, *einmalig*, *einst*.

Piotr Nowak

NOTHINGNESS AND ABSENCE

The eye does not go thither, nor speech, nor mind.
We do not know, we do not understand, how anyone can teach it.
It is different from the known,
it is also above the unknown,
thus we have heard from those of old, who taught us this.
Kena Upanishad, I:3-4[1]

THE TWO WAYS

I will begin my essay on the subject of nothingness and absence by ruling out the possibility of either of them: one cannot speak or know of that which is not. In support of this firmly "nominalist" thesis, I will refer to a text by Parmenides, which is, up to the eighth fragment (according to Diels' classification), concerned with the investigation of being:

> There is only one Way left to be spoken of, namely that *it is*. And on this way are many marks, that what is unborn and imperishable; whole and unique, and immovable, and without end (in time); nor was it ever, nor will it be, since it is now all at once, one, continuous. For what birth of it wilt thou look for? In what way and whence did it grow? Nor shall I let thee say or think that it came from what is not; for it cannot be said or thought that 'it is not.' And what need could have stirred it up, starting from nothing, to be born later rather than sooner? Thus it must either be altogether or not at all.
>
> Nor will the force of belief suffer to arise out of what is not something over and above it. Wherefore Justice (δίκη) with her fetters does not let it loose or suffer it either to come into being or to perish, but holds it fast. The decision concerning these things lies in this: *It is, or it is not*. But the decision has been given, as is necessary: to leave alone the one Way as unthinkable and unnameable – for it is no true Way – and that the other Way is real and true.[2]

Let us notice that, since the very beginning, since the dawn of Western thought – that is thinking *tout court* – nothingness, non-being, nonexistence, and absence have been

[1] Trans. F. Max Müller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1879), 147.
[2] F. Macdonald Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides. Parmenides'* Way of Truth *and Plato's* Parmenides *translated with an Introduction and a Running Commentary* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co, 1939), 35-37.

excluded from reflection on being, as if nothingness did not exist, as if we did not stumble over it daily, as if nothingness weren't there. "Thus the problem of being and not-being was twisted by Parmenides into a problem of what is and what is not," Ernst Tugendhat observes, "with the grotesque but consistent result that there is just a singly unmoved being, because with what is not not-being was also excluded."[3] Whence this sudden haste, these urgent Eleatic pronouncements, this issuing of orders and prohibitions regarding that which can be thought about and what is best not thought about at all? That we do not know. We are too far removed from the source and its wisdom. We can only project onto Parmenides our own understanding of these matters – an understanding that we have developed based non-Eleatic sources.

I believe that the key source, one that is the least aphoristic and elliptical, is Plato's the *Sophist*. Its usefulness is even greater in that it constitutes what is essentially a direct polemic with Parmenides' standpoint. Let us listen in on a conversation between the two philosophers to learn just how high the stakes of this debate are.

SOMETHING IS GONE

Somewhere near the beginning of the main section of the dialogue (233c)[4] the Stranger, not without reason associated with Plato, depicts the sophists as having the ability to "conjure" reality, to replace that which is with that which is not, and – as lies are inventions – perhaps even with that which never was. Nowadays, such individuals are referred to as frauds, con artists, public relations officers, propaganda artists – people who view the world askew, if at all (239e). It is worth noting at this point the Stranger's observation that such people are removed by life itself, by its truth. Suffice it to say that those who have been deceived are confronted with the quotidian in a painful manner. They will then immediately reconsider the opinions about the world which, influenced by the "conjurer, they had accepted as valid. This process is known as maturing. But it is not upbringing that is central to the discussion, though the topic is broached. As he differentiates between that which is and that which appears to us to be, the Stranger explains that behind the curtain woven from words themselves, a curtain that presents to us a beautiful tableau, there is also – or rather: there is, more importantly – reality itself. If we limit ourselves to its verbal aspect, then we will never discover *if* and *how* it is. The Stranger encourages us to step fearlessly into life, not to remain at its threshold of words, lest it – life, not the threshold – pass us by.

The conversation now shifts to the art of deception (ἀπατητικὴ τέχνη), that is, to the production of images (εἴδωλα). The Stranger discusses the example of Phidias. Phidias is a sculptor who reveals the beauty enclosed in stone. When he attempts to sculpt in it someone's image, he gives it unnatural proportions, disregarding the actual dimension of the object which he is imitating. His goal is to render it beautifully, not faithfully. Is that always the case? No, of course not. There are artists whose quills and chisels dart to and fro in a flurry of movement, artists who warp reality in good or bad faith, but there are also veristic artists, ones who are guided by a sense of realism. The latter "merely" duplicate

[3] E. Tugendhat, *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy. Lectures on the Philosophy of Language*, trans. P. A. Gorner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 33-34.

[4] Plato, *Theaetetus. Sophist*, trans. H. N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921). Subsequent references are provided in parentheses.

reality, dividing it into the object and its faithful replica. Does that make them any less guilty? It would appear so, considering that Plato – not just in the *Sophist*, but also in other works, including *Theaetetus* – explicitly states that it is one thing to intentionally produce deformed images of objects, and another to study and reproduce their proportions at a one-to-one scale. Is visual perception the decisive factor? Quite the contrary: realism in art is enabled by the mind's comprehension of geometry. Here Plato reveals his apriorism: to him, it is the human mind, not the senses, that serves as the means of cognition.

Let us return to the problem of the absence of being, which we will examine not ontologically – as an object – but rather epistemologically – linguistically. Is non-being knowable? Can it somehow be experienced? Perhaps we might even be able to say something about it, for example, by lying and claiming that that which *is not* in fact *is*, and that which *is* is not? Let us examine in particular the latter possibility.

"For the matter of appearing and seeming, but not being, and of saying things, but not true ones – all this is now and always has been very perplexing. You see, Theaetetus, it is extremely difficult to understand how a man is to say or think that falsehood really exists and in saying this not be involved in contradiction" (236e). What does the Stranger mean by this? What is it exactly that he finds extremely difficult? What poses a difficulty is the status of false things. The point is to examine whether false statements are founded on false objects, or whether they imply a false reality, that is, that which does not exist. How can we resolve this matter? In fact, we do it every time we make a statement in reference to the way things actually are. In order to do so, we must be able to define the "way things actually are," that is, we must have at our disposal the definition of truth. The Stranger refers to a version of truth embodied in the correspondence theory, which states that something is true if it corresponds to reality; it corresponds to reality, in turn, by rendering it faithfully. A false statement, by contrast, does no such thing. What does it do, then? It refers to that which is not, that is, it refers to non-being. Therefore he who makes a false statement – this is a very Greek approach to the matter – behaves somewhat like a mute, as he says nothing, even as he speaks: "And he who says not something, must quite necessarily say absolutely nothing" (237e). Lies and errors are associated with muteness. This statement echoes the position of Parmenides, who, as we may recall, held that one embarked on the path of falsehood at the peril of one's own voice and credibility. In other words, one may not say that that which is not, *is*. To the ancient Greeks, truth was an attribute of reality (or, in stronger terms: truth was reality[5]), just as lies and falsehoods testify to non-reality. Deliberations on "that-which-is-not" push us to pass judgments that are contrary to the way (and what) things are. It now remains to be determined whether that contradiction lies in being itself, or whether it is the nature of language.

"The main problem in Platonic dialogues," Marian Przełęcki writes, "is a matter of semantics: the question of the meaningfulness of statements pertaining to non-being."[6] In his view, the difficulties we encounter are linguistic in nature. Let's take the sentence: "a is A" ("Adam is a man"). In this simple sentence "a" is an individual name (as an analytic

[5] M. Heidegger, *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*, trans. T. Sheehan, in *Pathmarks*, ed. W. McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 181.

[6] M. Przełęcki, "O tym, czego nie ma. Na marginesie *Sofisty* Platona", in *Lektury platońskie* (Warsaw: Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii UW, 2000), 21.

philosopher would say), that is, the name of a specific, existing object. Hence the sentence "n is A," in which "n" were to mean non-being, is meaningless, as "n" ("non-being") is not an individual name attributing existence. Contemporary philosophers of language circumvent this problem by pointing out the metalinguistic nature of the sentence. It is concerned, they say, not with non-being, but with the word "non-being," that is, with denoting this vague term. This possibility was first discovered by Bertrand Russell. If we replace the nonsensical individual name that is the word "non-being" with a description, and instead of saying "non-being", say "that which is not" (a definite description), or "something that is not" (an indefinite description), then even sentences with descriptive subjects are not rendered meaningless if the object which they describe does not exist. "Such terms enable us to meaningfully speak about that which is not, without, in doing so, attaching existence to non-being."[7] Willard Quine went a step further, postulating the removal of names and descriptions from sentences in favor of extra-logical predicates. Instead of referring to the concept of non-being, Quine uses "n"-type terms such as "nonexistent". Here, too, the meaningfulness of the predicate does not hinge on the existence or nonexistence of anything. While both theories mentioned above allow us to "speak in a meaningful manner about that which is not, they preclude the articulation of that which one wishes to express."[8] How true. Yet it is the inquisitiveness of contemporary philosophers of language that has allowed us to better perceive that there are two overlapping perspectives in Plato: the ontological (concerning being) and the epistemological (concerning our special relationship to the being that we call cognition). Fully cognizant of this, the Stranger brands his linguistic philosopher contemporaries with the rather disparaging epithet "sophists." The sophists are concerned only with that which can be deduced from words and sentences themselves (240a), which is nothing more than simplification and gnawing on one's own tail. I thus wish to return at this point to the question with which I am preoccupied most: does a word bearing the "non-" prefix, for example the adjective "nonexistent," adequately describe a certain reality – in this case, *nonreality*? In other words: does there exist a noticeable isomorphism between purely verbal, "adjectival nothingness," and that which is not, that is, nothingness as such, substantial nothingness?

NOTHING IS GONE

First, however, I would like to consider another matter that stubbornly continues to trouble me. I am interested in knowing whether the Greek expression τὸ μὴ ὄν (something nonexistent, non-being) by its nature *nihilates* – I am gradually introducing the terminology developed by Heidegger – that is, destroys or annihilates the perceptible form of the world, in the sense of detaching existence from something to which it is absolutely entitled. It seems that this expression is synonymous with the English "non-being"; at the same time, it cannot mean nothingness, which was unfamiliar to the ancient Greeks. Thus it is sufficient to say here that things, people, books, and horses have no separate afterlife. Instead of "heaven," they have their cemeteries, and instead of memory, they have worn inscriptions and indecipherable ruins. Simply put: there is none of this. None of this *is*. Nothingness,

[7] Ibid., 22.
[8] Ibidem.

by contrast, involves the action of annihilation; it is an improbable machine that grinds everything into – fine dust springs to mind, but no! – one that grinds the form of the known world into nothing, an abyss into which slides the known and the familiar. If that is the case, then perhaps Parmenides was mistaken in telling us to forget it? Perhaps we should make at least some effort to tame this nihilation, to make sense of the nothingness which the Greeks decided to pass over? But let us return for a moment to the subject of likenesses.

Can a person's likeness be said to exist? It can indeed. After all, no one would think to deny the existence of that which he observes, sees, or registers by other means. And yet a likeness leads an incomplete existence, a false, trivial existence that is relative to the reality that it reproduces or imitates. Falsehood-hungry sophists are great enthusiasts of likenesses: as if voluntarily blind (239e), these verbal jugglers care little to know how things actually are, satisfying themselves with that which can be deduced from words (240a). All right, but what do we mean when we say that a likeness leads an incomplete, faulty existence? Says the Stranger: "You see, at any rate, how by this interchange of words the many-headed sophist has once more forced us against our will to admit that not-being exists in a way" (240c). He means that all likenesses, images, icons (εἰκών), photographs, and even ordinary phantoms and delusions must have a structure, as impermanent as it may be. In this sense likenesses are like tricks of the imagination, while at once being deformations of reality or merely its imperfect renditions. For this reason they can be said to have an appearance, but they cannot necessarily be said to *be*. Such is the case of the wonderful image fabricated by the playful hand of one Russian writer: "When a slow leaf fell, there would flutter up to meet it, out of the water's shadowy depths, its unavoidable double. Their meeting was soundless. The leaf came twirling down, and twirling up there would rise towards it, eagerly, its exact, beautiful, lethal reflection."[9] Thus that which does not exist "exists" as a likeness, as an illusion that assumes a certain form. One could say that nothing takes on the semblance of being, that something assumes the guise of something else. That's one side of the coin: there is still another. Namely, that we frequently deny the existence of that which in fact and unquestionably does exist. That is the job of propaganda artists. But even normal people often falsify their own perceptions of reality, as if they couldn't bear to live with truth itself. "And does it not also think that things which certainly are, are not at all?" (240e), the Stranger asks without a hint of sarcasm.

And thus we have two types of statements that say something about the world – or, rather, falsify the world. The first contradicts the existence of objects that in fact exist, while the second affirms the existence of that which is not. Neither are satisfactory, but in the end both sentences, each in its own, subversive manner, misses its deceptive mark. One sentence transforms being into non-being, while the other makes being out of non-being. How did this confusion arise? It is because, Theaetetus explains, "we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words" (241a-b). Precisely. If words do not correspond to reality, if they refer to non-being, then non-being must somehow *be*, even if it exists only relatively – in relation to the language in which we attempt to articulate that non-being. Is that not the subject of good poetry (Leśmian)? Do our everyday observations not testify as much? Do we not describe certain entities as being more than others, and others as

[9] V. Nabokov, *Despair* (London: Penguin, 2010), 47.

being less? Think of the infirm and those who have their whole lives ahead of them – until they are ground up by nothingness. Or consider that some people – those who have fused themselves to their image – are mere semblances of figures, while others appear to us in full force. Thus the world is ineluctably bifurcated, perhaps even torn. As Giorgio Colli writes in his commentary to the *Sophist*:

> Every object, be it abstract or perceptible with the senses, when judged, is proved above all else to be and not be at the same time, and it is furthermore shown to be both possible and impossible. This result, obtained each time through rigorous argumentation, is tantamount to the annihilation of the reality of every object, and even to the annihilation of the possibility of thinking of it.[10]

If non-being produces false statements, ones whose *ultima Thule* is silence, then what is nothingness itself: a substantialization of the negative prefix, adjectival nothingness, or perhaps something "more or less" separate, something nonlinguistic?

THE EXPERIENCE OF NOTHINGNESS

I think we have reached the appropriate moment in which to move on to Heidegger. But before we do so, I will deliver – as a warm-up – an apology for the negative statement, one I encountered while leafing through Henri Bergson's *Creative Evolution*, a book that remains utterly forgotten today.

Imagine, Bergson says, a vase with flowers. And now imagine that the vase is gone: the janitor has come and taken it away. The negative sentence proves to yield more than does a mere statement of the negative, one that questions the existence of the vase and the flowers. Why is that? It is because something else "appears" alongside the existence of these objects: a mysterious abyss into which everything collapses (as will we, in due time). We do not need to know what it is. Its overwhelming absence should suffice. "In other words, and however strange our assertion may seem, there is more, and not less, in the idea of an object conceived as 'not existing' than in the idea of this same object conceived as 'existing'; for the idea of the object 'not existing' is necessarily the idea of the object 'existing' with, in addition, the representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality taken in block."[11] Nonexistence – here Bergson confirms Plato's intuition – always does not exist due to something or someone.

Heidegger made no significant contribution to the subject of being and nothingness beyond that which had been resolved much earlier by Hegel or even Parmenides, observes the German philosopher Ernst Tugendhat. This is because Heidegger is not concerned with *nothingness*, but rather with a particular state, a particular manner of *not-being*.[12] A bold claim. Is it supported by the facts? Let's find out.

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[10] G. Colli, *La nascita della filosofia* (Milan: Adelphi Edizione, 1978), 91. Translated here from the Polish: *Narodziny filozofii*, trans. S. Kasprzysiak (Warsaw and Kraków: Res Publica & Oficyna Literacka, 1991), 84-85.

[11] H. Bergson, *Creative Evolutions*, trans. A. Mitchell (New York: Random House, 1944), 311.

[12] E. Tugendhat, *Traditional and Analytical Philosophy*, 50. Also J. Taubes, "Vom Adverb »nichts« zum Substantiv »das Nichts«", in *Vom Kult zur Kultur. Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007), 125.

When operating within the boundaries of philosophical reflection, we invariably pose questions about some whole – we refer to a whole. Science, on the other hand – perhaps with the exception of Renaissance science – studies a select, narrow discipline of reality. Science is concerned with being – or, in stronger terms: a specific sliver of being. "What should be examined are beings only, and besides that – nothing; beings alone, and further – nothing; solely beings, and beyond that – nothing."[13] Philosophy, by contrast, thrives in a sense on that which is not; it derives its meaning from nothingness. Heidegger contemplates whether it can only be expressed by negating being, that is, whether the question regarding nothingness can only be posed in the negative (by saying that something or other "is-not"). The research method applied by the philosopher is known as the "hermeneutic circle," one that more disciplined minds refer to as a "vicious circle." It begins by assuming that which it sets out to prove. There is no such thing, Heidegger says, as pure thought. In thinking, we rely on many assumptions, including ones whose validity we are still attempting to demonstrate. "Where shall we seek the nothing? Where will we find the nothing? In order to find something must we not already know in general that it is there? Indeed! At first and for the most part man can seek only when he has anticipated the being at hand of what he is looking for. Now the nothing is what we are seeking."[14] What "is" it? Heidegger equates it with destruction, catastrophe, death, "the complete negation of the totality of beings" (86). It is because of "the nothing" that one senses that a being cannot be encapsulated in whole, as such a "depiction" would inevitably have to account for its expiration and disintegration, and with it, its untamed nothingness. We relate to being, we experience it at the moment it reveals itself to us. Heidegger calls this state *Dasein*, "being-in," "there-being." All right, but can this state occur vis-à-vis the nothing? As it turns out – yes, but "rarely enough and only for a moment" (88). When, exactly? We experience the nothing as a sense of anxiety, different from fear, which is itself "fear in the face of" something. Anxiety is not associated with anything; or perhaps more aptly: it is associated with Nothing. No longer adjectival nothingness, it is now an existential experience of the incomprehensibility of existence, of the vacuum which we attempt to fill with "compulsive talk," as the nothing has a way of robbing us of speech (89).

Once more: how is nothingness given to us? How does it become manifest? It comes at the moment in which we lose our grounding in being, that is, when being disappears from under our feet and elbows, simply slipping out from under us. Heidegger refers to this moment as *transcendence*, the act of reaching out beyond being, inextricably tied to its constant disintegration, the "nihilation of the nothing." This nothingness is not born of negation: rather, it is its source. Our "no," our irrational opposition to the destabilization of existence, stems from the sensation of our sliding into the abyss of nonexistence. Language is revealed as secondary to the nonlinguistic experience, the experience of nothing, which is rendered ineffable by the very laws of logic. And, conversely, the source message, which

[13] M. Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?", in *Pathmarks*, 84. Subsequent references are provided in parentheses.

[14] A "hermeneutic circle" of sorts may be found in the dialogue between Socrates and Meno, in which the former points out to his interlocutor the sophistic captiousness of the statement arguing that one should not seek what one knows, because one already knows it, nor that which one does not know, because even if one were to find something, one would not recognize it as that which had been sought. The opposite, in fact, is true: in order to find (i.e., understand) what we are looking for, we should simply start by doing so. See Plato, *Meno*, 80d-81e.

finds its expression in our moods, is the "speech" of the nothing: its transcription and verbalization constitute the "likeness" of something that cannot be conveyed in words, something that is prelinguistic, nonverbal in nature. Words, sentences, and likenesses thus refer to a primal experience that is unique and impossible to reproduce via any form of communication. All that can be verbalized (λέγειν) is that which lies within the boundaries of λόγος and not beyond them. Thus it is not the linguistic negation that draws us into the vicinity of the nothing, but anxiety; but also "unyielding antagonism," that is, war; "galling failure and merciless prohibition," that is, the inability to negotiate with the unconditional; "stinging rebuke," meaning the abhorrence of that which is and which strives to not be; and finally "bitter privation," aging, meaning one's removal from sources of vitality (92-93). Heidegger is trying to demonstrate that "as we search for grounding, we must inevitably encounter being itself, which, from a being-oriented perspective, manifests itself as non-being, non-presence, nothingness. As we search for a constant presence in which to ground ourselves, we ultimately arrive at absence, which inevitably resists our attempts. The being which we encounter is not grounding, but rather an abyss, in the face of which thinking-in-search-of-grounding remains helpless. Yet, in Heidegger's view, this abyss – being – is in fact the ultimate goal of thinking."[15]

Let us examine in this context two opposite Western traditions: ancient Greece and Judeo-Christianity.

Can anything come from nothing? – asked the Greeks. Could anything be created from non-being? The Greeks of the Classical period seem to have been familiar with only one type of non-being, namely the void, the "nothingness" of unshaped matter, material devoid of appearance or form. This matter is ὕλη: the eternal, unestablished *materia prima*. When ancient philosophers spoke of the nothingness of matter, they meant being that had not yet been shaped,[16] and thus was not nonexistent but rather potential, pregnant with existence, in a sense unfinished, awaiting the final stroke of the brush. This concept of nothingness – nothingness understood as non-being, bursting with the possibility of existence – was juxtaposed in the Judeo-Christian tradition (particularly in its apophatic version) with the *creative* nothingness from which sprang forth the world, love, Sheol, and death – that is, everything with which man continues to struggle today. This marks the moment in which the non-being of philosophers transforms and, so to speak, substantializes in the nothingness of religion and theology, namely the unknowable, obscure face of God. In the presence of such a God, a Nothingness-God, one typically experiences no emotion but that of the terrified anxiety that leads us to Him. "He who sees nothing in everything, believe me, sees God," writes Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling in *Die Weltalter*.[17]

In the conclusion of the essay *What is Metaphysics*, Heidegger (paraphrasing Leibniz) poses the fundamental question: "Why are there beings at all, and why not far

[15] K. Michalski, *Zrozumieć przemijanie* (Warsaw: Fundacja Augusta hr. Cieszkowskiego, 2011), 59.

[16] Taubes, "Vom Adverb »nichts« zum Substantiv »das Nichts«", 167.

[17] Ibid., 169. Jacob Taubes, whose train of thought I retrace here, is characteristically imprecise. The cited words were not penned by Schelling himself, but rather by "a certain spiritual poet" (Angelus Silesius) quoted by Schelling, who paraphrases his words: "He who sees nothingness everywhere already stands before the Divine." Cited in F. W. J. von Schelling, *Światowieki. Ułamek z roku 1815*, trans. W. Rymkiewicz (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN 2007), 40.

rather Nothing?" (96).[18] In this question – I repeat here the opinion of Jacob Taubes – Heidegger at once defies the ancient philosophy of the solid being and the biblical doctrine of the creation of something from nothing, to which there is an emanatory dimension.[19] As the advocate of non-discursive nothingness, he attempts to "isolate not-being from the realm of speech" by turning to non-European planes of thought in search of solutions. *Überwindung der Metaphysik* – "overcoming metaphysics," or breaking with classic conceptuality – is synonymous with bridge-burning, abandoning that which is one's in favor of the foreign, a "voyage to the East," toward a radically different discourse.[20]

To summarize: to the Greeks, nothingness was dissimilarity, impossibility; it was beyond their comprehension; in literal terms: the Greek λόγος did not encompass nothingness. It thus became "unutterable, inexpressible, unintelligible."[21] The Stranger and Theaetetus are both aware of this paradox. It emerges in their discussion: the more forcefully and cleverly some philosophers strive to refute the claim of the nonexistence of nothingness, the more they contradict themselves, as they refer to it – in the very act of refutation – as something that exists. Meanwhile, *nihil ex nihilo fit*, "nothing is ever begotten from nothing,"[22] remains certain: it is an axiom, like "two plus two." Thus anyone who ascribes to existent things a pinch of nonexistence (which, as we know, was practiced by the sophists) commits unwarranted attribution, a reprehensible offense against intellectual discipline. There are paths one is not allowed to follow. This prospect struck Heidegger in equal measure as unpleasant, perhaps even terrifying, and stimulating to the imagination.

Philosophy is the only discipline capable of posing questions regarding the whole, meaning not only that which is, but also that which is not. In this sense, science, whose inquiries verge towards being, is in a sense a regression from the wisdom from which thought began. "The inception is what is most uncanny and mightiest," writes Heidegger. "What follows [i.e. science] is not a development but flattening down as mere widening out; it is the inability to hold on to the inception, it makes the inception innocuous and exaggerates it into a perversion of what is great."[23] It turns out that science simply has no clue what to do with something as weird as the question of nothing. That is, it certainly

[18] "There is a reason in Nature why something should exist rather than nothing. This is a consequence of the great principle that nothing happens without a reason, and also that there must be a reason why this thing exists rather than another." G. W. Leibniz, "A Résumé of Metaphysics", in *Philosophical Writings*, trans. M. Morris, ed. G.H.R. Parkinson (London: Dent, 1988), 145.

[19] Taubes, "Vom Adverb »nichts« zum Substantiv »das Nichts«", 171.

[20] H. W. Petzet, the author of a volume of essays written by Heidegger on the subject of Buddhism and Eastern philosophy, mentions an interesting conversation between the philosopher and the Buddhist monk Bhikkhu Maha Mani. When asked if he agreed with the statement that "This Nothing is not nothing; it is just the opposite – fullness. No one can name this. But it is nothing and everything – fullness," Heidegger replied: "This is what I have been saying throughout my whole life." H. W. Petzet, *Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger*, trans. P. Emad, K. Maly (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 180. W. Rymkiewicz claims that Heidegger's repeated and multifarious returns to Classical philosophy prove that he cannot be said to have overcome the tradition of Western thought. He remains within its boundaries, confined by the power of the concepts he employs.

[21] J. Klein, *Plato's Trilogy. Thaetetus, The Sophist, and The Statesman* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 34.

[22] T. L. Carus, *On the Nature of Things*, trans. C. Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910), 32.

[23] M. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. G. Fried, R. Polt (New Haven: Yale, 2014), 173.

knows that the study of nothingness is an unscientific endeavor, one falls outside its competence. To the philosopher, meanwhile, the question of nothingness is a "technical" matter, an abstract or purely "linguistic" problem: one that is intended to revolutionize our entire existence, our thinking, and our traditions.

In the 1929 inaugural lecture that opens *Wegmarken*, Heidegger holds a debate with Parmenides, perhaps a Parmenides that has been radicalized by Plato in the *Sophist*, or possibly with Plato himself as the latter debates the Eleatic metaphysical tradition. But why did Heidegger choose as his adversary Parmenides, whose name is associated with the inception of European metaphysics? This answer is found in *Being and Time*, among Heidegger's other works. He considered himself a historicist[24] who operated in a peculiarly-defined temporality in which a key role was played by the category of the nothing (alternately: death) – it is towards this nothing that the *Dasein* "leans." In placing a roadblock on the path leading to the nothing (or "merely" to non-being, absence), Parmenides created – here lies the crux of the paradox – the possibility to speculate about nothing. Heidegger accepts this challenge. In his drive to overcome Western European metaphysics, he reclaims – as if "incidentally," "on the way" – something that the clever Greeks obscured from our view, namely, the question of nothingness, which bears a whiff of an Oriental epilogue.[25]

[24] Leo Strauss in two letters written to Alexandre Kojève, dated March 24 and June 26, 1950, describes Heidegger as a "radical historicist." See L. Strauss, *On Tyranny, Including the Strauss–Kojève Correspondence*, ed. V. Gourevitch, M. S. Roth (New York: Free Press, 1991), 250-251.

[25] For more on this subject, see R. May, *Heidegger's Hidden Sources. East Asian Influences on his Work*, trans. G. Parkes (London: Routledge, 1996).

Christian Sommer

FALL OF DASEIN: HEIDEGGER READING LUTHER 1924-1927

Let us enter into our discussion by an archeological analysis of a significant case of last-century thinking, where we can find, in a highly entangled way, Lutherian and theological elements within a philosophical framework: Heidegger's *Being and Time* of 1927. To make manifest this complex interrelation between philosophy and theology, we wish to isolate an exemplary phenomenon in Heidegger's text and subtext that we may call the "circuit of lust". We will then question this operation of transposition or transfer of theological elements and discuss its legitimacy in Heidegger.

Heidegger's analytics of falling or fallenness (*Verfallen*, *Verfallenheit*) will be our starting point. In § 38 of *Being and Time*, the general mode of phenomenalization of the "mobility of falling" (*Bewegtheit des Verfallens*) of human being or *Dasein* in its everydayness is characterized by the term "whirl", or "turbulence" (*Wirbel*):

> This constant tearing away from authenticity and into the "they" [*das Man*] (though always with the simulation of authenticity) characterizes the mobility of falling as a *whirl*.[1]

This whirl disperses the human being among the glories of the world, tearing it into "the tranquillized supposition that it possesses everything, or that everything is within its reach",[2] as Heidegger writes, and thus brings the existence away from its highest possibility. This means: away from its possible authenticity or own excellence and fulfilment (*Eigentlichkeit*), as it can be represented, for example, by the ideal of a philosophical life.[3] This mobility of falling manifests itself as a fleeing from the possibility of authenticity: a possibility of authenticity which human being, when it is dissolved in the world of

[1] M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (SZ) (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2001), 178; *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); *Being and Time*, tr. J. Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996). – The term "whirl" could be a reference to Augustine, *Ep. Io. tr.*, II, 10 on 1 Jn 2, 16: *Volvit te amor mundi ? tene Christum*. – I have chosen not to burden this text with a scholarly apparatus; for documentation and further elaboration of some parts of it, the reader can refer to C. Sommer, *Heidegger, Aristote, Luther. Les sources aristotéliciennes et néo-testamentaires d'*Etre et Temps (Paris: PUF, 2005).

[2] SZ, 178.

[3] Cf. M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) 19, 169 on Aristotle, *Met*. V, 16, 1021 b 20; GA 18, 46, 99; Aristotle, *Eth. Nic*. II, 5, 1106 a 15; I, 6, 1098 a 15; IX, 9, 1169 b 33; X, 7, 1178 a 5. On *Eigentlichkeit* = ἀγαθόν / εὐδαιμονία, cf. GA 18, 75, 77; *Eth. Nic*. I, 3, 1095 b 14.

diversion, in the sense of Pascal's *divertissement*, does not want to see, or cannot see, and thus constantly represses:

> The absorption of *Dasein* in the "they" and in the "world" of its concern reveals something like a *flight* of *Dasein* from itself as an authentic potentiality for being itself (...) In this flight, *Dasein* precisely does not bring itself before itself. In accordance with its ownmost characteristic of falling, this turning away leads *away from Dasein*.[4]

The mobility of falling is a constant "fall" (*Absturz*) into the "nothingness" (*Nichtigkeit*), or vanity, of the inauthentic, "worldly" existence, into the discursive mode of opinion (δόξα) and falseness (ψεῦδος) of what Heidegger calls *das Man*, and is therefore a falling away from the authentic self articulated by a truth-saying λόγος. This, we wish to argue, is a phenomenological conceptualization of Martin Luther's description, in his commentary of the Genesis Book,[5] of the excessive and "hyperbolic" nature of sin (Rom 7, 13) as a movement of flight that turns away from God.

Heidegger gave a two-part talk on *The Problem of Sin in Luther* in Rudolf Bultmann's seminar on Paul's ethics (1923/24) on 14 and 21 February 1924 in Marburg, a large part of which dealt with this Lutherian commentary, especially the exegesis of Genesis 3.[6] Let us remember what happens there. The "man" and the "woman" hear the sound of God walking up and down in the garden, and they try to hide themselves from the presence of God among the trees (Gn 3, 8). Then God calls Adam and says to him: "Where are You?" (Gn 3, 9). In his commentary, Luther writes:

> This is the description of the trial. After Adam has become terrified through the awareness of his sin, he avoids the sight of God and realizes that not only Paradise but the entire world is too narrow to be a safe hiding place. And now, in that mental agony, he reveals his stupidity by seeking relief from sin through flight from God. But he had already fled too far from God. Sin itself is the real withdrawal from God, and it would not have been necessary to add any further flight. Thus it happens, and this is the nature of sin, that the farther man withdraws from God, the farther he still

[4] SZ, 184. On this movement of "turning away", cf. SZ, 135-136, 139, 184, 253-259, 425; on the movement of flight (*Flucht*, *fuga*...), cf. GA 17, 284-288; GA 20, 391-393; SZ, 184-185, 257-258; GA 24, 193.

[5] M. Luther, *In primum librum Mose enarrationes = Enarrationes in Genesin* (*Exegetica opera latina*, ed. C. v. Elsperger, t. I, Erlangen: Heyder, 1829) / *Martin Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (WA) (Weimar: Böhlau, 1883 et sq.; reprint Graz: Böhlau, 1964 et sq.), 42, 127-131; *Lecture on Genesis*, in *Luther's Works*, trans. G. V. Schick, ed. J. Pelikan, vol. 1 (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1958), chap. 1-5.

[6] M. Heidegger, *Das Problem der Sünde bei Luther*, in B. Jaspert, *Sachgemässe Exegese. Die Protokolle aus Rudolf Bultmanns Neutestamentlichen Seminaren 1921-1951* (Marburg: Elwert, 1996), 28-33; *The Problem of Sin in Luther* (PSL), trans. J. van Buren, in Heidegger, *Supplements*, ed. J. van Buren (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 105-110. – For a commentary of Heidegger's commentary of Luther's commentary, cf. M. Heidegger, *Luther et le problème du péché (1924)*, translation and commentary, in *Le jeune Heidegger (1909-1926). Herméneutique, phénoménologie, théologie*, ed. S.-J. Arrien, S. Camilleri (Paris: Vrin, 2011), 259-286. – We can find some traces of this talk in SZ, 179-180, and 306, n. 1. Luther's commentary is quoted in SZ, 190.

> desires to withdraw; and he who has once fled and apostatized keeps on fleeing forever.[7]

The source and the beginning of all perversity and all fallenness is, of course, the original sin, the Fall. Man turns away from God and falls away from his original faith. The meaning of sin is this apostasy, this godlessness and remoteness from God, and it could be described, as Heidegger does, as a fundamental dynamic category of human being in the world. After having emphasized that for Luther, the very essence of man is corruption (a doctrine that we can recognize in the concept of "guilt" [*Schuld*], beyond lack [*Mangel*] and *privatio* in *Being and Time*), Heidegger comments:

> Luther turns his attention to the movement that sin (*Bewegtheit der Sünde*) as a mode of the being of man bears in itself: One sin begets another and drags man down even deeper. The real sin is *incredulitas*, i.e., unbelief, *aversio dei*.[8]

This dynamic can be said to be hyperbolic, because this sin is a sin that "might become sinful beyond measure", exceedingly sinful (Rm 7, 13), in such a manner that the "real meaning of sin is this": "He who flees once flees in such a way that he constantly wishes to distance himself further, he keeps on fleeing forever".[9] (Luther)

Heidegger's interpretation is very close to the interpretation of his friend and colleague Rudolf Bultmann – Heidegger and Bultmann were together in Marburg from 1923 to 1928 and regularly worked together –, who also insisted, in an article published in 1925, on the importance of the movement of fleeing in Luther's commentary of Genesis 3:

> Adam thinks he is able to flee before God; but by the flight, God's claim and address (*Anspruch*) is not cancelled (...) how right Luther is when he says that the natural man flees before God and hates God. By fleeing the reality of his concrete existence, he precisely seeks to flee from that in which only he can find God.[10]

It is important to hear this *Anspruch* and to be able to respond to it by faith, to have some chance of being justified by God's transforming action, of being brought to my authentic self through inauthenticity, through the "world" and my sinful condition. This is also what Heidegger means when he says in his commentary:

> And nonetheless the situation of man in which he distances himself from God is a relation to God that shows itself in a certain looking back on man's

[7] M. Luther, WA 42, 128-129.
[8] PSL, 108.
[9] PSL, 109.
[10] R. Bultmann, "Welchen Sinn hat es, von Gott zu reden?", in *Glauben und Verstehen* (GV), t. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1933), 28, 30. Cf. also "Die liberale Theologie und die jüngste theologische Bewegung", GV, t. 1, 1-25, especially 18; "Römer 7 und die Anthropologie des Paulus", in *Exegetica. Aufsätze zur Erforschung des Neuen Testaments*, ed. E. Dinkler (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1967), 198-209.

> part in the sense that God is rejected as *auctor peccati*, in the sense that man says: "God is not God." / And this situation of man is effected by God, insofar as it is the *summa gratia* that he did not remain silent after the Fall but *loquitur*.[11]

The situation of the sinful and corrupt human, fallen away from God, is the very work of divine grace. The state of sin, which strictly speaking is alienation from God, is correlated with the redemption of sin by the grace of God as a happening or an event that occurs without my will. For Luther, a close reader of Paul, grace is not granted on the ground of merits and works (Ep 2, 8-9: "Because by grace you have salvation through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is given by God: / Not by works, so that no man may take glory to himself"). Grace is granted on the ground of sin (as we know from Rm 5, 20: "where sin abounded, grace overabounded"). In other words, I first have to become lost in order to be saved: "whoever would save his life will lose it; and whoever loses his life for my sake and the gospel's will save it" (Mk 8, 35).[12]

But let us concentrate on this hyperbolic fleeing as the meaning of sin that could be called the compulsive, pathological "circuit of lust" in the sense of "concupiscence"; in other words, what in Heidegger's *Being and Time* is called the everyday mobility of falling. The very matrix of this circuit is the New Testamentarian principle pronounced by Christ himself: "Everyone who drinks of this water will be thirsty again" (Jn 4, 13). And this principle could also be found in other religious traditions, for example in initial Buddhism, in the Buddha's *Sermon of Benares*, where the "thirst" or "greed" for being is given as the main reason for wandering in the "long night" of the samsaric cycle.

In the later Christian tradition, this circuit of lust, or desire (*concupiscentia, cupiditas, libido, appetitus* / ἐπιθυμία...), was often and forcefully described, for example by Bernard of Clairvaux in his *De diligendo Deo*:

> The wicked, therefore, walk round in circles (*in circuitu impii ambulant*), naturally wanting whatever will satisfy their desire (*appetitus*), yet foolishly rejecting that which would lead them to their true end.[13]

And the young Luther, in the Proof of his Theological Thesis XXII in the *Heidelberg Disputation* (1518), describes also the endless circuit of desire through the term "dropsy" or "water-addiction" of the soul:

> (...) desire cannot be satisfied by the acquisition of those things which it desires. Just as the love of money grows in proportion to the increase of the money itself, so the dropsy of the soul becomes thirstier the more it drinks (...) This holds true of all desires / Thus also the desire for knowledge is not satisfied by the acquisition of wisdom but is stimulated that much more.

[11] PSL, 109.

[12] Cf. also Lk 17,33, Mt 10,39, Jn 12,25.

[13] Bernard of Clairvaux, "De diligendo Deo", VII, 19, in *The Works of Bernard of Clairvaux*, vol. 5, Treatises II (Washington: CPC, 1974) – trans. mod.

> Likewise the desire for glory is not satisfied by the acquisition of glory, nor is the desire to rule satisfied by power and authority, nor is the desire for praise satisfied by praise, and so on.[14]

As a remedy for curing desire, Luther recommends the extinction or *destruction* of the addiction, a remedy which is precisely the "wisdom" which is folly considered from the point of view of the world. First, I have to understand that if I reach greedily for pleasures, which finally causes me pain, it is because I take some good for some evil and some evil for some good, and instead of walking forward on a straight path, I remain in a vicious circle. This confusion of the wrong good, which I greedily chase, with the real good (for example, the possibility of a excellent, "authentic" life), is simply called in the Bible, as we know, the "knowledge of good and evil" (Gn 2, 17, 3, 5), and means the new ability which man misuses through his sin, which is, in reality, a state of mental confusion and fallenness instituted through my worldly desire, through my love for the world.

Therefore, we could say that the "old man", or the falling *Dasein*, driven from his worldly desire, and slave of his own circle of sin, has to be destroyed to give place to the "new man". This means that the basic direction of my fundamental "desire", which is one and the same force (Mt 6, 24), the fundamental direction of my "care" (*Sorge*: *cura*, ὄρεξις), as Heidegger calls it in his existential-ontological transposition, has to be redirected and *converted*, a fundamental New Testamentarian structure that also functions in *Being and Time*.

The fundamental orientation of my care is split into two antagonistic and conflictual directions: towards "spirit" and towards "flesh" (Ga 5, 17, Mt 26, 41), as the New Testament would put it. In *Being and Time*, these two fundamental movements of human being in the world, as the movement of turning to... and the movement of turning away from... (*An- und Abkehr*),[15] are precisely conceptualized in the temporal and dynamic antagonism between fleeing as falling (*Flucht*, *Verfallen*) and anticipation (*Vorlaufen*), two modalities of care which refer to the possibility of annihilation of *Dasein*'s being (the possibility of death).

Heidegger's central concept of anticipative resolution (*vorlaufende Entschlossenheit*) of death, as a counter-movement against the movement of sin, transposes the structure of faith: resolute "courage" facing the fear of death reverses the intentional direction of care. The practical everyday business (*Besorgen*), and also the theoretical attitude, which are both referred to worldly beings, now turns to the mortal being of *Dasein*, in a philosophical *meditatio mortis*. Heidegger's concept of authentic *Dasein* philosophically aware of its mortal condition, hearing the call of its own finitude, secularizes therefore the "new life" (Rm 6, 4) of the NT that responds to the call of God by faith. Before the life in faith, the *homo vetus* lives as a "debtor" (Rm 8, 12) to the flesh, sin and death (*Schuld*, *Tod*), under the sign of fear (φόβος). In the life according to the flesh, "sin revives" (Rm 7, 9) and enslaves the *ego* (Rm 7, 17-20). Destroying the old *ego*, faith freely obeys (Ga 5, 13) the Word of the cross; sin and death are defeated and overcome (2 Co 4, 13).

[14] Luther, *Disputatio Heidelbergae habita* (WA 1, 350-374); *Heidelberg Disputation*, trans. H. J. Grimm, in *Career of the Reformer*, 39-70, in *Luther's Works*, vol. 31, ed. J. Pelikan, H. T. Lehmann (Philadelphia: Concordia, 1957).
[15] SZ, 135.

In this context, "sin" means that, because of a defective direction of my fundamental desire or care, I miss the possibility of the excellence of my life as the anticipated goal or target, in the sense that Aristotle defines ἁμαρτία ("sin") as a "missing of virtue" that is situated between excess and deficiency. If I want to accomplish life in its highest possibility, the intentional direction of my care has to be brought *from* worldly beings *to* the authentic self (*through* the tribulation and passion of anxiety where *Dasein* is reduced to "nothing"), from the "things of the world" towards the "things of the Lord" (1 Co 7, 32-34).

This is a conversion, or revolution, of the direction of my entire life, from lust or concupiscence to love or agape: the "love for the world" and for its transitory goods becomes now the love of God, as John proclaimed it in the first letter, and as Augustine will describe it later as the triple concupiscence or lust in Book X of his *Confessions* (30, 41):

> Do not love the world nor the things in the world. If anyone loves the world, the love of the Father is not in him. / For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the boastful pride of life, is not from the Father, but is from the world. / The world is passing away, and also its lusts; but the one who does the will of God lives forever (1 Jn 2, 15-17).

And "doing the will of God" means nothing else than to follow the commandment of love – a difficult, almost impossible task – and to follow the commandment of love means to destroy the circle of worldly craving and the fear of death on which it relies. Perfect love drives out fear (1 Jn 4, 18). "Love" (*caritas, amor, dilectio*), as Augustine in his treatise on fear formulates it (*De div. qu. 83*); it reduces the craving or desire to possess temporal goods or ephemeral things (q. 33). Perfect love is precisely the absence of fear (q. 36), and thus exemption from the pathological and obsessional adherence to the permanent "mobility", to the "fatal mutability" of the world and to the false and sinful *ego* or the fallen *Dasein* which desires this vanishing world.[16]

We interrupt here the development of these Neo-Testamentarian, Lutherian elements inside Heidegger's conceptual framework, and would like to conclude by thematizing very briefly the nature of Heidegger's reading of Luther. Things are not as simple as they may seem to be, because Heidegger is not just a secularization of Luther: he is a Neo-Lutherian *Aristotelian* Thinker.

We can see that Heidegger is guided by the Lutherian project of a return to the proto-Christian experience of the NT by way of a destruction of "pagan wisdom", i.e. a destruction of Greek philosophy and especially of Aristotle, the "blind and pagan

[16] In Heidegger, "mobility" (*Bewegtheit*) translates, in an Aristotelian context, κίνησις (μεταβολή); cf. for example GA 22, 170; GA 9, 243. On the notion of "mutability" (*mutabilitas*, *vanitas*), which could translate Heidegger's "mobility" and inscribe it in a larger conceptual field, cf. Augustine, *Io. ev. tr*., XCIX, 5; XXXI, 5; *De civ. Dei*, XIII, 10; *Conf*., XII, 8, 8; 15, 21; 17, 25; Boetius, *Consol. Phil*., II, 1, 10; 15; 2, 14; Thomas, *S. theol.* I, q. 9, art. 2; II-II, q. 57, art. 2; *In ep. ad Rom*., VIII, lect. 4 (in v. 21), 666 with ref. to Augustine, *Contra Maximinum*, II, XII, 2 and Aristotle, *Phys*. VIII, 1, 252 a.

master."[17] The Heideggerian *Destruktion*, which covers the 1922-1926 period of a very close reading of Aristotle, develops this initial impulse of the Lutherian *destruction*, which wants to dismantle the scholastic architecture considered as a "theology of glory" which has turned away from the experience of cross and passion.[18] But it is important to note that it is also in the young Luther that Heidegger finds a positive impulse to access to a primordial Aristotle without passing through the "scholastic doctors": "It is highly doubtful that Aristotle's thought can be find in the Latins", as Luther affirms in the thesis 51 of his *Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam* (1517).[19] In fact, Luther reads Aristotle – as we can see for example in his commentary (*Divi Pauli apostoli ad Romans epistola*, 1515/16) of Rm 12, 2 where he borrows terms of the *Phys.* to articulate the process of justification[20] – to find in his philosophy something that could be useful for theology: *Vide quam apte serviat Aristoteles in Philosophia sua Theologiae*.

In brief, we can say: Heidegger is NT (Luther) with (and against) Aristotle. In other words: *qui sine periculo volet in Aristotele philosophari, necesse est, ut ante bene stultificetur in Christo...* Let us suggest that the complex nature of Heidegger's conceptuality (*Begrifflichkeit*) is generated by these two matrixes which are the categorical structures and the operative presuppositions of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of factic life, or the analytics of human *Dasein*. What we may call a "crossed" or chiasmatic reiteration of Aristotle and the NT (Luther) nourishes and constitutes the rigorous operation of a *phenomenological conceptualization* of basic experiences insufficiently thought, or even unthought, in the philosophical *and* theological tradition.[21] One of these examples of destruction is the phenomenon of the "circuit of lust", as we have tried to demonstrate, but without soliciting the Aristotelian elements.

[17] LO II, 142 (WA 6, 457). Luther's hostility against Aristotle (Heidegger even speaks of hate, *Hass*, in GA 60, 97; GA 63, 5) has to be nuanced: *Vide quam apte serviat Aristoteles in Philosophia sua Theologiae* (WA 1, 28).

[18] The *destructio*, as the *ruina* and *annihilatio* of sin and human wisdom, is so central in Rm that Luther considers it as the "heart piece" (LD 5, 48; WA DB 7, 2) of the NT; cf. LO XI, 215 (WA 56, 157) on Rm 1, 1.

[19] LO I, 99 (WA 1, 226).

[20] LO XII, 210-211 (WA 56, 441-442).

[21] Cf. GA 20, 404 where Heidegger takes the example of the phenomenon of angst: "Dieses Phänomen der Angst ist nicht etwa eine Erfindung von mir, sondern es wurde schon immer, wenn auch nicht in der Begrifflichkeit, gesehen. Ich versuche hier nur, die Begriffe von den Dingen zu geben, mit denen man sonst als nebulose in den Wissenschaften zu arbeiten pflegt, auch in der Theologie zuweilen". The operation of conceptualisation ist strictly phenomenological, following a minimal definition of phenomenology: "das, was sich zeigt, so wie es sich von ihm selbst her zeigt, von ihm selbst her sehen lassen" (SZ, 34). As the science of being (*Wissenschaft des Seins*) or ontology (ibid., 37), phenomenology puts into light the essence or the etantity (οὐσία) of phenomena through definition (*Umgrenzung*) or concept (*Begriff*): λόγος (ibid., 58).

Christoph Jamme

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S REINVENTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Heidegger's philosophy of "fundamental ontology", i.e. a foundational doctrine of being, is foundational insofar as it is for that about which it is actually concerned: regional-ontologies. Heidegger questions (in connection with and departing from Aristotle) the inadequacy of the ancient question of being (coming up against, among other things, the elucidation of the thought of *analogia entis* in Franz Brentano's text *On the Manifold Meaning of Being after Aristotle* [1862]). Here we have a search for a unified concept of being behind the manifold meanings of being. The many historical formulations for an interpretation of being that have treated it only under certain conditions of being (that-being, what-being, how-being, or, in the medieval times, *ens tamquam verum*) have not come close to what being itself is. For Heidegger, the entirety of western metaphysics from Plato to Hegel and Nietzsche was an "onto-theology", i.e. all regions of being (angel – human – animal – plant – crystal) were derived from and grounded in the highest being (θεῖον).

This program of fundamental ontology can be read as a reformulation of Husserlian phenomenology; *Being and Time* is, pace Gadamer, "a very quickly assembled publication in which Heidegger, against his deepest intentions, conformed to Husserl's transcendental concept of the self". Indeed the relationship to Husserl is ambivalent. From phenomenology Heidegger takes over the program to determine the relation between the human and the world. Of particular importance is the general teaching of the "intentional" structure of consciousness from the fifth part of the *Logical Investigations* (1900-01). But Husserl then transitioned from the *Logical Investigations* of *Ideas* to the transcendental "I" and phenomenological reduction.

Heidegger did not follow; he criticized above all two things: that the theoretical sphere became a model and that that which occurs there should be secured for theory. Husserl belongs finally to the Cartesian tradition. But the world (as a manifold of horizons) has a side that reaches beyond that of our consciousness, our capacity to imagine. Heidegger therefore attempts to transcend the Husserlian concept of intentionality through that of transcendence (I transcend individual being and reach being), what he then comes to call the "world". Husserl's phenomenology fails at a decisive place: at that which then (by Bergson) was signified as (organic or historical) life and what Heidegger with Jaspers, whose *Psychology of World-Views* he reviewed in 1920, named "existence"; "existence" is the factical-historical insofar as it opens itself up and first clears the way to an "essence"

or "what-being". Phenomenology is now for Heidegger the primal science of life and experiences. Here we are concerned with foundational situations in which the totality of life is expressed. The goal is the acquisition of a familiarity of life with itself, a having of the self in its totality and primordial-ness. If there is existence and if this existence is temporal, why, Heidegger asks, has this existence in previous philosophy not been adequately represented? Time itself, according to the answer, has always already been perceived from a determined ontological option, and it is further understood as a being, as a series of present now-times. Time always entered by virtue of the present or presence. This leads Heidegger to *Being and Time*.

Departing from Husserl, Heidegger searches for a bridge to Dilthey. Although Dilthey did not raise the question of being, it exists in his research "through the constant enquiry into 'life' that holds the breath" (*Being and Time*, § 10), if tangentially proposed. With Dilthey, Heidegger searches for a nearness to history; in December 1923 he asks Rothacker to forward to him an edited copy of the then newly published letter exchange between Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck from Wartenburg; the planed edition then appears in the elaborate and comprehensive 1924 treatment of *The Concept of Time* and then in section 77 of *Being and Time*. In ten talks in Kassel on *Wilhelm Dilthey's Research* from 16-21 June, 1925 (to which Frithjof Rodi has referred)[1] Heidegger contests the "ahistoricity" of phenomenology while also criticizing Dithey for not having radically formulated the question concerning the essence of history. *Being and Time* seeks to remedy this oversight insofar as it formulates the question concerned with the being-meaning of the historical.

Heidegger takes up this question not only in regard to Dilthey, but also in regard to Aristotle and Augustine, whose Aristotelian foundation is interrogated. In 1919-23 Heidegger wanted to represent the "phenomenology of life" in a vast work on Aristotle. Here he orients himself above all to deliberations on "dianoetic virtues" in book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, truth not only for the theoretical realm, but also for that which speaks to technique and practice – a clear affront to Husserl's priority of the theoretical. But Aristotle is similarly criticized for having only inadequately answered the decisive question, namely that concerned with what is bound to a situation and καιρός in practice, because for him recognition is determined by a seeing of what is continually present, in contrast to καιρός he honors only the now.

For the true essence of καιρός, Heidegger gestures to the (early) Christian historical experience and its still to be interrogated ontological foundation. Most important are Paul's letter to the Galatians and the first letter to the Thessalonians, from which Heidegger develops early Christian religious lived experience. He seeks to show what he names the "actual-historical situation": the religious situation insofar as it is historical. Where Paul speaks of the hope for Christ's return, Heidegger sees the central concepts of χρόνος and καιρός, which he translates as "time and moment", respectively. In the lecture *Augustine and Neo-Platonism* (summer 1921), it is shown while departing from the tenth book of

[1] F. Rodi, "Die Bedeutung Diltheys für die Konzeption von »Sein und Zeit«. Zum Umfeld von Heideggers Kasseler Vorträgen (1925)", in *Erkenntnis des Erkannten. Zur Hermeneutik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 102-122.

the *Confessions* that if Augustine thinks from factical life-experience, because of his Neo-Platonic orientation, the factical life-experience of primal Christianity is missing.

FROM HUSSERL TO DILTHEY

Being and Time was written under the pressure of Marburg conditions; one wanted to call Heidegger Hartmann's successor, but this met with difficulties in Berlin, as Heidegger had not published anything since his habilitation in 1916. Today, we know through recent publications of a series of Heideggerian lectures that his main work, which finally appeared as two parts in 1927, had already been presented in oral form in lectures and that Heidegger had been concretely working on this book since approximately 1923. The general theme of his lectures from 1919-1923 constructs factic life, life in its actuality. Here Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes that "Existenz" is *a continual existing in time*, that one must conceive of the transcendental "I" as finite, namely as factic-historical, and that phenomenology is to be constructed as a self-interpretation of factic life. The earliest lecture we have, which Heidegger held as a "Kriegsnotsemester" in 1919 on *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of World-View,* is ground-breaking and anticipates his later way of thinking; it was a sensation in philosophical circles. It set forth the problem of facticity, without naming the concept. Inner-worldly experience, according to its central thesis, cannot be theoretically conceived; Heidegger sees the "priority of the theoretical" as a great danger: "every theoretical manner is a loss of livelihood". On the conception of the "pre-worldly lively-something", the "life in and for itself", only worthy is "the understanding, hermeneutic intuition" (Heidegger here fuses Bergson and Dilthey), for – in regard to his allusion to Dilthey – "Life is historical; not a dismemberment into essential elements, but instead togetherness".

In the lecture series *Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology* from the 1919/20 Winter semester Heidegger defines philosophy as experience that is constructed historically, and this means as factical life-experience that seeks to become historical. Insofar as factic life understands itself as historical, it becomes what it itself is. Heidegger defines phenomenology here as an "original science" of life in itself, and "life" is for him essentially historical, i.e. that into which a particular world of movement comes: it is "the ability to actualize". If phenomenology wants to succeed in finding entrance to this ability to actualize, then it must learn to understand itself as a modus of the ability of life to actualize. Because life is neither an object, nor a thing, I cannot relate myself to it theoretically: "I am not spectator and in no way the theoretical intellect of my self and my life in the world". If we try to make life accessible to us, then we must ourselves "go-with". The self always experiences itself as if in a static situation. "I experience the world through living contexts of meanings." Phenomenology must at once circumvent the distinction between theory and practice.

"Because philosophy does not arise from generally deduced definitions, but is instead always an element of factical life-experience", Heidegger seeks in the lecture course from the summer semester 1920 to inculcate the *Phenomenology of View und Expression*. This "factic life-experience" is the true theme of phenomenology – but remained concealed before – and "phenomenological destruction" exists insofar as "philosophy is led back to itself from an externalization". The guiding thesis is the following: Philosophy has as

its object the "world of the self", "pure modesty is to be sought" (1919/20), and its methods must be "radicalism in question and critique" in a way that interrogates all concepts. At the centre of the lectures from the summer of 1920 one finds the problem of a theoretical concept of philosophy: How is life as experience to become rationally accessible for philosophy? As Heidegger privileges the meaning of actualization over that of content and relation, he succeeds to the self-worldly being-here as the decisive criterium. The decisive problem is "how experience is to be had", and although Natorp and Dilthey could also have made the decisive step toward answering this question, it has still not been recognized "that only a radicalism which places all concepts in question can lead us further". Heidegger characterizes this new method as a "formal announcement" without here determining its content more closely.

In the lecture *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion* that the young lecturer Heidegger held at Freiburg University during the winter semester 1920/21, he answers two questions: the first was concerned with the essence of factic life-experience; and the second question was about facticity in regard to new phenomenological methods. The claim of factic life-experience demands "a complete transformation of philosophy". "The self-confrontation of the human with the world" is composed of the surrounding world we negotiate, the shared "with-world" to which other humans individually and socially belong, and the "self-world" wherein we encounter our selves. These three levels or modalities of the world are accessible only in and through factic life-experience, a gesture of thought that suggests a correction to Husserl's concept of a pure ego. The main reformulation of Husserlian phenomenology must be understood in regard to its turn to the "historical": "Philosophy is the regression into the original historicity." Through an analysis of the meaning of "experience" from the concept of "lived experience" Heidegger works out a new style of phenomenology. He begins with usual everyday experience ("everydayness").

The lecture course on Aristotle from the winter semester 1921/22 similarly grounds philosophy in an analysis of "factic life". In the third part Heidegger analyzes "factically factic life itself" as the root and meaning of the historical. For the phenomenological interpretation of facticity of life he uses the hermeneutic category of "interpretation" to clarify that "with respect to factic life there are no theoretical possibilities that one chooses according to moods and such". The "categories" with which philosophy works are "not invented (...), but instead are in a primordial way alive in life itself (...)". Heidegger introduces a "categorically foundational determination of facticity" as "ruined", which is to say that factic life continually misunderstands itself. Philosophy then has the task of clearing up this self-misunderstanding of life, and in this sense it is hermeneutic, for hermeneutics primarily serves understanding less than it does the resistance of misunderstanding.

In September/October 1922 Heidegger sketches the outline for a vast work on Aristotle that is to appear in 1923. For a long time thought to be lost, but then found by H. U. Lessing, this now completely edited outline is where Heidegger sets forth a great introductory "announcement for the hermeneutic situation" in which the actual nucleus of *Being and Time* is to be seen. In this programmatic research commentary, Heidegger explains that the object of philosophical study is the "human being as interrogated about its character of being"; i.e. a "factic human being as such". For the method of this

philosophical research, Heidegger asserts the "announcement of the hermeneutic situation": By enumerating the most important constitutive elements of facticity, the meaning of this concept should be brought within view and the concrete examination as a plan shall be made accessible." As the most important of these elements, factic life-movement is named "care-movement" and its fundamental character is that of "decline". The most important "counter-movement against the tendency of decline" Heidegger characterizes as "to carefully conceive" of possibility of the experience of death. Philosophy in this sense as "the genuine explicit actualization of the interpretation-tendency of fundamental movements of life" transforms itself into a "phenomenological hermeneutic of facticity".

During the summer semester 1924 Heidegger spoke about the *Fundamental Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* in the hope of moving forward with his long since promised book on Aristotle. In this lecture course, which is perhaps his "best" (Pöggeler), Heidegger leads from his hermeneutic of practice in regard to the *Nicomachean Ethics* to politics and rhetoric, which is a discipline of practical philosophy and which then leads to a dialectic. In this course (whose manuscripts have unfortunately been lost) one finds the most detailed working out of οὐσία as presentness – a spiritual flash that Heidegger had come to already in 1923, if it was then still inconceivable. The first part of the course on Plato's *Sophist* (winter semester 1924/25) is concerned with the guiding question "whether φρόνησις as such has the goal of unveiling the human being or if σοφία is the highest form of unveiling." Heidegger finds the answer in a very specific "meaning of being" "that gives rise to the leading thread, based upon that to which Aristotle comes, that speaks of σοφία as having precedence over φρόνησις". And this meaning, because the Greeks had being, allows itself to be formulated in the following way: "Being is that which is present [*anwesend*] in the proper sense". Therefore Aristotle articulates knowledge as a seeing of the constantly-presencing. Σοφία is determined by the always being because it is thought from τέχνη.

HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY

The program set up here is then what Heidegger searches to resolve at the end of his first Freiburg period during the summer semester 1923: in the lecture course *Ontology. Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Here he sees Dilthey's position as valid while searching through its radicalized form to mediate Husserl's position. This leads Heidegger to a revision of the traditional philosophical conceptual construction that in its last consequence finally leads to a break with Husserl. Targeted is the self-understanding of being-here which fundamentally distinguishes itself from the understanding of foreign things (life, texts, etc.); "interpretation itself is an excellent, possible way for the character of being of factic life itself". Hermeneutics is the essential constitution of facticity itself that Heidegger articulates in one of the first lectures as the "wake-being of being-here for itself". The "own-most possibility of itself that each being-here as such is what Heidegger names "existence". "From existence and on it facticity is to be interrogated." This is already the program of *Being and Time*: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, departing from the hermeneutics of being-here that has determined as the analytic of existence the end of the guiding threat of all philosophical questions from which it springs forth and comes back" (§ 7).

Heidegger explains in 1923 the task of philosophy today is to analyze in such a way that its "character of being" becomes visible. He then explores the "foundational phenomena" of this character of being of facticity, which he names "existential" and which is defined as "indications of the dealing of being with itself". Nevertheless, this analysis of being-here remains generally very unsystematic; temporality does not yet play the preeminent role in the analysis of facticity as it does three years later. At this stage there is much that is still of a purely postulate character and remains (somewhat self-consciously) like a thesis. Heidegger divides his analysis of being-here into three parts: 1. "What is world?" 2. "What does it mean *in* a world?" 3. "What is *being-here* in the world?" Here he claims that one cannot make being into an object of theoretical observation, but instead that one must try to open it up through its "characteristics of encounter". The *how* of the encounter, of the being-here of the world, is characterized by Heidegger as "meaningfulness". Being-here shows itself in this relation to things as "care" – whereby care has still to represent a basic definition of life, as it shall later represent in *Being and Time* (cf. § 41). Constitutive of the encounter-character of the world is for Heidegger the temporality of being-here. The lecture course ends in an expressive demand that care is seen as the primordial phenomenon, and that the theoretical is to be left behind. With this Heidegger immediately succeeds to the threshold beyond which (as in the two sections of *Being and Time*) the relation between being-here and temporality is to be elucidated.

In July 1924 the *Concept of Time* talk given at the Marburg Theological Society brackets that which for the main work is the central problem: the meaning of being in general. The question concerned with the essence of time leads also to the analysis of being-here, whose "fundamental structure" is given in eight steps. What now plays a central roll is the earlier excluded problem of the "forerunning of being" to death as the most radical form of its "self-interpretation". Here it remains unclear whether Heidegger at this time had already devised a full outline of his main work as the complete concept must have been clear soon thereafter; already at the beginning of 1925 he designed an essay of four sweeping components for the *German Quarterly Journal for Literary Science and the Humanities* that – according to the research of T. Kisiel[2] – can be understood as the original conception of *Being and Time*. But a publication of the (already mentioned) treatment of *The Concept of Time* did not appear. The Marburg lectures *Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time* from the summer 1925 then correspond to the first of the two sections of *Being and Time*, while there are indeed still differences in regard to the concepts ("appresentation" and "momentariness").

BEING AND TIME

In *Being and Time* Heidegger attempts to reinvent philosophy through the thematic of temporality. Whereas the first section offers a fundamental analysis of being-here (the character of being-in-the-world is articulated as "care"), the second section gestures to time as the way of being of care. What the tradition failed to interpret, namely the way of being of existence articulated through time, is to be interpreted. Heidegger is generally

[2] T. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, Part III (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 309 ff.

concerned with the question of how various ways of being, or "meanings" of being, can be understood by a science of being upon the basis of a single "meaning" of being. The principle of differentiating these ways of being is time or temporality.

The first section of the first part sets forth the foundational structure of being-here as being-in-the-world, which is to be interrogated according to its various moments. Following this, he thematizes the in-being of being-in-the-world. The world of being-here is in its everydayness the surrounding world. The being that confronts us everyday is no distant "present-at-hand-ness", but instead a "ready-to-hand-ness", a "tool" that serves a purpose (§ 15). Here, "world-handling" is no theoretical concept, but instead an unreflective "circumspection": "hammering itself reveals the specific 'handiness' of the hammer". Because the tool is not only a tool for something, but instead always also a tool for someone (namely its bearer), one encounters in it "not only being that is ready-to-hand, but also being in the way of being-here (...); therefore the world is encountered as one in which the bearer and the user both live and which is at the same time ours." The tool-analysis in respect to the analysis of the "work-world of the handy-worker" leads automatically to the analysis of the world as a "with-world", for "the being of being-here, such that it has to do with its own being, [belongs] to the with-being of others" (§ 26). Whereas disturbances of how we go about with a tool (conspicuousness, intrusiveness, recalcitrance) lead to the rise of theoretical sciences (cf. § 69), disturbances lead in the realm of with-world in regard to encounters with others to the dissolution of authentic being-here, and consequently to the distraction from the actual self in the being-here of the "they". "The 'they' releases (...) a particular being-here from its everydayness" and leads finally to the dissolution of the authentic being-here in the way of being "of others".

In regard to the phenomenon of the "man", Heidegger illuminates the fundamental way of being of the "here", which he interprets as "decline" and which he therefore names a third fundamental existential alongside "attunement" and "understanding" (§ 28). Under the title "attunement", Heidegger then searches (§ 29 ff.) to better understand the precedence of being-here over other beings. Being-here is always already "thrown" into being: that being-here always already finds itself in its "here-ness" (facticity). At the same time being-here is – as a free existence – always already "projected"; this is why Heidegger characterizes the in-being of being-in-the-world as a "thrown project". Equi-primordially with "attunement", the being of "here-ness" constitutes "understanding". This constitutes, "existentially in its thrown character, that which we name the view of being-here". As understanding, being-here throws its being upon its possibilities, whereby self-understanding and world-understanding are linked to a positive (hermeneutic) circle. "Existentially equi-primordial" with "attunement" and "understanding" is finally the "talk".

But what is talk for Heidegger? "The connected understanding of in-the-world-being expresses itself as talk. The whole meaning of understanding ascends into the word. Words grow into meanings. But word-things are not to be understood with meanings." Being-here as being-with is always already in a particular sharing-with, first in regard to language in which we exist in the situation communally (politically). In public the danger arises that talk can degenerate into the "rootlessness of idle chatter", with which a real understanding of being-here becomes excluded. (The concept of public-ness that Heidegger develops here cannot support democratic politics).

In § 39 Heidegger is then concerned with "conceiving this whole structure of everydayness of being-here in its totality". That which is in its multiple content-ness conceived of being of being-here Heidegger names "care": "Care characterizes not simply the existentiality freed from facticity and decline, but also encompasses the unity of these characteristics of being." That being-here never arises in mere facticity is made more clear by the being of being-here: "being-already-before-itself-in-(the world) as being-at (inner-worldly confronted being. This being fulfills the meaning of the title care" (§ 41). In "being-before-itself" lurks the possibility of "being-free for authentic existential possibilities".

With the determination of being-here as care the first critical step of *Being and Time* has been taken. The threefold existentiality, facticity and talk (at a later place Heidegger speaks of existentiality, facticity and decline, and he occasionally speaks of a fourfold) form the unity of the whole structure of care. Being is understandable first from the where-unto of the project of being, and being opens up first from its meaning – its where-unto. Heidegger characterizes the structure of this where-unto as fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception. In the second section of the first part Heidegger interprets the way of being of being-here in regard to time and can therefore derive what he had only gestured to before. He now grounds the existential analysis of the fore-running of death in regard to the second step of the determination of care *qua* the being of being-here to show temporality as the meaning of this being. Heidegger seeks to prove temporality as the unifying ground of the manifold structure of care. Turning to being (in § 45), he asks what shall become of a preparatory analysis of being-here? One should differentiate between present-at-hand-ness and "existence" in Kierkegaard's sense as human existence: a human is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but instead Heidegger articulates the human as self-comporting-to-one's-own-self, responsible-to-itself. Because a human is not like a thing determined by essences (categories), Heidegger introduces the existential: the existential framework of questioning guards against the blurring of the difference between human and thing.

That being-here can be modified is shown by inauthenticity, i.e. averageness, and authenticity. Being-here becomes authentic, if one achieves autonomy and wholeness. § 65 is concerned with this autonomy ("self-ness") of being-here. Being-here becomes itself. The human should already be conscious in life of the totality of his existence (forerunning-ness to death) and experience himself as an "I". In contrast "care" is the being of being-here that lives without self-awareness in an environment (shoemaker). The ontological meaning of this care resides in temporality. This is concerned with how moments of being-here (self-understanding-upon, attunement-to) can be made into a totality. "The ontological meaning of the being of being-here" is the unity of the manifold structure of moments of care that resides in temporality. "The original unity of the structure of care resides in temporality. Being-ahead-of-oneself is grounded in the future. Already-being-in announces itself in having-been. Being-at is made possible in making-present" (§ 65). That is a very formal analysis of time. Heidegger had articulated care as being-ahead-of-oneself-at in its possibilities (understanding, potentiality-of-being). That is now the future, according to Heidegger, the first element of time. The assumption of my thrown-ness, he continues, shows that being-here always already was: that is the ecstasy of having-been. Heidegger sees the present finally as only losing-itself; he knows no fulfilled present.

In § 68 the structural moments of care in regard to temporality are taken up and interpreted. Understanding (as being-with-before-itself) is parallel to the future, attunement (as already-being-with) with the past, decline (as being-with) with the present. The last two paragraphs of *Being and Time* show the doubtful essence of time as "inner temporality" and as "historicity". "Inner temporality" means time as passing in the sense of a series of now-points (scale), which Heidegger also names "inauthentic" time. Historicism is for him in contrast with "authentic time". How can one now use time to decipher various given ways of being? Heidegger distinguishes the following "ecstasies":

	Future	Present	Past
Authentic time	forerunning (to death)	moment (καιρός)	repetition
Inauthentic time	awaiting	presenting	forgetting/keeping

In regard to the ecstasies of authentic and inauthentic temporality, Heidegger then gives "schemata" borrowed from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (for-the-sake-of = future, wherefore/wherewith = past, in-order-to = present). This schemata serves, for him, as the principle framework of the derivation of various ways of being. If one looks through the glasses of inauthentic time with the schema (wherefore), one sees the ready-to-hand (the shoemaker at work without self-consciousness); if one looks through the same glasses with the schema (without wherefore), then one sees the present-at-hand. Through the glasses of authentic time one sees the existence-being (leading/fulfilled meaning of being) equal to οὐσία in Aristotle). Existence can only be, if time temporalizes into authentic time: when we run ahead into our possibilities and, in particular, into the final possibility, death, then our past "repeats" (in Kierkegaard's sense), i.e. draws back into confirmation or regret in the moment, and then momentarily is for our time. When time in-authentically temporalizes, the form of ready-to-hand-ness occurs as present-at-hand-ness (that which is a form of inauthentic time): a retreat from the future and the self-intrusion of the self-presentation.

Heidegger abruptly abandoned *Being and Time* after the second section of the first part in early January 1927. The third section, "Time and Being", was to show time as the criterium for the differentiating of various domains of being. The first part of the "construction" (systematic) was to be followed with a second part of a history of philosophical thoughts. This "destruction" of the ontological heritage, which was to be treated in three sections on Kant, Descartes and Aristotle, allows one to reconstruct the preview that the published part offers, along with a few lectures. Heidegger wanted to show that the tradition lacks a sufficient concept of time. Aristotle is, for him, the main initiator of this missing time-concept. Little is published from these plans; we find a singular indication in the appendix to volume 24 of the complete works *The Foundational Problems of Phenomenology*, which is concerned with a critique of the Aristotelian concept of time, as represented by his *Physics*. Heidegger criticizes Aristotle for interpreting "vulgar" time (as a number of movement). In regard to Kant, Heidegger says in the lecture course

Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason from the winter semester 1927/28 that this time was like scales that fell from his eyes because he had read Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in regard to Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's (shared in the §§ 81 ff. of *Ideas*) analysis of immanent time-consciousness, as a unity of impression, retention and protention, is related to Kant's faculty of imagination (three schemata), which corresponds to the three time-dimensions and articulations. This should, as Otto Pöggeler has shown,[3] compose the core component of the planned third section; in § 69c we have its preview.

EFFECT

Being and Time had for many contemporaries – and here not only philosophers – a uniquely shattering effect; of particular interest was the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity, the analyses of conscience and guilt, and, above all, the remarks about death. One of the first to recognize the work's new claim was Max Scheler, whose own newly begun work, *Idealism-Realism,* grappling with the problematic being-here, temporality and death was suddenly interrupted by the author's untimely death (in May 1928). Husserl was expectedly disappointed, as shown by his marginal notes to *Being and Time* from the summer 1929. The anthropological-criticism was clearly raised: "Heidegger transposes or adopts the constitutive phenomenological clarification of all regions of being and universals, the total region, into the distant anthropological; the entire problem is in the transformation in which being-here corresponds to the ego, etc. With this everything becomes profoundly unclear and philosophically it loses its worth." Husserl was particularly irritated by Heidegger's deviation from his influential concept of "intentionality": "(...) how can everything be explained differently if not through my teaching of intentionality (validity) and firstly through the experiencing one? What is said there is my own teaching, only without its deepest foundation".

Disappointed were also some of the early students. Karl Löwith missed the existential philosophy, while Oskar Becker missed the difference between individual sciences. Hans Jonas warned that the categories of the existential analysis in this work have theological origins. *Being and Time* was in large part understood existentially, as a call to autonomy, as "concrete philosophy" (Herbert Marcuse). The theologian Rudolf Bultmann urged an "existential interpretation" of the New Testament. Emil Staiger enhanced literary history with a "phenomenology of literature", Hannah Arendt, following the Second World War, developed an autonomous political philosophy departing from Heidegger. Sartre reports in his *Diaries* (November 1939 – March 1940) that during the Second World War he thus transitioned from being a Husserlian to a Heideggerian, because "Heidegger's philosophy" alone was "a freely taking up of its own time". An alternative to Sartre's reception is that of the 1946/47 Parisian series of talks *Le temps et l'autre* by Emmanuel Levinas, who listened to Husserl and also to Heidegger for a semester in 1927/28. Levinas' own claim to thinking, which he here first presented to the public, contains a critique of the ontology to the effect that being is to be experienced as meaningless and that good exists only by virtue of the self-comportment of the existing in regard to the other. The motives of the

[3] Cf. O. Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1990), 313 ff.

"hermeneutic of facticity" are worked out in Gadamer's main text from 1960 *Truth and Method*. Derrida continues Heidegger's "destruction" in the form of a "deconstruction".

Because the first main work of Heidegger's philosophical foundational concept is not singular in its meaning, its scientific discussion has split up since the 1930s into various competing interpretative claims.

THE SO-CALLED "TURN"

Heidegger's fundamental ontology seeks to bind phenomenology and hermeneutics: originally it is not θεωρία, not the separation between subject and object, but instead the binding of both through experience; originally it is a going along with the world – this much the tool-analysis makes clear – not independent from whether or not it will be actualized. Heidegger himself says in his Nietzsche lectures that the impetus for *Being and Time* had been the insight into "the particular interpretation of the human and with it the historical being-human (*Menschsein*) in regard only to the essential consequence of the particular 'essence' of truth and being itself". Nevertheless, he complains in 1940, this search for a non-metaphysical essential determination of the human, this overcoming of objectivity and with it the split between subject-object was not understood; "an initial understanding for this frame of questioning [did] not in the least arise". This unfortunate lack of understanding that Heidegger regrets also has its origin in the fact he himself gave up on the fundamental ontological claim of the question of being, as systematically developed in *Being and Time,* soon after the appearance of this book, when he then turned to the beyng-historical development of question of being. Technology, politics and art now enter his field of vision.

At the same time, after abandoning the claim of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's later thought continued to gesture back to this work, as shown in the 1977 and 2018 published *Hüttenexemplar*, in which he wrote down his new, breakthrough thoughts as marginal notes in his own book. This ambivalence is also reflected with Medard Boss, whose foundational construction of a psychotherapy based explicitly upon Heidegger's analysis of being-here introduced valuable innovations in theory and practice: although he departs from the late Heidegger, he concretely reaches back to an interpretation of being-here from *Being and Time* in his seminars. *Being and Time* breaks off because the grounding of the historicity of thinking is groundless. The original plan, according to the language of *Being and Time*, had been to open up the meaning of being through being-here (reduction) and from here to then allow being-here to be legitimated (deduction). But historicity made this final deduction impossible. The question of the "meaning" of being was the question of how a unified meaning of being, that is the various ways of being, or the "meanings" of being, could be made understandable through a science of being, i.e. foundational ontology. The principle of differentiating between ready-to-hand-ness, present-at-hand-ness and existence was time or temporality. But the question invited one to wonder if the concept of "meaning" that appeared to promise transparent clarity, was not in truth problematic. Are not the given styles of an epoch bound? Do not being present-at-hand-ness, readiness-to-hand and existing signify a wholly determined historical epoch (technology, for example, had it not been given to the Greeks)? One must consider whether being has a history. This results in an aporia: either history is a principle of differentiating between ways of being or history is itself historical and cannot be a principle. This aporia seeks to resolve the

concept of "fate" through the unification of historical and fundamental substance. The question of the "truth" of being must proceed from a concrete historical interpretation of being-meaning: Heidegger recognizes that the category of "historicity" cannot be seen as one that is beyond history. Art teaches us that a great artwork emerges from aspects that invoke different connotations at different times: a great work of art stands in a historical process in which it is always constructed in different ways. Reflection on art allows Heidegger to break through metaphysics that continually sees only what is present as what is. We experience what a shoe is – as noted in the essay on the origin of the work of art – not by virtue of scientific analyses of components, but instead by van Gogh's painting of the (apparent) shoes of a peasant woman (in truth the painter's own shoes). A great artwork, like the Parthenon temple, erects a whole city or polis. Art gives life openness, i.e. truth; truth is defined as un-concealment always wrested from self-concealing. Thus truth as "truth" belongs to the event in time. With this eternity is temporally and historically bound. Heidegger does not glance into the past in his art-philosophical observations, but instead into the future: this is how he takes up Hölderlin's hymns. One cannot misidentify as he sets forth in his first lectures on the "poet of poets" in the winter 1934/35, that Hölderlin's "still time-space-less work has already overcome our historical posturing and has founded the beginning of another history, that history which arises with the struggle and the decision about the arrival or flight of the gods".

The 1936-38 composed (but first published in 1989) *Contributions to Philosophy* furnish the theoretical foundations of the turn to art as "work". In this second main work "event" is introduced as the new foundational word of his philosophy: a sharpened reference to the radical historical, epochal and timely character of the whole immanent, time- and work – and *therefore* ground-less – "essencing" of "beyng". It is here that technology, politics and art enter into Heidegger's field of vision. Aphorism 125 looks back to *Being and Time* which comes to signify a mere (if also necessary) phase:

> 'Time' is to be experienced as 'ecstasy'. The play-space of the truth of being. The en-rapture into the lighted is to ground the light itself as the opening in which being gathers itself in its essence (...). In place of the systematic and derivation enters the historical readiness for the truth of being. And this requires first that this truth itself is created from out of its scarcely audible essence, but already the *ground-features* of its places (*the* being-here) into whose *construction and guarding the subject of* man must transfigure itself. The enactment of this preparation of our history is exclusively concerned with the question of being. All 'contents', 'opinions' and 'ways', in particular the first attempt of *Being and Time*, are accidental and can disappear (...). *Being and Time* is therefore no 'ideal' or 'program', but instead a preparatory beginning of the essencing of being itself, (...) which (...) compels [us] to think, (...) that (...) to ground truth as the time-play-space in which beings are once again beings; i. e. so that the safekeeping of being can be. Because this safekeeping needs many and distinctive ones for the sake of allowing beings to arise in themselves, art must be that which places truth in its work.

Die »Zeit« sollte erfahrbar werden als der »ekstatische« Spielraum der Wahrheit des Seyns. Die Ent-rückung in das Gelichtete sollte die Lichtung selbst gründen als das Offene, in dem das Seyn sich in sein Wesen sammelt. (...) An die Stelle der Systematik und der Herleitung tritt die geschichtliche Bereitschaft für die Wahrheit des Seyns. Und dies fordert zuvor, daß diese Wahrheit selbst aus ihrem kaum anklingenden Wesen doch schon die Grund-züge ihrer Stätte schaffe (das Da-sein), in deren Erbauer und Wächter das Subjekt des Menschen sich verwandeln muß. Um den Vollzug dieses Vorbereitenden unserer Geschichte handelt es sich allein in der Seinsfrage. Alle »Inhalte« und »Meinungen« und »Wege« im Besonderen des ersten Versuchs von »Sein und Zeit« sind zufällig und können verschwinden. (...) »Sein und Zeit« ist daher kein »Ideal« und kein »Programm«, sondern der sich vorbereitende Anfang der Wesung des Seyns selbst, (...) was *uns* (...) in ein Denken zwingt, (...) das (...) die Wahrheit gründet als den Zeit-Spiel-Raum, in dem das Seiende wieder seiend, d. h. zur Verwahrung des Seyns werden kann. Weil es dieser Verwahrungen mancheiner und auszeichnender bedarf, um überhaupt das Seiende in sich erstehen zu lassen, muß die Kunst sein, die in ihr *Werk* die Wahrheit setzt.

translated by Lucas Murrey

Thomas Sheehan

HEIDEGGER AND THE RIGHT HEIDEGGERIANS: PHENOMENOLOGY VS. CRYPTO-METAPHYSICS

Teach a parrot to say "supply and demand" and you have an economist.
(John Kenneth Galbraith)

Teach a philosopher to say Ἀλήθεια and you have a Heideggerian.
(Fritz Heidegger)



OK, I'm only kidding about Fritz. But even so, a significant number of Heideggerians seem dedicated to parroting Heidegger's thoughts in his own idiosyncratic language instead of discovering what he was driving at and expressing it in clearer, less quirky language.[1]

[1] Pre-notes: (1) When *Sein* refers to *das Sein des Seienden*, I will place the English in lower case: being. When it refers to the Right Heideggerian fantasy of a super-*Sein*, I will capitalize it and put it in scare quotes as "Being." (2) I reference Heidegger's texts by their *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) number, with page and line, and their English translations, with page and line.

Such parroting leaves the non-initiated baffled, if not dismissive of Heidegger's work, and understandably so. The upshot is a dialogue of the deaf between analytic and continental philosophers. Blindly parroting the Master's words also manifests a deep uncertainty among Heideggerians themselves. They can't seem to agree on what he was finally driving at or what his key terms actually mean – *Ereignis*, for example, or ἀλήθεια, or even *Sein*. This uncertainty hobbles efforts to move his thinking beyond its strictly circumscribed content into important areas such as ethics, epistemology, and even (*nefas dictu*) metaphysics. How can Heideggerians move beyond Heidegger's philosophy if they can't even agree on its very core? Hence, the safe path of parroting the Master's Voice.

This might remind us of the obituary that the Right Hegelian jurist Eduard Gans published when Hegel died in 1831. By just switching the names from "Hegel" to "Heidegger," some Heideggerians could easily make its sentiments their own:

> [Heidegger] leaves behind a host of brilliant students but no successor, for with him philosophy has for the first time come full circle. Any further progress will merely consist of thoughtfully working through his texts in the manner that the dearly departed has so precisely and clearly indicated.[2]

That's exactly what a good deal of Heidegger scholarship has been doing for decades, and it's why (with Eduard Gans in mind) I call such scholars "Right Heideggerians," single-minded dedicated to an extended, "thoughtful," and occasionally "poetic" commentary on the 100-plus volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*.

* * *

The classical paradigm that dominated Heidegger research for over a quarter-century was established in 1963 with the monumental works of William J. Richardson and Otto Pöggeler.[3] Their way of reading Heidegger was focused on being (or "Being"), and it started to show serious cracks with the 1989 publication of Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, which among other things made it clear that his later term *Ereignis* was only a reinscription of his earlier term *Geworfenheit*.[4]

The classical paradigm is anchored in the conviction that Heidegger underwent a momentous "turn" or "reversal" (*Kehre*) in the 1930s, when his thinking shifted from *Dasein* to *Sein*. As Richardson put it (translating *Dasein* as "There-being"), in Heidegger's early period

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[2] "Hegel hinterlässt eine Menge geistreicher Schüler, aber keinen Nachfolger. Denn die Philosophie hat fürs Erste ihnen Kreislauf vollendet; ihr Weiterschreiten nur als gedankenvolle Bearbeitung des Stoffes nach der Art und Methode anzunehmen, die der unersetztlich Verblichene eben so scharf als klar bezeichnet und angegeben hat." Eduard Gans, "Nekrolog von G. W. F. Hegel", in *Vermischte Schriften*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Dunker und Humblot, 1834), II, 242-252; here 251.25-252.4.

[3] These two scholars died within exactly two years of each other, Otto Pöggeler on 10 December 2014, William J. Richardson on 11 December 2016.

[4] Re *Ereignis* a reinscription of *Geworfenheit* cf. GA 65: 34.8-9; 239.5; 252.23-25; 322.7-8 with SZ 325.37; GA 9: 377, note d; GA 73, 1: 642.28-29; etc.

> Being (the World) was considered basically as the project of There-being [whereas with the *Kehre* in the 1930s] the focal point of Heidegger's reflection passes subtly from There-being to Being itself.[5]

What's more, in Heidegger's later work Being seems to take on a life of its own.

> [It is] experienced as an active force, a process that assumes an initiative of its own by revealing itself to *Dasein* – but concealing itself as well.[6]

To take only the United States as an example: While Right Heideggerians are hard pressed to measure up to Richardson's clear distinctions and lucid prose, they claim to have inherited his mantle and seem to have gained the ascendency in the Heidegger guild. Most importantly, they claim to have settled the debate over what Heidegger was ultimately about. They allege that die Sache selbst, "the thing itself" of Heidegger's thought, was Ἀλήθεια – which they always write with a capitalized alpha to distinguish it from the lower-case ἀλήθεια of *Metaphysics* IX, 10, which set Heidegger on his path to the Grundfrage. In another iteration they allege that "the thing itself" is called Φύσις, written with a capital Φ lest we confuse it with the φύσις that Heidegger analyzed in depth in his 1935 lecture course, *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (GA 40).[7]

Right Heideggerians also claim that co-equal with Ἀλήθεια as a term for the thing itself is "Being" – in spite of the fact that Heidegger insisted it wasn't. He was quite explicit that when one gets to the core of his thought, ist sogar für den Namen Sein kein Raum mehr: "there is no more room for even the word Sein."[8] Note: not even the word Sein! But that doesn't stop the Right Heideggerians from endlessly parroting the mantra Ἀλήθεια = "Being" = die Sache selbst.

Making clear distinctions as per Aristotle's διορίσωμεν (1048a26) is not the strongest suit in the Right Heideggerian deck. As with the word ὄν, the technical term ἀλήθεια in Plato, Aristotle, and Heidegger is a πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον: it is "said in many ways." The term has at least four distinct meanings in Heidegger's thought, within a πρὸς ἕν analogical schema. But Right Heideggerians never bother to spell out the crucial distinctions between the multiple meanings of ἀλήθεια, except to insist on spelling one of them with a capital alpha. Nor do they tell us why Ἀλήθεια *has* to be the *res ipsa*, except for the fact that Heidegger supposedly said it was.

Instead of making distinctions and explaining things, Right Heideggerians spin their philosophical prayer wheels and chant their mantras as they employ the rhetorical devise that Aristotle called τρόπος ψιττάκινος (Latin, *modus psittacinus*; cf. *Historia Animalium* VIII 12, 597b27-29), which is captured by the Latin truism *repetitio mater*

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[5] W. J. Richardson, "Martin Heidegger", in *From Phenomenology to Thought, Errancy, and Desire*, ed. B. E. Babich (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 238.32-33 and 238.34-35.

[6] Ibid., 621.17-19 for the shift from *Dasein* to *Sein*.

[7] In the USA the strongest voice for Ἀλήθεια = Φύσις = die Sache selbst belongs to Prof. Richard Capobianco of Stonehill College, Massachusetts.

[8] GA 15: 365.17-8 = 60.9-10.

studiorum. They think that if they repeat the mantra enough times, maybe someone will come to believe it.

By claiming that Heidegger's final goal was "Being," Right Heideggerians also think they can refute the charge of analytic philosophers that Heidegger wasn't doing philosophy at all but instead was engaged some kind of poetry or mystical speculation. Right Heideggerians insist that, no, Heidegger's work *is* philosophy – but it's about the crucial phenomenon that philosophy had *overlooked* in a centuries-long *Seinsvergessenheit,* stretching from Plato to Husserl. In Right Heideggerian lore, Heidegger's signal achievement was the *rediscoverery* of what Parmenides already knew but metaphysics had forgotten: "Being."

The narrative goes something like this: In sixth-century BCE Italy Parmenides did in fact know of this "Being" under the title Ἀλήθεια. That constituted *der erste Anfang*, the first onset of authentic philosophy. But starting with Plato, "Being" was forgotten for some 2400 years until Heidegger fortunately rediscovered it in Parmenides's poem and thereupon launched *der andere Anfang*, the second onset of real thinking, thereby restoring to philosophy its greatest omission. And not only that: Heidegger also discovered – for the first time in the history of Western philosophy! – that the real meaning of Being-as-Ἀλήθεια is (drum roll) *Ereignis!*

The Right Heideggerians claim Ereignis is "just another name" for "Being" (see note 11, below), but they are unable to explain what Ereignis means and why it has to be the thing itself. Instead they keep repeating their now expanded mantra, Ἀλήθεια = Φύσις = "Being" = die Sache selbst = Ereignis! Contrary to the Latin maxim rem tene, verba sequentur, they cling to these sacrosanct terms as precious gifts from the Master Himself. Long forgotten but now happily recovered, the philosophical treasure that these terms contain is the fragile possession of a fortunate few whose only task is to safeguard them against the depredations of metaphysics and the attacks of analytic philosophy.

* * *

Right Heideggerians pay a high price for this reading of Heidegger. They declare that his work has overcome metaphysics, but then they go on to transform that work into a crypto--metaphysics that hypostasizes Ἀλήθεια into a Super-Sein, which in fact Heidegger himself derided as ein phantastische Weltwesen.[9] They claim Heidegger shunned calculative logic in favor of a preter-rational "thinking" (Denken) that focuses on the mysterious "Being" that metaphysics had forgotten. This Geheimnis des Seins allegedly consists in the fact that "Being"-as-Ἀλήθεια both reveals itself to Dasein (hence the alpha-privative: Ἀ-) and at the same time inexplicably conceals itself from Dasein (cf. -λήθ-).

But having come that far, their discourse hits a wall. Precisely *why* "Being" takes the initiative to reveal and conceal itself is not ours to know or theirs to tell. Even *trying* to figure that out would mean falling back into calculative reasoning. Instead, the vocation of Right Heideggerians is to cultivate "the piety of thinking" as they await the apocalyptic moment when Ἀλήθεια will finally emerge from hiding *and reveal itself*, thereby initiating

[9] GA 9: 442.21 = 334.21.

> a change in the world's present condition [leading to] an altogether different age of the world [in which] "the god of gods" will perhaps appear.[10]

When that long-awaited event occurs, the Right Heideggerian faithful will "enter *Ereignis*" as if crossing the bridge into a post-metaphysical Valhalla, where they will dwell with "the last god," who alone can save them from the ravages of technology.[11]

That this reading has strong appeal is evidenced by its widespread acceptance in the Heidegger guild. The only problem is that it is dead wrong. Neither Parmenides' Ἀλήθεια nor Heraclitus' Φύσις ever was "the thing itself" for Heidegger – close, yes, but no cigar. On the positive side, what Parmenides and Heraclitus glimpsed but didn't thematize was the Open (*das Offene, die Lichtung*). The Open is what makes it possible and necessary for us to understand a thing only discursively, only through how-and-as-what the thing is currently meaningful to us – that is, only through *das jeweilige Sein* of that thing. But on the negative side, what the pre-Socratics did *not* see was how the Open is always already opened up due to the existential structure of human being, the thrown-openness of *Existenz*: *Geworfenheit* aka *Ereignis*. Thus Heidegger could say: "With *Ereignis* we are no longer thinking with the Greeks at all."[12]

Heidegger vs. the Right Heideggerians is a long story that has been discussed elsewhere at some length. Here, however, I will merely sketch out what "the thing itself" was for Heidegger, how he arrived at it, and where Right Heideggerians go off the rails.

* * *

Right Heideggerians are proof positive of Aristotle's dictum that small errors at the beginning portend huge errors down the road.[13] From the very start the Right Heideggerians get off on the wrong foot because they enter Heidegger's work through the wrong door. They approach his oeuvre as if it were a realist ontology (cf. SZ § 43) instead of the phenomenological ontology that he insisted it was.

They claim that both being *and* their fantasized "Being" are independent of *Existenz* – in fact Ἀλήθεια was already present and operative on Earth long before Homo sapiens evolved. According to Richard Capobianco, in the Jurassic period, 200 million years before any human being came on the scene, Ἀλήθεια was busy concealing and revealing itself (perhaps to dinosaurs?) in a way analogous to the realist ontology of Aquinas, where *esse* was at work in nature long before human beings were created. This pre- and extra-existential Ἀλήθεια is supposedly the self-manifestation of nature and is quite independent of existential temporality or historicity.

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[10] Combining, respectively, *Zollikoner Seminare* 332.22-23 = 266.7-8; GA 5: 326.14-15 = 246.1-2; and *Zollikoner Seminare* 332.19-20 = 266.4-5.

[11] Enter *Ereignis*: "Einkehr... in das Ereignis" GA 14: 50.13-14 = 41.14-15 and .24. The last god: GA 65: 35.1-2 = 29.33-35; 308.24-26 = 244.23-25, etc. For the contrary position see R. Capobianco, "*Das Ereignis*: (Only) Another Name for Being Itself", *Existentia* 16 (2006), 341-52.

[12] GA 15: 366.31-32 = 61.4: "Mit dem Ereignis wird überhaupt nicht mehr griechisch gedacht."

[13] *De Caelo et Mundo* I 5, 271b8-13: τὸ μικρὸν παραβῆναι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀφισταμένοις γίνεται πόρρω μυριοπλάσιον and Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, Prooemium, "parvus error in principio magnus est in fine." See also Plato, *Cratylus*, 436d2-4.

But Heidegger, precisely because he was a phenomenologist, said the exact opposite. From the beginning to the end of his career, and with regard to *both* the being of things *and* the Open, he declared:

- being: only from ex-sistence.[14]
- being is *dependent* on man.[15]
- being is given only as long as ex-sistence *is* – that is, only as long as an understanding of such being is ontically possible.[16]
- being occurs only in the understanding enacted by those entities [= *Dasein*] whose own form of being entails an understanding of being.[17]
- the being-question asks about being itself insofar as being enters into the region of intelligibility of ex-sistence.[18]
- being needs ex-sistence and certainly does not occur without the appropriation of ex-sistence.[19]

Even as they refuse the phenomenological attitude and adopt a naïve-realist approach, Right Heideggerians claim to be "doing phenomenology" in the spirit of Heidegger. However, their thinned out understanding of phenomenology is restricted to the brief and inadequate sketch of it that Heidegger gave in *Sein und Zeit* § 7, one of the least satisfying sections of the book. That is, they "do phenomenology" by simply "letting being show itself" – something that carpenters, musicians, and analytic philosophers also do, and in fact much better and more rigorously than Right Heideggerians.

Understanding Heidegger's *own* version of phenomenology begins with realizing that in the years between 1915 and 1919 he radically reinterpreted the traditional being of things (οὐσία, *esse*, etc.) as the *meaningfulness* of things and thus transformed the field of his research from the *Sein* of metaphysics to the *Sinn* of phenomenology. As Aron Gurwitsch pointed out years ago, once one has taken the phenomenological turn, which is the *sine qua non* of phenomenological work, "there are no other philosophical problems except those of sense, meaning, and signification."[20] Heidegger's work from beginning to end was phenomenology: it dealt with meaningfulness. And his innovation was about where he located the *source* of meaningfulness.

All phenomenology is correlation-research, but it is not an analysis of subjects and/or objects (much less of "Being" as the "radiant emergence" of objects à la Capobianco). The objects of phenomenology are *Sinngebilde*, and phenomenology studies the *relations*

[14] GA 66: 138. 32 = 118.24: "Das Seyn nur vom Da-sein." See also GA 65: 263.28-9 = 207.29-30 and 264.1-2 = 207.33-4.

[15] GA 66: 139.18 = 119.6: "Das Seyn is vom Menschen abhängig."

[16] SZ 212.4-5 = 255.10-1. "Allerdings nur solange Dasein *ist* das heißt die ontische Möglichkeit von Seinsverständnis 'gibt es' Sein."

[17] SZ 183.29-30 = 228.12-4.

[18] SZ 152.11-2 = 193.31-2: I translate "Verständlichkeit" as "region of intelligibility."

[19] GA 65: 254.22-23 = 200.23-24: "das Seyn... Da-sein."

[20] A. Gurwitsch, Review of *Le Cogito dans la Philosophie de Husserl* by Gaston Berger, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 7, no. 4 (1947), 652. Italicized in the original. A phenomenon is a *Sinngebilde*, a formation of meaning.

that make up the correlativity of persons and their "formations of sense." And just as phenomenology is exclusively about meaning, so also is it fundamentally about *minding the meant*, or what Franz Brentano called "intentionality." Within minding-the-meant, Heidegger made the important distinction between (1) existentiel-personal *acts* of minding the meant and (2) the existential-structural *essence* that makes such acts possible, which he called *Existenz*.

If phenomenology is correlation-research, the various historical tendencies within phenomenology derive from the different ways one understands the correlata, beginning with the so-called "subject"-pole. For Husserl human being is essentially transcendental consciousness. His phenomenological reduction, therefore, leads the philosophizing gaze back from (*re-ducere*, *Zurück-führen*) its focus on the object as just "existing out there" independent of consciousness, and redirects that gaze to the correlation between the object and the meaning-giving ("constituting") subjectivity of transcendental consciousness.

For Heidegger, on the other hand, human beings are essentially Da-sein: our essence is ex-sistence, and that ex-sistence accounts for the constitution of meaningfulness that Husserl had reserved to the transcendental ego.[21] Ex-sistence is thrown

1. *out of* any supposed "inner" subjectivity
2. *out among* things (indeed "submitted" to them), yet also
3. *beyond* things insofar as we are
   - *a priori* familiar with the all-encompassing context of meaning-as-such (*Bedeutsamkeit*),
   - a posteriori familiar with any number of specific, "personally lived" meaning-giving contexts,[22]
4. and thus able to contact things *only* through their *meaningfulness*
5. within this or that meaning-giving context.

Ex-sistence is not a transcendental *sub-ject* à la Husserl but a self-transcending *e-ject* (*Ent-wurf*). It is *a priori* "thrown out" or "made to stand out" (*ex* + *sistere*)[23]

1. first of all into *itself* as existential possibility,
2. thereby opening the existential space/clearing/world for
3. existentiel acts of taking a thing *in terms of* particular ontic possibilities.
4. Those interrelated relations-to-ontic-possibilities constitute a specific meaning--giving context (the world of the cab driver, the world of the hacker)
5. and account for the current meaningfulness of whatever one encounters within that context.

[21] In his letter to Husserl, 22 October 1927, Heidegger wrote that ex-sistence "harbors right within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution." *Husserliana IX*, 601 = *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1997), 138.

[22] Being "in" the world of meaning = "Vertrautheit mit der Bedeutsamkeit": SZ 87.19-20 = 120.25.

[23] The Latin *sistere*, like its Greek counterpart ἵστημι, is a causative verb. It doesn't mean "to stand" but "to *make* something stand." Ex-sistence is our essence as *thrown*/*made-to-stand* out and beyond [ex-]. Cf. GA 83: 72.23-24 and 69.4.

Thrown out as ontological possibility into ontic possibilities, I live "ahead" of my here-and-now-self in anticipation (προαίρεσις) of certain possibilities of myself, other people, and things. Therefore, Heidegger's first phenomenological move is not a re-duction back to the self as sub-ject but an in-duction forward to the self as e-ject and to the current possibilities it inhabits. ("In-duction" is Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's ἐπαγωγή.)[24] The Heideggerian phenomenologist looks ahead, beyond the encountered thing, towards specific possibilities connected to certain needs/wants/purposes, and understands a thing in terms of its relation to those current meaningful possibilities.





Heidegger argued that Greek ontology, especially Aristotle's, was a proto--phenomenology operating within an implicit phenomenological correlation. Heidegger's retrieval of the unsaid in Plato and Aristotle consisted in ferreting out the passages in which the usual words for the being of a thing (εἶναι, οὐσία) were understood as the "presence" of that thing (παρεῖναι, παρουσία) – not as a mere spatio-temporal presence but rather as the *meaningful* presence of that thing for human beings (παρὰ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ). To say, as Heidegger does, that τὸ ὄν = τὸ παρόν, and thus that οὐσία = παρουσία, means that the

[24] GA 9: 244.12-35 = 187.12-30.

being of something is now read phenomenologically as the meaningfulness of that thing, a position that Heidegger found articulated in *Metaphysics* II 1, 993b30-31, where εἶναι and ἀλήθεια are interconvertible: ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας: a thing has as much meaningfulness as it has being.[25]

Only if we realize that Heidegger as a phenomenologist reads *das Sein des Seienden* as the *Sinn des Seienden* (SZ 12:14-15) can we make sense of how his extraordinary analysis of *Metaphysics* IX 10, in combination with Husserl's insight into the "categorial intuition," led Heidegger to his *Grundfrage*. That fundamental question is not about being (much less "Being") but about what *accounts for* the possibility and necessity of discursive significance in the human realm.

* * *

Heidegger's path to his basic question was paved not only by Aristotle but also by Husserl's *Logical Investigations* VI, chapter 6, "Sensuous and Categorial Intuition."[26] By distinguishing two kinds of intuition, sensuous and categorial, and the objects given to them, Husserl had opened up the possibility of reformulating the traditional ontological question about the being of things as a phenomenological question about the meaningfulness of things, something that Heidegger also discovered in *Metaphysics* IX 10.[27]

Take, for example, an inkwell. The object of a sensuous intuition of it is what Husserl called the *hyle* (cf. Aristotle's ὕλη) – in Heidegger's words: "the sense data (blue, black, spatial extension, etc.). What is perceived sensibly? The sense data themselves."[28] But your dog Fido perceives as much. We, however, also see, in addition to the sense data (and founded upon them) that the data are *meaningful*, something that Fido presumably cannot see. The fact that the sense data are always already within meaningfulness (whatever specific meanings may eventually be ascribed to them) does not arise from a sensuous intuition; and yet, analogous to sensuous intuition, that fact of meaningfulness is also immediately intuited.[29]

In opposition to Kant's restriction of intuition to only sense intuition (since, given his position on the *Ding an sich*, the intellectual intuition of essences is impossible), Husserl, by way of an analogy with sensuous intuition, argued for a *categorial* intuition, to which the data of sense intuition are given as "present-as-meaningful." Lying behind this argument is the phenomenological presupposition shared by both Husserl and Heidegger that the word "is" means "is *meaningful* as." In other words, all seeing and saying of "is" or "to be" occurs only within a phenomenological correlation. The protocol of Heidegger's 1973 seminar reports (here paraphrased):

[25] See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I-II, 3, 7 c: "Eadem est dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate." Also *Summa contra gentes*, I, 71, 16: "quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de cognoscibilitate." See GA 45: 122.3-5 = 106.26-28: "Oft steht auch ἀλήθεια einfach anstelle von ὄν. Die Wahrheit und das Seiende in seiner Seiendheit sind dasselbe."

[26] GA 15: 373-78 = 65-67.

[27] See Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger* (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), 54-62.

[28] GA 15: 374.24-27 = 65.29-31.

[29] GA 15: 374.32-33 = 65.33-34.

> Here we encounter the Husserlian idea of "surplus" [Überschuß].[30] In a sentence like "The inkwell is black," the "is" [which in phenomenology means "is meaningful as"] through which I observe the presence of the inkwell as an object or a substance, is a "surplus" in comparison to the sensuous affections. But in a certain respect the "is" is given just as immediately as are the sensuous affections.
> But the "is" [the "it-is-meaningful"] isn't *added on* to the sense data; rather, it is "seen" [i.e., intuited] – even if it is seen *by the mind* and thus differently from what is sensibly visible. In order to be "seen" in this way, the so-called being [the sheer fact of the thing's meaningfulness] *must itself be given*.[31]

Husserl's doctrine of the categorial intuition led Heidegger to discover the clue to the classical Greek understanding of οὐσία as παρουσία, the steadfast meaningful presence of whatever shows up. The Greeks, Heidegger writes,

> are those people who lived immediately in the openness [i.e., meaningful presence] of phenomena.[32]

They understood things as

> τὰ ἀληθέα, that which shows up as open [to the mind, i.e., as meaningful] and available.[33]
> In their essence the Greeks belong to ἀλήθεια in which things are manifest in their phenomenality.[34]

What, then, does this ἀλήθεια name? What is it that the Greeks wonder at (θαυμάζειν)?[35] Heidegger answers: "It is the overabundance, the excess beyond whatever is present."[36] That θαύμα is the παρουσία in which things are always already wrapped and which Husserl had independently rediscovered as what the categorial intuition presents. This fact of "is meaningful" is experienced prior to and beyond the mere assertoric "is" of the copula with the flattened out sense of "exists." This is the ἀλήθεια that Heidegger pulled out of *Metaphysics* IX, 10, the ever-present, ever-operative meaningfulness in which things are always embedded – but it is not what Heidegger was ultimately after. The everyday ἀλήθεια of *Metaphysics* IX, 10 is only secondary, derived. Let us call it ἀλήθεια-2. But what is it derived from? What is the fundamental sense of ἀλήθεια, what we might call ἀλήθεια-1 or ἀλήθεια-prime? In other words: What was "the thing itself" for Heidegger?

[30] *Logische Untersuchungen*, *Husserliana* XIX/2, 660.7-9 = II, 775.26: "...es bleibt ein Überschuß in der Bedeutung, eine Form, die in der Erscheinung selbst nicht findet, sich darin zu bestätigen."
[31] GA 15: 375.28-376.4 = 66.13-19. My translation.
[32] GA 15: 330.7-9 = 37.31-33.
[33] GA 15: 327.23 = 36.4-5. As disclosed and available: "das Offenbare in der Unverborgenheit."
[34] GA 15: 330.23-25 = 38.1-2.
[35] Plato, *Theaetetus* 155d3; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I 2, 983a13.
[36] GA 15: 331.9 = 38.19: "Überfulle", "Übermaß"; see ibid., 330.23 = 38.1: "Übermaß."

From what he said in his later years – "I no longer like to use the word 'Sein'" and "there is no longer room for even the word Sein"[37] – it is clear that being in any form is a misleading word for die Sache selbst. Even "das Sein als solches" is at best a formal indication and heuristic stand-in for the "X" that was the Erfrages of Heidegger's basic question. But why not being?

1 Heidegger says that the word Sein – as in das Sein des Seienden – was at best only a "provisional term" that still had one foot in metaphysics.[38] It is better to call it "Anwesen" (παρουσία), the phenomenologically experienced meaningfulness in which the things of our world are always already bathed.
2 And when it comes to the "thing itself," let us call it not "*Sein*" but rather "X," i.e., whatever turns out to make meaningfulness *possible* and *necessary* for us in our encounters with people or things. That "X," which is only formally indicated by terms such as *das Sein als solches*, *das Wesen des Seins*, and *die Wahrheit des Seins*, is:
   - the Open or clearing
   - as always-already opened up by the ap-propri-ation (thrown-openness) of *Existenz*.
   - To pull the above two together, the "X" is the appropriated clearing, *die ereignete Lichtung*, the Open precisely as ever thrown-open.[39]

The following text, taken from the protocol of a late seminar discussion, reports how Heidegger found his way through *Logical Investigations* VI/6 to his own insight into the thing itself. (The protocol is here strongly but accurately paraphrased.)

> With his analyses of the categorial intuition, Husserl freed *Sein* from its attachment to judgment and at the same time led Heidegger to re-orient his own philosophical work from an analysis of being to the investigation of the meaningfulness of thing
>
> 1. If we ask how the *Sein*-qua-meaningfulness of something is itself present and intuitable in a categorial intuition, we are *reaching beyond* that *Sein*/meaningfulness.
> 2. The subject of the inquiry – *das Befragte* – is thus no longer things (*Seienden*) but rather the *meaningfulness* of things, their openness (ἀλήθεια-2) to the mind in the broadest sense.
> 3. In turn, the goal of the question – das Erfragte – is what allows for the openness or the meaningfulness of the thing.
>
> If we want to work out the question not about how *things* are intuited but about how the *sheer meaningfulness* of things is intuited, we first have to understand the traditional being of things not metaphysically as οὐσία

[37] GA 15: 20.8-9 = 8.34. See also note 8, above: "*für den Namen Sein kein Raum mehr*."
[38] GA 7: 234.13-17 = 78.21-24: "nur das vorlaüfige Wort."
[39] GA 71: 211.9 = 180.1-2: "die ereignete Lichtung."

> but phenomenologically as παρουσία; and second, we must see that this meaningfulness (aka being aka ἀλήθεια-2) is always already *given* to us immediately and non-discursively.[40]

Like the Greek philosophers and Husserl before him, Heidegger could now intuit the very givenness of meaningfulness as such. But unlike the Greeks or Husserl, he chose to question *behind* that immediately given meaningfulness and to ask why such meaningfulness is necessary and how it is possible. Neither the Greeks nor Husserl had taken such a step. The Greeks were so fascinated by and absorbed in the bright phenomenality of things that they did not ask what brings about that effulgence. And Husserl,

> having reached, as it were, being as *given*, did not inquire any further into it (...) since for him it goes without saying that being means being-an-object [of consciousness]."[41]

We can now see how Heidegger could write in 1963:

> What occurs for [Husserl's] phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and ex-sistence as ἀλήθεια [-2], the openness of whatever is present, their manifestness, their self-showing. What [Husserl's] phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thought proves to be the fundamental characteristic of Greek thinking, and indeed of philosophy as such.
> The more decisively this insight became clear to me, the more pressing became the question: How and on what grounds are we to determine that which, according to the principle of phenomenology, is to be experienced as "the thing itself"? Is it consciousness and its objectivity? Or is it the being [i.e., παρουσία] of things in its openness and its hiddenness?[42]

* * *

Within philosophy's centuries-long "turn to the subject" (die Wende zum Subjekt), Heidegger's phenomenological revolution marked a radical redefinition of "ontology." In his early name for his project, "phenomenological ontology," the adjective swallows the noun. What the classical realist tradition in philosophy had called being (εἶναι, οὐσία, esse, existentia, etc.) had to do with the intrinsic "realness" of things apart from any correlation with human knowledge and interests – as in Aristotle's ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν and ἔξω [τῆς διανοίας].[43] But when Heidegger the phenomenologist employs the word

[40] GA 15: 377.24-378.5 = 67.18-28. I paraphrase "Sinn" as "intuitable intelligibility" and "intuitability."
[41] GA 15: 378.11-16 = 67.33-37.
[42] GA 14: 99.1-15 = 79.18-31.
[43] Respectively *Metaphysics* XI 8, 1065a24 and VI 4, 1028a2.

Sein, he always uses it under strong erasure. It no longer refers to the intrinsic is-ness of a thing (its essence and existence) but rather refers to the significance, the Bedeutsamkeit, that the thing acquires (1) within a specific meaning-giving context and (2) in correlation with ex-sistence as always already appropriated to be the Open.

To return to the Right Heideggerians: Their crypto-metaphysics – characterized by their parroting of terms like Ἀλήθεια, Φύσις, and "Being" without understanding Heidegger's radical turn to phenomenology – runs Heidegger's philosophy off the rails and into the ditch of ontological realism. The Latins, as we mentioned, advised: Rem tene, verba sequentur, but the Right Heideggerians reverse the maxim: Verba tene, res [forsan?] sequitur. The only solution is for these epigones to scrap their approach and start over: first by divesting themselves of their naïve realism and then by understanding how Heidegger's phenomenology fundamentally transformed ontology – in fact, swallowed it whole. Hopefully they will then be able to rem tenere and to rediscover the res ipsa, the phenomenological πράγμα αὐτό of Heidegger's work.[44]

[44] Cf. Plato, *Seventh Letter* (ἐπιστολή Z), 341c7; *Protagoras*, 330d15.

Andrzej Serafin

HEIDEGGER'S PATRICIDE

La lotta continua, the struggle continues, the struggle for the οὐσία, which I would like to consider here as the struggle between the father and the son. Two foremost figures are of interest to me: Plato and Heidegger. Traditionally the former is regarded as the founder of metaphysics, someone who stands on the side of the father, staring with the eye of the soul towards the heaven, despising the world, while the latter is situated on the opposite anti-metaphysical pole as the defender of φύσις, a "son of the earth" (*Sophist* 248c). At first glance Heidegger seems to confirm this dichotomy by situating himself as an antiplatonic thinker, the destroyer of metaphysics. This boisterous, Nietzschean gesture of patricide, as I would like to claim, is nevertheless aimed towards the ultimate restitution of that which is occluded by multifarious idols. Heidegger's "principal atheism"[1] is the philosophical κατάβασις that he performs in order to restitute the divine, and not some otherworldly deity, but the divinity of the world. Paradoxically it may turn out that Plato's goal – despite the traditional readings – is not at all far off.

What is at stake in this struggle of giants? If the good is beyond οὐσία, and it is equivalent to the sun beyond the cave, then what is at stake is the status of the cave, or of the world in its sensual givenness. The question is whether we should despise the cave and long for some other reality, eternal and perfect, or rather affirm it as what is given, with awe, θαῦμα – since it stems out of nowhere, from nothing. I would like to keep in mind Nietzsche's suggestion that "eternal life is no other life, it's the very life you are living"[2]. Nevertheless both Plato and Heidegger are out for something hidden beyond that which is sensually available, for something invisible, for something that may not even be a thing. In order to reach it, they first have to remove the appearances, the δόξαι, or – according to the literal meaning of the Greek word – all the expectations, opinions, judgments, and conjectures, to purify oneself and remain with nothing left. Whether this nothingness is the goal, the ultimate point of arrival, or rather the veritable point of departure of any true knowledge, one cannot decide in advance. This intellectual κάθαρσις is performed by the act of patricide, the removal of all representations of the absolute and undertaking a detour, μετά-ὁδός, *Umweg*, an indirect way towards that which is beyond any name and reference and henceforth cannot be directly attained, only through errant blindwalking within the cave.

This method of purificatory patricide is therefore twofold. What is negated is the figure of the father in two senses: "the father Parmenides" in the case of Plato, and the

[1] M. Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik*, GA 62 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005), 363.
[2] F. Nietzsche, *Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. G. Colli, M. Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973), KGA 5.2, 411.

father Plato in the case of Heidegger. This negation boils down to the overcoming of a set of inherited metaphors attributed to the father figure. But what's more important, and this is the second aspect of the patricide that I'd like to stress, the metaphors themselves have a patricentric character that needs to be undermined. Let me recapitulate briefly some of the metaphors from the Platonic imagery that bear this character. *Timaios* introduces a distinction between the invisible father and the visible living son begotten in the father's image. *Politeia* uses the image of the sun in place of the figure of the father and furthermore identifies it with the good. The cave would therefore be the figure of the son. Plato is also using arithmetical metaphors inherited from the Pythagorean tradition, identifying the one with the sun and multitude with the cave, although this straightforward attribution is questionable, as shown in *Parmenides*. Furthermore there is the Parmenidean tradition of ontological metaphors, being and nonbeing, that are the subject of *Sophist*. In order to fully realize the consequences of Heidegger's patricidal "principal atheism", one has to negate the paternal poles of the above mentioned opposites. What we're left with is a cave without the sun, the multitude without unity, an orphan son, or the world in itself with nothing beyond. Such a gesture of identifying the father with nothingness is not devoid of consequences since together with the father we are getting rid of the good. When Descartes in his radical skepticism attained this stance, he felt it necessary to adopt a temporary morality. Those who don't tend to end up as "altogether mad" (*Sophist* 216d).

Such a reading of Plato and Heidegger seems congruent and tenable but it does not make Heidegger a nasty nihilist. Just the opposite, nihilism is merely a way of restituting the divine in a world destitute of it. It is a philosophical counterpart of the mystical "noche oscura del alma". When Heidegger is repeating the Leibnizian "why is there something rather then nothing" he is alluding to the radical opposition of the world and nothingness. But when he's quoting a similar phrase of Leibniz, "nihil est sine ratione", he performs a significant shift of attention towards the indeterminate nothingness by asking the question "quid est sine ratione" and finding the answer in the initial sentence: "nihil". His thematization of nothingness is a way to overcome the impasse of metaphysics without posing linguistic and conceptual idols, but it risks the danger of forming another idol by substantiating merely nothing. A thoroughly nihilistic patricide is not an attempt to pose anything beyond. Whatever is a thing – anything – is a part of the cave. Such a radical standpoint can be rephrased in various ways. It can be formulated as the phenomenological principle of accepting what is given within the limits of its givenness. But what is given to us is the world. The cave is the domain of givenness. Sheehan confirms this when he summarizes Heidegger's obscure considerations on the "last God" by stating that:

> The "god" that Heidegger's philosophy awaits is simply the epiphany of world (...) as the utterly groundless source of all meaning. The arrival of such a world (...) would also be the arrival of the "last god," i.e., world as such, and with that the possibility of secular-philosophical salvation.[3]

[3] T. Sheehan, "Heidegger and Christianity", in *The Cambridge Dictionary of Christianity*, ed. D. Patte (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 503.

If this is indeed what Heidegger was up to, it would make him similar rather to Socrates, who according to the official charge was a nihilist (knew nothing), corrupted the youth (was immoral), negated the gods of the city, and introduced new gods. But what were those new gods? According to Aristophanes they were the forces of nature. In other words, he divinized nature, φύσις. But this is exactly what Heidegger seems to be doing. His patricide would therefore make him prone to the accusal of ἀσέβεια. A claim of such an essential affinity between Heidegger and Socrates needs to be further examined. Heidegger explicitly admits that he wants to introduce a new divinity, e.g. in his motto to the Nietzsche book: "two thousand years and no new God", or in the Spiegel interview: "only one more [noch ein] God can save us". He also attributed the lack of God to the objectification of nature and suggested "a mysterious response of nature" against our mistreatment. What is objectified by the contemporary attitude of mischievous humanity is the "visible living creature". Φύσις, nature, is then equivalent to the world, or the son, or the last God. No wonder that Heidegger praises Aristotle's *Physics* as a book of utmost importance, and treats his *Metaphysics* as footnotes to *Physics*.[4]

This Socratic image of Heidegger and – reciprocally – the Heideggerian image of Socrates can be reconciled with the brief characterization of Socrates given by Aristotle (*Met*. 1078b), who assigns two things to Socrates: ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι and ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου. The traditional reading of those two attributions as inductive arguments and universal definition is problematic. The λόγοι of Socrates are inductive not in the modern mathematical sense, but rather as the words that induce the interlocutor towards nothing as that which must ultimately be known. The attribution of universal definitions to Socrates is much more troublesome. He undermined definitions with his subversive irony rather than posing universally valid formulas. But if we take into consideration the fact that Heidegger's nothingness was not only emptiness, but rather a "hidden fullness"[5], then we can interpret Aristotle's statement ontologically and understand ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου as the self-delimiting movement of the hidden fullness which is disclosed only by imposing a limit upon itself, by becoming finite. Such a reading would allow us to ontologically harmonize not only Heidegger with Socrates, but ultimately also with Aristotle and Plato. We would therefore have a tripartite model of the nothingness as the hidden fulness on one side, the phenomenal world on the other, and in between the movement of self-delimitation, ὁρίζεσθαι. This model is astonishingly concordant not only with Heidegger's posing of ἀληθεύειν as the revelatory movement of nothingness, ἀλήθεια being the figure of the in-between, but also with the Platonic schema from *Politeia*. The in-between is the domain between the cave and the now-occluded sun.

This situation is only a point of departure for any serious understanding of Plato and Heidegger. But first we have to consider one more aspect of the Socratic teaching, namely its political consequences, since we came to the conclusion that the nihilistic destruction of idols, his apparent ἀσέβεια, is only a means for the disclosure of a deeper piety which

[4] Cf. A. Serafin, "Heidegger on Nature", *Kronos Philosophical Journal*, Vol. 4 (2015), 171-175.

[5] M. Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, GA 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 185: "Der Fehl Gottes und des Göttlichen ist Abwesenheit. Allein, Abwesenheit ist nicht nichts, sondern sie ist die gerade erst anzueignende Anwesenheit der verborgenen Fülle." Cf. *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*, GA 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), 169-170: "Der Gott west nur an, indem er sich, verbirgt."

is only understandable by the few, as the inner treasure that he reveals only to the closest and dearest to him, while the majority perceives it as blasphemous immoralism and consequently persecutes it. The hidden treasure – we can assume – is that which is cannot be reduced to any system or dogma, to any set of axioms, or to a secret doctrine of ἄγραφα δόγματα. No one would kill Socrates for promulgating abstruse teachings about the ἀόριστος δυάς. But rejecting all the traditional divinities, teaching nothingness and the unity of nature as a living being – that is troublesome and subversive for those who are in power in the cave. Plato's dialogues can be therefore seen as an attempt to retain the nihilistic Socrates, but also to preserve the hidden treasure, albeit aporetically and apophatically. Unfortunately the pointers that he left behind, all the metaphors, myths and dialectical reasonings, have been petrified into a systematic teaching, forming another idol: metaphysics. This is the core of Heidegger's argument. For this reason patricide is necessary. One has to kill Plato in order to restitute Plato, or rather that towards which he is pointing, the truth itself.

But if Heidegger is fighting the metaphysical idolatry and performing the iconoclastic destruction of idols for the sake of recovering the occluded divinity, then the eclipse of the sun, of the good, of the father – to use a few Platonic metaphors – is only a strategic gesture, a stratagem, and not a dogma. Nevertheless such a Heideggerian maneuver can easily turn against itself, and Heidegger was well aware of it. What we have to do in order to remain true to Heidegger's intentions is to remove the idol of Heidegger himself. This doesn't mean burning his books or moving them to the bookshelves labeled "history of nazism" or "history of madness". Instead I would suggest trying to recover the metaphysical imagery by showing its convergence with Heideggerian metaphors. This reconstructive movement would amount to showing that towards which they point. Ultimately, if Heidegger was right, that which he was ceaselessly attempting to describe is the same as that towards which metaphysics was pointing. In other words, a restitution of Plato would be an attempt to return from the Heideggerian κατάβασις.

Any attempt to harmonize Heidegger, Plato, and Socrates must rely on the assumption that they are all arguing for the same. Whatever differences there are, if any, they must be superficial and allow for reconciliation. Let us start with Heidegger. His thinking is centered around a particular interpretation of the Greek ἀλήθεια, which he understands as disclosedness in an ontological sense. He claims that this meaning is equivalent to the presentation of phenomena, their coming out of hiddenness. The source of manifestation remains hidden, though, and is available only under the guise of phenomena.[6] The phenomena, or simply the world in its manifestedness, constitutes the revelation. Ἀλήθεια is therefore the relation between nothingness of the source of appearance as such and the appearances themselves. That which is hidden, occluded and revealed by the phenomenality of the world, can also be called the λήθη of ἀλήθεια. This model is structurally equivalent to the ontologized interpretation of Socrates, with ἀληθεύειν as the counterpart of ὁρίζεσθαι καθόλου. The manifestation of phenomena is the self-delimitation of the unlimited fullness, presenting itself only as particular, finite forms. The movement

[6] Cf. A. Serafin, "Heidegger's Phenomenology of the Invisible", *Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal*, Vol. 6 (2/2016), 313-322.

of particularization would therefore be ἀληθεύειν. The λήθη, the nothingness, the utmost potentiality of being is therefore realized in any particular phenomenon. An equivalent structure is also to be found in Plato. The cave constitutes the domain of phenomena, of θαῦμα, of the spectacle. The sun would be the counterpart of nothingness or λήθη. The intermediary region – the wall of the wonder-makers, θαυματοποιηταί – is the domain of transition from indifference to difference: formation, manifestation, differentiation. This area is of the highest interest to philosophy. The phenomenological ἐποχή shifts the attention towards it. It is the subject of *Parmenides*, thematized as the relation between one and many. In *Timaios* it is called χώρα, the womb, or the receptacle of being, the ontological female part, positioned between the hidden absolute father and the living world-son. In *Symposion* it is considered the daemonic region connecting gods and humans. Diotima leads through it from πολλοί towards πᾶν.

Such an interpretation, although congruent, leads to a serious ἀπορία due to the fact that the origin is indeterminate in itself and every phenomenon is regarded as its manifestation simply for the sake of having a particular form. This leads to an ethically radical consequence aptly formulated by W. F. Otto:

> It is a world in the full sense (...) and not some fragment of the total sum of existence. All things belong to it. (...) What occurs in it comes as though from heaven and entails no obligations; what is done in it is a virtuoso performance, where enjoyment is without responsibility. Whoever wants this world of winning and gains (...) must also accept losing; the one is never without the other (...) The spirit of a form of existence which (...) knows both gain and loss, both shows kindness and takes pleasure in misfortune (...) must appear questionable from a moral point of view, it is nevertheless a form of being which with its questionable aspects belongs to the basic images of living reality, and therefore (...) demands reverence (...) for the totality of its (...) being.[7]

Otto describes a stance destitute of judgment, accepting everything as it occurs with delight and rapture. Nothing is considered unworthy, imperfect, despicable, or fallen. The world with its vicissitudes and misdemeanors is reappraised, risen from demise, restored to its primordial splendor. Augustine expressed this thought by justifying evil for the sake of the divine ability to elevate it into a further abundance of the good. Here we are only speaking of the mere acceptance of things as they are.

This thought occurs several times in Plato, despite its apparent negation in the orphic visions of postmortem judgment of the souls. Whether they are the "noble lie" of a guardian, or the reminiscence of someone who saw the sun and the plain of truth, it is impossible to tell. Nevertheless the dialogues contain several hints confirming the interpretation sketched above. In *Parmenides* 130c Plato suggests that hair, mud, dirt and other things "vile and worthless" are also forms of the absolute. What is at stake is the presence of the absolute in the world: whether one has to reject the world, even some

[7] K. Kerényi, *Hermes: Guide of the Souls* (Putnam: Spring Publications, 2003), 31-32.

parts of it, or affirm it as the countenance of the divine. The classical approach favors the first answer, claiming that rejection of the sensuous, the bodily is a necessary step, and that chastity is a prerequisite of an ascent, as though the world was unworthy as such. Although Plato suggests a ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, his descriptions of this process are ambiguous and suggest a struggle and interplay rather than a simple rejection, as in *Phaidros* 254, where the *visio beatifica* occurs only when the sublimated libido of the frenzied horse, too strong to withhold, is ultimately released. A little further, in *Phaidros* 255, he says that it is nowhere stated that bad people can engage in intercourse, while good men can't. This sheds a different light on the commonplace understanding of *amor platonicus*. Perhaps what Diotima is leading to through the steps of a gradually expanded love is not some pure unworldly beauty but rather beauty embodied, present in all forms of being, especially human, attainable in an all-encompassing glance, a σύνοψις.

Thereby what Plato is up to, not only in *Symposion* but also in other dialogues, is the conceptual formation of an image of a πανάνθρωπος. In *Parmenides* 130-131 he suggests that there exists a figure of man apart from each particular man, present in all its parts while retaining its own unity, like a sail extended above each person. This figure appears also in *Timaios* as the one and only visible living creature, containing within itself all the living creatures (30d), παντελής, all-complete (31b), one single whole (33a), a perceptible God, most great and good and fair and perfect, made in the image of the invisible father (92c), a movable image of immovable eternity (37d). Such a schema is in accordance with the initial proposal under the condition that the nothingness, or the "hidden fulness" is identified with the model from which the visible and begotten son is copied (49a). What's important is that Plato considers it necessary to introduce a third intermediary element that performs the copying: the χώρα, the receptacle and nurse of all becoming, baffling and obscure, wet and burning with fire (49a, 52d). When Plato performs his analyses of this "strange nature interposed between motion and rest" (*Parmenides* 156d-e), later known under the deceptive name of the "theory of ideas", he focuses his attention on this third, female, intermediary element. I would like to claim that this is what Heidegger calls ἀλήθεια.

It may seem, therefore, that Heidegger's absolutization of nothingness is a detour, a way of restituting the hidden divinity, or pointing towards the unspoken. It may also seem that Heidegger is trying to conceptually model the situation of emptying the sky and establishing the divinity of the world as the last God. It may seem that Heidegger's patricide is a cathartic gesture devised in order to purify us of our δόξα and let the ἄρρητον reveal itself through the world in its givenness. It may seem as well that Heidegger's fallen existence was fleeing from the father, who waited all the time for the return of his prodigal son that erred so greatly. There is one hint, though, that can be helpful in clarifying all this seemingness. "Once the father is found, it is impossible to reveal him to others", says Plato in *Timaios* 28c. This paradoxical statement could serve as the key to the riddle of Heidegger's patricide. A platonic solution would be: because the knowledge of the father is the knowledge of oneself, and any relation – as Plotinus noticed – is a relation of the same to itself, then from such an absolute standpoint there are no others to reveal the father to, for what remains is "alone with the alone" (*Enn.* VI.9.11). The platonist Ibn Arabi states explicitly that "whoso knoweth himself, knoweth the lord". In other words, not only the

visible living son imitates the invisible father, but even more: the father i s the son. But then the fundamental question has to be posed: what does "is" mean? According to Heidegger's suggestion it means ἀληθεύει, or *weltet*. From such a perspective the "noble lie" that that the son is other than the father is not merely a myth invented by a guardian for political purposes. Instead, the "noble lie", ontologically conceived, denotes the world-formative movement of the θαυματοποιηταί, the formation of all particularity and thisness, the constitution of *Dasein*. The ultimate "noble lie" is the cave itself.

To conclude the above considerations I would like to quote a brief text by Heidegger and two poems by poets that he was fond of, Rilke and Celan. The first text, *Über die Sixtina*, written by Heidegger in 1955 on the occasion of returning Raphael's *Sistine Madonna* to the Gemäldegalerie in Dresden, is given in a slightly abbreviated, paraphrased form, in my own translation. The remaining two texts are *Buddha in Glory* (1908, tr. Stephen Mitchell) and Celan's *Mandorla* (1961, tr. Edward Snow). What occurs in Heidegger's reading of Raphael's *Sixtina* is the birth of *Dasein* out of the womb of ἀλήθεια.

> This painting focuses upon itself all the hitherto unanswered questions of art and the work of art. Initially the Sixtine Madonna was supposed to be an element of a church. The fact that it became a museum object hides within itself the destiny of western art since the Renaissance. Theodor Hetzer, the author of an exquisite monograph on the Sixtina, claims that she is not related to any church of any manner of exposition. From an aesthetic viewpoint this is correct, but it conceals an essential truth. As long as this painting remains only "exposed", it will be devoid of its proper place. Its errancy threw it into exile, into a museum, turned it into a "work of art", an object of aesthetic contemplation that lost its own essence. The Sixtine Madonna belongs however to the altar of a church in Piacenza not only in a historical-antiquarian sense, but in an essential sense. It shows the coming. A mother brings a child that comes to the world through her. She is a gateway through which her son enters the world. The gateway is the painting upon which the incarnation takes place, where God becomes man. What happens in the painting is the transformation, the transfiguration that constitutes the essence of a mass, that is the giving, the offering. During the transfiguration that takes place on the altar a gift is given to us. The painting is the altar itself upon which the offering is celebrated. Thereby the painting constitutes the place of the disclosing closure, of the occluding splendor of God-man's arrival.

> Center of all centers, core of cores,
> almond self-enclosed and growing sweet –
> all this universe, to the furthest stars
> and beyond them, is your flesh, your fruit.
> Now you feel how nothing clings to you;
> your vast shell reaches into endless space,
> and there the rich, thick fluids rise and flow.

Illuminated in your infinite peace,
a billion stars go spinning through the night,
blazing high above your head.
But in you is the presence that
will be, when all the stars are dead.

In the almond – what stands in the almond?
Nothing.
What stands in the almond is Nothing.
There it stands and stands.
In Nothing – what stands there? The King.
There the King stands, the King.
There he stands and stands. (...)
And your eye – what does your eye stand on?
On the almond your eye stands
Your eye, on Nothing it stands.
Stands on the King, to him remains loyal, true.
So it stands and stands. (...)
Empty almond, royal-blue.

Jason King

HEIDEGGER'S SEAM[1]

I

Where there were two Heideggers, there is now one. This has been one of the more palpable effects of the recent controversy surrounding the "Black Notebooks". That there was an "early" and a "late" Heidegger had long been part of the standard repertoire of Heidegger scholarship: questions entertained about where one ended and the other began; whether the two could be reconciled; which one was preferable; which more innocent. Now, thanks to the "Notebooks" and the ideological critique they helped into its final stages, a merger of the two Heideggers has finally been accomplished.

An ideological critique, after all, is the discovery of an infestation. Attempts at an all-encompassing critique of Heidegger had of course been attempted many times before, but at no point did any of the polemicists have at their disposal such irrefutable evidence as the "Notebooks". Up until now, there had been a lot of snooping around in the well-guarded archives and combing through the wartime *Contributions to Philosophy* as though it were the Apocrypha.

In many ways, the hardboiled detectives long at work on the "case of Heidegger" were never convinced there were two of them. If anything, Heidegger's evasions and equivocations after the war were proof of a profound political through-line from his earliest work to his last. Any anti-totalitarianism or liberalism that was detected in his sober, Husserl-dedicated, pre-war sensation *Being and Time* was a false flag: There was only ever the Heidegger who was illiberal, counter-revolutionary, nationalistic and, after one extrapolated a bit, anti-Semitic. But even his most vehement critics had to strain a bit to hold together that which was designed by Heidegger to so neatly break in two.[2] Though it was very doubtful that Heidegger's self-professed "turn" after *Being and Time* was an about-face, the philosopher himself riddled his later work so thoroughly with "turns" (*Kehren*) it was as though he was leaving behind, half-buried, a kind of skeleton key for his thinking.

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[1] The following essay was presented, abbreviated and in German, as a lecture at the Society for Applied Philosophy in Baden-Baden on October 29, 2016, as part of the two-part lecture event *Ontologie als Begegnung: von Martin Heidegger zu Emmanuel Levinas*.

[2] His most explicit, and therefore most famous statement on the two versions of himself can be found in the philosopher's own preface to a book written by William J. Richardson about his work: "The distinction you make between Heidegger *I* and *II* is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what *I* has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by *II*. But the thought of *I* becomes possible only if it is contained in *II*." W. J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), xxii. Italics mine.

This was the lay of the land. Whether one was convinced or not, there *appeared* to be two Heideggers. Perhaps one could never quite put a finger on it, but there was something on the face of things that remained unreconciled. A lot of the scholarship proceeded like a careful carving of the animal, knowing some parts to be good and others – questionable, to say the least. At last, with the "Notebooks", such surgical precision became no longer necessary, for there is no longer a "before" and "after" "the turn". Every part of the beast can now be used. Indeed, the "national" and "social" never *did not* belong together for Heidegger. His "ontology" was never *not* political.

In the following, however, I would like to put my finger back on this seam of Heidegger's, the one that runs somewhere through his works in the 1930s and 40s, even going so far as to make it more pronounced. This is easier now than it was previously, for it is the nature of the seam that when it falls out of view, it stands the chance of coming forward more prominently than ever before. We are at a better vantage *now* of understanding what our questions concerning Heidegger's seam *then* were even about. Our asking about Heidegger's seam was always inquiring after Heidegger's ethics, and inquiring after Heidegger's ethics was always inquiring into the use and value of ontology. The "Notebooks" present us with this opportunity: of returning to the question of Heidegger's seam after it has nearly disappeared, and finally understanding what, by asking the question or not, we stood and still stand to lose.

II

The question concerning Heidegger's seam is also a question concerning Heidegger's ethics. What is meant by this? "Does Heidegger have an ethics?" is a question that has had a long career in the Heidegger scholarship and even, one could say, spawned a cottage industry. Yet Heidegger asked it of himself before anyone else did. In the *Letter on Humanism,* Heidegger's first publication after the Second World War, there is the report of the young friend who asks the philosopher, "Wann schreiben Sie eine Ethik?"[3] ("When are you going to write an ethics?").[4] This question stands for all practical purposes right in the middle of the philosopher's oeuvre, placed there by the philosopher himself. It is an uncanny instance of the "late" Heidegger relating a story about the "early" one.

Heidegger preempts any question concerning his ethics by asking it of himself before anyone else (barring the young friend, if the account is anything more than a fiction). By doing this he shows that asking for an ethics is complicit with not only historical expectations of *the philosopher* Heidegger, but also structural expectations of the use and value of the ontological work he carried out before the war. What exactly are these expectations?

The historical one is the most obvious and, let us say, unphilosophical. Heidegger was a member of Hitler's National Socialist Party and held office as the rector of the University of Freiburg once the party came into power. He went so far as to deliver a speech in this official capacity, extolling the virtues of the party he served. This makes him, if not more complicit than the average party member, at least some degree more accountable for

[3] M. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, GA 9 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 353.
[4] M. Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, ed. W. McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 268.

the violence of the regime, which included the attempted genocide of Europe's Jews. The general *historical* consensus concerning Heidegger's ethics would be that his withholding of even the slightest excursus on the practical-moral value of his work, in light of his own moral failure, is an unforgivable sin of omission.

The structural expectation is more philosophical, but also less precise. It would assume the position that any philosophy asserting itself as an ontology, that is, a contemplation of what it means "to be", can be expected to serve as preliminary groundwork for an ethics, a contemplation of how one "should be". Otherwise, the work of ontology stands the risk of being only the building of castles in the air. Such an expectation arises from a familiarity with the history of philosophy, where there is a pattern of ethics following on the heels of ontologies, which has much to do with a long-standing assumption that knowledge should have practical-moral value.

It is with this structural expectation that the young friend's question from the "Humanism-Letter" is complicit, for the war has not yet happened. This is why the *timing* of the young friend's question is so important: We are informed it was asked "shortly after the appearance of *Being and Time*."[5] Heidegger is asserting that before the question concerning his ethics became an historical one, it was already a structural one – why else would someone be asking it so soon on the heels of his contribution to ontology?

We have to pause and marvel at this bold dramaturgy. Not only does Heidegger address the absence of his ethics at precisely the moment when an ethics was most hotly anticipated from him, he recreates a scene in which it is quite literally *inquired after*. And in setting this scene before the war, it allows him to pose the question to himself outside of the dire context in which it was being posed to him at the time. It presents him with the opportunity to handle the question *only* structurally, and is an implicit critique of the historical nature of how the question was being asked of him publicly. "If the name 'ethics'," Heidegger says,

> in keeping with the basic meaning of the word *ethos*, should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the human being (...) is in itself originary ethics. However, this thinking is not ethics in the first instance because it is ontology.[6]

Here, in true Socratic fashion, the philosopher on trial upbraids his accusers rather than defend himself against the accusations. As a response to the accusation that his ethics is "missing", the assertion that ontology is already ethics is the same as Heidegger's saying: *Be grateful for what I have already given you*!

This is one move of Heidegger's checkmate: If before the war the question concerning his ethics was unreasonable on structural grounds, then repeating the same question after the war will of course not make the question more reasonable. This is the masterful, and for his critics absolutely unbearable, apologetic craft of the "Humanism-Letter". It is not

[5] Ibid., 268.
[6] Ibid., 271.

an apology for anything Heidegger has done, but rather an apology for what he will not be able to bring himself to do. Simply put, he will *never* be writing an ethics. His readers will have to find it in themselves to make do with ontology.

The fact that the question concerning Heidegger's ethics has been repeated *ad nauseam* since the "Humanism-Letter" is proof we have not been able to make do with ontology alone. For what reason, though, have we not been able to make do? The inquiry into Heidegger's ethics should not be understood as a diegetic one, as a "case of the missing ethics". If we are asking "Does Heidegger have an ethics?" only in the sense that it is absent in the "Humanism-Letter", it is much like asking of a character in a novel, "What will she do next?" The answer can be found by simply turning the page. I do not believe this is the sense in which we ask the question.

The question is not "Will he or won't he write an ethics?" Our question is rather "Despite knowing Heidegger did not write an ethics, does Heidegger have one?" It is important to keep our eye on the hermeneutic with which this question is complicit. We are not in suspense. We know how the story turns out, but things need not be "as they seem". We want to read Heidegger's emphatic "No" as a "Yes" and, therefore, ask the question again despite its absurdity, because this kind of question does not simply wait upon an answer. This kind of question also has a conjuring power. We want to believe that if "the analysis is continued, the first evidence soon begins to appear that in such a case 'No' signifies the desired 'Yes'."[7]

Though Heidegger may have absolved himself from the structural expectations of an ethics in the "Humanism-Letter", there remains something unresolved about the matter, something about his "No" that we cannot accept as definitive. What is still unresolved is of course the historical content of the question concerning Heidegger's ethics, which Heidegger very purposefully sidesteps by way of his report of the young friend. Our preoccupation with Heidegger's ethics is, therefore, neither a structural one nor a diegetic one, but primarily an historical one. When we ask "Does Heidegger have an ethics, despite not having written one?" we are asking about Heidegger's ethics in a *different* way than the young friend is asking. And it is all a matter of timing. We are asking from the vantage of history. The young friend is asking too early, and we are asking too late.

III

It is the lateness of our question concerning Heidegger's ethics that makes it also a question concerning Heidegger's seam. We see from our historical vantage that there is something that does not *fit*, that certain parts of the Heideggerian gestalt remain unreconciled or certain promises of earlier works remain unfulfilled in later ones. The Heidegger who was still being asked whether he was going to write an ethics is irreconcilable with the Heidegger who, ultimately, did not write one. That is to say, Heidegger's seam is not merely between an "early" and a "late" conceptual framework, but between the Heidegger who still had an ethics to write and the Heidegger who wrote no ethics at all.

[7] S. Freud, *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, ed. Ph. Rieff (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1963), 52. Apologies to Freud.

Our coming to the situation late is what allows us to continue asking the question, despite the clear and unambiguous "No" we received as early as the "Humanism-Letter". There is no urgency in asking it, as perhaps Heidegger's young friend had, when the question was still "Will he or won't he?" and we certainly do not ask it in nail-biting suspense, as we turn the pages. We luxuriate in our asking it. This is scholarship. We ask this funny, almost absurd question and see if we cannot coax yet an ethics out of Heidegger – an anti-ethics, let us say, or a "meta" one. We perform this questioning in the spirit of the same "disappointed curiosity"[8] which befalls the crowd that comes across the impoverished Heraclitus, warming himself in front of the oven.

Arriving at something late, from the vantage of history, can often devolve into a project preoccupied only with assuaging our disappointment. There is some unaccomplished reconciliation of parts, or unfulfilled expectation, which we hope to forgive by discovering some hidden reason under the surface that forgives the apparent discord. If it is not immediately obvious what this might be, there is the sense that there is a secret being kept that need only be divulged.

Such an insistence on a secret meaning, however, is only possible because the unreconciled or unfulfilled nature of the object at hand makes itself known. Alcibiades' speech in *The Symposium* provides us with a useful example: The young acolyte says of Socrates that he reminds him of the busts of ugly Sileni that he would see in the workshops of herm-sculptors which, when broken open, reveal a beautiful god hiding inside.[9] Unspoken in this simile, but implicit, is that there is something that brings one to desire to break open the bust, and it cannot be simply that one finds the bust ugly. There are plenty of ugly things that possess no hidden meanings. There must be some discord, some unaccomplished reconciliation of parts – a *seam* – that betrays the possibility of its holding a secret.

It is because Heidegger has a seam, not because we find him despicable, that we ask continually after Heidegger's ethics. The disturbance on the surface is a failure of his ontology (the thinking of being) to provide us with an ethics (a thinking of how one should be). On a less philosophical level, but no more banal, it is also a failure of our question to receive a satisfactory answer.

We would not keep asking the question if we were not somehow dissatisfied with the answer we have received and did not still hold out hope that we can conjure Heidegger's "No" into a "Yes". And, of course, there is something tyrannical in this way of asking questions. This was Alcibiades' tyranny in the *Symposium*, a dangerous mixture of being shameless enough to point to the seam and shallow enough to insist that it betrays something beautiful or good which forgives the unreconciled nature it announces.

In the "Humanism-Letter", it is clear that Heidegger is styling himself as a martyr to public opinion in the vein of Socrates, of Heraclitus – a martyr to delinquent questioning, to the metaphysical insistence on hidden, redemptive meaning, to certain popular expectations of "the life of the mind". The timing of the young friend's question *before the war* may be an attempt to show that though we *think* we are asking the right question

[8] Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, p. 356. Translation mine.
[9] Plato, *Symposium*, 216 d.

from our historical vantage, it was always already the wrong question in a structural sense. But not only this. The second move of Heidegger's checkmate is showing how his young friend's question was also *already* an historical one. For already "the care fostered upon the ethical bond" is understandably great, Heidegger says,

> at a *time* when technological man, delivered over to the mass society, can be kept reliably on call by gathering and ordering all his plans and activities in a way that corresponds to technology.[10]

That is, the question of his young friend, though arising in different *times* from those times out of which we are asking, was already unmistakably a *product of the times*.

Heidegger defends himself in the "Humanism-Letter" against the two-sided delinquency of the question concerning his ethics by insisting that, no matter how we approach it or from when, we are always asking for something we do not even want. Either our question is too early or it is too late: Either our structural question is not sufficiently aware of its historical content, or our historical question is not sufficiently aware of its structural content. If this is indeed the nature of our inquiring after an ethics, Heidegger insists, any ethics that would satisfy it would be a structural-historical wash, the low-hanging fruit of a second-rate ontology – an ontology preoccupied with good timing.

IV

This concern for what is and is not a product of the times was of course Heidegger's great theme. Timing was everything for Heidegger. The thesis of *Being and Time* was essentially that "being" is all about timing and, therefore, any thinking about "being" must be a thinking about time. But it also must be a thinking about "the times", because any thinker necessarily starts out from his own times and must first understand how his experience of "being" is constituted by the times in which he lives.[11] Reflection on the times does not proceed from ontology (i.e., something like Nietzsche's confrontation with Wagner) but rather is *first* ontology.

This was Heidegger's revolutionary gesture, at least formally speaking: He took the old regime of transcendental objects and packed them full of non-transcendental, radically temporal, content. "Reality" became *in-the-worldness*, "being" became *concern*, the "thing" became *that-which-is-at-hand*. Traditional philosophic questions such as "What can we know?" were traded out for seemingly vulgar, everyday questions such as "What are we so anxious about?" and yet programmatically carried through as though they were as legitimate as the former.

Methodologically, it was a philosophy that could only be performed "from the inside", and when one compares Heidegger's "from the inside" with that of Descartes and Kant, one grasps quickly the radical, and impious, nature of what it was that Heidegger was doing: translating the solipsistic *inside* into an ecstatic, exoteric *in time*. Which is

[10] Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 268. Emphasis mine.

[11] "Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being." See M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 20.

why the impact of Heidegger's early work was that of a reverse-*vanitas*. That which long had been considered fleeting and every-day seemed to hold up just as well (if not better) under philosophic scrutiny than those more "eternal" figures that, especially since Kant, were long presumed to be the only ones that could do so.

It was these subversive methodological elements of the "early" Heidegger that would lend themselves so readily to the leftist, anti-totalitarian Existentialist movement that began to take hold in France during the Second World War. The protagonist of this movement was Sartre. The "Humanism-Letter", which operates also as a light polemic against the author, would be Heidegger's first reckoning with the liberal humanism for which his work was so fruitful but yet *against* which he emphatically decided during the war. This decision, which found its most concrete expression in the philosopher's joining the National Socialist Party, had baffled his students, and would remain baffling to the new guard on the Left who would continue borrowing substantially from Heidegger's pre-war work.

In this state of affairs, due to the debt owed to him in liberal humanist circles, Heidegger was primed as any *Mitläufer* could have been to be forgiven by history. This forgiveness hinged on how the philosopher would answer the question that was on everyone's tongue after the Second World War: "What is there to be done?" This was a natural quandary after millions of Europe's sons and daughters had been massacred both on the battlefield and off, but even more so after millions more had been exterminated outside of all wartime contingency in a planned genocide run with a technical efficiency that had never before been put to such ends.

The "disappointed curiosity" that meets Heraclitus in the "Humanism-Letter" is a thinly veiled hieroglyph of Heidegger's own predicament. Just as Heraclitus implies to the astonished crowd that whether there is a god in his stove or not is beside the point,[12] Heidegger, ever his own best publicist, not only points to his own seam in the "Humanism-Letter" but insists that our expectations of what this seam announces are complicit in a tyrannical hermeneutic, that there is "nothing to see here". It is the flinty irony of Socrates, swaddled in his wishful seducer's bed sheets, suggesting that Alcibiades "think it over, perhaps you are wrong and there is nothing to me."

V

Heidegger did not only refuse to answer the question "What is there to be done?", he appeared to reject the question's very premise. This is where the seam appears to flash, both dramaturgically by his refusing us an ethics, as well as bibliographically. The promised third division of *Being and Time* never appears, and the magnum opus he was preparing during the war, the *Contributions to Philosophy,* is abandoned, the draft of which would not be published until after his death. His work sheds almost all of the Husserlian phenomenological method of his pre-war output and, at least rhetorically, begins resembling, if not esoteric, a kind of fundamental-ontological evangelism.

[12] One must pay careful attention to Heidegger's translation of the Greek *εἶναι* as *anwesen*, "presencing" – a predicate that leaves the *presence* of the gods ultimately undecided. See Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, 355.

By the time Heidegger delivers his first post-war lectures, a cycle called *Insight Into That Which Is*, before the Club zu Bremen in 1949, little remains of the meticulous language developed in *Being and Time*.[13] There is no "Dasein", no "ready-" or "present-at-hand", and even "death" itself is delegated only a walk-on role. What would have been most conspicuously absent from these lectures, however, is any talk about "what should be done". Instead, the cycle heralds an age of stockpiling and aggregation, and wagers an unmistakably messianic *turn* toward a salvation that man, on his own, could do nothing to bring about.

Heidegger's "turn", if you will, reaches with the *Insight* cycle a stage of completion. It is of course not incidental that he titled the final lecture of the cycle *Die Kehre* (*The Turn*). If the "Humanism-Letter" was Heidegger's foreclosing upon the possibility of his writing an ethics, *Insight Into That Which Is* is his digging in his heels, intentionally "missing" the best opportunity to deliver one. Auschwitz had been liberated by the Soviets at the beginning of 1945, and in a matter of months American and British troops had liberated the rest of the camps. What is more, the Americans deployed photographers along with their soldiers to document the camps as they were found. They were the photographs seen around the world, emaciated survivors greeting American soldiers from behind barbed-wire fences with toothless grins, shoved into their cramped barracks, and, most astonishingly, those who had not survived the extermination lying around in heaping piles.

If we can think back to or imagine being alive at a time when the global proliferation of journalistic images was still a new phenomenon, there quite possibly had been nothing before seen like the circulation of the photographs of the human piles. The human being was not a thing one *piles*. Piling was for materials, resources. There were piles of hay, piles of felled trees, piles of steel beams. Maybe one had seen bodies lain out in lines, casualties of war, or knew of or had seen a mass grave. But unlike these, a pile, a mounded heap above the earth, in no way reveals the worth of the individual items which constitute it – the items on the outside are only seen partially, those on the inside do not appear at all. Only the sheer amount of items, the magnitude of what is collected there, is on display.

A photograph of one of these piles is something else altogether. A photograph transforms the pile of humans into something people do not have to "see for themselves". A photograph is reproducible and can reach the farthest ends of the earth, and the object that is pictured therein relies on no fallible memory for its recall and endurance as a testament. It serves as a unit of irrefutable, enduring proof that the human being has become a thing that one piles. That Heidegger, or for that matter any of the German *Bildungsbürger* that attended his lecture in Bremen, would not have had these photographs on their mind even four years later is hardly likely. With the publication of the "Humanism-Letter" in 1947, they would have been even fresher in one's mind.

It is worth pausing a moment to ask here – what suspicions does our historical vantage, our lateness to the question concerning Heidegger's ethics, possess? What do we hope to find by breaking open Heidegger along this seam, in which an ethics is asked for but is not delivered? There are of course many things we wish to find: an "unspeakable"

[13] Cf. M. Heidegger, "Insight Into That Which Is", in *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures*, trans. A. Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).

horror, repressed guilt, or sometimes even, at least in the magical thinking that preceded the publication of the "Notebooks", some kind of subversive, profounder Nazism expurgated of anti-Jewish sentiment. Ultimately, however, I believe it is the hope that a stash of these photographs would come spilling out. No matter how simple it sounds, it is the *failure of these photographs to elicit a reaction in Heidegger* that substantiates a great deal of our disappointment in his never having written an ethics.

The truly attentive reader of Heidegger, though, senses the photographs of the human piles in the "Humanism-Letter" and the philosopher's entire post-war work. Heidegger was sensitive to photographs, that much we know for certain. We know the photographs of Earth taken from the moon disturbed him deeply.[14] In his pre-war essay, *The Age of the World Picture,* he confesses to the acute image-intolerance that is bound so intimately to his critique of the "systematic" world-view. "Where the world becomes picture," he writes in 1938, "the system, and not only in thinking, comes to dominance."[15] He says further:

> To the essence of the picture belongs standing-together, system. By this, however, we do not mean the artificial, external simplification and collecting together of the given but, rather, the unfolding, developing unity of structure within which that which is set-before, represented as such, which arises from the projection of the objectness of beings.[16]

The photographs of the human piles, just as the images taken of Earth from the moon, would have been disturbing to Heidegger *not necessarily* because they totalized something or reduced it to a manageable whole, but because the images would have been evidence of something already malignant in man's thinking, whereby he can only appreciate the immensity of a thing he has brought before himself and is certain is there. For the photograph does not predict or reveal, it is ever only proof of what man can already picture.[17] One could even go as far as to say, following Heidegger, that it is itself a sign that warning signs have been missed.[18] Its nature is to show us only that which is already the case, that to which we have come late – a moral quandary arising at the impetus of photographic evidence is as late as our question concerning Heidegger's ethics.

The photographs of the human piles bear on the question "Does Heidegger have an ethics?" just as they had borne on the question "What is there to be done?" These two questions are asking the same thing, both too late, but from different directions. There is no doubt that, for Heidegger, the photograph was a certain technological apotheosis of the will to picture the world, and that the images of the human piles would have made

[14] Cf. M. Heidegger, "Der Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger", in *The Heidegger Reader*, ed. G. Figal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 353: "I do not know if you were alarmed, but I was just recently alarmed when I saw the pictures of the Earth taken from the moon..."

[15] M. Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Track*, trans. J. Young, K. Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 76.

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Cf. the historical constellation of anthropology, world-view, and picture. Ibid., 70-71.

[18] Cf. Heidegger, "Insight Into That Which Is", 54-55.

a particular impression upon him. That one would need to bring a picture of such a pile before oneself in order to understand that man is capable of reducing other men to mere quanta of matter, to a feedstock of global imperialism, is precisely the kind of thinking that arrives too late. More than that, it is the most dangerous kind of thinking: It is a question that arrives late but considers itself "timely".

VI

The *Letter on Humanism* is Heidegger's first publication after the war. *Insight Into That Which Is* is Heidegger's first public lecture after the war, when Heidegger was still barred from teaching in the universities. Both appear in the vacuum left behind by the unfulfilled promise of the third division of *Being and Time*. These are not trivial occurrences in Heidegger's oeuvre, and no less because it is precisely through them that an ethics is both methodologically foreclosed upon and then unwaveringly withheld. It is here, as we drag our finger across this "face of things", that we come across Heidegger's seam.

The seam is "out in the open" and is pointed to by the philosopher himself, but it is also nowhere in particular. It is somewhere between when Heidegger still had the question "What is there to be done?" to answer and when our hermeneutical question "Does Heidegger have an ethics (despite never writing one)?" first became possible to ask. One question is too early, and one is too late. "Too early" and "too late" are the only ways in which we can approach any seam – for we either arrive when there is still a promise of reconciliation, or when the possibility, unrealized, has passed. A seam is precisely that which bears the tension of these two temporalities, a too early and a too late, an expectation and the disappointment of its not being met.

Heidegger was not yet a philosopher of the seam. He was rather a philosopher of the *Fuge*. That he was a philosopher of the one and not the other is also a matter of timing. The word *Fuge* does not show up even once in *Being and Time*, but is all over the place in the *Contributions* (at one point he even calls the work itself a "*Fuge* of originary thinking"[19]). It would continue to stalk through Heidegger's post-war writing, always inflected by him, much like *Kehre*, as a skeleton key to the entirety of his work. Even in its most common usage the word is perfectly untranslatable into English – likely a quality that attracted Heidegger to it.

A *Fuge* is the "space" between two things joined, but it also has an archaic connotation of "fate". The Grimms insist in one of their definitions that it is the space between two things *narrowly* joined, an elaboration that is a clue to the tendency of the *Fuge*, which is to not make itself known.[20] The English word "juncture" is far from adequate, but comes closer than most, if only because one is able to use it in the sense of "life's junctures". However, "juncture" lacks *Fuge*'s adjectival force, whereby a certain *fittingness* is implied by the word – such as in the case of wood joinery, where one piece is cut to fit into another, or of an event that rightfully transpires, as when we say "it is fitting" what took place.

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[19] M. Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, GA 65 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), 81. Translation mine. This passage leaves the wholly other meaning of the word, as "fugue", still playfully intact.

[20] Cf. "Fuge", *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm* (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1878), 378.

A *Fuge* is not the same as a joint, however. It does not hold together two things and thereby impose itself between them. A *Fuge* is, paradoxically, an opening between two things that fit together or, seen from the other way, it is what remains between two things that are no longer apart.

Already we can spy the temporal, and therefore epistemological, nuance of this term. The *Fuge* is an interstice that shifts in its meaning depending on the approach, never being identical to itself: It is either the open place where two things stand to be joined, or a betweenness that remains after the joining has taken place. In neither case does the *Fuge* announce itself like the seam. Before as well as after two things are joined, the *Fuge* is essentially nothing. To know "of it" is only to know that where there was difference, there is now none. It is, if you will, a difference-gone-missing that can serve as a kind of cipher for identity. Like the seam, it cannot be known because one is either too early or too late to grasp it as itself. Unlike the seam, however, it is no announcement of discord or irreconcilability, but rather of a fulfilled *fit* and therefore no announcement at all.

For Heidegger, whose terminological work sought philosophical concepts that refused being pictured and "brought before" the subject, the *Fuge* would have been a useful figure. It was a "presence" that was always coming in and out of view. It would become central to the post-war elaboration of the epistemology underlying his ontology, which was never one grounded on the proposition of a radical absence or a radical presence of the real, but rather on approach and anticipation and things coming in and out of hiding. Approach and anticipation were the modalities of knowledge he so treasured in the ancient Greek word for truth: *ἀλήθεια*, or unhiddenness or unforgottenness.[21]

If we entertain the tidings of Heidegger's *Insight* cycle, and all we have left at our beck and call are piles and pictures, materials and information we have amassed in great amounts that lie in wait for us to make use of them, then the *Fuge* is endangered if not already a relic of bygone times. Neither pictures nor piles have *Fugen*: Ours is the age of resources amassed and means of production automatized, where there is no effort expended to make things fit together. Everything is pre-fabricated, that is, everything is made to fit beforehand without any effort. The prevalence of stockpiling and aggregation is for Heidegger an augury of the "dominion of the distanceless",[22] the auspice of a new age wherein traces of *work* have ceased making themselves known and care for the *Fuge* has the elegiac quality of "not knowing what one has until it's gone".

In the introductory remark with which he opens the *Insight* cycle, Heidegger asks,

> What is happening when, through the removal of great distances, everything stands equally near and far? What is this uniformity wherein everything is neither far nor near and, as it were, without distance?[23]

Such were Heidegger's questions after the war. They were untimely questions, but knew themselves to be. He may not have addressed the photographs of the human piles, but he

[21] Cf. M. Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. A. Schuwer, R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982), 10-14.
[22] Heidegger, *Insight Into That Which Is*, 4.
[23] Ibidem.

did wring his hands over this "uniformity wherein everything is (...) without distance." He appeared to foresee on the horizon a situation in which the decision between a thinking that was "theoretical" or "practical" had become a trivial one. The disappearance of the *Fuge*, an event to which he was as late upon arrival as the Americans were to the camps, was the harbinger of an epistemological crisis.[24]

VII

Heidegger was too late for the *Fuge*, too early for the seam. He was born in the twilight of handicraft, and the *altdeutsch* camp he practiced with his wife and children on Todtnauberg was already untimely. His epistemology was intimately bound with his aesthetics, in that marks of being "made", and the ability of a thing to trouble one because it was no longer "of any use", were the flashes of insight by which a thing made itself known and thinking about "being" first becomes possible. "Being" was always for Heidegger a robust "being surrounded by"[25] things that break, go missing, and are there when one does not need them.[26]

It is not surprising that the language of a culture so bound to ideas of *Heimat* and *Volk*, of "rootedness" in a myriad of traditions, would possess a word like *Fuge*, a *fitting-together*, that has connotations of felicitous craft. It is then also not surprising that when it came to assessing the disappearance of the *Fuge* that words would fail it. To approach the problem of modern technology, the Germans had terms like *Mobilmachung* and *Perfektion* and *planetarisch*, all of which became especially in vogue during the World Wars, but never "seamless", and today they still do not have it: The German word for seam, *Naht*, is still far afield from technological connotations, even in its privative form.

It could be said to be appropriate, then, that American English would grow a language that could speak so well to the matter at hand, that would first embed this sense of the word "seam" so deeply in everyday life: "seamless interface", "seamless feedback", "seamless technology". For Americanism was, according to Heidegger in the "Notebooks", one of the many horsemen of technical, systematic thinking. Bolshevism was another, as was – it needs to be said – "world-Jewry."[27]

However impoverished his language may have been, Heidegger could already make out the impending problems for our thinking about "being". He simply did not have the words for it. The word he did not have at hand was "seam", and yet he intuited, even without it, that the will to its negation spelled a crisis for ontology. The disappearance of the *Fuge* should have flashed as a warning, before the photographs of the human piles were set before us, of man's robust systematic will to eliminate disappointment and discordance, and the possibility of things not going as planned. The peak of this crisis would be the disappearance of another figure, that which announces something failing us by not fulfilling its promise: the seam.

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[24] "Everything is functioning. That is precisely what is strange [*unheimlich*], that it is functioning and that the functioning always drives to further functioning..." Heidegger, "Der Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger", 325.

[25] Cf. Heidegger, *Off the Beaten Path*, 78-80.

[26] Cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 95-107.

[27] Cf. M. Heidegger, *Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941)*, GA 96 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014), 243. Translation mine.

This is the wisdom underlying Heidegger's famous claim that "the essence of technology is (...) nothing technological."[28] We only catch sight of technology when it ceases functioning, when it gets in its own way, when it disappoints. We only catch sight of the systematic when it falls short of reconciling its parts. We catch sight of our own thinking only when it arrives too early or too late, when it fails to rise to our expectations. What we come to know is not the technology, or the system, or our thinking – but their failures and shortcomings, *their seams*. When technology is *seamless*, that is, being as it is supposed to be, it is of no concern to us. Which is the same as saying it is not at all *questionable*. The same goes for thinking.

VIII

Ontology, because it requires a thinking "in time" and from out of "our time", will always stand the chance of being too early or too late. It is, one could say, the hazard of the trade. Hegel tells us the owl of Minerva takes flight first at dawn[29] and Benjamin's Angel of History has her back to the future into which she is helplessly propelled.[30] Nietzsche was more sardonic, and relished calling his thinking "untimely". We will always be late to our "now", and thinking about "being" begins with this understanding. The question remains, however, if this understanding forces us to also admit to this kind of thinking an inefficacy, or an inevitable disappointment, or an inability to answer the question "What is there to be done?"

When we inquire after Heidegger's ethics, we are asking about this content of ontology's untimeliness. We are asking about the necessity of ontology being untimely and the use and value of ontology if it must be so. It is a question, ultimately, about the value in itself of the seam and the danger of the seam's disappearance.

[28] Heidegger, *Insight Into That Which Is*, 23.
[29] G. W. F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 23.
[30] W. Benjamin. *Illuminations*, trans. H. Zohn (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 257-258.

Dennis J. Schmidt

HEIDEGGER AND THE CALL FOR AN ORIGINAL ETHICS

1

While I would argue that Heidegger opens the door to truly important ethical reflections, reflections that ask us to rethink some of the most elemental ethical notions – notions such as responsibility, rights, guilt, imperative, to name a few – it is obvious that such an argument is not an easy one to see or to make. The problems do not only stem from Heidegger's own political failings, as even if one tries to demoralize his political statements, to take them out of the realm of judgment or to slice them out of his work, his allergy to any talk of ethics seems to obstruct every effort to pursue the questions of ethical life out of Heidegger. Nonetheless, I do believe that Heidegger's work holds real promise for thinking the enigmas of ethical life today. However in order to make this argument one needs to redefine the task and character of ethics, to rip it away from the sorts of shapes it has come to take in the present age – above all, to unmask the degeneration of ethical questions in the field of "applied ethics", since whatever else it is, such an ethical sense cannot be understood as the "application" of any theory or idea to life.

My purpose in what follows is not to tackle these large claims, but I do want such claims to form the background of my rather focused comments. Rather, what I want to do is look at some of the reasons that Heidegger gives for discounting, for actively discrediting, whole swathes of ethical traditions and reasoning. He is uncompromising in his critique of some of the most cherished ethical assumptions and grounds – especially those that buttress the very idea of humanism. In the end, my argument is that Heidegger's critique of humanism is neither gratuitous nor arbitrary, and that what one comes to see is that a real ethical sensibility begins, takes its first shape, precisely at the limits of the human. Ethics finds its source not in the affirmation or realization of human ideals, but in those points where the human meets its limits – in the animal, the earth, the divine, the monstrous, in death, birth, and countless other sites.

2

The most extensive comments Heidegger about ethical life and humanism belong, of course, to the "Brief über den Humanismus",[1] but to be understood, those comments need to be read as a stage in a longer, more complex set of arguments. Minimally, this text,

[1] M. Heidegger, "Brief über den Humanismus", in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), 311-360.

which does not stand well alone, needs to be read in conjunction with two other texts by Heidegger of the same time: "Die Armut" (1945) and "Der Spruch des Anaximander" (1946).[2] And, of course, one also needs the text to which Heidegger is at least covertly responding, namely Sartre's "L'existentialisme est un humanisme".[3] These four texts were written within a period of 15 months, a time of profound shock for the world and deep personal crisis for Heidegger. During those months, the world would witness the dropping of two atom bombs, the continued revelations of the horrors of the concentration camps, rampant homelessness, starvation and suffering, the emerging struggles between America and the Soviet Union, and the Nuremberg trails and all the disclosures that came with them. During these months Heidegger had a love affair, almost left his wife, was barred from teaching at the university after testifying about his time as *Rektor* before the de-Nazification Commission, his former friend Karl Jaspers would write to that commission that he found Heidegger's thought "unfree, dictatorial, and incommunicative in its essence,"[4] his pension was reduced to the bare minimum, and then he was hospitalized for three weeks with a "nervous breakdown" in the spring of 1946. Heidegger's problems are small, almost trivial, on the scale of suffering felt at this time and the problems that the world faced, but they do shape some of the ways in which he thinks at this time, and so need to be noted. Crisis defines the moment; a crisis that seems absolute and without limit.

It is against this background that these texts collectively ask: what should one do now? It is the question of the moment, one that cannot be postponed, but seems quite urgent. So, one asks, in light of the disaster and monstrous truth that has begun to reveal itself, and of the undeniable and utter failure of all grounds upon which such a disaster might be confronted and overcome, the same question is asked: what should one do now? How should one move forward, on what grounds, with what measures and guidelines? Action seems to be called for, but what actions are best? But, complicating matters right from the outset and slowing down the undeniable urgency of the moment, each of Heidegger's texts questions the very notion of doing as Heidegger. From the start, Heidegger calls into question the very idea of taking action: one sees this for instance in the opening sentence of "Brief über den Humanismus" when he says that "for a long time we have not yet thought the essence of action with sufficient decisiveness."[5] Heidegger immediately argues that action and change will be understood not as the result of the capacity of an agent to bring about an effect in the world, in what Sartre calls engaged thinking, but rather in an ever so slight transformation in understanding that marks a profound transformation in what can be seen. In other words, the question "what should I do?" is itself thrown into question, so that in advance every answer becomes hesitant. The need for transformation preempts action; more precisely, transformation will be the real beginning of action.

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[2] M. Heidegger, "Die Armut", *Heidegger Studies*, Vol. 10 (1994), 5-11; "Der Spruch des Anaximander", in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann Verlag, 1972), 296-342. As a note, I should say that the English translation of *Spruch* as "saying", which has become rather standard, misses the connotation of *Spruch* as a judicial "verdict", and so hides the sense of this essay as a commentary upon the verdict of history, but also (one has to assume) the verdicts of Nuremburg.

[3] J.-P. Sartre, *L'existentialisme est un humanisme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1996).

[4] Karl Jaspers's letter is cited in H. Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1988), 316.

[5] Heidegger, "Brief über den Humanismus", 145.

Heidegger had long been of the opinion that "in philosophical knowing a transformation (metamorphosis) of the human being who understands takes place from the outset"[6], so this claim that transformation in the human being will be the way action "happens" is unsurprising. It is nonetheless difficult to understand, but that is what the texts surrounding "Brief über den Humanismus" collectively address.[7] More: these three texts are not simply theoretical investigations into this problem, but set themselves up as efforts to enact, to move toward, this transformation of human being; this is especially the case with the short text "Die Armut". At a time when it seemed that the world needed real triage, Heidegger counsels something like a pause, a hiatus that might interrupt the urgency of the moment. This is not easy to endorse when suffering is so pervasive, but it is, at least for Heidegger, what we need to remember and "do".

In what follows, I want to call attention to some of the key features of what is to be found in these texts and which I believe we would do well to look at more closely. I will focus my remarks on "Brief über den Humanismus", but I want to situate that text by briefly speaking about the contexts for reading the "Brief über den Humanismus" which are forged by "Die Armut" and "Der Spruch des Anaximander".

3

"Die Armut" was a text presented in rather surreal circumstances about two months after the end of the war in Germany. This text is remarkably intimate and seems to be remote from the urgent crises of the moment, even when it seeks to address those crises. It sounds very much like a sermon, and indeed has strong resonances with Meister Eckhart's *Sermon 52* ("Beati Pauperes Spiritu"), but its leitmotif is taken from Hölderlin's 1790 text "Communismus der Geister" which speaks of the "anxiety [that follows when] the memory of past beauty becomes a poison," of "the death of the soul," and of "standing before history as a criminal."[8] In other words, it speaks of a time of emptying, of a profound impoverishment of spirit and it asks – but never clearly answers – just what response is needed in such a time. In other words, one finds here the same gesture, the same question that is put 15 months later in "Der Spruch des Anaximander" where Heidegger poses the question of the possibility of justice in a time of "the most monstrous alterations of the entire earth and of history."[9] The question again is about the need for a response. More precisely, the question Heidegger poses in both of these texts concerns the need for a response to history, to the impoverishment of time, to a world bereft of beauty, to a historical crime, to the verdict of time and a penalty paid for injustice. Doing is to be understood as a matter of a response. Strangely, those texts speak frequently of the need for a response, but the word "responsibility" seldom appears, even though I believe that

[6] M. Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Klostermann Verlag, 1989), 14.

[7] As an example of a small shift in understanding that marks a profound transformation, a hiatus, one might think of the small passage from Hugo von Hofmannsthal (5 Nov. 1905): "A man asked a child, 'Can you touch a star?' And the child answered, 'Yes,' and bent down and touched the earth." See H. von Hofmannsthal, *Gesammelte Werke* (Berlin: Fischer Verlag, 1986), 332.

[8] F. Hölderlin, "Communismus der Geister", in *Sämtliche Werke*, Bd. 4, ed. F. Beißner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer/ Cotta, 1961), 306.

[9] Heidegger, "Der Spruch des Anaximander", 300.

word above all is at the center of what Heidegger is trying to think – or should be trying to think – in these texts. How are we to respond, how will we ever be able, capable, of responding to what is put to us now? Of course, we first need to understand just what is being asked of us now. And then, perhaps, we will understand what sort of a response is possible.

4

Three months after Heidegger gave the lecture "Die Armut" to a small and quite private gathering of friends at a villa in the Black Forest, Sartre gave his celebrated lecture "L'existentialisme est un humanisme" on October 29, 1945 to a packed auditorium eager for some sense of what action Sartre would propose should be taken in the present age. Sartre argued that the basic values of humanism are needed as the grounds for building a better world after the ruin that had been brought into the world. The lecture was a true event – people crowded the auditorium, stood on the windows, and pushed against the doors – and it was widely covered by newspapers and magazines. It was a lecture that announced the hope for a real restoration of something good and decent. Sartre's text, which was published in 1946, placed the dignity and power of the human being to create at the center of any hope for a better future.[10] As Sartre saw it, the task moving forward and the call to action began with the restoration of what is best about the being of human as the ground of any possible future, namely radical freedom, and to will that freedom as the ground of all values. All acting, all doing, begins with this willing and assertion of freedom. Humanism is the achievement of this willing and this freedom. This, says Sartre, is the beginning of what needs to be done as a response to the crisis of the historical present. From here, action begins.

Heidegger would get a copy of Sartre's text from Jean Beaufret on September 12, 1946 and finish writing his reply – the "Brief über den Humanismus" – two months later, on November 23, 1946. The "Brief über den Humanismus" begins with a claim resonant with the general assumption guiding "Die Armut", namely, that "thinking does not become action only because some effect issues from it or because it is applied. Thinking acts insofar as it thinks."[11] In other words, thinking, properly understood, is already responsible, is a response that needs no application, indeed cannot be "applied" as if it were remote from the world and the being of the human, as if ethics were a *τέχνη*. In fact, it is in the very notion of an "applied ethics" – of ideas that need to be planned, calculated, and brought into action in the world – that we can see how far away from being an original ethics, an ethics that moves to the heart of how we are to respond to our being in the world, ethics in the modern age has fallen. Against this, a peculiar and quite specific sense of thinking is set up as an answer to the question "what is to be done?"

In the largest sense, the task of ethics has always been to think from a standpoint that is not defined – and so limited to – one's own horizons, however those horizons of understanding and need are defined. Perhaps the most all-embracing standpoint,

[10] It should be noted that Sartre is not alone in this call for a return to the greatness of the humanist tradition. Thomas Mann and others made impassioned arguments for a return to the ideals of the humanist tradition.

[11] Heidegger, "Brief über den Humanismus", 145.

the standpoint that is most inclusive and least specialized, is found in the tradition of humanism. In this tradition, the human being is the measure, even when the human is defined in some relation to a beyond, to a god: "for this is humanism: meditating and caring, that human beings be human and not inhumane, 'inhuman', that is outside of their essence. But in what does the humanity of the human being consist? It lies in his essence."[12] This is clarified later when Heidegger says "the first humanism, Roman humanism, and every kind that has emerged from that time to the present, has presupposed the most universal "essence" of the human being to be obvious. The human being is considered to be an *animal rationale*."[13] From Christianity to Marx – the two extreme poles of the humanist tradition – and up to Sartre, humanism is taken as the basis for thinking from this largest standpoint insofar as it thinks from out of the most basic humanity of the human being. Heidegger suggests that every definition of this humanity – and the diversity of such definitions is great – in the end understands the human being as an entity within the world, whether that entity is defined as a subject differentiated from objects, a soul with a body, a being of reason, or a being of god. And in this we find the first problem with every humanism: it is too small, too contained, too limited to the human insofar as it misses the most original way we are in the world. To put the point in Heidegger's vocabulary, humanism does not think the human being from out of its being as *da-Sein*. That way of being is, argues Heidegger, profoundly open, not at all defined by the orbit of the human, but rather defined by a realm we inhabit that is far greater than that defined by the human. That realm includes the non-human, the animal, the gods, the earth, as well as others who are like us. To speak and think from out of that which lets us be who we are, and to speak from a standpoint larger than a "self", means that the "we" to which we belong cannot even be defined by something like a "people". That which claims us is much larger, and so we must speak of the earth, of animals, of what we understand even less than we understand ourselves. But to say this does not efface a peculiar distinction of the human being: "ek-sistence can be said only of the essence of the human being, that is, only of the human way 'to be.' For as far as our experience shows, only the human being is admitted into the destiny of ek-sistence."[14] What sets the human being apart is that "for humans it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in their essence that corresponds to the destiny of being; for in accord with this destiny, the human being as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of being. The human being is the shepherd of being."[15] It is only once we come to understand this shepherding that the experience of our responsibility in the world emerges and can be assumed. It is, as Heidegger says, "something simple."[16]

More needs to be said about this response or responsibility, but for now let me turn to the second question I want to state in this text, namely, the question concerning the task and promise of an ethics.[17]

[12] Ibid., 146.
[13] Ibid., 147.
[14] Ibid., 148.
[15] Ibid., 153.
[16] Ibid., 156.
[17] On this notion of responsibility, see my essays "Honoring One's Commitments – Ordinary and Commonplace", in *Commonplace Commitments*, ed. P. Fosl et al. (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press/Rowman & Littlefield,

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Some concerns that have long defined ethical thought remain for Heidegger. Specifically, the most basic task and problem of ethical life concerns the finitude of one's understanding, and being in the world as one confronts a world beyond the borders of that finitude; in other words, ethical life poses the challenge of facing difficulties that are larger than what one can define, know, or control. The traditional effort to think from a horizon larger than one's own subjectivity remains, but two differences immediately separate the direction Heidegger moves from other traditional assumptions about ethics. First, the assumption that such a standpoint is to be thought in terms of a universal sense of humanity, of the human not conceived as a subject, however this "humanism" is defined. Second, that this standpoint is to be defined in terms of the idea, that is in terms of a concept, of reason, of a thinking that is remote from praxis and so in need of some sort of deliberate "application".[18]

We have already laid out the basic elements of the first point. Heidegger's critique of humanism is relatively easy to outline. There is, however, one consequence of this shift away from the tradition of defining the ethical in terms of the human that I have not mentioned. Heidegger does not mention this either – at least in this text – but we can find it developed both in Nietzsche and in Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche; namely, that as a consequence of this move out of the orbit, the hegemony, of the human, the categories that have long defined human interaction and the practice of power, that is the categories that articulate the law, are no longer appropriate for articulating ethical matters. This means that juridical notions such as right, wrong, guilt, innocence, pardon no longer have a place in ethical discourse. Such a discourse must, as Nietzsche remarked, be beyond good and evil – or as Heidegger might contend, it must be more original than good and evil. This will become clearer in Heidegger's other text from 1946, "Der Spruch des Anaximander".

For now, it is the second assumption of ethics which Heidegger disputes that I want to develop. In contrast to the longstanding conviction that reason, the concept, or the idea – some thought that is elevated above and apart from the mess of factical life and brought into play ["applied"] and validated by the authority of "theory" – should be the orientation point for any ethics, Heidegger argues that ethics can only be thought as a matter of how one belongs to factical life, and "such thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction."[19] In "Brief über den Humanismus" this site from out of which any possible ethical understanding can be found is discussed in terms of the "abode"

2016), 105-115; and "Ethics: After Heidegger", in *The Task of Thinking After Heidegger*, ed. R. Polt, G. Fried (London: Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2017).

[18] Heidegger makes clear – perhaps more than anyone else – the danger inherent in taking a theoretical "idea" as the measure of ethical life. Whether this idea is "good" or "bad" is irrelevant. The idea itself is the danger since, as detached from factical life, it can always turn against life. Ideology has no place in ethics. One way in which this appeal to a theoretical idea can be understood as dangerous is found in the way that "theoretical principles" can seem to validate a peculiar righteousness in one who believes in a cause.

[19] Heidegger, "Brief über den Humanismus", 169. This return to factical life as the real enactment of thinking is also evident in *Sein und Zeit*, see p. 38: "Philosophy (...) takes its departure from the hermeneutic of *Dasein*, which, as an analysis of *existence* has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry at the point from which it *arises* and to which it *returns*" and p. 436: "philosophy (...) begins with a hermeneutic of *Dasein*, which, as an analytic of *existence* has made fast the guideline for all philosophical questioning at the point where it arises and into which it is *folded back*."

of the human being.[20] One could trace the evolution of this notion for Heidegger from his analysis of the *da* of *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit*, through the discussions of the space of appearance in texts such as "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" and *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, to the notion of dwelling in "Brief über den Humanismus" and other texts such as "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken". What is most important about how this notion of dwelling is unfolded in "Brief über den Humanismus" is that its explicitly ethical character is made evident. Heidegger is clear: dwelling is to be thought as a matter of ἦθος, and this begins to expose the ethical sensibility emerging here. But one naturally asks: in what sense is this an "ethical" notion? What does it mean when Heidegger says that "if the name "ethics," in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ἦθος, should now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the human being, as the one who exists, is in itself original ethics"?[21] What does it mean to say that "more essential than instituting rules is that human beings find the way to their abode in the truth of being. This abode first yields the experience of something we can hold on to. The truth of being offers a hold for all conduct"?[22]

Heidegger answers this question and pulls forward the ethical sense here by drawing his discussion back into a Greek context. More precisely, he unpacks this claim by means of references to Heraclitus and Sophocles. The reference to Sophocles is a way of indicating some that the language of ethical discourse does not in the first instance belong to philosophy, which defines itself according to the mother tongue of the concept. Literature, and the work of art more generally, is more adept than philosophy at bringing forward the real meaning and sense of factical life, of how we dwell in the world: "that poetizing is truer than the inquiry into beings."[23] In short, the reference to Sophocles points to a sense of ethical understanding that is not defined by the self-authorizing terms of philosophy and the language of the concept with its attendant sense of imperative and law. The argument is that before one can understand Heidegger's claim about the ethical sense of dwelling, one needs to drop the presumption of self-evidence of the claim that ethics ultimately belongs to and is defined by the dominion of philosophy. This, in part, is what Heidegger means when he says that "it is time to break the habit of overestimating philosophy and asking too much of it."[24]

The reference to Heraclitus calls attention to the saying ἦθος ἀνθρώπω δαίμων [traditionally translated as "one's character is one's destiny"], a saying that Heidegger believes points to the basic meaning of the word ἦθος. To clarify that meaning, he reinterprets Heraclitus' words with the odd translation: "The (familiar [*geheuer*]) abode for humans is the open region for the prescening of god (the unfamiliar one [*der Ungeheueren*])."[25] When Heidegger speaks of the "basic meaning" of the word ἦθος he refers to the way it means something like a native place or the place where something

[20] The word translated here as "abode" is *Aufenthalt*, a term that includes a sense of its own ultimate impermanence.
[21] Ibid., 171.
[22] Ibid., 174.
[23] Ibid., 175. On Heidegger's relation to Sophocles, see my *On Germans and Other Greeks* (Bloomington: Indiana U. P., 2001).
[24] Ibid., 176.
[25] Ibid., 171.

belongs and flourishes. Rather than trace out Heidegger's remarks on this word in "Brief über den Humanismus", which are brief and a little opaque, I would like to point to two other uses of the word that help make Heidegger's point in a slightly different way. First, the word ἦθος is used in Homer's *Iliad* when Paris, running through Troy in order to find Hector, is likened to a horse breaking free and running to find the haunts [ἤθεα] and pastures [νομὸν] of other horses: ἦθος is the place where the animal belongs with other animals – it the place where they gather and flourish.[26] Second, there is a passage in Plato where one finds a more archaic sense of the word ἦθος, which I believe is an even more appropriate way of understanding the basic "meaning" of ἦθος. It appears in the *Phaedrus* (276d) when, in the course of discussing gardens Socrates introduces the idea that written words constitute a sort of "garden of letters" [γράμμασι κήπους] which are the seeds to be planted in the soil that is the soul. In that passage, Socrates speaks of the place where those seeds were planted as an ἤθεσι, and that place is also the word for the character of the soul in which that garden of letters is planted. In this case, ἦθος refers to a gathering place, but also something like a soil in which something grows, and that which grows in this place is one's character. It is the place where the soul is forged and formed. These more archaic senses of ethical life, of its roots and original character, open up upon the sense of an original ethics that which is what we find Heidegger calling for today. Such an ethics that is original cultivates this place, forms a character, and nourishes that out of which anything like conduct, decision, action, right or wrong is to be thought and understood.[27] To put it in other words, one might say simply: "ἦθος ἀνθρώπω δαίμων."[28]

In the end, Heidegger does not offer much of a positive or programmatic nature regarding ethical life. However, he does radically call into question the basic framework and organizing principles of ethical thought as it has been expressed in the long history of philosophy. In doing this, in asking what really constitutes the great riddle of our being ethical creatures, Heidegger does issue something of a call to think ethical life anew and fresh – he would say "originally". There is nothing "new" about this "originality": quite the contrary, it is an old notion to speak of the elements of ethical life as a matter of ἦθος understood as character or the place where one dwells. It is a call back to the ancient sense of ethical life as a task never finished, rather than a set of principles, as a way of life rather than a theory. Heidegger himself rejected the word *ethics* and did not pursue the sort of themes that I am proposing here, but I maintain that his work is a great resource – even despite Heidegger – for the task of thinking through the difficulties of ethical life in our times.

[26] On this, see C. Scott, *The Question of Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana U.P, 1990), pp. 143-147; also C. Chamerlain, "From 'Haunts' to 'Character': The Meaning of Ethos", *Helios*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1984.

[27] One finds this double sense of ἦθος – as both a practice and a place – expressed by the way he uses this word in both senses in *Laws* 792e (on children and habit as cultivating an ἦθος) and 865e (on a murderer who returns to his haunt ἦθος, the place where he is comfortable and at ease).

[28] Heraclitus, fragment 119 in *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Bd. I, ed. H. Diels, W. Kranz (Hildesheim: Weidmann, 1989), 177.

Dmitri Nikulin

THE BURDENS AND BLESSINGS OF BOREDOM: HEIDEGGER AND KRACAUER

Modernity is a complex set of interacting and interwoven social, cultural, political, and historical processes and phenomena that establish, define, and describe both theoretical cognition and practical action. Among the concepts that define it, perhaps the central and most significant is that of the modern subject, which establishes itself as universal, rational, and necessary, expelling everyday experience from philosophy. As a result, the post-metaphysical scene is that of devastation, a scorched landscape and an empty stage devoid of any decorations, which might represent and retain any of the minutiae that make life engaging and worth living. One could say that the modern subject is the only hero, the protagonist, the playwright, the director, and the spectator of the drama of modernity. Exclusive of the other of another human being and of the world, the modern subject is inevitably monological, lonely and alone, and thus can neither escape its own solitary presence nor get rid of itself. As such, it is inevitably bored. Boredom, then, becomes the *conditio moderna.*

KRACAUER'S PARADOXES OF BOREDOM

Perhaps one of the most significant modern accounts of boredom is a short piece by Siegfried Kracauer, which was published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in 1924.[1] Kracauer's writing is stylistically elegant, philosophically condensed, and literarily engaging. In just four pages he mentions and briefly engages with the themes (anonymity, alienation, inauthenticity) that preoccupied thinkers of the age and that would be developed at much more length and with scholarly ponderosity three years later by the author of *Sein und Zeit*. Kracauer begins his discussion with a rather paradoxical claim that those who today have time for boredom but are not bored (*nicht langeweilen*) are as boring as those who do not come to be bored. This happens because their self (*Selbst*) is lost, remains unaccounted for, and has been long forgotten, since people live in the ever-busy hasty world, without an aim or purpose, not lingering anywhere for long (*nirgendwo lang zu verweilen* [L 161]). Similar to Kant, Kracauer takes boredom to be *inevitable*, although in a very different

[1] S. Kracauer, "Langeweile", in *1924-1927*, pt. 2 of *Essays, Feuilletons, Rezensionen*, ed. I. Mülder-Bach, vol. 5 of *Werke* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2011), 161-4; henceforth L, followed by page number. The essay was originally published in *Frankfurter Zeitung* on November 11, 1924.

sense. The experience of the inevitability of boredom inescapably leads us to encounter a number of paradoxes. Kracauer himself seems not to notice them, and yet they transpire and are implied in his discussion. For him, boredom is both a burden and a blessing. People – by whom Kracauer means modern city dwellers, wage bureau laborers who routinely do tedious work, petit bourgeois who follow strict Kantian *Arbeitsethik*, the working ethics of duty, which they proudly uphold – reward themselves with the justly deserved contentment and satisfaction of fulfilled obligations, after which they customarily return to their city apartments to enjoy leisure.

However, for Kracauer there is no nature, but only urban civilization; therefore, unlike in Kant, boredom is not a voice of nature in us but is intimately connected with culture and its emphasis on production with its eventual rewards of entertainment and leisure. The distraction, fascination, fantasy, and enchantment of city life is endless. They drive oneself from oneself, hanging and hazing about in the evening streets, from one night into another, illuminated by lights and advertisement. The fantastic world of cinema, the illusion of the presence to other places through radio (and later television and the internet), which substitute for communication in cafés, are expressions of a city life that has become a perpetual self-contained stream of amusing activity (L 161-3). Kracauer is condescending toward the people of the (big) city, and yet, since he himself is one of them, he is not disdainful of the city inhabitants, unlike Heidegger, who cannot find a better way of describing the "contemporary city man" than "the ape of the civilization."[2] Because city life is the life of culture, superfluous yet vivid and engaging, the sympathetic figure of a city-dweller is that of flaneur, gadder – the observer of city life in its endless fascinating minutiae, a frequenter of films and cafés who knows and loves the city, in the theater of which every minor event may become insightful and connected with the lived history of the city.[3] Another figure representing the ever curious and never busy city inhabitant is a ragpicker and tatter, *Lumpensammler*, which is what Benjamin calls Kracauer in his review of Kracauer's book. Interested in the splinters and rags of what the city has to offer, a chiffonier is a connoisseur and antiquarian, a collector and appreciator of the ongoing poetic and political activity of the city. The first such figure in the history of the city is probably Socrates, followed by Diogenes the Cynic. In Benjamin, this becomes the flaneur, ever distracted and never bored.

Yet the leisure offered by the city is both a burden and a blessing. Here we encounter the first paradox: (1) contemporary life provides people with much leisure, yet in fact they have no leisure at all, because they are as bored at their leisure as they are at their work, which means that most people lack leisure. For rather than being time off – time for freedom – leisure becomes an institution that pays for the boring work. In such leisure, one is allowed not to do anything, does not want to do anything, and indeed one is made not to do anything.[4] But this is boring.

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[2] M. Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. W. McNeill, N. Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 5.

[3] The figure of the flaneur is best exemplified in Convolute M of Benjamin: W. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, trans. H. Eiland, K. McLaughlin, ed. R. Tiedemann (New York: Belknap Press, 2002), 416-55; *Das Passagen-Werk*, vol. 5 of *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. R. Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), 524-69.

[4] "Indessen: man will nichts tun, und man wird getan" (L 161).

Here, Kracauer introduces an important distinction between two kinds of boredom: the "right," "exemplary," "radical," "legitimate" type – and a "vulgar" (*vulgäre*), ordinary, and mediocre boredom. The latter is the insatiable satiety of the improperly lived leisure that suspends leisure and cancels its blessing. The vulgar boredom is neither hot nor cold, but rather tepid: it neither kills (Kant's English gentleman) nor calls for a new life. It only causes dissatisfaction, which can be driven away by morally allowable distraction, which ultimately testifies to moral uprightness. What Kant takes to be the purpose of boredom – the pursuit of duty, the establishing of moral character – for Kracauer is only the means to dispel the bother of the inauthentic boredom. People are too busy to be bored, which is why they are bored, but not in the right way. Boredom, then, is the condition of modern human existence in its two different forms, which in fact are two sides of the same coin, with which the modern self both pays and charges itself.

This entails the second paradox (2): the flight away from boredom through distraction by the abundance of modern entertainment does not save us from boredom. Fleeing boredom only makes us more bored in a "vulgar" way. On the other hand, embracing boredom in its inevitability makes us realize that boredom itself is *not boring* at all, once we come to recognize its right, radical form. Accepting boredom gives us back our leisure, which is the leisure not of fleeing boredom but the leisure for being bored, or rather for not being afraid of being bored. What we cannot avoid, we should accept, and boredom becomes our blessing.

The third paradox (3) is that boredom is a state of powerlessness and supineness, in which one cannot and does not produce anything, yet boredom is most creative. Kracauer's prescription for well-being is to turn away from vulgar boredom to the genuine one by a radical suspension of all commonly accepted distraction. On a sunny afternoon, when everyone is outside, one goes back to one's room, closes the curtains, lays on the sofa, and does the "spiritual exercise" of fully committing oneself to radical boredom by embracing inactivity, by not doing anything, drifting away in thoughts and reveries.[5] In this way, Kracauer performs a radical ἐποχή, yet not of thought or judgement – but of *action*. The radical boredom is the suspension of all action. In order to be properly bored, one needs leisure, which one should be able to know how to use. In a sense, one should dare to be lazy, not to produce, make, or do anything. Paraphrasing Erasmus, one could call Kracauer's way *Pigritiae laus*, "Apology of laziness."

Outlined ironically and in a sketch, Kracauer's way to the "legitimate" boredom goes through a number of stages (L 163-4). First, one entertains certain ideas and even thinks of some projects, which, similar to Chichikov's grand projects in Gogol's *Dead Souls*, do not and cannot lead anywhere, and are thus totally useless. Recognizing their ephemeral character, one comes next to the rejection of any thought and activity, marveling at the presence of "not serious" little ludicrous beings around you, such as a glass grasshopper or a cactus. Their just being-there testifies to the purposelessness of the activism of the constant production of new things, distractions, meanings, which makes one utterly and

[5] Cf. L. Tieck, *William Lovell* (Berlin: Carl August Nicolai, 1795; repr. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Jun., 1986), 215, where the experience of the hellish suffering of boredom ("Langeweile ist gewiß die Qual der Hölle") is associated with passing the time in one's room on a sofa.

inescapably bored. Such a being finds *nothing* (*Nichts*) in its existence worth noting, or of importance to the greater whole of the existent. Such a being is that which *is without being* (*was ist, ohne zu sein* [L 164]), a being that is present in its absence to the world of reality and purpose. But existence without (serious purposeful) being is irritating, causes an inner unrest without any aim, and one can only be content with "not doing anything further than being by oneself and not knowing what one actually should do."[6] And third, if one can wait long enough, one comes to the legitimate boredom, which opens the flux of passing images through a shimmering landscape that looks strangely like a paradise.[7] And here one encounters that which one was always looking for but was always missing, the end of the journey, which is itself a journey. For lack of a better word, Kracauer calls it a "great passion" (*große Passion*). But it can probably be called anything, because everything is just a game of boredom in the imagination playing against itself.

Hence, along the "way of boredom" one first needs to know how to be distracted; then one does not know at all what to do, rather than just being with oneself by being bored; and finally, one does not even know how to be, what to know, and how to ask the right question, committing oneself to the oblivion of anything having a purpose, useful knowledge, and dutiful judgement. Yet, one cannot force oneself to be rightly bored: the radical boredom cannot be produced or be had on purpose. Rather, one needs *patience* in order to be bored. Boredom thus comes to those who are capable of being bored in waiting for it.

And so boredom, which does not produce anything, generates *nothing*, *nichts*. The one who can get embraced and taken away by boredom, then, is a kind of bored creator who produces nothing – the nothing of the daydream, of not knowing and oblivion. Yet the nothing of boredom is *almost* nothing, which makes the bored creator an *as-if* creator who flows with the fleeing appearances of the world of rattletraps, fantasies, and forgetting that he makes up out of *prope nihil*.

This leads us, finally, to the fourth paradox (4): boredom alienates ourselves from ourselves (our self), yet it is the only way to go back or have access to our proper ("authentic") existence (*Dasein* [L 163]), which is being bored without giving an account (λόγον διδόναι) of that which is and should be, of the *Sein* and *Soll* of the world and our action in it with and against each other. Here, Kracauer diagnoses what many thinkers of the age were discussing at much length: that we can get back to ourselves as living non-productive beings by facing the negativity of finitude, mortality, or the anxiety of *Angst*. Kracauer is more benevolent: it is boredom that opens the way to our self and existence, rather than death. Unlike in Kant, boredom is not opposed to pleasure, but if it is the right one, it brings its pleasurable blessings (L 164). Boredom is useless, yet it is most helpful. We live to the full only when we are really bored. Paradoxically, we are liberated

[6] "[N]ichts weiter zu tun, als bei sich zu sein und nichts zu wissen, was man eigentlich tun solle" (L 164).

[7] Cf. J.-J. Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, trans. R. Goulbourne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 49-58. Dreaming at one's leisure, "to the attraction of an abstract and monotonous reverie, I am able to add charming images that enliven it. The objects of these images often eluded my senses in my ecstasies, and now, the deeper my reverie is, the more vividly it presents them to me. I am often more in their midst and more pleasantly so than I was when I was really there" (ibid., 58).

from (vulgar) boredom by (radical) boredom. Happiness, life, and freedom – such are the blessings of the right, radical boredom for Kracauer.

Radical boredom is thus the way to its own truth, which is *freedom*. It is the freedom for our proper existence and the freedom from the fake life of purposeful production. Kracauer thus establishes the diagnosis of modernity: *to be is to be bored*. Modernity is born out of the spirit of boredom. But he also finds (thinks he finds) a remedy by a kind of philosophical homoeopathy: treat the same by the same, *similia similibus*, evil by evil, poison by poison, *pharmakon* by *pharmakon*, boredom by boredom. In fact, philosophical thinking itself gets suspended by literary writing, the boredom of long treatises by a short newspaper article, attentive thinking by the *farniente* of doing nothing, which becomes the realization of freedom.

Kracauer's discussion is noteworthy in that it is both a reflection on boredom and an exemplification of the working of boredom by being bored. As he hints at the end of his piece, this very double reflection on the boredom of thinking about boredom and acting out of it, might itself be boring, and it might even be written out of boredom. If the modern subject is forever stuck in an ongoing reflection about itself, there might indeed be no way out of such a reflection. Besides being boring, the boring reflection of boredom on boredom, a kind of self-praise, is also highly narcissistic, which, however, is alleviated by self-irony, the way the praise of stupidity suspends and cancels stupidity.[8]

Yet Kracauer envisages radical liberation and freedom from boredom by boredom. The freedom achieved in boredom by being bored might even make the radical boredom extinguish and transcend itself, so that, as Kracauer says (L 164), everything that is, would be... simply "..." The end of thinking as the end of writing as the end of being-useful, not allowing for existence with oneself, at one's self... Just the ellipsis, which marks the inevitable elision in existence without being, without knowing and without acting, in total forgetfulness of these three. Only suspension points, which suspend any point of productive being, purposeful knowledge, and dutiful action...

Kracauer thus has to finish his discussion of boredom with an ironic self-suspension of what he said about boredom, in order to elude the boringly serious and productive conclusion about boredom (L 164). The "great passion" is just passing on the horizon, and the true boredom that does not mitigate itself, keeps being productive – but only of the trifles and bagatelles, as this boring one Kracauer has just quickly written for a newspaper that we have picked up and read in haste...

HEIDEGGER: THE POETICS OF BOREDOM

Boredom is a very modern phenomenon whose roots lie deep in the constitution of modern life and which cannot be cast off; rather, it needs to be carefully analyzed as a profound symptom of the crisis of our time and a sign of our condition.[9] This is also Kracauer's

[8] See Erasmus, *Praise of Folly*, in *Praise of Folly and Letter to Maarten van Dorp, 1515*, trans. B. Radice (London: Penguin, 1993), chap. 3.

[9] Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*; henceforth FC, followed by page number; *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*, vols. 29-30 of *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983); henceforth GM, followed by page number. In many cases, I am retranslating the original text, without further notice.

and Simmel's diagnosis.[10] Heidegger dedicates careful, studious and tedious philosophical investigation to boredom in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. His starting point is *Stimmung*, "mood" or "attunement," one of the key terms in *Being and Time*, which also often appears in Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin and Nietzsche.[11] Here, Heidegger argues that this fundamental mood "must permeate [*durchstimmen*] our Dasein in the ground of its essence" (FC 132; GM 199). It is always already there as waiting, latent or sleeping, and hence can only be *awakened* (FC 68; GM 103). What is this fundamental mood that we are meant to awake by philosophical questioning, which comes to a stop in *waiting* for the truth of things and of Dasein to become unconcealed? Waiting means putting oneself in a state of receptivity for a more manifest and transparent understanding of the fundamental mood or attunement of Dasein (FC 132; GM 199). For Heidegger, this mood is unique to us and unambiguous in our Dasein, when awakened: it is boredom.

But *how* do we wake the fundamental mood? Apparently, by stopping and waiting, listening to the word of the poet and to the language itself. Why? Because the language of the surrounding, Heidegger's native Alemannic of the place, has already provided the answer: "to be homesick" (*Heimweh haben*) means "to have a long time" (*lange Zeit haben* [FC 80; GM 120]). And the poet – Novalis – who speaks the language of philosophy, tells us philosophy is a homesickness (*Heimweh* [FC 5; GM 67]).[12] Therefore, philosophy awakes the mood in which the "long time" becomes transparent. But "long time" literally means boredom as a "long while," or *Langeweile*. Thus, binding together two singular sayings (a poetic fragment and a local linguistic utterance) into a kind of syllogism suggests a universal claim: that the ground mode of our Dasein *is* boredom. Listening and attending in waiting is thus ultimately the attention to language, which suggests turning to boredom.

THREE MODES AND TWO MOMENTS OF BOREDOM

How do we approach boredom? At the superficial level of ordinary perception – and Heidegger will start with ordinary examples and proceed by moving deeper and deeper – boredom is the modern response to the improper skewed life of the contemporary bourgeois city-dweller, who is thus caught in inescapable boredom, which comes out of the utter inadequacy of his existence. The immediate natural attitude is to drive boredom away, to escape it, which seems easy, given the enormous amount of entertainment that contemporary life provides. However, in boredom time becomes long, and yet we are constantly trying to make it short and eventually fall asleep. By making time short through increasing entertainment, which becomes more and more overwhelming in the contemporary world, going beyond any visible scope of amusement-seeking activity, we shorten the time of our life instead of making it longer. We give up on our life. The time of our life becomes filled with nonsensical

[10] G. Simmel, "The Metropolis and Mental Life", in *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*, trans. and ed. K. H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950), 409-24.

[11] M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962); *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993), 134-9, 339-46, etc. "Stimmung repräsentiert die Weise, in der ich je das geworfene Seiende primär bin" (340).

[12] "Die Philosophie ist eigentlich Heimweh, ein Trieb überall zu Hause zu sein". Novalis, *Das Philosophische Werke I*, vol. 2 of *Schriften*, ed. J. Minor (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1923), frag. 21, 179.

distractive activity that is ultimately pointed to ourselves, instead of becoming fulfilled with a few meaningful acts that reach out for the other.

The right attitude for Heidegger, then, is exactly the one Kracauer has described before: not to resist boredom but to "let it resonate" (FC 82; GM 122). Only in this way can we find something important about boredom, and hence about our fundamental mode, indeed about our very Dasein.

Heidegger accepts three different forms of boredom, each one present in two moments. The distinction between these three forms of boredom again is suggested by the genius of language, which distinguishes between the property of a thing (which may also stand for its concept), the state induced in oneself by a thing, and the thing or concept itself. The three forms, then, are (I) that which is boring; (II) becoming bored by something; and (III) boredom itself or profound boredom.

(I) We are at a tasteless train station several hours before the train leaves (FC 93; GM 140). This is the situation in which we try to get rid of boredom, because we are tired of waiting, which oppresses us. Yet boredom is neither waiting nor impatience, because waiting and impatience can be not at all boring (FC 94; GM 141). What we cannot miss noticing is that boredom is somehow connected with time in the activity of passing time (*Zeitvertreib*) (or the passivity of acting time out). Passing the time, then, is the "driving away of boredom that drives time on" (*zeitantreibendes Wegtreiben der Langeweile* [FC 95; GM 145]). Passing the time, therefore, is a confrontation with time that whiles, drags on, lingers, and vacillates. By passing the time, we find ourselves being oppressed by being held or delayed by lingering time (*Hingehaltenheit*, Heidegger's neologism [FC 99-100; GM 149-52]). This is the first important moment in the encounter with boredom: being delayed by time as it lingers. We are not late: we were there on time but we still had to wait. The situation of being held or delayed by time dragging is that of being in a prison. Although here we are free to leave, we don't. This being bored by something that results in the oppressive hold of lingering time is also the situation of our life, when we have to pass the time often not willing or wanting it, without reaching the desired end when we finally can move on and not be oppressed by the delay. In becoming bored, we are bored by something but are not looking for anything in particular, which means that we do not really know what we are looking for – something that will save us from being oppressed in the delay, which can be the delay of our entire life, and thus can even lead to death.

We thus get engaged in a rather meaningless activity: we try to flee from boredom as being held by lingering time, whose specifically modern form is an attempt to escape the vacuity and devastation of being held empty by immersion into endless activity – without stop or purpose – of being entertained, in order to become immersed in the fullness of things and life (cf. FC 101; GM 153).

This leads us to the recognition of the second constitutive moment of boredom, that of being left empty (*Leergelassenheit* [FC 101; GM 152], another neologism, in which Heidegger cannot miss the *Gelassenheit*, composure, as the constituent of this second moment of boredom). We become thrashed, emptied by things at hand that do not disturb us, but in doing so abandon ourselves to ourselves, and thus offer nothing (FC 103; GM 155). Things (the train station) refuse us in themselves by still being there yet not meeting us, by not allowing us to meet them in a precise moment. This is, then, a provisional definition

(even if Heidegger tries to avoid definitions as finalizing the unfinalizable) of the first form of boredom that ties together the two constitutive moments of boredom. (I) Becoming bored is the essential being delayed in allowing to become empty (*Hingehaltensein im Leergelassenwerden* [FC 105; GM 158]), that is, by the things that did not let us meet them at the right time and thus left emptied.

(II) In the first form of boredom, something is boring. In the second form, I am bored with something. Here, we find the same two structural moments of boredom that we saw in the first form, those of *delay* and *emptiness*. Although being delayed determines and carries the allowance to become empty with it, we will find that the two structural moments – which are independent – are transformed in the other forms of boredom, insofar as the two are connected by a link, *Fuge*, which also means musical fugue, where the two moments might be considered independent voices in the polyphonic sound of boredom in its three movements (FC 106-7; GM 160-1).

The important difference between the two forms of boredom is that the first is linked with something determinate: a particular thing at a particular moment. We can always say that we are bored with something at the moment when we are bored. In contrast, in the second form of boredom I am not bored with anything specific and not at a given moment. Here, "the border cannot be drawn" (FC 109; GM 165). The example of this kind of boredom is an evening that one spends quite comfortably at dinner and conversation, only later realizing that it was utterly boring (FC 109-11; GM 164-7). Thus, in the first form of boredom (I) one is *immediately reflective* of being bored by something "outside," by a thing that refused its meeting at the proper time. In the second form of boredom (II), reflection comes only *belatedly*, after the whole event took place, and thus comes *from us* (FC 118; GM 178). While in (I) we *do not want to lose time*, in (II) we *have* time, we give and leave it to ourselves (FC 115, 129; GM 174, 195).

Now, what about the other structural moment of boredom, that of being delayed or put on hold? During the entire evening, being busy with chatting and thus creating emptiness that appeared in the fullness of time as one time, the very "during" (*Während*) did not even occur to us (FC 121; GM 182). While and during we do not notice the passage of time by not paying attention to it, time mean*while* does not release us but spreads stillness and calm (*Stille*) into us (FC 122; GM 183). Unlike in (I), in (II) time does not hold us but leaves us to ourselves, makes it possible to be near here (*Dabeisein*), as part of the existent. But we are held still nevertheless. Hence, we stop time, make it stand still although we do not make it disappear: we allot, leave time to ourselves, but time does not leave us (FC 121; GM 182). Therefore, time *stands*, "whiles and endures" (*weilt und währt* [FC 122; GM 184]), and because this is not how we usually perceive time in its timing, it cannot be recognized and thus is indeterminate and unfamiliar. In the second form of boredom, time brings us to a standstill, to the point. To a full stop. To. Or, rather, it suspends us in stillness and brings us to suspension points and elision marks (FC 108-9; GM 163-4 et al.). The "...", which has also been used by Kracauer, stand(s) – in singular plural – indicating motion without moving. It stand(s) for being bored with something that then contracts to a point of "standing now," which nevertheless, being the point of utter indeterminacy, still has the traces of these three dots, as three "un-" for the indeterminate-and-unknown, or for indefinite-indeterminate-unknown.

By spending the evening in careless entertainment and chatting, rather than conversing, we blow time away by making it *stand* (FC 124; GM 187). The three points of suspension turn it into a "now." This "standing now" is what holds us still by making us pass away time as almost an atemporal activity, when the flow of time becomes imperceptible and thus makes time unfamiliar. The "..." stands for the having been and the future as cut off, disconnected from the present in which we are present to what is happening by being disconnected with what has just happened and what will be. The past and the future here are not lost but are dissolved, interrupted, although they are still tied to the *mere present* as disconnecting the have-been and the will-be (FC 124-5; GM 187-8). In the elision points, the middle point of the "standing now" is not connected to the other two that stand (still) for the past and future – but rather marks them as elided by suspending but not eliminating them in its current standing presence.

Therefore, in (I), the first form of boredom, time lasts and endures, while things and the existent as a whole refuse us in meeting them at the proper time. In (II), the second form of boredom, time stands still, does not move. And by not moving, it holds us still, brings a delay. The second structural moment of boredom, that of delay and delay and hold, comes in (II), the second form of boredom as standing now as time that *does not move*. However, the two structural moments, those of emptiness and delay, are not isolated, because by being immersed in entertainment, by spending time in chatting it away, we make present whatever is going on. And by making it present, we bring time to a stand, to standing. By passing the time without noticing it, or without paying attention to it, we make it stand. The time that has come to a stand forms emptiness, which stands (*stellt*) us, and thus holds and delays us. This "making-present bringing to a stand(still)" (*das gegenwärtigende Zum-Stehen-bringen*), then, is the structural unity of the two structural moments of (II), the second form of boredom, of becoming bored by something (FC 126-7; GM 190-1).

(III) Finally, we have to dig even deeper, in order to achieve the very height of the situation of boredom. For, as Heidegger says, "where there is height, there is depth" (FC 129; GM 194). We need to learn how to *move* in the "depth of Dasein" (FC 131; GM 198).

The three forms of boredom thus differ in their *depth* (FC 156; GM 233). The third form of boredom (III) is the most profound: it is boredom itself. Whereas for the other two forms there are paradigmatic examples (the train station and the party), there is no such example for the third one. This means that the profound boredom, boredom itself, is ubiquitous and all-pervasive: it is always there with us, whether we do not notice it or try to drive boredom away in a particular situation. Again, the genius of language comes to the rescue in the initial hint of how to approach this ultimate form of boredom: "it is boring for one [*Es ist einem langeweilig*]" (FC 134-5; GM 202-3). Here, two elements of what language reveals to us are important: *it* and *one*.

It is boring for *one*: *einem*, someone – everyone, anyone, not anybody in particular, and hence for everyone. It is given to one. One cannot escape boredom, because it is the most profound and proper mood indicative of what we are deep down, in the essence of our Dasein. Boredom is thus our human condition, which we should not try to escape but embrace and learn from. Here Heidegger and Kracauer are in full agreement.

It is boring for one: *Es*, the author and the namer of profound boredom. It makes its famous appearance in "there is," literally as "it gives" (*es gibt*) in *Zeit und Sein*.[13] That which is, is *it*, and is grammatically neutral, as being itself. In the "es gibt" *it gives itself* to us as our Dasein, itself as its self wants to tell us something through the constant pain and disturbance of boredom. *It* bores us – but we do not know what it is (FC 115; GM 174). *It* appears troubling, because it is utterly impersonal, as in "it rains." Therefore, *it* is indefinite, unknown (*Unbestimmte, Unbekannte* [FC 134; GM 203]), which already made its appearance before, in the second form of boredom (FC 116-7; GM 175-6). *It* can be perhaps approached by the *via negativa*: it is not this and not that (FC 142; GM 214). Yet it is not nothing, because it talks to us all the time, even if we do not want to listen, killing time and entertaining ourselves to death.[14] *It* is rather *no one* (*Niemand* [FC 135; GM 203]), the Odyssey's Οὖτις (*Od*. 9.367-408), who speaks to one from the depth, reveals itself in simple things and ordinary situations around us: during the walk through the city streets on a Sunday afternoon (FC 135; GM 204, which is also Kracauer's example!), the horizon of a plain, the snow when it snows. *It* speaks not to me but to the very self of the itself of Dasein. Thus, if in the (I) first movement of boredom we do not need to listen to boredom, in the (II) second we do not want to listen to it, in the (III) third movement we are compelled to listen to boredom as the oracle that we cannot escape, because it calls us *de profundis*, speaking the *proper* (*das Eigentliche*) of Dasein from its profound freedom (FC 136; GM 205).

THE TWO STRUCTURAL MOMENTS OF THE III FORM OF BOREDOM: EMPTINESS AND DELAY

EMPTINESS

With the two structural moments of the third, the deepest form of boredom, Heidegger proceeds in reverse. The first (formerly the second) moment, being left empty, comes now in a different form. Again, continuing with the poetico-philosophical description, Heidegger does not provide much of an argument concerning why this should be the case, drawing on the resources of the language and building up a coherent picture of the various forms of boredom. The emptiness now is neither a lack of fullness or fulfillment, i.e., not a privation or a hole, nor the nothing as a self-building emptiness where one's proper self can be left standing. Rather, emptiness now comes with *not wanting* any thing in any contingent situation (FC 137, 140; GM 206-7, 210). Emptiness is now *not wanting anything*. This is not depression or anxiety, though, because its origin lies not in us or our not knowing or not understanding the source of this not wanting. We do not want anything, because in profound boredom we are suspended and raised above any particular situation. For this reason, everything becomes *of equally great and equally little worth* (FC 137; GM 207). Everything is equally far removed and equally near. Nothing can be clearly seen, because everything that is too far and too close cannot be seen distinctly. Nothing matters, because everything is of equal worth, or *indifferent* (*gleichgültig*). We stand – are

[13] M. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, GA 14 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007), 9-14.

[14] This is achieved by creating new media that define new forms of truth-telling and entertainment. See N. Postmann, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Penguin, 1985), 27 et passim. One can even say that truth-telling *becomes* entertainment.

put – into the middle of the circle, the periphery of which is the existent as a whole, where all things are equally unimportant and thus are the same in their worth. Everything is at an equal distance from the horizon, and nothing can come in the proper vicinity.

The equal distance or worth, the indifference of every thing in every situation means that in profound boredom, it is the *existent as a whole* (*das Seiende im Ganzen*) that becomes indifferent. But if the existent, or all things, are indifferent, this means that everything is *impossible*. Nothing can be done. Not doing (*Tun*), not letting do and done (*Lassen*) is possible. It is profoundly boring – for one, which means for this particular Dasein. The equal worth or the indifference of the existent as a whole now reveals itself to Dasein as such. The existent as a whole becomes indifferent not to me as "I-ness" (*Ichlichkeit*) but to the self of Dasein itself, whose name becomes unimportant, and is from now on an Οὖτις, yet one which brings the self to itself as that which is there/here (*da ist*) in Dasein in me (FC 141, 143; GM 212, 215). This is Heidegger's substitution for reflection, when profound boredom brings itself to its self not through a systematic argument but through listening – being *compelled* to listen to the unknown that is already there. To what end? To be *it*.

DELAY

But why are we delayed when we encounter profound boredom? Again, Heidegger deduces the most profound characteristics of our being from language: the apparently *universal* features – which come from *German* language, where he mostly uses semantics (and not so much syntax, which might be more defining of the structure of thinking). If the existent as a whole refuses itself to the generous offer of Dasein, this refusal (*Versagen*) is itself saying or telling (*Sagen*), which both comes with and as an announcement (*Ansagen* [FC 140-2; GM 211-4]). The announcement, then, intensifies to the appeal, or calling (*Anrufen* [FC 143; GM 216]). The refusal needs to be told, and with this telling comes the announcement, or rather an *announcing hint* (*ansagendes Hinweiseisen*). At what? At the suspension points and elision marks (FC 142; GM 214)... We encounter the suspension and elision once again. The κένωσις of Dasein is left without response and recognition from the things, from the existent as a whole. There is the call of being in Dasein but no response from the existent in its entirety, from things that remain mute. There is not dialogue that being could have established in and through Dasein in and for us. We only need to wait in a profound boredom that is not caused by anything in particular. ...What does the announcement announce, besides its semantic commonality with refusal via telling? It tells us about all the *possibilities* in and of Dasein, which the existent as a whole has missed by refusing it. These are the possibilities of *doing* and *letting do* (*Tun und Lassen* [FC 141; GM 212]). But they are being left uncultivated, unused, unexplored, because they are being refused.

And yet... the refusal of and to Dasein by the existent as a whole, in the midst of which we are, announces and points toward *that* which allows (das *Ermöglichende* [GM 216]) for all essential possibilities of Dasein that are now being refused, *in me*. *That which* makes Dasein possible, however, is *without content*, because that where we are placed has refused Dasein and is thus being held empty. *That which* constitutes the possibility of acting and letting be, because it is contentless for us now, is *it*, *das* or *es*. *It*

is present in... It is *possible* that *it* is being itself. But it is not named, cannot be defined but rather only asked about. *It* is announced, hinted at. We drive away the way it is announced, which is boredom. But if we wake boredom, embrace and turn toward it, we cannot miss the hint, announcement, or appeal. Yet we do not know what calls us from the depth. This cannot but *disturb* us. And this disturbance *compels* us. To what? To the edge, peak (*Spitze*), which is another way of saying that we concentrate on that which makes Dasein possible in acting and being-there, where we realize these possibilities in ourselves. And this is what being held, *Hingehaltenheit*, means in the (III) form of boredom: being compelled to the original realization (*Ermöglichung*) of Dasein as such (FC 144; GM 216).

PEAK AND BREADTH

Because now, when we have a glimpse into the depth of Dasein, everything is very close to us yet unfamiliar, the unseen can only be described metaphorically, not in terms of familiar philosophical concepts. Despite stressing the temporal character of our existence, the wanderer through the woods and mountains chooses *spatial* metaphors to describe the unfathomable depth of time, which stands still and in front of which we suspend the flux of time on the moment of sharp vision. This should mean, in particular, that boredom, even if being ultimately profoundly temporal in its constitution and essence, is still understood from reference to places that arrange temporal events: travel and railway stations, the house full of guests, the entertainment of the city or the leisurely walk along its streets. *Loci temporis* have now been substituted for the places of memory that had embodied the properly temporal events in their succession yet suspend the flow of time in memory.[15] In particular, profound boredom is described metaphorically by breadth (*Weite*) and peak (*Spitze*), which, in their unity of the two structural moments, characterize the most profound form of boredom.

The refusal of the existent as a whole compels Dasein to the extremity, peak (*Spitze*), which is the moment of vision of the fundamental possibility of Dasein's proper existence. But we also know that this compulsion eventually comes from the refusal of time itself in its horizon, which means that Dasein is compelled by the banning of time itself in its proper essence, compelling Dasein to the fundamental possibility of its proper existence (FC 149; GM 224). Going even deeper through the layers of boredom compels us to the height of looking into the unfathomable depth, out of which every form of boredom comes. Moved by profound boredom, which thus becomes a productive force, the *bann*, spell-ban of the temporal horizon, makes the moment of vision that belongs to temporality disappear. In boredom, which as *Langeweile* is a "long while," time becomes long. The lengthening of time is the expanding of the temporal horizon into the entire temporality of Dasein. Yet Dasein as properly existing has its own time, which is a short while (FC 152-3; GM 229). It is in the moment of vision that our Dasein becomes "short whiled."

The proper existence of Dasein with all its possibilities can be thus regained *in a moment*, in this very moment of sharp vision, to which Dasein is compelled by boredom by this *bann*. *The* moment, *Augenblick*, is thus the peak, pike, and prick of time itself,

[15] See D. Nikulin, "Memory in Recollection of Itself", in *Memory: A History*, ed. D. Nikulin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 8-34.

the moment of its extremity and sharpness, which comes all of a sudden, in the blink of an eye, rupturing the spell-ban and disrupting the exclusion from things.[16]

The moment of vision is the look of Dasein in three perspectival directions (FC 151; GM 226), that is, at the time horizon, where the present, future, and past are present in their fusion and entirety. Yet at the moment of vision the continuum of the horizon is contracted into a point-like instant, a "now" that is standing and stood. The profound boredom makes us *oscillate*, swing between the *breadth* of the continuity of the temporal horizon and the *point* of the discreteness of the moment of vision, between the breadth of emptiness and the peak of the sharpness of the moment of vision (FC 166; GM 247). What is important to note here is that there is *no mediation* between the breadth and the peak, between the horizon and the moment of its interruption. One could say that the breadth locked into the undistinguished horizon is the Dionysian, and the summit of vision is the Apollonian moment provided to Dasein by time itself. The two are not mediated – and cannot be mediated – either.[17] The breadth of the temporal horizon, the entire circumference of things that has receded into the unreachable is interrupted and pierced by the moment of the simplicity of vision (*la simplicité du regard*, to use Pierre Hadot's word), which reinstalls Dasein in the center where it properly is – everywhere.

...In the end, through boredom it is time itself that casts a spell and bans Dasein from the existent and refuses it a meeting at the proper time. And yet, at the same time it is the same time that summons Dasein by compelling it to the possibility of its proper existence during the moment of acute vision, in all its possibilities as grounded in the depth of time and being (FC 153; GM 230). This is the mystical picture of the breadth and peak, of the continuous and the discrete that we have to relive, once we have awakened the monstrous sleeping beauty of boredom.

[16] On the concept of *Augenblick*, see K. Ward, *Augenblick. The Concept of the 'Decisive Moment' in 19th and 20th Century Western Philosophy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 97-124; and O. Pöggeler, "Destruction and Moment", trans. D. Magurshak, in *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 137-56.

[17] D. Nikulin, "The Gods and Demons of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche", in *Nietzsche and Dostoevsky: Philosophy, Morality, Tragedy*, ed. J. Love, J. Metzger (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2016), 173-200.

Babette Babich

BETWEEN HEIDEGGER AND ADORNO: AIRPLANES, RADIOS, AND SLOTERDIJK'S ATMOTERRORISM

Wißt! Apoll ist der Gott der Zeitungsschreiber geworden,
Und sein Mann ist wer ihm treulich das Faktum erzählt
(Hölderlin)

die Verpflichtung für Jedermann, zum Frühstück seine Zeitung zu lesen
(Nietzsche, *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, § 208[1])

Der Mensch ist ein Lebewesen der Zeitung liest
(Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 108)

ON "GOOD" AND "BAD" PHILOSOPHY AND THE ANALYTIC-CONTINENTAL RIFT

In one of his most uncannily articulated aphoristic works, *Minima Moralia*, Theodor Adorno spoke of possessions, shored up against an impossible foreign ruin. Across space and open seas as the French observers, Alexis de Toqueville and Jean Baudrillard, but also Günther Anders and Adorno himself had learnt this about America during their variously different sojournings, the emigrant seemed to have no choice but to rely on fetishes: "ideology with a bad conscience for those wishing to keep what they have."[2] Here, Adorno goes on to cite Nietzsche on homelessness as a kind of good fortune, "Wrong life cannot be lived rightly." (MM § 18) Nietzsche himself never built a house and was thus in the end a returned emigrant (from no more distant city than Turin in his final days), who would die mindlessly, *homelessly*, surrounded by those relations who would subsequently dedicate their lives to his legacy.[3]

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[1] Cf. F. Nietzsche, "Hegel und die Zeitungen", in *Kritische Studienausgabe* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1980) Vol, 7, 592 as well as: "Er redet wie ein Mensch, der täglich die Zeitungen liest" (Ibid., 605). Cf. "Volk und Cultur. / Classische Philologie. / Der Gelehrte. / Zeitungs-Sklaverei." Ibid., 754.

[2] T. Adorno, *Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life*, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 1974), § 18, 39.

[3] See any number of biographies but for questions on his mindlessness, or madness, as the story goes, see the final footnote in B. Babich, "Reading Lou von Salomé's Triangles", *New Nietzsche Studies*, Vol. 8, Nos. 3 & 4 (Winter 2011 / Spring 2012), 83-113, here 113.

The analytic-continental divide has been around a good while and is these days so very decided on the analytic side of the divide that one insists that there is no such thing.[4] In another version of this same decision, it is claimed that analytic philosophy is continental philosophy, or else that there is no difference. In all, it is urged, one should stop talking about such distinctions and just do "good" philosophy whatever that is to mean.[5] Some of this disputation is done with name-calling, denigration, and indignation, rather as if the sheer act of pointing out that there is such a thing as the analytic-continental divide (or "rift": as Reiner Schürmann called it some decades ago),[6] or else by underlining the success of analytic philosophy in commanding most of the job posts at universities all over the world, along with the bulk of the journals and book publications, not to mention citations, had somehow been an assault.

The rift is as old as the Vienna Circle out of which analytic philosophy grows with its original ambition to emulate the sciences and Heidegger had argued that philosophy in the modern academic landscape had long been "dissolved" into other disciplines, notably "psychology, logic, politology."[7] Instead of philosophy, calculative thinking, which he also gave an expressly digital name, "*die Cybernetik*," assumes the place of philosophy.[8] Given the challenges of thinking these other disciplines beyond Heidegger, and the new crises of homelessness and emigration, terror-driven as well as routinely economic, as the theoretical architect and historian, Mark Jarzombek, author of *Digital Stockholm Syndrome*, argues that we think the ontology of globalization in an age of the predictive algorithm,[9] this is also sometimes called deep data, both being speculative projections of what Jean Baudrillard

[4] See B. Babich and C. Bateman (Interview): "Claiming the Continental Flag", 13 December 2016, and see too: B. Babich and C. Bateman (Interview), "The Last of the Continental Philosophers", 29 November 2016.

[5] See further on the academic value judgment of philosophy as "good" or "bad," B. Babich, "Are They Good? Are They Bad? Double Hermeneutics and Citation in Philosophy, Asphodel and Alan Rickman, Bruno Latour and the 'Science Wars'", in *Das Interpretative Universum*, ed. P. Angelova et al. (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2017), 259-290.

[6] R. Schürmann, "De la philosophie aux Etats-Unis", *Le temps de la réflexion*, Vol. 6 (1985), 303-321 and, in English translation, as "Concerning Philosophy in the United States", *Social Research*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Spring 1994), 89-113. As one who has likewise made the effort to "report" on the state of American philosophy to the French, as spiritual assessors, in a book-length reflection see my own: B. Babich, *La fin de la pensée? Philosophie analytique contre philosophie continentale* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012) as well as Babich, "An Impoverishment of Philosophy", in an interview conducted by Dennis Erwin and Matt Story, eds., *Purlieu: Philosophy and the University*, Vol. 2 (2011), 37-71 in addition to a lecture first given at the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, in 1991 (just before the IUC would be destroyed) and which appears in a book collection along with Richard Rorty, "On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche's Lying Truth, Heidegger's Speaking Language, and Philosophy", in: *A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, ed. C. G. Prado (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003), 63-103.

[7] "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten". Martin Heidegger with Rudolf Augstein and Georg Wolff in September 1966, *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 23, (1976), May 31.

[8] The full exchange here can be useful: "HEIDEGGER: (...) Die Philosophie löst sich auf in Einzelwissenschaften; die Psychologie, die Logik, die Politologie. / SPIEGEL: Und wer nimmt den Platz der Philosophie jetzt ein? / HEIDEGGER: Die Kybernetik. / SPIEGEL: Oder der Fromme, der sich offenhält? / HEIDEGGER: Das ist aber keine Philosophie mehr. / SPIEGEL: Was ist es dann? / HEIDEGGER: Das andere Denken nenne ich es." See the Spiegel Interview reprinted in *Antwort*, ed. G. Neske, E. Kettering (Pfullingen, Neske: 1988), 81-114, here 102. The interview, published on the 31st of May, 1976, was originally conducted on the 23rd of September, 1966.

[9] M. Jarzombek, *Digital Stockholm Syndrome in the Post-Ontological Age* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).

had analyzed as the monological character, the non-reciprocable essence of the "virtual."[10] And this global ontology is also what Heidegger named "planetarismus."[11] At issue is the other beyond what analytic philosophy calls the problem of "other minds," a hermeneutic challenge for the social sciences as Bruno Latour underlines this in 1999, three years after the Sokal-driven "science wars," in his *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*.[12] Beyond the "parliament of things," the "other" is also a question of social ontology. The late German philosopher, Michael Theunissen (1932-2015) – himself one of a group of students in Heidegger's classes in Freiburg, who as part of a study group, read *Being and Time* closely, along with William J. Richardson, S.J. (1920-2016) and the journalist Dieter Brumm – sought to bring Heidegger's thinking into dialogical contact with Martin Buber and with Sartre, thinking about the relation to the thou, the *Du* in Theunissen's 1966 book, *Der Andere* [*The Other*].[13]

Even when our focus is on the "other" as such it can be difficult to consider those excluded from consideration because they become unnamed or negated and so unseen. This is especially difficult at the level of university philosophy as we routinely discount others by leaving them either unmentioned or dismissed as doing "bad philosophy"or as "tiresome" or "unproductive," as if value judgments were objective or neutral declarations. This discounting is practiced in good conscience for the same reason Adorno adduces: it allows one to keep what one supposes oneself to "have."

Beyond philosophy, value ratings constitute the heart of academia. We know the codes: we use them when we write letters of recommendation and when, sitting on a hiring

[10] See J. Baudrillard, *The Intelligence of Evil*, trans. C. Turner (London: Bloomsbury, 2005).

[11] I discuss this, along with radios and such, in B. Babich, "Heidegger's Black Night: The *Nachlass* and Its *Wirkungsgeschichte*", in *Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks: 1931-1941*, ed. I. Farin, J. Malpas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), 59-86.

[12] B. Latour, *Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*, trans. C. Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

[13] M. Theunissen, *Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965). In English as *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber*, trans. C. Macann (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984). The challenge, including Theunissen's phenomenologico-hermeneutic solution to it, would not be one on which all Buber scholars would agree. See H. Gordon, *The Heidegger-Buber Controversy: The Status of the I-Thou* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001). More complexly, directed to Adorno rather than Heidegger, although filtered through the lens of Adorno's critique of Heidegger's language, see M. Brumlik, "Theology Without Thorns: Adorno's Critique of Buber", in *New Perspectives on Martin Buber*, ed. M. Zank (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 247-254. E. Meir, *Dialogical Thought and Identity: Trans-Different Religiosity in Present Day* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2013) discusses Buber, Rosenzweig, Heschel, and Levinas, and engages Theunissen in passing. Theunissen's argument will not appeal to all Sartre or Husserl scholars, a lack of resonance more in evidence today than in the past as facility with the kind of Heidegger-inspired hermeneutic phenomenology on which Theunissen draws as essential for specifically *dialogical* thinking, is in eclipse. This, among other questions of talking between specialisations, not to mention disciplines, has, see above, also been the focus of my own discussion of the difference between analytic and continental philosophy in a specifically continental context (the distinction is originally quintessentially Anglophone) as this has migrated to France, as indeed and of course to Germany and everywhere else, see again: B. Babich, *La fin de la pensée?* as well as a recent lecture, "Les 'pseudosciences' à l'aune de l'échelle des valeurs de l'université. Quelles autres perspectives pour la philosophie, les SHS?" presented at a conference in sociolinguistics organized in response to that book, *Diversité linguistique et culturelle, appropriations, réceptions Francophonies, formations à distance, migrances. Réflexions épistémologiques et interventions*: 9-10 June 2016, Tours, France. Publication forthcoming.

committee, we read them.[14] And thus the problem of writing on either Adorno or Heidegger is that one will need to conform to the code of mainstream philosophy, that is, to be sure, analytic style philosophy, and thereby fail to engage either thinker, speaking of one at the expense of the other. The outcome seems unpromising either way.

Academic non-collegiality is a routine feature of academic life affecting much more than colleagues aligned on different sides of any ideological fence. For, as we may recall, where Jacob Taubes (1923-1987), was always to be counted among academic insiders, not only with appointments of his own but also able to influence appointments and university politics at an astonishing number of levels, Walter Benjamin's cousin, Günther Anders (1902-1992), who likewise was associated with, as Taubes was, with Gershom Scholem, would be, by contrast, not similarly advantaged. For, precisely unlike Taubes, Anders was an outsider type. This does not mean that he was never offered a post, it only means that he was excluded by the academy over the course of his own life, as he largely continues to be excluded by contrast with Benjamin whom Adorno himself lionized. The exclusion from academic notice matters because our non-interaction with Anders in our technological age has left us without decades of thinking about his thinking on our time, an ongoing legacy of oblivion.[15] For today's (post-phenomenological) technological philosophers see only their own projects, just as Heidegger saw nothing other than his own work, a circumstance of blind absorption that is the same for many academics today. We still have our others. And thus the same problems still threaten.

Style matters in the case of Heidegger and Adorno inasmuch as both thinkers are, in different ways, charged with deliberate obscurity.[16] If Adorno is problematic owing to the complexity (intellectual and ideological) of his writing, Heidegger has the same troubles

[14] This is also how the REF in the UK works, this is how German universities participate in and lay claim to *Exzellenzinitiative* and by maintaining that we insist on quality (this is how peer review works), we find we are able to praise ourselves, automatically, at the same time. This is the method widely used in university philosophy, I don't need to say "analytic philosophy" inasmuch as all university philosophy is analytic and all new appointments, whether in Germany or in France, never mind the UK or the US or Canada, Australia, etc., tend to go to those trained in what may be called analytic philosophy, by which I mean those who write "clearly" about very little (beginning by excluding all the names of history), claiming to make claims, counter-claims, play hunt-the-argument, always assuming, on Reiner Schürmann's account of this political stylization of formation, "that any reading other than that of the most recent articles bearing their colleague's names was not conducive to philosophical practice" (Schürmann, "Concerning Philosophy in the United States", 97).

[15] See for example, B. Babich, "Angels, the Space of Time, and Apocalyptic Blindness: On Günther Anders' *Endzeit – Endtime*", in *Etica & Politica – Ethics & Politics*: *Potere e violenza in Günther Anders – Power & Violence in the Thinking of Günther Anders*, XV, 1 (2013), 144-174 as well as B. Babich, "Geworfenheit und prometheische Scham im Zeitalter der transhumanen Kybernetik. Technik und Machenschaft bei Martin Heidegger, Fritz Lang und Günther Anders", in: *Die Neugier des Glücklichen*, ed. C. Streckhardt (Weimar: Bauhaus Universitätsverlag, 2012), 63-91. I also discuss Anders in direct connection with Adorno in B. Babich, "'The Answer is False': Archaeologies of Genocide", in: *Adorno and the Concept of Genocide*, ed. R. Crawford, E. M. Vogt (Amsterdam: Brill, 2016), 1-17.

[16] Several studies look at this but taste is the troublesome leveler in these respects, often attending to the aesthetic dimension of critique. See S. Helmling, *Adorno's Poetics of Critique* (London: A&C Black, 2009). See also, already moving in the analytic direction, F. Freyenhagen, *Adorno's Practical Philosophy: Living Less Wrongly* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

but was also a notorious Nazi and, furthermore, an anti-Semite, which we now with great anxiety understand, with specific thanks to Peter Trawny, that he was.[17]

Yet even more than Heidegger, it is Adorno who offers the most offense to analytic sensibilities. Hence if the latest trend in analytic philosophy is to claim that there is no difference between themselves and continental philosophers (all the better to appropriate or annex the continental tradition), and where there is no shortage of analytic Heideggerians, scholars have been slow to appropriate Adorno's work.[18]

ON THINGS, RADIO FACES, AND LIVING A DAMAGED LIFE

Beginning with Husserl's, *zu den Sachen selbst*, phenomenology has always been all about things. Above I referred to Latour's invocation of a "parliament of things," actants – to be granted the rights of a full social ontology. In similar fashion, radio, what Adorno called the "current of music," corresponding to the broadcast aethers of today's "digital realm," mattered for Heidegger and his student Günther Anders and so too Walter Benjamin. Heidegger, Anders, Benjamin, and Adorno were each of them concerned with radio (of course, many others could also be added, including Rudolf Arnheim with his 1936 book on *Radio*, continuing his 1933 discussion of film, as well as Louis Basso with his, for Bachelard crucially important, 1925 "*Induction technique et science experimental*" and Derrida underlines the relevance for Heidegger of Pongé's 1946 discussion of radio, as broadcast on Belgian radio in 1947, and so on).[19] If radio, as media, is often supposed (imprecisely) to be superseded today, it was for these thinkers an object for philosophical perceptual reflection, as well as aesthetic and political analysis.[20] Thus one can explore Adorno's *Current of*

[17] See P. Trawny, *Heidegger und der mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2014); in English as: P. Trawny, *Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy*, trans. A. J. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

[18] By contrast analytic scholars do read Heidegger and understand him on their own terms, for example, and more influentially the late Bert Dreyfus, Bill Blattner, Taylor Carman and not less Stanley Cavell and so on. Note that mainstream philosophers will claim, this is how those in power retain power, that neither Dreyfus nor Cavell are "analytic" philosophers. These readings are regarded as "continental." Yet the point of this definition allows mainstream scholarship to exclude other scholars who read Heidegger (Theunissen as already mentioned, along with Dieter Jähnig in addition to the names of so many other scholars in Germany, Italy, and France but not less Anglophone scholars in the continental tradition who are disregarded in the mainstream).

[19] See J. Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology (*Geschlecht IV*)", in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. J. Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 163-218 and see too, on Ponge and "radio technology" and "the torture of a microphone," J. Derrida, *Points : Interviews, 1974-1994* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 163-218. See for a discussion, F. Dyson, *Sounding New Media: Immersion and Embodiment in the Arts and Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009). I discuss Arnheim in *The Hallelujah Effect* (cited in the note to follow) but see for a central consideration, S. VanCour's contribution "Arnheim and Radio: *Materialtheorie* and Beyond" in *Arnheim for Film and Media Studies*, ed. S. Higgins (New York: Routledge), 177-194. For a discussion of Heidegger and Kittler, see chapter two in J.-H. Möller, *Mediale Reflexivität: Beiträge zu einer negativen Medientheorie* (Berlin: transcript Verlag, 2014).

[20] See for a discussion of Adorno and radio in connection with phenomenology, the central chapters of B. Babich, *The Hallelujah Effect: Music, Performance Practice and Technology* (London: Routledge, 2016) as well as B. Babich, "Adorno's Radio Phenomenology: Technical Reproduction, Physiognomy, and Music", *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, Vol. 40, Nr. 10 (Oct. 2014), 957-996.

Music[21] as an explicit phenomenology of radio in addition to his other studies of the musical work of art in the age of technological reproduction, as this included broadcasts of all kinds, radio, television, and film, recordings in any form, loudspeakers and microphones, analog or digital, inasmuch as all of this involved the resonant "physiognomy" of what Adorno called the "radio face."[22] Today, we can think of earbuds and headsets in their variety of aesthetic impact (on the music as on the person of the listener in the world) the variously numbered (2, 4, 5 and more) speaker sets, all as auratic palimpsest not underlying but haunting the now entirely digitized musical product, that is the "live" performance,[23] that is the miked and loudspeaker-outfitted modern concert hall, including opera houses.[24] But if that is too technical, too audiophile a reference, noting the details of any radio-set or apparatus (this invites, in French terms, a discussion of the *dispositif*) will do.

Heidegger himself cannot be excluded from this discussion nor indeed from studies of Digital Media, as some scholars suggest he be excluded, even if it had not been the case that Kittler was as influenced by Heidegger as he was in fact.[25] At issue here though is only the difference in voice or emphasis, as Ute Guzzoni speaks of *schonen*, a seemingly Suabian term, evident in Heidegger and thus, as she argues, to be differentiated from *love* in Adorno.[26]

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[21] T. Adorno, *Current of Music*: *Elements of a Radio Theory* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006) and see again, including references to further literature, Babich, "Adorno's Radio Phenomenology."

[22] See, again, for a discussion of other scholars and further phenomenological detail, Babich, *The Hallelujah Effect* as well as "Adorno's Radio Phenomenology."

[23] See B. Babich, "The Birth of kd lang's *Hallelujah* out of the 'Spirit of Music': Performing Desire and 'Recording Consciousness' on Facebook and YouTube", *Perfect Sound Forever. online music magazine*–Oct/Nov 2011.

[24] The very claim that opera houses might be outfitted with mikes and loudspeakers upsets some aficionados, and purism is key to the influence of Adorno, positively and negatively, on music aesthetics. See for further references, the footnotes to B. Babich, "On *The Hallelujah Effect*: Priming Consumers, Recording Music, and The Spirit of Tragedy", *Proceedings of the Society for Phenomenology and Media* (San Diego: National University Press, 2015), 11-12.

[25] See for an uncompromising call for non-engagement, C. Fuchs, "Martin Heidegger's Anti-Semitism: Philosophy of Technology and the Media in the Light of the 'Black Notebooks'. Implications for the Reception of Heidegger in Media and Communication Studies", *Triple C*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2015). For a phenomenology of radio Adorno remains key, along with Anders as I show in a reflection on attunement and listening to voice and tone in *The Hallelujah Effect*. For a discussion of hearing taking its departure from Heidegger's amplification of phenomenological intentionality, see D. Espinet, *Phänomenologie des Hörens: eine Untersuchung im Ausgang von Martin Heidegger* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009). Elsewhere I write about Joseph Smith, as one of the founding members of the US Heidegger Circle, ignored within that circle and not known today to many, apart from musicologists for his work write on Jacques de Liege and his *speculum musicae*.

[26] This point is essential for Lukàcs and dominates the Frankfurt School to this day. Although neither Heidegger nor Adorno oppose rationality, critics are fond of suggesting that they do, following Lukàcs. Thus, Löwith in his wake, but not less Habermas, blamed Nietzsche for inaugurating nihilism as a project of irrationality. Käthe Meyer-Drawe is an exception as she attends to demystification as the precondition for recollection as she also invokes these, explaining some of the reasons we often miss an attunement to things (and I would specify and not less animals and above all trees and other plants) inasmuch as we tend to follow a very modern (in Bruno Latour's sense) ideal of rationality. Meyer-Drawe, who alludes to Adorno only in passing in this overview, includes a focus on education, specifying Rousseau and Comenius, etc., in her "Herausforderung durch die Dinge. Das Andere im Bildungsprozeß", *Zeitschrift für Pädagogik*, 45, 3 (1999), 329-336. Cf. K. Meyer-Drawe, "Aneignung–Ablehnung–Anregung. Pädagogische Orientierungen an Heidegger", in: *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie*, ed. A. Gethmann-Siefert, O. Pöggeler (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1988), 231-250. Cf., too, U. Guzzoni, "Human Beings and Things in Adorno and Heidegger", in *Adorno and Heidegger: Philosophical Questions*, ed. I. Macdonald, K. Ziarek (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 124-137, here 134-135.

The reference to sound recalls Leonard Cohen, our priest minstrel of the shattered voice with which one nevertheless sings of a cold and broken *Hallelujah* as it can also recall Bob Dylan, this year's winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature.[27] Attention to voices, cracked or whole, attuned to things, to listening, in the context of life, includes from the outset in *Being and Time* an always already given reference to world, not qua ideal but the life of the world as it is the world-for-us, to technology, as well as a complicated hermeneutics of what it is that is effected – a Nietzschean move[28] – by asserting a compound such as "*Geräusch*."[29]

Thus Heidegger refers to the acoustic – "acousmatic" as Joseph Smith would say – to recur to the things themselves as things, still taking Husserl's phenomenology literally, emphasizing that

> First of all and to begin with [*Zunächst*] we never hear noises and sound complexes but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle. One hears the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the crackling fire[30]

Noting in *The Origin of the Work of Art*, that airplanes and radio sets are among the things closest to us, Heidegger goes on to reflect on what is manifest to us in things, phenomenologically speaking, arguing that we are never first confronted with an array of sensations:

> we are never to begin with and actually confronted with an array of sensations, for example, tones and sounds, but we hear the storm whistle in the chimney, we hear the 3-motor airplane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Adler-wagon.[31]

As Jacques Taminiaux highlights, Heidegger's lecture predates Benjamin's essay on the work of art, a keen topic for scholarly debates because more than primacy is at issue. And Adorno's "A Social Critique of Radio Music," quite in spite of his antipathy to Heidegger, frames a number of Heideggerian questions, as Adorno likewise does

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[27] Bob Dylan is the subject of an essay authored by the late W. J. Richardson, S.J., "Towards an Ontology of Bob Dylan", *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 36 (7) (2010), 763-775, first presented as a lecture at Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, in 1966.

[28] See again, with reference to Adorno and Anders and the UK sound recording artist and philosopher, Steve Goodman, etc., Babich, "Adorno's Radio Phenomenology."

[29] See again my above discussion and see further a discussion of "unheimlich Künstlichkeit" including reference to Heidegger's emphases if not indeed Adorno, Jürgen Gedinat's *Ein Modell von Welt: Unterwegs in der Globalisierung* (Frankfurt am Main: Springer 2016), 85ff.

[30] "Zunächst' hören wir nie und nimmer Geräusche und Lautkomplexe, sondern den knarrenden Wagen, das Motorrad. Man hört die Kolonne auf dem Marsch, den Nordwind, den klopfenden Specht, das knisternde Feuer." M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer 2006), 163.

[31] "Niemals vernehmen wir, im Erscheinen der Dinge zunächst und eigentlich einen Andrang von Empfindungen, z. B. Töne und Geräusche, sondern wir hören den Sturm im Schornstein pfeifen, wir hören das dreimotorige Flugzeug, wir hören den Mercedes im unmittelbaren Unterschied zum Adler-Wagen." M. Heidegger, "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", in *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. 1980), 10. Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", in *Poetry Language Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Perennial Classic, 2001), 25.

in *Current of Music*.[32] For Heidegger writes against the incipience of "*Empfindungen, z. B. Töne und Geräusche*," that is, as sense data *qua* reduction, pointing out that, very specifically, this is part of the point of *Ge-Stell* for Heidegger, we hear things hermeneutically, technological things included and quite as technological things. In other words: we do not deduce from a raw sound, a sense datum, that a motorcycle must be roaring past but we *hear* the motorcycle *as such*, the plane *as such*.[33] Thus even as Heidegger refers to the whistling wind and the knocking of the woodpecker, he adverts to the things of technological provenance: including specific brands of automobile, just as in *Being and Time*, published ten years after the end of World War I, the reference was to the advance of an army, the kind of plane, things apprehended directly, this is Heidegger's all-too-phenomenological point regarding the heard-world that is the lifeworld. And in the same way, we hear the train pulling out of the station especially acutely as we descend the steps into the subway/Metro/Underground.[34] Thus when asking about or "questioning concerning technology," (3) Heidegger mentions the power plant as an example of modern technology as opposed to handcraft or traditional technology, he also notes that an airplane, together with all its complexity, including "the high frequency apparatus are means to ends" (5) to point out, after reflecting on the complex of fourfold indebtedness or causality using the example of a work of handcrafted silver, that modern technology, too, "is a revealing" (14). But the revealing in question "has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth" (16). Heidegger's insight stands behind – if it does not fully come to word – Jarzombek's *Digital Stockholm Syndrome* and inspires, in this case explicitly so, Sloterdijk's complex reflections in *Terror from the Air*. Thus we can read Heidegger's inexplicit gloss of the word "cybernetic," not mentioned as such in this context, along with Sloterdijk's "explicitation": "The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through regulating their course" (16). As opposed to Hegel's definition of a machine, as Heidegger cites it here, as "an autonomous tool", the machine today, given the *Ge-Stell* that is the standing reserve of modern technology "is completely unautonomous, for it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable" (17). Heidegger's example is an airplane, on the runway, ready for take-off, with everything that constellation of the ready to hand implies. Later, I will return to the airplane as it may help explicate Sloterdijk's observation that:

[32] In addition, there are others who have begun to take up this connection, but see, in addition to be sure to Michael Eldred, Wesley Philips, Eduardo Marx as well as, on *hearing* and in addition to the already mentioned, Anders, Smith, and Espinet.

[33] "Die phenomenale Beleg dafür daß das Dasein als in-der-Welt-sein schön bei innerweltlich Zuhandenen sich aufhält und zunächst gar nicht bei »Empfindungen«, deren Gewühl zuerst geformt werden müßte, um das Sprungbrett abzugeben, von dem das Subjekt abspringt, um schließlich zu einer »Welt« zu gelangen." Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 164.

[34] "Viel näher als alle Empfindungen sind uns die Dinge selbst. Wir hören im Haus die Tür schlagen und hören niemals akustische Empfindungen oder auch nur bloße Geräusche. Um ein reines Ge-rausch zu hören, müssen wir von den Dingen weg hören, unser Ohr davon abziehen, d. h. abstrakt hören. In dem jetzt genannten Dingbegriff liegt nicht so sehr ein Überfall auf das Ding, als vielmehr der übersteigerte Versuch, das Ding in eine größtmögliche Unmittelbarkeit zu uns zu bringen." Ibidem.

> the airforce per se is a central phenomenon of the state form of atmoterrorism. Military aircraft essentially function as missile artillery would also come to, as access weapons: they work to abolish the immunizing effects of spatial distance between army units.[35]

MURMELTIERE AND MORTALITY[36]

Heidegger offers the most important moral equation of our day, damned as he is for having done so, identifying – given Heidegger's focus on the same, the like, the identical – *industrielle Ackerbau* as factically the same as the "manufacture of corpses," and critically retracing the logic of *Ge-Stell*.[37] Adorno writes of the uncanny tone of the marmots in mountains around Silvaplana, as if their natural presence modulated a music of silence. Thus Adorno points out that *Murmeltiere*, woodchucks as we say in English, are as Adorno notes as if named for their murmuring, their silence. Thus the contrast with the whistles that signal deathly danger.[38]

If Adorno pays attention to the harsh whistles of the *Murmeltiere* (one of the alternate names in English for woodchucks or marmots is whistlepig), and if Adorno was also very fond of wombats, there seems a kind of cuddly metonymy for Teddie, as many seem to call him, friends and enemies alike.[39] Yet there is a parallel to the attention Heidegger seems to pay to industrial farming. Thus Adorno also tells us that the animal is worldless, and that the animal does not die. Adorno relates an innkeeper's thuggishness, invoking the paradox of Anthropocene obscenity, in his account of that same innkeeper's casually brutal extermination of rats in the presence of a watching child. Scholars wonder what this tells us about Adorno's psyche, others conclude that the child exposed to this display of horror ought to have been shielded but whatever one thinks, one does not think of the rats, which last point was Adorno's point and the solidarity the child cannot help feeling, until it is "educated"[40] out of him, as solidarity with the weak and the powerless.

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[35] Peter Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*, trans A. Patton and S. Corcoran (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), p. 51.

[36] Alternately this can be titled: *Or: The Mereness of Things: Poverty / Only Animals: Beyond Comprehension*.

[37] The ontologically attuned analysis of modern technology Heidegger offers has not been bettered, though it is supplemented in different ways by Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* and more significantly, more disturbingly, more dissonantly, G. Anders, *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen* (Munich: Beck, 1956). Only Sloterdijk comes close. See for one discussion, also including Anders, B. Babich, "Sloterdijk's Cynicism: Diogenes in the Marketplace", in *Sloterdijk Now*, ed. S. Elden (Oxford: Polity, 2011), 17-36; 186-189.

[38] "Daß er ein Pfeifen sei, sagt zu wenig: es klingt mechanisch, wie mit Dampf betrieben. Und eben darum zum Erschrecken. Die Angst, welche die kleinen Tiere seit unvordenklichen Zeiten müssen empfunden haben, ist ihnen in der Kehle zum Warnsignal erstarrt; was ihr Leben beschützen soll, hat den Ausdruck des Lebendigen verloren."

[39] Heidegger gives us a scholastic declination addressing his reflections to the issue of psychology and what it claims as a contribution to epistemology. Thus Heidegger observes, as much for Husserl's enrichment as for Adorno this would be invaluable, "was man in der Psychologie »zunächst« als Hören bestimmt, das Empfinden von Tönen und das Vernehmen von Lauten" evidences nothing other than "die Seinsart des verstehenden Hörens." Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 163. In the same fashion, Heidegger clarifies the working "effect" of poesie and music: "Das Lautende ist im Sprachwerk. Das Klingede ist im Tonwerk. (...) Das Sprachwerk is im Laut. Das Musikwerk ist im Ton." "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes", 3.

[40] One will not wish to read further on this for understandable reasons (it is unpleasant to consider what we collectively, as humanity as a whole and overall, "do" to animals (trees, the earth), for the most part without reflection, but see further, B. Babich, "Adorno on Science and Nihilism, Animals, and Jews", *Symposium: Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy/Revue canadienne de philosophie continentale*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2011), 110-145.

It takes a Derrida to read what otherwise only an *Adorin*g, to quote Charles Rosen, *Adorno* reader can read: the subtlety of a text that indicts us for love in our *inability to love*. Thus in "Education After Auschwitz," Adorno writes "Every person today, without exception, feels too little loved." For Adorno, this is a mark of bourgeois society, always already present, and the bite, the spur of his point is the point: "Every person today, without exception, feels too little loved, because every person cannot love enough."[41]

Derrida reflects beyond this allusion to happiness, on the promise of art as a promise, an opening to something else in philosophy, an opening that is about the other as other:

> The exposition of this being-without-defense, this deprivation of power, this vulnerable *Ohnmächtigkeit* can be just as much the dream, language, the subconscious, the animal, the child, the Jew, the stranger or woman.[42]

Adorno reminds us of the same breath that does not come to word here in Derrida but is nonetheless the breath one loses, the breath taken away from us in shock, disappointment, surprise, failure.[43]

The point here might be that we opt to read both Heidegger and Adorno which would mean to read between them without choosing between them which is to read critically in a philological sense, bracketing judgment, in such a way that we might begin to think, critically, theoretically.

HEIDEGGER ON TELEVISION, REFUSING ADORNO

When Richard Wisser came to Freiburg to meet Heidegger for the first time (in order to interview him on television), he insisted on posing a question about Adorno, a thematic focus Wisser would sustain throughout his reconstruction of their discussion on the 17th of September 1969.[44] The interview was held only a few weeks after Adorno's death on the 6th of August 1969 but still, Heidegger deflected the question, recalling the report relayed to him that "When Adorno came back to Germany, he said (...) 'In five years, I'll take Heidegger down' [*In fünf Jahren habe ich Heidegger klein*]," pointing out, although Wisser simply let the comment fall without reply: "You see what kind of man he is."[45]

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[41] T. Adorno, "Education After Auschwitz", trans. H. W. Pickford, in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*, ed. R. Tiedemann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 19-33, here 29.

[42] J. Derrida, *Fichus* (Paris: Galilée, 2002), 29.

[43] T. W. Adorno, "Parataxis: On Hölderlin's Late Poetry", in *Notes to Literature*, Volume II, ed. R. Tiedemann, trans. S. Weber Nicholson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 109-49. Cf. J. N. Shklar, *After Utopia: The Decline of Political Faith* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), the chapter on "The Romantic Mind" 55ff. And if there is no time to turn to a reflection on Herder and his account of lyric and of Hölderlin's affine theory of the same (Nietzsche one can suppose knew the first and would not likely have known the latter, though as I always say, this itself is hard to know), there is no time to reflect on the romantics and death.

[44] This is the inscribed date of a text dedicated to Wisser, the broadcast itself is a week later and Heidegger himself had been on television before, in 1964, speaking with Thai monk, Bikkhu Maha Mani, on TV in Baden-Baden: 1964 September 28.

[45] Richard Wisser: "Ich berichte von Erfahrungen, die mit Adorno-Schülern, die in Rundfunk- und Presseredaktionen sitzen, zu bestehen waren, und davon, daß es derzeit nicht immer leicht ist, bestimmte Gedanken, die nicht nur »kritisches Bewußtsein reflektieren«, zu äußern, ohne »zerrissen« zu werden. Heidegger: »Als Adorno nach Deutschland zurückkam, hat er – man hat es mir berichtet – geäußert: In fünf Jahren habe ich Heidegger klein. Da sehen Sie, was das für ein Mann ist.« Ich: »Eine kleine Äußerung, aber ein großes Kraftgefühl. Er hat sich

The belittling language might have bothered the remarkably diminutive Heidegger. Certainly, the negativity would be hard to overlook: and additional, alternate, accounts relate Adorno's promise to "destroy" Heidegger. In the interview, Wisser's prejudices are as obvious[46] as Heidegger's own, preoccupied with his own reception as he was[47] and absorbed with what seemed to him to be the prevailing misunderstanding of his work. Thus the interview is an object lesson in anti-hermeneutics, a conversation between two discussants whose concerns are elsewhere. Thus, apparently pointing to his black notebooks then *in situ*, according to Wisser's report of the surrounds of Heidegger's Freiburg study, Heidegger gestures at the shelves of yet-unpublished works, declaring (and mystifying Wisser in the process) that the problem besetting scholarship is that one reads *only* the latest thing (here Heidegger's point continues to be accurate as a description of academic reading), reading only that latest thing until the next latest thing appears. For Heidegger, the publisher's preoccupation with readership, "the people" [*die Leute*] – we can update: the consumer, the reading public – is what drives the concern for new publications.

Overall, Wisser is concerned to note that Heidegger is critical of Adorno. Thus above I noted what one supposes to be "good" and "bad" philosophy, "interesting" and "uninteresting" themes, as all such distinctions are made against the backdrop of those we leave out altogether: this would be *stillschweigerei*. Heidegger insists he'd never read Adorno, not even after, as he tells us, Hermann Mörchen himself tried to talk him into it: "I have read nothing by him."[48] By contrast, we know that Adorno did read Heidegger, referring to him with the first line of *Negative Dialectics* and the title of his first chapter, "The Ontological Need," and the section, "Question and Answer": "The ontologies in Germany, Heidegger's in particular, remain effective to this day. Traces of the political past are no deterrent." For Adorno,

> The awareness that a philosophy carried on as a specialty no longer has anything to do with people – with the people it trains to stop asking, as

bestimmt in der Sache geirrt, aber manches spricht daftir, daß seine Auswirkung der Wirkung Ihres Denkens nicht förderlich ist.«" "Nachdenkliche Dankbarkeit", *Antwort*, 29-80, here 66-67. Cf. "Das Fernseh-Interview", in *Erinnerung an Martin Heidegger*, ed. G. Neske (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1977), 283-284.

[46] These prejudices had a great deal to do with Adorno as Wisser had recently reviewed Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*, but this reference, perhaps unsurprisingly, failed to find resonance with Heidegger, which did not stop Wisser from pushing it. This did not lead to understanding instead intensifying the negativity of Heidegger's commentary. "Ich spreche ausführlich, vielleicht zu lange, weil ich vor einiger Zeit eine Besprechung von Adornos »Negativer Dialektik« veröffentlicht habe (*Die Welt der Bücher*, 3. Folge, H. 9, Freiburg i. Br. 1968, S. 459f.; übrigens um ein Drittel gekürzt)." Ibid., p. 67. The awareness Wisser has of his own preoccupations, not to say that he always draws the consequences of these, is impressive. Here he adds a partial explanation for his own insistence on this point as he had been compelled to cut his review of Adorno by a third.

[47] B. Babich, "Heidegger's Black Night: The *Nachlass* and Its *Wirkungsgeschichte*", in *Reading Heidegger's Black Notebooks: 1931-1941*, eds. I. Farin, J. Malpas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), pp. 59-86.

[48] To cite Heidegger here in English: "I have read nothing by him. Hermann Mörchen once tried to talk me into reading him. I never did" (ibidem.) Heidegger's reluctance to engage Adorno would appear to have inspired Mörchen's second book: *Adorno und Heidegger. Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981).

> futile, the only questions for whose sake they turn to it – this awareness was already stirring in German idealism[49]

Adorno, who has no fear of dogmatism for his own part, criticizes Heidegger for his dogmatism.[50] Adorno invokes science and experience, the senses, and reason – a critique of Kant's critique which requires a critically careful reading of Nietzsche:

> Admirers of the critic of pure reason, and of his attempt to find reasons for experience, were deaf to this admission of bankruptcy: that the immeasurable strain of that critique was ἀδιάφορον with respect to the content of experience.[51]

The reference to the Greeks, and (here with respect to Kant) the Stoic ἀδιάφορον, is Nietzsche's[52] as Adorno retraces Nietzsche's short *History of an Error*. Using the logic of *ressentiment*, whereby weakness is renamed as strength, Adorno unpacks the deficit balance sheet that is Heidegger: "Heidegger's philosophy is like a highly developed credit system: one concept borrows from the other."[53] Thus indicting Heidegger for irrationality, as Adorno points out, as Nietzsche himself had already argued, "irrationality itself remains a function of the ratio and an object of its self-criticism: what slips through the net is filtered by the net."[54]

The claim had already been posed against Nietzsche by Lukács with whom Adorno refuses to make common cause. Rather, and as Nietzsche seeks to raise the level of critique itself beyond Kant, Adorno challenges the conventional appeal to reason to go beyond Nietzsche, railing against the narrowness of science, observing, and here again the lineage of the analytic-continental divide is in evidence, "Philosophy is neither a science nor the "cogitative poetry" to which positivists would degrade it in a stupid oxymoron."[55]

Thus, very formally for Adorno, contra Heidegger:

> Philosophy itself, as a form of the mind, contains a moment deeply akin to the state of suspense which Heidegger assigns to the topic of meditation

[49] T. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), 62. The stronger and more implicit critique is of Husserl: "But Husserl wished to have his cake and eat it too: he kept his philosophy within the bounds of the division of labor and left the concept of strict science alone until his late phase, despite all of the so-called 'foundation questions,' and yet he sought to apply the strict rules of the scientific game to whatever critique of these rules has its own meaning." Ibid., 69.

[50] For Adorno, Heidegger's "dogmatics simply turns into a higher truth, as against the traditional critique of dogmatics." Ibid., 70. As Adorno elaborates the "ambiguity of the Greek words for 'being' – an ambiguity that dates back to the Ionians' failure to distinguish between materials, principles, and the pure essence – is not listed as a defect but as original superiority." Ibid., 70.

[51] Ibid., 72.

[52] "What Kant wished to prove, in a way that would offend 'all the world,' was that 'all the world' was right – this was that soul's secret joke. He wrote against the scholars and in favor of the prejudices of the people, but he wrote for scholars, and not for the people." Ibid., 72.

[53] Ibid., 76.

[54] Ibid., 85.

[55] Ibid., 109.

> – and which prevents meditation. It is a form transmitted to those which differ from it as well as distinguished from them. Its suspended state is nothing but the expression of its inexpressibility. In this respect it is a true sister of music.[56]

Here Adorno's invective assessment reaches its high point:

> The suspended character of thought is thus raised to the very inexpressibility which the thought seeks to express. The nonobjective is enhanced into the outlined object of its own essence – and thereby violated. Under the weight of tradition, which Heidegger wants to shake off, the inexpressible becomes explicit and compact in the word "Being," while the protest against reification becomes reified, divorced from thinking, and irrational.[57]

Of course, by making common cause with Nietzsche, Adorno who otherwise tends to take Hegel's part, criticizes Hegel here:

> Dialectical criticism is due the concept of the first Being itself. Heidegger repeats the Hegelian sleight-of-hand maneuver, except that Hegel's is practiced openly while Heidegger, not wanting to be an idealist, shrouds and beclouds the ontologization of the ontical.[58]

For Adorno, the failure to be able to say what the human is, does not leave us with the basis for what Husserl called anthropologism but "vetoes any anthropology."[59]

If Heidegger seems to take up all the air in the world, one has in the interim had one's revenge. We can now bracket Heidegger.[60] Thus Adorno accuses Heidegger: vague, unclear, really, in the end, saying nothing. Heidegger says nothing – this was already Rudolf Carnap's way to do what Adorno ambitioned that he would do once again, cutting Heidegger down to size – nothing about nothing.

The personal question is the everyday question concerning Heidegger *and* Adorno, like the question one heard from the audience at a May 2016 roundtable on Heidegger and Technology at the London School of Economics, like Lacan's voice from the depths of the Real – the mothers of being, Nietzsche said, quoting Goethe – *does anyone know? Did Heidegger and Adorno get along?* The other panelists were invited to answer in the time available (the question never got to this author) and no one responded to the very personal question of the personal: what, in the end, did Adorno and Heidegger know of one another?

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[56] Ibid., 108.
[57] Ibid., 110.
[58] Ibid., 121.
[59] Ibid., 124.
[60] I am referring to (but this is not only true of) J. P. McCormick, *Confronting Mass Democracy and Industrial Technology: Political and Social* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 270ff and this, including a resistance to Nietzsche no less, may be one of the reasons this (otherwise important) book is as limited in its scope as it is.

This highly personal dimension is key to Wisser's conversations with Heidegger, including the very important relevance of the young man, Wisser, persuaded of his own central insights, speaking to an old scholar, Heidegger, famous to be sure, but of whose insights the young man was less persuaded, and hence minded to urge him to consider what he, Heidegger, did not know, but ought perhaps to know, the better mind, Adorno, a thinker perhaps to be read in place of Heidegger, as Wisser himself had just recently done. Adorno was Wisser's back story. I am reminded of conversations with another old man, Taubes, already named above, who spoke more brazenly than anyone I had ever met in academia, not then, not since. Taubes was no Heidegger yet he had a similar set of personal issues: there were those he adored and could not help talking about, Carl Schmitt, those with whom he had to do and could not prevent himself blurting out unpleasant names about, Heinz Wenzel, and others he could not stand, and I will not repeat those names. Calumny is still calumny.

The point is a dialectical one: the truth was not in Taubes' mouth nor is it in Wisser's account of his own design to draw Heidegger out on Adorno. For my part, all I wanted to talk to Taubes about was Nietzsche, that is: Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, I did not really care which. But in all the time I knew Taubes, in two years at the end of his life, all the time I spent in Berlin when I was a student there, and afterwards, in Paris, we never spoke, not a single word, about anything I wanted to talk about.

And if Heidegger and Adorno failed, quite mutually, to get on, they knew quite well of one another as their circles intersected and as German academics typically tend to know one another with a fair amount of precision (competition and a relatively spare number of university chairs leads to this). Both Heidegger and Adorno wrote in the ambit of Husserlian phenenomology.[61] Thus Heidegger could repeatedly press Wisser regarding Adorno's teacher as Heidegger knew and as Wisser admits that he was not aware that Adorno's teacher was Hans Cornelius,[62] Adorno's own *Doktorvater* who, however, would subsequently refuse to accept Adorno's *Habilitationschrift* as insufficiently original, meaning too derivative of Cornelius' own work. This is to say that Adorno's initial strategy – saying what a supervisor says – which had yielded a doctoral promotion in record time would not succeed twice over. Adorno, unfazed, withdrew the text and submitted a different Habilitation, revising a text he already had composed on Kierkegaard and aesthetics, to submit to Paul Tillich. Success.

Heidegger's question to Wisser: who was Adorno's teacher? is more complicated than can be pointed to in this essay. Suffice it to say that in the context of academic teachers and academic contests, Heidegger and Adorno would have inherited their opposition and that it went back even beyond the level of academic gossip that I can reproduce (it was only to the extent that I cared about Taubes' hermeneutic concerns that I could ask him useful questions and the same was true for my attunedness to Gadamer, who was my teacher for a longer time: we can only, as Nietzsche reminds us, get out of things what we bring to them to begin with).

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[61] M. Heidegger, *Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus*. Diss. Habil. 1916.

[62] For, however, a discussion of Max Horkheimer's engagement with both Cornelius and Heidegger, see O. Asbach, *Von der Erkenntniskritik zur Kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft: Eine Untersuchung zur Vor- und Entstehungsgeschichte der Kritischen Theorie Max Horkheimers (1920-1927)* (Frankfurt: Springer 2013), 103ff.

Inspired by Max Horkheimer, who knew both Cornelius *and* Heidegger, Adorno reads between Nietzsche and Marx:

> Culture creates the illusion of society worthy of man which does not exist; that it conceals the material conditions upon which all human works arise, and that, comforting and lulling, it serves to keep alive the bad economic determinations of its existence. This is the notion of culture as ideology, which appears at first sight common to both the bourgeois doctrine of violence and its adversary, both to Nietzsche and to Marx. (MM, *Baby with the bathwater*, § 22)

As Adorno makes this point as plainly as he can, not that we get it:

> Inexorably, the thought of money and all its attendant conflicts extends into the most tender erotic, the most sublime spiritual relationships. With the logic of coherence and the pathos of truth, cultural criticism could therefore demand that relationships be entirely reduced to their material origin, ruthlessly and openly formed according to the interests of the participants. (MM, *Baby with the bathwater*, § 22)

In other words, offering a different reading of Hölderlin on finding one's own in the foreign than Heidegger would give it, but not necessarily to the satisfaction of today's confidently moraline ideologues, Adorno writes: "Illuminated in the neon light (...) culture displays its character as advertising." (MM, *English spoken* § 26)

There is an ellipsis in the quote above that must be mentioned because one cannot understand the last line, nor indeed the point, of an aphorism without reading it whole cloth. The relatedness here, possibly one Heidegger might not himself have cared for, between Adorno and Heidegger is found on the level of questioning, that kind of questioning which is for Adorno a matter of "contradiction," of "resistance" precisely as opposed to simply swallowing or consuming everything (which is what we do today, of course, that is why even students are regarded as "consumers" especially in the US but also increasingly in Germany and the EU in general, now I am compelled to specify the UK, of course, maybe given the focus in the UK on that they call "impact" and, in Germany, but also elsewhere, making the prospects for raising *Drittmittel* prerequisite to some appointments, as if professors ought to be entrepreneurs and salesmen, as if ideas only made sense if and with the imprimatur of some corporate collaborative concern). Per contra, and Adorno in his own interview with Hellmut Becker takes care to emphasize the philosophical force of his call for a revolution in intellectual formation, that is education, that as he articulates this here and unmistakably, and once again: "that education is an education to contradiction and to resistance [*daß die Erziehung eine Erziehung zum Widerspruch und zum Widerstand ist*]." [63]

[63] Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 145.

Adorno does not bother to trifle with modality. Philosophically, logically speaking he is articulating that education is *education to* or *towards contradiction*, the very capacity to contradict, and *towards resistance*, where what is essential is a capacity to resist that is demonstrated only in its consummation even if this is and cannot always be a matter of what is done nor indeed, as this is an illusion foisted upon us by those in power, of "getting things done."

Adorno is no pragmatist and one is not merely manipulated by certain themes repeated on Facebook or CNN (and sometimes there is no difference, and sometimes, which is why Facebook is probably the more subversive, there is) as we understand media priming today, no election takes place as the free option of a free population. Neither politics nor culture, all of this is entertainment, the *industry* of control. The complexities of Google searches that yield not an oracle, the voice of truth, but limited, filtered results, or Facebook regurgitations of the same, always the same, or media programming of news reports that are not news reports but preparations of a population to think or to act in this or that way, the various ways to "hack" an election in a digital era, or to vote in this or that fashion; or the new pretense that there is some news that is true, some news that is fake; all, all of this is utterly supererogatory because the culture industry has already hijacked the mind for some time, beginning with the origin of the mass broadcast, radio, loudspeakers, that is the "work" of technological "art" in our digital mediatic era. For Adorno's sensibilities we have *already* been undone by the kind of morning music radio programs that seem to our modern mind perfectly classical, nothing to do with an objection to jazz or to new or popular kinds of music.[64]

I began above with a series of epigraphs from Hölderlin Nietzsche and Heidegger, and Adorno could offer us a fourth, arguing that if one were actually to learn something in school one might use popular culture as an object lesson for the purpose of decoding, it is obvious enough, magazine and other sorts of advertising. For Adorno, you can learn enough about the way music works to learn to how to understand the recognition mechanism of the hit parade in music; the making of presidents is also the making of Madonna, Justin Bieber, Lady Gaga but also Bob Dylan, Metallica, even the Ramones, and whoever's next.[65]

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[64] For Adorno: "Ich könnte mir etwa denken, daß man auf den Oberstufen von höheren Schulen, aber wahrscheinlich auch von Volksschulen gemeinsam kommerzielle Filme besucht und den Schülern ganz einfach zeigt, welcher Schwindel da vorliegt, wie verlogen das ist; daß man in einem ähnlichen Sinn sie immunisiert gegen gewisse Morgenprogramme, wie sie immer noch im Radio existieren, in denen ihnen sonntags früh frohgemute Musik vorgespielt wird, als ob wir. wie man so schön sagt, in einer »heilen Welt« leben würden, eine wahre Angstvorstellung im übrigen". Ibid., 145. I am not happy to say this, inasmuch as such radio programs got me through my years of doctoral study in Boston, *Morning pro musica*. Thus, just as I write on Alan Rickman owing to his voice, I also mourn Robert J. Lurtsema for his voice for the very reason that Adorno indicts the process (and given Adorno's own radio broadcasts this is a bit of the pot calling the kettle black), qua "programming" as such, speaking of schools and how they might teach resistance to the overarching program of programming. This is what I name the "Hallelujah Effect" (a book in three parts, only the first two of which bear on modern technological media manipulation and effective or consummate indoctrination).

[65] "Oder daß man mit ihnen einmal eine Illustrierte liest und ihnen zeigt, wie dabei mit ihnen unter Ausnutzung ihrer eigenen Triebbeürftigkeit Schlittengefahren wird; oder daß ein Musiklehrer, der einmal nicht aus der Jugendmusikbewegung kommt, Schlageranalysen macht und ihnen zeigt, warum ein Schlager oder warum auch meinetwegen ein Stück aus der Musikbewegung objektiv so unvergleichlich viel schlechter ist als ein Quartettsatz von Mozart oder Beethoven oder ein wirklich authentisches Stück der neuen Musik." My friend, the late Ernest

As Adorno proceeds, the consequentiality of his thinking is overwhelming as is in retrospect his use of a good bit of some of the concerns with media and the manufacture of popular taste that likewise concerned Heidegger in his lectures on technology, as on *Gelassenheit* after the war, points that also correspond to concerns that Heidegger had roughly coincidentally with the formation of the Frankfurt School.

This hardly means that Adorno would embrace Heidegger, that he would not do, nor am I saying that they say the same thing. But there are convergences which remain significant precisely to the extent that Adorno goes further, summarizing the point above concerning education as education to nothing other than contradiction and resistance.

Note that nothing of what Adorno says here has been superseded by anyone. Today's Frankfurt School has not been critical for years, from Habermas to Honneth, et al., as I point out elsewhere in connection with Nietzsche,[66] and hence there remains the difficulty of engaging with both critique *and* impotence as Adorno underlines the two as our constant constellation.[67]

The observation that Horkheimer and Adorno analyse in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* has not been superceded with respect to the circular constraints and functioning of what we might call the Brexit effect, or the Trump effect, or even, think of the World Cup, the Football effect: "In fact it is the circle of manipulation and retroactive needs [*this is the 'Hallelujah Effect'*], in which the unity of the system encloses itself ever more narrowly."[68] And here perhaps the parallel with Heidegger Heideggerians might

McClain, who knew Adorno, was a music theorist a little over-preoccupied with the arithmetic of the Hebrew bible and its musical metaphors as he analysed these in his own work, consulted on *The Hallelujah Effect*, surprised me by suggesting that Leonard Cohen's *Hallelujah*, a reflexive song about King David and his composition, his "secret chord" that "pleased the Lord," subjected to an Adorno-style "Schlageranalyse," as performed and as composed, was picture-book manipulative. My book testifies to this but also seeks to explain why so many, myself included, would like such a manipulative the song and not less to explore the performances that got under one's skin. Thus I wrote to add k.d. lang's name to the pantheon of singers who have achieved this by "covering" Cohen's song, all in addition to the beautiful Jeff Buckley who is often claimed as author in Cohen's place when authors today "cover" Hallelujah.

[66] See B. Babich, "Towards Nietzsche's 'Critical' Theory – Science, Art, Life and Creative Economics", in *Nietzsche als Kritiker und Denker der Transformation*, ed. H. Heit, S. Thorgeirsdottir (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2016), 112-133.

[67] Thus we read: "Wer ändern will, kann es wahrscheinlich überhaupt nur, indem er diese Ohnmacht selber und seine eigene Ohnmacht zu einem Moment dessen macht, was er denkt und vielleicht auch was er tut." And: "So daß man einfach versucht, zunächst einmal überhaupt das Bewußtsein davon zu erwecken, daß die Menschen immerzu betrogen werden, denn der Mechanismus der Unmündigkeit heute ist das zümn Planetarischen erhobene mundus vult decipi, daß die Welt betrogen sein will. Daß diese Zusammenhänge allen bewußt werden, könnte man vielleicht doch im Sinn einer immanenten Kritik erreichen, weil es wohl keine normale Demokratie sich leisten kann, explizit gegen eine derartige Aufklärung zu sein. Obwohl ich mir sehr gut die Lobby etwa der Film -Industrie vorstellen kann, die sogleich in Bonn vorstellig würde, wenn man etwas Derartiges versuchte, und erklären würde, man wolle auf diese Weise einerseits einseitige weltanschauliche Propaganda betreiben und auf der anderen Seite den für die deutsche Bilanz so überaus wichtigen ökonomischen Interessen der Filmindustrie schaden. Diese Dinge müßten alle in einen realen Prozeß zur Beförderung der Mündigkeit mit hineingenommen werden. (...) Ich möchte das Gespräch am liebsten damit schließen, daß wir unseren Zuhörern das Phänomen zu bedenken geben, das gerade im Eifer des Änderungswillen allzu leicht verdrängt wird, daß Versuche, in irgendeinem partikularen Bereich unsere Welt wirklich eingreifend zu ändern, sofort der überwältigenden Kraft des Bestehenden ausgesetzt sind und zur Ohnmacht verurteilt erscheinen." M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, in T. Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 3 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998), 146-147.

[68] Ibid., 142.

refuse but which, in my reading is there to be made, so I have attempted to argue: the individual is absolutely replaceable, and he or she knows this, we all know it.[69]

In this sense, the culture industry gives what the academic culture industry also gives and that is what is always and ever the same, again and again, to say this again in German "Reproduktion des Immergleichen."[70] Even the stars like Madonna, Justin Bieber – but these names are already fading – are played precisely as fabricated, as Adorno and Horkheimer say with respect to their production as such – and all stars are produced, even and to be sure: academic ones – or they are not stars, as themselves representing consumers as so many brands, all these are representations for Horkheimer and Adorno of "*Pseudoindividualität*."

GE-STELL AND *GE-REDE*: FROM THE CLICHÉ MEANINGLESSNESS OF TALK ABOUT THE WEATHER TO SLOTERDIJK'S ATMOTERRORISM

Heidegger's concern with the elusive *Ge-* in his analysis of *Ge-Stell* reflects upon *Gebirge* in the examples he gives, as well as *Gefahr* and *Gelassenheit*. Thus in his reflection on the technological foundationality of modern science he writes that we need only consider:

> the airplane and the radio in order to see at once that not only are both machines devices that have arisen in the context of modern natural science, but that they are also determining the course of the most recent history of the modern era.[71]

Adorno looks at radio and its complexities; Heidegger compares airplanes and radios almost automatically in a way that has been sufficient to allow his readers to overlook his attention to radio. And it is Heidegger's *Ge-Stell* that links them. This is best seen in Heidegger's articulation of the complex required such that:

> the airplane and the radio are intrinsically, that is, in terms of their machine essence and in terms of the extensive scope of their essence, determining the leeway for playing out possibilities that can be planned and accomplished through human willpower and for its putting things into effect.[72]

Sloterdijk argues, in an oblique parallel, that

> in his own way Adorno advanced a doctrine of en-framing [*das Ge-Stell*] – which in his work is called the existing [*das Bestehende*] – according to which there is a continually self-corroborating play of reciprocal fixations and distortions at work between a subject that is egoistically calloused and

[69] "Die Kulturindustrie hat den Menschen als Gattungswesen hämisch verwirklicht. Jeder ist nur noch wo er den Anderen ersetzen kann: fungibel, ein Exemplar. Er selbst als Individuum ist das absolut Ersetzbare, das reine nichts, und eben das bekommt er zu spüren". Ibid., 131.

[70] Ibid., 120.

[71] Heidegger, *The Ister*, 44.

[72] Ibidem.

> calculates everything, and an object-world that has been tailored to this subject.[73]

For Sloterdijk, what I initially noted as the distinction between analytic and continental sensibilities is evident in the kinship between Heidegger and Adorno, as both are "critical of science and metaphysics."[74] Where Sloterdijk very rightly points to a theodistic element in Adorno no less than that of *ressentiment*, one has yet another way of thinking the other. Here in a passage from the collection of Sloterdijk's essays published as *Not Saved*, and in which one can see at least one justification of the title:

> The world itself, and only it, is the site of euphorias in which, should it be possible, the total transfiguration of all things, their shining in the light of justice, comes to pass. Critique is already the anticipatory sheen of this light – hence a salvific undertaking. It is as such the fulfillment of the other. The Critical Theorist is not only an occult herald of the Messiah but also the Messiah himself.[75]

Sloterdijk borrows this insight from Taubes' reflections on poetic surrealism but the point here is really Gnosticism for those, post Benjamin and his own mystical-mechanical celebration of Marinetti towards the end of "The Work of Art in the Age of Technological Reproducibility," who have been suffused with futurist poetics. Hence, as Sloterdijk continues:

> an Aesthetic Theory that purports to be critical cannot proceed further than to be a Gnosticism-as-if. It does not have to do with a redemption from the world, let alone as ascent to extra-cosmic sites, but rather with distinguishing the world from the world within the world.[76]

Beyond Irigaray's *Heidegger and the Forgetting of Air*, including her more recent meditation on yoga and breath,[77] beyond (yet more esoterically), Peter Kingsley on air/aer in Empedocles,[78] Sloterdijk raises the question of air to question the weather, questioning something we, this is the cliché, do not question, this is what we shrug off, an act of God, nature's *clinamen*, beyond any control apart from the New England joke, which is

[73] P. Sloterdijk, *Not Saved: Essays After Heidegger*, trans. I. A. Moore, C. Turner (London: Polity, 2017), 153.
[74] Ibidem.
[75] Ibid., 158.
[76] Ibid., 159.
[77] See L. Irigaray, *Heidegger and the Forgetting of Air* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999) as well as L. Irigaray, *Between East and West: From Singularity to Community* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) and see, further, the contributions to *Breathing with Luce Irigaray*, ed. L. Škof, E. A. Holmes (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
[78] P. Kingsley, *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). I take these questions a little further to read between Goethe and Hölderlin and Hebel on aether in B. Babich, "Heidegger and Hölderlin on Aether and Life", *Études phénoménologiques. Phenomenological Studies*, 2 (2018), 111-133.

also the English joke, that if one is unhappy about the weather, one need only wait for what is expected to be changeable, according to its own lights. Thus talking about the weather is idle chatter and hence the cliché among German student groups in the late 1960s foregrounded this – *Alle reden vom Wetter. Wir nicht.* – to foreground the quietism of weather talk rather more than Heidegger's *Gerede* (and neither Heidegger nor Adorno, was any kind of hero to the student movement, by contrast with Sartre, say, or Marcuse). When scholars like Ackbar Abbas and Michael Taussig and others undertake a scholarly reflection on the weather, what they do not do is *question the weather* and to be sure the language of "critical theory" is often used as a device to sidestep critique and to talk, what else should one do when writing a text, only about texts. Thus Abbas' brief essay, "Adorno and the Weather: Critical Theory in an Era of Climate Change,"[79] turns out, perhaps predictably, to be about neither Adorno nor the weather (Abbas is on more solid ground with Beckett, his theme for the first page and a half of his essay) much less about critical theory or climate change apart from the presumably well-intentioned observation that concern with the weather would be a rich person's or first world concern, as if the poor might be simply minded to ride to hell in a handbasket no matter what as long as there's some advantage to be grubbed (an argument which finds that the capitalists and the indigent have the same mindset). Similarly, the anthropologist, Michael Taussig in a chapter on "Wind and Weather," talking about William Dampier's assessment of winds as they prevail (and Greg Milner's *Pinpoint* reinforces Taussig's account with a very readable prehistory of dead reckoning in the South Seas),[80] undertakes an interpretation unburdened by hermeneutics apart from the most everyday conventionality of decoding what is meant by the weather, and drawing on Andrew Ross' *Strange Weather* to do so,[81] arguing that, like *mana* (Alasdair MacIntyre would have preferred "taboo,")[82] to contend talk of the weather is "a way of avoiding talking about anything else."[83]

The three epigraphs at the start concerned the compulsion to read the products of journalism, first Hölderlin – "Know ye: Apollo has become the god of newspaper writers. And his man is whoever faithfully tells him the facts." – then Nietzsche on one's duty to read the newspaper with breakfast (BGE § 208) and finally Heidegger with his philosophical joke on featherless bipedalism, "The human is a living being that reads the newspaper" (BT 108), which last remains, to this day a very German civic obligation. Peter Sloterdijk knows the form, how what is fit to print comes to be and how what is

[79] A. Abbas, "Adorno and the Weather: Critical Theory in an Era of Climate Change", *Radical Philosophy* 174 (Jul/Aug 2012), 7-13.

[80] G. Milner, *Pinpoint: How GPS Is Changing Technology, Culture, and Our Minds* (New York: Norton, 2016).

[81] Andrew Ross, *Strange Weather* (London: Verso, 1991).

[82] A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 105.

[83] M. Taussig, *My Cocaine Museum* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 45ff. Although predating his discussion by a quarter of a century, Taussig manages to omits reference to MacIntyre, despite MacIntyre's own reference to anthropology. For a useful, applied, discussion of weather and models, see O. H. Pilkey and L. Pilkey-Jarvis, *Useless Arithmetic: Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) and for discussion my "Hermeneutics and Its Discontents in Philosophy of Science: On Bruno Latour, the 'Science Wars,' Mockery, and Immortal Models", in: *Hermeneutic Philosophies of Social Science*, ed. B. Babich (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017), 163-188.

swept aside or left unnoted is damned as to be discounted. This means that in distinction to many academics, Sloterdijk is singularly well-placed as a thinker to write about our modern age as a question poised in terms of gas warfare, atmoterrorism, and weather (including weaponized weather), but that he can also frame what he writes not on his own authority but so that the reader cannot skip the issue. Thus, and here we can think a bit more reflectively about the "favorable wind", that would bring the first instance of gas warfare into the pages of history and the misery of soldiers and animals and anyone in the region of that evening attack, when according to Sloterdijk, the 20th century began. If Latour holds that we have never been modern, Sloterdijk dates it to the day, the when, the where, the battle of Ypres, the why of it, World War I, all taking place, eventuating as Heidegger would say:

> On April 22, 1915, when a specially formed German "gas regiment" launched the first, large-scale operation against French-Canadian troops in the northern Ypres Salient using chlorine gas as their means of combat.[84]

Sloterdijk articulates the question he poses by tracing it through two world wars, including the firebombing of Dresden and the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as wars of action-at-a-distance, deployed, as "the de facto norm for 'air battles,'" as "one-sided, irreciprocable air strikes."[85] And the ongoing wars, declared and not, *explicated* at a distance, beyond posing the rhetorical question of wars that take place without, as Baudrillard has it: "taking place," past, present, and future, speaking of the "militarization of weather" as he does, variously, in both German and in English translation as *Terror from the Air* and *Airquake* and *Spheres*, three's the charm. I have already referred to the celebration of Marinetti (who in turn celebrates the "beauty" of gasmasks) in Benjamin's essay on the work of art, which haunts in this way Sloterdijk's explication of the same such that one might begin, after so very long, to see why.

These are difficult topics and Sloterdijk goes places that we are not accustomed to seeing in our professors of philosophy who are usually a little more tame, students of convention. Thus what Sloterdijk tells us here goes beyond, if it also draws on Heidegger and Adorno. Because to tell the technological story of war, to explain the technique involved at Ypres, the complex fire bombing of Dresden as a precisely calculated firestorm: a "blast furnace effect," that is

> the attackers aimed to generate a fiery central vacuum by dropping a high concentration of incendiary bombs, to produce a hurricane-like suction effect – a so-called firestorm.[86]

[84] P. Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*, trans. A. Patton, S. Corcoran (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 10.
[85] Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*, 52.
[86] Ibid., 54.

The result of these deliberately executed projects, as Sloterdijk observes, was the production of

> a special atmosphere capable of burning, carbonizing, desiccating, and asphyxiating at least 35,000 people in the space of one night constituted a radical innovation in the domain of rapid mass killings.[87]

With Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Sloterdijk reflects one has to do with more than an escalation of the tactics deployed by Churchill and Harris against Dresden, there is not just (to use a gaming metaphor) a leveling up (this is just escalation), much rather the complex term, *explication*, as Sloterdijk chooses to render his reflections on air begins to unfold a very different articulation of *Ge-Stell* as what Sloterdijk calls "the scandal of Being taken to its dark limits."[88] For, and this is where Being comes to the fore, by making "radioactivity explicit," an explication that could only be done over time and against the backdrop of the expressly inexplicit, denied as such, given occupation censorship, a refusal to acknowledge even the bombs themselves in Japan (mention of which was prohibited until 1952). For Sloterdijk this brings to the fore, despite the silencing that continues to accompany such things (after all: who talks about and thus who worries about microwaves? cellphone radiation? and so on and who considers, these points are oblique but still directly related, Monsanto and pipelines and fracking?), all for the sake of what he names a "radically new level of latency." As Sloterdijk continues here:

> The long concealed, the unknown, the unconscious the never-known, the never-noticed and imperceptible, were forthwith forced to the level of the manifest becoming indirectly noticeable in the form of peeling skin and ulcers, as if they were the result of an invisible fire.

What makes Sloterdijk unique is his focus on what he calls atmospheric explication, all the way to the current use of weather manipulation (it is routine for academics to deny the very possibility of such a thing, although, of course, it is, *qua* actual, quite possible, as Kant long ago pointed out) with HAARP. Thus among public philosophers only Sloterdijk seems to have the bravery, I do not know what else to call it, the sheer willingness to mention that this exists at all, and it is obvious that this is problematic, given that, as Sloterdijk writes:

> Built-in to the premises of weather weapons research is a stable moral asymmetry between US acts of warfare and every potential act of warfare: under no other circumstances could there be any way to justify investing public funds in the construction of a technologically asymmetrical weapon of an evidently terrorist nature. Democratically legitimizing atmoterrorism

[87] Ibid., 66.
[88] Ibid., 64.

> in its advanced form requires a concept of the enemy that gives the use of means for the enemy's special ionospheric treatment an air of plausibility.[89]

Sloterdijk's point here concerns HAARP, with express, or *ex-plicit*, reference to the US Department of Defense 1996 publication "Weather as a Force Multiplier: Owning the Weather in 2025,"[90] a decade which saw "a previously unthinkable leap in escalation, largely unbeknownst to the public, in the possibilities of atmoterrorist intervention",[91] including all action-at-a-distance, including, as he had earlier noted, the logical implications of the use of drone warfare under Obama, and made into a Hollywood movie starring Helen Mirren and Alan Rickman, *Eye in the Sky* (2015), "far from providing the antidote for terrorist practices, the stratification of weaponry works toward their systematization."[92] Thus Sloterdijk can observe that

> The fact that the dominant weapons systems since World War II, and particularly in post-1945 US war interventions, are those of the air force, merely betokens the state-terrorist habitus and the ecologization of warfare.[93]

Explaining that:

> Air-design is the technological response to the phenomenological insight that human being-in-the-world is always and without exception present as a modification of "being-in-the-air,"[94]

Sloterdijk points to the difference between those phenomenologists (that would be most Heideggerian scholars) who "explicate human dwelling in its global atmospheric conditions." Sloterdijk here refers to Irigaray's very material insight "that Heidegger's concept of *Lichtung* be bracketed and replaced by a meditation on air,"[95] citing Irigaray: "It is not light that creates the clearing but light comes about only in virtue of the transparent levity of air. Light presupposes air."[96] But the mediating difference Sloterdijk means to advance is the difference made by philosophical questioning in the wake of technology. With reference to radio, or what Adorno called the "current" of music, Adorno had made just such questions central to his critique of what he along with Horkheimer called the "culture industry," Heidegger would make attention to technology central to his own reflections. We are still trying to catch up to this, as Sloterdijk maintains, and this may be the place of purchase for the new Thracian maid's reflections, just to explicate "highly explicit procedures." We are so caught in the idea of the idea, even when it comes

[89] Ibid., 51.
[90] Ibid., 64.
[91] Ibidem.
[92] Ibid., 53.
[93] Ibidem.
[94] Ibid., 93.
[95] Ibidem.
[96] Irigaray, *The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger*, 166.

to thinking Being that we can forget the stars down to earth. For Sloterdijk, "any thinking that stays phenomenological for too long turns into an internal water color which in the best of cases fades in to non-technical contemplation."[97]

CODA

Adorno has perhaps still more to offer than Sloterdijk's own accounting of his thinking would suggest just as we need more than attention to positive programs for the personal advantage of "airconditioning" as Sloterdijk parses this or the negative exposition of atmoterrorism at any level of explication of heretofore latent vulnerabilities. Thus for Adorno, in an aphorism entitled *Antithesis*, that can be read as an anguish continued on past an initial reflection but sustained:

> For those who do not play along, there exists the danger of considering themselves better than others and misusing their critique of society as an ideology for their own private interest. [98]

The point can and should be read against Adorno's academic colleagues as he also assuredly meant it as a caution: this is the kind of auto- or self-critique he learned from Nietzsche:

> We detect the decay of education, and yet our prose, measured against Jacob Grimm or Bachofen, has phraseologies in common with the culture-industry which we did not suspect. Moreover we no longer know Greek or Latin like Wolf or Kirchhoff. We point out the transition of civilization into analphabetism and ourselves forget to write letters or to read a text of Jean Paul, as it must have been read in his time. We abhor the coarsening of life, but the absence of any objectively binding common decency [*Sitte*: morals] compels us at every step into modes of conduct, speech and calculation which are barbaric, measured by humane standards, and tactless, even by the dubious standards of the good society.[99]

For Adorno,

> The notion that every single person considers themselves better in their particular interest than all others, is as long-standing a piece of bourgeois ideology as the overestimation of others as higher than oneself, just because they are the community of all customers. Since the old bourgeois class has abdicated, both lead their afterlife in the Spirit [*Geist*] of intellectuals, who are at the same time the last enemies of the bourgeois, and the last bourgeois. By allowing themselves to still think at all vis-a-vis the naked reproduction

[97] Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*, 93-94.
[98] Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, § 6.
[99] Ibidem.

> of existence, they behave as the privileged; by leaving things in thought, they declare the nullity of their privilege.[100]

Adorno's conclusion does not because it expressly refuses to supercede this insight:

> There is no exit from the entanglement. The only responsible option is to deny oneself the ideological misuse of one's own existence, and as for the rest, to behave in private as modestly, inconspicuously and unpretentiously as required, not for reasons of good upbringing, but because of the shame that when one is in hell, there is still air to breathe.[101]

We dedicate our minds, ignoring the possibilities that those minds can be subject to strictures of control beyond the culture industry Adorno indicts along with Heidegger, to the level of frequencies ELF as Sloterdijk speaks of these, as does Steve Goodman in his book *Sonic Warfare* reviewing the use of music as a different kind of military "air-conditioning," as does Kittler, but where Sloterdijk takes the point to reflect that

> infrasonic waves affect not only inorganic material but also living organisms – in particular the human brain, which operates in these low frequency zones – HAARP includes the prospect of developing a quasi-neurotelepathic weapon capable of destabilizing the human population with long-distance attacks on their cerebral functions.[102]

It is time perhaps to bring Heidegger and Adorno together beyond Heideggerians, beyond Adorno enthusiasts to use their shared focus on phenomenology and technology for the sake of a critique of reason, cynical and otherwise for the sake not merely of reading one's newspaper with breakfast as a religious occupation. And the primary reason for naming Sloterdijk is not merely because he is a rarely, if not uniquely, critical thinker of our times, a thinker between Heidegger whom he always engages and Adorno, it is because Adorno can point to the express danger of quietism that is part of thinking about the air that we still have to breathe in hell. For mentioning things like weather modification cannot but, as Sloterdijk points out, "appear as a form of incitement to blasphemy." As we already noted, as we already say, and as our insurance policies spell out for us had we neglected the emphasis: things like the weather are not covered, being "acts of God" – the term for insurance companies has a technical, legal definition: "the principle of the weather is like that of birth and death: it comes from God and from Him alone."[103] This is also the meaning of the Anthropocene, inevitably, passively whether one wishes to dare heresy by adverting to public documents available from no less a source than the US Department of Defence (the US long ago learned that the best way to conceal its motives was to hide them in plain sight: thus the organization of opposition to terror by terrorist means is justified

[100] Ibidem.
[101] Ibidem.
[102] Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*, 68.
[103] Ibid., 88.

and no one notices any kind of contradiction, which we cited above as one of Sloterdijk's themes in passing). For there is such a thing as climate change and, like Pogo looking for the enemy, we ourselves are it, or better said, we are the anthropogenic cause.

> Nowadays what human beings meet in the weather are their own expectorations – become atmospherically objective – of their own industrial-chemotechnical, militaristic, locomotive, and tourist activities.[104]

If Sloterdijk does not refer to Ivan Illich when he speaks of the "miasmatic air quality in public spaces near cemeteries, slaughtering yards, and cloacas," it is because rather than considering the "cultivation," on Illich's terms, of "conspiracy,"[105] he is concerned to raise a certain consciousness, even broaching questions such as "black meteorology," that is:

> a theory of special man-made precipitations which deals with the way that aircraft unfold airspace and are deployed for atmoterrorist and para-artillery purposes.[106]

Thus along with Adorno, we may count Sloterdijk as Heidegger's other as he speaks with the freedom an outsider has to speak, even one who has long since arrived at insider status.

And we need this because after all our efforts it remains for us to continue to raise the question of the question – after technology.

[104] Ibid., 89.

[105] I discuss Ivan Illich's Bremen lecture "The Cultivation of Conspiracy" in "Ivan Illich's *Medical Nemesis* and the 'Age of the Show': On the Expropriation of Death", *Nursing Philosophy*, 19/1 (2018), 1-13 and further in another essay, "Spirit and Grace, Letters and Voice. Or: Performance Practice and Alchemy in Ivan Illich, Alan Rickman, and Nietzsche", *Journal of the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 3, (2018), forthcoming.

[106] Sloterdijk, *Terror from the Air*, 51.

Robert Bernasconi

DESIRE BECOME ABSTRACT

DESIRE SIGNS ITS OWN DEATH WARRANT

Must desire always come to an ignominious end? Nothing seems more noble, more exhilarating, more powerful, in its beginnings than desire, but so often it dissipates and leads to boredom or it becomes sly, tortured, and even destructive. Jean-Jacques Rousseau presented a description of the formation of society in which desire is foundational and yet betrays itself. "Young girls came to fetch water for the household, young men came to water their herds. Their eyes accustomed to the same objects from childhood began to see sweeter ones. The heart was moved by these new objects, an unfamiliar attraction made it less savage, it felt the pleasure of not being alone. Imperceptibly water became necessary, the livestock were thirsty more often; they arrived in haste and parted reluctantly."[1] This account of the formation of language in the South appeared in his *Essay on the Origin of Languages* written after the more famous two discourses. If we combine these texts we can construct Rousseau's narrative according to which desire turns into need and need seeks to take possession of the world in order to satisfy vanity (*amour propre*).

Must desire always dissolve into need as Rousseau seems to suggest? Is desire just another form of need, so that desire belongs to those needs which constitute the *conatus essendi*, the desire for existence or life that since Darwin is a biological law? Does desire sit comfortably among the drives, as some phenomenologists want to maintain? Is it perhaps what drives the drives? Is desire the mode of existing of the living subject? There are no definitive answers to these questions because the core sense of the word *desire* is contested. In this essay I explore an alternative sense of desire to that which currently dominates the phenomenological literature. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it is simply a case of different senses of "desire." I suspect that much of the mystique surrounding desire, such that philosophers are led to privilege it in their systems, is parasitic on the sense of desire that I develop here.

The central feature of Jean-Paul Sartre's description of desire in *Being and Nothingness* is that desire is doomed to failure.[2] Desire in Sartre is fundamental, but when it came to give a detailed analysis he focused on sexual desire and concluded that "Pleasure is the death and the failure of desire. It is the death of desire because it is not only

[1] J.-J. Rousseau, *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, trans. J. T. Scott (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998), 314.

[2] J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. Barnes (London: Methuen, 1957), 396.

its fulfillment but its limit and its end."[3] For Sartre sexual desire is "trouble."[4] He explains that it takes hold of one, overwhelms one, paralyses one, but that at the very moment when it reaches fruition and accomplishes its goal it dissolves. Approaching sexual desire from the point of view of a man making love to a woman, he described the accomplishment of the man's desire to impregnate her at which point the man becomes an instrument and "by the same token the *Other* ceases to be an incarnation; she becomes once more an instrument."[5] That is to say, Sartre alleged that she becomes an instrument for the man. "This does not mean that I cease to desire but that desire has lost its matter; it has become abstract; it is a desire to handle and to take."[6] One might think that desire is only abstract so long as it is an idea in the mind and that its realization is its concretization. Sartre understood it better than that. The reverse is true. But, on his account, when it becomes concrete it betrays itself and wants to take possession of its object as part of its project to take possession of the world.

The details of Sartre's account in *Being and Nothingness* are in a large part governed by other issues in his philosophy as well as by an unmistakable sexism.[7] By the time he wrote this account, the framework which determines it had been set: desire is a singular mode of my subjectivity.[8] It is an "affective intentionality."[9] His account of desire in the *War Diaries,* where he set about showing that the being who desires is afflicted by an existential lack, is phenomenologically purer than that in *Being and Nothingness*. He presented himself as the first thinker to have recognized this aspect of desire with the possible exception of some Christian thinkers who were misled on other issues.[10] For Sartre "to lack" is "to determine oneself as not being that of which the existence would be necessary and sufficient to give one a plenary existence."[11] Lack thus comes to be interpreted as "consciousness's primary relation to the world."[12] "Desire is possible only if the for-itself is *by nature* desire – in other words, it is *lack* by nature."[13] So the question shifts to the need to account for particular desires. The desired object is said to symbolize the desired world. It appears to us as "the condition *sine qua non* that makes our *being-in-the-world* possible."[14] Sartre's example is how all his pleasures – the cinema, conversation with friends, and so on – seem to dissipate if he tries to imagine indulging in them without his pipe. But Sartre understands this desire for the world as

[3] Ibid., 397.
[4] Ibid., 387.
[5] Ibid., 398.
[6] Ibidem.
[7] That the various claims made by Sartre concerning consciousness as nothingness, as lack, as drive, and as desire cannot be assimilated to each other without further examination has been argued by Rudolf Bernet and is a place where these extra-phenomenological considerations can be explored: "La 'conscience' selon Sartre comme pulsion et desir", *Alter* no. 10 (2002), 31.
[8] Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 386.
[9] Ibid., 385.
[10] J.-P. Sartre, *War Diaries. Notebooks from a Phony War*, trans. Q. Hoare (London: Verso, 1985), 230.
[11] Ibid., 232.
[12] Ibid., 239.
[13] Ibid., 231.
[14] Ibid., 239.

a desire to appropriate it. In Sartre, desire is from the start what in Rousseau it becomes: it is concerned with fulfillment and possession.

The aporia of desire as traditionally conceived is that what appears to be its concrete fulfillment, is in fact desire become abstract, that is to say, desire become need because it has been reduced to something that can be attained. What inspired desire is lost sight of in the attempt to turn it into the object of a conquest.

DESIRE AS RESPONSE

The most powerful resistance to Sartre's account was offered by Emmanuel Levinas when he insisted on the distinction to which Sartre appeared oblivious, the distinction between desire and need. "Metaphysical desire" is a desire for the invisible. It is a movement toward "the absolutely other."[15] It is insatiable and so by definition it cannot be fulfilled. Insofar as we can talk of our desires and loves being satisfied, it is only because they are not pure[16]. They are needs. So, for example, hunger, which for Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* is another form of desire alongside of sexual desire, is for Levinas a need, not a desire.[17]

Levinas began *Totality and Infinity* with the distinction between desire and need as if it were obvious, but it soon emerges that it is not, at least not in the way he presented it. He explained both the difficulty of drawing the distinction and the importance of doing so: "The distinction between need and Desire cannot be reflected in formal logic, where desire is always forced into the forms of need. From this purely formal necessity comes the force of Parmenidean philosophy"[18]. The distinction between desire and need is not to be taken for granted. It is a philosophical accomplishment but not one within the reach of philosophy as conventionally practiced and the difficulty of thinking about desire without turning it into a need perhaps also helps to explain why what we often think of as desire is not desire at all but need. In other words, it is thought in terms of a goal to be attained, even if at the same time we know we can never accomplish it.

Levinas intended his account of desire and need as they are set out at the beginning of the book to describe formal structures. That is to say, they are both approached abstractly, as abstractly in their own way as desire is in Sartre when it comes to be fulfilled. Levinas was not endorsing mysticism with his notion of metaphysical desire. Indeed, he frequently polemicized against it. While granting that the distinction between desire and need is difficult to sustain in thought, he also insisted that for the most part these two terms are not easily separated in practice either. He offered an account of "desire in its positivity" which he found in "the relationship between strangers who are not wanting to one another"[19], but this only serves to emphasize that ethical desire is not pure desire. It is not only that in the face of the widow, the orphan, and the hungry, I can address the Other only through their needs, that I cannot approach the Other with empty hands and a closed home[20]. In addition,

[15] E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 33.
[16] Ibid., 13-14.
[17] Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, 387.
[18] Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 104.
[19] Ibidem.
[20] Ibid., 172.

I become invested in my own goodness and precisely for that reason it gives me a return, a return which compromises goodness.[21]

Levinas explored the interlacing of need and desire in most detail in the discussion of Eros at the end of *Totality and Infinity*. In Eros, both desire and need are concretized in tandem so as to constitute "*the equivocal* par excellence." "The ambiguity of love" is that it consists in the "simultaneity of need and desire, of concupiscence and transcendence."[22] Nevertheless, Levinas's suggestion against Sartre is that desire is not consigned to inevitable failure. Desire coexists with need and can occasionally dominate. In love it is always compromised but not necessarily obliterated: "Love remains a relation with the Other that turns into need, and this need still presupposes the total, transcendent exteriority of the other, of the beloved."[23] Desire is at the source, but it fades as need gains the upper hand. Indeed, for Levinas desire as foundational as it was for Rousseau and Sartre. "Human need already rests on Desire."[24]

Desire, whether it be ethical, sexual, between strangers who want nothing from each other, or whatever it may be, disorientates the subject. Need is the preserve of subjects; but desire is situated elsewhere. More precisely, the experience of desire in Levinas is not the experience of a movement toward the Other. It is a response. For this reason desire is not to be understood as an affective intentionality in the manner of Husserl and Scheler. If it is an intentionality at all, it is a reverse intentionality. "Desire is an aspiration that the Desirable animates; it originates from its 'object'; it is revelation – whereas need is a void of the Soul; it proceeds from the subject."[25] Indeed, because desire comes from elsewhere it is beyond our control.

We are not in control of our desires. We can try to exercise some control over the ways and the extent to which we place ourselves in the presence of whomever or whatever is desirable, but given that desire feeds on absence, this only shows how little we can control it. It is not up to us. Our desires are not our own and because we cannot control them, neither can the state. This is what gives desire a deep political significance and explains why Levinas in *Totality and Infinity* locates resistance to the totalitarian state not so much in ethical desire but in *Eros* and fecundity.

For modern philosophy, the individual as subject is what is most immediate and most concrete; it is what remains when all else is paired away by analysis. That is why, for abstract thinking, desire can only be understood as subjective. But for phenomenology, desire provides the proof that we are not only subjects. In desire, one is taken out of oneself by being opened up to what breaks down the walls of subjectivity. In desire we escape subjectivity. Desire happens when we open ourselves up and let ourselves be transformed by what is desirable. By contrast, what is most often mistakenly discussed as desire is only the subject's reassertion of itself over desire which is why for such a subject what is

[21] This point was insisted upon by Derrida in *Given Time*, trans. P. Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). See also R. Bernasconi, "What Goes Around Comes Around: Derrida and Levinas on the Economy of the Gift and the Gift of Genealogy", in *The Logic of the Gift*, ed. A. D. Schrift (London: Routledge, 1997), 256-73.
[22] Ibid., 255.
[23] Ibid., 254.
[24] Ibid., 117.
[25] Ibid., 62.

desirable in the one who is desirable no longer seems to matter to him or her, as Sartre observed. In such a person, desire as a passivity is replaced by an ego that wants to assert itself over what disturbed its equilibrium. Desire takes us out of ourselves. It gives us a sense of belonging, but whereas Merleau-Ponty says "I belong to myself in being in the world," in desire I have a sense of belonging in which I am no longer myself.[26] Perhaps one should say that in desire I become something other in belonging to another, to a destiny, to a people, or to God, the holy.

"TODAY THE TEXT WE ARE TO STUDY IS IN THE BOOK OF OUR OWN EXPERIENCE."[27]

Sartre was more right than he knew when he suggested that Christian writers, especially the Christian mystics, had an insight into the nature of desire that is largely lacking elsewhere. The great phenomenologist of desire is the Cistercian mystic, Bernard of Clairvaux, as is clear from his commentary on *The Song of Songs*. As with Levinas, what he wrote was rooted in experience rather than in arguments based on reason or learning alone, but his experience led him elsewhere.[28] He already recognized to a degree unparalleled ever since until then, and perhaps not even in Levinas, that desire does not have its source within us. At the same time it does not come to us from the outside, a perspective which would perpetuate the idea of a human subject as the axis around which the world turns. With Saint Bernard, desire is experienced as a response, a response to a gift. Echoing the First Epistle of Saint John, he writes "His desire gives rise to yours; (...) for He first loved us, not we Him."[29] Our desire is a response; it has already found what it is looking for and only needs to keep faith. The meaning of desire is not trouble, as in Sartre, but hope and not hope for anything specific.

In desire one experiences being taken over but not from the outside. Unlike the subject in need, desire is not the experience of a subject so it does not experience itself as moved from the outside. It is in our desires that we are brought back in touch with something we recognize as much greater than ourselves to which we belong. Desire can never think of itself as unrequited because it is itself already a return, a response. It rejoices in its own existence and fears only its transformation into need or its obliteration by need. Desire wants nothing other than to persist in desire. The desire for desire accompanies desire.

What is the object of desire? The simple answer is that there is no object. Because desire has no subject, there can be no object. We are subjected to desire. Desire gives us an orientation or rather a reorientation. To the extent that desire stands beyond our control, it does not just mark the limits of intentionality or of the human subject. It reverses the subject's sense of mastery or control and takes it elsewhere, marking a break from modern

[26] M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. D. A. Landes (London: Routledge, 2012), 430.

[27] Bernard of Clairvaux, *On the Song of Songs*, Vol. I, trans. K. Walsh (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1971), 16.

[28] See Bernard of Clairvaux, *On the Song of Songs*, Vol. II, trans. K. Walsh (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1976), 14-24.

[29] Bernard of Clairvaux, *On the Song of Songs*,Vol. III, trans. K. Walsh, I. M. Edmonds (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1979), 101. See also M. Casey, *Athirst for God. Spiritual Desire in Bernard of Clairvaux's Sermons on the Song of Songs* (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 1988), 65-75.

philosophy. Desire is a transcendence in the sense that we transcend our limitations, including our own perspectives. Goals or ambitions are not desires because they are experienced as our own. Calculative thinking is alien to desire as it renders it abstract. It comes to be more about manipulating some form of success and not about acquiescing in desire.

We do not own our desires: they possess us and thrust us elsewhere. Desire is a desire to belong to or with what one experiences as greater than oneself. This is why there can be a philosophy of desire only insofar as philosophy is transformed into something like a negative theology. Meister Eckhart writes: "Desire extends further than anything that can be grasped by knowledge. (...) Desire is wide, immeasurably so,"[30] It is more akin to faith than knowledge and indeed in its purer forms is experienced as a kind of grace. It cannot contain itself. It overflows in poetry, song, dance, and deeds.

DESIRE BETRAYED

To construe desire in terms of goals that are to be met is to betray desire. The attempt to turn desire into a philosophical foundation, whether in the form of a lack as in Sartre, in the form of metaphysical desire as in Levinas, or in the form of affective intentionality as in Renaud Barbaras is also a betrayal of desire.[31]

Appealing to desire as the basis for a philosophical system is a way philosophers betray desire. They take or try to take possession of it and employ it for their own ends. They abstract desire from its source, its belonging to something or someone that it experiences as more and other than itself. In attempting to make desire more primordial, desire becomes abstract in another sense than the one described by Sartre. One sees this in Barbaras's *Desire and Distance* where desire is discussed at such a level of generality that one wonders why the term "desire" was selected for the purpose at all. It seems that the Husserlian term "drive" might have served better to describe what Barbaras calls this "fundamental movement by which appearance as such is possible." [32] Nevertheless, in more recent writings, Barbaras has imported more content into his account of desire. In *Desire and Distance,* the living subject is essentially desire and the living of the living subject the act of desire, where desire is defined as "an incompleteness that is hollowed out by what fulfills it and that experiences every satisfaction as the negation of what would truly fulfill it."[33] But more recently his account is more concrete and owes less to Sartre and more to Levinas. So in *Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie* he appeals explicitly to Levinas's distinction between need and desire which played no role in *Desire and Distance*.[34] For this reason, Barbaras's more recent discussions come closer to mine here than his earlier one. I also endorse his insistence in *Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie* that desire is not located on the plane of knowledge.[35] But for Barbaras, desire

[30] Meister Eckhart, *Selected Writings*, trans. O. Davies (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), 185.
[31] For Barbaras's own account of his relation to Sartre on this issue, see "Désir et manque dans *L'Être et le néant: le désir manqué*", in *Sartre, Désir et liberté*, ed. R. Barbaras (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), 134.
[32] R. Barbaras, *Desire and Distance*, trans. P. B. Milan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 131.
[33] Ibid., 121.
[34] R. Barbaras, *Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie* (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 293-297.
[35] Ibid., 308.

remains even in his recent work foundational and, as I have tried to show, this undermines the work of a concrete phenomenology.

Our desires appear against a background, a history, but the question of why one's desires take the form they do is not open to epistemological scrutiny. By the same token, it is a mistake to give desire a role in founding knowledge or to see it as a form of knowledge. This is especially evident in the case of that kind of desire sometimes called love, and here Marcel Proust is a valuable witness because he recognized that wanting to know everything about those we love, while a natural temptation, dooms love: if love becomes confused with the pursuit of knowledge, then as knowledge is accumulated love dies. And if love seeks knowledge, then lack of knowledge feeds jealousy. Proust explored both these errors in his great novel, albeit without recognizing that the cause of the error is the ease with which he passes between need and desire. So Marcel tells us of his desire for Albertine: "And it was consequently her whole life that filled me with desire; a sorrowful desire because I felt that it was not to be fulfilled, but exhilarating because, what had hitherto been my life having ceased all of a sudden to be my whole life, being no more now than a small part of the space stretching out before me (...) offered that prolongation, that possible multiplication of oneself which is happiness."[36] Proust is the chronicler *par excellence* of a desire that destroys itself, but one suspects that this is because he does not distinguish need from desire as Levinas, an avid reader of Proust, would want him to do. And yet when Marcel describes a moment when his life ceases to be his whole life, there is no mistaking that he is talking about desire.

A life without desire is not lived as incomplete, except in retrospect from desire itself. A life without desire is still a life. Rather than being some kind of condition for experience in general, desire is a relatively rare experience and one can live without it, although having known it one will not want to, which is why the question with which I began of how one can retain desire has so much significance for us.

[36] M. Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff, T. Kilmartin (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981), Vol. I, 852. See also M. de Beistegui, *Proust as Philosopher* (London: Routledge, 2013), 5-8.

Peter Kalkavage

SCHOPENHAUER'S WILL AND WAGNER'S EROS

They who were two and divided now became one and united.
(Gottfried von Strassburg, *Tristan*)

The following essay is an attempt to connect Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will in his masterwork, *The World as Will and Representation*, with the portrayal of erotic love in Wagner's *Tristan and Isolde*.[1] I take my cue from Nietzsche, who famously called Wagner's musical drama "the actual *opus metaphysicum* of all art."[2] What is the meaning of this pronouncement? In what sense is Wagner's musical rendition of death-devoted love metaphysical?

It is well known that in the middle of working on his epic *Ring* cycle, Wagner read Schopenhauer's book at the urging of a friend (the poet, Georg Herwegh) and was enthralled. The composer had found in the philosopher's cosmic pessimism a perfect articulation of what he, Wagner, was feeling at the time and what he thought was the ultimate truth about life. The musical genius had found his philosophic muse, and the pessimistic Schopenhauer, whom Wagner called "a gift from heaven to my loneliness," replaced the utopian Feuerbach as Wagner's intellectual hero.[3] The offspring of this ideological conversion was *Tristan and Isolde*.

Schopenhauer, as it turns out, had no use – and no ear – for Wagner's chromatic harmonies. Wagner sent him a beautifully bound copy of the *Ring* with the inscription, "from respect and gratitude." The Sage of Frankfurt was not impressed. He instructed the Swiss journalist, Franz Wille, to convey a message to his friend Wagner: "but tell him that he should stop writing music. His genius is greater as a poet. I, Schopenhauer, remain faithful to Rossini and Mozart."[4] The response was rude but not surprising, since

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1 The essay was originally presented as a talk at the Wagner Society in Washington DC (13 October 2016).

2 F. Nietzsche, "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth" (section 8), in *Untimely Meditations*.

3 The influence was so strong that Wagner changed the end of the *Ring* cycle to reflect a Schopenhauerian view of the world. Instead of a tribute to love, Brünnhilde would sing: "Grieving love's / profoundest suffering / opened my eyes for me: I saw the world end." This is the shift that Nietzsche mocked in his *Case of Wagner* (section 4). Ultimately, however, Wagner returned to his initial idea, in which Brünnhilde's final profession of love for Siegfried ("In bliss your wife greets you!") balances and corrects Wotan's grim resignation and provides the right closing note for the whole cycle. Schopenhauer was dear, but the demands of art were dearer. See S. Spencer and B. Millington, *Wagner's Ring of the Nibelungen: A Companion* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2010).

4 D. Cartwright, *Schopenhauer: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

Schopenhauer, who played the flute (not, like Nietzsche, the piano), was a lover of diatonic catchy tunes. My concern in this essay, however, is not with personal stories but with the philosophic teaching of the one man and the *Tristan* music of the other. Where do the teaching of Will and the music of Eros meet, and where do they part company? What light can Schopenhauer cast on music, a phenomenon at once familiar and mysterious? And how might music and Eros reveal each other's elusive depths?

MUSIC, WORLD AND WILL

The World as Will and Representation has two volumes, the second being a further explication of the main parts and themes of the first. The principal volume is divided into four books. Thomas Mann, the greatest admirer of Schopenhauer in the 20th century, called the book "a symphony in four movements."[5] Mann, himself a cosmological pessimist and self-styled "musician among the poets," was keenly sensitive to the central role that music plays in the work. In his masterful essay on the philosopher, Mann observes that Schopenhauer, who was very musical, "celebrates music as no thinker has ever done" by making music *metaphysically significant*.

As its title indicates, *The World as Will and Representation* depicts the world as having two distinct sides or aspects. These derive from Kant's distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself, which Schopenhauer appropriated and made expressive of an even more radical dualism. One side, representation, is the topic of Book One. As representation or *Vorstellung*, the world is everything that is *vorgestellt*, "placed before" us and made present in the daylight of consciousness. Although a more accurate rendering of the word would be "presentation," which suggests original coming-to-presence rather than the imitation of something original, I have chosen, for the sake of ease, to retain the traditional term. Representation is the realm of perceived objects – finite determinate *things* that appear in space and time and interact according to the principle of sufficient reason, that is, through the relation of cause and effect. Representation, for Schopenhauer, is the world as a well-ordered surface.

Schopenhauer turns to the other, inner aspect of the world in Book Two. Whereas representation is the world as appearance or *phenomenon*, will is the world as thing-in-itself or *noumenon*. Will, here, is not a psychic faculty and does not refer to choice. It is not my will or your will, or God's will, since for Schopenhauer there is no God. Will is the universal force and infinite striving that underlies all things and rises to self-awareness in man. Schopenhauer calls the will "eternal becoming, endless flux" (164). As the world's "innermost being" and "kernel" (30-31), will is the source of meaning (98-99).[6] Viewed from the standpoint of will, life is more than the perception of objects; it is also feeling and care. Objects of representation are the vessels of my care. They are meaningful and important to me in all sorts of ways. This object I desire and strive to possess; that one I avoid. This event I hope for; that one I dread. This human being I love; that one I despise. My body, for Schopenhauer, is the embodiment of my care. It is the seemingly concrete reality to which I am intimately joined and which I care about in a thousand ways. My living

[5] "Schopenhauer", in T. Mann, *Essays*, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York: Random House, 1957), 283.
[6] Numbers in parentheses refer to page numbers in the edition by E. F. J. Payne, New York: Dover, 1969.

body reminds me that I am constantly in the condition of seeking to preserve my life and to stave off harm, pain, frustration, and death. My being and my life consist in striving to be and to live. I cannot escape striving, not even when I sleep, for it is more obvious in dreams even than in waking life that representations matter to me and are the creatures of my care. Dreams *are* my hopes, fears, anxieties, and desires made into a private movie, often a surreal one. It goes without saying that as a human being with a certain nature I am subject to this care. But on this point Schopenhauer is far more radical. For him, I am this care, this infinite striving to be and to live as *this* individual confined to *this* body. As we shall see, this identification of human care with human individuality constitutes Schopenhauer's tragic appropriation of Leibniz's *principium individuationis*.

Dreams are to desire what the whole phenomenal realm is to the noumenal will. Schopenhauer reminds us repeatedly that what we call life is in fact a dream – a world-view that Nietzsche appropriated in his *Birth of Tragedy*. The will is not the cause of the world, since the principle of sufficient reason operates only within the dream world of phenomena or appearances. There is no intelligible principle or creator God that is responsible for the natural order. Nature is unaccountably there, just as human beings are unaccountably there – "thrown," to use Heidegger's term, into existence. The will, then, does not cause nature but objectifies itself *as* nature, just as our care objectifies itself in dreams. Hence the phrase, "the world *as* will and representation." Will objectifies itself in a fourfold way: as inorganic nature, plant life, animal life, and human life. The self-manifestation of the will is especially noteworthy in the case of our bodily parts, which are so many ways in which the will objectifies itself: "Teeth, gullet, and intestinal canal are objectified hunger; the genitals are objectified sexual impulse; grasping hands and nimble feet correspond to the more indirect strivings of the will which they represent" (108).

The identity of will and meaning shows why music is metaphysically significant. For Schopenhauer, music, especially melody, "speaks not of things but simply of weal and woe [*Wohl und Weh*] as being for the *will* the sole realities."[7] From the standpoint of the will, being is meaning. Music is unique among the arts because it depicts the inner world of care, or rather the world as care. Music is pure meaning apart from all objectivity. It is the artful, intuition-based revelation of the world heart. That is why music is not an elitist who speaks only to her learned inner circle but rather the "universal language" that is "instantly understood by everyone," intuitively and without the aid of concepts (256).

To exist as a human being is to be, for Schopenhauer, an egocentric individual afflicted with insatiable desire, in particular sexual desire. To be is to be subject to what he calls "the miserable pressure of the will" (196). In the third act of Wagner's musical drama, Tristan suffers this pressure horribly and at great length. It is the living hell into which the love potion, or rather Love itself, has thrust him. The will, as I noted earlier, is infinite striving – striving with no ultimate good or end. Moments of contentment and joy appear, to be sure, but only as passing tones, ripples in a sea of frustration, ennui, and renewed desire. To live is to suffer. Schopenhauer here reveals the hard edge of his pessimism and "tragic sense of life." He cites approvingly poets like Calderón who define original sin as

[7] A. Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 2, trans. E. F. J. Payne (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), 430.

"the guilt of existence itself" and affirm that it would be better never to have been born.[8] Viewed in this light, death becomes a positive good – the correction of an error. It is, as Schopenhauer puts it, "the great opportunity no longer to be I" (vol. 2, 507). Wagner's lovers in Act 2 give ecstatic musical utterance to this very longing for non-individuality.

Schopenhauer's image of life as suffering is the wheel of Ixion. Ixion was King of the Lapiths. After being shown hospitality by Zeus, he lusted after Hera and tried to seduce her. For this attempted outrage Zeus bound Ixion on a wheel of fire and consigned him to Tartarus. Only once did the wheel of torment stop – when Orpheus descended to the Underworld and charmed its inhabitants with his song.[9] This relief from suffering is, for Schopenhauer, the psychic therapy that all fine art offers, in particular the art of music. Music represents the will as thing-in-itself – meaning apart from all things, words and pictures. But music also gives us momentary relief from the fiery wheel on which we are bound, the wheel of infinite longing. In music, as in all aesthetic contemplation, we are no longer self-interested individuals but "pure, will-less subject[s] of knowing," subjects who are "lost in the object" (209). In art, as Schopenhauer puts it, "[w]e celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still" (196).

The third part of Schopenhauer's book is devoted to the arts, which are beyond the reach of the principle of sufficient reason. This is evident in music, where tones, though tightly connected, have no causal relation to each other. The famous opening phrase of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, for example, does not cause the second.[10] A stranger to causality and deduction, art is the intuitive apprehension of the Ideas, which Schopenhauer takes from Plato. The Ideas are *universalia ante rem*. As universals metaphysically prior to experience, they are not to be confused with general concepts, which are *universalia post rem* (263). The most encompassing Ideas are, as mentioned above, the eternal archetypes of nature – Mineral, Plant, Animal, and Human.[11] The human Ideas, in their further specificity, are the universals of experience. Shakespeare's plays, for example, are distillation of what is eternally true in human life. In the ambition of Macbeth, jealousy of Othello and tragic integrity of Cordelia, we behold archetypes of will at its highest grade.[12] Art is therapeutic because, as the aesthetic contemplation of universal Ideas, it detaches us from the particular objects of our care. To behold the sufferings of Oedipus or Lear is precisely to be taken away from our own.

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[8] Schopenhauer quotes from Calderón's *Life Is a Dream*: "For man's greatest offence is that he has been born" (vol. 1, 254). This is "the guilt of existence itself" – original sin. Death is, in effect, the correction of an error. Schopenhauer would say to the dying individual: "You are ceasing to be something which you would have done better never to become" (vol. 2, 501).

[9] Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, 10.42.

[10] Schopenhauer makes this point in *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, trans. E. F. J. Payne (La Salle: Open Court, 1974), 127: "In just the same way, the succession of sounds in a piece of music is determined objectively, not subjectively by me the listener; but who will say that the musical notes follow one another according to the law of cause and effect?".

[11] The Ideas, for Schopenhauer, differ from how Plato describes them. For Schopenhauer, the Ideas cannot be genuine beings, for that would undermine the ultimacy of the irrational will. They are no more than eternal modes or ways in which the will objectifies itself.

[12] These archetypes recall Vico's "imaginative universals." See G. Vico, *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. T. Goddard Bergin, M. H. Fisch (Cornell NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), paragraphs 381 and 460.

Art, however, is powerless to provide enduring release from Ixion's wheel and offers only "occasional consolation" (267). The fourth part of Schopenhauer's book takes us from the artist to the saint, who alone is truly happy – if we can call resignation happiness. The saint (who, for Schopenhauer, is more Buddhist than Christian) has neutralized the will to be and to live through the knowledge that objects of care are nothing but illusion (451). Thanks to this enlightenment, he needs no artworks. The pacification of the will makes the saint good. In the obliteration of his ego, he is released from private suffering – in particular from erotic longing – and free to feel compassion for the suffering of other human beings and even for that of animals (372).

Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music appears in both volumes of *The World as Will and Representation*. These chapters contain the most fascinating discussions of music one will ever read. They are an attempt to identify music as a source of truth, indeed the deepest truth: "The composer reveals the profoundest wisdom in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand, just as a magnetic somnambulist gives information about things of which she has no conception when she is awake" (260). Music reveals the world as thing-in-itself, as will. The scientifically minded Leibniz had asserted – correctly, for Schopenhauer – that listening to music was "an unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the mind does not know it is counting" (256). But in Schopenhauer's "higher" view, which goes to the depths rather remains at the surface of experience, musical listening is "an unconscious exercise in metaphysics in which the mind does not know it is philosophizing" (264).

Dissonance in music is the phenomenal representation of will as tension and as such is the sounding analogue of desire, longing, and the erotic in general. Musical dissonance yearns for resolution as desire yearns for consummation. The so-called suspension, a prominent feature of Renaissance polyphony, is a good example of how dissonance works in music. In a suspension, two lines or voices start out in consonance but then produce dissonance when one of the voices moves while the other holds; a resolution then follows. Here is how Schopenhauer puts it: "[Suspension] is a dissonance delaying the final consonance that is with certainty awaited; in this way the longing for it is strengthened, and its appearance affords greater satisfaction. This is clearly an analogue of the satisfaction of the will which is enhanced through delay."[13]

The term "analogue" is important here. The suspension is not the image or likeness of a specific desire that is eventually gratified but rather a tonal event that communicates, in a purely musical way, a universal truth about the will. When Schopenhauer says that music is the universal language, he is not being poetic. He means that although tones are not words, they function intuitively in the same way that words function conceptually – not as likenesses of the things they signify but as symbols, bearers of universal meaning.

[13] Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 2, ed. Payne, 455-456. An even better instance of the connection between dissonance and will is the *appoggiatura* or leaning tone. This unprepared dissonance on a strong beat delays a tone of the melody and intensifies expectation. It is the perfect tonal analogue of longing. A good example occurs in Tamino's love song in the *Magic Flute*. Tamino gazes on a picture of Pamina and falls in love with her. By *singing* in response to *seeing*, he moves from the world as representation to the world as will. His repeated leaning tones on the words "I feel it," "*ich fühl es*," embody the universal truth of erotic love.

In music, this meaning is directly perceived rather than inferred. Listening to music is, in sum, non-verbal symbol-recognition.

Music as tension or force flourishes in the tradition of modern tonal harmony. This tradition reaches from Bach and Handel, through Mozart, Haydn, and Beethoven, up to Brahms and Wagner. It experienced a rebirth in the last century in the form of neo-Romanticism, which was a reaction against the twelve-tone music of Schoenberg. Tonal music, as opposed to the mode-inspired music of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, exhibits a play of forces – tonal dynamism. This music is friendly to the language of will, since will is tension. The most famous musicologist of the last century, Heinrich Schenker, applied this very term to music: *Tonwille*, the will of the tones. In tonal harmony, tension is not confined to isolated events, like the suspension, but pervades the whole of a musical work and constitutes its unity. "Tonal" refers to the rule of a single tone, the tonic or keynote, to which all the other tones in a tonal work point or, as some prefer to say, the centrality of the tonic triad, the I-chord.[14] These tensions compose the major scale and cause it to sound like a journey with clearly defined stages and a predetermined end: 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8.[15] Tension is especially urgent in degree 7, which strives toward 8, as desire craves satisfaction. Degree 4 tends, less urgently, down to 3. Together, degrees 4 and 7 produce the dissonant interval of the tritone. This is the best example of directed tension in music, since the tritone, when combined with degree 5 in the bass, makes up the dominant seventh chord, which points to the tonic triad and so fixes the music in a key. Thanks to their dynamic relations, which operate at many levels, tones and the triads they form generate musical wholes through the artful prolongation and eventual resolution of their will-like tension.

Wagner's *Tristan* takes full advantage of musical tension as a symbol of Eros and Will. Indeed, tension here is thematic. The opera highlights extreme chromaticism (the use of non-diatonic tones), constant unresolved cadences and the deceptive shifting of tonal centres or prospective keys. These phenomena form the tonal analogue of Eros as infinite longing. As others have noted, Wagner's opera pushes tonal harmony and musical tension to the absolute limit and extends the striving of tones over the course of several hours in what seems like one unbroken arc.[16] The opening phrase of the Prelude, with its famous "Tristan chord" resolving to a dominant-seventh chord, is perhaps the most powerful evocation of tension-as-desire in all of music. The phrase sets up a cadence (or rather musical period) that is not completed until the very end of the opera, when the crashing waves of the orchestra overwhelm the transfigured Isolde before settling into the blissful, post-climactic froth of B major.[17] Richard Strauss attached this final cadence

[14] In Schoenberg's twelve-tone system, the twelve equal-tempered chromatic tones stand in relation not to a governing "one" but only to each other. It is a system of tonal relativity – tonal egalitarianism.

[15] V. Zuckerkandl in *The Sense of Music* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 18-28 calls these tensions *dynamic qualities*.

[16] See C. Dahlhaus, *Richard Wagner's Music Dramas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 64: "It is not that Wagner anticipated Schoenbergian atonality; there was never any question of his abandoning the principle of tonality, and he used to attribute emotive and symbolic significances to tonal relationships. Yet the harmonies of Tristan point the way to the dissolution of tonality, the emancipation of melody and counterpoint from preformed chordal associations".

[17] Strauss called this final moment of *Tristan* "the most beautifully orchestrated B major chord in the history of music". Cf. D. Borchmeyer, *Richard Wagner: Theory and Theatre* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 367.

in B major to the opening A minor phrase of the Prelude to reveal in brief the harmonic arc of the whole opera.[18] In Schopenhauerian terms, the immense prolongation of tonal tension in *Tristan* is the *noumenal* interior of the lovers' prolonged *phenomenal* eroticism. More cautiously stated, it is the analogical, symbolic representation of that interior. The universal undying truth of the story is not in the death-bound lovers but in the tones.[19]

The central teaching of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music is that music is "a copy [*Abbild*] of the will itself," not of the Ideas of the will, as in tragedy (257). The notion of music as copy is problematic, since there can be no copy of something utterly indeterminate and therefore uncopiable. How can music, with all its intricate detail, be a picture or copy of the will, which Nietzsche rightly called "the unaesthetic in itself"?[20] But for now let us go with the flow of Schopenhauer's theory. All the arts, for him, objectify the will, but the non-musical arts do so "only indirectly." They present universality through the medium of *things*, whether the Parthenon, or the *Birth of Venus*. or the character of Cordelia. Music, by contrast, makes no such appeal and represents the world's pure subjectivity. It leaps over the Ideas and captures the world as the process or flux that it most truly is.

By music Schopenhauer means "the sacred, mysterious, profound language of tones."[21] This signals the primacy of what Wagner was the first to call "absolute music" and we now call instrumental music.[22] For Schopenhauer, music as the language of tones captures the Absolute through non-visual representations. It is the will "speaking" to us through the medium of composers, who are the will's symbolists, somnambulists and high priests. Because tones are meaningful all by themselves, Schopenhauer can make the astonishing claim that music, in passing over the Ideas and everything phenomenal, "to a certain extent, could still exist even if there were no world at all" (257). The reason is that music, in negating the world as thing, contains that world from the perspective of its deepest interior, its heart. Schopenhauer states this with maximum concision in another work: "Music is the melody to which the world is the text."[23] In other words, tones all by themselves represent the indwelling, immortal spirit of the world. If we imagined the phenomenal world as a staged opera, or a movie, then the orchestral parts would stand to this world as inner to outer, essence to appearance, truth to seeming. As I observed earlier in the case of *Tristan*, the real drama, the world-process in its universal truth, would be taking place not in what we see but in what we hear. It would be a drama of tones.

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[18] Reproduced in Borchmeyer, *Richard Wagner: Theory and Theatre*, 367. Strauss' reduction of the opera to its simple harmonic period lays bare the most beautiful part of Wagner's design: the use of the minor subdominant of B major, the E minor chord that binds the opening phrase in A minor to the B major cadence at the end.

[19] "The longing of the lovers is merely objectified in the poem and plot: it is expressed directly in the music". Cf. E. Zuckerman, *The First Hundred Years of Wagner's Tristan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 17. In Kant's terms, the words and images function as the *schematism* of a pure *concept* (*Critique of Pure Reason*).

[20] F. Nietzsche, *Birth of Tragedy*, section 6. Cartwright puts the problem very well: "Schopenhauer's account of music ended, however, with a dissonance. Music was said to be the copy of something that cannot be copied – a mirroring of an original that cannot be reflected, a representation in tunes of that which cannot be represented" (*Schopenhauer*, 318).

[21] Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 2, ed. Payne, 432.

[22] See *Wagner on Music and Drama*, ed. Goldman and Sprinchorn (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988), 171.

[23] Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, vol. 2, ed. Payne, 430.

But although music transcends the world of things, it is also deeply connected with that world. The four parts of a string quartet or chorus capture in symbolic form the four natural grades of the will's self-objectification. The bass part is the analogue of inorganic nature, the tenor and alto parts of plant and animal, respectively. As for the soprano or melody Schopenhauer writes: "in the *melody*, in the high singing, principal voice, leading the whole and progressing with unrestrained freedom, in the uninterrupted significant connexion of *one* thought from beginning to end, and expressing a whole, I recognize the highest grade of the will's objectification, the intellectual life and endeavour of man" (259). Melody, the μῦθος and symbol of human life, "relates the story of the intellectually enlightened will, the copy or impression whereof in actual life is the series of its deeds." But melody also goes beyond outward deeds, since it relates "the most secret history of the intellectually enlightened will, portrays every agitation, every effort, every movement of the will" (259). Even death finds its correlate in the world of tones. Death in music occurs in modulation, where a key-change "entirely abolishes the connection with what went before" (261).[24]

To sum up, there is nothing in the natural world, or in the inner and outer life of man, that does not find its counterpart in the all-embracing realm of tones. Music, as symbol, is the whole of all things. That is why, for Schopenhauer, "we could just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will" (262-3). Music, if it could speak, would be perfectly justified in proclaiming what Wagner's lovers say at a climactic moment of their duet in Act 2: "I myself am the world."

EROS UNBOUND

The story of Tristan and Isolde goes back to the 12th century. Among the several versions that survive the best known is that of Gottfried von Strassburg, whose poem Wagner used as the basis of his opera.[25] In his far-ranging book, *Love in the Western World*, Denis de Rougemont asserts that Wagner "completed" the Tristan myth by transposing it into its proper domain – music. "Music alone," de Rougemont writes, "could utter the unutterable, and music forced the final secret of *Tristan*."[26] The secret, which up to now had been concealed by medieval courtliness and diverting adventures, is that Eros is a terrible, not-be-sentimentalized god (or in this case the goddess, Frau Minne) who inflicts horrible suffering, the pain of separation, and, above all, a longing for death.[27]

Wagner's Prelude tends to support de Rougemont's view. In his program notes to the concert version of *Tristan*, which paired the Prelude and Finale, Wagner left no doubt that the Prelude, which he called *Liebestod*, was meant to capture the endless torment of Love:

[24] E. Zuckerman applies this claim about death in music to Wagner's drama: "If the unexpected movement into a remote key is, as Schopenhauer hyperbolically maintains, like death, then the second and third acts of *Tristan* represent (as they should) a continuous dying" (*The First Hundred Years of Wagner's Tristan*, 19).

[25] The story of the doomed lovers was given a second literary life when the French medievalist, Joseph Bédier, composed his beautiful *Roman de Tristan et Iseut* (1900).

[26] D. de Rougemont, *Love in the Western World*, trans. M. Belgion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 218.

[27] "In writing *Tristan*, Wagner transgressed the taboo. He *said* everything – admitted everything, not only in the words of his poem, but still more in the notes of his score. He sang of the Darkness of the dissolution of forms and beings, of the release of desire, of desire become anathema, and of the tremendously plaintive and blessed twilit glory of the spirit after it had been rescued at the price of a fatal wound inflicted on the body." Ibid., 228.

"longing, longing unquenchable, desire forever renewing itself, craving and languishing; one sole redemption: death, surcease of being, the sleep that knows no waking."[28] The Transfiguration music of the Finale offers "blessed fulfilment" (to use Wagner's phrase) for Isolde but not for Tristan, who is love's tormented victim and who dies without, so to speak, a moment of grace.

The Prelude to *Tristan and Isolde*, and by extension the whole opera, begins with a musical moan: a hushed woe-filled rising minor sixth played by the cellos. The phrase to which it belongs is sometimes called the *Liebestrank* or love potion motif. In his first complete sketch of the Prelude's opening seventeen-measure unit, Wagner used, rather than the sixth from A to F, a tritone from B to F.[29] The tritone, which I discussed earlier, conveys the extreme tension of the erotic will. But it lacks the moodiness of the minor interval and mutes to some extent the shock of the Tristan chord, which contains this same tritone. Wagner must have realized early on that the sixth was better suited to Schopenhauerian gloom and to what the opening of his opera musically and dramatically required. The haunted sound of this sixth is love's dark longing rising out of the depths of the soul. It is the felt onset and intimation of what Isolde calls the *böse Ferne* or "evil distance" that separates lovers. But the sixth also has a cosmological meaning. In mythic terms, it is the infinitely sad emergence of the phenomenal world out of the depths of the Will. At the very moment that the cellos complete their phrase on a G-sharp (the raised 7 of A minor), bassoons, clarinets, English horns and oboes join the cellos to form the Tristan chord. Sounded mostly by wind instruments, the chord is the first breath of the new born world of *things*, the burst of the World Spirit into Baudelaire's *brumeuse existence*, gloomy existence. World and Woe come on the scene together. In a letter to Mathilde Wesendonck, Wagner puts forth this very connection between the opening of *Tristan* and the Buddhist story of creation as the primordial "troubling" of the originally cloudless heaven.[30]

Having mentioned the famous *Liebestod*, I hasten to point out that the notion of a Love-Death stands in sharp opposition to Schopenhauer's metaphysics of sexual love, according to which love is only the will to *life*. Being "in love," for Schopenhauer, is no more than a ruse that the will employs to propagate the species.[31] Wagner, by rejecting this cynical reduction of sexual love to the physiological, saves the phenomenon and experience of Eros as a relation of spirits rather than mere bodies. In mythic terms, he preserves the bond between Eros and Psyche.

Wagner pared down Gottfried's story to its bare essentials, all the better to focus on the inner drama of the lovers' emotions and metaphysical flights. Wagner writes the following about the composition of *Tristan*: "Here, in perfect trustfulness, I plunged into the inner depths of soul events and from out this inmost centre of the world I fearlessly built up its outer form."[32] Wagner's devotion to interiority and the wordless music of Eros

[28] *Prelude and Transfiguration from Tristan and Isolde*, ed. R. Bailey (New York: Norton Critical Scores, 1985), 47.
[29] Ibid., 131.
[30] See E. Newman, *The Wagner Operas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949), 208.
[31] "...nature can attain her end only by implanting in the individual a certain *delusion*, and by virtue of this, that which in truth is merely a good thing for the species seems to him to be a good thing for himself, so that he serves the species, whereas he is under the delusion that he is serving himself" (vol. 2, 538).
[32] Goldman and Sprinchorn, *Wagner on Music and Drama*, 270.

is no doubt why he chose to call his opera not a music drama but more simply a *Handlung* or action, thereby distinguishing it from his more spectacular works that depict outward deeds and events. This fierce focus on inner movement – the raw subjectivity of feeling – lifts the story of the lovers out of its medieval setting and puts it beyond time and place in the realm of eternal universal truth.

Wagner neatly divides the drama into three acts. De Rougemont calls them, respectively, "initiation, passion, fatal fulfilment."[33] We begin *in medias res*, as Tristan, King Mark's most trusted knight, is conveying Isolde from her native Ireland to Cornwall as Mark's bride-to-be. Other elements of the story – the death of Morold, Isolde's betrothed, at the hands of Tristan, her nursing the wounded Tristan back to health when he comes to her disguised as Tantris, and the fatal "glance" that begets Love – are not dramatized but recollected by the lovers. Knight and Lady drink the potion and proceed to express in passionate, death-devoted terms the love that was already burning within them. Back in Cornwall, while Mark and his knights are on a hunting party, the lovers meet, in defiance of the urgent warnings of Brangäne, Isolde's lady in waiting. The lovers indulge in a long, Dionysian outpouring of their love-death passion but are discovered by Mark, who has been informed of the affair by the jealous Melot. Tristan provokes Melot to fight and practically throws himself on Melot's sword, whereupon the wounded Tristan, accompanied by his servant-friend Kurvenal, flees to his native Kareol in Brittany, where he suffers from his physical wound, which is the symbol of the wound of erotic longing in the absence of the beloved. Upon news of Isolde's approaching ship, Tristan, in a fit of delirious excitement, rips the bandage from his wound and eventually dies in Isolde's arms. When Mark and Melot come on the scene, Kurvenal attacks and kills Melot but is in turn killed by Mark's defenders. Brangäne informs Isolde that Mark now knows about the potion and has come to forgive all and to give Isolde to Tristan in marriage. But Isolde is beyond all this. As she gazes on Tristan's face in rapture, she follows her lover to Hamlet's "undiscovered country." Isolde does not merely die: she is transfigured, made radiant, as she sinks on Tristan's body, breathes her final breath, and experiences the world, mystically, as music:

> In the billowing surge
> In the ringing sound [*in dem tönenden Schall*],
> In the World Spirit's fluttering All –
> To drown,
> To sink –
> Unconscious –
> Highest bliss![34]

In Wagner's version of the story, as opposed to Gottfried's, the lovers never physically consummate their love-passion. They are chaste, like the Night that protects them in Act 2. When a "climax" occurs for each of the lovers, it is in the absence of the beloved and takes place not so much in the bodily world as in the act of leaving

[33] De Rougemont, *Love in the Western World*, 229.
[34] The final rhyme between *Unbewußt* and *höchste Lust* captures the teaching of the whole opera.

it.[35] Wagner's lovers forego the trivial transitory pleasures of sex for the final rush of self-immolation. This, death, is what their love-passion seeks. By preventing the lovers from engaging in sex, Wagner preserves Eros as infinite striving with only one release. The absence of physical completion also points to the radical purity that the lovers are ultimately seeking. This purity, this catharsis or purification, is freedom from bodily, worldly taint and from the principle and prison of individuation.[36]

Wagner's drama is framed, significantly, by two sea voyages, two transitions or transports involving Isolde. Throughout his writings, Wagner uses the image of the sea to describe harmony as the movement of chords. Harmony, for him, interprets and completes melody by giving it emotional depth.[37] Harmony, Wagner's musical strong point, is the realm of feeling, the primordial undercurrent and ocean of the Unconscious.

Flow and fluids are central to the drama and are always connected with transition and transformation. Even the leitmotifs here are handled more fluidly, organically, than in Wagner's other operas and cannot as a rule be confined to a single meaning, since meaning here is itself fluid. The crucial fluid is, of course, the potion, which neither causes the love (as Mark mistakenly thinks at the end of the opera) nor causes the lovers to realize that they are in love (they know that already).[38] The potion, in addition to being the sacred symbol of Eros, simply allows Tristan and Isolde, who think they are drinking a death potion, to confess their love openly – to let love flow.[39] There is also the flow of Tristan's blood in Act 3. Another crucial flow is the lovers' desire to destroy their identities and cancel the principle of individuation – the *und* that separates them – so that they might flow into each other and die in each other. There is, finally, the passage from being to non-being. This is the Great Crossing – from Life, Day, and Memory to Death, Night, and Oblivion – a crossing over that Isolde interprets as a return to origin. Her metaphysical homecoming is prophesied by the song of the young sailor at the very beginning of the drama: *Frisch weht der Wind / der Heimat zu* ("The wind blows fresh toward land of home"). All these instances of flux have as their metaphysical wellspring the perpetual transmutations of Eros or Will, the cosmic force none can resist.

In a well-known letter to Mathilde Wesendonck, the composer boasted of having perfected in the love duet of Act 2 his "subtlest and deepest art," that of "transmutation

[35] "Of the two sexual climaxes that are unmistakably depicted in the orchestra, one is interrupted by the entry of Kurvenal on an unnamable discord, and the other occurs after Tristan has been dead for twenty minutes" (Zuckerman, *The First Hundred Years of Wagner's Tristan*, 22).

[36] De Rougemont emphasizes the influence on medieval courtly love of the gnostic heresy known as Catharism (from the Greek adjective *katharos*, clean or pure). According to the Cathars, who adopted the Persian-Manichean dualism of Good and Evil, the material world was the work of Satan rather than God (*Love in the Western World*, 79). De Rougemont sees Catharism at work in Wagner's *Tristan*, whose second act "is the passion song of souls imprisoned in material forms" (ibid., 229).

[37] "The sounding out of the harmony to a melody is the first thing that fully persuades the feeling as to the emotional content of that melody, which otherwise would leave to it something undetermined" (Goldman and Sprinchorn, *Wagner on Music and Drama*, 214). In the very first sentence of his book on Wagner's *Tristan*, Ernst Kurth, a devotee of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of will, writes: "Harmonies are reflexes from the Unconscious" (*Romantic Harmony and its Crisis in Wagner's Tristan*, Berlin: Max Hesses Verlag, 1920).

[38] Tristan makes this clear in Act 2: "The frightful drink with the torment it gave, I myself – I myself brewed it!"

[39] See Borchmeyer, *Richard Wagner: Theory and Theatre*, 338. As Dahlhaus writes, "unlike the fatal potion in *Götterdämmerung* it [the potion in *Tristan*] changes nothing but simply brings into the open something which already exists but has not previously been admitted" (*Richard Wagner's Music Dramas*, 51).

or transition."[40] Wagner achieved this largely through enharmonic modulation, where, for example, a D flat mutates into a C sharp, thereby smoothly, magically, changing the harmonic landscape, or rather seascape. Other devices include extensive use of non-diatonic or chromatic tones, unresolved cadences and the deceptive cadence, which is highlighted in the heart melting "glance" motif. Wagner's art of transition, of which he rightly boasted, is more than a compositional technique. The seamless and deceptive harmonic flow that Wagner miraculously achieved is a metaphysical analogue and symbol meant to produce in the listener the very experience of Eros as infinite striving, or, as Schopenhauer calls it, will.

In the words of Ernest Newman, "if ever there was an opera born of the spirit of music itself it is *Tristan and Isolde*."[41] In this work, it seems that music, through the joint efforts of Dionysus and Apollo, has congealed to form a determinate story in word and image that constantly points beyond itself to its transcendent ground and origin – to what is always already there. We do not need to infer this transcendence. It is explicated relentlessly by Wagner's lovers, who constantly provide sung metaphysical commentary on the wordless text of their love. The tone-obsessed character of *Tristan* has led some to speculate that Wagner's drama is in fact a gigantic symphonic work with words attached.[42] Nietzsche, who spoke of "the shivery and sweet infinity of *Tristan*,"[43] wondered whether a human being "would be able to perceive the third act of *Tristan and Isolde*, without any aid of word and image, purely as a tremendous symphonic movement, without expiring in a spasmodic unharnessing of all the wings of the soul."[44]

Of course, images and words are vital to Wagner's purpose and cannot be dispensed with, not just because they shield us from the destructive power of orgiastic tones but more essentially because we need the images and words, especially the words, to provide an intelligible context for the terrifying unintelligibility of Eros. To put this simply, the Beyond, represented by tones all by themselves, must reveal itself as the Beyond of something. A good example of the need for words occurs precisely at a moment when words fail. In Act 2, at the very end of his gloomy reflection, Mark asks Tristan to make clear to the world "the inscrutable, deep and mysterious ground" of his betrayal. Tristan confesses that he cannot. But before he speaks, and in direct answer to Mark's question, the potion motif, sounded only by winds, wells up darkly, as if from a tomb. The "answer" to Mark's question is in the irrational realm of tones – in the wordless uncanny reality and music of Love. But we wouldn't recognize this purely tonal response as the absolute "answer," unless someone (in this case Mark) had asked the question in words and someone else (Tristan) had said in effect: "It is beyond words."

Nietzsche's comment about the devastating emotional effect of Wagner's *Tristan* music corrects a major problem in Schopenhauer's metaphysics of music. For Schopenhauer,

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[40] Goldman and Sprinchorn, *Wagner on Music and Drama*, 212-213. "No less than *Tristan*, *Parsifal* is governed by Wagner's 'art of transition'" (Dahlhaus, *Richard Wagner's Music Dramas*, 152).

[41] Newman, *The Wagner Operas*, 196.

[42] Newman writes: "the bulk of the opera would make an organic musical whole if played through by the orchestra without the voices" (ibid., 202).

[43] F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, section 6.

[44] Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, section 21 (trans. Kaufman).

music, like all art, is a form of detached aesthetic contemplation.[45] But music also moves us, sometimes overwhelmingly. The phenomenon of being moved by music was in fact the basis of Socrates' moral-political critique of music in the *Republic*. It seems paradoxical that Schopenhauer, the philosopher of feeling and will, would short-change, of all things, feeling. But his emphasis on aesthetic contemplation and corresponding neglect of feeling in musical experience become understandable in light of what music was for this Eros-tormented philosopher: solace and momentary release from Ixion's wheel. For Wagner, the metaphysical situation is quite different. Music, for him, is emphatically the realm of feeling rather than detached contemplation (although both Wagner and Schopenhauer agree that music is to be considered as a form of cognition). As Wagner puts it, the goal of drama, which he considered "the most perfect artwork," is "the *emotionalizing of the intellect*": "in the drama we must become *knowers* through *the feeling*."[46] And harmony, the musical language of the Unconscious, surpasses Schopenhauer's beloved melody, the symbol of the rational will, because harmony is the cause of feeling in music – the source of the emotive "truth" of music.

The sharp metaphysical difference between the philosopher and the composer regarding the role of feeling in musical experience helps us to understand Wagner's intention of writing to Schopenhauer in an effort to urge him to correct his metaphysics of sexual love by allowing for the possibility of redemption *through feeling* – through love's rapture, which Wagner believed was the ultimate pacifier of the will.[47] One can only imagine what Schopenhauer's response would have been to this well-intentioned advice. I would suggest, however, in Schopenhauer's defence, that Wagner, in both his music and his theoretical writings, tends to overdo the role of feeling in music to the detriment of aesthetic contemplation, the act in which we take pleasure in the perceptive and rational aspects of music. These are stunningly present in the arias of Mozart and the polyphonic works of Bach.[48] In music, passion and perception work together. We are moved because we have perceived something, some intelligently conceived structure that is there to be heard and contemplated – whether a tonal phrase in a melody, the interplay of voices in polyphony, or a chord progression – and what we perceive moves us. If Schopenhauer is right, and on this point I think he is, then in music we are hearing tonal analogues, symbols, of that of which we ourselves are made (except that whereas Schopenhauer uses the word "will," I would use "soul," on the grounds that "soul" preserves rather than destroys human individuality and includes stable dispositions, conditions, and habits as

[45] Commenting on Schopenhauer's remark that in real life as opposed to listening to music "we are the vibrating string that is stretched and plucked," Julian Young writes: "Whatever (...) the differences between music and life, in musical experience, too, we *are* the 'vibrating string.' What leads Schopenhauer into this phenomenological mistake is, I think, his restriction of his account of the relation between music and emotion to the language of 'representation'". *The Philosophies of Richard Wagner* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2014), 82.

[46] Goldman and Sprinchorn, *Wagner on Music and Drama*, 188-89.

[47] See Borchmeyer, *Richard Wagner: Theory and Theatre*, 365-366. Wagner started his unfinished letter by telling Schopenhauer why he wanted to persuade him of the redemptive potential of sexual love: "You alone give me the material of the concepts through which my views become communicable along philosophical lines" (quoted by C. von Westernhagen in his *Wagner: A Biography*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, vol. 1, 254).

[48] In keeping with Nietzsche's criticism of "infinite melody," E. Zuckerman writes: "Wagner deprives one of the intellectual pleasures of music – a pleasure, Nietzsche might have added, for which there is no substitute in the recognition and tracing of leitmotifs" (*The First Hundred Years of Wagner's Tristan*, 78).

well as fleeting passions). Music is therefore an occasion for insight and self-knowledge. But this knowledge comes with – if not through – an emotional impact. It was this impact that Wagner, in his music dramas, was able to generate on an unprecedented scale.

This brings us to the most important respect in which Wagner and Schopenhauer part company, and to the apparent doctrinal tension within Wagner's *Tristan*. Wagner's lovers obviously do not renounce Love, as Schopenhauer would have them do. They do not go quietly into the night of asceticism but hurl themselves headlong into Love's abyss – Tristan by tearing off his bandage to expose his wound, and Isolde by rising to an orgiastic pitch before gently descending on Tristan's body, in effect closing the wound he had opened for her, the wound that was his agonizing Love. Isolde, Wagner's Irish Bacchant, throws Schopenhauerian calm to the winds when she leaps to her high G sharp on the word *Welt-Atem*, "World-Spirit." The lovers' volcanic energy supports Nietzsche's remark that Love in *Tristan* "is not to be interpreted as Schopenhauerian, but as Empedoclean."[49]

But Nietzsche's remark, though apt, is too simple. The Schopenhauerian strain of *Tristan*, Love as curse, is not to be denied or minimized. It is the emphatic subject of Act 3, and Isolde's Bacchic exultation comes on the scene only after we have been subjected to Tristan's interminable love-agony.[50] If Wagner had wanted to, he could have had the lovers die in each other's arms at the end of Act 2 "in the spirit of early romanticism."[51] But, inspired by Schopenhauer, he wanted a musical-metaphysical depiction of Eros as the sheer pain of endless longing.[52] Writing to Frau Wesendonck, Wagner gives the stark contrast between these two psychic modes – Tristan's and Isolde's – when he describes the final act of the opera as "real intermittent fever – the deepest and most unprecedented suffering and yearning, and, immediately afterward, the most unprecedented triumph and jubilation."[53] In Wagner's formulation, these extreme states are juxtaposed but not connected. At least one commentator regards this fact as pointing to the philosophic incoherence of Wagner's drama.[54] Whether or not this is true, from a dramatic and experiential standpoint, Isolde's transfiguration music in B major, though decidedly not Schopenhaurian, satisfies, and, as we have seen, it harmonically completes the opening A minor phrase of the opera.[55] Through its soaring beauty and evocation of the sea's sublime power, Isolde's Dionysian

[49] Quoted in Borchmeyer, *Richard Wagner: Theory and Theatre*, 366. Empedocles was the Sicilian philosopher who leaped into Mt. Etna in order to prove that he was a god.

[50] At an early stage of his work on Tristan, Wagner had contemplated having Parsifal visit the Love-tormented Tristan in order to charm away his suffering with a strain of magical music.

[51] M. Geck, *Richard Wagner: A Life in Music* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 239: "[Wagner] needed the third act to articulate his thoughts on the 'curse of love' to which he refers in one of his sketches for the later libretto."

[52] On this point, see M. Geck, who cites Ernst Bloch's opinion that Isolde's "beatific transfiguration" is nothing more than "a concession to the world of the theater" (ibidem). According to Geck, Wagner started out intending to write a monument to the love-happiness he confessed to Liszt he had never experienced and only later decided to dwell on love's extreme torment (ibid., 233).

[53] Ibid., 240.

[54] "...although *Tristan and Isolde* cannot be salvaged as a coherent philosophical work, we are under no obligation to rescue it in this way. Unlike the *Ring*, the fascination it exudes rests not on the depiction of a baleful system but on an underlying message we would do best not to examine too closely" (ibid., 244).

[55] Newman says something similar about the concert version of *Tristan*: "The selection from *Tristan* known in the concert room as the Prelude and Liebestod (...) makes an admirably rounded whole, musically and psychologically" (*The Wagner Operas*, 204).

swan song offers emotional relief from the haunted and broken Tristan music that came before. Who would want a more logically consistent but less musically gorgeous *Tristan and Isolde*? The opera is unimaginable without precisely the ending that Wagner gave it.

ONE LITTLE WORD

What does Eros want? Isolde thinks she knows. In the lover's duet in Act 2, Isolde is the first to make explicit that love's τέλος is the destruction of the "little word" *and*, which both joins and separates the lovers as individuals. Tristan and Isolde seek an intimacy more radical than mere being-with or even eternal intertwining – like that of the ivy and the vine that were said to have sprouted over the lovers' shared tomb. Love seeks the total merging of the lovers' separate selves, a merging that spells the death of the lovers as individual beings. In Act 2 Tristan and Isolde exchange each other's names and identities. Music, in its spirituality, its tonal defiance and transgression of spatial boundaries, allows the lovers' voices to do what their bodies cannot: merge in a musical-erotic unity. Erotic love seeks the sweet dissolution of the self, the loss of self in other and other in self: "No more Isolde!" "No more Tristan!" Love's desire is to negate and destroy individuality, to de-create. Eros unbound, on this view, is the ultimate nihilist.

The lovers' desire for the destruction of the little word "and" – which is equivalent to the desire for the destruction of the whole world – lays bare the gnostic underpinning of the worldviews of both Schopenhauer and Wagner.[56] Gnosticism, familiar to us from the Manichean moments of Augustine's *Confessions*, posits a strict dualism between Good and Evil. According to gnostic teaching, the world of determinate things, the realm of body, is evil. It is the arena of selfishness, greed, envy, love of wealth and honour, competition, hatred, war, and lies. It is also the realm of suffering, in particular erotic suffering. The underlying cause of all this evil is, as we have seen in the discussion of Schopenhauer, *the principle of individuation* – the bodily world's haecceity or this-ness. Night is good – indeed, it is "chaste" or virginal – because it cancels all determinateness, erases all boundaries, and drowns all distinctions in the warmth of undifferentiated feeling. Night – which the poet Novalis called "the holy, the unspeakable, the secretive Night"[57] – is a metaphysical embrace and return to the womblike origin of all things. Whereas Day divides, Night unites.

The paradox to which the gnostic metaphysics of love gives rise is that to love another erotically is to will the destruction not only of myself but also of the beloved, on whom my love feeds. I cannot, strictly speaking, rejoice in the beloved's being any more than in my own, since all bodily being is determinate and as such inherently evil. From Schopenhauer's perspective, the matter is simple: when lovers adore each other's identities, it is only because they are deluded, not because they have perceived anything intrinsically lovable or true. But for Wagner, erotic love, though dreamy, is the basis of mystic revelations or rather a call to mystic union in Death. It is the ultimate enlightenment

[56] According to de Rougemont, Gnosticism is inherent in Gottfried's original tale: "*Tristan* is far more profoundly and indisputably Manichean than the *Divine Comedy* is Thomist" (*Love in the Western World*, 135). For a full discussion of Gnosticism, see H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958). Especially interesting is the Epilogue: *Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism*.

[57] Novalis, *Hymns to the Night*, 1.

(for Isolde, if not for Tristan). The coveted dissolution of identity, Love's voluptuous death wish, makes us wonder what Tristan and Isolde's Love is love of. It seems that it is not love of the beloved, at least not primarily, but the love of Love, passion for the sake of passion, which de Rougemont argues is inscribed in the Tristan myth itself.[58] This view takes us to the infernal realm of Dante's Francesca, who is far more consumed with the love of Love than love for her adulterous lover, Paolo.[59] In the purely subjective world of Love as passion, the beloved is no more than grist for the mill of self-feeling and "a great opportunity to be no longer I."

But on what grounds would we conclude that individuality and determinateness are evil, that limits, boundaries, and distances are evil, and that feeling surpasses thinking as Night eclipses Day? Does it not seem more reasonable, not just healthier, to believe that goodness consists in good order, in a cosmos rather than an abyss? Is the look of Love, the glance, not inspired by the beloved's determinate *form*, which begets the desire for a keener vision, as it does for Dante in his relation to Beatrice? How could I ever want this inspiring, radiant individuality to go away, to die? And yet how could I want to preserve it without regarding the "distance" between lover and beloved as in some way good?

Listening to Wagner's *Tristan and Isolde* is a ravishing and, I believe, important human experience. The opera contains music of incredible beauty and power, especially in its richly textured harmonies. To listen to this music, quite apart from seeing a production, is to be under a spell and to imbibe Wagner's all-too-effective tone-potion. We listen at our peril, for in listening we are the voluptuous music of death-bound Eros. The musical potion that is *Tristan* contains much truth, terrible truth, about erotic passion. But it also serves as a warning. It prompts us to search for an antidote to the lovers' death wish and the nihilism it embodies – to pursue a love that preserves rather than destroys, celebrates rather than abolishes individuality, and seeks life rather than death, clarity rather warmth alone, wakefulness rather than sleep, and reconciliation with the external world, which mixes great evil with great good.

[58] "Tristan did not love Iseult for herself, but only on account of the love of Love of which her beauty gave him the image. He, however, did not know this, and his passion was naïve and strong" (*Love in the Western World*, 223). "Tristan is not in love with Iseult, but with love itself... [Iseult] is but a lovely pretext" (ibid., 309) "Let us remember, however, that the passion of love is at bottom narcissism, the lovers' self-magnification, far more than it is a relation with the beloved" (ibid., 260). See also Zuckerman on this point: "The lovers, in short, are in love not with each other but with love itself. Their quest is not for transitory fulfillment but for the obstacles that prolong passion – ultimately for the final obstacle, death, which is paradoxically the only permanent fulfillment" (ibid., 24).

[59] D. Alighieri, *Inferno*, V. Tristan is among the "carnal sinners who subjected reason to desire" (line 39).

Richard Kearney

NARRATIVE IMAGINATION AND CATHARSIS

How are we to "interpret" psychic traumas which seem to defy meaning and language? Traumatic wounds are by definition unspeakable. Yet from the earliest of literatures, we find tales of primal trauma which testify to a certain catharsis through storytelling and touch. And we witness a special role played in such tales by figures called "wounded healers".

By way of exploring the cathartic paradox of *telling the untellable*, I will look at some examples drawn from both classical mythology and contemporary literature (including Freudian psychoanalysis, Joycean fiction and Holocaust testimony).

My basic hypothesis is this: while traumatic wounds cannot be *cured,* they may at times be *healed* – and such healing may take place through a twin therapy of 1) narrative catharsis and 2) carnal working through. In short, healing by word and touch. A double transformation of incurable wounds into healable scars.

PART ONE: ORIGINARY STORIES OF WOUNDING

I begin with three tales of wounded healers – Odysseus, Oedipus and Chiron.

ODYSSEUS

In Homer's great epic, the hero Odysseus is condemned to act out the wound of his own inherited failure, his own existential finitude, again and again. The name Odysseus means "bearer of pain", and we learn during the course of the poem that he is carrying wounds both suffered and inflicted by his forebears. Indeed, the ultimate act of recognition when Odysseus returns to Ithaca coincides with the exposure of his childhood scar, identified by his nurse Euryclea.

The poem begins with Odysseus absenting himself from the wounds of his birth and upbringing, his autochthonous origins in Ithaca, sailing off to heroic glory. But his attempts to become an immortal warrior are constantly thwarted by reminders of his mortality (the brutal carnage of Troy and subsequent calamities and failures). The decisive rupture of the lure of Calypso is central to this disillusionment – Odysseus chooses earthly nourishment over godly ambrosia.

Originally leaving Ithaca as an aspirant hero, Ulysses returns as a beggar: a lowly outcast finally recognized by the smell of his flesh (by his dog, Argus) and the touch of a scar on his thigh (by his nurse, Euryclea). It is significant that Euryclea only touches her master's scar after a very detailed narrative about how Ulysses received the original

wound in a childhood hunting incident with his grandfather, Autolycus (bk 19, v 393-469) – a typical example of transgenerational trauma.[1] The narrative "working through" leading up to the Euryclea's touch, takes all of seventy seven lines. The climactic moment of "recognition" (ἀναγνώρισις), in short, takes the form of a double catharsis of *narrativity* and *tactility.* The hero comes to final self-knowledge by both acknowledging and embodying the story of his own primal wounding.

Telemachus, expecting a return of a triumphant victor, does not at first recognize his own father. He is so fixated on his great expectations of the *pater familias* that he does not see the wound on his body. The son is blinded by illusory imagos, and delusions abound until he finally acknowledges, sharing food in a swineherd's (Eumaeus') hut, that the mortified stranger before him is in fact his *real* father. Tasting simple fruits of the earth is how they finally come together as host and guest. Hospitality as antidote to the hostile curse of fate (ἄτη).

The word Homer uses for "scar" in this final recognition episode is οὐλή (*Odyssey*, 19.391). It is a term often associated in Greek literature with "trauma", as in Plato's *Gorgias*, 524c, οὐλὰς ἐν τῷ σώματι (...) ὑπὸ τραυμάτων, where οὐλή means both "trace" and "scar". While the wound is timeless, the scar appears in time: it is a carnal trace which can change and alter over time though it never disappears. Scars are written on the body; they are forms of proto-writing. And narrative catharsis is a process of working through such carnal traces. Put simply: while wounds remain timeless and non-representable, scars are the marks left on the flesh to be seen and touched, told and read. Scars are engraved wounds that may, or may not, be healed.[2]

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[1] Speaking of transgenerational trauma in the *Odyssey,* there is also the trauma of the son – Telemachus. In addition to the childhood wound at his father's premature departure and mother's subsequent obsession with Odysseus' absence, there are several accounts of the child Telemachus being subjected to a terrifying death experience. According to Hyginus, Palamedes (a friend of Odysseus) "put the baby Telemachus in front of his father's ploughshare (...) to expose Odysseus' pretended madness." But there are further allusions to patricide and infanticide in the story, told by Eugammon of Cyrene in the epic *Telegoneia*, which describe Telemachus being "killed unwittingly by Telegonus, Odysseus' son by Circe". Telemachus' traumatic wounds, like those of his father, remain, however, largely hidden and uncovered – alluded to rather than exposed. The father-son cycle of patricide-infanticide clearly finds echoes in the later Oedipus cycle, as we shall see below.

[2] E. Auerbach, "The Scar of Odysseus", in *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003). Odysseus' name, given by his grand father, Autolycus, means "son of pain". It comes from the fact that his grandfather was a bringer of great pain to many whom he plundered and robbed – in collusion with Hermes, the "partner of his crimes". Odysseus himself is both a bringer of pain to others (the Trojans) and a witness of great pain himself (the death of his friends and his own exile and homesickness). The fact that the name Odysseus is given in the middle voice carries this double sense of being both a receiver and giver of pain. It is only when the secret scar on his thigh (which even Athena could not disguise) is revealed by Euryclea (Book 19, 455-527), that the secret story of his name and his childhood wounding is also finally disclosed, the scar serving as a trace of repressed (and repetitively acted out) wounds which have informed Odysseus' life from childhood to old age and which are only disclosed in the last act. In addition to Auerbach's seminal essay on the subject, one might also note here the pioneering research on hermeneutic meanings of wounds and scars by S. Rambo, "Refiguring Wounds in the Afterlife of Trauma", in *Carnal Hermeneutics*, ed. R. Kearney, B. Treanor (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015) and K. MacKendrick, *Word Made Flesh: Figuring Language at the Surface of Skin* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004). See also our examples of writing the flesh in our discussion of carnal hermeneutics (Queequeg's tattoos, stone and skin hieroglyphics etc.) – in "What is Diacritical Hermeneutics?", *Journal of Applied Hermeneutics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011 and in *Carnal Hermeneutics*, ed. R. Kearney, B. Treanor, New York: Fordham University Press, 2015. For some more explicitly therapeutic analyses of scaring (including self-cutting) as a form of bodily proto-writing see G. Staker, "Signing with a Scar: Understanding

What I am suggesting – following Aristotle's notion of μῦθος-μίμησις in the *Poetics* – is that certain kinds of narrative may bring about a catharsis of our most basic passions, through a "purgation of pity and fear". But such healing must be understood in a very specific manner – not as facile closure or completion but as open-ended story: namely, as a storytelling which forever fails to *cure* trauma but never fails to try to *heal* it. As Samuel Beckett's unnamable narrator puts it: "I can't go on, I'll go on". And in the very effort to narrate the unnarratable there is, curiously, not only therapeutic caring but pleasure: the pleasurable purgation *of* pity and fear *by* pity and fear.[3] More precisely, we interpret the role of narrative catharsis here as a twofold transformation of passions (παθήματα) – namely, the distilling of i) pathological pity (ἔλεος) into compassion and ii) of pathological fear (φόβος) into serenity. Compassion spells a proper way of being "near" to pain; serenity – a proper way of remaining "far" from it (keeping a healthy distance, as we say, lest we over-identify or fuse with the other's pain). Catharsis, according to Aristotle, makes for healthy citizens. Purged emotions lead to practical wisdom.

OEDIPUS

Now to my second story – Oedipus. It has been noted by Lévi-Strauss and others that the proper names for Oedipus and his patrilinear ancestors all refer to "wounds" which cause difficulty in walking: Labdacus ("lame"), Laius ("left-sided"), Oedipus ("swollenfooted"). Each of these figures acts out the crimes and wounds of a previous generation: Laios raped the son of his host, Pelops, thereby committing the equivalent of incest and the betrayal of hospitality. His double transgression replicates the curse (*ate*) of his own father, Labdacus, and is repeated by Oedipus in the next generation. This fatal trans-generational lineage comes under the heading of the "House of Labdacus" and involves a recurring acting out of unspoken τραύματα ("wounds").

This recurrence of trauma (inflicted or suffered) takes place over three generations and the only solution to this curse of cyclical repetition is, it appears, the conversion of the untold wound into a form of enacted storytelling – in this case, the symbolic emplotment of Oedipus's tragic narrative. Only this, according to Lévi-Strauss, can effect a cathartic transformation of passions which suspends the compulsive acting out of trauma. The basic thesis, in sum, is that myths are machines for the purging of wounds: strategies for resolving at a *symbolic* level what remains irresolvable at the level of lived experience. (Oedipus' self-blinding at his own hands is another aspect of wounding-into-wisdom, as the blind healer, Tiresias, also reminds us. The double sense of *blesser* as blessing and wounding captures this).

Self-Harm" (*The International Journal of Relational Perspectives*, Vol. 16, 2006) and S. Pizer, "Catharsis and Peripeteia. Considering Kearney and the Healing Functions of Narrative", in: *In the Wake of Trauma: Psychology and Philosophy for the Suffering Other*, ed. E. Severson., B. Becker, D. M. Goodman (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press: 2013).

[3] See our development of this Aristotelian theory of catharsis in R. Kearney, "Narrating Pain: The Power of Catharsis", ed. R. Bégin, L. Roy, in *Figures de La violence*, *Collections Esthétiques* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012); and "Writing Trauma: Homer, Shakespeare Joyce", *Giornale di Metafisica*, 2014 and in *Making Sense: Beauty, Creativity and Healing*, ed. B. Lee, N. Olson and T. Duffy (New York: Peter Lang, 2015).

Let me briefly unpack Levi-Strauss's argument. Human existence is cursed by a tragic, because impossible, desire to escape the trauma of our autochthonous origins. Namely, the desire to buck our finitude – to deny death (as Levinas puts it, "*l'existence est notre traumatisme originel*"). In the Oedipus cycle, this tragic curse is epitomized, as noted, by the patrilinear names for wounds that bind us to the earth. And the poetic role of μῦθος-μίμησις – which comprises drama for Aristotle – is to express both our heroic desire to transcend our terrestrial nature *and* our mortal inability to do so! The effort to surmount our earthly finitude is repeatedly acted out in the struggle with monsters: Cadmus kills the dragon, Oedipus defeats the Sphinx. But these attempts to overcome mortality are ultimately *impossible* for we are scarred by irreconcilable fidelities: to both earth and sky, to immanence and transcendence, matter and spirit, nature and culture. So for Lévi-Strauss, great mythic narratives – beginning with the synchronic myths of *la pensée sauvage* – are attempts to procure cathartic relief by balancing these binary opposites in symbolic constellations or "mythemes". In a word: what is impossible in reality becomes possible in fiction.[4]

Let's return to the plot. Oedipus comes to a recognition of his traumatic finitude – and the transgenerational crimes of his forebears – through a series of woundings culminating in the removal of his eyes. This ultimately leads, not to curing (that is impossible, the eyes are gone forever), but to a certain cathartic healing through i) a new kind of vision (he sees differently), a new kind of touching (as he is lead by the hand of Antigone), and a new kind of speaking: his final words at Colonus where he accepts his estranged outsider status as a mortal human. Oedipus' wound has finally become a scar, a witness for later generations. His empty tomb serves as a talisman for Athens.

(Apropos of Oedipus's wounding-into-wisdom, we might also recall here that those who reminded Odysseus of his errant wandering and called him back to Ithaca were the blind Tiresis and the ghost of his dead mother. Those were two wounded healers who guided Odysseus home to be healed by the *touch* and *testimony* of Euryclea – the nursemaid who bathed his childhood scar and recounted the origin of his wound).

CHIRON

Odysseus and Oedipus recall a whole series of other wounded healers in Greek mythology, from Tiresias and Cassandra to Philoctetes and Chiron. I will confine myself here to the last of these – Chiron – a figure who, I believe, most powerfully represents a primal hermeneutics of wounding.

Chiron was a demi-god and a centaur, half-man and half-horse. He was the son of the Titan, Chronus (Saturn) and the love-nymph, Philyra, and was wounded by Heracles during a boar hunt when a poisoned arrow pierced his leg and it would not heal. Though Chiron could not cure himself, he found that he could cure others and became known as

[4] See C. Lévi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth" and related essays on the therapeutic power of stories, "The Effectiveness of Symbols" and "The Sorcerer and His Magic", in *Structural Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1963). See our commentary on this discussion of the cathartic potential of oral, written and cinematic narratives (in myths, novels and holocaust testimonies) in R. Kearney parts 1-2 and 4 of *On Stories* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-76 and 125-156.

a wise and compassionate healer. Those who came to visit him in his underground cave found understanding and compassion. In his wounded presence they felt more whole and well, which is why they called him "the wounded healer."[5] Because his wound was incurable, and unbearably painful, Chiron voluntarily relinquished his immortality and underwent death, eventually being assigned a place among the stars as the constellation Centaurus.

Very importantly, Chiron became the teacher of Asclepius, one of the two founders of Western medicine, the other being Hippocrates. Chiron, who dwelt in a cave, taught Asclepius the art of healing through a) touch (Chiron means hand, χείρ, or more precisely, skilled with the hands, the word χειρουργός means surgeon), and b) song (Chiron used music along with healing herbs from the earth and induced dreams). By contrast, Hippocrates, the other patron of Western medicine, followed the way of Zeus, Chiron's brother, who dwelt on Mount Olympus and promoted a method of superintendence and control. In short, while Asclepius promoted *healing* through carnal nature and nocturnal dreaming from below, Hippocrates promoted c*uring* through inspection and intervention from above. The former worked through taste, touch and fantasy; the latter through cognitive management.

There are further things to be noted about Chiron. As a hybrid of human and animal form, he is a half-creature who reconnects with our deeper unconscious feelings and earth belonging. As son of not only Chronus (saturnine melancholy) but Philyra (love), Chiron suggests another approach to the compulsive and often violent repetitions of "chronological" time – he prefers an art of loving care, inherited from his mother of that name (φιλία*)*. And this opens up to another kind of time, a time after time, *après-coup*, *nachträglich* – a healing repetition not backward but forward, which permits a break from cyclical recurrence and a release into the future.

Unlike his brother Zeus who continues the periodic blood cycle of father-son castration (Chronus castrates his father Uranus, Zeus castrates his father Chronus), Chiron chooses a different route. He puts an end to the compulsive repetition of patricidal castration, giving birth instead to a daughter, Hygieia, a priestess of healing (whence our word, hygiene).

And what is more, in renouncing the vicious cycle of father-son violence, Chiron assumes the wound into his *own* body. Instead of acting it out violently and compulsively on others, he turns it into a power of empathic healing through touch, taste and song. (Indeed in Ovid's version it is Chiron who takes the arrow from another wounded centaur and drops it onto his own foot: a typical gesture of self-sacrifice). Pindar praises him accordingly

[5] M. Kearney, *Mortally Wounded: Stories of Soul Pain, Death and Healing* (New Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2007). See also the author's insightful development of the notion of the wounded healer in subsequent books such as *A Place of Healing: Working with Nature and Soul at the End* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and *The Nest in the Stream*: *How to Be with your Pain* (forthcoming). One might also mention here the pioneering work of two other physicians, R. Charon, *Narrative Medicine: Honoring the Stories of Illness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); co-editor of *Stories Matter: The Role of Narrative in Medical Ethics* (New York, London: Routledge, 2002); and co-editor of *Psychoanalysis and Narrative Medicine* (New York: State University of New York, 2008); and R. Coles, *The Call of Stories: Teaching and the Moral Imagination* (Boston: Houghton, 1990).

as wise hearted Chiron who taught Asclepius the soft-fingered skills of medicine's lore (*Neman Ode* 3.52 ff.). And Homer has Eurypylus address Patroclus as follows: "Cut the arrow out of my thigh (...) and put kind medicines on it, good ones, which they say you have been told of by Achilles since Chiron, most righteous of the Centaurs, told him about them" (*Illiad* 11.832, trans. Lattimore). Indeed it is curious that the Homeric Odysseus, like Chiron, receives his wound in a childhood boar hunt.

So where is narrative catharsis in all this? I think it is telling that a key ingredient in Chironic healing involves dream stories – visions invigilated by Oneiros and Hypnos – as well as dramatic retelling (the ancient Aesclepian site of Epidaurus is renowned for its famous theatre).

In his book, *The Wounded Healer,* Dr Michael Kearney, a pioneer of palliative care medicine in Britain and Ireland, contrasts the Asclepian tradition of healing with the Hippocratic. The former was inspired by Chiron who worked in a cave under the ground and practiced earth wisdom. The latter, took its tune from Zeus and the Olympian gods and prescribed pain control strategies – that is, means of identifying (diagnosing) and seeking and destroying (treating) the disease, using evidence-based practice. It is this heroic model of outsmarting and subduing the enemy that prevails in modern Western Medicine and is, of course, very successful. It is effective in curing disease, lessening suffering, and improving quality of life in chronic and terminal illnesses with pharmo-chemical intervention. And it has often proved a good match for physicians' own natural pain phobia, allowing the doctor to come close to patients who are suffering, while remaining safe behind the protective barrier of a white coat, stethoscope, and professional persona. The result of a successful therapeutic encounter, on this standard medical account, is relief all around; a lessening of the physician's pain along with that of the patient.[6]

However, the heroic-Hippocratic model does not address all kinds of pain or tell the whole story. Pain control only works when the pain can be managed by our interventions. Something else is also required in the face of uncontrollable malaise. And here we may look to Asclepius and Hygieia. A different way of understanding suffering and of responding to it.

The Asclepian approach suggests that even though the healer cannot completely control the pain and grief of dying, one can choose to be with and hold that pain. With self-knowledge and mindfulness healers can learn to recognize the pattern of what happens when one hits the limits of what one can do in the face of suffering. One can choose to stay with one's own distress as a way of staying with the other in their suffering. The mutual abiding with suffering becomes a form of shared witness – a bi-lateral healing beyond uni-lateral curing.

Drawing on the story of Chiron, the author writes: "The wounded healer is one who holds her own pain while staying present to the other in theirs, knowing that this, more than anything else he or she may do, is what awakens the inner healer in the other. The wounded healer is one who knows that even when there is nothing left to do, we

[6] Kearney, *Mortally Wounded.*

still have choice (...) we each carry a potential for healing within us (...) our woundedness being the very ground from which the green shoot of healing emerges (...) The more we can be with our own pain, the more we can be with others in theirs. This encourages the other to stay with their own suffering, which is where they need to be if they are to experience healing."[7]

With the path of the wounded healer one finds, so to speak, a second leg to stand on. There is a different therapeutic model at play. "When we are no longer confined to the heroic medical model, we are no longer trapped in a power-down, one-way dynamic of the expert responding to the one needing expertise. Doctor and patient now meet as two human beings, both of whom are wounded and both of whom carry an innate potential for healing within. It is precisely this recognition of our mutual humanity, combined with the capacity to stay with our own suffering that releases this potential. While we suffer alongside the patient on this path, we may also experience the freshness of being, the peace of mind, and the sense of meaning that are the hallmarks of arriving in a place of healing."[8] Other therapists, like Françoise Davoine, observe a similar Asclepian practice with the notion that "trauma speaks to trauma". By sharing one's own pain with one's patient in an exchange of narratives, one allows for a certain reciprocity of healing – another way of listening and speaking.[9] And I would suggest that the shared witnessing of pain in Twelve Step programs is yet another powerful example of Asclepian healing through the exchange of words and wounds.

The poet Rumi, already acknowledged this way of the wounded healer when he wrote, "Don't turn your head. Keep looking at the bandaged place. That's where the light enters you." Or as another poet, Leonard Cohen, puts it,

> Ring the bells that still can ring
> Forget your perfect offering
> There is a crack, a crack in everything
> That's how the light gets in.

I hasten to add that the model of the wounded healer is by no means confined to the Greeks. The biblical tradition also features stories of such figures, from Jacob and Jesus to Francis of Assisi and Padre Pio. Jacob, we recall from *Genesis*, was wounded at the hip while wrestling with a dark stranger at night; and only thus wounded could he receive the sacred name of Israel and be reconciled with his estranged rival, Esau, next day. Likewise Christ is, for Christians, a salvific wounded healer whose crucified and risen body was to become an emblem of healing for centuries – with many subsequent wounded healer madonnas and saints, from the heart-pierced Mater Dolorosa to stigmata-bearing Saints who could heal others though they could not heal themselves. Think here of Francis of Assisi's bleeding hands and eyes or John of the Cross's invocation of the "wounded stag"

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] For more on this notion of "trauma speaking to trauma" and "suffering alongside," see F. Davoine and J.-M. Gaudilliere, *History Beyond Trauma* (New York: The Other Press, 2014) and Pizer, "Catharsis and Peripeteia".

in his *Spiritual Canticles*. Indeed it is curious how the Christian tradition has variously interpreted the wounds of Christ's body, some proclaiming it a blemish that would be removed in the Glorious Mystical Body in the Kingdom (see Shelly Rambo's work on Calvin and Gregory of Nyssa).[10] Even Hegel claimed that Absolute Spirit has no scars. On the other hand, many have insisted that the blessed wound/*blessure* was a positive feature of the Christian message (see Caravaggio's painting of Thomas touching Jesus' wound). Though, it must be said, the celebration of woundedness could sometimes veer to cultic extremes of sado-masochistic excess as in the Spanish Baroque and counter-Reformation).

But that is a discussion for another paper. For now suffice it to say that Christ, like Chiron, willingly abandoned immortality in order to assume the wounds of others into his body, thereby offering himself as a sacrificial healer for mortals. Christ healed the sick both haptically and narratively – he touched wounds and told stories (parables) – and invited others to repeat this double act after him.

PART TWO – MODERN STORIES OF WOUNDED HEALERS

FREUD: TRAUMA AND TRANSFERENCE

Many modern psychologists have supported Lévi-Strauss' claim that the cathartic function of myth is by no means confined to "primitive" societies but continues to operate in the human psyche today. Examining the depth structures of mythic stories, both Maria Louise Von Franz and Bruno Bettelheim make the point that folklore and fairy tales can serve to heal deep psychic wounds by allowing trauma victims or other disturbed persons find expression for inhibited feelings.[11] Myths enable us to experience certain otherwise "inexperienced experiences" – that is, events that were too painful to be properly registered at the time but which can, *après coup*, be allowed into expression indirectly, fictionally, "as if" they were happening. Thus good and evil mothers, for example, in famous folk tales allow for the symbolic articulation of children's deeply ambivalent attitudes towards their own mothers (*good* fairy godmother because loving, nourishing, present/*wicked* witch or foster mother because controlling, punishing, absent). And the same goes for surrogate fathers (as benign protectors or malign castrators).

Freud had, of course, already alluded to this phenomenon of child fantasy in his famous account of the *fort*/*da* scenario. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, he recounts how one day he witnessed his grandchild struggle with the painful absence of its mother. The infant, Ernst, managed to overcome its acute anxiety at the departure of his mother by playing a game of symbolic naming – *there*/*here* – as it cast a cotton reel into his cot and then pulled it back again. So doing, it was, Freud observed, fictionally imitating the otherwise intolerable comings and goings of the mother. Freud recognised this primal scene of symbolic play as the shortest story ever told – one which brought about a basic sense of

[10] Rambo, "Refiguring Wounds in the Afterlife of Trauma".

[11] B. Bettelheim, *The Uses of Enchantment: The Meaning and Uses of Fairytales* (Knopf: New York, 1971). M. L. Von Franz, *Interpretation of Fairytales* (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1987).

catharsis which appeased the child. What remained unbearable at the level of reality (the separation from the mother) was resolved, at least momentarily, in the playacting with the cotton reel and the words of make-belief *fort/da*. Imagining that the game of words was imitating the game of life, the child performed its first therapeutic feat of "let's pretend!" It created a fantasy self that healed the wounds of the real self.

Now my question is this: might not Freud have recognized his own unbearable separation anxiety in his grandson's little "trauma" at his parents' absence (mother away, father at war). And might he not also have recognized the power of words to "work through" wounds? *Working through* as *talking through?* When Freud wrote of his grandson's loss of his mother was he not also writing about his *own* loss of his own daughter, Ernst's mother, Sophie Freud? Sophie was Freud's favorite daughter who died tragically in January, 1920. Several months later Freud, devastated by the loss, wrote the *fort/da* scene. This scene, incidentally, was inserted in the book's narrative quite abruptly after Freud's initial outline of a series of examples of WWI trauma. And this interpolation of a "little trauma" – separation from a loved one – into Freud's seminal account of "Big Trauma" – unspeakable violence at war – opens up, I believe, the whole conversation about relations between ordinary and extraordinary trauma[12] (a topic we cannot go into here).

My suggestion for now is that the mirror play of Sophie Freud's "disappearance" – enacted between her father (Freud) and her son (Ernst) – is a micro-drama of transgenerational trauma (with a small "t"). It signals a crossing of identifications where Freud is at once Sophie's father and son, "writing the book of himself," as Joyce put it, so as to mourn a departed loved one (a lost object). In other words, Freud is acting here as a modern Chiron endeavoring to turn melancholy into mourning. A further example of "trauma speaking to trauma" and by extension, trauma listening to trauma. Indeed, it is interesting that some of the most important modern pioneers of trauma therapy were themselves victims of war traumatisms – Bruno Bettleheim, Victor Frankl, Dori Laub, and Francoise Davoine. All four survived violence and went on to help others speak their unspeakable wounds into healable scars. And something similar might be said of Emmanuel Levinas, who lost most of his family in the Holocaust before going on to compose his path-breaking philosophy of human relations with the Other as a response to "un traumatisme originel". Each, in his/her own way, was a wounded healer.

JOYCE: WRITING TRAUMA INTO FICTION

Many writers are also wounded healers. In the case of Joyce, we find someone, I have argued elsewhere, who wrote books in order to transform personal and collective trauma into art. The personal traumas related to the death of Joyce's young brother (alluded to in the first of his famous "Epiphanies") and a brutal mugging in Dublin in 1904. The collective trauma related primarily, I believe, to the Irish famine. When Joyce visited Carl

[12] I develop this reading of Freud on trauma in "Writing Trauma: Narrative Catharsis in Homer, Shakespeare and Joyce", in *Making Sense: Beauty, Creativity and Healing*, ed. B. Lee, N. Olson and T. P. Duffy (New York: Peter Lang Press, 2015).

Jung in Zurich – hoping he would cure his daughter, Lucea – Jung replied that he could not cure Lucea's madness and that Joyce had only managed to cure his own by writing *Ulysses*! In short, Joyce is Stephen Dedalus "writing the book of himself" in order to save himself from melancholy.

Let me say a brief word about the mugging at the root of *Ulysses*. In a letter to his brother Stanislaus on November 13, 1906, Joyce announced that he had just begun a new "short story." It was called *Ulysses*. He came up with the idea, he explained, because of a memory triggered by a recent mugging in a street in Rome. He had just been fired from his job at the Nast-Kolb Schumacher bank, and drunk all his severance pay (which should have paid the rent and help provide for his one year old son, Giorgio). On his way home Joyce was robbed and left lying in the gutter, destitute, despondent and bleeding. And it was at that very moment that he suddenly remembered something: being assaulted several years previously (June 22, 1904) in Dublin and rescued from the gutter by a man called Hunter, "a cuckolded Jew" who dusted him down and took him home for a cup of cocoa – "in true Samaritan fashion," as Joyce put it. This repetition of woundings triggered a lost memory where an immigrant Jew came to the rescue of a wounded Dubliner and planted a seed of caritas in his imagination.

Several weeks after the Rome mugging, Joyce and Nora were given tickets to an opera whose librettist was called Blum. This second moment of happenstance, after his humiliating fall in a Roman alleyway, furnished the name of his paternal protagonist, Leopold Bloom. Thus was born the longest short story ever told – *Ulysses.* The tale of a father (Bloom) and a son (Stephen) traversing wounds on the way to healing.

In a pivotal scene in the National Library, at the heart of *Ulysses*, Stephen expounds his central theory of the father/son idea in *Hamlet*. His thesis is that Shakespeare wrote *Hamlet* the year his son, Hamnet, died and his own father, John Shakespeare, was dying. The play, he argues, is about the transmission of mortal trauma between fathers and sons. In short, according to Stephen, Shakespeare wrote "the book of himself" in order to avoid the madness of melancholy, that is, in order to properly mourn his father and his son in a way that he was unable to do in real life. The play itself thus serves as a symbolic "working through" of an otherwise irresoluble crisis in which a father (King Hamlet) commands his son (Prince Hamlet) to do something impossible: that is, to remember what cannot be remembered! To tell something that cannot be told. A double injunction. An unbearable burden. An impossible story. The double bind of trauma: "To speak is impossible, not to speak is impossible."[13]

[13] S. Weitz cited by C. Caruth, "Recapturing the Past: Introduction", in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. C. Caruth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 154. On this double injunction to tell and not tell trauma, see also our chapter, "Hamlet's Ghosts: From Shakespeare to Joyce", in R. Kearney, *Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness* (London: Routledge, 2003), 141-162. On Joyce's 1906 letter to his brother, Stanislaus, about the Bloom/Hunter connection, see R. Ellmann, "Ulysses: A Short Story", in R. Ellmann, *James Joyce: A Biography* (Harmondsworth: Penguin-The Bodley Head, 1968), 705 f. and G. Melchiori, "The Genesis of Ulysses", in *Joyce in Rome*, ed. G. Melchiori (Roma: Bulzoni, 1984), 37 ff. On the *Ulysses/Hamlet* connection see D. Kiberd, *Ulysses: Annotated Student's Edition* (London-New York: Penguin, 1992), 1013 and his *Ulysses and US* (London: Faber, 2009). Kiberd argues that just as Joyce sought to become his own father by writing *Ulysses*, so, too, Shakespeare sought to become his own father (as Ghost) of his literary son (Prince Hamlet). He also notes

Remember me, remember me...

says the ghostly father to his son, while at the same time adding:

But that I am forbid
To tell the secrets of my prison house
I could a tale unfold whose lightest word
Would harrow up thy soul...[14]

The ghost's unspeakable secrets -for which he is condemned to the latency of purgatory, those "sulphurous and tormenting flames"[15] – these very things are precisely what *remains* secret. The secret "crimes committed in his days of nature' (youth) are, King Hamlet tells us, *forbidden* tales. In short, the things to be remembered cannot be told in the first place! We are concerned here, I suggest, with traumas. Unspeakable things which we do not possess but which "possess us" – like specters. For traumas, as Cathy Caruth writes, describe "overwhelming experiences of sudden, or catastrophic events, in which the response to the event occurs in the often delayed, and uncontrolled repetitive occurrence of hallucinations and other intrusive phenomena."[16] I think Hamlet perfectly qualifies.

My suggestion is that Joyce offers a literary correlative for Freud's therapeutic narrative of *fort/da*. The longest short story ever told (*Ulysses*) echoing the shortest (gone/back again)![17] Joyce admitted that he wrote much of his fiction when he was "Jung and

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the revealing fact that Shakespeare's son Hamnet was eleven when he died and Bloom recalls in his final bedtime reverie that it was almost eleven years since his son, Rudy, had died. On Stephen Dedalus' theory of *Hamlet* see also R. Girard, "Croyez-vous vous-même à votre théorie?", in *Shakespeare: les feux de l'envie* (Paris: Grasset 1990), 313-330 and H. Bloom, "Hamlet", in *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* (New York: Riverhead Books, 1998), 390: "For him [*scil.* Joyce/Stephen], Hamlet the Dane and Hamnet Shakespeare are twins, and the ghostly Shakespeare is therefore the father of his most notorious character." For other pieces of information on the father/son motif in *Ulysses* I am also grateful to my Joycean colleagues, J. Nugent, J. O'Leary, Luke Gibbons and Susan Brown. A challenging psychoanalytic contribution to the discussion is to be found in S. Critchley and J. Webster, *Stay, Illusion!: The Hamlet Doctrine* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2013).

[14] W. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, I.5.

[15] Ibid., I.5.

[16] C. Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma and the Possibility of History*, in C. Nouvet (ed.), *Literature and the Ethical Question* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 181. Caruth adds: "The experience of the soldier faced with sudden and massive death around him, for example, who suffers this sight in a numbed state, only to relive it later on in repeated nightmares, is a central and recurring image of trauma in our century" (ibid.). For other current definitions of trauma – especially relating to major horrors of war, rape, torture, genocide and natural catastrophe – see J. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); *Trauma and Its Wake*, ed. C. Figley, vol. 1 and 2 (New York: Brunner-Mazel, 1985-1986); S. Rambo, *Spirit and Trauma: A Theology of Remaining* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), especially pp. 1-15; D. Laub, "Re-establishing the Internal 'Thou' in Testimony of Trauma", *Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society*, 2 (2013), pp. 184-198; and D. Laub and S. Felman, *Testimony* (New York and London: Routledge, 1992).

[17] S. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. G. Richter (Toronto-New York: Broadview, 1984), 55-65. The incident of little Ernst playing with the spool of string occurred in 1915 when Freud visited the Hamburg home of his daughter Sophie, who later died in January 1920 as Freud was still composing his text. See also the commentaries by J. Derrida in *The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) and E. Santner, "History beyond the Pleasure Principle", in *Probing the Limits of Representation*, ed. S. Friedländer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 143-155. It might be interesting to ask if is also be a basic isomorphic rapport between 1) the primordial therapeutic play of *fort/da,* and 2) the cathartic play of

Freudend" and we also have the *Finnegans Wake* boast: "I can psoakoonaloose myself any time I want!"[18] Joyce did just that in writing his personal and national traumas into words, prefiguring his fellow expat writer, Eugene O'Neill, when he confessed that *Long Days Journey into Night* was written in "blood and tears". Their books saved them from sickness and insanity. And perhaps others too, for in turning "ghosts into ancestors" (as Hans Loewald recommended), Joyce may have helped many readers recover from their personal or collective traumas.

BAMBER: THE GOOD LISTENER

A final example of a modern Chironic narrator is Helen Bamber. The main reason for this, we are told in her biography by Mark Belton, is that she managed to integrate her own suffering into her understanding and was accordingly an exceptionally "good listener". A trauma therapist in practice more than theory, Bamber was both a founding member of Amnesty International and one of the first counsellors to enter the concentration camps after the war. Her goal was to encourage survivors of horror to convert their trauma into stories and thereby find some release from their mute and immutable paralysis.

In Bergen-Belsen, Helen Bamber encountered "impossible stories" which *had to be told.* She describes this narrative paradox – of telling the untellable – in her experience of counselling victims after her arrival in the camps in the immediate wake of the liberation. "(I) would be sitting there in one of those chilly rooms, on a rough blanket on a bed, and the person I was talking to would suddenly begin to tell me what they had seen, or try to tell what it was like (...) Above all else there was the need to tell you everything, over and over and over."[19] Eventually, Bamber realized that what was most important was to sit closely beside the survivors, and to "listen and receive this", as if it were part of you and that the act of taking and showing that you were available was itself playing some useful role. A sort of mourning beneath and beyond tears: "it wasn't so much grief as a pouring out of some ghastly vomit like a kind of horror."[20] The purgative idiom here is not accidental. (Catharsis in Greek most commonly referred to the physical act of voiding toxic liquids). What Bamber's accounts of these basic first-hand testimonies makes evident is that Holocaust stories – like all stories of deep pain – are to be understood less as tales of heroic triumph over adversity, than as truncated, tentative quasi-narratives that call out to be heard: impossible stories that the victims and survivors nonetheless *have to tell*. Indeed Primo Levi, one of the most famous narrator-survivors, compared this narrative

pity (identification with immediate suffering right *here*/*da*) and fear (distance of the one who detaches, mediates and lets go over *there*/ *fort*) as expounded by Stephen Dedalus in *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*? If so, we might be tempted to ask what the equivalent of Ernst's spool play is in Joyce's own writing. Is Stephen, to put it fancifully, his *fort* and Bloom his *da?* And what role has Molly in the drama of pity and fear? Does she turn the tragic purgation into comic serenity? The split dyad of father-son into a dialectical triad? We might draw useful suggestions here from feminist reinterpretations of the *fort/da* game by such thinkers as L. Irigaray, *Sexes and Genealogies*, trans. G. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and, more recently, A.-C. Mulder, *Divine Flesh, Embodied Word* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2006), 41 ff.

[18] J. Joyce, *Finnegans Wake* (New York: Viking, 1939), 522.

[19] M. Belton, *Helen Bamber: The Good Listener* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998). Cited in Kearney, *On Stories*, 139-140.

[20] Ibid.

impulse to retell the story as something as basic as an "alimentary need". For without such conversion from aphasia to testimony, from silent wounds to narrated words (however stammered or inarticulate), the survivors could not survive their own survival. They could not lift themselves from their bunks and walk out the gates of the camps. They could not pass from death back into life.

One especially vivid account of narrative testimony in Bergen-Belsen says this with terrible poignancy. Bamber describes a play in Yiddish which was performed for remaining survivors by other survivors. It re-enacted a typical family at table and was received in total attention by the audience. She writes: "The family portrayed would be an orthodox family; and then the Nazis would come in. And they would drag or kill the mother; and the power of the scene turned around the abuse of the mother, and the break-up of the family. The depiction of the Nazis was realistic and violent. The sense of disaster about to happen could be felt in that hall. Nothing explicit about the aftermath was shown, as I remember it. I have never seen anything so effective, despite the crudity of the stage and the performance. It was raw and so close to the experience of the audience. There was never any applause. Each time was like a purging."[21] In other words, basic catharsis.

The key to releasement from the nightmare – which this elementary μῦθος-μίμησις permitted – was that it balanced the act of identification with a theatrical representation. So that the pain, which could not be lived directly, could be re-lived by being re-presented "as if" it were happening again; but this time from a certain distance (the "estrangement" being provided, however minimally, by the theatrical form and plot). The survivors were thus permitted to re-experience their own previously un-experienced experience – un-experienced because too unbearable to be registered or processed in the original immediacy of the trauma. And this, we might add, requires its own special time as well as space: there is a time for wounds to open and a time for wounds to close. As with the physical process of granulation where scar tissue is formed from within the wound, allowing for a proper mix of exposure to air and protective closure, so too with the psyche. Working-through of trauma calls for a delicate equipoise between silence and speaking, invisibility and visibility, if the wound is to grow into a scar. If one covers the pain too soon, it festers and needs to be reopened at a later time for new scar-tissue to form; if one covers it too late, infection can set in and the pain becomes intolerable. Wounded healers know, from their own experience of woundedness, two basic things: 1) the right timing between too early and too late, and 2) the right spacing between too near and too far. As important as sensitivity to timing, is being careful neither to over-identify with suffering (too close) nor to remain an indifferent observer (too removed). It is a matter of *tact*, in the sense of both tactility and know-how. An art of "exquisite empathy."[22]

[21] Ibid.

[22] The common notion of "tact" as both carnal and cognitive finds another etymological ally in the equally colloquial term, "savvy", with its double sense of both knowing (*savoir)* and tasting (*sapere, savourer*). See our opening essay in *Carnal Hermeneutics*, ed. R. Kearney and B. Treanor, entitled "The Wager of Carnal Hermeneutics", especially 15-56. A similar sense of hermeneutic tact and savvy is part of the process of "exquisite empathy" currently being researched by a number of pioneering physicians and therapists. See M. Kearney, R. Weininger, B. Mount, R. Harrison and M. Vachon, "Self-Care of Physicians Caring for Patients at the End of Life", *The Journal of American Medical Association*, March 18, 2009, vol 39, No. 11.

CONCLUSION

What these various examples suggest is that stories become cathartic to the extent that they combine empathic imagination with a certain acknowledgment of the cause and context of the suffering – thereby offering a wider lens to review insufferable pain. The degree of detachment afforded by the narrative representation may be small indeed, but without it one would be smothered by trauma to the point of numbness. Without some mediation through μῦθος-μίμησις, one risks succumbing to the sheer over-whelmingness of horror. Indeed, in this regard, it is telling that several camps survivors have recounted how they finally achieved some relief from the trauma when they recognized themselves, from a certain formal distance, in characters portrayed in narrative accounts of the holocaust, often well after the events took place. One could cite here the important debates on the role of mourning in recent cinematic works like *Schindler's List* (Steven Spielberg, 1993), *Shoah* (Claude Lanzmann, 1985) or *Life is Beautiful* (Roberto Benigni, 1997), not to mention the literary accounts of authors like Wiesel, Hillesum, Amos or Levi.[23] Indeed one concentration camp inmate who was fortunate to make it onto Schindler's original list confessed that she was never able to reconnect with her trauma in the camps until she actually saw herself played by a professional actor in the Spielberg movie – half a century later. Only then, through the detour of fictional narrative, could she reintegrate her pain and tell her own story.

These various narrative testimonies – cinematic, theatrical, literary, documentary – invite first and subsequent generations to recall, in however flawed or fractured a manner, the unspeakable events of trauma "as if" they were experiencing them for themselves. And even though such narrative representations inevitably fail to do full justice to the singularity of the original horror, they allow, in spite of all the odds, many people to remember what actually happened; and this is important so that, in Primo Levis' words, "it may never happen again".

Genuine cathartic witness implies something more profound than mere cognitive information (though this is crucial). Narrating stories of horror is a way of never giving up on the suffering of the dead. "We must *acknowledge* the truth as well as having *knowledge* of it."[24] This double duty of testimonial *recognition* (through narrative affect) and scientific *cognition* (through empirical explanation) seeks to honor the forgotten and forfeited of history. When it comes to healing wounds, we need both Hippocrates and Asclepius. We need, as Paul Ricoeur puts it, to "count the cadavers and be struck by the pain."[25]

If we possess narrative compassion, we cannot kill. If we do not, we cannot love. The loving is in the healing, in the cathartic balancing of what Joyce called "identification with the sufferer" and knowledge of "the hidden cause" (*A Portrait*). We might say, in conclusion, that narrative catharsis, performed by a listener-narrator, offers a singular mix of empathy and distance, whereby we experience the pain of other beings – patients,

[23] See the sections "Testifying to History: The Case of Schindler" and "The Paradox of Testimony", in R. Kearney, *On Stories*, 41-77, and the chapter "The Immemorial: A Task of Narrative", in R. Kearney *Strangers, Gods and Monsters* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003). See also *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution"*, ed. S. Friedlander (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

[24] M. Belton, *Helen Bamber*, 228 f.

[25] P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3, "Conclusions" (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988).

strangers, victims – "as if" we were them. Cathartic healing involves the narrating of past wounds both *as* they happened and *as if* they happened in this way or that. And it is precisely this double response of truth (as) and fiction (as-if) that emancipates us from our habitual protection and denial mechanisms. One suddenly experiences oneself as another and the other as oneself – and thereby begin to apprehend otherwise unapprehendable pain.

Wounded healers are those, in sum, who maintain such equilibrium in a subtle interplay of word and touch, narrativity and tactility, effect and affect. To have the "healing touch" means knowing when it is time to listen and when it is time to speak. When to draw close and when to draw back. When to hold and when to withhold. In the final analysis, it's a matter of tact. What Chiron taught us.

Bruce Rosenstock

THE ORIGINS OF JEWISH TRAGIC DRAMA: AN EPISODE IN GERSHOM SCHOLEM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH OSKAR GOLDBERG

In the late summer of 1927, Gershom Scholem spent some weeks with Walter Benjamin in Paris before returning to Jerusalem and his teaching responsibilities at the Hebrew University. Scholem had been granted academic leave for the spring semester to research Kabbalistic manuscripts in England and France. In his memoir, *Walter Benjamin, The Story of a Friendship,* Scholem explains that "Benjamin was the first person I told about a very surprising discovery I had made: Sabbatian theology – that is, a messianic antinomianism that had developed within Judaism in strictly Jewish concepts."[1] Scholem's discovery of Sabbatian theology in the spring of 1927 centered on certain manuscripts in the Bodleian library in Oxford written by Abraham Miguel Cardozo. Cardozo had been an early follower of Sabbatai Zvi and, after his conversion to Islam in 1666, Cardozo set about using his considerable knowledge of Kabbalah to expound the antinomian messianic logic behind the apostasy. Scholem recounts in his memoir one particularly memorable conversation with Benjamin that summer in which he sketched out the details of Cardozo's Sabbatian theology. "In Abraham Miguel Cardozo's writings," Scholem concludes, "smoldered a flame that leaped from me to my first audience".[2]

In a now famous essay entitled "Redemption through Sin,"[3] Scholem unfolded the details of Cardozo's Sabbatian antinomianism. But this is not Scholem's first effort at explicating Sabbatian antinomianism. Scholem's first publication on this topic, "Über die Theologie des Sabbatianismus im Lichte Abraham Cardozos"[4] ("On the Theology of Sabbatianism in light of Abraham Cardozo"), was published in 1928, just months after his

1 G. Scholem, *Walter Benjamin: The story of a friendship* (New York: New York Review Books, 2001), 136

2 Ibid., 165.

3 G. Scholem, "Redemption through Sin", *Knesset* II (1937), 347-92 (Hebrew). English translation in G. Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism and other essays on Jewish Spirituality* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 78-141.

4 G. Scholem, "Über die Theologie des Sabbatianismus im Lichte Abraham Cardozos", *Der Jude*, Jg 10 (1928), Nr 1, Sonderheft, 123-139.

visit with Benjamin in Paris.[5] In this early essay, I will argue, we find unmistakable traces of Scholem's encounter with Benjamin. Previous scholars have devoted considerable attention to examining Scholem's and Benjamin's fascination with messianic antinomianism.[6] This fascination can certainly be viewed as part of a much larger turn in *Religionswissenschaft* (the historical-philological study of religion) taking place in Weimar Germany in 1928, marked by a number of publications on another antinomian movement with Jewish roots, namely, ancient Gnosticism, ably documented by Stephen Wasserstein.[7] Wasserstein has shown how, for many young German-Jewish thinkers of the Weimar period, ancient Gnosticism seemed to hold a mirror to their own sense of alienation from their parents' faith in bourgeois *Bildung,* and their sense that Judaism, to remain vital, had to be reconnected to the mythic roots against whose seductions, from the biblical period forward, Rabbinic Judaism had frequently fought. But despite the attractions of antinomian Gnosticism, it was clear to everyone involved in the study of this movement that any reappropriation of myth and its mighty symbolic power opened the door to extremely dangerous psychic and historical impulses. My paper seeks to shed light on Scholem's earliest publication on Abraham Cardozo and Sabbatian antinomianism, a work that receives only a footnote in the larger story told in Wasserstrom's essay.[8] Scholem's essay concludes with a biting critique of the growing fascination among Weimar Jews with gnostic antinomianism, directed in part at his friend Walter Benjamin. In their different responses to the seductive appeal of messianic antinomianism as a way to rekindle a vibrant Jewish life in German, Benjamin and Scholem, I will argue, uncannily replay the drama of Sabbatianism in what might be called a "spiritual flash-fire," sparked by Cardozo's Sabbatian manuscripts.

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[5] This essay develops the approach to Weimar "Marranism" sketched in B. Rosenstock, "'In the Grip of the Theologico-Political Predicament': Baroque and Weimar Marranism", in *Versteckter Glaube oder doppelte Identität? Das Bild des Marranentums im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert / "Concealed faith or double identity? "Marranism" in the 19th and 20th centuries*, ed. P. Ferruta, H. L. Lund, A.-D. Ludewig (Berlin: Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum für Europäisch-Jüdische Studien, 2011), 68-85 and also my earlier work on the Sabbatian theologian Abraham Miguel Cardozo in B. Rosenstock, "Abraham Miguel Cardoso's Messianic Theology: A Reappraisal", *Association of Jewish Studies Review* 23:1 (1998), 63-104.

[6] The most extensive treatment of Benjamin's and Scholem's shared interest in an antinomian messianic "metaphysics" is found in E. Jacobson, *Metaphysics of the Profane: The Politcal Theology of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). Jacobson does not, however, mention Sabbatianism in his discussion of the political theologies of Benjamin and Scholem. Lazier offers a fuller account of the significance of Sabbatianism for interwar German-Jewish thinkers (*God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination between the World Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, see esp. pages 139-145 for a fine discussion of Scholem's flirtation with gnostic antinomianism and his ultimate return to a this-worldly experience of the divine). Lazier also offers an insightful discussion of Scholem's messianism and its relation to Sabbatianism in "On the Origins of 'Political Theology': Judaism and Heresy between the World Wars", *New German Critique* 105 (Fall 2008), 143-164. His one sentence summation of Scholem is spot on: "He was above all concerned with the meaningfulness and authenticity of this-worldly life" (155). Lazier argues that Scholem's discomfort with the gnostic and antinomian thrust of Sabbatianism distinguishes him from Benjamin. Scholem, I will argue in this essay, saw early on that Benjamin was in danger of falling prey to a Sabbatian rejection of the meaningfulness of thisworldly life. J. Mehlman, in *Walter Benjamin for Children: An Essay on His Radio Years* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 41-7 has drawn attention to some of the thematic links between Benjamin's thought and Sabbatianism. Mehlman offers a portrait of Benjamin who is, even before he learns about Sabbatian antinominanism, tempted by the promise of a messianic redemption through sin.

[7] S. Wasserstein, "Hans Jonas in Marburg, 1928", in *The Legacy of Hans Jonas: Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life*, ed. H. Tirosh-Samuelson and Ch. Wiese (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 39–72.

[8] Ibid., 67, 127.

Through the lens of Sabbatianism, one can not only better understand the Benjamin-Scholem friendship at this time, but one can also discern the lineaments of the broader historic configuration of interwar German-Jewish intellectual life and the central place of antinomian messianism within it. Scholem's 1928 essay on Abraham Cardozo's theology contains his first published reference to Oskar Goldberg. Manfred Voigts has recently written a full account of the history of Scholem's relationship to Goldberg. My essay examines only a small part of this history, but I believe it does shed light on the deeply-felt hostility that Scholem felt towards Goldberg. Goldberg's obscurity is in large part due to Scholem's campaign against him. Manfred Voigts's work has done a great deal to set the record straight. I am currently completing a book-length study of Oskar Goldberg that builds upon Voigts's work. This essay, although it does not focus on Goldberg, may at least shed light on the origins of Scholem's negative judgment of Oskar Goldberg.

When Scholem writes that "there smoldered a flame" in Cardozo's manuscripts that "leaped from me to my audience," he is referring to the flame of antinomian messianism. That smoldering flame found in Scholem and Benjamin a rather combustible ground upon which to be reignited. Benjamin's study of Baroque allegory had primed him to receiving the spark of Cardozo's antinomian messianism. When he met Scholem in the summer of 1927, Benjamin had just completed the proofs for *Die Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels* (the book was published in January, 1928). In the *Ursprung* book, the theme of redemption through sin comes across quite clearly, especially in the final pages of the book. Baroque allegory offers a vision of history as a "petrified, primordial landscape" whose deepest meaning is decay and death without apparent hope of redemption, and the melancholic gaze of the allegorist "leads down into the empty abyss of evil in order to make sure of its infinity."[9] Descending into this abyss, the melancholic gaze is at last redeemed: "Ultimately, in the death signs of the baroque, the direction of allegorical reflection is reversed; on the second part of its wide arc it returns, to redeem."[10] So Benjamin was, in the late summer of 1927, a particularly explosive audience for the smoldering spark of a baroque era Jewish theology of messianic antinomianism. And Scholem himself was a no less combustible reader of Cardozo's smoldering manuscript, having for many years shared with Benjamin an interest in a messianic politics running against the grain of secular history. His letter to Franz Rosenzweig, written just the year prior to his discovery of Sabbatian antinomianism (December 26, 1926[11]), spoke about the volcanic apocalyptic power rumbling within the secularized Hebrew of the Yeshuv. The letter reflects his preoccupation at that time with what he called "religious anarchism," as David Biale argues in a recent essay. Religious anarchism is a phrase Scholem will later use to characterize Sabbatianism. The spark of messianic antimonianism in Cardozo's manuscript could not, it seems, have found a more receptive audience than Benjamin and Scholem.

Scholem will offer his most extensive account of Abraham Miguel Cardozo and the theology of Sabbatianism in the 1936 essay "Redemption through Sin," as I have said, but his first scholarly effort, "On the Theology of Sabbatianism in the light of Abraham

[9] W. Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, trans. J. Osborne (London: Verso, 1985), 231.
[10] Ibid., 232.
[11] G. Scholem, "Thoughts About Our Language", in *On the Possibility of Jewish Mysticism*, 27-28.

Cardozo," uniquely witnesses to the explosive force of antinomianism latent within the thinking not only of Benjamin and Scholem, but also within Weimar Jewish intellectual life more generally. "On the Theology of Sabbatianism" was printed in a special issue of *Der Jude* published in honor of Martin Buber's fiftieth birthday in the spring of 1928. When Benjamin read the essay, he wrote to Scholem saying, "I believe this essay is a junction in the railway net of your thinking; at least I sense that navigable routes radiate in all directions" (April 23, 1928[12]). I myself have written about the writings of Abraham Miguel Cardozo and his antinomian messianism[13] and in what follows I will draw from this work, but my focus in this paper is on Scholem's article. I want to chart the path of some of those "navigable routes" that radiate out from it. The routes I will chart have station stops, I will argue, in Benjamin's *Ursprung* book. Benjamin had sent his book to Scholem in late January, 1928, in other words, around the time that Scholem was completing work on his essay about Cardozo for *Der Jude*. But I am not in fact arguing for the influence of Benjamin on Scholem. I believe that the "navigable routes" linking the work of Benjamin and Scholem at this time can be discerned with relative clarity, but the different contributions each man made to mapping out the routes cannot, I fear, be reliably disentangled. The problem would remain even if we had the privilege of being present, for example, at that memorable conversation between Scholem and Benjamin in the late summer of 1927. Sparks do not only jump in only one direction. Rather than tracing lines of influence, my paper seeks to trace the patterns of the criss-crossing routes linking Benjamin's *Ursprung* book and Scholem's essay.

There are four thematic routes that stand out: the first is the route linking Benjamin's analysis of the baroque experience of history with Scholem's discussion of Marranism ("Marranentum"); the second is the route linking Benjamin's suggestion that redemption follows upon a descent into the abyss of evil with Scholem's characterization of Abraham Cardozo's understanding of messianic descent into the realm of the k'lipot, the shards holding the fragments of divine light; the third is the route linking Benjamin's description of the theatricalization of history in the baroque period with Scholem's discussion of modern Jewish life as *Spiel,* mere playacting and mere play; and the fourth route links Benjamin's discernment of the lineaments of the baroque worldview in contemporary Weimar with Scholem's concluding words in which he alludes to a new Sabbatianism threatening contemporary Jewish life. In this paper I will chart the first two thematic routes and briefly gesture toward the last one. A proper account of the third theme, the theatricalization of history, would take us too far afield, requiring an examination of Benjamin's *Ursprung* book in relation to Carl Schmitt that, however important, cannot be broached within the space of this paper. However, I hope to suggest in what follows how important is the theme of theatricalization of history for understanding Scholem's and Benjamin's fascination with Sabbatianism and the baroque era more generally.

The first thematic route connecting Benjamin's *Ursprung* book and Scholem's "On the Theology of Sabbatianism" is the one joining Benjamin's discussion of the baroque

[12] *The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940*, ed. G. Scholem, Th. Adorno, trans. M. R. Jacobson, E. M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 333.

[13] B. Rosenstock, "Abraham Miguel Cardoso's Messianic Theology: A Reappraisal", *Association of Jewish Studies Review* 23:1 (1998), 63-104.

experience of history and the significance of Marranism in Scholem's essay. This thematic linkage is, in fact, a nodal point at which all the other routes meet. It is therefore apt that we begin with this theme as our point of departure. Scholem begins his essay with an historiographical prolegomenon. He explains that it is actually not on the "historical stage" ("historische Schauplatz") that Sabbatianism's significance should be looked for, but on the "metaphysical stage."[14] Not unlike Benjamin's critique of the previous treatments of German *Trauerspiel* that fail to consider the "metaphysics of this form" because of its "awkward shape" ("befangene Gestalt"[15]), Scholem criticizes Graetz for dismissing Cardozo's writings as uninteresting and repetitive scrawlings ("zusammengeschmiert"). Any Jew who reads Cardozo with an eye to their metaphysical import, however, would be overtaken with "trembling" (Erschütterung). The antinomian messianism coming to expression in the writings of Cardozo will, Scholem claims, ultimately undermine the very fabric of modern Jewish existence. Scholem identifies the two major forces at play on the metaphysical stage of Sabbatianism as the spirit of Marranism ("Marranentum") and Lurianic Kabbalah. "The theology of Sabbatianism," he writes, "manifests itself as the construction of a virtually gnostic antinomianism within the world of Judaism and its form of life, arising from a dialectical disintegration of the fundamental ideas of Lurianic Kabbalah as they are reconceptualized in a Marranic spirit."[16] Marranism (Marranentum) is, Scholem adds, "the true stage of this tragic drama" ("Trauerspiel"). Here, then, is the first and most explicit linkage between Scholem's essay and the *Ursprung* book. Sabbatianism is a Jewish *Trauerspiel* and Marranism is its metaphysical stage. The main character is Sabbatai Zvi, and, as with all baroque tragic dramas, the scene is haunted, in this case with the disintegrated spirit of Rabbi Isaac Luria. What interests me for the moment is the nature of the "metaphysical stage" provided by Marranism.

Marranism is the split between outward form and inner content; the outward form dissimulates the inner truth. Scholem refers to Carl Gebhardt, the most prominent Spinoza scholar of the generation, when he speaks about the metaphysics of Marranism. One of Gebhardt's major scholarly innovations was that he situated Spinoza within the context of the Marranic Judaism of the Amsterdam community. Gebhardt spoke of Marranism as possessing a "strange originality" marked by a "splitting of consciousness" ("Spaltung des Bewusstseins."[17]) Scholem credits Gebhardt as the first to bring to light the "dangerous ambiguity within the spirit of Marranism." Gebhardt refers to the Marrano's critical distance from his Catholic culture but also from traditional Judaism. "These men, after having lost the categories of their own religion, law and justice, are also unable to accept the categories of their new religion, original sin and redemption. Their consciousness is split. They live in danger and without interior security, Jews by volition but without knowledge."[18] For Gebhardt, the Marranic split consciousness endangers only their own

[14] Scholem, "Über die Theologie des Sabbatianismus im Lichte Abraham Cardozos", 124.
[15] W. Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. R. Tiedemann, H. Schweppenhäuser, Bd. I.1 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1991), 228.
[16] Scholem, "Über die Theologie des Sabbatianismus im Lichte Abraham Cardozos", 125.
[17] C. Gebhardt, "Was ist Spinozismus?", in *Spinoza: Von den festen und ewigen Dingen* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), xii.
[18] C. Gebhardt, "Spinoza, Judentum, und Barock", in *Spinoza: Vier Reden* (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1927), 35-53.

personal sense of identity, but Scholem argues that it endangers Jewish identity more generally. The danger of Marranic inner groundlessness, born from a break with both Jewish law and the redemption of the Cross, is that it provides fertile ground for what Scholem calls "antinomian perspectives." The Marranos continue to hope for a not-yet-achieved redemption, but the link between messianic redemption and Jewish law has been broken. Spinoza, Scholem following Gebhardt says, was led to break with Judaism entirely as he sought a more secure grounding for his inward longing to achieve contact with a God who seemed no longer present either in the revealed law of the Torah or the sacraments of the Church. But Abraham Miguel Cardozo (1627-1706) remained within Judaism and thus posed a far more dangerous threat, bringing his split consciousness and his antinomian messianic perspectives into the very heart of the Jewish people. "The religious substance of Judaism," Scholem writes, "fell victim to the [Sabbatian movement]" but the new world it hoped for, built as it was upon an inward lack of grounding in any reality, was filled with mere "chimaeras."[19]

Cardozo argued that Jewish law had not only lost its link to the hoped-for redemption, but that it had also lost its link to the God of revelation in the Hebrew Bible. Cardozo claimed that Rabbinic tradition had ceased to worship the God of revelation (and creation) and had, after the close of the Talmudic era, turned its prayers toward the infinitely distant God of Maimonidean rationalism. This God, the First Cause from whom the Bible's God emerges, has no relation to the created world or to history. The "First Cause" of rationalism is not the God revealed in the Torah. In the Torah, rather, the divine couple, the Holy One Blessed be He and his Shekhinah, are revealed as the conjoined Personhood responsible for bring our world into being and guiding humanity to redemption. Cardozo turned to those passages of the Kabbalah that Scholem in the essay describes as "dynamite" waiting to be lit, namely, those that declare that we live in an age in which God's true nature has been obscured but will be unveiled by a Messiah who will bring the true knowledge of this "mystery of the faith." When this knowledge is restored to Israel, the Torah's 613 commandments will be reversed as the revelation of the divine conjugal Person – the Holy One and his Shekhinah – shines forth once again. The Marranic experience of a Jewish identity uncoupled from its living connection to God was thus the "metaphysical stage" for an antinomian messianism that posited Rabbinic Judaism as the worship of an infinitely distant God. Cardozo in effect declared that Rabbinic Judaism was no closer to the true God of revelation than was Christianity (or, indeed, Islam). By being forced to cut his ties with Jewish law but refusing to accept salvation in the Church, the Marrano was thrown back upon the path toward redemption. The Marrano was prepared to receive anew the long-forgotten "mystery of the faith" brought by the Messiah Sabbatai Zvi, a Messiah who voluntarily became, as Cardozo wrote, "a Marrano [*anus*] like me."

Carl Gebhardt had taught Scholem that Marranism holds the key to understanding the spiritual danger facing the Jewish people in the baroque period. Marranism looks upon everything in the outer Christian world as hypocrisy and sham, empty ritual forms without any linkage to redemption. Turned inward, Marranic consciousness finds only a hope for redemption but no knowledge of how to go about attaining it. History has been

[19] Scholem, "Über die Theologie des Sabbatianismus im Lichte Abraham Cardozos", 126.

cut off from its living tie to the promise of redemption. This Marranic consciousness, however, is not uniquely Jewish, at least if we accept Benjamin's characterization of the mentality prevailing in the baroque era. The *Trauerspiel* is pervaded with what Benjamin calls "insuperable despair" that arises from the tension between transcendence and immanence in the baroque era. "For all that the increasing worldliness of the Counter-Reformation prevailed in both confessions," Benjamin writes, "religious aspirations did not lose their importance: it was just that this century denied them a religious fulfillment, demanding from them, or imposing upon them, a secular solution instead... [A]ll the energy of the age was concentrated on a complete revolution of the content of life, while orthodox ecclesiastical forms were preserved. The only consequence could be that men were denied all real means of direct expression."[20] What Benjamin is describing could be called a generalized form of Marranism. Outward forms of piety have been severed from their connection with God's plan for salvation in history, and inward faith has lost its grounding in the sure sense that God cares for the individual's redemption. European humanity, Benjamin says, "was denied direct access to a beyond."[21] The unlinking of history from redemption is given expression in the *Trauerspiel*. "Whereas the middle ages present the futility of world events and the transience of the creature as stations on the road to salvation, the German *Trauerspiel* is taken up entirely with the hopelessness of the human condition."[22] This leads, Benjamin goes on, to a "rash flight into a nature deprived of grace" that is, he says, a particular feature of German tragic drama. But this rash flight, this descent into the "disgrace of revelation" as Gillian Rose aptly calls it,[23] is precisely the route taken by Sabbatai Zvi, or at least it is the route into redemption through sin that Cardozo's antinomian messianism will expound.[24] The flight into a "disgraced" nature takes on the appearance, Benjamin further explains, of playfulness, or deliberate playacting. The external deed cannot be taken seriously, so one wears the outer garments of the world – in Sabbatai Zvi's case, the turban – with a playful disdain. "Life itself is a game," Benjamin explains, but not because nothing is serious, but rather because that which is serious – redemption – has lost its connection with life in this world. Outward

[20] Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 79.

[21] Ibidem.

[22] Ibid., 81.

[23] G. Rose, "Walter Benjamin – out of the Sources of Modern Judaism", in *Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays* (London: Blackwell, 1993), 181.

[24] Rose does not draw Benjamin's discussion of the "Baroque ethic" directly to Marranism and Sabbatianism, but her characterization of the "Judaic categories" in which this ethic, as Benjamin describes it in the *Ursprung* book, is expressed as a precise description of what Scholem has called the "metaphysical stage" upon which Sabbatianism is played out: "The Baroque ethic evinces a *created and creaturely world* with the aspiration but *without the promise of redemption*. In Judaic categories, this spiritual condition gives rise to the Messianic fixation. For the Messianic fixation in Judaism always indicates *a disgrace or disorder in the relation to revelation*. ('Revelation' in Judaism means the Written and the Oral Law, the teaching and its interpretation, not the redeeming death of Christ which affects individual salvation.) Benjamin expresses this disgrace of revelation as 'the decay of aura' or 'transmission without truth.' The object, style and mood of Benjamin's philosophy converge, not in the Christian mournfulness or melancholy, discerned from the Baroque *Trauerspiel* to Baudelaire, but in the Judaic state of desertion – in Hebrew, *agunah* – the stasis which his *agon* with the law dictates" (Rose, "Walter Benjamin – out of the Sources of Modern Judaism", 181). How better could one characterize the Marranic consciousness than as a "Judaic state of desertion" in which a "Messianic fixation" has taken hold? And how better can one characterize Cardozo's Sabbatian theology than as an "*agon* with the law"?

play expressed the seriousness of a deeply *hidden* redemption. "In the drama, the play element was demonstratively emphasized, and transcendence was allowed its final word in the worldly disguise of a play within a play."[25] So we move from a generalized Marranism to a generalized theatricalization of life via a rush into a nature deprived of grace. The *Trauerspiel* shows both the mournful tragedy of history bereft of hope fallen into a graceless nature, and the playful laughter at its center that perhaps breaks through the tragedy to redemption. This is the laughter that follows upon the descent of the mournful gaze into the "abyss of evil" portrayed on the stage. But the *Trauerspiel* also has a figure who revels in the playacting as a way to conceal his machinations, and his laughter is rather the grim hilarity of his nihilistic delight in hastening all things to their inevitable end. This is the intriguer, the descendant of the medieval passion play's Satan. In Scholem's essay, this role is played by Oskar Goldberg, a man that Scholem called "Satanic." But I am running ahead of myself.

Starting from nodal point of the theme of Marranism as the "metaphysical stage" of the *Trauerspiel* of Sabbatianism, all the four routes linking Scholem's essay to the *Ursprung* book have now been at least adumbrated. Let me once again say what these four thematic routes were: Marranic consciousness as the matrix for a revolutionary transformation in modern Jewish conscience; messianic redemption as achieved through a descent into the k'lipot or shards of a fallen world; the theatricalization of life as a game or play; and the threat to contemporary Jews of a new Sabbatianism. I want now to turn to the second route connecting Scholem's essay to the *Ursprung* book, the theology of redemption following a messianic descent into the k'lipot, the rush into nature without grace and the descent into the "abyss of evil" as Benjamin describes it.

In his essay, Scholem identifies two messianic figures who together participate in the drama of redemption according to Cardozo. The first that Scholem describes is the Messiah son of David, the messiah who hastens redemption through knowledge of the true nature of the divine couple – the Holy One Blessed be He and his Shekhinah – revealed in the Hebrew Bible, the second is the Messiah son of Ephraim who hastens redemption by descending into what Scholem calls the "dumb world of objects" under the sway of the power of the "demonic shards and of matter" within which the original divine light has been trapped after what R. Isaac Luria called "the shattering of the vessels." Scholem explains that Cardozo identified Sabbatai Zvi as the Messiah son of Ephraim, but he does

[25] Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 82. Here is the point where a discussion of Benjamin's notion of the theatricalization of history would need to confront Carl Schmitt's critique of this notion in his *Hamlet oder Hekuba* (Schmitt 1956). Schmitt argues that Shakespeare's play intends to teach the reigning monarch, James I, that the essence of sovereignty is *decision*. Benjamin, in his *Trauerspiel* book, invokes Schmitt to show how human sovereignty has been severed from divine sovereignty; Schmitt considers this reading of his work to miss the point, namely, that sovereign decision can always break into time and re-connect the human and divine realms. In his *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlaganstalt, 1938) Schmitt will precisely characterize the sense of history as sheer playacting as the mark of a *Jewish sensibility hiding within a Christian identity*, in the case of Friedrich Julius Stahl, whom Schmitt insists on calling "Stahl-Jolson," using his Jewish surname. The description that Schmitt gives of Stahl's "penetration" into Prussian society could have come from an anti-*converso* writer of fifteenth- or sixteenth-century Spain. Schmitt, in fact, traces this Jewish-convert sensibility (breaking the link between outer form and inner faith) back to the baroque period, to Spinoza. Whether deliberately or not, Schmitt confirms the linkage between Marrano and baroque world-views that the Cardozo "spark" relights in the conversation between Benjamin and Scholem.

not say who functions in the role of the Messiah son of David, the messiah of knowledge. In fact, Scholem is somewhat unclear on this point, and it is due to a lack of clarity in his source material. Cardozo, as long as Sabbatai Zvi was alive, identified Sabbati Zvi as the Messiah son of David who *also* functioned as the Messiah son of Ephraim, the Messiah of descent. But, as I have shown in my own study of Cardozo, the Messiah son of David is later identified as the messiah of descent and the Messiah son of Ephraim is assigned the role of being the Messiah of knowledge. What is more, Cardozo claims that he himself is the Messiah son of Ephraim, the Messiah of knowledge. That Cardozo presents himself as the messiah of knowledge is never, as far as I know, acknowledged by Scholem. I will have something to say about this later, but for now I want to draw out the parallel between the double messianic roles and Benjamin's *Ursprung* book.

The act of descending into the depths of dumb and demonic materiality, as Benjamin explains it in the final pages of the chapter titled "Allegory and Trauerspiel," is the redemptive act of the melancholic allegorist who voluntarily repeats the original descent or fall of Adam. The fall of Adam "brought down nature with it"[26], so that nature itself mourns for Adam and for itself. Nature, Benjamin explains, mourns in mute silence because the fall transformed Adam from a being whose words gave expression to the objects he named into a being who *judged* these objects, standing over against the world with his knowledge of good and evil. Adam's guilt, the knowledge of his disobedience, divides him from nature and nature reflects back the guilty knowledge of Adam by no longer revealing to him its inner living essence. Postlapsarian nature only shows Adam its dead surface, a surface of forms like hieroglyphs that Adam reads, no longer able to speak the true name of things. But these forms, for all their diversity, bear the same mournful message, the message that Adam has been severed from his communion with the world and its creator. How can Adam and nature be redeemed from their mournful separation? According to Benjamin, the melancholic allegorist who takes pleasure in multiplying the emblems which nature offers, as when he creates a crown out of a grove of blood-soaked cypress trees and thus emblematizes kingship as nothing more than a vain and violent attempt to transcend death, this melancholic allegorist descends into fallen nature in search of more knowledge, but he only encounters ever greater depths of evil. The allegorist in the end only discovers his own guilty selfhood reflected back at himself. What he sees is the very face of Satan, the "king of the abyss" in the words of an anonymous baroque playwright quoted by Benjamin. If the allegorist is not careful, he will fall victim to Satan's temptation to throw himself headlong into the abyss, descending ever deeper into fallen materiality as he generates ever more clever but empty emblems, playful signs of devilish mirth. He will then assume either the role of the tyrant or the intriguer as they are portrayed in the *Trauerspiel*. "Knowledge," Benjamin says, "is the most characteristic mode of evil... Its dominant mood is that of mourning, which is at once the mother of the allegories and their content. And from it three original satanic promises are born. They are spiritual in kind. The *Trauerspiel* continually shows them at work, now in the figure of the tyrant, now in the intriguer. What tempts is the illusion of freedom – in the exploration of what is forbidden; the illusion of independence – in the secession

[26] Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 240.

from the community of the pious; the illusion of infinity – in the empty abyss of evil."[27] The first two – the illusion of freedom and the illusion of independence – are the "Satanic temptations" to which Sabbatai Zvi succumbed, and the third is that which captured Joseph Frank: the violation of the prohibitions of the Torah (illusion of freedom), apostasy (illusion of independence), and finally orgiastic violence (illusion of infinity). Benjamin, unlike Scholem, sees the descent of the allegorist to be necessary for redemption, however dangerous it may be. "For it precisely visions of the frenzy of destruction," Benjamin declares, "in which all earthly things collapse into a heap of ruins, which reveal the limit set upon allegorical contemplation, rather than its ideal quality. The bleak confusion of Golgotha... is not just a symbol of the desolation of human existence. In it transitoriness is not signified or allegorically represented, as much as, in its own significance, displayed as allegory. As allegory of resurrection."[28] So at the limit of the descent into what Benjamin calls Tartarean materiality, what Scholem calls "the dumb world of things," the allegorist does an about-face and rediscovers himself "not playfully in the earthly world of things, but seriously under the eyes of heaven."[29]

In those final pages of the *Ursprung* book, Benjamin presents us with an updated version of Dante's encounter with an upside-down Satan in hell, thus allegorizing the reorientation of the world brought about on the Cross. But he is doing much more as well. Benjamin is uncannily repeating Abraham Cardozo's legitimation of the messiah's apparent transfiguration into the garments of Satan himself: only by meeting Satan on his own territory can one turn his derisive laughter against him and transform tragedy into comedy. Benjamin certainly does not want to play either tyrant or intriguer on the stage of world politics, but in his study of allegory's about-face "under the eyes of heaven" he does want to offer his readers access to a redemptive knowledge. "Allegory, of course, thereby loses everything that most peculiar to it: the secret privileged knowledge, the arbitrary rule in the realm of dead objects, the supposed infinity of a world without hope."[30] Benjamin's redemptive knowledge, brought back after a descent into the "abyss of evil" represented on the stage of the *Trauerspiel,* translates allegory back into the original language of pure names, the language of Adam before the fall. And this is just what Cardozo claimed to do for the overwrought symbolism of Lurianic Kabbalah: he showed that beneath it all there was hidden the simple truth of the divine couple as the divinity responsible for the creation of our world and the revelation of the Hebrew Bible. The knowledge of the true name of God – the four-letter name in which the Holy One blessed be He and his Shekhinah reveal themselves as a single divine couple – arises only when that knowledge has been most profoundly occluded, that is, at that time in history when God seems most remote. Explaining Cardozo's theory of the redemptive power of knowledge, Scholem writes: "Whether because of the impurity of the obfuscations, or because of the fallen condition of the soul's appetitive nature, or because of other forces at work in history, the illuminative power of our reason [*Ratio*] has been darkened. It displays its weakness in relation to the urphenomenon of speech, the name of the creator. However, when in the course of the birth

[27] Ibid., 230.
[28] Ibid., 232.
[29] Ibidem.
[30] Ibidem.

pangs of the new eon it purifies itself, the name of God answers again to reason's call."[31] Scholem thus characterizes the redemptive function of knowledge to be the restoration of the urphenomenon of speech, the very name of the creator, just as Benjamin characterizes the reversal of the allegorist's proliferation of emblems as abstract hieroglyphs to be the final recuperation of the prelapsarian language of concrete names.[32]

Given the limitations of space, I can only briefly trace out the remaining two themes – the theatricalization of history and the return of a new form of Sabbatianism – that link the *Ursprung* book with the "Theology of Sabbatianism" essay. Scholem's essay concludes with a very short discussion of the transformation of Jewish existence into a mere "play" without moral substance and in the final paragraph he alludes to the threat of a new upsurge of gnostic antinomianism. His allusion to the "reality of the Hebrews" falling prey to "chimeras" and to the "lazy pathos that is nothing more than the unpathetic self-indulgence of gossip" recalls for the perceptive reader not only the figure of Oskar Goldberg but the entire group of young Jewish writers and intellectuals who, in the years just before World War I, formed the core of the expressionist "Neue Club" and "Neopathetic Caberet" in Berlin, individuals including Goldberg but also Erich Unger and many others with whom Benjamin was on very close terms in those years.[33] We may certainly say that, like Benjamin, Scholem is concerned to draw a connection between the baroque world and the contemporary scene. Although Scholem alludes to Oskar Goldberg as the dangerous new mystagogue at the center of a deluded group of Jews pursuing nothing more than chimeras and gossip, we should not forget that the antinomian messianism of Cardozo is mirrored in Benjamin's own spiritual physiognomy no less so than it is in Goldberg's. Scholem describes Goldberg at some length in his memoir about Benjamin, and Scholem, whether intentionally or not, comes across as something of a heresy-hunter trying to put a stop to the spread of Goldberg's ideas. He describes a letter written in 1928 that he sent from Palestine in which he attacks Goldberg.[34] Benjamin, in a letter written to Scholem at the time, describes this letter as one of the very best things Scholem has written to date. Scholem may have learned something of how to write such letters from his familiarity with the writings of anti-Sabbatian rabbis. In his memoir about his friendship with Benjamin, Scholem admits that Benjamin never broke with the Goldberg circle despite his best efforts at separating him from it. "Benjamin's interest in this Jewish sect, if I may so describe it" Scholem writes, "accompanied him right into the Hitler period."[35]

I would suggest that "The Theology of Sabbatianism in the light of Abraham Cardozo" can be read as a warning not only to the Jews of his day but also to Benjamin, perhaps even most especially to Benjamin. Dear friend, Scholem seems to be saying,

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[31] Scholem, "Über die Theologie des Sabbatianismus im Lichte Abraham Cardozos", 133.

[32] See esp. Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 234.

[33] For a discussion of Goldberg's participation in the Neue Club and Neopathetic Caberet, see M. Voigts, *Oskar Goldberg: Der mythische Experimentalwissenschaftler. Ein verdrängtes Kapitel jüdischer Geschichte* (Berlin: Agora Verlag, 1992), 24-28. For a discussion of Goldberg and his relationship to the vitalist philosophies of his day, see Bruce Rosenstock, *Transfinite Life: Oskar Goldberg and the Vitalist Imagination* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017).

[34] The letter is preserved in the Franz Rosenzweig archive at the Leo Baeck Institute in New York, and is available online (in the Scholem Briefe folder).

[35] Benjamin, *Story of a Friendship*, 98.

Abraham Cardozo, like you today, yearned to bring a new eon to birth by spreading the redemptive knowledge of the holy speech, the ur-speech in which the name of God would shine forth once more. His yearning drew him toward a messianic pretender who descended into the abyss of evil. Cardozo turned Judaism into a mere game where every outward form is ironically overturned. You, Walter, must watch your step. The stakes you are wagering in this game, this *Spiel*, involve your very soul, and perhaps even the soul of the Jewish people. In the last line of his essay Scholem points to the real threat to Jewish existence: "the hybris of the Jew," that is, the belief in the Jew's unique redemptive role in history. Scholem hoped, though not without some trepidation, that this messianic hybris could be neutralized and that the holy speech could be resurrected in the everyday language of Jews in their own land. Benjamin, more deeply immersed in the melancholic vision of the "abyss of evil," had forgone all such hope, at least for himself. As he writes in the last line of his study of Goethe's *Elective Affinities:* "It is only on behalf of those without hope that hope is given to us."[36]

[36] Herbert Marcuse's translation, cf. *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964), 257.

Jean-Luc Nancy

HERE COLOR SEEMS TO THINK BY ITSELF[1]

I should like people to know that they cannot approach color as if coming into a barn door; one must go through a severe preparation to be worthy of it.
(Matisse, Letter to Henry Clifford, February 14th, 1948)[2]

1

Practices and thoughts about color have a history. No doubt there are several such histories, each one part of a specific culture. And surely each culture experiences one or several moments when form, delineation, and drawing become pregnant. For example, what happened in European art between the 16th and 19th centuries is well known: painting during this period appears to be cadenced by the expansion, liberation, and intensification of color. The same can be said about music, thanks to some shifts in time and thanks, above all, to the metaphorical displacement of the word *color*. Moreover, these shifts and metaphorical diversions pertain also to literature. (Is this merely about metaphor? This is a question that is worth coming back to). But other alternations may be found in other cultures, such as Egyptian or Chinese culture, and in some native cultures.

Maybe it is never really possible to clearly separate distinct moments, aspects or connections between form and color, no more than one could separate the elements that Poussin puts together to define painting:

"Definition: painting is imitation with lines and colors on a surface of all that can be found under the sun. Its end is delectation. The visible is not possible at all without light, without form, without colors, without distance, without a tool."[3]

Poussin was not just being careless when he wrote "line and color" then immediately after "without form, without color": in doing this he brings to light a mild indetermination

[1] This essay was written for a project of an exhibition which ultimately failed to come to fruition. The title is inspired by Charles Baudelaire's reflections on the painter Eugène Delacroix. Cf. Charles Baudelaire, "The Universal Exhibition of 1855. Eugène Delacroix", in *Selected Writings on Art and Artists*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, p. 137.

[2] Letter to Mr. Henry Clifford for the opening of a major Matisse Art exhibition, trans. E. R. Clifford, in: *Henry Matisse Retrospective Exhibition Paintings, Drawings and Sculptures* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1948), 15-16 [TN].

[3] Jean-Luc Nancy freely cites a letter by Nicolas de Poussin written on March 7th 1665 to Mr. de Chambray [TN].

of the first dimension of the visible (line, form, though he could have also written "figure", "outline", even "drawing"), which is in contrast with the determination of the word "color", which cannot easily be replaced by another term ("hue", the closest term, already evokes nuances, shades). But Poussin surely realized that the first time he used the word "color" it defined pictorial material – and this is why he paired it with "lines" rather than "form", because it refers more clearly to drawing – while in its second occurrence the word means the physical property of color.

The third sentence of the definition lists the elements of the visible in general and those of the art of the painter without making – here again, on purpose – any distinction; this seems clear from the "tool" that concludes the series in a slightly unexpected manner. Meanwhile, the expression "the visible is not possible at all" has to refer to painting and displaces surreptitiously what was suggested by the words "what can be seen under the sun". "Imitation", a common reference in his day, is affected in its notion. Painting offers the visible of what is seen, without reproducing it. All the well-known arguments about the exact artistic meaning of μίμησις are condensed here in a way that might almost be called sneaky – in any case, subtle and brushed by without even really touching it.

What is of interest here is the central position occupied by color, even though Poussin was at the time revered by the partisans of drawing who opposed the colorists, and for whom Rubens was a reference.

Certainly, color occupies this position here together with the line/form. But, as said earlier, between line and form there lies the difference of the gesture that traces and the figure that reveals itself: this difference preserves – and again, even at the risk of insisting too much, let us repeat that Poussin knew very well what he was saying – an interval in "imitation". With color, on the other hand, the interval is no more than a subtle distinction between the plural (the colors in the paint store) and the singular (color as property of the visible). This difference is evanescent because we know all too well that colors – whether as found in nature or at the paint store – exist only in the plural. There is color only in a difference of color from or in itself.

Of course the same is true for "form". There is form only through the distinction between different forms. But this should make us think – and this is another precious detail of Poussin's text – that the "form – color" pair cannot be precisely superimposed onto the "line – color" pair. Lines can be distinguished from color as the rim or the contour that passes between the strands or patches of color, but that can also divide portions on a colorless or monochromatic background. Form doesn't encircle, it "measures and qualifies space" as pointed out by Focillon,[4] who is always a reference when discussing form in Art.

When it comes to characterizing how the visible is offered, it is no accident that the word "form" crops up, even though it was undoubtedly thought of by Poussin as analogous to the line. It is associated with color as one of its qualities, but a pregnant quality, without which no form would take form – that is to say, no form would offer itself

[4] H. Focillon, *Vie des formes* (Chicoutimi: Université du Québec, 1934), 7. Color belongs to form, as it is recalled by these sentences: "Art is not only a fantastic geometry, or rather a more complex topology, it is linked to weight, to density, to light, to color" (35); "materials entail a certain destiny or, if you will, a certain formal vocation. They have a consistency, a color, a grain. They are form, as we suggested, thanks to which they call, limit or develop the lives of art forms" (36).

to be seen. In other words, form is the formation of the sensation, which also means, of course, its differentiation and delineation, but also its texture, its consistency, its color. Color, therefore, is part of form; it *is* form. Its relationship to form, in the sense of line and contour, is neither a relationship of confinement nor of exteriority: it is not a colored shape. The expansion of color and the tracing of the contour are made together, one and the other, one in the other, following the movement of appearing: a visible is offered, namely colored forms, formed colors.[5]

2

What Focillon says in his famous formulation: "Sign signifies, however, form signifies itself"[6] applies to all aspects and to all possible configuration of form. It is, in fact, the definition of form: it does not refer to anything other than itself. Form is in the appearing. One might be tempted to qualify it as sensible, but it would be redundant; all that appears is part of the sensible world. The coming into the world of all kind of things or, better, their making the world, where the world is the co-presence of all things, is the Sensible. (Things deemed "intelligible" or "spiritual" are never without existence or a sensible manifestation).

The world does not refer to anything other than itself. All the metaphysical or religious preoccupations that are concerned with a hereafter that is beyond this world are wrong about this reference: they imagine an "elsewhere" that is merely a "here" that refers to itself. Undoubtedly, this is quite confusing, because there is definitely *reference*. Indeed, form signifies itself. This signification is without end because it has no referent: there is nothing other than form, in that it forms itself and presents itself.

Of all human activities, the one we call "Art" takes on the signification of itself.[7] But in Art or in the Arts in general, this decisive trait of self-signification seems to be taken on in a special fashion by color, in all the values to which this word refers to in a very long series of concatenations and associations, starting with "value" itself, followed by tone, tonal quality, nuance, accent, cadence, variation, rhythm,[8] pulsation, even drive and impetus, intensity, brightness, glow, iridescence, bouquet...

How is the expression "signifying itself" to be understood? By definition, a sign refers to something other than itself. No doubt, this reference is internal in the linguistic

[5] We can add that in Plato, from whom we believe we have inherited the motive of the visible form as σχῆμα, εἶδος or ἰδέα – visible "idea" as intelligible, and as such... invisible – we can find a determination of color (χρῶμα) as the true visible reality of which the σχήματα are a secondary accompaniment, according to both the difference of colors and the difference of solids or volumes (color and thickness – στερεότης – are the characteristics of sensible matter). The visible is the first of all χρῶμα or else χρόα, namely the complexion of the skin or even skin itself as necessarily tinted, colored. This analysis is carried out by Bernard Suzanne thanks to a reading of *Meno* in "De la couleur avant toute chose", an article published in the online review *Klésis*, 2010-2014 ("Varia").

[6] Ibid., 7.

[7] If truth be told, the meaning of "art" shouldn't be limited to artistic activities which are the Index and the specific production of what "the self-signification", that we could also call the meaning without end, is about. This is involved in thought, in emotion, in passion, in impulse and in all of their forms (love, knowledge, power...). This is why we often say that "it is an art...": whether it be the performing of an action or behaving according to a register where it is important that the form of the action be asserted in and of itself, relatively independent from the purpose that lies outside the action. This is not the place to discuss this topic further, but it is worth noting the strong sense of form that we have, beyond all protocols and formalities. We always perceive tones, nuances, colors.

[8] About Rhythm, we shouldn't forget that ῥυθμός is in its origin very close to σχῆμα as shown by Benveniste; an indication that was elaborated by Lacoue-Labarthe on several occasions.

sign, from the signifier to the signified, where the "referent" – or exterior reality – is not necessarily given. The word *flower* refers to the idea of a "flower" ("missing from all bouquets", as Mallarmé says). But, one might say that, while this relating of sound to meaning may very well be contained in the word (in language) and be as such auto-referential, it is however perfectly distinct from the "signification" offered by a painted flower. This "Bouquet of flowers" by Bonnard (cf. Illustration 1) signifies itself not as one of the bouquets from which "the flower" is missing as "its gentle idea",[9] but in that it is this precise, unique bouquet for which the idea of flower and the idea of bouquet are only accessory circumstances, conventions (just like the table cloth and the other objects) that occasions the unique sensation of this painted bouquet, of this painting, of these precise colors – these greens, these reds, these blues, these purples, these violets in their mutual relations which involve also the pearly-white reflections of the vase, the light wrinkling of the table cloth, the gray-white and yellow stains of the rectangular indefinite objects – a unique sensation that originates completely in the general tonality of these hues, that are tuned with the tonality of blue, without overlooking the discreet relationship of the bouquet on the table with a background that may very likely announce a painting.

The same vase, or its twin, and we might dare say even almost the same flowers appear in "Flowers on a fireplace" by Bonnard as well, but where the tonality is completely different (cf. Illustration 2).

We could examine several other bouquets by the same painter (also with the same vase) and, as is well known, there are countless bouquets in the history of Western painting and they are present also in other traditions.

What is the role of flowers in painting? We might say that it is the same as in nature: they offer their colors. It would be legitimate to meditate for a long while about this "offering", this manifestation or natural appearance of color irreducible to any possible functions (attraction or repulsion of insects, etc.). But what is to be considered here is that when flowers are painted the offering itself appears.

In Furetière's dictionary, under the item "color", dealing with the sensible quality included in this noun, there is a subdivision that states: "color, is also said about solid bodies, about substances that are useful for painters and for dyers to make colors appear."[10] These colors are of course the ones we were talking about earlier. The color-painting is therefore designated, in a rather remarkable way, not as a means of imitation, of reproducing natural colors, but "to make them appear": to offer them as such, withdrawn from the environment and from perception in order to be presented as the sensation they offer, or also, in the double sense of the word, to the sensation that receives them (which, upon seeing them, tastes them, touches them, is delighted by them).

[9] Jean-Luc Nancy is here still citing from Mallarmé. Cf. "Avant-dire au *Traité du Verbe* de René Ghil (1886)", in S. Mallarmé, *Œuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 857-858 [TN].

[10] A. Furetière, *Les Couleurs*, ed. C. Wajsbrot (Cadeilhan: Zulma, 1997), 27. This is also why the French language of that time had a word, less definite today, *coloris*, that designates "the way in which colors are applied and mixed to make a painting" (Furetière). As the Italian word *colorito*, adopted later in German (*Kolorit*), this word was used to refer to the pictorial color, the use of color for an autonomous presentation, and not of individual colors, but of their composition, in the entirety of a specific form. Cf. J. Lichtenstein, "Coloris", in *Dictionary of the Untranslatables, A Philosophical Lexicon*, ed. B. Cassin (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014).

The sensible is what signifies itself and does not express anything else other than itself, as long as it is withdrawn from perception; perception registers the environment and organizes a behavior. Sensation is satisfied – if one can say so – with offering (itself) to be sensed (again, according to the propitious double sense of the word). *Sentir* (in the French connotation of "smell", "inhale a scent", that one may dream of extending to all the senses) does nothing other than giving itself to be felt. The sensation – or the sentiment, there is no difference in this respect – signifies itself in the sense that it presents itself to itself: a color, a sound, a taste, a smell, a texture will present itself as what is felt by a "feeler", who identifies this color, this sound, etc. only by identifying herself with it. Color colors me, sound makes me resonate: all the analyses of the information pathways, of nervous and neuronal receptors, cannot replace the sensible in its self-presentation as sensed or felt. The feeler and what he or she feels are in this sense the *same*; this has been said since Aristotle and the statue of Condillac that becomes smell, color and sound which penetrates it and must not be mocked, as is often done: it is a figure of the self-sensing of the sensation.[11]

3

Color is one of the modes of sensation, which are irreducible to one another; even if some metaphors, such as musical colors or pictorial tones, determine a peculiar crossing and overlapping that makes them all touch each other simultaneously. No doubt these are not metaphors at all. If it were supposedly always possible to distinguish clearly between a proper sense and a figurative sense,[12] it is surely in the domain of inter-sensorial metaphors ("the line of a song" or "the tenderness of a hue", there are lots of examples) that this indistinctness manifests itself best. The vocabularies for sensation refer easily to one another because it is always about "self-signifying", in one way or another, "self-presenting", "self-forming" or "self-making". A color does not signify itself as "red" but each time as this red or that red, light, dark, lively, faded, acid, irritating, deep, etc. The great abundance of the names of colors and the ingenuity that goes into creating them bears witness to an extreme susceptibility of the modality (and the world) of colors to a never

[11] The self-sensing in sensation simultaneously and indistinctly represents the becoming-world of the subject and the becoming-subject of the world. "While sensing, [the Artist] experiences what happens to him, and what happens to him is presence itself, which is co-presence, being-with-the-world. Sensation does not provide only impressions (...) it is first of all a symbiotic communication with the world, and as such, it is feeling." Cf. H. Maldiney, *Aux déserts que l'hisoire accable. L'art de Tal Coat* (Montolieu: Deyrolle, 1996), 109, in the citation by M. Callot, *La Pensée-paysage* (Arles: Actes Sud/ENSP, 2011), 114. To tell the truth, the idea of "symbiosis" that Maldiney uses is a suggestive but insufficient image: a symbiotic association is beneficial for two distinct individuals, whereas what happens with sensation in itself (in this πρᾶξις of the Sensible that is called ποίησις) is different from the subject-object pair (perception, knowledge) as well as from an association of subjects (symbiosis, society): it is the autonomous vibration – called for better or worse "artist", or "Artwork", "aesthetic" or "poetry" in the broad sense – of what makes it possible to experience anything at all, in other words the *self-sensing of or as being*, which is simply "being" (an ontological distinction should be introduced here, but this is not the right place to do so). It is not a reunion of two previously separate entities, symbiosis, sympathy or sympoetry (Schlegel's word), nor a coming together of different pieces – symbols – but it is a unity prior to all reunion, and hence prior to any division, having in itself the possibility of division and of relation, in this sense less a unity than an opening: it is what is named by the verbs "being", "creating", and "appearing" that say the same thing. This thing is given or is present before and after language: it is felt.

[12] It is known that Derrida ("White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy") and Ricoeur (*The Rule of Metaphor*) animated – with others – a decisive debate on this question.

ending search for minuscule variations, continuously and without end (carmine red, violet, cinnabar, vermilion, cherry, scarlet, madder, crimson, garnet, burgundy, etc.) At the same time, all reds nevertheless signify themselves as red, all the way to the end where they slip into orange, violet, brown, pink, etc.

Each color sensation is held in a continuous movement within which it is barely possible to isolate and to fix this specific color. Or better: a specific color can be determined only in a specific sensation – this red, here, in this specific place of the painting, of the petal, of the skirt, at this moment, in this light. It demands a sort of *freeze-frame*, which is what painting seeks to do, and this without waiting for Impressionism (but we will come back to the diachrony and the synchrony of the material). But this freeze-frame cannot remain motionless: color pulsates, vibrates, quivers.[13] Color is not simply identical to itself. At the same time, a specific color (supposed or considered to be specific) is also carried away over time, it changes depending on the light, on the gaze, as well as on the proximity, on the touching and on the reflection of the neighboring colors. A color is always also its own transformation, and not in a secondary manner, but indeed in a primary and constitutive manner.

We can say that the same happens for sound. This is correct, in several respects. Sound, however, spreads out in its essential dimension of duration: it appears, it dwells and vanishes: Nevertheless it has a real presence, not a fleeting one. It is the presence in us of a piece of music in its entirety, or of a melodic phrase, or of a resonating pitch. I hear this song here and now, this movement of a given quartet, this voice. This presence nonetheless stays afar, depending also on my musical knowledge.[14]

The sound gives its presence in a coming and going without end. Color[15] in a certain way appears and disappears at the same time, it oscillates in a never ending present. Namely, it does not appear and disappear literally, but it does not stop to give and withdraw its identity (*this* color) in an infinitesimal flutter. These are two perfectly distinguished modalities of the presence that signals and signifies itself – the coming that traverses, the pressure of a wink. They cross, there is no question, in that they call from one to the other in a deep rhythm of the presence and of the present. But we could say that sound plays a more honest game by declaring where it traverses, that it comes and goes (thus penetrating sensitively into an "inside" from which it departs just as sensitively). Color, on the other hand, makes us believe in its steadfast stability, in front and hence outside, even though it produces a flux of agitated inputs.

[13] At this point, and maybe only at this point, the analysis of the physical frequencies overlaps with the reflection on the Sensible.

[14] Even though there is a chromatic knowledge, which is comparable to acoustic knowledge, there is no pictorial knowledge that can be compared to musical knowledge. Clearly, the difference is expressed by the fact that unlike music, there is no pictorial writing that can be distinguished from its execution. And even non-written, improvised, music refers – in any musical system – to some form of coding and/or of calculation device. Such devices exist in painting only as *bricolage*, as trial, as preference of the individual artist (and sometimes kept as a jealous secret). There are pictorial techniques as there is the art of the lute, but there are no real "systems" (if we overlook the geometric or symbolic relationship systems, whose levels of meaning have nothing to do with painting, just like the self-signification that we are discussing here.

[15] And maybe with line, if the two are closely united in the visible *form*.

Each of these two modes of sensation – if we consider only them – can claim an aesthetic privilege or exemplarity. We won't start a debate on precedence. It is only important to underline here that color proposes a paradigm of sensation as a relationship to the world outside and in front of me – in this distance, which has so often been considered to be a cognitive and theoretical model since Plato's "idea" (visible form).[16]

4

The visible is in front of us. It faces us, it appears on the surface, and the surface is colored. It makes no sense to imagine a colorless surface, with the exception of posing a geometric plane that rightly does not appear in front of anything and anybody, but merely stretches out in two directions. Geometry does not consider the surfaces in and of itself, as moments or elements of the coming into the light arising from a background, in relationship to a background, or even from the background itself. The geometrical plane can rest on a structure of other planes that define a volume: but the volume itself has neither background nor surface, it is in the relationship of the planes.

Color nonetheless does not merely appear at the surface, nor on the surface, it makes the background appear on the surface. It is not only the expression of the background, it is the background itself – even when it is obscure – or the thickness of the material that manifests itself. Color itself is thick – it doesn't matter if it is a thin sediment of a wash drawing or the layer of a dense texture. This is why it does not restrict itself to "covering", as the etymology of the Latin word would suggest (just like the etymology of the Greek word). The first thought that one has to dedicate to color has to consist of removing this idea of covering, or of an ornamental layer. Color does not cover, no more than skin covers: like skin, it manifests the body, the substance, putting it into the world.

A poet says it this way:[17]

> Substance
> Is this black background of color: the black of the earthquake and of
> the eclipse into which a great nameless painter, if he does exist,
> will immerse his brushes.

Without attempting an exegesis of this fragment, let's consider the words "substance", "black" and "immerse". It is less concerned with a black substance than with black, with the black background as substance. Namely, to evoke the terms of the debate between Goethe and Hegel against Newton, it is not an analysis of light (color according to the prism and the spectra), but of an alteration, a disturbance that happens to it.[18] This

[16] Even though, as said earlier, εἶδος is, in Plato, first of all, the invisible, while the really visible (the Sensible) is made of χρῶμα accompanied by σχῆμα. Ideas (that are often translated as "form" nowadays...) are certainly not colored. Nonetheless, the significance of the visual model is that the visible meets the seer; it presents itself to him. What is at stake is the correctness and the integrity of vision and sight. Color can clearly not be seen correctly: its appearance, its manifestation takes place in a vibratory communication between the visible and the beholder.

[17] A. de Bouchet, *Peinture* (Montpellier: Fata Morgana, 1983), 167.

[18] We are not going to go into the history of this very famous debate that marked the introduction of the debate on color into the modern era, because it was thanks to Goethe (Hegel will join his cause) that the thought about color in itself was inaugurated, and today, after Cézanne and Matisse, it can be left to unfold in a line of thought of its own.

background, the obscurity and opacity of the material in itself – of the thing in itself – is what allows the thing to manifest itself for itself. Immersing the brushes into the substance is striving for the manifestation – in general and as itself: enabling the thing or things to come into the world. So Theodor Hetzer could talk about "color as a symbol of matter existing in itself and which has to be overcome through formation."[19]

Understood in this way, color is neither "in front of" nor does it "cover" the object. It is in the front without being distant, it is the surface as a background that comes to the front. From the front and from the background, from the general material on the outside, it is what it touches.

Color touches, it is the tangible of the visible; it is not the mobile and moving tangible which is the one of the modeled, of the volume, of the pending, of the coming close (even though color does partake in all this: no line, no matter how thin, is not colored) but the touch of the grain, of the density and of the fluidity, of the thickness and of the thinness, the tangible of the vibration and of the pulsation. Color touches through pulsations, it pushes and withdraws, it comes forward and retreats, it flatters or it attacks.

As Hetzer also writes, "color is might."[20] Guido Reni, depicting the "Union of Drawing and Color" (a topic that suggests a lot about this question also in 1620; cf. Illustration 4) shows Drawing that with one hand, in fact, draws (maybe he is looking at and drawing his companion) and with the other hand holds Color by the shoulders. Color, on the other hand, holds a palette, but she is not painting and she is not looking at her companion, her eyes are gazing into space, touching her own breast flesh on flesh at the junction with the colored fabrics.

translated by Giada Mangiameli

Important literature on this topic exists already. From a philosophical perspective, one of the best approaches is that by Eliane Escoubas, in a chapter of *Imago mundi*, Galilée, 1986. Suffice it here to notice that, albeit on opposite camps, both Goethe and Newton refer to "light" – analyzed or altered – understood as a glowing source of light, as *lux* – luminescence in some sense. The debate is about this dependency on a representation of a pure and original luminosity. We cannot be enmeshed in this debate. *Lux* has indeed in itself the idea of an absolute emergence, of a *fiat lux* that would be a tautology, *lux* being none other than the *fiat* of the world and the other way around. This light emerges in a pure "in front of" the world and of all gazes, and it can only dazzle (it is also the Sun in Plato). In the realm of Art, it is related to the golden background of the icons and of an important part of paintings up to the time of Giotto. It [the golden background] never stops haunting painting, for example in Turner, in Monet ("Impression, Sunrise": the title and the painting deserve a reflection about the desire to paint the emergence of the *lux* that at the same time is completely given as color, in color) and through to the elevation of neon lights to Art (cf. Illustration 3). But painting never stops showing that there is no *lux* if not as *lumen*, not so much directed on them, but penetrating and expressing them, emerging from them as their manifestation and in this sense each time individually modulated, namely colored – in this way achieving the third name of light: *splendor*. Thoughts about color envelop an atheism of *splendor* (that can be that of the "black background").

[19] To offer the best possible translation of "die Farbe als Symbol der an sich existierenden und durch Gestaltung zur überwindenden Materie". Cf. T. Hetzer, *Tizian* (Stuttgart: Urauchhaus, 1992), 184.

[20] "Farbe ist Macht," ibidem.

Illustration 1: “Bouquet of flowers” by Pierre Bonnard (Albert André Museum, Bagnoles-sur-Cèze)

Illustration 2: “Flowers on a fireplace” by Pierre Bonnard (private collection)

Illustration 3: “Neon art” by Seletti

Illustration 4: “Union of Drawing and Color” by Guido Reni (Louvre, Paris)



Piotr Nowak

THE MAN FROM UNDER GROUND

[M. Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente* (Amsterdam: Querido, 1947); English translations: *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972); *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002)]

HOMER AND MAN

In Greece, the observer (θεωρός) – the one who observes and sees – precedes observation (θεωρεῖν), or the activity itself. The Homeric hero would see into the future, thus allowing him to later see that which he would not normally perceive. Such was the case with his own body. "Theory" merely gave him an identity, the material with which he could reassemble, rebuild himself at any moment, though he had always been there. The concept of the body (σῶμα) did not apply to living people: it was only used in reference to corpses. The living enjoyed a δέμας, a mobile body that could not be described as an autonomous creation. The Greeks did not explore the body's various nooks and crannies; they did not peek inside or peel back the skin. It was only the surface of the body, its beauty, that the Greeks regarded as wholly their own. Thus the word χρώς, skin, in effect refers to one's superficial aspect; it delineates the boundary between the person and the world, and, sometimes, describes his color or pigmentation; when Homer's characters put on armor, he describes them as fastening it over their skin. Conversely, μέλεα and γυῖα indicate a body that is capable

of movement, a body equipped with the power to set itself in motion. Thus it is more the limbs than the *corpus* that constitute the body. Homer prefers to describe great hearts, firm hands, strong shoulders, and swift legs than some general, abstract body. Where does this place the soul (ψυχή)? The soul merely animates the body, keeping it in motion (alive), not unlike an engine that determines the power of the machine it propels. "This vital breath is, as it were, a semi-concrete organ which exists in a man as long as he lives,"[1] observes Bruno Snell. Thus we say that the ψυχή departs from a person at the moment of his death, but also when he faints, sleeps, or rests. The soul ("life") abandons a person for good through a bodily orifice (the mouth, a wound) and proceeds to Hades, where it remains a mere shadow, a "reflection" of the body, an εἴδωλον. To bring the soul salvation means, among Homeric heroes, to preserve their ability to navigate the world, to grant protective coverage to their own power, their own dynamics. To lose the soul is to lose power.

Movement is driven by θυμός, a word which conveys strong feelings that prompt a person to move: happiness, pride, proclivity, love, anger. While ψυχή refers to people and their lives, θυμός can also be used to describe the behavior of animals. Yet it is only humans who employ both θυμός and νόος, imagination. The former is a dynamic power, the latter a receptive one; it takes impressions and transforms them into images. Θυμός and νόος together form ψυχή. In Homer's dictionary, these concepts typically resemble organs that govern the body's mobility.

Heraclitus claimed that reason was common to all people.[2] To Homer, different people could not possibly have a shared spirituality; it would be as if they had a shared hand or eye, or suffered a shared wound.

Is the soul itself therefore the πρῶτον κινοῦν, the prime mover? No: Homer was not yet aware of any central point serving as the "control center" for the organic system. "Mental and spiritual acts are due to the impact of external factors, and man is the open target of a great many forces which impinge upon him, and penetrate his very core."[3] The inside is a space that is acted upon by non-human forces. What forces are they? The most primal of them all: ones given by the gods.

The gods in Homer's world impart man with the will to live; they are the source of his energy, his power. They imbue the θυμός with strength. Thus Homeric heroes can hardly be said to make their own decisions. Rather, they are in a sense beset and manipulated by the gods. If so, then who is Odysseus – the most important character (from the philosophical point of view) in Homer's epic poem? Who fills him? Who is it that pulls his strings?

ODYSSEUS, MEANING WHO EXACTLY?

He certainly is crafty, πολύτροπος. Robert Fagles depicts him as a "man of twists and turns." To Richmond Lattimore, he is a "man of many ways." Barry Powell, meanwhile, describes

[1] B. Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind in Greek Philosophy and Literature*, trans. T. G. Rosenmeyer (New York: Dover Publications, 1982), 9.

[2] Z. Bauman, M. Bieńczyk, M. Dzielska, M. P. Markowski, S. Minkov, G. W. Most, J. M. Rymkiewicz, T. Sławek, J. Zychowicz, "Lekcja interpretacji: cztery zdania z Heraklita" ("Lessons in Interpretation: Four Sentences from Heraclitus"), *Kronos* 2 (2008).

[3] Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, 20.

him simply as "resourceful." Whatever the translation, the character is an extraordinary one: the poet emphasizes as much in the very first line of the poem. Somewhat later Nestor explains to Telemachus, the son of Odysseus, that "no one (...) could hope to rival," him, "not for sheer cunning – at every twist of strategy he excelled us all."[4]

He pretends to be someone else five times in the *Odyssey*. We know that he "plundered the hallowed heights of Troy" (HF, 1:2-3) and, shortly thereafter, Ismaros. It was his conviction that the weak would suffer what they must, and the strong could (and did) do with them what they pleased. Thus Odysseus' turbulent ten-year voyage begins with the slaughter of the Cicones, to the great displeasure of Zeus. "Zeus presented us with disaster, me and my comrades/ doomed to suffer blow on mortal blow" (HF, 9:61-62), he says to the Phaeacians. Odysseus set off with a fleet of a dozen ships. "Out of each ship, six men-at-arms were killed" (HF, 9:69) – a substantial portion of his crew of several hundred. Their shadows trailed behind the living for some time, following their voices, as the dead can hear – so Homer claims – but cannot see. Odysseus again loses companions in the land of the Lotus-eaters, where there grew flowers that gave unremitting pleasure, granting those who ate them the blessing of forgetting. Those who submitted to the narcotic numbness gradually gave themselves up, eradicating every trace of their own autonomy and free will. They found themselves stranded, stripped of the desire for human relationships. The next island encountered by Odysseus and his men is inhabited by the Cyclops, beings unfamiliar with any law beyond the law of survival and self-preservation. They were not even bound by divine law, though some of them were the descendants of the gods. "We Cyclops never blink at Zeus and Zeus's shield/ of storm and thunder, or any other blessed god – / we've got more force by far" (HF, 9:309-311). The only language used by the Cyclops was the language of violence. For this reason – or lack thereof – one of them slays Odysseus' "finest" (HF, 9:217) companions. The hero himself manages to escape with his life, but at the cost of calling his own identity into question when he renounces his own name:

> Nobody is my name. My father and mother call me
> Nobody, as do all the others who are my companions.[5]

"Nobody" – Οὖτις in Greek – can also be expressed by using the particle of negation, μή. This produces a pun that is descriptive of Odysseus' behavior: Οὖτις (nobody) and μήτις, deceit. Thus the Cyclops Polyphemus is deceived. "Good friends, Nobody is killing me by force or treachery" (HL, 9:408) Freed from the trap, Odysseus finally reveals his true name. A naïve reading of the ninth book of the Odyssey would interpret Odysseus' actions as sign of foolish, disastrous pride, mad ὕβρις.[6] Yet the revelation of his true name

[4] Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. R. Fagles (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 3:134-136. Subsequent references are cited parenthetically, preceded by HF.

[5] Homer, *The Odyssey of Homer*, trans. R. Lattimore (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 9:366-367. Subsequent references are cited parenthetically, preceded by HL.

[6] Even as shrewd a reader of Greek myths as Jean-Pierre Vernant can fall into an interpretative rut, perceiving in Odysseus the inability to resist "the pleasure of taunting and gloating." J.-P. Vernant, *The Universe, the Gods, and Men: Ancient Greek Myths*, trans. L. Asher (New York: Perennial, 2002), 92.

is for the hero a return to himself, an attempt to rebuild the identity he lost among the Cyclops. But all in vain: Zeus is unmoved by Odysseus' sacrifice, while Poseidon hears Polyphemus' prayer for his enemy to return home "a broken man – all shipmates lost – / alone in a stranger's ship" (HF, 9:593-594) after years of wandering. Subsequently, when Odysseus and his company end up at the "somber feast" of the cannibals, most of his companions fall victim to the hosts' appetites. At long last the sailors of the sole surviving ship take refuge on Circe's island, where they disembark unaware that their unbridled sexual urges will transform them into swine.[7] They momentarily forget that they are human. Once the spell is removed, they depart with Odysseus to a place where the sun neither rises nor sets.

ΚΑΤΑΒΑΣΙΣ

The Menippean stage of Odysseus' adventures seems no less fascinating than his maritime peregrinations, as it involves images of his journey to the world of the dead. Odysseus arrives in a strange place, enshrouded in mist, located at the far end of the ocean. This land is impenetrable to sunlight. Its inhabitants are immersed in the darkness of night, as if in a dream. It is thus untrue that Odysseus descended – as superficial commentators of Homer have claimed and emphasized – to Hades, as did Orpheus, Heracles, and, in later times, Jesus of Nazareth. He arrives in the realm of the Cimmerians as if entering a haunted house. It is an exterritorial space of sorts, a place veiled in such pitch-black darkness that one cannot tell Olympus from Hades, up from down, nor left from right. Odysseus begins by digging a trench for a sacrifice, sprinkling it with honey, milk, sweet wine, water, and barley. Then he slaughters rams, letting their black blood soak into the soil. In doing so he becomes a medium through which specters reveal their problematic presence. "And he does see coming toward him the crowd of those who are nobody, οὖτις, as he once pretended to be – the nameless, the νώνυμνοι, people who no longer have faces, who are no longer visible, who have no more substance. They form a vague mass of being who used to be individual persons but can no longer be distinguished. From that mass swarming past him there rises a terrifying, undifferentiated sound."[8] This is the throbbing chaos of life, the "bobok."[9] It emits εἴδωλα, "doppelgängers," a semblance of existence. "Up out of Erebus they came,/ flocking toward me now, the ghosts of the dead and gone.../ Brides and unwed youths and old men who had suffered much/ and girls with their tender hearts freshly scarred by sorrow,/ and great armies of battle dead" (HF, 11:40-45). The first shadows that approach him in Hades are the specters of unburied casualties and those whose deaths came unexpectedly. Their complaints testify to the political consequences

[7] Socrates pointed out the dehumanizing power of an excessive "capitalistic" appetite for food products. This observation appears in his discussion with Xenophon, where he says "in jest, 'it was by providing a feast of such things that Circe made swine; and it was partly by the prompting of Hermes, partly through his own self-restraint and avoidance of excessive indulgence in such things, that Odysseus was not turned into a pig.'" Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, (1.3.7), in *Xenophon in Seven Volumes*, vol. 4, trans. E. C. Marchant (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923).

[8] Vernant, *The Universe, the Gods, and Men*, 102.

[9] F. Dostoyevsky, "Bobok", in *White Nights and Other Stories*, trans. C. Garnett (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2009), 134-148.

of leaving the deceased unburied: the dead want to be interred, and when they are not, they begin to interfere in the matters of the living.

> What is a specter? A dead person who has not been properly mourned, who haunts us, bothers us, refusing to pass over to the "other side," where the dearly-departed can accompany us at a distance sufficient for us to live our own lives without forgetting them, but also without dying their death – without being the prisoner of the repetition of their final moments. Then what is a specter become the essence of the specter, the specter par excellence? A dead person whose death is such that we cannot mourn them. That is to say: a dead person for whom the work of mourning, the passage of time, proves inadequate for a tranquil bond between them and the living to be envisaged. A dead person the horror of whose death lays heavy not only upon their nearest and dearest, but upon all those who cross the path of their history.
>
> Essential specters are those of terrible deaths: premature deaths, odious deaths, the death of a child, the death of parents knowing their children are destined to the same end – and yet others. Natural or violent deaths, deaths which cannot be come to terms with either by those whom they befall, or by those who survive them. Essential specters are the dead who will always refuse to "pass over," who obstinately cast off their shroud to declare to the living, in spite of all evidence, that they still belong amongst them. Their end attests to no meaning, brings with it no completion. These are not necessarily shadows who declare their revenge, but shadows who cry out beyond all vengeance.[10]

In the "haunted house" the shadows of the dead descend upon Odysseus: taking pity upon him, his mother calls out, "My son, my son, the unluckiest man alive!" (HF, 11:247); there is Agamemnon, who "died a wretched, ignominious death" (HF, 11:466) and now warns him of the duplicity of wives; and Achilles, who would sooner hire himself out to a tenant farmer than rule over "all the breathless dead" (HF, 11:556-558). Ostensibly, this last sentence is an obvious contradiction of Book IX of the *Iliad* (411-417), in which Achilles consciously chooses a brave yet short existence while forfeiting his chances at a long life of toil. Yet the lament of his shadow and his longing for the sun seem entirely understandable to us: the soul loses its power in the land of the shadows, and power was the quality that defined Achilles' entire being. A soul separated from the body is nothing: it is a specter, a phantasm, as Odysseus' mother explains to her son. "This is just the way of mortals when we die./ Sinews no longer bind the flesh and bones together – / the fire in all its fury burns the body down to ashes/ once life slips from the white bones, and the spirit,/ rustling, flitters away... flown like a dream" (HF, 9:249-253). That is why Tantalus suffers thirst and Sisyphus slaves away until the end of time. It is not death by gradual

[10] Q. Meillassoux, "Spectral Dilemma", trans. R. Mackay, *Collapse* 4 (2008), 261-262.

disappearance nor the ultimate decay of all its traces. Nor can such a death be regarded as the regression of matter to its inorganic form: the specters Odysseus encounters contradict this notion. It would seem that the actual end of a person occurs with his return to the state of a trembling, jelly-like matter, resembling infinite insanity more than nothingness. Such a death can be described as an unindividuated superfluity of existence.

> For becoming-material would be the effacement of the selection of images. And it would seem then that to make an image of death, we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and of elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of all things, traversing us continually and instantaneously. As if the nothing of death could not be understood as a simple void, but on the contrary only as a saturation, an abominable superfluity of existence. Death, thus understood, is the triumphant reign of communication.
> To die is to become a pure point of passage, a pure centre of communication of all things with all things. It will be seen, then, that the living being is not the emergence of pain in an atrophied world, but on the contrary the diminution of madness in a becoming-terror of chaos, bringing the latter to an infinite speed.[11]

The mindless corpse constitutes a transitory point through which an infinite number of objects and images pass. Odysseus – an unquestionably mediumistic figure with mere traces of his own identity, one that is perpetually being blurred by outside additions – momentarily restores the specters' lost cohesiveness; he reinstates individuation into the chaos that engulfs their world, allowing them to finally speak. Among the first to do so is the blind (ὅμηρος) Tiresias, "whose mind remains unshaken" (HF, 10:542).[12] He divines the future for Odysseus, who henceforth knows what awaits him and his companions on his homeward voyage: "you'll come home late/ and come a broken man – all shipmates lost" (HF, 11:129-130). That is likely the precise outcome Circe is hoping for – that Odysseus will rejoin her once he discovers his grim fate.[13] He nevertheless chooses to sail on, condemning his crew to certain death. They perish first between Scylla and Charybdis

[11] Meillassoux, "Subtraction and Contraction: Deleuze, Immanence, and Matter and Memory", *Collapse* 3 (2007), 104.

[12] According to Quentin Meillassoux, the nature of his death would therefore be "philosophical" and gradual (by "contraction"), the opposite of death understood as an eternal and eternally "expanding" incoherence, as infinite madness and chaos. Ibid., 102. Erwin Rohde, on the other hand, correctly emphasizes the total unconsciousness and "mindlessness" of the human corpse. "Down in the murky underworld they now float unconscious, or, at most, with a twilight half-consciousness, wailing in a shrill diminutive voice, helpless, indifferent. Of course, flesh, bones, and sinews, the midriff, the seat of all the faculties of mind and will – these are all gone for ever. They were attached to the once-visible partner of the psyche, and that has been destroyed." E. Rohde, *Psyche. The Cult of Souls and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks*, trans. W. B. Hillis (Oxford: Routledge, 2001), 9.

[13] In some variants of the myth they have a son, Telegonus, who sets off in search of his father, killing him in an accidental scuffle. This story is mentioned by Eugammon of Cyrene (6th century BC) in the *Telegony*, which has not survived to the present day. This turn of events would contradict the words of the protagonist's mother, whose shadow predicted that a long life and gentle death awaited him.

and, later, on the sea, following their feast on the island of Helios. In the latter instance, the direct cause of their misery is λιμός, Hunger, which Hesiod lists among other children of Night: Darkness, Murder, Forgetfulness, and Sleep. Weary with hunger, the crew eat Helios' cattle while Odysseus sleeps.

> Father Zeus, and you other everlasting and blessed
> gods, with a pitiless sleep you lulled me, to my confusion,
> and my companions staying here dared a deed that was monstrous.
> (HL, 12:371-373)

It is rather significant that Odysseus falls asleep whenever he appears to be reaching the end of his journey: when he nearly lands in Ithaca with a cargo of winds bound by Aeolus; when his crew plunders the estate of the sun god; when he arrives at the island of the Phaeacians; and finally when the Phaeacians grant him passage home. Dreams mix with reality, as does hunger and darkness; forgetfulness leads to murder, and consequently to the death of the entire crew. Morpheus follows in the footsteps of his brother Thanatos. Odysseus summons the specters once more – this time using the voices of the Sirens, if it is true that "music is the call that lures [souls] toward death."[14] Sirens are the threat of death in its most savage and repulsive form – with no funeral, no tomb, nor ceremony to send the soul on its way into the afterlife – "only the corpse's decomposition in the open air."[15] Emerging unscathed from all his misadventures, Odysseus lands on the island of Ogygia, the home of Calypso – daughter of Atlas – a goddess whom he describes as strange and shunned by gods and men alike (HF, 7:285). He spends eight years with her, though some claim it is even more. But the exact number is irrelevant, as this is a place where one drops out of time, and every day is the same as the last. The name Calypso comes from the verb καλύπτω, to cover, to conceal. The nymph hides her visitor from people and from the gods. The two are alone. These are the happiest moments in Calypso's timeless existence. Hoping to keep him for herself, she offers Odysseus immortality. "Here Calypso is offering him nondeath and eternal youth, but there is a price to pay for achieving that metamorphosis. The price is that he remain with her, that he forget his homeland. And furthermore, if he stays on with Calypso, he will remain in concealment and thus cease to be himself – Odysseus, the homecoming hero."[16] But he remembers well the parable of Tithonus, brother of Priam, with whom the goddess Eos fell in love. She was said to have asked her father to grant her young lover

[14] P. Quignard, *The Hatred of Music*, trans. M. Amos, F. Rönnbäck (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 121. "Music penetrates to the interior of the body and takes hold of the soul. The flute induces a dance movement in the limbs of humans, followed by an irresistible salacious squirming. Music's prey is the human body. Music is invasion and capture of this body. It plunges those it tyrannizes into obedience by snaring them in the trap of its song. The Sirens become the ὁδός of Odysseus (ode in Greek means both path and song). Orpheus, the father of songs, softens stones and tames lions and harnesses them to plows. Music captures, it captivates in the place where it resounds and where humanity tramples toward its rhythm, it hypnotizes and causes man to abandon the expressible. In hearing, man is held captive." Ibid., 145.

[15] Vernant, "Feminine Figures of Death in Greece", trans. A. Doueihi, *Diacritics* 2, vol. 16 (1986), 60.

[16] Vernant, *The Universe, the Gods, and Men*, 112; "Feminine Figures of Death in Greece", 62-64.

immortality. This he gave to Tithonus, but without eternal youth, which the goddess forgot to request. By the age of two hundred he resembled more a withered insect than a man. In the end, he flew away in the form of a cicada. Odysseus departs as well. Freed by the intercession of Zeus or, equally likely, by the caprice of his mistress, he sails away and encounters the Phaeacians.

NAUSICAA

She is the first person whom Odysseus encounters after years of peregrination and captivity. I omit Odysseus' companions, as he does not encounter them, but soon loses them. He reveals himself to Nausicaa at the outskirts of the city, where the inhabitants go to wash their clothes, which the poet mentions several times (HF, 6:64, 101-104). Odysseus clearly longs for the sound of human speech, as he inquires in anticipation: "Am I truly/ in the neighborhood of human people I can converse with?" (HL, 6:124-125). Barely concealing his nudity, he reveals himself – "a terrible sight" – to the daughter of the Phaeacian king, appearing as a mountain lion and yet as something entirely unnameable. He has no single face. The existence of Odysseus is improvisation, constant metamorphosis, pretending. "At first he seemed appalling, I must say – / now he seems like a god who rules the skies up there!", Nausicaa says of him (HF, 6:268-269). Similar words are uttered by Argive Helen when Telemachus inquires about the true identity of his father. She, too, makes note of his fantastic proclivity for transformation.

> He hid himself, looking like another man, a beggar, such as there were none in the Greek camp. In this likeness he entered the city of the Trojans, and no one recognized him. I alone saw through his disguise, and I questioned him. In his cleverness he avoided me. But when I was bathing him and rubbing him with olive oil, and putting clothes on him, and swearing a great oath not to expose him as Odysseus among the Trojans before he returned to the swift ships and the huts – then he told me all the plans of the Achaeans. After he had killed many Trojans with his long sword, he returned to the Argives, bringing back much information.[17]

Odysseus is a person – or is he? – with no references or characteristics of his own. He slips into the palace unnoticed. He must walk in a manner that does not reveal his presence. He is not allowed to look at anyone: the invisible cannot make eye contact with others. Cunningly, the goddess addresses him in English: she hopes to prevent anyone from understanding their conversation:

> Well known to me the palace you inquire,
> For fast beside it dwells my honour'd sire:
> But silent march, nor greet the common train
> With question needless, or inquiry vain:

[17] Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans. B. Powell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4:221-231.

A race of rugged mariners are these:
Unpolish'd men, and boist'rous as their seas:
The native islanders alone their care,
And hateful he who breathes a foreign air.
These did the ruler of the deep ordain
To build proud navies, and command the main;
On canvas wings to cut the wat'ry way;
No bird so light, no thought so swift as they.[18]

Odysseus can be everything and nothing with equal ease. His past – which he himself recounts at the banquet held by the Phaeacians – may have some semblance of truth, yet it remains vague, fantastic, and adventurous, while his future – which only he knows – is a bloody and calamitous time for everyone whose path Odysseus crosses. Even someone with an ear as acute as that of Hans-Georg Gadamer can be mistaken in writing that "the encounter with Odysseus carries no consequences for Nausicaa herself."[19] It is as if he had forgotten about the destruction of the nation of the Phaeacians – a nation walled off in retribution for offering a visitor help and hospitality. Homer writes about the punishment that befalls the Phaeacians clearly and in no uncertain terms at the beginning of Book XIII, since "much that is terrible takes place in the Homeric poems, but it seldom takes place wordlessly."[20] Thus a ship and its crew of Phaeacian seamen sailing home from Ithaca are turned to stone, while the city founded[21] by the father of King Alcinous, Nausithous, is cut off from the sea by a mountain range. The Phaeacians cannot comprehend why this has happened. They suspect that they had failed to make the appropriate sacrifice to Poseidon when transporting their guest to the neighboring island. What they do not realize is that the true cause of their misfortune was their famed guest, Odysseus (HF, 13:187-212).

EVIL

Odysseus has an icy demeanor. His body and soul are certainly untouched by any trace of noble emotion, as Constantine P. Cavafy proposed in his poems. Odysseus is a bizarre assemblage of λόγος and ζωή, a combination of wisdom ("cunning") and fierce determination to survive at any cost. Pallas Athena describes him as such in blunt terms:

[18] *The Odyssey of Homer*, trans. A. Pope, (London 1867), 106 (7:37-48).
[19] H.-G. Gadamer, "Nauzykaja" (Nausicaa), trans. J. Gajda-Krynicka, *Odra* 2 (1995), 81.
[20] E. Auerbach, "Odysseus' Scar", in *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Thought*, trans. W. R. Trask (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003), 6. Jorge Luis Borges make the same argument even more emphatically when he writes: "In Book VIII of the *Odyssey* we read that the gods weave misfortunes into the pattern of events to make a song for future generations to sing. Mallarmé's statement that the world exists in order to be written in a book seems to repeat, some thirty centuries later, the same concept of an aesthetic justification for evils." J. L. Borges, *Other Inquisitions, 1937-1952*, trans. R. L. C. Simms (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1964), 116.
[21] The political act of founding a city, Homer writes, involves marking its boundaries, erecting houses, and choosing a place for the temple (HF, 6:10-13).

> Any man – any god who met you – would have to be
> some champion lying cheat to get past you
> for all-round craft and guile! You terrible man,
> foxy, ingenious, never tired of twists and tricks –
> so, not even here, on native soil, would you give up
> those wily tales that warm the cockles of your heart!
> (HF, 13:329-334)

We invariably encounter Odysseus in somewhat murky, ambiguous, embarrassing circumstances. His interests include people who have been poisoned with ricin – or stabbed with knives. This is readily apparent in an examination of a book as beautiful and illuminated with good light as the *Iliad*. We first meet Odysseus – embroiled in a crude exchange with Thersites, who "baited the kings"[22] – as he quells a mutiny in the ranks of the soldiery. We meet him again in the infamous Tenth Book. Though the Greeks fought each other by day – under the light of the sun that glorified the ἀρετή of noble men – Odysseus has the Trojan spy Dolon executed under the cover of night, when no one can see or judge his actions. He uses the dull Diomedes to this end as one would a sharp sword or similar tool: "On with it now – show us your strength, full force./ Don't just stand there, useless with your weapons./ Loose those horses – or you go kill the men/ and leave the team to me!"[23] In Books IV (verse 271 et pass.) and VIII (verse 487 et pass.) of the *Odyssey*, the poet holds his hero directly responsible for devising and deploying in the ἀγών a deadly piece of technology (the infamous "horse"), inciting the gods to mete out punishment by thwarting his return home.

One would describe Odysseus as δεινός, as he is able to take advantage of any situation and exploit it to his own benefit. This cunning is his worst and most dangerous quality. All ex-centric extremes – "an immortal devastation/ terrible, savage, wild, no fighting her, no defense" (HF, 12:128-129) (a description of Scylla) – are comprehensible; they are easily "diagrammed," mapped out, analyzed, and circumvented. Cunning is unpredictable. The evil it smuggles into the world is an unexpected one. Odysseus finds a way out of every circumstance. He his πανοῦργος, capable of anything.

> This natural counterpart to φρόνησις is characterized by the fact that the δεινός is "capable of anything"; he uses his skills to any purpose and is without inhibition. He is ἄνευ ἀρετῆς. And it is more than accidental that such a person is given a name that also means "terrible." Nothing is so terrible, so uncanny, so appalling, as the exercise of brilliant talents for evil.[24]

Odysseus is "uncanny" in the sense of the German *unheimlich*. His actions are driven by an inhuman necessity, while he himself is led by the forces of fate, which

[22] Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. R. Fagles (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 106 (2:248).
[23] Ibid., 292 (10:553-556).
[24] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. J. Weinsheimer, D. G. Marshal (London: Continuum, 2006), 320.

command him to "suffer all that Fate/ and the overbearing Spinners spun out on his life line/ the very day his mother gave him birth" (HF, 7:232-234) – and to suffer all that the inhuman nature of things commands.

> But there's no way to hide the belly's hungers –
> what a curse, what mischief it brews in all our lives!
> (HF, 16:313-314)

But when he murders his wife's one hundred and eight suitors, he is not driven by hunger. They perish because they found themselves in the wrong place: at the οἶκος rather than the agora, and because they had diminished his wealth. Their slaughter resembles the execution of Dolon. It takes place at night and is a premeditated crime, a mass killing. It is veiled in the darkness of the household: a realm of necessity that is not for show; where promiscuous handmaidens are hanged by a clothesline. Odysseus' actions are distinguished by their sheer ruthlessness, as is every action undertaken in defense of ζωή by a mind shaken to its existential foundations. His cunning – as Gadamer suggests above – is the antithesis of courage and prudence. It is essentially the ability to adapt to unknown forces, to assimilate into chaos. "In reality, Odysseus, the subject, denies his own identity, which makes him a subject, and preserves his life by mimicking the amorphous realm."[25] In the struggle against the forces of nature, reason is most terrifying when, in order to salvage the foundations of its existence, it resorts to casting aside that which makes it human. "The formula for Odysseus's cunning is that the detached, instrumental mind, by submissively embracing nature, renders to nature what is hers and thereby cheats her" (DE, 45). What is rendered to nature is in fact violence directed at the human βίος: Odysseus alone knows that his companions must die, and he knows that not a single suitor will keep his head. Everything he encounters withers and dies. Reason is terrifying when it gives itself up, calling itself Nobody and hiding behind its nothingness: "his obedience to his name and his repudiation of it, are really the same thing. He declares allegiance to himself by disowning himself as Nobody; he saves his life by making himself disappear" (DE, 47-48).[26] Whenever reason finds itself in dangerous circumstances, it casts doubt on the foundations of rationality, questioning its humanity and disowning its human origin, its human roots. Odysseus thus cannot ease the torment of nostalgia by going home, going "to Ithaca," as he rejects the word in favor of extra-discursive mythical violence: "he would fear to become Nobody again if he did not reestablish his own identity by means of the magical word" (DE, 53). Yet when he attempts to do so, when λόγος momentarily gets the better of ζωή within him, his words strike the gods and people as bloody sounds: the Phaeacians turn to stone the moment they hear them. Odysseus has no place in the city of free people. He must travel far away from there, preferably to a place where people – people? – will take his oar for a spade.

[25] M. Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments*, trans. E. Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 53. Subsequent references are cited parenthetically, preceded by DE.
[26] Jean Améry offers a poignant discussion of this idea in *At the Mind's Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities*, trans. S. Rosenfeld, S. P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). I refer in particular to the eponymous opening chapter.

Let us reiterate: in the *Iliad* the actions of the magnanimous are seen by all, while in the *Odyssey* the behavior of its protagonist is characterized by its secretiveness. Meanwhile, Odysseus himself usually remains the only witness of the events he describes, and of which he conceals more than he reveals. When he finally arrives in his homeland, he is recognized by no one save for the gods, a dog, and a slave. He murders the suitors unclothed, acting in blind, naked fury. Socrates uses him as an example in teaching Alcibiades the difference between justice and injustice.[27]

Ultimately unable to liberate himself from the wheel of life and death, he consciously chooses to live out his days as a private person, preferring to stay in the shadows, indifferent to public matters. Recall that this is precisely the image with which Plato concludes the *Republic*.

> And by chance Odysseus' soul had drawn the last lot of all and went to choose; from memory of its former labors it had recovered from love of honor; it went around for a long time looking for the life of a private man who minds his own business; and with effort it found one lying somewhere, neglected by the others. It said when it saw this life that it would have done the same even if it had drawn the first lot, and was delighted to choose it. And [in these circumstances,] from the other beasts, similarly some went into human lives and into one another [some people turned into animals, which, in the case of democracy – the regime of private people – seems only natural] – the unjust changing into savage ones, the just into tame ones, and there were all kinds of mixtures.[28]

In *Hippias Minor* the word πολύτροπος, "wily," is used to mean "false." In his conversation with Socrates, Hippias juxtaposes plainspoken Achilles, a man hewed from a simple wood, with the ambiguous existence of Odysseus, who is "wise at least in this very thing, deception."[29] The difference between the two heroes was obvious to Athenians in the fifth century BC: both inhabit mutually incompatible worlds. Achilles' straightforward disposition, as Aristotle describes it in the Book IV of *Nicomachean Ethics*, is characterized by a lofty, aristocratic outlook that translates into a scorn for death. His severe code of honor, his magnanimity, ἀγών, simplicity, and respect for the world, and his characteristic approach to asceticism, combined with the athletic beauty of his body, were simply foreign to Odysseus. The latter represents a modern and "democratic" – so to speak – approach to reality. The modern person is defined by his flexibility, the ease with which he assimilates and adapts to difficult circumstances, the skill with which he conducts incessant negotiations, and, finally, his intellectual openness. Such a person is capable of great sacrifice in the name of individual success,

[27] Plato, *Alcibiades I*, in *Plato*, vol. 8, trans. W. R.M. Lamb (London: William Heinemann, 1927), 129-131 (112a-d).
[28] Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. A. Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 303 (620c-d). Author's comments in square brackets.
[29] Plato, *The Hippias Minor*, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol. 3, trans. R. E. Allen (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1996), 33 (366a).

which he admittedly associates with glory, but he is nevertheless incapable of living or dying for glory. Glory that is not synonymous with particularistic goods strikes the modern-day Odysseus as somewhat abstract.[30] The Odysseus of today, in short, is an American expat in Frankfurt[31].

translated by Arthur Barys

[30] B. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes: Sophocles' Tragic Hero and His Time* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), 121-122.

[31] This is an excerpt of the first chapter of Piotr Nowak's book *I Die, Therefore I am* (2016). Translation was made possible with funding from the Book Institute's SAMPLE TRANSLATIONS ©POLAND program.

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SUMMARY

Krzysztof Michalski

MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF TRUTH

What is the being of being? – τί τὸ ὄν – this is a question that has been "asked for a very long time, and today, a question which will be asked forever, and will always worry us..." The above conviction of Aristotle is, from Heidegger's point of view, an accurate prediction of the destinies of European philosophy. A philosopher, Heidegger says, is he who asks about being – even if he is unaware of it. Ordinarily, however, we understand the word "philosopher" otherwise; we apply it to someone who is searching for truth, who "loves wisdom." Heidegger's answer to the question: who is a philosopher?, seems to be different from the common one; yet, his reflection on the history of European philosophy concerns the same persons whom we usually call philosophers.

We usually conceive of the "searching for truth" as an attempt at arriving at true knowledge; in searching for truth we want to gain such knowledge that would show us a thing as it is. "Truth" is commonly believed to be a qualification of knowledge. It characterizes the knowledge that shows us reality as it is, that conforms to reality.

Yet, according to Heidegger, truth, conceived as the correspondence of knowledge with a thing, is by no means a relationship between two things: knowledge on the one hand, and a thing on the other. Knowledge, by its very nature, pertains to a thing, and is – as proven by Husserl – intentional, whereas the thing is merely its correlate. Therefore, one cannot sensibly speak of a thing in separation from our knowledge of it; nor can one speak of knowledge in separation from the thing it pertains to.

Richard Capobianco

HEIDEGGER'S BEING AS *ALETHEIA*: "OLDER" THAN THE HUMAN BEING

Our contemporary age remains dominated by an array of "subjectivisms," including the persistent Cartesianism and Kantianism of classical phenomenology as inaugurated by Husserl. Husserl's basic position was strongly inflected toward the dependence of "being" on human subjectivity. The later Heidegger refused all such human-centric perspectives. At present, I would like to consider the matter afresh and highlight several of his signature themes along the way. In 1967, Heidegger delivered an address to the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Athens, Greece, under the title "The Provenance of Art and the Determination of Thinking." There, he points out that that Ἀλήθεια (as Being), although correlated with the human being in the expanse of the time of human beings, is nonetheless independent of the human being. Heidegger opens the address by stating in a characteristic manner that the matter of the inception of the "arts and sciences" among the Greeks is not fundamentally a "historical" matter that lies in the distant past, but rather a matter – and an experience – that remains "present" to us. He claims that all persisting philosophical positions that posit the human being as the "source" of Being – that is, as the "source" of all unconcealment and concealment – are simply symptomatic of the hubris and narcissism of the prevailing modern subjectivism that the later Heidegger identified again and again as blocking us from entering into the fullness of our *Da-sein*. Being is the "measure" that is not made by us.

Krzysztof Ziarek

EVENT AND NOTHINGNESS

It is thanks to nothingness that beings disclose themselves to us as beings in the first place and that we can experience their strangeness. Wonder aroused this way leads to asking the question "why?," thus opening the inquiry into beings and, in turn, making science and knowledge possible. The paragraph in "What is Metaphysics," in which this thought is expressed a differentiation seems to be made between adverbs *einzig* and *nur*. If we take Heidegger's point about poetic thinking seriously, take it – as we should – perhaps even beyond the scope of his own ways of exploring the poetic in his readings of poets, then the question of prefixes, suffixes, prepositions, and, yes, adverbs and adverbial modifiers, gains a central position. It becomes the matter of

thinking. That is why the topic of adverbs is worth exploring. At the end of his 1961 lecture "Time and Being" Heidegger argues that the necessity of speaking in propositional statements is in fact an impediment to thinking, because it focuses attention on the meaning of statements rather than on the movement of language and the way of thinking. The analysis of the two aforementioned adverbs leads us to the subject of singularity.

Piotr Nowak

NOTHINGNESS AND ABSENCE

Nothingness was something the ancient Greeks remained silent about. They believed that any speculation in this regard led us astray and into the dangerous waters of nonexistence. Even Plato, who in his Sophist accurately described the aporetic character of the relation between being and non -being, did not introduce nothingness into the philosophical discourse, i.e. into the realm of logos. Martin Heidegger in his attempt to overcome metaphysics (which culminates in Nietzsche's "reversed Platonism") restores the "dignity" and the epistemological potential of the concept of nothingness. He thus takes thinking beyond the European tradition towards the East – towards wisdom which expresses itself in a silent contemplation of being.

Christian Sommer

FALL OF DASEIN: HEIDEGGER READING LUTHER 1924-1927

To make manifest this complex interrelation between philosophy and theology, we wish to isolate an exemplary phenomenon in Heidegger's text and subtext that we may call the "circuit of lust." We will then question this operation of transposition or transfer of theological elements and discuss its legitimacy in Heidegger. Heidegger's analytics of falling or fallenness (*Verfallen*, *Verfallenheit*) will be our starting point. This, we wish to argue, is a phenomenological conceptualization of Martin Luther's description, in his commentary of the Genesis Book of the excessive and "hyperbolic" nature of sin (Rom 7, 13) as a movement of flight that turns away from God. It can be exposed by the reading of Heidegger's commentaries on Luther. Yet things are not as simple as they may seem to be, because Heidegger is not just a secularization of Luther: he is a Neo-Lutheran Aristotelian Thinker. We can see that Heidegger is guided by the Lutheran project of a return to the proto-Christian experience of the NT by way of destruction of "pagan wisdom," i.e. the destruction of Greek philosophy and especially of Aristotle. But it is important to note that it is also in the young Luther that Heidegger finds a positive impulse to access a primordial Aristotle without passing through the "scholastic doctors:" "It is highly doubtful that Aristotle's thought can be found in the Latins."

Christoph Jamme

MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S REINVENTION OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Heidegger's philosophy of "fundamental ontology," i.e. a foundational doctrine of being, is foundational only for those areas with which it is actually concerned: regional ontologies. Heidegger questions (in connection with and departing from Aristotle) the inadequacy of the ancient question of being. For Heidegger, the entire Western metaphysics from Plato to Hegel and Nietzsche was an "onto-theology," i.e. all regions of being (angel – human – animal – plant – crystal) were derived from and grounded in the highest being. Here we trace the development of his attempts to transform phenomenology and metaphysics.

Thomas Sheehan

HEIDEGGER AND THE RIGHT HEIDEGGERIANS: PHENOMENOLOGY VS. CRYPTO-METAPHYSICS

A significant number of Heideggerians seem dedicated to parroting Heidegger's thoughts in his own idiosyncratic language instead of discovering what he was driving at and expressing it in clearer, less quirky language. The classical paradigm that dominated Heidegger research for over a quarter-century was established in 1963 with the monumental works of William J. Richardson and Otto Pöggeler. Their way of reading Heidegger was focused on being (or "Being"), and it started to show serious cracks with the 1989 publication of Heidegger's *Beiträge zur Philosophie*, which among other things made it clear that his later term Ereignis was only a reinscription of his earlier term Geworfenheit. By claiming that Heidegger's final goal was "Being," Right Heideggerians also think they can refute the charge of analytic philosophers that Heidegger wasn't doing philosophy but instead was engaged in some kind of poetry or mystical speculation. They pay a high price for this reading of Heidegger. They declare that his work has overcome metaphysics, but then they go on to transform that work into a crypto-metaphysics. Neither Parmenides' Αλήθεια nor Heraclitus' Φύσις ever was "the thing itself" for Heidegger. On the positive side, what Parmenides and Heraclitus glimpsed but did not thematize was the Open. The Open is what makes it possible and necessary for us to understand a thing only discursively, only through how-and-as-what the thing is currently meaningful to us. His oeuvre is being approached as if it were a realist ontology instead of the phenomenological ontology that he insisted it was.

Andrzej Serafin

HEIDEGGER'S PATRICIDE

La lotta continua, the struggle continues, the struggle for the οὐσία, which I would like to consider here as the struggle between the father and the son. Two foremost figures are of interest to me: Plato – the father, and Heidegger whose gesture of patricide, as I would like to claim, is nevertheless aimed towards the ultimate restitution of that which is occluded by multifarious idols. Heidegger's "principal atheism" is the philosophical κατάβασις that he performs in order to restitute the divine, and not some otherworldly deity, but the divinity of the world. The question is whether we should despise the cave and long for some other reality, eternal and perfect, or rather affirm it as that which is given. The core of Heidegger's argument is in fact that one has to kill Plato in order to restitute Plato, or rather that towards which he is pointing, the truth itself. Such a Heideggerian maneuver can easily turn against itself, and Heidegger was well aware of it. What we have to do in order to remain true to Heidegger's intentions is to remove the idol of Heidegger himself.

Jason King

HEIDEGGER'S SEAM

Where there were two Heideggers, there is now one. This has been one of the more palpable effects of the recent controversy surrounding the "Black Notebooks." In many ways, the hardboiled detectives long at work on the "case of Heidegger" were never convinced there were two of them. If anything, Heidegger's evasions and equivocations after the war were proof of a profound political through-line from his earliest work to his last. Any anti-totalitarianism or liberalism that was detected in his sober, Husserl-dedicated, pre-war sensation *Being and Time* was a false flag: There was only ever the Heidegger who was illiberal, counter-revolutionary, nationalistic and, after one extrapolated a bit, anti-Semitic. But even his most vehement critics had to strain a bit to hold together that which was designed by Heidegger to so neatly break in two. Though it was very doubtful that Heidegger's self-professed "turn" after *Being and Time* was an about-face, the philosopher himself riddled his later work so thoroughly with "turns" (*Kehren*) it was as though he was leaving behind, half-buried, a kind of skeleton key for his thinking. When we inquire after Heidegger's ethics, we are asking about this content of ontology's untimeliness. We are asking about the necessity of ontology being untimely and the use and value of ontology if it must be so. It is a question, ultimately, about the value in itself of the seam and the danger of the seam's disappearance.

Dennis J. Schmidt

HEIDEGGER AND THE CALL FOR THE ORIGINAL ETHICS

While I would argue that Heidegger opens the door to truly important ethical reflections, reflections that ask us to rethink some of the most elemental ethical notions – notions such as responsibility, rights, guilt, imperative, to name a few – it is obvious that such an argument is not an easy one to see or to make. The problems do not only stem from Heidegger's own political failings, as even if one tries to demoralize his political statements, to take them out of the realm of judgment or to slice them out of his work, his allergy to any talk of ethics seems to obstruct every effort to pursue the questions of ethical life out of Heidegger. My purpose in what follows is not to tackle these large claims, but I do want such claims to form the background of my rather focused comments. Rather, what I want to do is look at some of the reasons that Heidegger gives for discounting, for actively discrediting, whole swathes of ethical traditions and reasoning. Nonetheless, I do believe that Heidegger's work holds real promise for thinking the enigmas of ethical life today. However in order to make this argument one needs to redefine the task and character of ethics, to rip it away from the sorts of shapes it has come to take in the present age – above all, to unmask the degeneration of ethical questions in the field of "applied ethics," since whatever else it is, such an ethical sense cannot be understood as the "application" of any theory or idea to life. Heidegger himself rejected the word *ethics* and did not pursue the sort of themes that I am proposing here, but I maintain that his work is a great resource – even despite Heidegger – for the task of thinking through the difficulties of ethical life in our times.

Dmitri Nikulin

THE BURDENS AND BLESSINGS FOR BOREDOM. HEIDEGGER AND KRACAUER

Modernity is a complex set of interacting and interwoven social, cultural, political, and historical processes and phenomena that establish, define, and describe both theoretical cognition and practical action. Among the concepts that define it, perhaps the central and most significant is that of the modern subject, which establishes itself as universal, rational, and necessary, expelling everyday experience from philosophy. As a result, the post-metaphysical scene is that of devastation, a scorched landscape and an empty stage devoid of any decorations which might represent and retain any of the minutiae that make life engaging and worth living. One could say that the modern subject is the only hero, the protagonist, the playwright, the director, and the spectator of the drama of modernity. Exclusive of the other of another human being and of the world, the modern subject is inevitably monological, lonely and alone, and thus can neither escape its own solitary presence nor get rid of itself. As such, it is inevitably bored. Boredom, then, becomes the conditio moderna. In the end, through boredom it is time itself that casts a spell and bans Dasein from the existent and

refuses it a meeting at the proper time. And yet, at the same time, it is the same time that summons Dasein by compelling it to the possibility of its proper existence during the moment of acute vision, in all its possibilities as grounded in the depth of time and being (FC 153; GM 230). This is the mystical picture of the breadth and peak, of the continuous and the discrete that we have to relive, once we have awakened the monstrous sleeping beauty of boredom.

Babette Babich

BETWEEN HEIDEGGER AND ADORNO: AIRPLANES, RADIOS, AND SLOTERDIJK'S ATMOTERRORISM

The problem of writing on either Adorno or Heidegger is that one will need to conform to the code of mainstream philosophy, that is, analytic style philosophy, and thereby fail to engage either thinker, speaking of one at the expense of the other. The outcome seems unpromising either way. Academic non-collegiality is a routine feature of academic life affecting much more than colleagues aligned on different sides of any ideological fence. Today's (post-phenomenological) technological philosophers see only their own projects, just as Heidegger saw nothing other than his own work, a circumstance of blind absorption that is the same for many academics today. Style matters in the case of Heidegger and Adorno inasmuch as both thinkers are, in different ways, charged with deliberate obscurity. Yet even more than Heidegger, it is Adorno who offers the most offense to analytic sensibilities. Hence if the latest trend in analytic philosophy is to claim that there is no difference between themselves and continental philosophers (all the better to appropriate or annex the continental tradition), and where there is no shortage of analytic Heideggerians, scholars have been slow to appropriate Adorno's work.

Robert Bernasconi

DESIRE BECOME ABSTRACT

The central feature of Jean-Paul Sartre's description of desire in "Being and Nothingness" is that desire is doomed to failure. The aporia of desire as traditionally conceived is that what appears to be its concrete fulfillment, is in fact desire become abstract, that is to say, desire become need because it has been reduced to something that can be attained. What inspired desire is lost sight of in the attempt to turn it into the object of a conquest.

The most powerful resistance to Sartre's account was offered by Emmanuel Levinas when he insisted on the distinction to which Sartre appeared oblivious, the distinction between desire and need. "Metaphysical desire" is a desire for the invisible. It is a movement toward "the absolutely other." It is insatiable and so by definition it cannot be fulfilled.

Moreover, Sartre was more right than he knew when he suggested that Christian writers, especially the Christian mystics, had an insight into the nature of desire that is largely lacking elsewhere. According to Bernard of Clairvaux, our desire is a response; it has already found what it is looking for and only needs to keep faith. The meaning of desire is not trouble, as in Sartre, but hope and not hope for anything specific.

Peter Kalkavage

SCHOPENHAUER'S WILL AND WAGNER'S EROS

It is well known that in the middle of working on the *Ring* cycle, Wagner read Schopenhauer's book at the urging of a friend (the poet, Georg Herwegh) and was enthralled. The composer had found in the philosopher's cosmic pessimism a perfect articulation of what he, Wagner, was feeling at the time and what he thought was the ultimate truth about life. The musical genius had found his philosophic muse, and the pessimistic Schopenhauer, whom Wagner called "a gift from heaven to my loneliness," replaced the utopian Feuerbach as Wagner's intellectual hero. The following essay is an attempt to connect Schopenhauer's metaphysics of the will in his masterwork, *The World as Will and Representation*, with the portrayal of erotic love in Wagner's *Tristan and Isolde*. I take my cue from Nietzsche, who famously called Wagner's musical drama "the actual *opus metaphysicum* of all art." What is the meaning of this pronouncement? In what sense is Wagner's musical rendition of death-devoted love metaphysical?

Richard Kearney

NARRATIVE IMAGINATION AND CATHARSIS

How are we to "interpret" psychic traumas which seem to defy meaning and language? Traumatic wounds are by definition unspeakable. Yet from the earliest of literatures, we find tales of primal trauma which testify to a certain catharsis through storytelling and touch. And we witness a special role played in such tales by figures called "wounded healers." By way of exploring the cathartic paradox of *telling the untellable*, I will look at some examples drawn from both classical mythology and contemporary literature (including Freudian psychoanalysis, Joycean fiction and Holocaust testimony). My basic hypothesis is this: while traumatic wounds cannot be

cured, they may at times be *healed* – and such healing may take place through a twin therapy of 1) narrative catharsis and 2) carnal working through. In short, healing by word and touch. A double transformation of incurable wounds into healable scars. What various examples suggest is that stories become cathartic to the extent that they combine empathic imagination with a certain acknowledgment of the cause and context of the suffering – thereby offering a wider lens to review insufferable pain. These various narrative testimonies – cinematic, theatrical, literary, documentary – invite first and subsequent generations to recall, in however flawed or fractured a manner, the unspeakable events of trauma "as if" they were experiencing them for themselves. And even though such narrative representations inevitably fail to do full justice to the singularity of the original horror, they allow, in spite of all the odds, many people to remember what actually happened; and this is important so that, in Primo Levis' words, "it may never happen again."

Bruce Rosenstock

THE ORIGINS OF JEWISH TRAGIC DRAMA: AN EPISODE IN GERSHOM SCHOLEM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH OSKAR GOLDBERG

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to examining Scholem's and Benjamin's fascination with messianic antinomianism. This paper seeks to shed light on Scholem's earliest publication on Abraham Cardozo and Sabbatian antinomianism, which has not been so widely read. The essay concludes with a biting critique of the growing fascination among Weimar Jews with gnostic antinomianism. Through the lens of Sabbatianism, one can not only better understand the Benjamin-Scholem friendship at this time, but one can also discern the lineaments of the broader historic configuration of interwar German-Jewish intellectual life and the central place of antinomian messianism within it. Scholem's 1928 essay on Abraham Cardozo's theology contains his first published reference to Oskar Goldberg. This paper seeks above all to trace the patterns of the criss-crossing routes linking Benjamin's Ursprung book and Scholem's essay. There are four thematic routes that stand out, of which two are charted here: the first is the route linking Benjamin's analysis of the baroque experience of history with Scholem's discussion of Marranism; the second links Benjamin's suggestion that redemption follows upon a descent into the abyss of evil with Scholem's characterization of Cardozo's understanding of messianic descent into the realm of the k'lipot. The dangers of antinomianism are mirrored in Goldberg, to whom Scholem alludes as to the dangerous new mystagogue at the center of a deluded group of Jews pursuing nothing more than chimeras and gossip.

Jean-Luc Nancy

HERE COLOR SEEMS TO THINK BY ITSELF

Of all human activities, the one we call "Art" takes on the signification of itself. But in Art this decisive trait of self-signification seems to be taken on in a special fashion by color. The sensible is what signifies itself and does not express anything else other than itself, as long as it is withdrawn from perception. Sensation is satisfied – if one can say so – with offering (itself) to be sensed. Color is one of the modes of sensation, which are irreducible to one another. However the vocabularies for sensation refer easily to one another, it is because it is always about "self-signifying." The sound gives its presence in a coming and going without end. Color in a certain way appears and disappears at the same time. It does not appear and disappear literally, but it does not stop to give and withdraw its identity in an infinitesimal flutter. These are two perfectly distinguished modalities of the presence that signals and signifies itself – the coming that traverses, the pressure of a wink. The color proposes a paradigm of sensation as a relationship to the world outside and in front of me – in this distance, which has so often been considered to be a cognitive and theoretical model since Plato's "idea." And color is not only the expression of the background, it is the background itself – even when it is obscure – or the thickness of the material that manifests itself.

Piotr Nowak

THE MAN FROM UNDER GROUND

Homeric heroes are in a sense beset and manipulated by the gods, who impart man with the will to live being the source of his energy and power. If so, then who is Odysseus – the most important character (from the philosophical point of view) in Homer's epic poem? Who fills him? Who is it that pulls his strings? He pretends to be someone else five times in the Odyssey. Caught by Polyphemus, he manages to escape with his life at the cost of calling his own identity into question when he renounces his own name. Odysseus is a bizarre assemblage of λόγος and ζωή, a combination of wisdom ("cunning") and fierce determination to survive at any cost. He represents a modern and "democratic" – so to speak – approach to reality. The modern person is defined by his flexibility, the ease with which he assimilates and adapts to difficult circumstances, the skill with which he conducts incessant negotiations, and, finally, his intellectual openness. Such a person is capable of great sacrifice in the name of individual success, which he admittedly associates with glory, but he is nevertheless incapable of living or dying for glory.

The philosophical quarterly *Kronos* was established in 2007 by scholars connected with the University of Warsaw and the University of Białystok. Metaphysics, the philosophy of politics, the philosophy of literature and religion, history of psychoanalysis comprise the thematic scope of the journal. The editors of the quarterly strive to familiarize the Polish reader with new translations and commentaries of classic works (Plato, Joachim of Fiore, Nicholas of Cusa, Shakespeare, Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, Heidegger and many others), as well as the work of contemporary philosophers.

The annual *Kronos Philosophical Journal* (in English) was established in 2012 as a companion edition to the quarterly, to supplement it, yet without repeating the content of the Polish edition. The papers presented in the annual might be of interest to the readers from outside Poland, allowing them to familiarize themselves with the dynamic thought of contemporary Polish authors, as well as entirely new topics, rarely discussed by English speaking authors. One of the issues published so far contained passages from previously unknown lectures by Leo Strauss on Aristotle; another issue was dedicated to the Russian phenomenologist Gustav Shpet.

ISSN 2392-0963
9 772392 096008

FUNDACJA
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