

# Can we see things that are not there?

Jeff Coulter

## Introduction

This essay is about the problematic phenomena of 'hallucinations' and 'illusions' - problematic, at any rate, for efforts at theorising and scientific explanation in the contemporary human sciences. In this treatment, my objective will be to demonstrate that various existing efforts at their elucidation miss their mark, and also to try to show in what ways we can pacify the apparently intractable issues which arise therefrom. In some respects, then, this will be a retrospective analysis, drawing as it will upon classical versions of, and putative solutions to, these problems. But, as I hope to show, corrective *vis-à-vis* past treatments do not require novel methodologies nor theories for the adequate analysis of the phenomena under scrutiny. Rather, the problems can, I believe, succumb to a careful weighing of the logic of the concepts involved in the disputes which these issues have engendered.

## The 'Stroppy Student' and Professor Ryle

I have occasion, from time to time, to teach an undergraduate course in the 'sociology of mental illness', in which course I focus upon the "schizophrenias". This is, of course, a simply gorgeous domain of high-quality, interdisciplinary research and theorising, with its full compendium of intellectual controversy. When I lecture to my students about the major "symptoms" of the "schizophrenias", I must deal with the phenomena (from Kraepelin and Bleuler to the DSM3R, at least) called "visual hallucinations". I first read from the

canonical texts thus: *visual hallucinations are cases in which a person sees things which are not there*. I make no initial move to endorse such a definition. A stropy student (or perhaps that should read: a very serious student?) *objects* as follows (thence the discussion you are currently reading): Professor Coulter: how can anyone *actually see* something which is *not there* since there is nothing there to be (actually) seen? Shouldn't you say that the hallucinator "sees" (in scare quotes) something which is not there? *Really* seeing something requires that there be something to be seen. But if there isn't anything to be seen, then what do we mean by claiming that an hallucinator sees something that isn't (really) there?

I pause, and reach for my Ryle. In *The Concept of Mind*, page 233<sup>2</sup>, he writes: "The victim of *delirium tremens* is described by others, not as seeing snakes, but as 'seeing' snakes". I announce (prematurely, I must add) that the student is correct: to hallucinate is not actually to see something that is not there - it is an instance of "seeing" something that is not there. But the questioning does not cease with this putative solution. The student *now* wants to know: in what, literally speaking, does the scare-quoted "seeing" actually consist? I am flummoxed, and request a week in which to study the question, promising an adequate response in the next class...

From this point, the issue becomes: what could we (anyone) *mean* by "seeing" as distinct from (simply) seeing? Ryle's efforts to settle this problem, along with other cognate attempts, will be the initial

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<sup>2</sup> Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Penguin University Books, 1973: originally 1949).

focus of this essay. The chief issue remains: can the student's question be given an adequate answer? My work was cut out for me. I here report upon what I have (so far) mustered to handle the objection.

### Ryle on "Seeing"

As is well known, Ryle introduced the world of letters to the distinction between 'process' and 'achievement' verbs, and sought to categorise the verb: *to see* as an 'achievement-verb'. Of course, he did *not* neglect the various cases in which *seeing* is *not* so utilised in language, drawing attention to such uses as 'seeing the joke', 'seeing the implication', 'seeing the point', 'seeing the doctor', and so forth. Nonetheless, he *was* alert to the fact that, in many of its *visual* uses (e.g., 'he sees the tree', 'she saw the monkey'), the verb: *to see* *does* indeed signify an achievement, since one can *think that* one sees/saw something, and be wrong, and one can *try to see*, but fail.

Moreover, he endorsed an Aristotelian point in his celebrated paper, "Perception": "At any given moment either I have not, yet, seen it or I have now seen it. The verb 'to see' does not signify... a sub-stretch of my life-story".<sup>3</sup> Visually seeing is *not* a *process*. Much of Ryle's great accomplishment consisted in drawing out the theoretical-conceptual implications of this grammatical point: for example, in being able to argue, cogently and precisely, against any and all efforts to construe seeing/perceiving as 'psychological' or 'mental' or 'neural' *process*. In various academic quarters, this lesson has yet to be learned. Nonetheless, there were problems attending Ryle's treatment of 'seeing' in scare-quotes which

require much further thought.

In characterising instances of 'seeing' as distinct from simply seeing (*simpliciter*), Ryle took on the job of specifying in what the scare-quoted version could literally consist. What could we be *actually* talking about when we feel the need to invoke such scare-quotes? He variously considered the possibilities that 'seeing' as distinct from: seeing) might comprise 'mock-seeing' or 'pretend-seeing', but settled eventually for 'seeming to see'. The major problem with this logical analysis of the rules of use for such a construction is that it does not enable us to distinguish between cases in which someone claimed to have seen something, was shown to have been wrong, and thence invoked the 'fall-back position' that he merely 'seemed to see/have seen' ('thought that he saw') what it was that he claimed to see/have seen, on the one hand, and cases of 'hallucinating' on the other. After all, not *all* cases of 'seeming to have seen' something may logically be characterised as cases of having 'hallucinated': e.g., my taking a rolled-up piece of white paper in the furrow of the blackboard to be chalked my have involved me in 'seeming to have seen chalk' (or: 'thinking that I saw a piece of chalk'), whilst, in fact, there was no chalk there to be seen, only a small piece of rolled-up white paper where I had expected there to be a piece of chalk. However, I certainly did not 'hallucinate' a piece of chalk. Moreover, I can be ordered to 'pretend to see' something, whereas I cannot be commanded either to 'seem to see' something not to 'hallucinate' something. So, Ryle's first stabs at unpacking the grammar of 'seeing' in scare-quotes, as distinct from simply seeing, fail to elucidate in what it might consist in the domain of hallucinations (as well as of optical illusions, on which more later).

<sup>3</sup> Gilbert Ryle, "Perception" in his *Dilemmas: The Turner Lectures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), p. 103.


Ryle's prejudice, which I (briefly) shared, was to insist that the *only genuine* cases of seeing (as distinct from merely 'seeing' with scare-quotes) are ones in which one's eyes are used in order to see, or (to put the matter into current neuroscientific terms) are ones in which photons emitted by some object strike photoreceptor cells and the energy quanta are subsequently transduced into electrochemical impulses along the optic nerve (etc.). Visually *hallucinating* is obviously not of this kind, and thus, Ryle concludes, it therefore cannot be a case of seeing at all. Rather, it is a case of (merely) 'seeing'. And such 'seeing' (in scare-quotes) is to be construed as: 'seeming to see'.

This characterisation of the logic of the ascription conditions for visual hallucination is simply wrong, as we have noted. It is at once far too general, facilitating the subsumption of cases which are intuitively, obviously, *not* ones of visually hallucinating. But is visually hallucinating, thence, to be construed as a case of 'falsely believing that *X* is there to be seen'? No, because there are many cases in which one may hallucinate and know full-well that one has, indeed, *hallucinated*, that what one sees is *not* actually there: some victims or sufferers from hallucinations (e.g., those with a *neurological* or *drug-induced*, rather than a *psychiatric*, disorder) have *no false beliefs at all* about what they are seeing. They *know* that what they are seeing (leaving aside for the moment the contentious dropping of the scare-quotes) is not, in fact, there to be seen. This is in sharp contrast to the psychiatric patient who (characteristically) does *not* know that what he is seeing is not there to be seen, and may well develop various subsidiary false beliefs in order to accommodate to such a primary impression.

The essential prejudice in Ryle's

scare-quoted version is simply this: for Ryle, one's eyes must be open and an object must be present in order for one to be able, intelligibly and correctly, to claim that one sees an *X* (whatever *X* may be). Preoccupied with his (incisive) analysis of the "achievement-verb" uses of the verb: to see, Ryle forgets, in the context of hallucinations (and of optical illusions) his erstwhile restrictions upon that generality: viz., "seeing the point", "seeing the joke", "seeing the implication", and the like. Because of his momentary lapse in grasping the *diversity* exhibited in the grammar of the verb: to see, he tries (vainly) to extend the achievement-verb analysis *too generically*, and thereby ends up attempting to assimilate instances of visually hallucinating to it, finding that it doesn't fit, and thence consigning "visually hallucinating" to the domain, not of seeing, but of "seeming to see" or of "thinking that one sees". And this move is made irrespective of the fact that these latter constructions (designed to capture what scare-quoted "seeing" might literally consist in ) have many *diverse* uses themselves, *none* of them characteristically criterial of what it is visually to hallucinate!

Let us now turn to consider a canonical example of an "optical illusion": the Kanizsa Triangle, and the neuropsychological claims currently made about it in respect of our visual capacities and competences:



In his article, "The Visual Image in Mind and Brain",<sup>4</sup> Semir Zeki characterises the nature of this illusion as follows:

"In this famous illusion, a normal observer perceives a triangle among the presented shapes even though the lines forming the triangle are incomplete: the brain creates lines where there are none".<sup>5</sup>

Zeki, a neurobiologist, proceeds to adduce neurobiological findings purporting to explain how certain cells in the cortex "respond to the illusion by 'inferring' the presence of a line".<sup>6</sup> Leaving aside for the moment the misleading personifications of brains and their cellular components involved in attributing to them such predicates as "creating lines" and "inferring" them, let us focus upon Zeki's characterisation of the illusion itself.

Those to whom I have shown this illusion generally claim, *not* that they see a white triangle formed of complete boundary lines, but a white triangle with differentially bright edges. The illusionary quality of the figure, if we can put it this way, consists not in the appearance of a complete white triangle which does not in fact exist, but rather in the differential brightness effect - an effect which vanishes if the three black near-circles are occluded. It is this effect which enables them to see the white triangle against a (less) white background. But do they genuinely *see* this triangle, or only infer its presence?

The ecological conditions of the figure facilitate the perception of a fully-formed white triangle overlapping and incomplete formed one with intersected black boundary lines. As such, a white triangle is *visible*, not apparently, not

seemingly, but actually. There are many analogues of such a state of affairs in our everyday lives: various things become visible against varying backgrounds such that to change the background conditions renders them invisible. Such phenomena do not require special explanations in terms of neural function, but in terms of ecological conditions. It is not that we are seeing (or 'seeing') something which is not there: we can see (in this case) the white triangle on the white page against its particular background, and *only* against such a background. We can see it because, *under these conditions*, it is *there to be seen*.

### Conclusion

Can we see things that are not there? Yes, we can. It is only by virtue of a prejudice, which insists that there is only one foundational mode of seeing that involves something to be seen and the use of one's eyes to see it, the might lead us to conclude otherwise. This "achievement-verb" sense of 'seeing' does not exhaust its grammar, and it is not a kind of 'standard' against which other modes could be judged to be 'secondary' or 'defective forms'. And the case of the Kanizsa figure (above) teaches us, not that our brains must somehow create or infer visual phenomena but that various ecological conditions can facilitate our full-fledged perception of various sorts of phenomena. Occasionally, we *are* tricked, as when we *think that* we see two lines of different length in the Muller-Lyer figure where they are, on measurement, of equal length. But mistakenly believing that one has seen such-and-such or that so-and-so is the case is not a mysterious kind of seeing, requiring a special form of *visual* explanation. One cannot say that one has not seen, but only thought that one had, and then proceed to announce that such an instance is itself a kind of (actual) seeing!

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<sup>4</sup> Semir Zeki, "The Visual Image in Mind and Brain", *Scientific American*, Vol. 267, No. 3, September 1992.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

## Discussion of Coulter

RR: May I attempt to re specify (the last) question, very briefly. I think part of what its' getting at is there is an ironic worry in relation to the way that you use the term hallucination in your talk. In that you've got this marvellous critique of certain kinds of theorising around neuro-physiology and neuro-psychology and so on... The worry is that you are actually relying on a sort of dogmatic version of (what) psychological theorists understand by the term hallucination as completely unproblematically transcultural, transhistorical etc, etc. And that actually the idea of hallucination may have an historical specificity. For example isn't it, at least, an interesting question to ask: When somebody says, after they have experienced something; "Oh, it turns out I actually hallucinated that!"

Is their experience the same experience when that is an option available to them as when it is not, in the cases when I describe it? So when somebody has a vision, are they experiencing the same thing as somebody who we could characterize ...as seeing something, refined somehow like on mutual terms, as a some kind of mutual third language? Is it actually the same thing when people now have the concept of hallucination available to them?

JC: Well I'm not a constructivist in the following sense; that just because there is a historicity to the origin of various concepts that you now have to be wedded to the notion that prior to the introduction of

those concepts the phenomena characterisable by those concepts, so to speak, didn't exist. I mean the concept of 'Quasar' came to the English language in 1964 - were there quasars before the word 'quasar' came into the language?

RR: It's different for human....

JC: No it's not! Of course people hallucinated before the word hallucination was introduced. Why not? This Foucault stuff has gone far to far. (Laughter). This shifting signifier. You have to say, contrary to Kuhn, before Galileo in Aristotelian times of course there were pendula, not that anyone there could have *said* there were, but there were pendula. Similarly, prior to Bleuler in 1911, coining the concept of dementia praecox - sure there were schizophrenics. They wouldn't have been called that, but there were schizophrenics. Why not? This kind of Foucaultian constructivism can lead to all kinds of problems, which it is designed to avoid, i.e. it can be appearing to be a charitable, relativistic, you know - 'your culture, my culture; our history, your history.' But it ends up misrepresenting the facts.

RR: But is it ironic, isn't it, the way that that does leave you saying that the basic categories of psychology are completely unproblematic? Given that you want to attack that kind of claim when it comes to neuro-psychological theories.

JC: But it is not a category of psychology! It's a category of ordinary language! You don't have to be a psychologist to figure that somebody has had an hallucination. You have to be smart, you have to

SM: I liked your general approach to the material, but I was puzzled by quite a lot of things you've said in the presentation. It may be that I missed some steps, so this may be questions to ask you to expand ... Please.

JC: Sure!

SM: One distracting thing was that you and those in the 'Scientific American', seemed to have a different view about what the illusion in the Kanizsa triangle was. It looks as if they're talking about filling in the gaps in the black lines, rather than worrying about the brightness of the white triangle. That seems to what your point is (in that) whole discussion... But that's just a small point. More generally, it did strike me that you were very quick to identify the *Homunculus fallacy*, in this sense. It looks as if the main text philosophers that talk about the visual cortex seeing under the caption of the figure, immediately has a reference to the observer. So that doesn't look terribly homuncular in itself. As you said yourself, when talking about the observer and the brain creating lines where there are none, that does it seems to me, immediately get ashed out in terms of neuro-physiological theorising. I'm not objecting to the worry about the consciousness; just about how seriously you are saying that its' present int his particular article. Another thing I was...

JC: I'm going to lose by track... The nature of the illusion. The argument is that the sort of lines filling in - - it seems to me that is prima facie not what the illusion is.

It seems to me that they mischaracterise the illusion in the article. The Kanizsa figure is know to be a figure that provides for differential brightness and contrast. The notion that for the white triangle to be seen, that you need somehow to add lines in to it, is a gratuitous idea! That is unnecessary, given the fact taht what provides for the white triangle to be perceivable is exactly the contrast - the brightness contrast - that is set-up by the conditions of judgement. So I think they misdescribe the nature of the illusion. ....But let's allow that they describe it correctly. Let's allow that they have actually identified the explanandum; which is granting a lot, but let's say they have i.e. that somehow or other there's a matter of supplying lines where none are there. Now the notion of the brain creating lines, seems to me to be absolutely uncashable into anything distinct from, independently from its homuncular fallaciousness. Because the criterior for creating lines are criteior that can only be satisfied by persons who have implements or have various kinds of materials that they are oving aobut in an environment. It seems to me a personal level predicate primarily. Unless you say that it is a place-holding metaphor, which is a standard line. But if it is a place-holding metaphor, then what we need is prior to the produciton of remarks about what we need prior to remarks about what happens in photo-active cells in visual cortex sector six (laughter) prior to *that* what we need is literal version for which this is the metaphor.

Otherwise, we don't yet have an explanandum. We think we might have an explanandum. It may seem we have an explanandum, but we don't. We have an uncashed metaphor. And that's what makes the difference between neuro-psychological theory, which I'd call disparagingly, deliberately disparagingly, Neuro-Cartesianism; and good old Neuro-Physiology. Neuro-Physiology provides a description, in neuro physiological terms, on the mechanisms, processes, events and so on - that enable people to see things, hallucinate - do whatever they do.

SM: I accept that general distinction - my worry is just that one can get, in certain sense, oversensitive to these unfashionable reports. Now when they come up in the kind of material that Dennett, that we were dealing with this morning and unfortunately I wasn't here to hear that, it does seem to be a serious problem. When we are talking about it in a context like this, it seems to me, that it is perfectly possible for philosophers, particularly Wittgensteinian philosophers, to get too wound up about the metaphors. Because it doesn't seem to me, in this kind of context, that serious harm has been done. Certainly it doesn't look to me, although I don't know much about neuro-physiological experimentation, but it doesn't look to me that the scientific work that you were perfectly happy to allow to continue, is being seriously altered or distorted by this kind of top dressing at the metaphorical level.

JC: No, but our general intellectual culture is! As a matter of fact I

think you could find quite a lot of neuro-physiologists who would treat this as a badly described account of what in fact neuro-physiology accomplishes. My problem is not with the neuro-physiology, but with the cognitivist mill, which is neo-Cartesian, which is the real target. And in addition I think it misleads the educated public, if not perhaps some neuro-physiologist of vision; it can mislead the educated public, including our students, into the notion that the Mind/Body problem has been solved, because there is a clear-cut solution i.e. there is mind/brain identity; or some computational or connectionist version of mind-brain relations. All of which I want to reject, and today I've only been able to do a tiny bit of it.

AJ: Can I add something on what you are saying....in judgement you can't have uncashed metaphors - a science can work in steps of building up. There is a host of phenomena whose descriptions are very problematic - that we try to explain - realising at the same time, and maybe the only way we can gesture towards the areas is with uncashed metaphors.

JC: No! I don't think there is any need for uncashed metaphors, you see. I think the only reason you have these uncashed metaphors, is, that you start out with Cartesian premises which you then neutralise; if you don't make those moves, then you have a perfectly coherent neuro-physiological problem i.e. explain in neuro-physiological terms, how the brain works so as to enable people, not brains, PEOPLE, to see what they see, do what they

- do etc.
- AJ: But if you ask what they see?  
That's very hard to do without ...  
saying well...
- JC: But neuro-physiology can never be  
in the business of explaining what  
it is you see, so to speak. It can be  
in the business of generally  
explaining the condition for  
seeing anything whatever.
- AJ: Well, I think ... it seems to me hard  
to say that they are not in the  
business of describing what they  
see, but they garner a description  
before they can offer a neuro-  
physiological account of what's  
going on. As a defence of the  
uncashed metaphor - I tell you  
what it could be: 'We can't describe  
this phenomena right now! There  
are lots of things we can't describe!'
- JC: What phenomenon?
- AJ: What goes on!
- JC: When!
- AJ: When you look at that!
- SM: Just two other points. One was your  
speculation about why Ryle said  
what he said, and used the inverted  
commas notion of seeing. And it  
seems to me extremely important  
about why Ryle is being motivated  
by physicalist notion of seeing.  
Particularly in that chapter in 'The  
Concept of Mind' where what he's  
primarily worried about, as you  
pointed out, is the feeling that  
visual hallucinations and visual  
illusions are encouraging the  
principle constitutionally (in a ).  
But surely the reason he ends up in  
developing a notion of mock or  
pretend seeing. The reason it's a  
puzzle for his own positive analysis  
of these concepts; is that he's taken  
this dispositional view of seeing:  
then you're going to have problems  
in that kind of vocabulary

distinguishing, in a useful way,  
between genuine visual perception  
and visual hallucination.

Because in terms of  
(sufficiency) ... the hallucinating  
persons or (brains) tend to behave  
in such ( ) way ... that the  
individual achiever in such a  
(dispositional was.

- JC: No! No, no, Ryle didn't have a  
dispositional analysis of seeing. He  
had a achievement verb analysis of  
seeing. An important difference!  
Ryle argues that to see an 'X' is to  
correctly have identified the 'X'.  
But if its an achievement: like  
understanding; realising; these are  
achievement verbs. They are not  
dispositional verbs, they are not  
any of these other kinds of  
categories. They are achievement  
verbs, and what he wants to suggest  
is that there is some problem in a  
construction like 'seeing' without  
inverted commas - something that  
is not there, because it seems to  
violate the achievement verb  
analysis of what it is to 'see'. But  
the achievement verb analysis of  
what it is to 'see', whilst partially  
true, is only generalised to all  
cases, it seems to me, by Ryle.  
Which is most unusual - is initially  
generalised to all cases to give him  
his problem. Because if you don't  
generalise the achievement verb  
sense of 'seeing' to all, you don't  
have a problem. If you allow that  
there are some uses of 'seeing' that  
aren't achievement verb uses, then  
you don't have a problem that  
started out. So he clearly does  
generalise to begin with, and then  
pulls back from the generalisation  
of all 'seeing' is achievements.  
Because now we've got a case of  
hallucinating: which is seeing

something that is not there. "Woe, wait a minute! If I allow that it's really seeing that is not there. Then how can this be because it's not an achievement - it's a failure - because there's nothing there to be seen; it won't work!" So we have the inverted commas. But that he generalises in the first instance seems to me, I may be wrong, seems to me to be a tactic concession to the notion that 'seeing' is really somehow physical or physiological. That's a speculation! But it's an unusual thing for Ryle to do! Ryle is a man who labours mightily on making fine distinctions with a conceptual scalpel. And, indeed for the most part in his book manages to succeed brilliantly, and indeed there are many uses of seeing 'X', which are properly construed as achievement verb uses. But he sets up a problem by over-generalising the achievement verb uses if he's got the entire gamut of uses of 'see' - are achievement uses. And, of course, clearly they don't have to be construed that way. That's the real point of what I am saying!

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KJ: I want to sketch very briefly an account of what happened between the logician and the student, and see what you think of it: I'm not sure it is right, but I'm interested in your reaction to it. Let's confine ourselves to visual hallucinations, and leave the illusion case out. Imagine we have person 'S' that we know is having a visual hallucination. 'S' doesn't know it. 'S' says: "I see the light-house!" Why not say something like this:

"Well it's true you can't see what's not there; truthfully we should say his statement: 'I see the light-house!' Is an expression of belief; he sees a light-house. He's not employing any visual experience at all. In fact that's just how we account for a visual hallucination: you have a false belief that you are having a visual experience."

JC: Well, I think, part of the trouble there is - I can falsely believe that that is a piece of chalk. Right! So you can have all kinds of perceptual claims that you can analyse in terms of articulating false beliefs about phenomena in the visual field, without in any way there being ascription conditions for hallucination. So although it's not wrong it is by no means sufficient of an analysis of the ascription conditions. Because, if you just leave it there, then you've got a characterisation that covers so many instances that have nothing to do with hallucinating - that we are still short of an account of what it is to visually hallucinate.

KJ: When I tell you of the false belief that the person has; he believes also that he sees the light-house. There are other ways to satisfy that.

JC: Oh, there are! But it might be that he mistook a peculiar shaped rock for the light-house. Which is not a case now of hallucinating! There are so many different scenarios, that to fit your logicist version that it can't now satisfy an account of what it is visually to hallucinate that provides for what that can possibly be. So it's ( )

KJ: Maybe you don't need an account. Maybe that's what I take it, in a sense, the logician and the student are trying to get you to see. There

is nothing for you to account for. You take the ( ) distinction between situation-specifying descriptions and content-giving descriptions. You can say of the person in our example that when you say of them; if you want to say yourself that 'he sees a light-house' or he believes it, its' a situation-specifying description you are telling him of how things seems to him from the inside. But there's no content-giving description because there is nothing happening visually at all.

JC: Yes, that may be true, but all I'm suggesting is that it is an insufficiently rich account of the logic of that situation that you gave me; when you gave me the analysis of hallucinating as; falsely believing - that's a light-house. Because I can now provide you... with many other examples for falsely believing that you's seen a light-house. I can now give you many, many other examples that you can use that describe exactly that particular construction, and aren't cases of hallucinating and you'd never think of them as such. So whilst what you say is not false, it's insufficient because clearly one aspect of hallucinating is to make a perceptual claim about something which is false.

KJ: You've just reifying hallucinations; you're making them much too interesting as a category. This is ...

JC: Oh! No! No, no, no, they are rich! The analysis ...

KJ: Why. I mean maybe this is the whole problem. You went to reify hallucinations, you want to quantify them.

JC: No, no we just want to a full, fully ... we want the logical grammar of

hallucinating in order to do the following: What I want to do is to provide a dissolution of the way in which the problem is set-up in the areas I'm attacking i.e. I'm arguing that neuro-psychological theories of illusions and hallucinations are incoherent, because they haven't properly identified the nature of the explanada; the things they are trying to explain. They tend to commit lots of falacies, which I go after! Like reification; misassimilation: I go after all those. But now the onus is on me: "Alright smart ares, you're doing a lot of destructive stuff! But what the hell are they? And how do we give an account of them?" So it seems to me that the onus is on those of us who reject this mode of theorizing to provide an alternative. But the alternative is not an alternative mode of theorizing! It's a way of dissolving the problem by exhibiting the logical grammer and showing that the nature of hallucinations are not the nature of internal phenomena; whethere mental or neural. Showing that takes a lot of work, and hasn't been done. Ryle didn't do it! I haven't yet done it! Though I think we are getting a bit further than Ryle; realising where Ryle went wrong. But it hasn't yet been done, and until it's done, the theorizing that has the logical problems I think most of us agree it suffers from will continue to win the day. So of course, it's important to give an account of hallucinating!