

# **Explaining citizenship light in the context of direct democracy**

Dissertation

of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Lucerne

handed in by

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Francesco Veri

## **Abstract**

The extension of citizenship rights – i.e. citizenship light (CL) - in modern liberal states has been only studied in the context of representative democratic arena. Explanation regarding citizenship rights extension and restriction have not been yet clarified in the context of direct democracy.

The direct democratic decision-making process differs from the representative democratic one, this imply that the conditions that explain the CL extension or restriction in the direct democratic arena are different to the conditions that explain the same phenomenon in the representative democratic arena. Indeed the direct democratic arena decision making process is characterized by two major hurdles which are absent in the representative democratic arena. First, in the direct democratic arena the consensus of voters is required to deliberate policies: without that consent policies are blocked. Second, the conflicts amongst political actors on the direct democratic arena are broader than the ones in the representative democratic arena because of the lack of deliberative spaces that allows every political actors to reach consensus over the CL policies.

This PhD thesis aims to individuate under which conditions bills that support citizenship rights extension are successful or unsuccessful in the direct democratic arena. In order to pursue this research, I have undertaken a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) of every referendum in western liberal democracy questioning CL policies. I have individuated a total of five theoretically-informed conditions that explain citizenship liberalization and the success of popular votes. I then located these conditions within two configurational hypotheses which suppose how referendum proponents might overtake direct democratic hurdles.

The analysis for the success of referendums reveals that the only sufficient path that leads to the popular vote's success is to insert the sensitive issues into a multifaced bill. As demonstrated by a more in-depth case-analysis, the condition of having *multiple issue referendum* is sufficient for the success of CL referendum because such condition allows to the reduction of the conflicts amongst political actors and deactivate voters' negative attitudes towards CL object. Political actors' conflicts are reduced because multiple issue revisions that involved a CL policy always refers to total constitutional revisions: in this type of revision, political actors reach a consensus over the referendum object before the referendum is held. Meanwhile the deactivation of voters' negative attitudes towards CL object happen because the sensitive CL object is hidden to voters during the referendum campaign. Finally, the analysis of the failure of referendum reveals that conditions *popular initiated referendum opposed by the government* and a *divided rightwing government* together with *strong populist parties* lead to the CL failure. These conditions leads to CL failure because they raise the conflicts amongst political actors in the direct democratic arena.

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## **List of abbreviations**

### *Terminology*

CHA – Causal Heterogeneity Attribute  
 CiH – Citizenship Heavy  
 CL – Citizenship Light  
 CPT – Causal Process Tracing  
 ELITE – Government’s elite cohesive in supporting the referendum  
 ~ELITE – Government’ elite divided in supporting the referendum  
 EUT – Empirical Uncertainty Tuple  
 FMAC – Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Condition  
 fsQCA – fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis  
 INGO -International non-governmental organizations  
 INI – Popular initiative supported by the government  
 ~ INI – Non Popular initiative supported by the government  
 LEFT – Left wing government  
 ~LEFT – Right wing government  
 MULT – Multiple issue referendum  
 ~MULT – Single issue referendums  
 POP – presence of strong far right populist parties  
 ~POP – absence of strong far right populist parties  
 QCA – Qualitative Comparative Analysis  
 TBT – Tuple Based on Theory

### *Organizations*

EEA – European Economic Area  
 EFTA – European Free Trade Association  
 EU – European Union

### *Political Parties*

AP – Norwegian Labour Party (Norway)  
 BPD – Conservative Democratic Party (Switzerland)  
 CDA – Christian Democratic Appeal (Netherlands)  
 CG - Green Party (EIRE)  
 CSP – Christian Social Party (Switzerland)  
 CSV – Christian People Party (Luxembourg)  
 CVP – Christian Democratic People’s party (Switzerland)  
 DG – Green Party (Luxembourg)  
 DKF - Conservative People Party (Denmark)  
 DP – Democratic Party (Luxembourg)  
 DSP – Social Democratic Party (Switzerland / Basel Stadt)  
 D66 – Democrats 66 (Netherlands)  
 EDU – Federal Democratic Union (Switzerland)  
 FBP - Progressive Citizens’ Party (Liechtenstein)  
 FDP – Radical Party (Switzerland)  
 FF – Fianna Fail (EIRE)

FN – National Front (France)  
 FPS – Freedom Party of Switzerland (Switzerland)  
 FPÖ - Freedom Party of Austria (Austria)  
 FRP – Progress Party (Norway)  
 FRP/DDP – Danish Progress Party (Denmark)  
 GP – Swiss Green Party (Switzerland)  
 KESK – Centre Party (Finland)  
 KOK – National Coalition Party (Finland)  
 LdU – Alliance of Independents (Switzerland)  
 LPF – Pim Fourtyn List  
 LPS – Liberal Party (Switzerland)  
 LSAP – Socialist workers party (Luxembourg)  
 MNR - National Republican Movement (France)  
 Ny – New Democracy (Sweden)  
 ÖVP – Austrian People’s Party (Austria)  
 PD – Democratic Party (USA)  
 PDs – Progressive Democrats (EIRE)  
 PN – Nationalist Party (Malta)  
 PR - Republican Party (USA)  
 PSOE – Spanish Socialist Worker Party (Spain)  
 SAP – Swedish Social Democratic Party (Sweden)  
 SD – Swiss Democrats (Switzerland)  
 SFP – Swedish People’s Party (Sweden)  
 SMP – Finnish Rural Party (Finland)  
 SPF – Socialist Party (France)  
 SPÖ – Socialist Party (Austria)  
 SSP – Social Democratic Party (Switzerland)  
 SVP – Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland)  
 UDF - Union for French Democracy (France)  
 UMP – Union for a Popular Movement (France)  
 VD – Venstre (Denmark)  
 VU – Patriotic Union (Liechtenstein)  
 VVD – People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (Netherlands)

Other organizations

ECPR – European Consortium of Political Science  
 RSI – Swiss Italian Radio Television  
 RTS – Swiss French Radio Television  
 SDA/ATS – Swiss Agency Press  
 SRF – Swiss German Radio Television

## **Introduction**

Relevant hypotheses on citizenship studies highlight a tendency of modern liberal states to adopt lighter forms of citizenship, i.e., citizenship light (CL). The concept of citizenship evolves towards states' laws and policies, which allow the citizenship to be made more porous and less exclusive (Joppke and Morawska 2003: 1-36; Howard 2010: 443-455; Joppke 2010a). According to Joppke (2010b), the tendency to lighten the concept of citizenship is unavoidable, and it happens in four specific contexts of representative democracy: i) formal state membership; ii) citizenship rights; iii) citizenship identity (Joppke 2007: 38); and iv) membership of the nation-state in a supranational organization (Joppke 2010b: 19-29). Joppke also suggests a formula which proposes that evolving citizenship reforms depend on the political ideology of the government in power. According to him, CL restrictions happen under rightist governments that promote policies grounded in the ascriptive criteria of *jus sanguinis* and favourable legislation for co-ethnics abroad (Joppke 2003: 443). Meanwhile, leftist governments promote increasing the citizenship rights of immigrants (Joppke 2003: 443, Janoski 2010, Bird et al. 2010, Green 200). A second reason behind CL restrictions has been observed by Howard, who considers the presence of strong anti-immigrant, populist, far-right parties as a sufficient and necessary condition of citizenship access restrictions. In the presence of anti-immigration parties, governments will try to accommodate extremist voters or voters who support anti-immigrant issues through the restriction of citizenship policies (Howard 2010: 735-751). Howard also identifies a quasi-symmetric relationship in which the absence of the far right is a necessary condition for citizenship liberalization (Howard 2010: 747).

The CL process has only been studied by scholars in the context of representative parliamentary democracy; consequently, explanations regarding CL restriction/extension have only been clarified from this perspective and not in the context of direct democracy.

This approach does not sufficiently cover all frameworks of this phenomenon because CL scholars do not focus on popular perception in the circumstance of direct democracy. With this research,

we aim to understand whether there are potential hurdles to CL whenever citizens have a say. Our aim is to determine whether Joppke's and Howard's hypotheses as well as other possible conditions could influence the same CL outcome of interest in the specific context of referendums.

In order to analyse CL in the direct democratic context, we will firstly provide a definition of the term *citizenship light* we will then delineate a theoretical framework that considers the concept of citizenship using two distinctive dimensions: 1) individual citizenship, and 2) collective citizenship.

Our theoretical framework will be used to determine to which fields CL can be applied in the context of referendums. The aim is to identify tangible policy fields in which both individual and collective citizenship concepts can be operationalized.

From our theoretical framework, we will identify six types of referendums regarding the following issues: i) policies of naturalization; ii) legal and illegal immigration policies; iii) the right of foreigners to vote and be elected; iv) membership in a supranational organization; v) the transformation of the political system; and vi) dual citizenship policies.

Afterwards, we will consider conditions that explain CL extension and restriction; given the direct democratic context, we will also consider other theoretically-informed conditions in our study that explain popular votes' success or failure.

The five conditions in this study are divided into two groups. None of these conditions fully explain the specific context of CL extension and restriction in direct democracy. Likewise, the outcome of interest can be explained by a configuration of conditions related to both the CL literature and the direct democratic literature. Therefore, the phenomenon under our investigation refers to a configurational social reality.

This study's final target is to explore the conditions that led to the outcome and uncover the complex causal relationships of conditions generated by previous studies' hypotheses on a medium number of cases.

In order to address this target, we located these five conditions in configurational hypotheses. Next, we tested conditions and hypotheses on every popular vote which involved CL extension.

To test our conditions, we used fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). This technique is particularly suited to identifying causal configurations, thereby providing a tool to explain the success or failure of CL policies in a direct democracy as well as or better than our starting hypotheses. Our discussion of the QCA results for the outcome will follow two separate steps. Firstly, we will focus on technical analysis to describe the parameters of fit of the QCA analysis of necessity and sufficiency, and also identify claims about necessity and sufficiency. Secondly, we will relate our QCA analysis results to our configurational hypotheses.

### **Research questions**

It is our primary intention that this thesis explores citizenship liberalization, whenever citizens have a say in the process. The question we want to answer through this examination is:

“Under which combinations of conditions are attempts to extend citizenship rights by popular vote successful or unsuccessful?”



## Part I: Theoretical chapter

### 1) Conceptualizing citizenship light as a dependent variable

#### 1.1) Citizenship light

##### 1.1.1) *Citizenship light definition*

Relevant hypotheses in citizenship studies highlight a general and universalistic evolution of the concept of citizenship in liberal modern representative democracies and contemporary states (Joppke 2010a: 31). In general, liberal democracies configure most parts of their citizenship politics in terms of rights without obligations (Joppke 2010a: 33).

The trend of a less exclusive citizenship is explained by the idea of CL as coined by Christian Joppke. CL is a typology of citizenship distinguished by “easy [individual] access with more rights (and few obligations) that do not sharply distinguish citizens from certain aliens and capped by thin identities” (Joppke 2010a: 224). According to Joppke, “as citizenship has become more accessible, it inevitably must mean less in terms of rights and identity” (Joppke 2010a: 33). In CL, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens is not clear: it is minimal, if it exists at all, because non-citizens acquire the same or similar rights as citizens even if they do not share the same legal status. The fundamental tendency of citizenship has been the lessening of entitlement to exclusive rights and the fracturing of the unique claim to national identity representation with the increasing of universalistic ideals such as the normative understanding of national identity (Joppke 2007: 44).

If we relate CL to Brubaker’s (1992) idea of citizenship, which considers citizenship to be internally inclusive (because all citizens share the same rights and duties), but at the same time externally exclusive (because non-citizens are not given these rights), CL would be considered externally non-exclusive because non-citizens have the same or similar rights of citizens.

### ***1.1.2) The inevitable lightening of citizenship***

Joppke (2008: 138) remarks that the CL tendency is unavoidable. According to him (Joppke 2010b), CL persists despite states' recent efforts to upgrade and re-nationalize citizenship through ceremonies, civic integration tests, and more exclusive rights. CL trend is visible even if in the post-2001 world (i.e., due to a wave of religious terror), some countries have started a more restrictive immigration policy, especially with respect to Muslim immigrants. Joppke (2008: 138) argues that these restrictions occur within a further liberalizing framework, and citizenship still remains a light concept. Joppke (2008: 164) also emphasises that this trend is not clear, but that "strong restrictive trends have often been counterbalanced by liberalizing elements". He considers that changes within the context of restriction do not reverse liberal practice: the new requirement does not indicate a shift from liberal to restrictive policy but a shift of norms from rights- to obligation-based citizenship (Joppke 2007: 35).

Joppke also highlights an irreversible change to the meaning of citizenship as a marker of collective identity. Liberal states respond to centrifugal diversification with campaigns for unity and integration. According to this author, nation-states use liberal concepts of CL as a tool of integration and identity for newcomers (Joppke 2010a: 157); therefore, the cultural belonging and social membership of non-citizens inside the national society is less exclusive.

### ***1.1.3) CL in the context of direct democracy***

CL scholars study the extension and restriction of CL exclusively from the representative democratic perspective and not in the context of direct democracy. In essence, there is a gap in CL literature in regarding the CL phenomenon in the context of direct democracy. This thesis aims to close this gap and identify the conditions that lead to CL policies in the direct democratic arena.

In the direct democratic process, there are different explanations as to why parliamentary decisions differ from the results of popular votes.

Here we identify two essential differences between CL in a representative democracy versus the direct:

- i) In the direct democratic arena, the consensus of voters is required to deliberate policies: without that consent, policies are blocked or delayed. Therefore, the population itself constitutes an additional veto player, or an actor whose consent is required to change the status quo. This addition could make significant policy changes more difficult. As a result, during the popular voting procedure, the government and parliamentary majority must take the population into consideration in order amend new policies. In the context of direct democracy, the change of the status quo towards a lighter form of citizenship happens whenever the actors involved in policy making agree on that change, meaning that a simple voter majority is required. In such deliberative procedures, the change in status quo regarding CL policies could have different explanations than in a representative democratic system.
- ii) The direct democratic arena provides less deliberative space amongst political actors than the representative democratic arena. In the direct democratic arena, the level of conflicts amongst political actor is higher than in the representative democratic arena because there is not a deliberative space (such as the parliament) that allows the political actors involved in the debate to reach consensus. In such context, CL supporters must find strategies to reduce political actors' conflicts and influence popular preferences.

#### ***1.1.4) Citizenship light domain***

From Joppke's perspective the tendency towards lightening the concept of citizenship happens on four specific levels, explored in detail below:

- i) At the level of formal state membership, citizenship is light when: a) the individual access of non-citizens to citizenship status is easy, and b) the states tolerate dual citizenship (Joppke 2007: 39). In the first case, immigrants are entitled to acquire citizenship on the basis of their residence (*jus soli*), and their access to citizenship is less exclusive because aliens do not have to share cultural membership with the host society in order to become citizens. In the second case, the exercise of full political rights happens in more than one polity without a genuine connection with the respective society (Joppke 2010b: 18); the citizens do not have to be culturally assimilated into just one society to exercise their rights.
- ii) In the domain of citizenship rights, it is possible to observe an extension of social citizenship rights to non-citizens (such as the social right to contribution-based benefits) and the strengthening of minority rights to anti-discrimination and multicultural recognition (Joppke 2007: 42). This domain is related to the phenomenon of post-nationalization (Soysal 1994: 513). The source of many of these rights lies in the international rights regime, which recognizes individuals on the basis of their personhood rather than national affiliation.
- iii) In the level of national identity, citizenship is lighter whenever the nation-state's identity is no longer linked to a specific cultural affiliation (Joppke 2007: 39). Here, the shift towards light forms of citizenship is accomplished through the positive actions of multicultural policies that recognize minority groups or through anti-discrimination approaches. Aliens do not have to share ethnic, racial, or cultural affiliations with the host society, and the host society protects the naturalized alien through anti-discrimination and multicultural rights.
- iv) Finally, at the supranational organization level, citizens acquire more rights, such as social, economic, and political rights, inside other countries. These rights are no longer linked to a narrow concept of territorial nation-state but extended to aliens. When a nation-state becomes a member of a supranational organization, the notion of citizenship moves from a particular nation or group dimension to a broader level (Soysal 1994: 512). In a supranational organization, it is possible to enable a dissociation between citizenship and nationhood

(Joppke 2010b: 19). Joppke considers the European Union (EU) as the key example of this kind of citizenship liberalization and also the quickest-moving citizenship light example in the world (Joppke 2010b: 19).

## **1.2) Specification of citizenship: the two dimensions of citizenship**

Though Joppke identifies four specific policy fields in which CL occurs, his observations might be limited and not exhaustive. In fact, we can imagine that other policies can mark the CL trend. In order to determine the specific policy fields in which CL can operated in the direct democratic context, we decided to build a theoretical framework that considers the general definition citizenship in terms of system of rights and legal status.

We then identified two main normative dimensions of citizenship: 1) individual 2) the collective.

### ***1.2.1) General definition: citizenship as System of rights and legal status***

Citizenship is defined by mainstream scholars as a system of civil, political, social and economic rights. In relation to this definition, T. H. Marshall (1994: 93-111) identifies civil rights (the individual rights necessary for individual freedom), political rights (the right to participate in the exercise of political power), and social rights (the rights to a modicum of economic welfare and security) as the main characteristics of citizenship.

This system of rights is regulated by the legal status of citizenship that defines the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens. Those people included in these boundaries legally enjoy rights and social membership, while those outside these boundaries are excluded from the practice and enjoyment of full citizenship rights (Bosniak 2000; Rubenstein 2007).

Bloemraad et al. (2008: 156) highlight that the criteria of inclusion or exclusion between citizens and non-citizens are determined by legal status. The level of difficulty in accessing citizenship also allows one to determine how exclusive or inclusive the legal status of citizenship is.

Klimcyka and Normann (1994: 352) point out that the degree of inclusiveness and exclusiveness of citizenship is determined by the rights dimension: citizenship is more inclusive when rights are granted to non-citizens and more exclusive when the rights are mainly granted to citizens.

In this thesis we consider dimensions of both legal status and rights in order to determine the meanings of exclusive and inclusive citizenship, as intended by Brubaker (1992).

### ***1.2.2) Normative dimensions of citizenship***

Citizenship can be framed into two normative dimensions, which allow citizenship policies to be easily identified according to their legal status or rights system.

#### ***1.2.2.1) Individual citizenship dimension***

The first dimension we discuss here is individual citizenship. This concept is related to the classic theories of citizenship, which distinguish two ideal types of nations: i) the civic-territorial model of the contractual nation; and ii) the ethnic model of the cultural nation (Schnapper 1994):<sup>1</sup>

- i) In the civic-territorial model, the concept of citizenship is linked to a social contract amongst individuals who create the state and the civil society. The nation is defined ‘in purely political terms, so that *State* and *Nation* [are] congruent and coextensive’ (Safran 1997: 310-311). In this case, citizenship is universalist, individualist, and inclusive (Singer 1996: 310-311). This model locates the civic principle in a dominant position, defining citizenship in terms of functional criteria. The legal status is regulated by the principle of *jus soli*. Therefore, an individual becomes a member of a civic community in a determinate territory when he or she makes a civic contract and swears to respect civic laws and rules. Relatedly, the extension of individual rights to aliens offers recognition to individuals on

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<sup>1</sup> As emphasised by Dominique Schnapper contractual and cultural nations are ideal types that do not exist in reality. The concept of citizenship embodies both concepts of cultural and civic dimensions, and some nations may be more or less contractual or more or less cultural compared to another.

the basis of their personhood rather than their national affiliation (Soysal 1994: 513). Therefore, to be a citizen is not a central attribute granted by citizenship rights, because citizenship is understood to be a universal ideal and it is inclusive towards aliens.

- ii) The ethnic model links the concept of citizenship to ethno-cultural membership. Citizens are members of a compact ethnic and cultural society; they share language, myths, historical memory, mores, traditions, and cultural heritage in a determinate territory. The legal status is regulated by the principle of *jus sanguinis*. Therefore, this model defines citizenship through ascriptive criteria of birth and descent (Safran 1997: 314). Individual rights are granted to members of the community who share the same heritage; other members are excluded until they assimilate such heritage. Indeed, the ethnic model considers citizenship as particularist, collectivist, and organicist (the citizen is linked to the particular national society, values and culture) (Soysal 1994: 513).

#### 1.2.2.2) Collective citizenship dimension

Citizenship also has a broader meaning when it is related to collectivity and so to the groups' degree of recognition inside a state. Recognition in this context is defined as the range of policies that determine recognitions of different cultural, racial, ethnic and religious groups inside a state.

In relation to this we can have two distinctive models: i) the cultural pluralist model, and ii) the cultural monist model.

- i) In the case in which the State is oriented towards cultural pluralism, it seeks to retain or even stimulate diversity and allow cultural groups to follow a variety of cultural patterns" (Koopmans et al, 2005: 9-10). The legal status is non-exclusive and dual or multiple citizenship is encouraged and guaranteed. Cultural pluralism takes ethnic and racial criteria as a basis for fighting against disadvantages and discrimination (Koopmans et al. 2005: 14-15). In a cultural pluralist state, different groups will have the cultural right to express their


distinctive cultural identity (Soutphommasane 2005: 406-407). Group membership to the society is not exclusive to a single group of people, but is open to different groups through the politics of recognition (Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995).

- ii) In contrast, when the State is accustomed to cultural monism, the State insists on a single cultural model (Koopmans et al. 2005: 9-10). Access to legal status is exclusive and refers to a specific and unique cultural model. In such cases minority groups, must adapt (or renounce) their cultural rights in order to fit with the mainstream national culture in a process of cultural assimilation. This model insists on conformity to a single cultural model that is shared by all citizens (Koopmans et al., 2005: 9-10).

### 1.2.2.3) Citizenship light considering individual and collective citizenship

Individual and collective citizenship define the architecture of the theoretical framework that will be used in order to identify specific CL policy fields.

*Figure 1: Citizenship light in the individual and collective citizenship axes*






As displayed by figure 1, CL occupies the area defined by the civic-territorial and cultural pluralist models. In contrast, non-citizenship light is located in the area defined by the ethnic and cultural monist models.

The distinction between citizens and non-citizens in the civic-territorial and cultural pluralist models is minimal or even non-existent. Indeed, in this model an alien has gained access to individual citizenship's legal status towards *jus soli*. Meanwhile, the collective legal status established by dual- or multiple-citizenship policies allow the alien to maintain his or her original collective cultural affiliations. In such a scenario, aliens have the possibility to benefit from individual rights and collective social and cultural recognition.

Contrarily, the ethnic and cultural monist model is more exclusive towards aliens. Indeed, it is difficult or impossible for an alien to reach the legal status of citizens because naturalization's policies are grounded on *jus sanguinis*. Meanwhile, as a collective member legal status is also difficult or impossible to achieve because aliens are not allowed to maintain their original cultural affiliation after naturalization (dual-multiple citizenship policies are not allowed). Moreover, aliens are excluded from individual and collective rights of citizenship.

Figure 2: The lightening of citizenship in the individual or collective dimension



As indicated by figure 2, each time a policy moves along the individual axis from the ethnic to civic model a lightening of citizenship is observed from an individual dimension of citizenship; meanwhile, whenever a policy moves along the collective axis from cultural monism to the cultural pluralism, a lightening of citizenship is observed from the collective dimension of citizenship.

### 1.3) Operationalization: Policies concerning the two dimensions of citizenship

As table 1 illustrated, our theoretical framework allows us to differentiate between individual and collective legal status and individual and collective rights.

*Table 1: Individual and collective Citizenship Light*

FRAMEWORK	LEGAL STATUS	RIGHTS
INDIVIDUAL CL	jus soli	Extension of citizenship rights to aliens
COLLECTIVE CL	dual citizenship	Extension/acceptance of groups rights to aliens

#### *1.3.1) Individual citizenship policies in the direct democratic context*

The CL ideal type is closely related to the civic-territorial model from an individual citizenship perspective, and the lightening occurs whenever there is a shift in policy from the ethnic to the civic-territorial concept.

A lightening of citizenship from an individual perspective occurs whenever the legal access to citizenship status is facilitated, and there is a shift from policies that refer to the principle of *jus sanguinis* to those that refer to the principle of *jus soli*.

Moreover, in a CL ideal-typical regime, aliens and citizens would be entitled in the same way to the system of citizenship rights. Both groups would enjoy the same individual civil rights (such as speech liberties, privacy rights, property rights, and so forth), individual social rights (such as the guaranteed contributed social benefits for aliens), and individual economic rights (such as free

access to the labour market by resident aliens, the absence of legal hurdles for resident aliens to work). This ideal-typical model also indistinctively provides aliens with the same political rights, such as the right for foreigners to elect and be elected.

Here we briefly summarize these points:

*Table 2: Individual CL*

<b>INDIVIDUAL CITIZENSHIP</b>	<b>LEGAL STATUS</b>	<b>CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS TO ALIENS</b>
<b>FROM ETHNIC AND NON-CL REGIME</b>	Jus sanguinis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited civil rights (e.g. limited property rights for aliens)</li> <li>- Limited social rights (e.g. limited social benefit for aliens)</li> <li>- Limited economic rights (e.g. no access to labor market)</li> <li>- Limited political rights (e.g. no voting right for aliens)</li> </ul>
<b>TO CIVIC AND CL REGIME</b>	Jus soli	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Extended civil rights (e.g. property rights for aliens)</li> <li>- Extended social rights (e.g. social benefit for aliens)</li> <li>- Extended economic rights (e.g. access to labor market for aliens)</li> <li>- Extended political rights (e.g. voting right for aliens)</li> </ul>

It is possible to identify two distinctive domains in which the liberalization of individual citizenship could appear in a direct democratic context: A) the transformation of legal status through easing the naturalization policies process, and B) the extension of and access to citizenship rights (civil, social and economic rights) to and by aliens.

#### *A) Naturalization policies referendums*

Policies of naturalization are linked to the individual legal status access of aliens to citizenship. These kinds of referendums propose to make individual access to citizenship less exclusive through policies that promote *jus soli* concepts and abandon the concept of *jus sanguinis*. For example, such referendums might ask for the reduction of the period of residency or automatic naturalization policies for immigrants. In other words, these referendums ease the individual's

access to citizenship, and individual membership to a community would no longer be based on particularist ethnic terms but on a universalist civic-territorial contract.

### *B) Aliens rights referendums*

This group of policies can be further divided into two subgroups considering aliens' normative definition. Indeed, aliens could refer to both migrants and residents that are not citizens. Therefore, the policies related to aliens' rights mainly refer to the immigration policies and policies that regulate the civil, social, economic, and political rights of resident aliens.

#### B.1) Immigration policy referendums

Certain individual aspects of citizenship rights are extended to newcomers (e.g., by facilitating access to rights and privileges to immigrants not yet residents in the polity). Therefore, through these kinds of policies, immigrants will legally possess certain citizens' rights, such as property, education, social benefits, right to work, and so forth.

#### B.2) Resident aliens' rights referendums

The distance between resident aliens and citizens in the exercise of citizenship rights becomes subtle when resident aliens acquire the same or similar rights as resident citizens. Relatedly, the primary right usually not granted to resident aliens is the right of foreigners to vote and be elected. In fact, this right is the core citizenship right that distinguishes resident aliens from resident citizens. This kind of referendum proposes to extend the exercise of individual political rights (passive or active political rights) to resident aliens, and make less exclusive the individual idea of the practice of collective self-governance regarding ruling and being ruled. These referendums constitute a shift from an exclusive form of political participation to an inclusive one that is based not on nationhood, but on a universal dimension of citizenship rights. In other words, there is a

disassociation between citizenship and nationhood, because the practice of collective self-governance in relation to ruling and being ruled is not related to a specific national community anymore.

### ***1.3.2) Collective citizenship policies in the direct democratic context***

The CL ideal type is closed to the cultural pluralist model from a collective citizenship perspective, and lightening happens whenever there is a shift in policy from the cultural monist to the cultural pluralist concept.

A lightening of citizenship is observed whenever dual (or multiple) citizenships are accepted and positive multicultural policies are promoted. In a CL ideal-typical regime, different cultural groups would enjoy the same collective civil recognition (such as State recognition of minority groups' mores, e.g., dress code freedom), social recognition (such as the adoption of multicultural school curricula or State funding of the activities of ethnic group organizations), and economic recognition (such as free movement of jobs seekers). The cultural pluralist ideal-type also indistinctively provides different groups of aliens the same political rights, such as promoting advisory bodies or councils that deal with immigration and integration issues (Koopmans et al. 2005), or supranational forms of political participation or transnational voting rights which refer to the extension of suffrage to non-resident citizens.

Here we briefly summarize these points:

Table 3: Collective CL

<b>COLLECTIVE CITIZENSHIP</b>	<b>LEGAL STATUS</b>	<b>GROUP CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS</b>
<b>FROM CULTURAL MONISM</b>	No dual citizenship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited civil rights (e.g. dress code restrictions)</li> <li>- Limited social rights (e.g. welfare chauvinism)</li> <li>- Limited economic rights (e.g. minority groups cannot access to the job market)</li> <li>- Limited political rights (e.g. no supranational political participation)</li> </ul>
<b>TO CULTURAL PLURALISM</b>	Dual (multiple) citizenship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Extended civil rights (e.g. dress code liberties)</li> <li>- Extended social rights (e.g. special help for minority groups)</li> <li>- Extended economic rights (e.g. free movement of persons seeking for jobs)</li> <li>- Extended political rights (e.g. supranational political participation)</li> </ul>

It is possible to identify two distinctive domains in which collective citizenship liberalization could appear in the direct democratic context: C) the transformation of legal status through accepting dual citizenship, D) the extension of group citizenship rights.

#### *C) Dual citizenship policies*

Dual citizenship policies are related to the concept of transnationalization by allowing aliens to maintain their ties with other national polities. In this case, the State would promote internal racial and ethnic diversification on the basis of cultural pluralist ideals.

#### *D) Extension of group citizenship rights*

Collective citizenship rights policies can either directly or indirectly refer to the extension of citizenship rights to specific cultural or minority groups.

### D.1) Direct extension of civil, social, and economic recognition of cultural groups

The direct extension of citizenship rights refers to any referendums that aim to explicitly extend minority and cultural rights in term of civil, social, or economic recognition. This type of referendum may include a single policy change, or a broad transformation related to the extension of cultural groups' civil, social, and economic recognition from a monocultural to a pluricultural perspective.

### D.2) Indirect extension of citizenship rights: membership to supranational organization referendums

The indirect extension of citizenship light refers to referendums that do not explicitly question collective citizenship rights. In this type of referendum, the CL policies are the indirect consequences of other decisions. Such referendums are linked to the process of economic regionalization. Indeed, as has been noticed by Joppke (2010b: 19) and Caramani and Grotz (2015: 13), economic regionalization through supranational organizations (such as the EU) has enhanced and extended the citizenship rights of non-citizen residents in the respective member states. However, such rights extension is an indirect consequence of economic regionalization. In this context, the national understanding of citizenship moves from a particular national group to a broader supranational level. Citizens inside a supranational organization acquire more rights, such as economic, social, and political rights, in other countries that are member of the same supranational geographic area.

## **2) Existing explanations on extension and restrictions of CL**

Academic literature in this area has developed conditions that explain the CL extensions and restrictions. We have considered such conditions despite the fact they have only been studied in the context of the parliamentary decision process, and understand that the parliamentary process is more deliberative than the direct democratic process.

## 2.1) Government ideology (LEFT, ~LEFT)

Joppke (2008: 167-168) suggests a formula which considers evolving citizenship reforms based on the political ideology of the government in place.<sup>2</sup> He demonstrates that leftist governments are typically in favour of increasing the citizenship rights of non-citizens, whereas rightist governments tend to resist such impulses.

Joppke considers CL resistance the result of the rightist ideology of the government in place; in contrast, he considers CL promotion to be the result of a leftist government (Joppke 2008: 167).

He observes that rightist governments promote a process of re-ethnicization, or an adaption of policies grounded in the ascriptive criteria of *jus sanguinis* typical of the ethnic-territorial model.

In contrast, leftist governments promote a process of de-ethnicization which adapts policies that facilitate access to citizenship using the civic-territorial principle of *jus soli* (Joppke 2008: 167).

This relationship between government ideology and CL extension or blockage has also been observed by other scholars such as Janoski (2010), Bird et al. (2010), and Green (2005).

Specifically, it has been observed that governments predominantly composed of leftist parties provide more inclusive and generous citizenship policies than rightist governments (Janoski 2010, Bird et al. 2010, Green 2005).

This condition is not symmetrical; indeed, the presence of strong rightist governments tends to restrict citizenship rights (Joppke 2003) but only because the government tries to accommodate xenophobic movements (Joppke 2008: 166); this condition implies that rightist governments alone are not sufficient for CL opposition.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, according to this formula, CL occurs if a leftist government is in power and such liberalization is less likely to occur when a rightist government is in power.

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<sup>2</sup> For the concept of de-ethnicization, Joppke emphasizes a passage from the ethnic to civic model of citizenship, contrary to re-ethnicization policies with an ethnic model of citizenship framework.

<sup>3</sup> Joppke's argument is largely supported by the fact that nearly all countries that liberalized citizenship in his survey had leftist governments at the time (Finland, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Netherlands) (Joppke 2008: 166); meanwhile, rightist governments tend to restrict CL (France, Italy, Spain, Luxemburg, Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands) (Joppke 2003; 2008: 166). According



## 2.2) Presence or absence of strong far right populist parties (POP, ~POP)

According to Wallace and Howard (2013: 120), the existence of a rightist government is in itself not sufficient to make citizenship liberalization unlikely.<sup>4</sup> They see another crucial factor that makes liberalization of citizenship unlikely, which is the extent to which xenophobic public sentiments are activated by far-right political parties, referendums, or by the use of public mobilization.

According to Howard (2010: 735-751), anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiments are pre-existent in the population and populist parties are the catalyst that mobilize these types of sentiments. The source of restrictiveness of citizenship policies is provided by latent anti-immigration sentiments in the public opinion that become politically activated by far-right parties or movements; this process serves to block any attempt of citizenship liberalization. Therefore, the issue is not simply “whether a right-of-centre government is in power, but whether it is mobilized on the issue of immigration and citizenship reform” (Howard 2006: 449)<sup>5</sup>.

Howard suggests a non-symmetrical relationship in which the presence of strong anti-immigrant movements and their capability to mobilize xenophobic mass public sentiments is a necessary and sufficient factor that prevents CL policies; in contrast the absence of far-right parties is only a necessary and not sufficient condition for liberalization.

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to him, moderate rightist governments try to accommodate extremist voters or support anti-immigrant issues through restrictive developments of citizenship.

<sup>4</sup> In order to capture the outcome of citizenship liberalization, he makes use of the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI), which includes policies related to the access of citizenship. Therefore, Howard’s field of research was not strictly related to the broad concept of CL defined above, but to the subfield of access to citizenship. Here we test whether this condition (as well as which combination of conditions) also works in the context of direct democracy and extend this concept to the broad concept of CL.

<sup>5</sup>He observed this process in studying the relationship between far-right parties, their strength in terms of electoral weight, and liberalization trends in 11 Western European countries between 1992 and 2006 (Howard 2010: 747). The presence of a strong anti-immigrant movement is a necessary and sufficient factor that prevents citizenship liberalization, given that all the countries under analysis with a strong far-right organization did not liberalize their citizenship laws (Denmark, Austria, Italy); meanwhile two countries with weak far-right organizations (Greece and Spain) did not liberalize, and six countries with low levels of support for far-right parties did have citizenship liberalization (Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, Finland and Sweden) (Howard 2010: 746-747).

### **3) Further potential explanation of restriction of CL in the context of popular votes**

CL literature only refers to conditions that explain CL in the context of representative democracy.

In order to bridge the gap, we have added other theoretically-informed conditions to our study that will explain popular votes' success or failure.

#### **3.1) Popular initiated referendums (INI, ~INI)**

The type of popular vote affects the popular vote campaign and so also the voting behaviour of individuals.

It is important to make a distinction between referendums and popular initiated referendums (also called popular initiatives). Referendums are instruments that allow citizens to decide on particular policies adopted by the political authorities and popular initiatives are instruments that enable parts of the population to enforce popular votes, which may go against the will of parliamentary majorities (Freitag and Vatter 2006).

As argued by Setälä (2009: 49) and Kriesi (2006: 405), the popular initiative success rate is generally low.<sup>6</sup> Kriesi (2006: 605) observes that the success rate of popular initiative is lower whenever the government is cohesive in opposing the bill. Therefore, we can consider that, in the context of popular initiatives, the opposition of the government is a sufficient and necessary factor for its failure. This condition has a non-symmetric relationship. Indeed, non-popular initiatives (i.e. mandatory referendums, facultative referendums, government counterproposals, or popular initiatives supported by the government) are neither sufficient or necessary for success in the

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<sup>6</sup> For, example in Switzerland, where the popular initiative is widely used, the success rate of popular initiatives is 8% (Setälä 2009: 49) which is already a quasi-sufficient condition for the failure of popular votes. The success rate has increased from 13% in 2010 to today. This positive trend of the success rate has only a relative impact on the understanding of this condition given that our period of study is not limited to the period after 2010.

popular vote due to the great variance of their success rates as pointed out by Setälä (2009: 49) and Trechsel and Sciarini (1996: 216)<sup>7</sup>.

### **3.2) Political elite cohesive or split the referendum (ELITE, ~ELITE)**

The degree of polarization of the political elite influences the outcome of a popular vote; the more fragmented the political elite is on the issue put into popular vote, the less likely the citizens will agree with the government (Kriesi 2006: 601-602; Trechsel and Sciarini 1996: 223-224).<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the division amongst political elites creates a polarization effect amongst voters who are exposed to two competing flows of communication (Sciarini and Tresch 2011: 336). Therefore, whenever the government supports the bill but is internally polarized, the bill will fail.

In short, the split of the government is a sufficient and necessary condition to the failure of the referendum. In such context the referendum campaign is usually intense, and people vote according to the cues they receive from different camps (Kriesi 2006: 600).

This hypothesis has a symmetrical nature. Ray (1999: 298) pointed out that cohesion among elites enhances a party's persuasiveness in referendums: whenever the government support the bill and is cohesive in that support, the bill is successful. Essentially, when all parties are unified in favour of a proposal, a one-sided information flow exists, and referendums will be successful (Hobolt Binzer 2006: 629).

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<sup>7</sup> For example, the success rate of non-popular initiatives varies across the type of referendum. In Switzerland, the mandatory referendum is 79%, the rejective referendum 70.4%, and the counterproposal from the government to a popular initiative is 50% (Setälä 2009: 49).

<sup>8</sup> Kriesi (2006: 606) observes that in Switzerland, the coalition government was successful in only three out of 14 projects in which the coalition was totally split. Amongst these three referendums, two concerned minor institutional reforms and the other related to the liberalisation of abortion rights (Kriesi 2006: 606), which are not relevant for our research.

### 3.3) Referendum with multiple or single issues (MULT, ~MULT)

Popular votes with multiple subjects (those that gather together one CL policy and several other non-citizenship-related policies into a single vote) and those with single subjects (those that address only specific policies on CL) behave in different ways. Popular votes with multiple subjects have a better chance of passing because the complexity of the vote can reduce the sensitive object's salience (Ginsburg 2009: 3). In such cases, CL matters can be hidden inside a broad bill and the political elite can better control the propaganda related to the bill. Meanwhile, the single-subject popular vote on CL policy has a lower chance of passing because the salience of the CL matters would be significant (Cooter and Gilbert 2010: 745). Moreover, with a popular vote which deals with a single subject, the public is able to focus on a single issue and have a more manageable set of choices and thereby enhance the quality of deliberation (LeDuc 2005: 17). Therefore, a symmetrical relationship exists between multiple- versus single-issue in popular votes.

#### 4) Expected causal configurations

The five conditions set out above are divided into two groups:

- i) the conditions *government ideology* and *presence/absence of strong far right populist parties* belong to the group of CL literature's conditions that explains CL restriction or extension in the sole context of representative democracy;
- ii) the conditions *presence of popular initiatives opposed by the government, elite cohesive or split*, and *presence of multiple or single-issue referendum* belong to the group of general direct democracy literature that explains the popular vote's success or failure.

These two groups of conditions are circumstantial to their specific contexts: none of them fully explain the specific context of CL extension or restriction in a direct democracy. Likewise, the outcome of interest can be explained by a configuration of conditions related to the CL literature

and those related to the direct democratic literature. Therefore, the potential explanations expressed in the conditions contain both elements that have been discovered in the context of representative democracy and those that are important only in the context of direct democracy. The presence of both elements highlights the fact that even when the final decision is made in a direct democratic fashion, the political process involves elements of both representative and direct democracy.

As a result, the nature of the phenomenon under our investigation is configurative; the use of such an approach allows us to obtain the set of potential configurations of conditions that can combine the two different groups of conditions outlined above. In relation to this approach, we believe that our outcome of interest would be best understood in terms of configurative causation rather than the average causal effects of variables across cases.

#### **4.1) Hurdles in the direct democracy arena**

The complex nature of the decision-making process leads us to expect more hurdles to the success of CL in the context of direct democracy than in that of representative democracy. This expectation exists because CL policies in the direct democratic system are successful whenever the proposition overcomes the existing hurdles in the both the representative democratic and the direct democratic arena. From a configurational point of view, this complexity means that there are many necessary conditions that are needed for making progress towards CL in the direct democratic arena.

It is possible to identify at least two important hurdles:

- 1) First is the role of voters as veto player in the context of direct democracy. In this context, the consent of the population plays a central role because without it, policies can be blocked or delayed. Therefore, when trying to amend new policies during the popular voting process, both the government and the parliamentary majority must consider the population as a new

veto player. Given the less-liberal attitude of the electorate in respect to the representative democratic actors towards cultural diversity and policy change (Marcus et al. 1995; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 105-106), CL policies may be easily subject to the voters' veto. As result, in the representative democratic arena political outcomes can deviate from voters' preferences, which is not the case in the direct democratic arena given that voters themselves are called upon to express their preferences on the outcome.

- 2) Second is the high level of conflict in the direct democratic arena. As pointed out by Donovan and Bowler (1998:3), conflicts on the direct democratic arena are broader than the ones that can be observed in the representative democratic arena. The legislative process in the representative arena provides for the debate over alternatives, compromise, and consensus amongst elites about a policy. The direct democratic arena does not provide such opportunities for consensus because conflicts take place beyond the representative democratic actors and in different group settings than the representative arena. Essentially, the representative democratic decision-making process provides a deliberative space that allows for consent amongst the political actors involved which is absent in the direct democratic process. In such context, representative democratic actors must find strategies to introduce a deliberative space into the direct democratic arena and reduce political actors' conflicts and influence popular preferences.

In such a difficult context of the direct democratic arena, the conditions related to the CL literature must be complemented by at least one condition that explain the success of popular vote.

#### **4.2) Configurational condition for the CL success in the context of the direct democratic arena**

The many hurdles posed by the direct democratic arena and the explanations expressed in the conditions contain elements of both the representative and the direct democratic arenas, are translated in a complex configurative combination of conditions which work together in order to

achieve CL success. Therefore, in relation to the outcome “CL success” during referendum, we expect configurations of conditions with at least one element coming from the group of CL conditions and an element coming from the group of direct democratic conditions.

In relation to these configurations, we expect two possible combinations of conditions that can be used by CL promoters to overcome the hurdles of the direct democratic arena: 1) the open strategy and 2) the hidden strategy of CL promotion in the context of direct democracy.

- 1) In the open strategy, CL issues are openly debated during the referendum campaign. Considering the voters’ veto role and the higher level of conflicts between groups in the direct democratic arena, promoters of CL policies should provide a one-sided influx of information (without strong opposition) in order to convince voters about the CL object and reduce such conflicts. In these circumstances, the CL promoters will seek for elite cohesion in order to create little or no opposition to CL and positively influence the voters’ preferences on the issue. However, it is necessary to have the favourable circumstance of the absence of far-right populist parties in order to avoid conflicts over the CL reform. In such circumstances, CL promoters can decide to pose the CL issue in the form of a referendum question little fear that the CL policy will be considered unpopular by voters. Indeed, the strong elite’s propaganda in favour of CL and the absence of mobilizing actors that could activate latent xenophobic and anti-immigration sentiments would lead voters to accept the bill.

This strategy leads to the following configurational hypothesis:

*Configurational hypothesis 1 (CH1): Absence of populist parties (~POP) AND Elite Cohesion (ELITE) AND non-popular initiative (~INI).*

This configurational hypothesis considers that CL can be achieved if a cohesive elite can introduce it without being afraid of resistance from a populist right-wing party.

- 2) Considering the role of voters as a new veto player, CL promoters might adopt a hidden strategy of communication in order to pass the bill. In this context, CL’s promoters fear the

possible mobilization of pre-existent xenophobic sentiments amongst the population. Basically, left-wing governments, as main promoters of CL policies, are aware that voters might stop the bill because of their conservative attitudes on this type of object. Therefore, the governments might decide to avoid informing voters about the content of the bill in order to minimize the risk of focus being placed on the sensitive issue in the campaign (Ginsburg 2009; Besley and Coate 2008). This strategy also allows conflicts amongst political actors during the referendum debate to be reduced, given that the issue is not discussed. We define this possible strategy with the term *hidden strategy*, given that the CL issue is hidden inside a broad bill and people are not aware of the bill's content.

The hidden strategy leads to the following configurational hypothesis:

*Configurational hypothesis 2 (CH2): left-wing government (LEFT) AND multiple-issue referendum (MULT) AND non-popular initiative (~INI).<sup>9</sup>*

This configurational hypothesis considers that a CL can be achieved if a left-wing government includes it in a multiple-issue referendum. Along this line, unpopular policies would be kept hidden from the people. As a consequence, voters' preferences would not be determined by the CL object but by other objects included in the referendum's question.

The open strategy considers voters' negative sentiments towards aliens as latent and thereby able to be activated only by the mean of an agency factor. Therefore, in order to be successful, it is sufficient to deactivate or avoid activating the action of the agency factor (i.e., populist parties). The hidden strategy considers that voters' negative sentiments towards aliens are already active because they are pre-existent. Therefore, in order to be successful, it is important to avoid activating this pre-existent sentiment by hiding the issue in a broad bill. Essentially, the open strategy and the hidden strategy refer to an optimistic and a pessimistic view, respectively, of voters' attitudes towards aliens.

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<sup>9</sup> In Boolean terms, we expect to have this configuration: LEFT\*MULT\*~INI→CL



### **4.3) Expected configurations in CL failure in the context of direct democracy**

In relation to the failure of CL, it is assumed that the many hurdles facing the passage of a bill in a direct democracy are translated into many sufficient conditions alone to stop CL. Indeed, it is only required that the population disagree in order to sink the reform, despite the representative democratic actors' efforts to propose a bill. As previously pointed out, the rejection of a CL bill in the context of direct democracy would be relatively easy due to the hurdles of the direct democratic arena pointed out above. Basically, in these circumstances conditions that explain referendum failure and CL failure in the context of a representative democratic system are alone sufficient to the failure of referendum.

*Hypothesis 3 (H3): presence of a rightist government (~LEFT)*

This hypothesis considers that a CL bill will fail when it is opposed by a rightist government because the right-wing government coincides with conservative attitudes of voters.

*Hypothesis 4 (H4): presence of a divided elite (~ELITE)*

This hypothesis considers that a CL bill will fail when it is supported by a divided government, due to the lack of one strong flux of information able to convince voters on CL bill.

*Hypothesis 5 (H5): presence of strong far right populist party (POP)*

This hypothesis considers that a CL bill will fail when it is opposed by a strong far-right populist party, because the conservative vision of populist parties coincides with voter's preferences.

*Hypothesis 6 (H6): presence of popular initiative opposed by the government (INI)*

This hypothesis considers that a CL bill will fail when it is proposed as popular initiative opposed by the government because the government opposition will raise the conflicts between actors in the direct democratic arena.

*Hypothesis 7 (H7): Presence of single issue referendum (~MULT)*

This hypothesis considers that a CL bill will fail when is included in a single-issue referendum because pre-existent xenophobic sentiments are easily activated by the referendum question. Voters will then vetoing the unpopular object.<sup>10</sup>

## **5) Other conditions not considered**

In the literature, it is possible to identify other conditions that explain CL extension or restriction and referendum acceptance or rejection. Below we discuss such conditions and the reasons for dismissing them. In relation to this, we identify at least four specific reasons for rejection:

- a) Conditions built considering their probabilistic effects;
- b) Circumstantial conditions that are intrinsic to the ontology of existent conditions;
- c) Conditions not covered by the analysis process;
- d) Conditions not applicable to our context.

### **5.1) Conditions built considering their probabilistic effects**

All conditions discussed until this point have a well-defined nature. This means that they have a qualitative threshold below which the effect does not occur. According to previous studies, such conditions are determinative in terms of sufficiency and necessity for the outcome. Basically, the conditions have a deterministic effect, and it is this deterministic metaphysic that allow us to individuate necessary and/or sufficient conditions.

In contrast, a probabilistic reality understands causation in terms of probabilistic effect. The central idea behind the probabilistic effect is that the probability of the occurrence of an outcome increase with the change in degree of the condition. Basically, the outcome is dependent on the degree of the condition; it is not possible to determine a qualitative threshold above which the outcome is observable. Essentially, a condition with probabilistic effect does not fulfil the

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<sup>10</sup> In Boolean terms we expect to have this configuration:  $\sim\text{LEFT} + \sim\text{ELITE} + \text{POP} + \text{INI} + \sim\text{MULT} \rightarrow \sim\text{CL}$

requirements of necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcome in the same manner as a deterministic condition does (Dowe and Noordhof 2004).

Our focus is not to measure or seek the average effect of an individual condition on an outcome across a large population, but is instead to identify sufficient and necessary conditions (and configuration of conditions) that lead to the outcome.

We consider the following condition to be probabilistic:

- i) *The effects of propaganda on the referendum outcome.* The propaganda can be considered a condition with a probabilistic effect on the outcome. Indeed, as pointed out by Hobolt (2009: 196-197) and De Vreese et al. (2006), its effect varies depending on its intensity, salience, or tone and coverage. In relation to this variation, it is difficult to determine a qualitative threshold of the propaganda effect and measure the nature and intensity of propaganda given the existence of several frame models.<sup>11</sup>

However, even though the propaganda would not be considered as an autonomous condition, its potential effects on the outcome are couched elements of other existent conditions. Specifically, the propaganda is engulfed in the following conditions: a) strong far-right populist parties, b) a split or cohesive political elite, and c) multiple or individual referendum issues.

- a) In relation to the condition of strong far-right populist parties, it is implicit that an electorally strong party is able to run intense propaganda against a bill put into referendum.
- b) In relation to the condition of a split or cohesive political elite, it has already been implied that the more the political elite is split on a popular vote, the more intense the public debate will be with the result of a high salience of the issue put into discussion;

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<sup>11</sup>In this condition can also be included the effects of inadequate information given to voters during the referendum campaign. According to Milic (2015), this lack of information has the negative impact and consequences of the refusal of a proposal given to voters (Milic 2015).

- c) In relation to the nature of the issue put into referendum, it is implied that the in multiple issue referendums, the propaganda on specific CL issue is weaker than on a single-issue reform.

### **5.2) Circumstantial conditions that are intrinsic to the ontology of existent conditions**

Some conditions have not been considered because they are already covered by existing conditions. In relation to this, other than the effect of propaganda discussed above, we can also include the following condition:

- ii) *The role of international non-governmental organisations (INGOs)*. According to Park (2006), INGOs have a key role in the diffusion of norms at an international level and across states and are key players in the protection of non-citizens' rights. This condition is already contained by the condition *popular initiated referendum*. Indeed, in the context of the direct democratic arena, an INGO can be an active promoter of CL in the sole context of popular initiated referendums.

### **5.3) Conditions covered by the analysis process**

Some conditions cannot be considered in the specific context of our thesis because they a subgroup of our case population.

In relation to this we can mention:

- iii) *The economic regionalization through supranational organization*. This condition is already a subgroup of our possible case population as set out above. It is a specific subgroup of cases that refers to the extension of collective understanding of citizenship.

In general, geographic, economic, socio-economic, and demographic factors, such as the jurisdiction size and level (Donovan and Bowler 1998), will be taken into account during the analysis by creating homogeneous sub-groups of cases.

#### 5.4) Conditions not applicable to our context

Some conditions cannot be applied to our specific scope. These include:

- iv) *The debate in the parliament on the risk of a popular vote* (Christmann and Danaci 2012). Whenever there is a debate in parliament about the risks of a popular vote, a CL bill will not be proposed because parliament will feel restricted by the median (conservative) voter's position. This condition implies that the legislator will not put a CL bill into referendum if they fear a possible popular vote and not the proper presence of a referendum. Basically, this condition is not applicable to our scope condition in which the presence of popular is a necessary prerogative.
- v) *The level of judicial review* (Earnest 2008; Hofhansel 2008). Whenever a court decides to overrule legislative measures about citizenship liberalization. This condition cannot be considered in our context of direct democracy because the decision-making process is not linked to the courts. Courts can overturn the final result, but this is not the focus of our research. We do not intend to discover whether or not citizenship liberalization happens or does not happen after a popular vote has taken place, but instead to understand under which condition(s) a referendum on citizenship liberalization will pass or fail.
- vi) *Pattern of immigration*. Escobar (2015) observes that the enfranchisement of resident aliens in South America is linked to the nature of immigrant communities: suffrage was mainly offered to non-citizens residents because the targets of such reforms were mainly Europeans with high socio-economic status (Caramani and Grotz 2015: 12; Escobar 2015: 232-234). This condition is circumstantial to the specific geographic area of Latin America. Latin America is not a geographic area considered by Joppke or other CL scholars in observing CL trends, making such a condition not applicable to the context of our study.

## **6) Case selection**

### **6.1) Scope conditions and other criteria**

#### ***6.1.1) Scope condition***

Our scope aims to reveal what are the condition(s) that make CL possible or not possible when the instruments of direct democracy are used. In short, our scope condition is the failure or acceptance of CL policies proposed in the direct democratic arena in the context of an established Western liberal parliamentary democracy. The context of an established liberal democracy is important because it is in such a context that scholars made their observations. For example, Joppke (2003, 2010b: 43-44), Koopmans et al. (2005: 73), and Spiro (2008) remarked on citizenship lightening trends receive an acceleration in France, Germany, the European Union, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the USA. In these countries the citizenship policies are directed towards a more civic-territorial model and a cultural pluralist approach with the consequence of lightening the concept of citizenship. By focusing on specific geographical areas with similar political regimes, a homogeneous population of cases can be constructed. Therefore, we focus on the referendums which concern citizenship matters and target lightening citizenship policies in established liberal democracies.

As previously emphasized, we want to understand how CL restrictions work in the context of direct democracy. Therefore, we will consider both referendums triggered by authorities and popularly initiated referendums (popular initiatives) which promote more inclusive policies on citizenship related to the six categories described above.

As a consequence of our scope, we will omit referendums and popular initiatives that promote more exclusive policies on citizenship, i.e., citizenship heavy (CiH) policies.

#### ***6.1.2) Period studied and context***

The trend of liberalization happens in different times depending on the country and the specific field of liberalization.

By and large, there is a general consensus amongst scholars that citizenship liberalization has increased from the 1990s. In particular, scholars have remarked that since the 90s, there has been a remarkable trend of citizenship liberalization through more liberal citizenship laws and policies (Joppke 2008: 130-131). Indeed, certain scholars have emphasized that the de-nationalization of citizenship has been the main trend since the early '90s (Zapata 2009: 7; Spiro 2008: 4). Other studies have stressed that globalization from the 1990s' citizenship liberalization trend is more evident, because of the decline of the importance of space and territorial boundaries (Spiro 2008: 4). Wallace and Howard (2013:115) observed that the 1990s was a decade of liberalization for most European countries. Finally, Caramani and Grotz (2015: 7) noticed that since the 1990s, increasing numbers of countries have granted voting rights to all citizens abroad and resident aliens. Other surveys point out that the trend towards a broader acceptance of dual citizenship and the tendency of a relative high number of countries to simplify access to national citizenship took off in the 90s (Blatter et al. 2009: 16-24).

In addition to the positive trend on CL, beginning in the 1990s, it is also possible to observe an increasing use of the referendum around the world as a decision-making process. In fact, between 1993 to 2003, 497 national referendums were held worldwide, more than double that of the previous decade (Hobolt 2009: 5). The 1990s are therefore the starting point of analysis.

### ***6.1.3) Access to data***

In order to build our population of cases, we have extensively examined the political science literature on popular initiatives and referendums to find those that involve the CL policy fields defined above. We have also gathered information through governmental websites and specialized websites about direct democracy (such as [www.ballotpedia.org](http://www.ballotpedia.org) and [www.swissvotes.ch](http://www.swissvotes.ch)), vote analysis (such as [www.anneepolitique.ch](http://www.anneepolitique.ch) and [www.polittrends.ch](http://www.polittrends.ch)), governmental statistic databases (<http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index.html>), or the database of the Centre for

Research on Direct Democracy (C2D) (<http://www.c2d.ch>). We have gathered as many details as possible about each case; however, we do not claim to have found all the citizenship-related referendums and popular initiatives that have made their way onto ballots in Western countries.

## 6.2) Specification of the population of referendums that will be analysed

We will consider the most homogeneous CL-oriented referendums in which conditions' data are accessible. As a consequence, we will omit the cases that lack sufficient data to be analysed as well as the cases that are not properly CL-oriented referendums in order to avoid biased results. The idea is to include all cases with the scope condition of CL resistance and in which the outcome of interest has a real possibility of occurrence, and so omit irrelevant observations. Therefore, we consider popular votes that demand CL extension and exclude popular votes that request CL restrictions. This choice allows us to craft a homogeneous population. In order to build our population selection, we will gather our cases into potential referendums and de facto referendums that will be analysed based on our scope condition. We put an emphasis on potential popular votes in order to better profile and motivate our choices.

### *A) Potential and de facto included referendums in the field of naturalization:*

The de facto referendums that question citizenship on policies of naturalization are as follows:

- The Swiss referendum “*Access to citizenship to young immigrant*” (1994, rejected) requested facilitating access to citizenship for young immigrants.
- The Liechtenstein referendum on “*Law on citizenship – introduction of facilitated naturalization for long-time residents*” (2000, accepted) had the aim of facilitating access to citizenship for long-time resident aliens.
- The Swiss referendum “*Citizenship rights I*” (2004, rejected) had the aim of simplifying the acquisition of citizenship by second-generation young foreigners.



- The Swiss referendum “***Citizenship rights 2***” (2004, rejected) had the aim of simplifying the acquisition of citizenship by foreign youths born in Switzerland and allowing automatic acquisition of Swiss citizenship by third-generation foreign residents.
- The Swiss referendum “***Citizenship rights for third generation and facilitated naturalization for long-time residents***” (2017, accepted) aimed to introduce the facilitated naturalization of people belonging to the third generation of immigrants and the reduction of years of residency from 12 to 10 in order for other non-citizen to apply for citizenship.

Amongst policies of naturalization referendums, we do not consider the ones that are linked to the topic of promotion of the exclusive concept of citizenship:

- The Irish referendum on the “***Twenty-seventh amendment of Constitution***” (2004, rejected) was a restrictive revision of *jus soli*.
- The Swiss popular initiative for “***Democratic naturalization***” (2008, rejected) proposed to implement a policy in the Constitution which would allow local communities to decide on the naturalization of immigrants through popular votes.
- The Basel Stadt cantonal initiative “***For fair naturalization***” (2011, rejected) required higher levels of language knowledge in German for foreigners that wanted to be naturalized as Swiss.
- The Zurich cantonal referendum “***No right of naturalization for criminals***” (2012, rejected) proposed to deny the right of naturalization to foreigners criminals.
- The Bern Cantonal initiative “***No naturalization for criminals and for beneficiary of social help***” (2013, accepted) proposed to deny the right of naturalization to foreign criminals and foreigners that used State’s welfare.

Other cases that we exclude because of their lack of data and being out of scope:

- The San Marino “***Law on citizenship***” (1999, rejected) proposed the automatic acquisition of citizenship for children of mothers from San Marino, and for foreign spouses. Despite

this referendum being CL oriented, we decided to not consider it because of the difficulty of access to data. Indeed, the data linked to this referendum are highly cryptic. It is possible to find information on the law put into referendum but not on other information such as the position of the government, whether the government was split over the issue, or the presence of populist actors during the referendum campaign.

- We also exclude the *Swiss naturalization petitions* that were held in certain municipalities of Switzerland. Indeed, these kinds of referendums do not concern policies but instead are focused on the singular cases of aliens' naturalization. However, it is interesting to remark that communities with direct-democratic decision-making procedures on naturalization have a lower number of naturalizations than those with a representative democratic process (Helbling and Kriesi 2004: 33-58).

The table below summarizes the referendums held in the world from the 1990s to the 2010s that questioned naturalization policies through direct democracy:

*Table 4: De facto included referendums in the field of naturalization*

<i>Referendum</i>	<i>date</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Case ID</i>	<i>Result</i>
<i>Access to citizenship for young immigrant</i>	1994	Switzerland	CH94	No
<i>Citizenship right (second generation)</i>	2004	Switzerland	CH04.1	No
<i>Citizenship rights /Third generation)</i>	2004	Switzerland	CH04.2	No
<i>Citizenship rights / Third generation</i>	2017	Switzerland	CH17	Yes
<i>Facilitated naturalization for residents</i>	2000	Liechtenstein	FL00	Yes

## *B) Aliens right's referendums*

### B.1) Potential and de facto included referendums in the field of immigration policies

Referendums which question immigration policies and rights are as follows:

- The “*New Mexico amendment 4*” (2002, rejected) aimed to delate a provision for aliens who are not eligible to become citizens to acquire real property.
- The “*New Mexico amendment 1*” (2006, accepted) aimed to delate a provision for aliens who are not eligible to become citizens to acquire real property.

- The “*Florida property right act amendment 1*” (2008, rejected) aimed to delete a provision allowing the legislature to regulate property rights to aliens not eligible for citizenship.

We excluded referendums that promote an exclusive form of citizenship:

- The “*Swiss Foreign right law*” (1994, accepted) proposed the introduction of a period of three months of detention for illegal residency in Switzerland.
- The “*California proposition 187*” (1994, accepted) proposed to establish a state-run citizenship screening system and prohibit illegal aliens from using health care, public education, and social services.
- The “*Swiss popular initiative illegal immigration*” (1996, rejected) proposed to deny asylum rights to illegal immigrants.
- The “*Swiss Asylum right law*” (1998, accepted) proposed more restrictive asylum requirements.
- The “*Swiss popular initiative about regulating immigration*” (2000, rejected) proposed a maximum quota of 18% of foreign residents in Switzerland.
- The “*Swiss initiative regarding asylum law*” (2002, rejected) proposed introducing new elements of procedural law, criminal, and welfare sector asylum, to make Switzerland less attractive as a country of asylum.
- The “*Arizona Bailable Offenses, Proposition 100*” (2006, accepted) proposed preventing bail for those charged with serious felony offenses and who could not prove they were in the US legally.
- The “*Arizona Proposition 300*” (2006, approved) proposed excluding illegal immigrants from entitlement to benefits and social assistance.

- The “*Arizona Standing in Civil Actions Proposition 102*” (2006, approved) proposed prohibiting illegal immigrants from receiving punitive damages in state lawsuits filed in Arizona.
- The Swiss “*Foreign right law*” (2006, accepted) proposed the limitation of immigration from EU and EFTA countries and limits weddings whose only purpose is to obtain citizenship.
- The “*Swiss Asylum right law*” (2006, accepted) proposed more restrictive asylum requirements.
- The “*Montana Proof of citizenship LR-121*” (2012, accepted) proposed to require proof of citizenship in order for a person to receive certain services.
- The “*Swiss Asylum right law*” (2013, accepted) restricted asylum seekers’ rights.
- The “*Swiss popular initiative regarding deportation of foreign criminals*” (2010, accepted) proposed to deny the right of residence to violent foreign criminals, foreign drug dealers, and foreigners that abused the welfare system.
- The “*Swiss popular initiative against mass immigration*” (2014, accepted) proposed limiting immigration by introducing quotas on immigrants.
- The “*Swiss Immigration cap popular initiative (Ecopop)*” (2014, rejected) proposed preserving the natural resources of the country by limiting immigration to Switzerland to 0.2% per year.
- The “*Swiss popular initiative regarding the application of deportation of foreign criminals*” (2016, rejected) proposed to define strict rules in the Constitution in order to deny foreign criminals the right of residence.
- The Ticino popular initiative “*Before our people*” (2016, accepted) asked for a change of the cantonal constitution with the obligation for employers to give priority to Swiss nationals and residents over non-residents.

- The Hungarian “*Migration quota*” referendum (2016, rejected) asked whether to accept the EU’s proposed mandatory quotas for relocating migrants.

The table below summarizes the referendums considered in this study:

*Table 5: De facto referendums in the field of immigration policies*

<i>Referendum</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Case ID</i>	<i>Result</i>
<i>New Mexico property rights act amendment 4</i>	2002	USA-NM	USANM02	No
<i>New Mexico property rights act amendment 1</i>	2006	USA-NM	USANM06	Yes
<i>Florida property rights act amendment 1</i>	2008	USA-FL	USAFL08	No

## B.2) Potential and de facto included referendums in the field of aliens’ political rights

Referendums that relate to the political rights of foreigners are as follows:

- The **Neuchâtel cantonal referendum** (1990, rejected) proposed that foreign residents could be elected to the local legislative body.
- The **Vaud cantonal popular initiative** (1992, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected at the local and cantonal level.
- The first **Geneva cantonal popular initiative** (June 1993, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote at the local level.
- The **Geneva cantonal counterproposal** (June 1993, rejected) conferred on foreign residents and employees the rights to vote and be elected in the Working Tribunal (Tribunal de Prud’hommes).
- The second **Geneva cantonal popular initiative** (November 1993, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected at the local level.
- The **Zurich cantonal popular initiative** (1993, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote at the local level.
- The **Bern cantonal popular initiative** (1994, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right of vote and to be elected at the local and cantonal level.

- The **Bern cantonal counterproposal referendum** (1994, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected at the local level.
- The **Basel Stadt cantonal popular initiative** (1994, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote at the local and cantonal level.
- The **Uri cantonal popular initiative** (1995, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote at cantonal level.
- The **Appenzell Ausserrhoden cantonal Constitutional revision** (1995, accepted) included an article (art 105 Appenzell Ausserrhoden Constitution) that gave the local authorities the possibility to confer on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected in local elections.
- The **Aargau cantonal popular initiative** (1996, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected at the local level.
- The **Jura cantonal referendum** (1996, rejected) proposed that foreign residents in the Canton could be elected to the legislative local body.
- The **Fribourg cantonal popular initiative** (1997, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected at the local level.
- The **Solothurn cantonal popular initiative** (1997, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and to be elected at the local and cantonal level.
- The **Neuchâtel cantonal Constitutional revision** (2000, accepted) included an article (art 37, Neuchâtel Constitution) gave foreign residents in the canton for at least 5 years the right to vote in cantonal elections.
- The **Geneva cantonal referendum** (2001, rejected) conferred on foreign residents in the canton the right to vote and be elected in local election.
- The **Schaffhausen cantonal referendum** (2001, rejected) conferred on foreign residents in the canton the right to vote in local election.

- The **Vaud cantonal Constitutional revision** (2002, accepted), which included an article (art. 142 Vaud Constitution), which gave foreign residents in the same town for at least three years and in Switzerland for at least 10 years the right to vote in local elections.
- The **Graubünden cantonal Constitutional revision** (2003, accepted) included an article (art 9 Graubünden Constitution) that gave the local authorities the possibility to confer on foreigners the right to vote and be elected in local elections.
- The **Fribourg cantonal Constitutional revision** (2004, accepted) included an article (art 11 Fribourg Constitution) that gave the local authorities the possibility to confer on foreign residents in the same town for at least five years the right to vote and be elected in local elections.
- The **Basel Stadt cantonal Constitution revision** (2005, accepted) included an article (§40 Basel-Stadt Constitution) that gave the local authorities the possibility to confer on foreigners the right to vote and be elected in local elections.
- The **Geneva cantonal first popular initiative** (2005, accepted) conferred on foreign residents in the canton for at least eight years, the right to vote in local elections.
- The **Geneva cantonal second popular initiative** (2005, rejected) conferred on foreign residents in the canton the right to vote and be elected in local elections.
- The **Solothurn cantonal referendum** (2005, rejected) gave the local authorities the possibility to confer on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected in local elections.
- The **Jura cantonal referendum** (2007, rejected) proposed that foreign residents in the canton could be elected to the local legislative body.
- The **Neuchâtel cantonal popular initiative** (2007, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and to be elected at the cantonal level.
- The **Neuchâtel cantonal counterproposal referendum** (2007, accepted) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected in local elections.

- The **Glarus cantonal popular initiative** (2010, rejected) conferred on foreigners the right to vote and be elected at the local and cantonal level.
- The **Basel Stadt cantonal popular initiative** (2010, rejected) conferred on foreign residents in the canton for at least 10 years the right to vote and be elected in local elections.
- The **Basel Stadt cantonal counterproposal referendum** (2010, rejected) conferred on foreign residents in the canton for at least 10 years the right to vote in local elections.
- The **Bern cantonal popular initiative** (2010, rejected) conferred on foreign residents the right to vote and be elected at the local level.
- The **Vaud cantonal popular initiative** (2011, rejected) conferred on foreign residents in the canton for at least 10 years the right to vote and be elected at cantonal level.
- The **Lucerne cantonal popular initiative** (2011, rejected) conferred on foreigner residents of at least 10 years the right to vote and be elected at local level.
- The **Zurich cantonal popular initiative** (2013, rejected) “For more democracy” proposed the optional right to vote and be elected for foreigners at the local level.
- The **Jura cantonal referendum** (2014, accepted) proposed that foreign residents in the canton could be elected to the local legislative and executive bodies.
- The **Schaffhausen cantonal popular initiative** (2014, rejected) conferred on foreigners who were residents for five years in the Canton the right to vote and be elected at the local and cantonal level.
- The **Luxembourg referendum** (2015, rejected) conferred on foreigners who have resided for at least 10 years in Luxembourg and have previously participated in European or municipal elections in Luxembourg the right to vote.
- The **Neuchatel cantonal referendum** (2016, rejected) conferred on foreigners the right to be elected to the executive cantonal body.
- The **Basel Land cantonal popular initiative** (2018, rejected) conferred on foreigners with C permits the right to vote at the local and cantonal level.



The table below summarizes the referendums considered in this thesis:

*Table 6: De facto popular votes in the field of aliens' political rights*

<b>Popular votes</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>CaseID</b>	<b>Result</b>
<i>Neuchâtel RE at LOC (referendum)</i>	1990	Neuchâtel	CHNE90	No
<i>Vaud VR and RE at CANT and LOC (initiative)</i>	1992	Vaud	CHVD92	No
<i>Geneva VR at LOC (initiative)</i>	1993	Geneva	CHGE93.1	No
<i>Geneva VR and RE in Tribunals (counterproposal)</i>	1993	Geneva	CHGE93.2	No
<i>Geneva VR and RE at LOC (initiative)</i>	1993	Geneva	CHGE93.3	No
<i>Zurich VR at LOC (initiative)</i>	1993	Zurich	CHZH93	No
<i>Bern VR and RE at CANT and LOC (initiative)</i>	1994	Bern	CHBE94.1	No
<i>Bern VR and RE at LOC (counterproposal)</i>	1994	Bern	CHBE94.2	No
<i>Basel Stadt VR at CANT and LOC (initiative)</i>	1994	Basel Stadt	CHBS94	No
<i>Uri VR at CANT (initiative)</i>	1995	Uri	CHUR95	No
<i>Appenzell AR Constitution revision which includes VR/RE at LOC</i>	1995	Appenzell R	CHAR95	Yes
<i>Aargau VR and RE at LOC (initiative)</i>	1996	Aargau	CHAG96	No
<i>Jura RE at LOC (referendum)</i>	1996	Jura	CHJU96	No
<i>Fribourg VR and RE at LOC (initiative)</i>	1997	Fribourg	CHFR97	No
<i>Solothurn VR and RE at CANT and LOC (initiative)</i>	1997	Solothurn	CHSO97	No
<i>Neuchâtel Constitution revision which included VR at CANT</i>	2000	Neuchâtel	CHNE00	Yes
<i>Geneva VR and RE at LOC (referendum)</i>	2001	Geneva	CHGE01	No
<i>Schaffhausen VR at LOC (referendum)</i>	2001	Schaffhausen	CHSH01	No
<i>Vaud Constitution revision which included VR and RE at LOC</i>	2002	Vaud	CHVD02	Yes
<i>Graubünden Constitution revision which includes VR/RE at LOC</i>	2003	Graubünden	CHGR03	Yes
<i>Fribourg Constitutional revision which includes VR/RE at LOC</i>	2004	Fribourg	CHFR04	Yes
<i>Basel-Stadt Constitutional revision which includes VR/RE at LOC</i>	2005	Basel Stadt	CHBS05	Yes
<i>Geneva VR at LOC (initiative)</i>	2005	Geneva	CHGE05.1	Yes
<i>Geneva VR and RE at LOC (initiative)</i>	2005	Geneva	CHGE05.2	No
<i>Solothurn VR and RE at LOC (referendum)</i>	2005	Solothurn	CHSO05	No
<i>Jura RE at LOC (referendum)</i>	2007	Jura	CHJU07	No
<i>Neuchâtel VR and RE at CANT (initiative)</i>	2007	Neuchâtel	CHNE07.1	No
<i>Neuchâtel referendum RE at LOC (counterproposal)</i>	2007	Neuchâtel	CHNE07.2	Yes
<i>Glarus VR and RE at LOC and CANT</i>	2010	Glarus	CHGL10	No
<i>Basel Stadt VR and RE at LOC (initiative)</i>	2010	Basel Stadt	CHBS10.1	No
<i>Basel Stadt VR at LOC (counterproposal)</i>	2010	Basel Stadt	CHBS10.2	No
<i>Bern VR and RE at LOC (initiative)</i>	2010	Bern	CHBE10	No
<i>Vaud VR and RE at CANT (initiative)</i>	2011	Vaud	CHVD11	No

<i>Lucerne VR at LOC (initiative)</i>	2011	Lucerne	CHLU11	No
<i>Zurich VR and RE at LOC (initiative)</i>	2013	Zurich	CHZH13	No
<i>Jura VR and RE at LOC (referendum)</i>	2014	Jura	CHJU14	Yes
<i>Schaffhausen VR and RE at LOC and CANT (initiative)</i>	2014	Schaffhausen	CHSH14	No
<i>Luxembourg VR at LOC (referendum)</i>	2015	Luxembourg	L15	No
<i>Neuchatel RE at CANT (referendum)</i>	2016	Neuchâtel	CHNE16	No
<i>Basel Land VR at LOC and CANT (popular initiative)</i>	2018	Basel Land	CHBL18	No

**Abbreviations: VR = Voting rights / RE = Right to be elected / CANT = Cantonal level / LOC = Local level**

### C) Potential and de facto included referendums in the field of dual citizenship

All the referendums in the field of dual citizenship do not fit our scope condition. Indeed, not all of these referendums are held in an established Western democracy:

- Ecuador's "**recognizing double citizenship**" referendum (1998, accepted) proposed allowing citizens to have double citizenship.
- Palau's "**Constitutional reform: dual citizenship**" referendum (2004, accepted) proposed allowing citizens to have double citizenship.
- The Hungarian "**Double citizenship**" referendum (2004, rejected) proposed allowing citizens to have double citizenship.
- The Micronesian "**Revoking the prohibition of citizenship**" referendum (2011, rejected) proposed prohibiting article III, section 3 of the Constitution, which did not allow Micronesian citizens to be double citizens.

### D) Extension of group citizenship rights

#### D.1) Potential and de facto included referendums in the field of the extension of civil, social and economic recognition of cultural groups

All the referendums in the field of extension of civil, social, and economic recognition of cultural groups do not fit our scope condition.

The following referendum is not included because it does not propose proper changes:

- The “*Australian Republican Referendum*” (1999, rejected) proposing changing the political system from a constitutional monarchy to a republic was a proposal that neglected to focus on a broad range of meaning linked to the concept of citizenship. Indeed, as pointed out by Veri (2016: 4-5), the referendum proposed an exclusive concept of cultural monistic republic by mimicking the Australian constitutional monarchic regime.

Other referendums are not included in our population because they propose an exclusive vision of collective citizenship:

- The “*California Proposition 227*”, called the “English in Public School” Initiative (1998, accepted), proposed eliminating bilingual classes.
- The “*Arizona English language education for children in public school’s proposition 203*” (2000, accepted) proposed repealing the existing bilingual education laws.
- The “*Colorado English Language Education Initiative 31*” (2002, accepted) proposed waving bilingual education.
- The “*Massachusetts English Language Education in Public Schools Initiative*” (2002 accepted) proposed eliminating bilingual education in public schools.
- The “*Oregon Public School English immersion Measure 58*” (2008, rejected) proposed prohibiting teaching public school students in languages other than English for more than two years.
- The “*Swiss popular initiative on Minarets ban*” (2009, accepted) proposed banning the building of minarets.
- The “*Ticino popular initiative regarding Ban of Burqa*” (2013, accepted) proposed banning the full-face veil.

## D.2) Potential and de facto referendums in the field of membership to supranational organization

All the referendums regarding membership to a supranational organization have been held in the context of EU membership.

The EU referendums which fulfil the criteria of CL ballots are as follows:

- The “*Maastricht treaty referendums*” in Denmark (1992, rejected), France (1992, accepted), and Ireland (1992, accepted) promoted both civic-territorial values and pluralist culture ideals through the freedom of movement of persons and the introduction of the civic concept of European citizenship.<sup>12</sup> These concepts involve no apparent differences between national citizens and other Europeans in terms of access to the job market, travel rights ,and rights of residency. As a consequence of this policy, “external” Europeans coming from the EU can access national citizenship easily (i.e., through residency rights to aliens), meanwhile the national sense of community is subordinated to a supranational ethos.
- The “*EU Constitutional referendums*” in France (2005, rejected), Spain (2005, accepted), Luxemburg (2005, accepted), and the Netherlands (2005, rejected) included the Charter of Fundamental Rights which promotes a universalist vision of European Citizenship. Amongst the rights proposed is the freedom for every citizen of the EU to work and exercise the right of establishment in any other member state (art. II 75); the prohibition of collective expulsions (art. II-79); the guarantee of social security and social assistance to every citizen of the EU in any member state (art. II-94); freedom of movement and residence for every citizen of the Union within the territory of the member States (art II-105); and so forth.<sup>13</sup> The concept of the Charter of Fundamental Rights weakens the concept of national citizenship in the direction of post-nationalized citizenship.

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<sup>12</sup> Art. 8a) §1: The Maastricht Treaty: Provision amending the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community with a view to establish the European Community, Maastricht, 7 February 1992 <http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf> [Accessed: 5 March 2014]

<sup>13</sup> Cfr. “Constitution for Europe: Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”, 2005 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09\\_01\\_05\\_constitution.pdf](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/09_01_05_constitution.pdf) [accessed 6 March 2014]

- The “*Lisbon treaty referendums*” in Ireland (2008 and 2009, rejected and accepted, respectively) gave force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, albeit by referencing it as an independent document rather than incorporating it into the treaty itself.
- The “*EU membership referendums*” in Austria (1994, accepted), Finland (1994, accepted), Norway (1994, rejected), Sweden (1994, accepted), and the Swiss popular initiative (2001, rejected) cover the treaties described above such as EU citizenship and the freedom of movement of persons.
- The “*EEA membership referendums*” in Switzerland (1992, rejected) and Liechtenstein (1992 and 1995, accepted) incorporated the so-called “four full freedoms of the internal market” which includes the free movement of persons.<sup>14</sup> As in the Maastricht treaty, the “freedom of movement of persons” is a concept that reduces the gap of specific rights between other European Economic Area (EEA) citizens and Swiss citizens and leads to a change in national immigration policies. From a CL perspective, the EEA Referendum guarantees an EU immigrant the opportunity to reside and work in Switzerland or Liechtenstein.
- The Swiss “*Free movement of persons referendum (Bilateral Agreement 1)*” (2000, accepted) was included in this category for the same reasons as the Maastricht Treaty.
- The Swiss referendum for “*approving the extension of the agreement on the free movement of persons to the new EU member states*” (2005, accepted) between Switzerland on the one hand and the EU and its members states on the other.
- The Swiss referendum for “*approving the renewal of the agreement between Switzerland and the European Community*” (2009, accepted) and its member states on the free movement of persons and the approval and implementation of the protocol to extend the agreement on free movement to Bulgaria and Romania.

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<sup>14</sup> AAVV, “The European Economic Area (EEA), Switzerland and the North”, In: *Fact sheets on the European Union*, European Parliament, 2013, pp. 1-2

We exclude from our population all ex-communist countries (i.e., Eastern European countries) because they are outside of our scope condition. Indeed, they are not Western liberal democracies.<sup>15</sup>

Amongst EU related referendums, we have also not considered EU referendums that are not strictly linked to the topic of citizenship light:

- The second Danish “*Maastricht treaty referendum*” (1993, accepted) included the Edinburgh agreement which explicitly stated that European Citizenship would not replace national citizenship. The outputs changed the terms of the debate and led to a different set of issues (Siune et al. 1994: 107-116). There was an instrumental adaption in which CL policies disappeared.
- The Swiss popular initiative “*Negotiation concerning EU membership: let the people decide*” (1997, rejected) required the approval of a referendum and the Cantons to launch accession negotiation with EU. This popular initiative asked that the any negotiation on joining the EU be subject to a popular vote in order to slow down the process of joining the European Union.
- The Irish and Danish “*Amsterdam treaty referendums*” (1998, accepted) incorporated the Schengen agreements in the legal system. As outlined by Hallihan, the shadow of Danish rejection of Maastricht in 1992 had made states wary of strengthening EU citizenship (Hallihan 1997: 193-194). For this reason, states’ members decided to add a new clause in the Amsterdam Treaty to the citizenship provision of the Maastricht Treaty which states: “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”.<sup>16</sup> Therefore,

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<sup>15</sup> Moreover, they cannot be considered to be CL-oriented referendums. In these countries, historical, social, and economic factors have a major role in determining referendum outcomes. Eastern European referendums represent a unique and distinctive sub-type of European referendums, because they are a symbolic demonstration of citizens returning to Europe. In this context of transformation of a post-totalitarian state to a liberal democracy, people tend to look at EU membership referendums as a long-term historical and civilization transformation (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2007). Indeed, as emphasized by Szczerbaik and Taggart (2005:6), “the referendums in the post-communist States were always more likely to be symbolic demonstrations of the united will of citizens determined to return to the Europe of which they felt they should always have been a part”. It would be unreasonable to consider these referendums as CL oriented given the status of citizenship in these countries was still in construction

<sup>16</sup>Cfr. Art 17, § 1” Citizenship provision EC Treaty, post Amsterdam. <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/inc/policydoc/Citizenship%20Provisions%20Amsterdam.pdf> [accessed 7 March 2014]

the Amsterdam Treaty is not properly definable as a CL referendum because it de facto reduces CL policies.

- The “*referendums on Euro*” in Denmark (2000, rejected) and Sweden (2003, rejected) were economic and financial in nature (Rosenberger 2005: 347-348).
- The two Irish “*Nice treaty referendums*” (2001 and 2002, rejected and accepted, respectively) were linked to improvement in the decision-making capacity of the EU and the States’ Members (i.e., re-weighting of votes in the Council; increasing the use of qualified majority voting in the Council and composition of the Commission). No citizenship matters were raised.
- The referendum “*related to Schengen and Dublin agreement (Bilateral Agreement II)*” in Switzerland (2005, accepted) addressed the two named agreements. The Schengen agreement proposed the gradual abolition of border checks, allowing members of this agreement the freedom to cross borders, while the Dublin regulations established a European collaboration in asylum-seeker matters. From a CL point of view, it is difficult to determine whether or not this regulation can be considered a promotion of CL, given that it merely guarantees freedom of travel for EU citizens and not other rights that could make national citizenship less exclusive towards others. In other words, this agreement does not consistently decrease the gap between Swiss citizens and Europeans (Schwok 2009: 64). Therefore, given the ambiguous nature of these referendums, we prefer to exclude it from our population.
- The “*Irish European Fiscal Compact (Thirtieth Amendment of the Constitution of Ireland)*” (2012, accepted) strictly concerned financial and monetary policies.
- The “*Danish Unified Patent Court Membership*” (2014, accepted) was linked to the European Patent convention only.
- The “*Greek bailout referendum*” (2015, rejected) was financial in nature.
- The “*Danish European Union opt-out referendum*” (2015, rejected) concerned matters of security and police collaboration.

- The “*United Kingdom European Union membership referendum (Brexit)*” (2016, rejected) asked UK citizens whether or not to remain inside the EU, which represented a restriction rather than an extension of citizenship rights.
- The “*Hungarian migrant quota referendum*” (2016, rejected) asked for a restriction rather than an extension of citizenship rights.

The table below summarizes the referendums held worldwide between the 1990s and the 2010s that questioned immigration policies through direct democracy:

Table 7: *De facto referendums in the field of membership to supranational organization*

<i>Referendum</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Case ID</i>	<i>result</i>
<i>EEA membership</i>	Switzerland	1992	CH92	No
<i>EEA membership</i>	Liechtenstein	1992	FL92	Yes
<i>Maastricht Treaty</i>	Denmark	1992	DK92	No
<i>Maastricht Treaty</i>	France	1992	F92	Yes
<i>Maastricht Treaty</i>	Ireland	1992	EIRE92	Yes
<i>EU membership</i>	Austria	1994	A94	Yes
<i>EU membership</i>	Finland	1994	SF94	Yes

### 6.3) Final de facto population

Here is the list of referendum and their requirements:

Table 8: *Final population*

	<b>Country</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Case ID</b>	<b>Result</b>		<b>Country</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Case ID</b>	<b>Result</b>
	<b>Naturalization Policies</b>				<b>38</b>	Basel Stadt	2010	CHBS10.1	No
<b>1</b>	Switzerland	1994	CH94	No	<b>39</b>	Basel Stadt	2010	CHBS10.2	No
<b>2</b>	Switzerland	2004	CH04.1	No	<b>40</b>	Bern	2010	CHBE10	No
<b>3</b>	Switzerland	2004	CH04.2	No	<b>41</b>	Vaud	2011	CHVD11	No
<b>4</b>	Switzerland	2017	CH17	Yes	<b>42</b>	Lucerne	2011	CHLU11	No
<b>5</b>	Liechtenstein	2000	FL00	Yes	<b>43</b>	Zurich	2013	CHZH13	No
	<b>Immigration policies</b>				<b>44</b>	Jura	2014	CHJU14	Yes
<b>6</b>	New Mexico	2002	USANM02	No	<b>45</b>	Schaffhausen	2014	CHSH14	No
<b>7</b>	New Mexico	2006	USANM06	Yes	<b>46</b>	Neuchatel	2016	CHNE16	No
<b>8</b>	Florida	2008	USAFL08	No	<b>47</b>	Basel Land	2018	CHBL18	No
	<b>Aliens' political rights policies</b>				<b>48</b>	Luxembourg	2015	L15	No
<b>9</b>	Neuchâtel	1990	CHNE90	No	<b>Membership to supranational organization</b>				
<b>10</b>	Vaud	1992	CHVD92	No					
<b>11</b>	Geneva	1993	CHGE93.1	No	<b>49</b>	Switzerland	1992	CH92	No
<b>12</b>	Geneva	1993	CHGE93.2	No	<b>50</b>	Liechtenstein	1992	FL92	Yes
<b>13</b>	Geneva	1993	CHGE93.3	No	<b>51</b>	Denmark	1992	DK92	No
<b>14</b>	Zurich	1993	CHZH93	No	<b>52</b>	France	1992	F92	Yes
<b>15</b>	Bern	1994	CHBE94.1	No	<b>53</b>	Ireland	1992	EIRE92	Yes
<b>16</b>	Bern	1994	CHBE94.1	No	<b>54</b>	Austria	1994	A94	Yes




17	Basel Stadt	1994	CHBS94	No	55	Finland	1994	SF94	Yes
18	Uri	1995	CHUR95	No	56	Norway	1994	N94	No
19	Appenzell AR	1995	CHAR95	Yes	57	Sweden	1994	S94	Yes
20	Aargau	1996	CHAG96	No	58	Liechtenstein	1995	FL95	Yes
21	Jura	1996	CHJU96	No	59	Switzerland	2000	CH00	Yes
22	Fribourg	1997	CHFR97	No	60	Switzerland	2001	CH01	No
23	Solothurn	1997	CHSO97	No	61	Malta	2003	M03	Yes
24	Neuchâtel	2000	CHNE00	Yes	62	Switzerland	2005	CH05	Yes
25	Geneva	2001	CHGE01	No	63	France	2005	F05	No
26	Schaffhausen	2001	CHSH01	No	64	Spain	2005	E05	Yes
27	Vaud	2002	CHVD02	Yes	65	Luxemburg	2005	L05	Yes
28	Graubünden	2003	CHGR03	Yes	66	Netherlands	2005	NL05	No
29	Fribourg	2004	CHFR04	Yes	67	Ireland	2008	EIRE08	No
30	Basel-Stadt	2005	CHBS05	Yes	68	Ireland	2008	EIRE09	Yes
31	Geneva	2005	CHGE05.1	Yes	69	Switzerland	2009	CH09	Yes
32	Geneva	2005	CHGE05.2	No					
33	Solothurn	2005	CHSO05	No					
34	Jura	2007	CHJU07	No					
35	Neuchatel	2007	CHNE07.1	No					
36	Neuchatel	2007	CHNE07.2	Yes					
37	Glarus	2010	CHGL10	No					

We have a population of 69 popular votes. The population is evenly distributed in term of decades with 28 cases in the 1990s, 28 cases in the 2000s, and 13 cases in the 2010s.

This data could identify the priorities of the CL debate in the context of direct democracy. There is little attention paid to the extension of social, economic, and civil rights to individuals and groups, but significant attention has been paid to the extension of political rights and membership in a supranational organization.

Figure 3: Referendums' results



As displayed in figure 3, the majority of referendums are not successful. Indeed, 43 referendums had a negative outcome and 26 a positive one.

#### 6.4) Cases not considered

Here is the list of potential referendums.

Table 9: Excluded cases

	Country	Object	Date	Result	Reason of exclusion
<b>Naturalization Policies</b>					
1	Switzerland	Petitions	1990s/2010s	N/A	Ambiguous CL
2	San Marino	Automatic naturalization	1999	No	Ambiguous CL
3	Ireland	Restriction of jus soli	2004	No	Citizenship Heavy
4	Switzerland	Democratic naturalization	2008	No	Citizenship Heavy
5	Basel Stadt	German language requirements	2011	No	Citizenship Heavy
6	Zurich	No naturalization for criminals	2012	No	Citizenship Heavy
7	Bern	No naturalization for criminals	2013	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
<b>Immigration policies</b>					
8	Switzerland	Detention for illegal immigrant	1994	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
9	California	Proposition 187	1994	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
10	Switzerland	Illegal immigration rights restriction	1996	No	Citizenship Heavy
11	Switzerland	Swiss Asylum seekers law	1998	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
12	Switzerland	Immigratin quotas	2000	No	Citizenship Heavy
13	Switzerland	Asylum rights restriction	2002	No	Citizenship Heavy
14	Arizona	Illegal immigrant proposition 102	2006	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
15	Arizona	Proposition 100	2006	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
16	Arizona	Proposition 300	2006	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
17	New Mexico	Property rights proposition	2006	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
18	Switzerland	Immigration restriction amendment	2006	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
19	Switzerland	Asylum rights law	2006	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
20	Switzerland	Foreign criminal deportation	2010	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
21	Montana	Proof of citizenship LR-121	2012	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
22	Switzerland	Asylum rights restriction	2013	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
23	Switzerland	Mass immigration restrictions	2014	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
24	Switzerland	Ecopop	2014	No	Citizenship Heavy
25	Switzerland	Foreign criminal deportation	2016	No	Citizenship Heavy
26	Ticino	Befor our	2016	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
<b>Aliens' political rights policies (none)</b>					
<b>Dual Citizenship policies</b>					
27	Ecuador	Dual citizenship proposition	1998	Yes	geographical
28	Palau	Dual citizenship proposition	2004	Yes	geographical
29	Hungry	Dual citizenship proposition	2004	No	geographical
30	Micronesia	Dual citizenship Ban	2011	No	geographical
<b>Extension of civil, social and economic recognition of cultural groups</b>					
31	Australia	Republican Referendum	1999	No	Ambiguous CL
32	California	Proposition 227	1998	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
33	Arizona	English Language of education	2000	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
34	Colorado	English Language of education	2002	Yes	Citizenship Heavy

35	Massachusetts	English language of education	2002	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
36	Oregon	Public school english language	2008	No	Citizenship Heavy
37	Switzerland	Minarets ban	2009	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
38	Ticino	Burqa Ban	2013	Yes	Citizenship Heavy
<b>Membership to supranational organization</b>					
39	East Europe	EU Membership	2003-2013	Yes	geographical
40	Denmark	II Maastricht	1993	Yes	Ambiguous CL
41	Switzerland	EU negotiation	1997	No	Citizenship Heavy
42	Denmark	Amsterdam Treaty	1998	Yes	Ambiguous CL
43	Ireland	Amsterdam Treaty	1998	Yes	Ambiguous CL
44	Denmark	Euro Referendum	2000	No	Ambiguous CL
45	Ireland	Nice Treaty I	2001	No	Ambiguous CL
46	Ireland	Nice Treaty II	2002	Yes	Ambiguous CL
47	Sweden	Euro Referendum	2003	No	Ambiguous CL
48	Switzerland	Schengen / Dublin Treaty	2005	Yes	Ambiguous CL
49	Ireland	Fiscal Compact	2012	Yes	Ambiguous CL
50	Denmark	Unified Patent Court referendum	2014	Yes	Ambiguous CL
51	Greece	Greek bailout referendum	2015	No	Ambiguous CL
52	Denmark	European Union opt-out referendum	2015	No	Ambiguous CL
53	UK	EU membership (Brexit)	2016	leave	Citizenship Heavy
54	Hungary	Migrant quota	2016	N/A	Citizenship Heavy

Table 9 offers a better overview of the excluded referendums and the reasons behind this exclusion. From our population, we excluded 54 popular votes. By and large our exclusion was motivated by three reasons: 1) the ambiguity of the vote's object in respect of CL; 2) the geographical area; and 3) the nature of the vote's object that is not CL promotion but citizenship restriction.

## **7) Methodology QCA**

The focus of our thesis is to identify sufficient and necessary conditions that lead to the outcome of CL extension in the direct democratic arena.

In our theoretical section, we determined three important elements: a) firstly, we identified 69 popular votes; b) secondly, we individuated five conditions that explain CL extension blockage or popular vote results; c) thirdly, we observed that these conditions could have a complex configuration as demonstrated by our configurational approach.

Our methodology should be a tool for testing sufficient and necessary conditions that might work together in a medium number of cases.

The best methodology that matches these criteria and our research goals is the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987; Ragin 2000). QCA is a method that is distinguished by the analysis of data sets in relation to their membership; it is a set-theoretic approach, which examines social and political phenomena by using sets and searches for set relations in a Medium-N of cases.

### **7.1) Comparative method on Medium-N size of cases**

The QCA method has been used in many applications, particularly in applications with a medium number of cases (Götz 2011: 728), in order to test certain hypotheses or to derive new inferences from existing data sets through the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions linked to the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2006: 752). The purpose of the QCA method is to develop an original synthetic strategy as a midpoint between case-orientated (qualitative) approaches and variable-orientated (quantitative) approaches (Schneider and Wagemann 2006: 84).

The medium size number of cases allows us to acquire more in-depth case knowledge and to focus more intensively on single (or group) cases during the analysis and during the interpretation of results (Schneider 2007: 14).

### **7.2) The set theoretic nature of conditions**

QCA is a set-theoretic method. In relation to this, its understanding of reality relies on the concept sufficiency and necessity. Sufficiency and necessity depend on the idea that reality can be understood in holistic terms that relate condition(s) and outcome(s) in set-theoretic manner. Indeed, whenever a condition is subset of the outcome, it means that when the condition appears the

outcome also appears. In this circumstance, the condition would be sufficient for the outcome. Sufficiency also imply that the outcome can also appear whenever the condition is not present.

In contrast whenever a condition is a superset of the outcome, it means that the outcome appears only when the condition is present; in this circumstance, the condition is necessary for the outcome.

Essentially, QCA is a method used to test certain conditions or derive new inferences from existing data sets through the identification of necessary and sufficient conditions which are linked to the outcome (Schneider Wagemann 2006: 752).

A necessary and sufficient understanding of causation implies the existence of a deterministic world. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that deterministic reality has a different meaning in qualitative comparative research than quantitative probabilistic research. Indeed, the meaning of deterministic condition in qualitative comparative research indicates the presence of necessary and sufficient conditions, while in quantitative statistical language, determinism refers to models in which the error term is specified to be zero (Schneider and Wagemann 2006: 778). Essentially, QCA determinism does not suppose a deterministic metaphysics (Götz 2011). An advantage of QCA is that it uses fuzzy sets which provide some flexibility in the hard-deterministic nature of the method (Rihoux 2006: 691).

The term deterministic is therefore mainly related to the set-theoretic nature of causation that leads to the success or failure of a CL referendum and not the absolute probability that this condition will always lead to the outcome.

### **7.3) Configurational methods**

The phenomenon under our investigation refers to complex reality and can be explained in terms of a set relationship rather than linear reality. General linear reality perceives the social world in terms of fixed entities with variable attributes, in which causal attributes have only one causal pattern at once, the sequence of events does not influence their outcome, and the causal attributes

are generally independent of each other (Abbott 1988: 169-186). Complex reality cannot be explained in these terms, because this method of analysis does not consider the different dynamics of complexity.

The complexity of causality in the QCA method is defined by three assumptions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 1-19):

- a) The assumption of conjunctural causation. This assumption implies the existence of at least one condition that only affects the outcome when combined with one or more other conditions.
- b) The assumption of equifinality. This assumption presumes that different causal conjunctions can produce the same outcome (Schneider and Wagemann 2007: 4).
- c) The assumption of asymmetry. This assumption implies that the absence of causal attributes, which would have led to an outcome, does not lead to the absence of that outcome or that the presence and the absence of the outcome, respectively, may require different explanations (Berg-Schlosser 2009: 9).

## **PART II: Empirical analysis**

As motivated by our methodological choice, we decided to employ the QCA. This technique is particularly suited to identifying causal configurations, thereby providing a tool to explain the success or failure of CL policies in a direct democracy.

Our empirical part will follow three separate stages.

Firstly, we will focus on the calibration of the conditions in respect to the population of cases.

Secondly, we will carry out a QCA analysis on the most causal homogeneous subgroups of cases, focusing next on technical aspects of QCA analysis.

Finally, we will relate our QCA analysis results to our configurational hypotheses and open a discussion with the help of cases covered by the solution formula.

### **8) QCA process and terminology**

QCA is a data analysis technique that uses standardized algorithms and the appropriate software (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 11). In our analysis, we will use the software fsQCA 2.5<sup>17</sup> and R QCA packages. The QCA technical process can be divided into three separate steps:

- a) The first step is related to the condition calibration; each case receives a specific numerical score for each condition. This process is essential in order to transform data into numerical sets.
- b) Once each condition has been transformed into numerical sets, the sets are reformulated as truth tables and reduced by the Quine McCluskey algorithm.
- c) The minimization identifies necessary condition (i.e., the condition X which is a superset of the outcome Y) and sufficient solution formulas (i.e., the conjunction of condition X whose score is a subset of outcome Y).

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<sup>17</sup> We do not use the version 3.0 of fsQCA software because it presents major problems.

The use of the QCA method requires a specific terminology that we will refer to from now on. When we refer to the term *independent variable* we will employ the term *condition*; when we refer to the term *dependent variable* we will employ the term *outcome*, and when we refer to the term *equation* we will employ *solution formula*, *path*, or *configuration of conditions* (Schneider and Wagemann 2010: 404).

The solution formula is expressed by Boolean algebra operators. In general, capital letters denote the presence of conditions or outcomes (A, B, C, D, Y) and capital letters preceded by the tilde ( $\sim A$ ,  $\sim B$ ,  $\sim C$ ,  $\sim D$ ,  $\sim Y$ ) indicate the absence of conditions or outcomes. In our research, we will give acronym names to conditions and the outcome. We will detail these acronyms in the calibration section.

Regarding the Boolean operators:

- the plus sign (+) indicates the logical operator OR (the union of two sets to the left and the right of this sign);
- the asterisk sign (\*) indicates the logical operator AND (the intersection of two sets to the left and the right of this sign);
- the right arrow ( $\rightarrow$ ) indicates a statement of sufficiency; and
- the left arrow ( $\leftarrow$ ) indicates statement of necessity.

At this stage, we believe that it would be redundant to provide a detailed explanation of the QCA's method; in fact, we believe that it is better to deal with these explanations in more detail once we come across the particular methodological issue.

## **9) Calibration, crisp sets, and fuzzy sets**

The QCA method is distinguished by two main variants: a) the crisp set analysis (csQCA) in which outcomes and the conditions can only take dichotomous values (0, 1); and b) the fuzzy-set version (fsQCA), which allows for more levels of membership (Rihoux and Marx 2013: 168). Fuzzy sets



allow for degrees of membership anchored by two extreme membership scores – 1 (fully in) and 0 (fully out) - and the membership score 0.5 is the point of indifference where it is not known whether a case is qualitatively in or out (Schneider Wagemann 2012: 28). The procedure of attributing values to the cases and determining by what degree they display a condition or an outcome is called calibration.

### **9.1) Crisp-set conditions**

We use crisp set in conditions that are truly dichotomous; when a condition is present we use the crisp score 1, and whenever the condition is absent we use the crisp score 0. In principle, crisp sets are applied to conditions that cannot be expressed in fuzzy terms. In this study we will use crisp set calibration for the conditions *referendum outcome*, *single versus multiple issues popular votes*, and a *popular initiated referendum opposed by the Government*. Due to their binary nature, these three conditions cannot be expressed in fuzzy terms.

### **9.2) Fuzzy set conditions**

Fuzzy sets have a fine-grained value. This variant of the QCA method allows the scaling of membership scores in the  $\{0, \dots, 1\}$  interval, so a case can be given a fuzzy membership score to indicate partial membership to a set<sup>18</sup>. Fuzzy sets are used whenever the condition does not have a crisp nature but has a vague and imprecise meaning according to different degrees of membership in sets.

We use the fuzzy set technique to score the conditions *ideology of the government*, *presence or absence of a strong far right populist party* and *degree of the split and cohesion of the political elite*. All of these conditions refer to concepts that incorporate qualitative differences in kind and quantitative differences in degree.

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<sup>18</sup> A case membership can be fully in, mostly in, more or less in, more or less out, mostly out, or fully out.

### **9.3) Calibration technique**

In relation to the calibration techniques, there are at least three possible procedures of calibration, including the direct method, the indirect method (Ragin 2008: 71-108), and the qualitative method (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 38-41; Basurto and Speer: 2012). Here we decide to use the qualitative and direct methods of calibration.

The qualitative method is used when we fuzzify linguistic scales that define a condition. Indeed, when data are non-numerical, a mathematical transformation is a less appropriate way of reflecting the presence or the absence of a concept (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 40). In the qualitative method, the values are directly assigned by the researcher using a theory-guided qualitative calibration process that draws on external criteria.

When data are numerical we use the direct method, which transforms interval-scale conditions into fuzzy-set value using log odds, i.e., natural logarithms of the odds based on Euler's number 2,71828 (software base: fsQCA 2.5, R QCA packages).

### **9.4) Principles of calibration**

Before we proceed with our conditions' calibration, we would like to point out the principles of calibration that we will apply to our empirical case. Firstly, as emphasized by Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 35), it is important to have deep theoretical knowledge and singular case knowledge in order to identify the meaningful qualitative membership for each case in respect to crisp or fuzzy qualitative anchors. In order to maximize the deep theoretical knowledge, we will base our calibration on ideal typical concepts, meaning the best hypothetical construction of a concept based on theory (Weber 1949).

Secondly, it is important to be transparent in assigning set membership scores. Basically, it is important to define the rules for assigning set membership values to cases, such as the decision of

where to locate the maximum point of indifference 0.5 between membership versus non-membership (Schneider Wagemann 2012: 32). In order to be transparent, we will provide the reasons for our choices and all the raw data in the appendix.

Thirdly, it is important to represent a concept in its essential, structural, and definitional level with respect to: a) the theory (by defining the qualitative anchors); b) the causal heterogeneity; and c) the empirical uncertainty. In order to deal with these specific aspects, we will use Veri's (2017; 2018) propositions on condition fuzzification based on fuzzy multiple attribute conditions (FMACs). FMACs is the most important methodological contribution of this thesis, they are complex and thick concepts that are composed by multiple already-calibrated attributes, which express the ontological nature of a concept and are able to deal with causal heterogeneity and empirical uncertainty.

### **9.5) Fuzzy multiple attribute conditions (FMACs)**

FMAC is a theoretical construction that is flexible towards fuzzy logic and natural language and is designed to extrapolate the architecture of a concept. These conditions are able to identify which attributes are responsible for the causal heterogeneity (Veri 2017: 7) and by using the appropriate strategy of fuzzification of raw data they allow the contextualization of fuzzy numbers in relation to the empirical uncertainty (Veri 2018a).


#### **9.5.1) Definition of FMAC**

The use of FMACs will allow us to identify the defining characteristics of a condition and its ontological architecture Veri (2017).

As detailed by figure 4, FMACs are complex conditions composed by more than one definitional attribute. FMAC refers to complex ideal types that can be compared to Goertz and Mahoney's two levels theory (Goertz and Mahoney: 2005). The whole FMAC is the basic level, which, in its totality,

is the main condition; meanwhile, each attribute is the secondary level or the constitutive dimension of the basic level. As emphasized by Goertz and Mahoney (2005: 503), the secondary level has an ontological relationship; it represents the defining feature that constitutes the basic level variable.

*Figure 4: Fuzzy Multiple Attribute Condition's structure*



FMACs are aggregates of more than two attributes that are part of the theoretical structure of the basic level concept. The appropriate aggregation strategy of attributes enables the case to be defined in terms of membership of a set and of similarity to its ideal type.

FMACs are also the most important methodological innovation of this PhD thesis. Below we have summarized the main points that will be used during the process of score fuzzification.

### ***9.5.2) Causal heterogeneity***

FMAC is a good strategy to deal with causal heterogeneity in condition calibration, because it allows a bridge to be created between the scope and the theoretical accounts of the condition itself. We define causal heterogeneity as the result of the interaction between the theoretical knowledge of the condition and the researcher's scope (Veri 2017: 7). This interaction affects the final configuration of each FMAC. The researcher can modify a complex theoretical concept so that it fits within the scope of his or her research by adding an additional attribute. Basically, the new attribute has the

epistemological purpose of fitting to the characteristics of external context (Veri 2017: 7). We define this attribute with the term causal heterogeneity attribute (CHA).

The CHA entertains a relationship of necessary and joint sufficiency with the rest of the condition because it activates or deactivates the condition inside a specific causal context. Indeed, CHA is a constitutive attribute of the concept: by adding it to the other elements, it increases the intension and decreases the extension of the concept. Essentially, CHA better specifies the concept in relation to the scope and reduces the cases in which the concept is applied (or the cases to which the concept is applied). The operator applied to the aggregation of CHA and other attribute is an AND-like operator because it refers to classic categorization in which the principle and intension and extension are logically related (Veri 2017: 23). This operator is the arithmetic mean based on the compensatory fuzzy logic (AMBCFL) operator (Bouchet et al. 2011; Veri 2017), which is an AND-like operator with compensatory properties.

The AMBCFL operator is defined as:

$$AMBCFL(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = \sqrt{\left[ \min(x_1, \dots, x_n) \cdot \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \right]}$$

### 9.5.3) *Empirical uncertainty*

FMAC is also a good strategy to deal with empirical uncertainty in condition calibration (Veri 2018).

Empirical uncertainty refers to the lack of certain knowledge about each case. In order to handle such uncertainty, researchers must consider the role of the theoretical knowledge in assigning scores to be of crucial importance. However, they should also consider the specific context of the assignment of the final fuzzy score to be important in order to deal with single case knowledge. The importance of including the empirical measures is paramount, as it allows one to clarify cases that will appear in the grey zone near the 0.5 threshold.

The QCA method is a theory-centred technique with the objective of testing conditions and identifying which conjunctions of conditions lead to the outcome and the non-outcome. The role of the theory-based calibration is justified by the scope of identifying coherent theoretical solutions. The theoretical accounts allow the researcher to determine the qualitative status (member or non-member of a set) of a specific case. Theoretical accounts are therefore the gestalt of the condition: the central element that provides definitional accounts on cases. However, theoretical information might not be fully sufficient to determine the exact fuzzy score given the empirical uncertainty related to data. In relation to this, the empirical data can be considered the noncentral subcategory of a concept.


Fundamentally, in QCA, we can conceptualize each FMAC's attribute to be composed of two different typologies of tuples:

- a) the tuple based on theoretical knowledge (TBT) which is the central element. The TBT allows one to specify the theoretical boundaries of the concept in order to pursue the target of theory testing and determine theoretically coherent solutions;
- b) the tuple resulting from the fuzzification of the empirical data, i.e., the empirical uncertainty tuple (EUT). The EUT is the noncentral element of each specific TBT that determines the fuzzy border of each FMAC's attribute, adjusting the final membership score in relation to the context.

As outlined by figure 5, FMAC ontological architecture is based by two levels of elements: 1) the basic level of tuples that define each attribute's fuzzy score, and 2) the secondary level of attributes that define the final condition's fuzzy score.

The ontological relationship between EUT and the TBT is based on the radial category (Collier and Mahon 1993: 848). Indeed, as in radial categories, we have a central attribute (the TBT) that constitute the gestalt of the concept and a noncentral attribute (the EUT) that refers to internal structures and defined subcategories of the same concept. By using radial category structures, there are no longer logical trade-offs between intension and extension which allows one to handle empirical uncertainty.

Figure 5: FMAC condition ontological architecture



As identified by Veri (2018: 20-21), the weighted quadratic mean (WQM) operator is the best operator to aggregate the radial category concept in fuzzy logic. The WQM is define as:

$$\text{WQM}(A,B) = \sqrt{\frac{(TBT \cap DHA)^2 \theta + (DHA - TBT)^2 \alpha}{\Sigma \alpha \theta}} \quad (\text{Veri 2016: 13-22})$$

In summary, the central element of TBT establishes the three crucial qualitative membership points (0, 0.5, 1) of each FMAC's attribute to a set; it establishes differences in kind because it is connected to the qualitative variation of membership of a case to a set  $>$  or  $<$  0.5. Meanwhile, the non-central EUT establishes differences in degree or that the fuzzy borders are inside to the fuzzy membership scores.

## **10) Condition calibration**

In order to gather data for our conditions' calibration, we will examine previous case studies made by other scholars with reference to our population. Moreover, we will use data from the University of Bern databases <http://www.anneepolitique.ch/fr/>, the Swiss Statistic Office <http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index.html>, the database of Centre for Research on Direct Democracy (c2d) Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau ZDA <http://www.c2d.ch/>, the Manifesto Project Database (MPD) of the Berlin Social Science Centre (WZB) <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/>, and

the Sotomo Institute data <https://sotomo.ch/wp/> . In order to facilitate the reading of this thesis, we decided to include all the calibration procedure details, the scales, the reasons choice of qualitative threshold, and calibration calculation in two annexes. In annex 1, it is possible to access the calibration procedure description and coding schemes; meanwhile, in annex 2 it is possible to access the calibration calculation and data transformation. Here we only detail the name and the principle of calibration applied to each condition

### **10.1) Outcome calibration (OUT, ~OUT)**

Our outcomes (OUT; ~OUT) are the result of the popular vote (Yes/No). As previously anticipated, our outcome has a symmetrical and perfect crisp nature. A full membership of 1 means that the referendum on CL is successful, while a full non-membership of 0 means the referendum on CL is unsuccessful.

### **10.2) Left wing government calibration (LEFT, ~LEFT)**

The condition *left-wing government* (LEFT) versus *right-wing government* (~LEFT) has a fuzzy set membership due to different degree of left-wing and right-wing ideology. The full membership of 1 coincides with the ideal typical left-wing government, while the full non-membership of 0 aligns with the ideal type of right-wing government.

### **10.3) Strong populist party calibration (POP, ~POP)**

The condition *strong far right populist parties* (POP) versus *absence of far right populist parties* (~POP) has a fuzzy set membership due to different degree of populism and far-right ideology. The full membership of 1 coincides with the ideal typical presence of strong far-right populist parties, while the full non-membership of 0 equates to the ideal type of absence of strong far-right populist parties.



#### **10.4) Popular initiated referendums opposed by the government (INI, ~INI)**

The popular initiated referendum has a clear binary nature and will therefore have a crisp value of 0 or 1. Whenever the object is put into popular initiative and opposed by the government, the score assigned will be 1 (INI), and whenever it is not a popular initiative or is supported by the government the score assigned will be 0 (~INI).

#### **10.5) Popular votes with multiple-issue calibration (MULT, ~MULT)**

Popular votes with multiple or single issues also have a perfectly binary nature and are based on a perfect symmetrical concept. Whenever a popular vote is expressed in terms of two or more policies, it is member of the set *multiple issue* and will receive a score of 1 (MULT). In contrast, whenever a popular vote only encompasses a single policy issue it is a member of the set *single issue* and will received a score of 0 (~MULT).

#### **10.6) Political elite split/cohesive calibration (ELITE, ~ELITE)**

The degree of elite cohesion or division over a popular vote is a fuzzy concept, given that there can be different degrees of cohesion or division. The score full membership of 1 indicates that the condition is connected to the CL referendum success, meanwhile the full non-membership of 0 the condition is linked to the CL referendum failure. In general, whenever the government is cohesive in supporting an object we have a full membership of 1 (ELITE), meanwhile whenever the government supports the referendum object in a split manner we have a full non-membership of 0 (~ELITE). In the circumstance that the government is split in opposing the object we have a full membership of 1 (ELITE), and whenever the government is cohesive in opposing the referendum object we have a full non-membership of 0 (~ELITE).

## **11) Final calibrated condition**

Set out below are the results of the final calibration condition. The raw data and fuzzification computation of each condition can be found in annexes 1 and 2.

*Table 10: Final calibration scores*

	<b>Case ID</b>	<b>LEFT</b>	<b>POP</b>	<b>INI</b>	<b>MULT</b>	<b>ELITE</b>	<b>OUT</b>
1	CH94	0.373	0.5444	0	0	0.3	0
2	CH04.1	0.258	0.9222	0	0	0.2	0
3	CH04.2	0,258	0.9222	0	0	0.2	0
4	CH17	0,307	0.8567	0	0	0.2	1
5	FL00	0.2	0	0	0	1	1
6	USANM02	0.2	0	0	0	1	0
7	USANM06	0.4	0	0	0	1	1
8	USAFL08	0.2	0	0	0	1	0
9	CHNE90	0.7697	0	0	0	0.6	0
10	CHVD92	0.373	0.6036	1	0	0.6	0
11	CHGE93.1	0.327	0.0727	1	0	0.6	0
12	CHGE93.2	0.327	0.0727	0	0	0.2	0
13	CHGE93.3	0.2506	0.1468	1	0	0	0
14	CHZH93	0.2893	0.8697	1	0	0.6	0
15	CHBE94.1	0.2293	0.7261	1	0	0.6	0
16	CHBE94.2	0.2293	0.7261	0	0	0.2	0
17	CHBS94	0.3025	0.5151	1	0	0.6	0
18	CHUR95	0.3109	0	1	0	0.6	0
19	CHAR95	0.1995	0	0	1	1	1
20	CHAG96	0.3525	0.6884	1	0	0.6	0
21	CHJU96	0.3735	0	0	0	1	0
22	CHFR97	0.3589	0.6495	1	0	0.6	0
23	CHSO97	0.2773	0.7033	1	0	0.6	0
24	CHNE00	0.263	0	0	1	1	1
25	CHGE01	0.3659	0.6521	0	0	0.2	0
26	CHSH01	0.2377	0.8889	0	0	0.2	0
27	CHVD02	0.2684	0.8409	0	1	0.2	1
28	CHGR03	0.3625	0	0	1	1	1
29	CHFR04	0.3553	0.8489	0	1	0.2	1
30	CHBS05	0.7519	0.8891	0	1	0.6	1
31	CHGE05.1	0.7528	0.9076	0	0	0.6	1
32	CHGE05.2	0.7528	0.9076	0	0	0.6	0
33	CHSO05	0.2646	0.9082	0	0	0.6	0
34	CHJU07	0.3771	0.7107	0	0	0.6	0
35	CHNE07.1	0.7626	0.8674	1	0	0.2	0
36	CHNE07.2	0.7626	0.8674	0	0	0.2	1
37	CHGL10	0.2722	0.9156	1	0	0.6	0
38	CHBS10.1	0.7504	0.8863	1	0	0.6	0
39	CHBS102	0.7504	0.8863	0	0	0.2	0
40	CHBE10	0.7537	0.8817	1	0	0.6	0
41	CHVD11	0.2579	0.8847	1	0	0.6	0
42	CHLU11	0.2863	0.9255	1	0	0.6	0
43	CHZH13	0.2474	0.9355	1	0	0.6	0
44	CHJU14	0.3667	0.3373	0	0	0.2	1
45	CHSH14	0.1729	0.9351	1	0	0.6	0
46	CHNE16	0.7569	0.9092	0	0	0.2	0
47	CHBL18	0.2056	0.9312	1	0	0.6	0
48	L15	0.7408	0.6648	1	0	0.6	0
49	CH92	0,3728	0.6739	0	1	0.2	0

50	FL92	0.2	0	0	1	1	1
51	DK92	0.2	0.6785	0	1	0.6	0
52	F92	0.8	0.6082	0	1	0.4	1
53	EIRE92	0,4559	0.0901	0	1	0.8	1
54	A94	0.5607	0.9172	0	1	0.6	1
55	SF94	0.4768	0.6134	0	1	0.6	1
56	N94	0,6351	0.62	0	1	0.2	0
57	S94	0,6715	0	0	1	0.8	1
58	FL95	0.2	0	0	1	1	1
59	CH00	0,3093	0.5509	0	1	0.6	1
60	CH01	0,3093	0.9222	1	1	0.8	0
61	M03	0,3212	0	0	1	0.4	1
62	CH05	0,2583	0.7038	0	0	0.2	1
63	F05	0.3052	0.7691	0	1	0.6	0
64	E05	0,8199	0	0	1	0.8	1
65	L05	0.4928	0.685	0	1	0.6	1
66	NL05	0.3326	0.6489	0	1	0.6	0
67	EIRE08	0.4669	0.3283	0	1	0.8	0
68	EIRE09	0.4673	0.3283	0	1	0.8	1
69	CH09	0.3601	0.8488	0	0	0.4	1

## **12) fsQCA analysis process: causal homogeneous subgroups categorization**

QCA is a set-theoretic method that aims to identify causally relevant condition or configuration of conditions. In order to pursue the target of identifying the set-theoretic causal path, it is necessary to have the analytical prerequisite of causal homogeneous groups of cases. This requirement is grounded on the assumption that causal patterns can only be individuated in causal homogenous groups of cases. Indeed, as pointed out by Brady and Collier (2004: 29), a causal homogeneous group allows causal patterns to be identified given that the same condition should have the same expected causal inference on the outcome. In other words, our conditions (and our configurational hypotheses) might only be appropriate and create causal patterns on groups of cases that held similar contextual characteristics in terms of referendum typology and geographical, cultural, or jurisdictional level. Whenever we have similar contextual circumstances amongst cases, we expect that conditions have the same causal relationship with the outcome across cases of the same group.

Therefore, before operating the fsQCA analysis we should first identify possible homogeneous groups of cases from our designed population. Next, we individually run an fsQCA analysis on these groups. Finally, we identify solution's paths that are transversal to various categories as well

as paths that are unique to a specific group. This strategy allows us to make a more in-depth analysis and discussion: conditions may work in different way depending on different groups of referendums or they may have the same causal relationship with the outcome across the different groups of referendums.

In the analysis process, we acknowledge that entire categories of referendums will be dropped because the conditions selected in the theoretical part of this thesis do not create set-theoretic relationships with the outcome. This scenario would happen whenever our theoretical context was not appropriated for the group of cases. Essentially, there are other conditions not considered in this study that might be sufficient and/or necessary for the outcome of interest. The parameters of fit of consistency and coverage during the fsQCA analysis are particularly helpful in discovering the existence of set-theoretic causal relationships. Indeed, the parameter of consistency indicates whether set-theoretic relationships of sufficiency (and causal relationships) exist; meanwhile, the parameter of coverage indicates whether empirical relevance exists. Parameters of fit which result in low values might indicate a substantial problem in the condition selection.

### **12.1) Causal homogeneous subgroups**


In the following chapter we discuss possible homogeneous subgroups of referendums from our designed population of cases. Our cases can primarily be divided into four distinctive subgroups:

- a) The geographical level;
- b) The specific topic of referendum;
- c) The theoretical framework level;
- d) The jurisdiction levels.


## 12.2) The geographical distribution

The population is unevenly distributed in term of geographical area with three popular votes in countries outside of Europe (in the USA), 18 in European countries excluding Switzerland, and 48 in Switzerland.

*Figure 6: Referendums' geography*



*Figure 7: Referendums' countries*




Switzerland is therefore the most represented country amongst our cases' population. This is explained by the fact that referendum practice is part of the Swiss decision-making process. In the countries in which this process is not part of the usual political decision-making process, the use of referendum is rare or even unique. Therefore, the Swiss popular votes group is not only the

most geographically homogeneous sub-class of cases, but also has the most homogeneous political context, which will receive special analytical attention.

### 12.3) Specific referendum topic

When we closely examine specific topics, we can observe four main topics in which CL is put into referendum during popular vote. Amongst these four topics, the supranational organization popular votes and the referendums on the extension of alien's political rights are the two largest groups with 40 and 21 referendums, respectively.

*Figure 8: Results and topic of referendums*




The success rate between these two largest groups varies greatly. Indeed, the success rate of the aliens' political right group is lower (with ca 22.5% of positive outcome) than the success rate of EU-related referendums (with ca 67% of positive outcome). In the light of these differences, we expect that different conditions (or configurations of conditions) are causally related to the outcome of interest. Nevertheless, whenever similar causal patterns are produced the differences of outcomes result might be explained by a dissimilar distribution of conditions amongst cases.

These two groups will be discussed in depth in our analysis because they constitute the two largest and most homogeneous subclasses of cases in-between the typology of referendums.

### 12.4) Theoretical framework level

Our theoretical framework distinguishes two typologies of CL: the individual CL and the collective CL. Our population can therefore be divided by considering this distinction.

*Figure 9: Referendums fields results*




Each group of this subdivision is characterized by specific peculiarities. Indeed, the individual citizenship group is larger than the collective citizenship group. Moreover, contrary to the collective citizenship group which only refers to one CL topic, the individual citizenship group gathers together three different CL topics. In relation to this difference, it is important to point out that the collective citizenship group coincides with the EU referendums groups pointed out above. As observed above, the success rate of this group is significantly larger than the other referendum groups, which might indicate different set-theoretic explanations.

### 12.5) Jurisdiction level

The referendums also refer to two different jurisdiction levels: the national and the subnational. The subnational level mainly refers to the Swiss cantons (with 39 referendums) and in minor part at US States (with three referendums). The other referendums refer to the national level with a predominance of EU-related referendums over other cases.


*Figure 10: Sub-national versus national referendum results*



As displayed in figure 10, we can observe that the success rate of the subnational level is lower than the one at the national level. Specifically, around 24% of the subnational referendum is successful; meanwhile, the 59% ca of the national referendums are successful. This is partially explained by the fact that on the national level, there is an important presence of referendums related to supranational organization that are more successful than other type of referendums.



Figure 11: Sub-national versus national referendum results



In contrast, when we focus on the individual citizenship theoretical framework, the success rate at the subnational and national level are similar.<sup>19</sup> Basically, the most homogeneous groups that consider national and subnational level are in-between the individual citizenship theoretical framework. Our fsQCA will therefore consider this differentiation.

## 12.6) Summary of possible causal homogeneous groups

Up to now, we have identified four possible causal homogeneous groups. Table 11 details the four groups and the number of specific cases.

<sup>19</sup> The success rate of the subnational referendums is 25%; the success rate of the national referendums is 33%.

*Table 11: Homogeneous groups of analysis*

	<b>GEOGRAPHIC</b>	<b>TOPIC</b>	<b>FRAMEWORK</b>	<b>JURISDICTION</b>
<b>CASES / GROUPS</b>	48 – Switzerland	5 – Naturalization	48 – individual	43 - subnational 6 - national
	3 – USA; Liechtenstein; Ireland	3 – Immigration	21 - collective	
	2 - Luxembourg; France	40 - political rights		
	1 - Denmark; Austria; Finland; Norway; Sweden; Malta; Spain; Netherlands.	21- supranational		

These four groups provide five sets of cases on which the fsQCA analysis can be applied.

At the geographic level:

- All the Swiss referendums (48 cases) that belong to the geographical group

At the topic level:

- The referendums about political rights policies (40 cases) that belong to the topic group
- The referendums about membership to a supranational organization (21 cases) that belong to either the topic or the framework group

At the framework level:

- The individual citizenship referendums (48 cases) that belong to the theoretical framework group

At the jurisdictional level:

- The subnational referendums level (43 cases) that belong to the jurisdiction level group

## 12.7) Other possible causal homogenous subgroups

We can increase the contextual homogeneity of groups by considering possible conjunctions of these groups.

*Table 12: Possible group conjunction*

<b>4 groups conjunction</b>	Geographic AND Topic AND Theoretical framework AND Jurisdiction			
<b>3 groups conjunction</b>	Geographic AND Topic AND Theoretical frame	Geographic AND Topic AND Jurisdiction	Geographic AND Jurisdiction AND theoretical frame.	Topic AND Jurisdiction AND Theoretical frame.
<b>2 groups conjunction</b>	Geographic AND Topic		Geographic AND jurisdiction	Theoretical frame AND Jurisdiction
	Geographic AND Theoretical frame.		Topic AND Jurisdiction	Topic AND Theoretical frame

The first largest and most homogeneous subset of cases that is produced by the conjunction between the four groups is the one composed of Swiss cantonal referendums on the extension of political rights to foreigners, which includes 39 cases. This subset of cases nearly coincides with the group of cases on the extension of political right to foreigners.

*Table 13: Largest and most homogeneous subset of cases*

<b>Geographic AND Topic AND theoretical framework AND jurisdiction</b>	Swiss cantonal referendum on individual dimension of citizenship focus on the extension of political rights to foreigner.
<b>Geographic AND theoretical framework</b>	Swiss referendum on individual dimension of citizenship
<b>Topic AND Theoretical framework</b>	European referendums on membership to a supranational organization

The second largest and most homogeneous set of cases is the one that includes the conjunction of the geographical level and the theoretical framework. This group counts 43 referendums related to the Swiss level on an individual citizenship theoretical framework.

The last largest and most homogeneous set of cases is the one that encompasses the conjunction of topic level and the theoretical framework level. This groups counts 21 referendums related to

supranational organization membership. This subset of cases also coincides with referendums on the collective citizenship dimension and the EU-related referendum topic.

Other sets of cases produced by the conjunctions of this groups are too small to be analysed through fsQCA.


### **12.8) Analysis considering causal homogeneity**

Our fsQCA analysis will include groups from the most causally homogenous to the least. This strategy of analysis allows us to create and maintain causal homogeneity as a prerogative and to build coherent generalization at the end of our fsQCA analysis.

As illustrated by figure 12, our cases are organized in a set-relationship:

- A) The total referendum population contains the whole population of cases that ultimately we aim to analyse. This group is the largest group of cases and it is the superset group of referendums.
- B) The two theoretical frameworks that divide individual versus collective citizenship referendums are supersets of various referendums topics.
- C) The topic level of referendums includes the membership to supranational organization, immigration policies, naturalization policies, aliens' political rights.

Figure 12: Cases population set-relationship



The geographic and jurisdiction levels are transversal to the various topics subgroups.

Our analysis will consider such peculiarities:

- 1) Collective citizenship referendums:
  - i) Referendums related to the supranational organization (21 cases)
- 2) Individual citizenship referendums:
  - ii) Swiss cantonal referendums on the extension of political rights to foreigners (39 cases)
  - iii) Referendum on aliens' political rights (40 cases)
  - iv) Referendums on the subnational level (43 cases)
  - v) Swiss referendums on individual citizenship dimensions (43 cases);

vi) Referendums on individual citizenship dimensions (48)

3) Referendums transversal to the theoretical framework:

vii) Swiss referendums at any jurisdictional level (48)

viii) The entire referendum population (68)

Essentially, we will run the fsQCA analysis from the smallest to the largest group of cases. This strategy of analysis allows us to determine whether set-theoretic relationships are produced by our most causally homogeneous groups, which in turn allows us to check whether our conditions selection makes sense in a causally homogeneous population.

In the circumstances, when coherent causal set-theoretic relationships are produced by the fsQCA analysis of a specific homogenous group of population, it means that the conditions provide valid explanations for the specific group of cases. Therefore, we can move forward and run the fsQCA analysis on a larger group of cases in order to check whether the same conditions produce the same set-theoretic relationship with the outcome.

Meanwhile, in the circumstances that set-theoretic relationships between conditions and outcomes are not produced by the fsQCA analysis, our conditions are not a valid explanation for this group.

In this event we can exclude such groups of cases from our final analysis.

### **13) fsQCA analysis: solutions interpretation and principles**

In this section we want to clarify some technical aspect on fsQCA solution and interpretation. As indicated in the theoretical part of this thesis, fsQCA is a set-theoretic technique which examines social and political phenomena by using sets. Whenever a condition is a superset of the outcome it will be considered as a necessary condition; meanwhile, whenever a condition is a subset of the outcome it will be considered as a sufficient condition. Therefore, fsQCA's main goal is to identify necessary and sufficient condition(s) or conjunctions of conditions.

The fsQCA analysis follows two steps, the first of which is intended to identify necessary condition(s), while the second step aims to identify sufficient solution terms.

In one solution, the analysis of necessity indicates which condition is necessary for the outcome of interest. Meanwhile, the analysis of sufficiency yields three different solutions: a) the complex solution, b) the intermediate solution, and 3) the parsimonious solution.

In QCA, Boolean algebra is used in order to logically minimize the truth table. Quinne and McCluskey's algorithm generates the parsimonious and intermediate solutions on the basis of easy and difficult counterfactuals (Ragin 2008; Fiss 2011: 403). Easy counterfactuals are remainders that are in line with our directional expectations. These remainders appear whenever redundant causal conditions are added to a configuration of conditions that lead to the outcome (e.g., if we know that  $A*\sim B*C\rightarrow D^{20}$  and we have substantial theoretical knowledge to assume that B also leads to the outcome, then we can assert that  $A*C\rightarrow D$ ). A difficult counterfactual is the reverse situation in which we have a redundant causal condition that is removed from a configuration of conditions that leads to the outcome (e.g., we know that  $A*B*C\rightarrow D$  leads to the outcome but we do not know whether  $\sim B$  leads to the outcome) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 12-13).

The parsimonious solution derived the sufficient formula by including all simplifying assumption regardless of whether they are easy or difficult counterfactuals; meanwhile the intermediate solution derived the sufficient formula by only including easy counterfactuals (Ragin 2008; Fiss 2011: 403; Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 12-18).

Scholars still debate which solution is causally interpretable. Baumgartner (2015) and Thiem (Baumgartner and Thiem 2016) consider the parsimonious solution to be the only causally interpretable solution because it eliminates causally irrelevant factors. Baumgartner's understating of causality is spelled out in terms of Boolean difference-making in which conditions are Boolean

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<sup>20</sup> This expression can be read as follows: the presence of condition A, the absence of B, and the presence of C is sufficient for the outcome D.

difference makers for their own effects (Baumgartner 2015: 840). This understanding of causation is rooted in the INUS-Theory of causation<sup>21</sup>, in which factors that are Boolean difference-makers are non-redundant elements of minimally sufficient conditions within minimally necessary conditions (Mackie 1974; Baumgartner 2015; Thiem and Baumgartner 2016). Consequently, the intermediate solution contains redundant (non-causal interpretable) factors that can be further eliminated (Baumgartner 2015: 840; Thiem and Baumgartner 2016). In summary, according to Baumgartner and Thiem, if  $A \rightarrow D$ , also  $AB \rightarrow D$  for any arbitrary B. Therefore, B is redundant.

Ragin (2008: 175) emphasized that the intermediate solution is the preferred one, as it balances parsimony and complexity based on the substantive and theoretical knowledge of the researcher. The strength of the intermediate solution resides in the quality of the assumption, given that the solution is derived by using theoretically informed easy counterfactuals. In other words, according to Ragin, the intermediate solution is theoretically informed and plausible;<sup>22</sup> meanwhile, the parsimonious solution may be unrealistically parsimonious due to the incorporation of difficult counterfactuals (Ragin 2008:163).

In general, it is important to keep in mind that the parsimonious solution is a superset of the intermediate solution and the complex solution; therefore, if an outcome occurs in the circumstances spelled out by the parsimonious solution, it will also occur in the circumstances spelled out by intermediate (and complex) solution (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 174). The differences between Baumgartner, Thiem, and Ragin is that the former understand the intermediate solution as a subset of the parsimonious solution with redundant factors, while the second understands the intermediate solution as a more specified solution.

Owing to the lack of agreement amongst QCA scholars on which solution term is preferable and casually interpretable, in our analysis we decided to discuss both the parsimonious and intermediate

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<sup>21</sup> INUS stand for insufficient but non-redundant parts of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the occurrence of the effect

<sup>22</sup> The directional expectations are spelt out in the Annex 3.



solution terms before producing a final statement of causal interpretation. By comparatively inspecting both solutions it is possible to identify the factors that belong to both solutions and advance a facilitated informed interpretation (Thomann and Maggetti 2017: 17).

Therefore, our discussion on fsQCA results for the outcome will follow three separate steps. Firstly, we will focus on technical analysis to describe the parameters of fit of the fsQCA analysis of necessity and sufficiency, and also identify claims about necessity and sufficiency. Secondly, we will relate our QCA analysis results to our configurational hypotheses. Finally, we will interpret such solutions by considering both the parsimonious and intermediate. This approach considers the factors identified by a parsimonious solution as “causal core” factors and those appearing in the intermediate solution as “peripheral factors”. According to Fiss, core factors are causally central and determinant, while peripheral factors are the one for which the evidence for a causal relationship with the outcome is weak (Fiss 2011: 394) or inexistent as understood by Thiem and Baumgartner. In our empirical discussions we will consider such an approach in order to identify causal conditions (and configurations) of condition in a wide discourse.

#### **14) Collective citizenship rights referendums**

The cases related to the supranational organization referendums constitute the sole group of cases linked to the collective citizenship theoretical framework. This group is also the smallest to be analysed with 21 cases. This group is homogeneous from a political, historical, and jurisdictional point of views. Indeed, in this group we find referendums that refer to Western European countries and are held at the national level on similar topic.

In order to proceed to our fsQCA analysis, we will identify the necessary conditions and sufficient solution formulas of the outcomes “CL extension” and “CL restriction” that are related to the referendums’ success and failure, respectively. Then we will look at whether or not such solution formulas produce any sense in relation to the cases from a configurational point of view.

### 14.1) fsQCA analysis in relation to membership to supranational organizations' referendums

In this section, we will examine the technical aspects of the analyses of necessity and sufficiency that explain the outcome “success of membership to supranational organization by direct democracy” (OUT) and the outcome “failure of membership to supranational organization by direct democracy” (~OUT) This outcome also coincides with referendum success.

#### 14.1.1) Necessary Conditions supranational organization's membership success and failure

Table 14 and 15 displays the analysis of necessity of EU related referendums.

*Table 14: Analysis of necessity for the success of supranational organization referendums*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.456700	0.709185
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.543300	0.634680
<b>POP</b>	0.381839	0.535131
<b>~POP</b>	0.618161	0.786008
<b>INI</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~INI</b>	1.000000	0.700000
<b>MULT</b>	0.857143	0.631579
<b>~MULT</b>	0.142857	1.000000
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.357143	0.609756
<b>ELITE</b>	0.642857	0.703125
<b>LEFT+~POP</b>	0.715521	0.771509
<b>LEFT+ELITE</b>	0.677014	0.682567
<b>ELITE+~POP</b>	0.729007	0.713254

*Table 15: Analysis of necessity for the failure of supranational organization referendums*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.374557	0.290815
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.625443	0.365320
<b>POP</b>	0.663409	0.464869
<b>~POP</b>	0.336591	0.213992
<b>INI</b>	0.142857	1.000000
<b>~INI</b>	0.857143	0.300000
<b>MULT</b>	1.000000	0.368421
<b>~MULT</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.457143	0.390244
<b>ELITE</b>	0.552857	0.296875
<b>~LEFT+POP</b>	0.712671	0.357409
<b>~LEFT+~ELITE</b>	0.712286	0.381473
<b>POP+~ELITE</b>	0.706709	0.430215

The recommended thresholds for the consistency and coverage of necessary conditions are 0.9 or higher (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 143-147).

The analysis of necessity for both the success of referendum and the failure of the referendums does not produce any necessary conditions. The absence of the condition *popular initiative supported by the government* ( $\sim$ INI) and the condition *multiple-issue referendums* (MULT) have the highest consistency scores. However, their low coverage indicates a trivial relationship. A relationship of trivialness in the analysis of necessity indicates that the condition is a too-large superset of the outcomes; as a result, there is no observable causal inference between conditions and outcomes. For instance, in relation to the EU-related referendums, the condition *absence of popular initiative* ( $\sim$ INI) and the condition *multiple-issue referendums* (MULT) do not provide a causal explanation of the outcomes; this because not every EU referendum is a popular initiative and on multiple issues.

#### 14.1.2) Sufficient conditions supranational organization's membership success

We turn now to the analysis of sufficiency condition for the outcome “acceptance for supranational membership and supranational treaties” (OUT).

Table 16: Parsimonious solution for the success supranational organization referendums

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000			
CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
$\sim$ LEFT* $\sim$ ELITE	0.322986	0.322986	0.635629
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b>	<b>0.322986</b>		
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (VERI):</b>	<b>0.0965</b>		
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b>	<b>0.635629</b>		

The outcome success of supranational organization referendum has the following parsimonious solutions:

- (a) a right-wing government ( $\sim$ LEFT) that is divided ( $\sim$ ELITE) in supporting the referendum is successful.

Table 17: Intermediate solution for the success of supranational organization referendums

<i>FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000</i>		<i>ASSUMPTIONS:</i>	
<i>CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000</i>		<i>POP (ABSENT)</i>	
		<i>ELITE (PRESENT)</i>	
	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
<b>~LEFT*~INI*~MULT*~ELITE</b>	0.095836	0.095836	1.000000
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b>	<b>0.095836</b>		
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (VERI):</b>	<b>0.06038</b>		
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b>	<b>1.00000</b>		

The intermediate solution has the following paths:


- (b) a right-wing government (~LEFT ) that is divided (~ELITE ) in supporting a non-popular initiative referendum (~INI) on single issue (~MULT) is successful.

The consistency of 0.635629 in the parsimonious formula makes the solution formula theoretically not relevant. Similarly, the coverage of 0.322986 of the parsimonious formula and of 0.095836 of the intermediate formula indicate a solution formula that is empirically not relevant. However, the relatively low Ragin's coverage of 0.322986 or 0.095836 might be primarily linked to the crisp nature of the outcome as opposed to the fuzzy nature of the solution terms (Veri 2018b). Indeed, coverage measures the percentage of the sum of the outcome membership values covered by the consistent cases' membership in the solution. Unfortunately, when the outcome is expressed in crisp values (such as the referendum result) and the condition in fuzzy values, the coverage tends to be low because the fuzzy distance between the condition (or configuration of conditions) and the outcome is naturally large (Veri 2018b).

In order to provide a more accurate measure of empirical coverage, we decided to indicate fuzzy coverage in tables 19 and 20 Veri's (2018b). This coverage is expressed in terms of a fuzzy number; therefore, whenever the result is above 0.5, we have a high frequency of empirically relevant cases over the entire population of cases (Veri 2018b: 9). The coverage < 0.5 means that there is no

empirical relevance in the solution term and that the sufficient relationship established in the solution formulas are trivial (Veri 2018b). Trivial sufficient formulas are usually the automatic product of Boolean minimization. As pointed out by Braumoeller (2017), fsQCA is subject to an aggregation bias due to the process of Boolean minimization, which minimizes the values of two or more aggregated condition and therefore mechanically produces a subset relationship between minimized aggregated conditions and a non-minimized outcome (Braumoeller 2017: 243). Basically, according to Braumoeller, certain solution terms might be the result of chance. This is the case with the two solution formulas on EU referendum success with a very low Veri's coverage of 0.0965 for the parsimonious solution and 0.06038 for the intermediate solution. As pointed out by Veri (2018b: 150-151), a low Veri's coverage indicates a trivial relationship between conditions and the outcome.

Figure 13: Referendum success's parsimonious and intermediate solution formulas' XY Plots



Indeed, as demonstrated by figure 13, only three cases out of the 14 that display the outcome (Malta 2003, Switzerland 2005 and Switzerland 2009) are covered by the parsimonious solution formula and only two cases out of 14 (Switzerland 2005 and Switzerland 2009) are covered by the intermediate solution formula.

### 14.1.3) Sufficient conditions for supranational organization's membership failure

We turn now to the analysis of sufficiency conditions for the outcome “opposition to supranational membership and supranational treaties” ( $\sim$ OUT).

Table 18: Parsimonious solution for the failure of supranational organization referendums

<i>FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000</i>			
<i>CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 0.489288</i>			
	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
<b><math>\sim</math>LEFT*POP*MULT</b>	0.5762180	0.116323	0.468933
<b>POP*ELITE</b>	0.475471	0.015614	0.604482
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b>	<b>0.591794</b>		
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (VERI):</b>	<b>0.6193</b>		
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b>	<b>0.523589</b>		

Table 19: Intermediate solution for the failure of supranational organization referendums

<i>FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000</i>		<i>ASSUMPTIONS:</i>	
<i>CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 0.489288</i>		<i>POP (PRESENT)</i>	
		<i><math>\sim</math>MULT (ABSENT)</i>	
		<i><math>\sim</math>ELITE (ABSENT)</i>	
	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
<b><math>\sim</math>LEFT*POP*<math>\sim</math>INI*MULT</b>	0.477509	0.477509	0.558811
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b>	<b>0.4775097</b>		
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (VERI):</b>	<b>0.5257</b>		
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b>	<b>0.558811</b>		


The fsQCA analysis of sufficiency for referendum failure produces the following parsimonious solutions:

- (a) A strong populist party (POP) that opposes a referendum on a multiple-issue matter (MULT) supported by a right-wing government ( $\sim$ LEFT).
- (b) A strong populist party (POP) that opposes a referendum supported by a cohesive political elite (ELITE).

Meanwhile, the intermediate solution engenders the following path:

- (c) A strong populist party (POP) that oppose a non-popularly-initiated referendum ( $\sim$ INI) on multiple issues (MULT) supported by a rightist government ( $\sim$ LEFT).

Figure 14: Referendum failure's parsimonious and intermediate solutions formulas' XY plots



The solution consistency is significantly low, which make this solution formula theoretically trivial. Indeed, as detailed in figure 14, the majority of cases are located in the inconsistent area of the XY plot. In the parsimonious solution formula, seven cases are inconsistent (amongst which 3 are inconsistent in kind), eight cases are ambiguous cases – or are cases in which the conjunction of conditions is associated both with the presence and the absence of the outcome – and only six cases are consistent. In the intermediate solution there are nine inconsistent cases, five ambiguous cases, and only five consistent cases. This result is therefore theoretically not informative.

#### ***14.1.4) Sufficient solutions discussion***

The negative performance of parameters of fit in both solution formulas indicates that our condition does not produce interpretable causal set-theoretic relationship. In short, the solution formulas generated by the fsQCA analysis does not contain any useful information because the solution formulas are either inconsistent, and therefore theoretically not relevant, or empirically irrelevant, and therefore the mere result of Boolean minimization (in this case we have a false positive result as intended by Braumoeller 2017).

This result is probably due to our design model that does not specifically suit this subgroup of cases. Therefore, we can assume that the conditions selected in this study do not work in the context of the EU popular vote.

This circumstance appears in relation to causal heterogeneity. Causal heterogeneity establishes that a condition could behave differently depending on the context. Our conditions have been crafted according to CL and direct democratic literature. However, the specificity of the EU-related referendums' context might influence the causal relevance of our original condition. Essentially, our selected conditions could be ineffective in the context of EU-related referendums. When we closely explore the EU-related literature, we can identify some conditions that are redundant with respect to the EU context and some conditions that have not been considered in our study.

Indeed, according to EU literature, the conditions *left versus right government*, *popular initiative* and *multiple versus single issues* are redundant. The left-right wing is not relevant to the referendum outcomes given that support for European integration is provided by both left- and right-wing governments (Hooghe et al. 2004). Meanwhile, the opposition to the EU integration can be seen as an inverted "U" curve with low support being concentrated at the extreme ends on both sides amongst extreme left and extreme right parties (Hooghe et al. 2004; Crum 2007).



In relation to the popular initiative and multiple issues referendums as highlighted by the analysis of necessity, both are large supersets of the success and the failure of the referendum; nearly every EU referendum is on multiple issues and are not popular initiatives opposed by the government.

Nevertheless, the EU-related referendums have their own explanations. According to the specific EU-related literature, the referendum outcome is influenced by the legal characteristics of referendum (Hug and Sciarini 2000); the referendum timing (Qvortrup 2016: 65); the EU's attitude and partisanship (Hobolt 2005: 93; Wagschal 2007: 61); and economic factors (Hobolt and Riseboroug 2005: 246; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007: 133). None of these conditions can be use in a broader analysis on CL-related referendums because they have specifically been studied in the EU context only. Therefore, the EU related referendums are substantially different from the other CL-related referendums.

It is not our intention to pursue the analysis on the topic of supranational organization referendum given that it now falls outside of our scope condition. Therefore, we will exclude this group of referendums from any further analysis we will make.

### **15) Individual citizenship rights referendums**

The referendums related to the individual citizenship rights includes five subgroups with different degrees of causal homogeneity: 1) the extension of political rights to foreigners in the Swiss cantonal context, which is the most homogeneous group given that it refers to the same jurisdictional level, the same topic, and the same geographic reality; 2) the extension of political rights to foreigners around the world, which refers to the same topic; 3) the referendums held at the subnational level which refer to the same jurisdictional level; 4) the referendums held in Switzerland which refer to the same geographic context; 5) all referendums on individual citizenship rights extension which refer to an heterogeneous jurisdictional level, topic, and geographic content.

In the next section, we will run a fsQCA analysis of necessity and one of sufficiency for each of the individual citizenship groups of referendums. This analytical strategy allows us to determine whether similar or identical causal patterns are applicable to each group of cases despite different degrees of causal homogeneity.

### 15.1) fsQCA in relation to the success of referendums on individual citizenship rights<sup>23</sup>

In this section, we examine the technical aspects of the analyses of necessity and sufficiency that explain the outcomes of *Individual citizenship liberalization success by direct democracy* (OUT).

This outcome also coincides with referendum success.

#### 15.1.1) Necessary condition for individual citizenship success (technical explanations)

Tables 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 display the necessary conditions for referendums on aliens' political rights, referendums on the subnational level, referendums on individual citizenship dimension in Switzerland, and referendums on the individual citizenship dimension in the world.<sup>24</sup>

Table 20: Analysis of necessity for the success of foreigners' political rights extension in Switzerland

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.453633	0.258588
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.546367	0.221385
<b>POP</b>	0.521251	0.199115
<b>~POP</b>	0.478749	0.298401
<b>INI</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~INI</b>	1.000000	0.450000
<b>MULT</b>	0.666667	1.000000
<b>~MULT</b>	0.333333	0.093750
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.444444	0.215054
<b>ELITE</b>	0.555556	0.257732
<b>LEFT+ ~POP</b>	0.728189	0.298055
<b>LEFT+MULT</b>	0.875789	0.402397
<b>LEFT+ ELITE</b>	0.695300	0.265471
<b>~POP+ ELITE</b>	0.606967	0.239675
<b>~POP+MULT</b>	0.765292	0.404718
<b>MULT+ ELITE</b>	0.777778	0.327103

<sup>23</sup> All the robustness tests and tables relatives to fsQCA analysis are included in annex 3.

<sup>24</sup> In fsQCA, when a condition is written in CAPITAL letters it means that the condition is present. When a condition has a tilde ~ in front of the letters, this means that the condition is absent.

*Table 21: Analysis of necessity for the success of referendums on aliens' political rights*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.453633	0.258588
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.546367	0.221385
<b>POP</b>	0.521251	0.199115
<b>~POP</b>	0.478749	0.298401
<b>INI</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~INI</b>	1.000000	0.450000
<b>MULT</b>	0.666667	1.000000
<b>~MULT</b>	0.333333	0.093750
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.444444	0.215054
<b>ELITE</b>	0.555556	0.257732
<b>LEFT+ ~POP</b>	0.728189	0.298055
<b>LEFT+MULT</b>	0.875789	0.402397
<b>LEFT+ ELITE</b>	0.695300	0.265471
<b>~POP+ ELITE</b>	0.606967	0.239675
<b>~POP+MULT</b>	0.765292	0.404718
<b>MULT+ ELITE</b>	0.777778	0.327103

*Table 22: Analysis of necessity for referendums on individual citizenship at the subnational level*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.448270	0.268929
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.551730	0.226757
<b>POP</b>	0.469127	0.191547
<b>~POP</b>	0.530873	0.321575
<b>INI</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~INI</b>	1.000000	0.454545
<b>MULT</b>	0.600000	1.000000
<b>~MULT</b>	0.400000	0.114286
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.400000	0.210526
<b>ELITE</b>	0.600000	0.272727
<b>LEFT+ ~POP</b>	0.594567	0.212246
<b>LEFT+MULT</b>	0.828210	0.404635
<b>LEFT+ ELITE</b>	0.725770	0.277381
<b>~POP+ ELITE</b>	0.646270	0.254515
<b>~POP+MULT</b>	0.765292	0.404718
<b>MULT+ ELITE</b>	0.800000	0.333333

*Table 23: Analysis of necessity for the success of referendums on individual citizenship dimensions in Switzerland*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.438970	0.254259
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.561030	0.218000
<b>POP</b>	0.554797	0.200021
<b>~POP</b>	0.445203	0.291687
<b>INI</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~INI</b>	1.000000	0.416667
<b>MULT</b>	0.600000	1.000000
<b>~MULT</b>	0.400000	0.108108
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.480000	0.220183
<b>ELITE</b>	0.520000	0.245283
<b>LEFT+ ~POP</b>	0.686070	0.292183
<b>LEFT+MULT</b>	0.875789	0.402397
<b>LEFT+ ELITE</b>	0.656480	0.256553
<b>~POP+ ELITE</b>	0.566270	0.230264
<b>~POP+MULT</b>	0.765292	0.404718
<b>MULT+ ELITE</b>	0.720000	0.310345

*Table 24: Analysis of necessity for the success of referendums on individual citizenship dimensions in the world*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.415808	0.262540
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.584192	0.241780
<b>POP</b>	0.462331	0.195339
<b>~POP</b>	0.537669	0.329215
<b>INI</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~INI</b>	1.000000	0.428571
<b>MULT</b>	0.500000	1.000000
<b>~MULT</b>	0.500000	0.142857
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.400000	0.216216
<b>ELITE</b>	0.600000	0.279070
<b>LEFT+ ~POP</b>	0.738392	0.313968
<b>LEFT+MULT</b>	0.732425	0.375404
<b>LEFT+ ELITE</b>	0.713725	0.282394
<b>~POP+ ELITE</b>	0.638558	0.262492
<b>~POP+MULT</b>	0.752577	0.407218
<b>MULT+ ELITE</b>	0.766667	0.330935

The recommended thresholds for the consistency and coverage of necessary conditions are around 0.9 or higher (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 143-147).

The condition ~ INI (which in our operationalization means a mandatory referendum, facultative referendum, or popular initiative supported by the government or counterproposal) with a consistency of 1 appears to be the necessary condition for the success of policies relating to foreign political rights.

However, the low-set theoretical coverage between 0.416667 and 0.454545 makes this condition trivial. The condition does not explain which type of popular vote is necessary for the success of the extension of CL in the context of direct democracy; this necessity is not causally interpretable because it is too large a superset. We can, therefore, conclude that no specific necessary condition exists that leads to the success of a popular vote. Other conditions have a consistency which is too low to be considered necessary.

### 15.1.2) Sufficient condition results for CL success (technical explanation)

The analysis yields three different solutions, as highlighted by table 25. In table 26, we detail the parsimonious solution and in table 27 the intermediate solution.

As previously pointed out, in our discussion below we will consider intermediate and parsimonious solutions in order to identify causal conditions (and configurations) of conditions in a wide discourse.

Table 25: Solution formulas for CL success

<b>Complex solution</b>	$POP * \sim INI * MULT * \sim ELITE + \sim LEFT * \sim POP * \sim INI * MULT * ELITE$
<b>Intermediate solution</b>	$\sim INI * MULT * ELITE + \sim LEFT * \sim INI * MULT$
<b>Parsimonious solution</b>	MULT

Table 26: Parsimonious solution for CL success

<i>FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000</i>			
<i>CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000</i>			
<b>MULT</b>			
	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	0.666667	0.666667	1
(B) Aliens' political rights	0.666667	0.666667	1
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	0.6	0.6	1
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	0.6	0.6	1
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	0.5	0.5	1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b>	(A) 0.666667 /	(B) 0.66667 /	(C) 0.6 / (D) 0.6 / (E) 0.5
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (VERI):</b>	(A) 0.8331 /	(B) 0.8331 /	(C) 0.6922 / (D) 0.6922 / (E) 0.6123
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b>	(A) 1 /	(B) 1 /	(C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1

Table 27: Intermediate solution for CL success

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000		ASSUMPTIONS: ~POP (ABSENT) ELITE (PRESENT)	
(1) ~INI*MULT*ELITE (2) ~LEFT*~INI*MULT			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.444444 (2) 0.422144	(1) 0.130778 (2) 0.108478	(1) 1 (2) 1
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.444444 (2) 0.422144	(1) 0.130778 (2) 0.108478	(1) 1 (2) 1
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.4 (2) 0.37994	(1) 0.11769 (2) 0.09763	(1) 1 (2) 1
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.4 (2) 0.37994	(1) 0.11769 (2) 0.09763	(1) 1 (2) 1
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.33333 (2) 0.316617	(1) 0.098075 (2) 0.081358	(1) 1 (2) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.55292 / (B) 0.55292 / (C) 0.49763 / (D) 0.49763 / (E) 0.41469			
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE VERI:</b> (A) 0.706169 / (B) 0.706169 / (C) 0.65483 / (D) 0.65483 / (E) 0.57649			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1			

The outcome that explains the CL extension by referendum has the following parsimonious solution:

- (a) A popular vote with multiple policies (MULT) is successful;

and the following intermediate solutions:


- (a) A popular vote with multiple policies (MULT) supported and triggered by a cohesive government (~INI\*ELITE) is successful.
- (b) A popular vote with multiple policies (MULT) supported and triggered by a rightist government (~LEFT\*~INI) is successful.

The Ragin's consistency of 1 means that all the cases displaying the solution formula's causal configurations also display the outcome; such a consistency score indicates that the solution paths are theoretically consistent.

The solution formula is identical along different groups of cases. Essentially, the causal pattern identified in the smaller and most homogeneous (from a geographical, jurisdictional, and topic level) subgroup of cases also explains the broader and less homogeneous supergroup of cases. This

explanation indicates causal homogeneity across the whole population of referendums that refer to the success of individual citizenship liberalization.

Figure 15: Referendum success's parsimonious and intermediate solutions formulas' XY plots



Indeed, as we can observe in figure 15, all the cases are located above the XY plot diagonal which corresponds with the sufficient cases area.

Finally, in relation to the coverage, Ragin's coverages between 0.414692 and 0.552922 might seem low. However, as previously emphasised in the chapter discussing the EU referendums, a relatively low Ragin's coverage might be primarily linked to the crisp nature of the outcome as opposed to the fuzzy nature of the solution terms (Veri, 2018b).

In order to provide a more accurate measure of empirical coverage and check the validity of the fsQCA analysis's results, we illustrate Veri's (2018b) fuzzy coverage in tables 29 and 30. As previously pointed out, this coverage is expressed in terms of fuzzy numbers; as a result, whenever the result is above 0.5, we have a high frequency of empirically relevant cases over the entire population of cases (Veri 2018b: 9). Therefore, a coverage between 0.6123 and 0.8331 for the

parsimonious solution and between 0.576489 and 0.706169 for the intermediate solution indicates empirical relevance.

In summary, the solution formulas displayed in tables 26 and 27 are set-theoretically meaningful and empirically relevant.

## **15.2) Discussion on the CL success**

### ***15.2.1) General observations***

As the premise of our discussion, it is important to point out that all cases covered by the parsimonious and intermediate solution formulas refer to total cantonal constitutional revisions in the Swiss cantons. The intermediate solution formula highlights that these total cantonal constitutional revisions (MULT) are put into referendums ( $\sim$ INI) that are supported by a cohesive coalition of political elites (ELITE) OR they are supported by a right-wing coalition government ( $\sim$ LEFT).

### ***15.2.2) Discussion on the analysis of necessity for the success of CL referendums***

The overall result of the analysis of necessity confirms our expectations. The direct democratic arena is a difficult environment for CL policies to pass. The analysis of necessity did not uncover any necessary conditions; therefore, promoters of CL policies cannot rely on possible crucial conditions in order to succeed in their purposes. In other words, a direct democratic system does not provide essential necessary conditions for CL success. This finding is in line with our theoretical expectations. Indeed, the hurdles of the direct democratic system inevitably hinder possible necessary conditions that would allow CL to succeed in a representative democratic system. In such circumstances, promoters of CL policies must therefore not rely on direct democracy in order to pursue CL extension.



### ***15.2.3) Discussion on the analysis of sufficiency for the success of CL referendums***

In the analysis of sufficiency, the condition *multiple-issue referendum* appears in every path of the parsimonious and intermediate solution formulas.

*Multiple-issue referendum* is the key factor that should confirm the “hidden strategy” hypothesis explored in the theoretical chapter at the point 4.2. The political elite seems to use multiple-issue referendums in order to avoid public discussion on CL during the referendum campaign.

#### *15.2.3.1) Causal interpretation of the CL success intermediate solution formulas*

In order to proceed with the discussion, we first consider the intermediate solution as causally interpretable. Then we discuss the parsimonious solution.

A causal interpretation of the intermediate solution formula implies a strong trade-off relationship between conditions that appear in the intermediate solution formula.

Path 1 displays the configuration of three conditions: the *absence of popular initiative* (~INI) with the *elite cohesion* (ELITE) and the *multiple-issue referendum* (MULT). These three conditions reveal the circumstances that allow a CL policy to be accepted by the people.

In relation to this, we can assume that on the one hand elite cohesion is an important factor for the success of the referendum because it allows for a compact referendum propaganda in favour of the bill that it has been proposed by the political elite in a mandatory referendum<sup>25</sup>. When the elite are cohesive over the issue, the conflicts during the referendum political arena will be reduced or nullified. Practically, this cohesion signifies that the elite will provide a strong one-side influx of information during the popular vote campaign supporting the object at stake. On the other hand, the presence of a multiple-issue referendum allows political elites to run a campaign in which the unpopular bill is not discussed. Basically, the multiple-issue referendum and elite cohesion together

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<sup>25</sup> The operationalization of the condition *absence of popular initiative* (~INI) also includes mandatory referendum.

create the circumstances for a strong compact elite battlefront in defence of a broad bill in which sensitive issues are hidden from the voters.

Path 2 differs from path 1 only by the presence of the *right-wing government* (~LEFT) condition instead of the *cohesive elite* (ELITE) condition. Path 2 has a similar configurational interpretation to path 1. The right-wing government reverses its causal power from opposing to supporting CL in the context of multiple-issue referendums. Essentially, in the context of a multifaceted reform, the conflicts between left-wing parties and right-wing parties are reduced. In this respect, it is possible to hypothesize a possible trade-off between the two conditions. On the one hand, the multiple issue referendum includes policies that have a broad ideological spectrum and therefore the CL object is only one “non-right-wing” policy that can be hidden during the right-wing government referendum campaign; on the other hand, right-wing governments can take advantage of including a progressive policy in a multifaceted bill because it allows little to no ideological opposition to the main bill from the left-wing parties. The same is valid for CL policy supporters who can exploit multiple-issue referendums (also under a right-wing government regime) in order to gain greater support for these types of policies inside the parliamentary arena. The multiple-issue referendum creates the ideal circumstances for an inter-ideological battlefront on sustaining the referendum object.

### 15.2.3.2) Intermediate solution redundant conditions

As previously pointed out, the solution formula covers only cases that refer to the specific context of total constitutional revision in the Swiss cantons. The target of this discussion is therefore to understand whether context-dependent circumstances reveal the presence of redundant conditions.

The specific Swiss cantonal context makes the condition ~INI (*absence of popular initiative opposed by the government*) causally redundant because it is a definitional element of the condition MULT (*multiple-issue- referendum*). Indeed, as previously observed, the condition MULT at the Swiss cantonal level always refers to total constitutional revision. In Switzerland, every total constitutional

revision is always subject to a mandatory referendum.<sup>26</sup> A mandatory referendum is also a *non-popular initiative*, which coincides with the operationalization of condition  $\sim$ INI. This connection signifies that a total constitutional revision always includes the concept of mandatory referendum. Basically, in the Swiss cantonal context, the ontological architecture of condition MULT always include the condition  $\sim$ INI.<sup>27</sup>

The second condition of *elite cohesion* (ELITE) seems to be causally redundant for two reasons. First, this condition is intrinsic to the context of total constitutional revision. As previously discussed, a *multiple-issue referendum* condition always refers to a total constitutional revision. The process for a total constitutional revision involves long and complex discussions in the cantonal parliaments or in specific constitutional assemblies. In such context, a total revision before to be accepted requires mediation and elite to be in favour. In other words, a strong elite cohesion is a necessary constituent element for a total constitutional revision to be put into referendum. Indeed, a parliament or constitutional assembly would not put into mandatory referendum a bill that does not achieve strong cohesion.

Second, from a configurational perspective, the causal power of the condition *elite cohesion* becomes totally redundant in presence of condition *multiple-issue referendum*. Indeed, it is causally irrelevant to have strong propaganda supporting a CL bill when such bill is not being discussed during the referendum campaign because it is hidden by a complex multi-faced referendum question. Basically, the causal power of the *elite cohesion* condition is dismissed in conjunction with the *multiple-issue referendum* condition given that there is no longer the necessity to run propaganda in favour of a specific object whenever the object itself is hidden (and not discussed) during the referendum campaign.

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<sup>26</sup> A popular initiative can request a total revision of the constitution, but it does not propose a total revision of constitution.

<sup>27</sup> In contrast, the specific ontology of condition MULT also implies that the conjunction of *popular initiative* with *multiple-issue referendum* (MULT\*INI) in the context of the Swiss system is impossible.

The same type of concerns can be raised for the condition *right-wing government* ( $\sim$ LEFT). In the specific Swiss cantonal context, each government is formed by a multi-party coalition. In the light of this context, the right-wing government can be seen as a variance of elite cohesion. Similar to the condition *elite cohesion*, the condition *right-wing government* is a definitional and intrinsic element of the *multiple-issue referendum* condition. The right-wing government decides to support the total constitutional revision because the government itself has proposed the revision, which is supported by the majority of parties that are in the government<sup>28</sup>. Without such support a referendum would not be possible.

Secondly, the presence of a multiple-issue referendum allows the content of the unpopular bill to be hidden from voters during the referendum campaign. Essentially right-wing governments do not have to defend their choice of sustaining the referendum given CL bill is not discussed. In light of such concerns, we can state that the peripheral factors that compose the intermediate solution are causally redundant.

### 15.2.3.3) Cases covered by the solution formula

In order to find evidence of our considerations, we briefly discussed cases covered by the intermediate solution formula and empirically observe whether redundant conditions exist.

*Table 28: Causal configurations for CL success*

SOLUTION FORMULA		CASES NON-UNIQUELY COVERED	CASES UNIQUELY COVERED
<i>Path 1</i>	$\sim$ INI *MULT*ELITE	CHAR95, CHNE00, CHGR03	CHBS05
<i>Path 2</i>	$\sim$ LEFT * $\sim$ INI *MULT	CHAR95, CHNE00, CHGR03,	CHVD02; CHFR04
<b>Cases not covered by the solution formula</b> CHGE05.1; CHNE07.2; CHJU14; CH17; FL00; USANM06			

<sup>28</sup> Presumably, the right-wing governments agreed to include the CL bill inside the constitutional revision in order to reach a larger interideological consensus on the overall bill.

As highlighted by table 28, path 1 displays four cases and one unique case (CHBS05). Meanwhile, path 2 depicts five cases amongst which two are uniquely covered (CHVD02 and CHFR04). Three cases are displayed by both paths (CHAR95, CHNE00, CHGR03). Nevertheless, the non-uniquely covered cases refer to a cohesive right-wing government, and will therefore will be discussed as members of path 1. In order to proceed with our examination, we will closely examine each case by reading voting material available in c2d database ([www.c2d.ch](http://www.c2d.ch)) and cantonal websites, and access the debate by reading articles that appeared in the press (Schweizer Mediadatenbank, <https://www.smd.ch/SMDView/log/index.jsp>) and in the Swiss Television Archives (Swiss television archives RSI, RTS and SRF).

*A) Path 1: A multiple issue mandatory referendum supported by a cohesive elite*

*(~INI \*MULT\*ELITE)*

By examining the case of Basel Stadt 2005 (CHBS05), we can observe a long process of elites meeting during the *Verfassungsrat*, i.e., the Constitutional Assembly elected by the people in 1999 that regrouped all political parties.<sup>29</sup> The purpose of the *Verfassungsrat* was to propose a total constitutional revision that could meet the different political expectations of every political party involved. In relation to this proposal, the government-elites attempted to reduce the effectiveness of non-government populist opposition by using nuanced issues that better met voters' preferences; to this end, the elites strove to eliminate more radical versions of CL reform that included the accordance of voting rights to foreigners at the cantonal level instead of the local level (Aiolfi: 2005: 17). On March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2005, after six years of meetings, the elected Constitutional Assembly reached important inter-party agreements when the final constitutional draft was accepted by every party except the non-governmental right-wing populist parties of Swiss People's Party (SVP) and Swiss Democrats (SD).<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> The composition of the *Verfassungsrat* was as follows: 21 members from the Socialist Party; 21 members of the Liberal Party (LDP); eight members of the Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP); seven members of the Radical party (FDP); six members of the Swiss People's Party (SVP); five members of the Social Democratic Party (DSP) five members of the left-wing alliance BastA, and two members of the Swiss Democrats (SD). <http://query.staatsarchiv.bs.ch/query/detail.aspx?ID=192437>

<sup>30</sup> <http://query.staatsarchiv.bs.ch/query/detail.aspx?ID=192437>

In this instance, the political elites accepted a constitutional reform which included an article on the possibility of extension of political rights to foreigners in the towns of Riehen and Bettingen only (but not for the city of Basel). The government-elites decided to unanimously campaign for the constitutional reform without revealing the sensitive CL content to people. During the referendum campaign, the political elite kept hidden from the voters the existence of the CL bill and, as indicated in the referendum booklet, argued that there was no bill that produced an extension of political rights to foreigners given that such right is not enforced inside the Cantonal territory.

In the canton of Appenzell Ausserrhoden (CHAR95), the traditional left, the traditional right-wing parties, and the populist parties together supported the total constitutional revision which included a CL object. During the referendum campaign, each political party campaigned in favour of the constitutional revision without mentioning the existence of CL reform (RSI archives: ID A806838).

In Graubünden 2003 (CHGR03), only the left-wing party was against the proposed total constitutional revision (RSI archives: ID A51594). However, the reasons for the opposition were linked to the electoral reform and not to the CL object. Indeed, the CL reform was not debated during the referendum campaign. Similar circumstance appeared in Neuchâtel 2000 (CHNE00), where the CL reform was not discussed by the political elite during the referendum campaign.

To summarize, in CHAR95, CHGR03 and CHNE00, the political elites cohesion was a requirement of the total constitutional revision. The elite decided to hid sensitive CL issues from the referendum campaign. In both cases, there was no propaganda against citizenship liberalization, and the extension of political rights to foreigners was not discussed during the referendum campaign.

The fact that the CL object was hidden during the referendum campaign supports the causal inference of conditions on the outcome and corroborates our assumptions on the redundancy of ELITE and  $\sim$ INI condition: the elite cohesion (ELITE) and the presence of a mandatory referendum ( $\sim$ INI) are definitional elements of the multiple-issue referendum (MULT) and they have no causal inference on the outcome of referendum success. Indeed, the causal power of MULT is already sufficient by itself for the referendum to pass.

*B) Path 2: A multiple-issue mandatory referendum supported by a rightist government*

*(~INI \*MULT\*~LEFT)*

In Cantons Vaud 2002 (CHVD02) and Fribourg 2004 (CHFR04), the political elites were divided. In CHVD02, the Constitutional Assembly tried to meet some, but not all, opposing views on extending political right to foreigners. On March 2001, the Constitutional Assembly voted for the first time on the extension of political rights at the cantonal and local level. Despite the proposition receiving the majority of consent with 91 votes versus 51 (Bolliger 2001), the assembly members decided to re-vote on the issue in September of the same year. However, in September the CL object was nuanced; instead of providing political rights to foreigners at the cantonal level, the assembly agree to accept the Radical Party's (FDP) proposal of providing political rights to foreigners only at the local level (Bourquin: 2001). This proposal gained greater support with the FDP, which eventually decided to support the agreement; only the Liberal Party (LPS) and the relatively weak SVP opposed the constitutional reforms. During the political campaign, the CL object played a secondary role. The campaign actively focused not only on the extension of political rights, but also on the extension of social rights (such as the right to maternity insurance), the union of Church and State, and the reduction of the cantonal districts from 19 to 10 (Rychen: 2002; RTS archives: ID ZB052346/03). In Fribourg 2004 (CHFR04), the constitutional revision was supported by every party with the exception of the SVP. In this case, the primary issue discussed during the referendum campaign was the article on civil unions for homosexuals and not the reform of foreigners' political rights (RSI archives: ID A1085490; RTS archives ID ZB052784/07). In conclusion, in both CHVD02 and CHFR04 the CL object only played a secondary role and was subtly hidden by the presence of other priority objects.

Other cases of path 2 corroborate the assumption about the redundancy of conditions ~INI and ~LEFT in the intermediate solution. Indeed, mandatory referendum (~INI) is a contextual attribute of the total constitutional revision (MULT); the right-wing government's (~LEFT) causal power becomes trivial

in conjunction with the condition MULT, given that the CL object played a secondary role during the referendum campaign. Essentially, it was not necessary for the right-wing government to run a strong campaign in favour of the specific CL object only.

15.2.3.4) Causal interpretation of the CL success parsimonious solution

The central role played by the *multiple-issue referendum* condition is corroborated by the parsimonious solution formula in which the condition appears alone. In the parsimonious solution, *multiple-issue referendum* results in being the Boolean difference maker. Essentially, *multiple-issue referendum* is identified as the only non-redundant and causal factor that explains the outcome of CL success in the context of extension of political right to foreigners.

The parsimonious solution provides five important points on CL success in the context of the direct democratic arena:

- 1) First, the causally relevant solution path is not a configuration of conditions as displayed by our initial hypothesis. According to the parsimonious solution, a single core factor explains the outcome. This condition comes from the general literature that explains the direct democratic vote. Basically, despite our initial configurational hypothesis, CL-related conditions are considered redundant in the context of direct democracy.
- 2) Second, notwithstanding the presence of a single sufficient condition, we still observe a configurational phenomenon due to the complex ontology of the condition *multiple-issue referendum* (MULT) when it is inserted in the specific context of the Swiss cantonal system. Indeed, as previously highlighted, the condition MULT always refers to total constitutional revisions. A total constitutional revision is probably the most radical and complex form of multiple bill that can be put into popular vote. These types of revisions are long processes that require mediation and acceptance of compromises in order to enlarge the ideological spectrum of the elite in favour of reform. In this respect, the MULT condition encompasses the concepts



of *right-wing government* or *cohesive political elite*. Additionally, in Switzerland every total constitutional revision is always subject to mandatory referendum, and in that respect the MULT condition also includes the condition *absence of popular initiatives*. As a result, even if we do not have configurational paths, we can still assert that our theoretical expectations on the complexity of the solution formula are met.

- 3) Third, the causal power of condition MULT is sufficient to overtake the hurdles of the direct democratic arena. This happens because whenever a complex and multifaceted reform is put into referendum a large deliberative space is created through the formation of constitutional assemblies. This deliberative space allows to the reduction of conflicts between the political actors that will be involved in the referendum campaign. Indeed, during the constitution revision debates the representative democratic actors have the time to reach consensus and compromises over the CL policies. Essentially, the complex ontology of the MULT condition provides to the CL policies' promoters the instruments to reduce the conflict inside the direct democratic arena.
- 4) Fourth, the causal power of condition MULT is sufficient by itself to produce the outcome of interest. This interpretation of the MULT condition corroborates the hidden strategy hypothesis outlined above: CL promoters use constitutional revisions in order to hide the unpopular CL issue and at the same time to gain greater support on the issue from different political forces (including right-wing parties). As a consequence, voters' preferences would not be determined by the CL object. Essentially, voters will not exert their vetoing power over the CL object because the salience of the unpopular object is reduced in multifaceted referendums.
- 5) Finally, we can identify two types of hidden strategies that differ in degree: i) a hard-hidden strategy, and ii) a soft-hidden strategy. The hard-hidden strategy refers to CHAR95, CHGR03, CHBS05 and CHNE00. In these cases, the unpopular CL object was never mentioned during the propaganda campaign. The soft-hidden strategy refers to CHVD02 and CHFR04, where

the unpopular CL object was softened and partially hidden by the presence of other priority objects.

### 15.3) fsQCA in relation to the failure of referendums on individual citizenship rights

#### 15.3.1) Necessary condition for CL failure (technical explanation)

Tables 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 display the analysis results of the necessary conditions for the outcome “CL failure in the context of direct democracy”.

Table 29: Analysis of necessity for the failure of foreigners’ political rights extension in Switzerland

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
LEFT	0.403647	0.741412
~LEFT	0.596353	0.778615
POP	0.650665	0.800885
~POP	0.349335	0.701599
INI	0.620690	1.000000
~INI	0.3793310	0.550000
MULT	0.000000	0.000000
~MULT	1.000000	0.906250
~ELITE	0.503448	0.784946
ELITE	0.496552	0.742268
~LEFT+POP	0.779242	0.759335
~LEFT+INI	0.820268	0.828696
~LEFT + ~MULT	1.00000	0.810069
~LEFT+~ELITE	0.696847	0.765953
POP+INI	0.850413	0.840179
POP+~MULT	1.00000	0.838662
POP+~ELITE	0.751680	0.808777
INI+~ELITE	0.841379	0.859155
~MULT+~ELITE	1.0000	0.852941

Table 30: Analysis of necessity for the failure of referendums on aliens' political rights failure

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
LEFT	0.410542	0.757119
~LEFT	0.589458	0.787961
POP	0.660161	0.813515
~POP	0.339839	0.709727
INI	0.645161	1.000000
~INI	0.354839	0.550000
MULT	0.000000	0.000000
~MULT	1.000000	0.911765
~ELITE	0.496774	0.793814
ELITE	0.503226	0.757282
~LEFT+POP	0.778308	0.771099
~LEFT+INI	0.832087	0.839890
~LEFT + ~MULT	1.00000	0.847483
~LEFT+~ELITE	0.754660	0.819466
POP+INI	0.8600061	0.850373
POP+~MULT	1.00000	0.847483
POP+~ELITE	0.754660	0.819466
INI+~ELITE	0.851613	0.868421
~MULT+~ELITE	1.00000	0.861111

Table 31: Analysis of necessity for the failure of referendums on individual citizenship at the subnational level

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
LEFT	0.393097	0.731071
~LEFT	0.606903	0.773243
POP	0.638716	0.808453
~POP	0.361284	0.678425
INI	0.612903	1.000000
~INI	0.387097	0.545454
MULT	0.000000	0.000000
~MULT	1.000000	0.885714
~ELITE	0.516129	0.789474
ELITE	0.516129	0.727273
~LEFT+POP	0.782669	0.757619
~LEFT+INI	0.825635	0.822663
~LEFT + ~MULT	1.00000	0.824931
~LEFT+~ELITE	0.733215	0.815161
POP+INI	0.827803	0.845444
POP+~MULT	1.00000	0.824931
POP+~ELITE	0.733215	0.815161
INI+~ELITE	0.819355	0.863946
~MULT+~ELITE	1.0000	0.837838

*Table 32: Analysis of necessity for the failure of referendums on individual citizenship dimensions in Switzerland*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.390133	0.745733
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.609867	0.782005
<b>POP</b>	0.672394	0.799979
<b>~POP</b>	0.327606	0.708313
<b>INI</b>	0.575758	1.000000
<b>~INI</b>	0.42424242	0.583333
<b>MULT</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~MULT</b>	1.000000	0.891892
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.515152	0.779816
<b>ELITE</b>	0.472727	0.750000
<b>~LEFT+POP</b>	0.785883	0.763822
<b>~LEFT+INI</b>	0.815324	0.827460
<b>~LEFT + ~MULT</b>	1.00000	0.808835
<b>~LEFT+~ELITE</b>	0.701467	0.768452
<b>POP+INI</b>	0.850021	0.834875
<b>POP+~MULT</b>	1.00000	0.833778
<b>POP+~ELITE</b>	0.768911	0.808484
<b>INI+~ELITE</b>	0.842424	0.852761
<b>~MULT+~ELITE</b>	1.00000	0.846154

*Table 33: Analysis of necessity for the failure of referendums on individual citizenship dimensions in the world*

CONDITIONS TESTED	CONSISTENCY	COVERAGE
<b>LEFT</b>	0.389328	0.737460
<b>~LEFT</b>	0.610672	0.758220
<b>POP</b>	0.634828	0.804661
<b>~POP</b>	0.365172	0.670785
<b>INI</b>	0.555556	1.000000
<b>~INI</b>	0.444444	0.571429
<b>MULT</b>	0.000000	0.000000
<b>~MULT</b>	1.000000	0.857143
<b>~ELITE</b>	0.491667	0.786667
<b>ELITE</b>	0.508333	0.717647
<b>~LEFT+POP</b>	0.783304	0.749615
<b>~LEFT+INI</b>	0.819603	0.808021
<b>~LEFT + ~MULT</b>	1.00000	0.786036
<b>~LEFT+~ELITE</b>	0.700594	0.750171
<b>POP+INI</b>	0.806964	0.839648
<b>POP+~MULT</b>	1.00000	0.807557
<b>POP+~ELITE</b>	0.720524	0.811870
<b>INI+~ELITE</b>	0.797222	0.856716
<b>~MULT+~ELITE</b>	1.00000	0.818182

A popular vote on single-issue (~MULT) policies has been determined to be the necessary condition for the failure of CL with a high-set theoretical coverage between 0.857143 and 0.906250, which indicates a non-trivial relationship.

### 15.3.2) Sufficient condition results for CL failure (technical explanation)

The parsimonious sufficient solution for the outcome “CL blockage by referendum” encompasses two different causal combination of conditions; meanwhile, the intermediate sufficient solution encompasses three different causal combinations of conditions.

Table 34: Parsimonious solution for CL failure

<i>FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000</i>			
<i>CONSISTENCY COTOFF: (A) 0.819642 / (B) 0.819642 / (C) 0.819642 / (D) 1 (E) 1</i>			
<b>(1) ~LEFT*POP*~MULT*~ELITE</b>			
<b>(2) INI</b>			
	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
<i>(A) Swiss aliens' political rights</i>	(1) 0.327174 (2) 0.62069	(1) 0.128798 (2) 0.422314	(1) 0.920291 (2) 1
<i>(B) Aliens' political rights</i>	(1) 0.327328 (2) 0.645161	(1) 0.120488 (2) 0.438321	(1) 0.925071 (2) 1
<i>(C) Individual citizenship subnational level</i>	(1) 0.318967 (2) 0.612903	(1) 0.1204888 (2) 0.414424	(1) 0.923258 (2) 1
<i>(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland</i>	(1) 0.361103 (2) 0.575758	(1) 0.174653 (2) 0.389308	(1) 0.887211 (2) 1
<i>(E) Individual citizenship in the world</i>	(1) 0.338211 (2) 0.555556	(1) 0.160099 (2) 0.312696	(1) 0.889437 (2) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.749488 / (B) 0.76565 / (C) 0.733392 / (D) 0.750411 / (E) 0.715653			
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (VERI):</b> (A) 0.830149 / (B) 0.82215 / (C) 0.797262 / (D) 0.798581 / (E) 0.7721			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 0.963564 / (B) 0.966531 / (C) 0.96511 / (D) 0.942352 / (E) 0.75773			

Table 35: Intermediate solution for CL failure

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: (A) 0.819642 / (B) 0.819642 / (C) 0.819642 / (D) 1 / (E) 1		ASSUMPTIONS: POP (present) ~MULT (absent) ~ELITE (absent)	
(1)~LEFT*POP*~MULT*~ELITE (2)~LEFT*INI*~MULT (3) POP*INI*~MULT			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.327174 (2) 0.420941 (3) 0.420941	(1) 0.128798 (2) 0.077048 (3) 0.101215	(1) 0.920291 (2) 1 (3) 1
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.327328 (2) 0.402532 (3) 0.445262	(1) 0.120488 (2) 0.069719 (3) 0.112448	(1) 0.925071 (2) 1 (3) 1
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.318967 (2) 0.423816 (3) 0.394171	(1) 0.120488 (2) 0.099364 (3) 0.069719	(1) 0.923258 (2) 1 (3) 1
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.361103 (2) 0.370282 (3) 0.398131	(1) 0.174653 (2) 0.065494 (3) 0.093342	(1) 0.887211 (2) 1 (3) 1
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.338211 (2) 0.346625 (3) 0.383420	(1) 0.160099 (2) 0.060036 (3) 0.096831	(1) 0.889347 (2) 1 (3) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.74948 / (B) 0.63547 / (C) 0.61402 / (D) 0.63828 / (E) 0.60355 <b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (VERI):</b> (A) 0.83015 / (B) 0.74419 / (C) 0.796366 / (D) 0.793131 / (E) 0.769528 <b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 0.96356 / (B) 0.95995 / (C) 0.95861 / (D) 0.9329 / (E) 0.934823			

The consistency is high, which means that nearly all the cases fit into the patterns identified by the analysis; Ragin's and Veri's coverage is also high, which makes the solution empirically relevant.

The parsimonious solution suggests that a popular vote will fail whenever the following criteria exist:

- (a) strong populist parties (POP) that oppose a single-policy (~MULT) popular vote promoted by a divided rightist government (~ELITE\*~LEFT)
- (b) a popular initiative (INI) referendum on CL is held

Meanwhile, the intermediate solution suggests that a popular vote will fail whenever the following criteria exist:

- (a) strong populist parties (POP) that oppose a single-policy (~MULT) popular vote promoted by a divided rightist government (~ELITE\*~LEFT)

- (b) a rightist government ( $\sim$ LEFT) in which unified elites ( $\sim$ ELITE) oppose a single-policy ( $\sim$ MULT) popular initiative (INI)
- (c) a strong populist party (POP) which opposes a single-policy ( $\sim$ MULT) popular initiative (INI).

The solution is asymmetric to the success of referendums described above, which means that the causal process that leads to the outcome is not irreversible and there is a different combination of causal conditions relevant to the absence of the outcome.

The first path is identical in both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions, meaning that each insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition which is itself an unnecessary but sufficient component of the causal configuration is a Boolean difference maker.

Finally, the solution formulas are identical along different groups of cases. This uniformity indicates that the causal patterns discovered in the most homogeneous cases from the perspective of geographical, jurisdictional, and topic level also explain broader groups of cases. We can therefore assume that the whole population of cases that refer to individual citizenship liberalization referendums is causally homogeneous given that it presents the same causal formulas.

#### **15.4) Discussion on the failure of political rights extension in the context of direct democracy**

##### ***15.4.1) Discussion on the analysis of necessity for the failure of CL referendums***

*Single-policy referendum* ( $\sim$ MULT) is the necessary condition of citizenship liberalization failure in a direct democracy. The failure of the extension of foreigners' voting rights would not occur without this crucial condition. When people vote against the referendum, the CL object is expressed as single-issue policy. This result corroborates our initial hypothesis: CL resistance finds fewer hurdles in the context of direct democracy than CL extension. As pointed out in the theoretical chapter, in the direct democratic arena the decision-making process is characterized by the presence of voters as veto players and a higher level of conflict amongst political actors. Condition  $\sim$ MULT plays a role in these

two features of the direct democratic decision-making process. On the one hand, the conflicts amongst political actors increase because it is difficult – or even impossible – to avoid an ideological debate over the issue at stake when it is explicitly debated; on the other hand, the natural unpopularity of CL objects amongst citizens will push voters to exert their veto power over the issue.

#### ***15.4.2) Discussion on the analysis of sufficiency for the failure of CL referendums***

For the referendum failure, we first consider the intermediate solution as causally interpretable. Next, we discuss the conditions in relation to the parsimonious solution in order to identify possible context-dependent circumstances that reveal the existence of possible redundant conditions.

##### ***15.4.2.1) Causal interpretation of the CL failure intermediate solution***

According to the intermediate solution formula, the failure of CL referendums follows three distinctive paths. Path 1 of the intermediate solution is identical to path 1 of the parsimonious solution formula and will therefore will be discussed separately in the context of the parsimonious solution's causal interpretation. Here we will discuss paths 2 and 3 of the intermediate solution, given they that differ in term of conjunction of conditions.

According to the path 2, a *right-wing government* (~LEFT) that campaigns against a *popular initiated referendum opposed by the government* (INI) on a *single-issue referendum* (~MULT) is sufficient for the popular vote failure. As highlight by the parsimonious solution, the core factor that leads to popular vote failure is the presence of a popular initiative opposed by the government (INI). The conditions *right-wing government* and *single-issue referendum* are peripheral conditions given that they only appear in the intermediate solution. Relatedly, a right-wing government and single-issue referendum might increase conflict amongst political actors in the direct democratic arena and thereby have the role of increasing the unpopularity of the object put into popular vote amongst the voters. Essentially, the high salience of the object (provided by the *single-issue referendum* condition) and



the presence of a conservative top-down influx of information over the CL object during the referendum campaign which raises the salience of conflicts against the object in the political arena (due to the presence of the *right-wing government* condition) might increase the unpopularity of CL propositions in the context of direct democracy.

According to path 3, the presence of *strong populist parties* (POP) that campaign against a *popular initiative opposed by the government* (INI) on *single-issue referendum* (~MULT) is sufficient for the referendum failure. In a similar way to path 2, in this path the core factor is the presence of a popular initiated referendum opposed by the government as demonstrated by the parsimonious solution. The other two peripheral factors can be interpreted as elements that increase the salience of the CL object amongst the voters. Indeed, the condition *single-issue referendum* might help to raise the salience of the unpopularity of the CL object and the condition *strong populist parties* might activate xenophobic attitudes amongst the voters, which would have an effect on their preference during the ballot.

#### 15.4.2.2) Redundant conditions in fsQCA's intermediate solution for the referendum failure outcome

According to the parsimonious solution, paths 2 and 3 can be minimized and reduced to one single condition: the condition *popular initiative opposed by the government* (INI).

It is important to pointed out that all the cases covered by the solution formulas refers to Swiss cases. In the specific context of Switzerland, popular initiatives can be held only on single objects. Basically, the *single-issue referendum* (~MULT) condition is nested into the *popular initiatives opposed by the government* (INI) condition. The condition ~MULT is therefore redundant because it is part of the definitional component of condition INI.

The condition *right-wing government* (~LEFT) expresses the opposition of the right-wing government to the popular initiative.

At this stage, it is not possible to know whether condition the  $\sim$ LEFT has a causal role with the condition INI. In relation to this, we can potentially assume two scenarios: 1) in the circumstance that condition  $\sim$ LEFT has a causal role, we should expect evidence on active participation of the government in the referendum campaign through conservative propaganda that highlights possible negative aspects of the CL reform as pointed out by the theoretical accounts on condition  $\sim$ LEFT; and 2) in the circumstance that condition  $\sim$ LEFT results to be redundant, we expect that the government will campaign against the referendum only because the referendum has been popularly initiated. In this case, government action is already nested in the operationalization of condition INI<sup>31</sup>. Therefore, the government would not be the source of a top-down influx of conservative views about the CL object neither the factor that increase the conflicts between political actors during the referendum campaign.

These two scenarios can also be applied to the condition of *strong populist parties* (POP). Indeed, in order for the condition POP to be considered causally redundant, strong populist parties should not actively campaign through xenophobic arguments against the popular initiative but their campaign against the popular vote should keep with the government's arguments. If this is the case, it would be assumed that the presence of condition INI would be sufficient by itself to produce the outcome of interest. Basically, this signifies that the presence itself of a popular initiative opposed by the government provide sufficient causal power to make a CL bill unpopular amongst the voters. Meanwhile, in the circumstance that the campaign of the populist parties follows a xenophobic agenda as set out by the theoretical accounts of condition POP, these parties will mostly likely be a factor that helps raise the salience of the CL object's unpopularity and raise the level of conflict in the direct democratic arena.

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<sup>31</sup> The condition INI is composed by two attributes: 1) being a popular initiated referendum; 2) being opposed by the government. The first attribute is a definitional attribute, while the second attribute activates or deactivates the condition inside the specific causal context of CL related referendum. Basically, the INI condition is present only whenever the government itself opposes the popular initiative.

*15.4.2.3) Cases covered by the solution formula*

In order to find evidence of our considerations, we briefly discussed cases covered by the intermediate solution formula.

*Table 36: Cases covered by the intermediate solution*

SOLUTION FORMULA	CASES NON-UNIQUELY COVERED	CASES UNIQUELY COVERED
1 ~LEFT*POP*~MULT*ELIT E		CHBE94.2; CHGE01; CHSH01; CH94; CH04.1; CH04.2
2 ~LEFT *INI*~MULT	CHVD92, CHZH93, CHBE94.1, CHBS94, CHAG96, CHFR97, CHSO97, CHGL10, CHVD11, CHLU11, CHZH13, CHSH14	CHGE93.1, CHGE93.2, CHUR95
3 POP*INI*~MULT	CHVD92, CHZH93, CHBE94.1; CHBS94, CHAG96, CHFR97, CHSO97, CHGL10, CHVD11, CHLU11, CHZH13, CHSH14	CHNE07.1, CHBS10.1, CHBE10,
<b>Cases not covered by the solution formula</b> USANM02; USAFL08; L15		

Given the high number of cases covered by the solution paths, we decided to select our cases in relation to the assumptions made above on the possible existence of redundant conditions. Cases of path 1 will all be discussed during the discussion on the parsimonious solution. Path 2 and path 3 display cases that appear in both paths and cases that are uniquely covered. In principle, the QCA literature suggests to only select uniquely covered cases (Schneider and Rohlfing: 2014) because these types of cases can be explained by one single (and therefore unique) conjunction of conditions. Essentially, there cannot be other explanations for the case's outcome (Schneider and Rohlfing 2014). In contrast, cases covered by more than one path can be explained from different angles or by a single dominant configuration. This is not an error of interpretation of our configuration but is instead linked to a specific QCA understanding of causal relationships built not on causal mechanisms, but on the counterfactual causal relationship of necessity and sufficiency.

However, in the light of the assumptions addressed above on the possible existence of redundant conditions, we decided to include in the discussion some cases that were non-uniquely covered. This decision will allow us to determine whether the conditions *right-wing government* and *strong populist*

*parties* are causally redundant or whether they play a role in referendum failure. The second advantage to analysing non-uniquely covered cases is to identify which solution path is dominant.

We decided to analyse cases for which data is the most accessible.

Finally, we will avoid discussion of the single-issue referendum because we already provide evidence of the redundancy of such condition. Indeed, in relation to paths 2 and 3, we have already established that this condition is causally redundant because is a constitutive part of the popular initiative's concept.

Therefore, we will only discuss the causal power of this condition in relation to path 1, where it appears as INUS condition of the parsimonious solution formula.

*A) Path 2: a rightist government that opposes a single-issue popular initiative*

*(~LEFT\*~MULT\*INI)*

In configuration 2, voters accept the government's proposition. None of the uniquely covered cases involved a campaign that used xenophobic or anti-immigrant arguments. The government ran a campaign primarily focused on small-step policies toward CL, and therefore opposed the popular initiative because it was considered too radical to have chance to pass by popular vote. This interpretation is corroborated by each uniquely covered case of path 2.

Indeed, in the cases of Geneva 1993 (CHGE93.2) and (CHGE93.2), the government was in principle in favour of CL policies, but became so through a gradual political change and not through a radical political change as proposed by the opposition.<sup>32</sup> In Uri (CHUR95), the government provided similar arguments in opposition the popular initiative (SDA/ATS 1995).

In each case, the action of the right-wing government was not motivated by the CL object itself but by the fact that the popular initiative was promoted by the leftist opposition (in Geneva the Socialist

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<sup>32</sup> [https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting\\_brochure\\_ge\\_1993\\_11\\_28.pdf](https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting_brochure_ge_1993_11_28.pdf); [https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting\\_brochure\\_ge\\_1993\\_06\\_06.pdf](https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting_brochure_ge_1993_06_06.pdf)

Party, the Workers Party, and the Green Party; in Uri the youth section of the Socialist Party and the cantonal section of the Green Party). In the light of such concerns, the right-wing government condition cannot be considered as a core agency factor that mobilized anti-immigrant sentiments or conservative views on citizens' rights amongst the population; neither can the government's political campaign be considered an additive element that helped to raise the unpopularity of the CL issue amongst voters. The opposition was simply part of the government's deliberative process in respect to the popular initiative and the popular initiative's promoters. As pointed out above, this aspect is already considered in the operationalization of the condition INI.

*B) The dominant path*

One solution path is dominant over another whenever its conditions' causal explanation explains the outcome of cases that are in common (the non-uniquely covered cases). Non-uniquely covered cases of paths 2 and 3 refers to cases in which the condition  $\sim$ LEFT of path 2 appears together with the condition POP of path 3. Basically, in these cases the popular initiative (INI) is opposed by strong populist parties (POP) and by the right-wing government ( $\sim$ LEFT)

The observations made in relation to the uniquely covered cases of path 2 indicate that the right-wing governments did not campaign against the CL object by using conservative or anti-CL arguments during the popular initiative propaganda; they were instead opposing the popular vote only because it had been popularly initiated by the opposition. In this path, the causal power of the condition *right-wing government* is already integrated in the operationalization of condition *popular initiated referendum opposed by the government*. Essentially, the condition  $\sim$ LEFT is a component of condition INI, and condition INI is sufficient by itself for the popular vote failure.

In the case that path 2 is dominant over path 3, we expect to address the same conclusions, or that the condition INI is itself sufficient for the outcome of CL reform failure. This expectation implies that the conditions  $\sim$ LEFT and POP result to be redundant. Essentially, in this case we expect that the

right-wing government and the populist parties oppose the popular initiative without using anti-CL arguments.

In contrast, path 3 would be dominant over path 2 in the circumstance that non-uniquely covered cases are explained by path 3's specific causal pattern in which the populist parties are not a redundant element for the outcome.

*C) Path 3: a strong populist party that opposes a single issue popular initiative  
(~LEFT\*~MULT\*INI)*

According to configuration 3, the popular initiative together with the populist parties are the elements that leads to the failure of CL policy.

The analysis of path 3 will follow three separate steps. First, we provide general circumstantial observations on cases covered by path 3. Second, we analyse uniquely covered cases in order to determine whether or not path 3 produces a specific causal pattern. Third, we proceed to the analysis of non-uniquely covered cases in order to observe which causal pattern is dominant between path 2 and path 3.

C.1) Circumstantial observations of path 3

As previously pointed out, in the specific Swiss cantonal context each government is formed by a multi-party coalition. In this contextual circumstance, it is common to have strong far-right populist parties that have seats in coalition governments together with other traditional (left- or right-wing) parties. Therefore, the condition POP can either be inserted into the government or simply be a strong opposing party.

*Table 37: path 3's case with populists in the government and cases with populists outside the government*

<b>Path 3</b>	<b>Populists in the Government</b>	<b>Populists not in the government</b>
<b>Uniquely covered cases</b>	CHBE10	CHNE07.1; CBS10.01
<b>Non-uniquely covered cases</b>	CHVD92; CHZH93, CHBE94.1; CHVD11; CHZH13; CHSH14;	CHBS94; CHFR97; CHSO97; CHGL10; CHLU11

In our cases' examination, we will refer to cases in which the populist parties are in the government and cases in which populist parties are outside the government. Due to the high number of cases, we have decided to only refer to cases for which data is easily accessible.

### C.2) The uniquely covered cases

The uniquely covered cases refer to circumstances in which the strong far right populist parties both participate in the government (i.e., Bern 2010) and are in the opposition (i.e., Basel 2010 and Neuchâtel 2007). Therefore, the causal relationships of condition POP with the outcome might differ depending on whether the populist parties are in the government (i.e. the case of Bern 2010) or not (the cases of Basel 2010 and Neuchâtel 2007).

In Bern (CHBE10), the opinion of populist party SVP on the initiative is moderate and is not discernible from the government opinion on the popular initiative. The popular initiative campaign against the referendum was run by a single committee composed by the SVP, the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP), the Federal Democratic Union (EDU) and FDP, which proposed a unifying strategy of propaganda (Wyler 2010). SVP, together with the right-wing parties in the government, argued that the extending voting rights to foreigners should not be a tool of integration but a consequence of the integration process (Guggisberg, 2010). Indeed, naturalization was considered the only official tool to guarantee that a person was integrated and that s/he can understand the society and the language where s/he lives. According to the SVP (and the inter-parties committee),

naturalization is the only tool that would allow the foreigner to have the right instruments to make decisions during the vote (Fuchs, 2010). Finally, the same committee argued that voting rights are strictly linked to the duties of being citizens, such as compulsory army service (Lachat, 2010)

Meanwhile in Basel (CHBS10.1) and also in Neuchâtel (CHNE07.1), the populist party was an additional actor to the government action in opposing the popular initiative. For example, in the case of Basel, the SVP's arguments were based on strong xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments; the group used street posters with figures of women wearing burqas, a young black man with sunglasses, and a suspicious-looking Arabic man in front of the ballot box with the cantonal flag (Weber 2010). (cfr. annex 4)

The observations made in relation to these two cases seem to indicate that strong far-right populist parties take a moderate position whenever they are in the government, but tend to actively participate in the debate against CL whenever they are not part of the government. Therefore, on the one hand, such as in the case of Bern, the condition POP would result in being redundant to the outcome because its referendum's campaign coincides with the government campaign. In such circumstances, the POP causal inference is indistinguishable from the condition INI causal inference. Essentially, the causal power of the condition *strong populist parties* is integrated and already operationalized by the condition *popular initiated referendum opposed by the government* (as in path 2) and therefore is causally redundant. In the other hand, as in the case of Basel Stadt, the condition POP stands alone as a proper INUS condition. Indeed, in CHBS10.1, the populist party ran an aggressive referendum campaign against CL through the use of xenophobic and anti-immigration rhetoric. This type of campaign serves as an additional mobilizing element, together with the opposition of the government to the popular initiative, that influences the outcome of popular vote failure.



### C.3) Non-uniquely covered cases

In order to corroborate the findings of the uniquely covered cases, we decided to examine the non-uniquely covered cases with the most accessible data. Specifically, we will examine the cases of Vaud 1992 (CHVD92), Zurich 2013 (CHZH13), and Solothurn 1997 (CHSO97).

In Vaud (CHVD92), the SVP had a seat in the cantonal government. The popular initiative was opposed by both the government (including the Socialist party) and by the SVP. The government estimated that the initiative was too radical and therefore not practicable. However, they considered the principle of extending political rights to foreigners in a positive manner (SDA/ATS 1992). In CHVD92, the SVP did not actively run any campaign against the popular initiative, but it addressed conjunct statements with other political parties at the government. This case seems to corroborate the finding of the uniquely covered case of Bern 2010, in which the condition POP is ultimately redundant in the outcome result when the populist party is in the government.

The case of Zurich 2013 (CHZH13), however, provides a different interpretation of the role of condition POP, despite the case's similar contextual circumstances to CHVD02. As observed in CHVD92, in CHZH13 the SVP was in the government, but in contrast to CHVD02 the group ran an aggressive and xenophobic propaganda campaign against the CL object which substantially differed in content from the official government position. In this respect, the government opposed the popular initiative only because it considered the timing too "early" to implement such type of reform;<sup>33</sup> meanwhile, the SVP opposed extending voting rights to foreigners because it was considered a danger to the Swiss democracy (Meier: 2013) and a "socialist political strategy" to increase left-wing consensus, given that all foreigners were considered "leftists" (Boller 2013). In this case, it seems plausible that the populist party played an idiosyncratic role in the failure of the referendum despite the SVP being in the government. The SVP's propaganda was not aligned with the government

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<sup>33</sup> [https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting\\_brochure\\_bs\\_1994\\_06\\_12.pdf](https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting_brochure_bs_1994_06_12.pdf); [https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting\\_brochure\\_ag\\_1996\\_03\\_10.pdf](https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting_brochure_ag_1996_03_10.pdf)  
[https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting\\_brochure\\_zh\\_2013\\_09\\_22.pdf](https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting_brochure_zh_2013_09_22.pdf)

propaganda but was instead centred on anti-immigrant rhetoric, which according to Howard would mobilize pre-existent xenophobic sentiments amongst the population.

Finally, in the case of Solothurn (CHSO97), strong populist parties were not in the government. In Solothurn the government considered naturalization the preferred tool of integration for foreigners and hoped to ease naturalization procedures instead of providing political rights to foreigners (SDA/ATS 1997). This argumentation was shared by the SVP that was not in the government. This case contradicts the findings of CHBS10.1; indeed, despite the SVP's lack of involvement the government, its propaganda coincides with the government and therefore its action would be redundant for our outcome of interest.

In summary, as highlighted by table 38, we can state that all these cases display a certain degree of ambiguity in interpreting the condition *strong populist party* as causally relevant or causally redundant, regardless of whether the populist parties are in the government.

*Table 38: condition POP redundant or relevant*

	<b>POP causally redundant</b>	<b>POP causally relevant</b>
<b>SVP in the government</b>	CHBE10; CHVD02	CHZH13
<b>SVP not in the government</b>	CHSO97	CHBS10.1

Essentially, the role of condition POP as causal element of the solution formula is not clear. Consequently, is not clear whether path 2 is dominant over path 3 or vice-versa.

#### C.4) Path 3 conclusive remarks

The examination of specific cases highlights the fact that the condition POP is not uniformly causally related to the outcome. The fact that in certain cases covered by the solution formula the condition POP is causally relevant and in other it is causally redundant indicates that the solution formula does not provide a full satisfactory understanding of the phenomenon under our investigation. Essentially, from a set theoretic perspective, this ambiguity is not acceptable because the condition POP appears

to be an INUS condition over certain cases, but not in other cases. Therefore, POP should be considered a redundant condition because statements of sufficiency are not fulfilled with the intermediate solution formula.

The ambiguity on the causal relationship between condition POP and the outcome leads us to corroborate the choice of considering the parsimonious solution as the most adequate casual explanation for the outcome of referendum failure. Indeed, statements of sufficiency are only fulfilled with the parsimonious solution, because POP can be removed without influencing the relationship of sufficiency. In essence, condition POP is redundant in relation to statements of casualty between condition INI and outcome “referendum failure”.

#### 15.4.2.4) Causal interpretation on the CL failure parsimonious solution

The parsimonious solution formula displays two different paths.

*A) Path 1: strong populist parties that oppose a single-policy popular vote promoted by a divided rightist government (POP\*~MULT \*~ELITE\*~LEFT)*

Path 1 does not present any causally redundant condition, given that it appears exactly how it is in both the intermediate and the parsimonious solution. In path 1, voters opposed the proposition supported by the government. In this path, we can individuate two conditions coming from CL literature and two conditions coming from the general literature on direct democracy. At this stage, we can address two assumptions in relation to the causal role of INUS conditions in path 1:

- i) First assumption: the specific Swiss context of a multi-party coalition government can explain a possible trade-off between the split right-wing government (~LEFT\*~ELITE) and the presence of strong populist parties (POP). Indeed, in Switzerland it is common to have populist parties at the government together with traditional left-wing and right-wing parties. Considering this contextual circumstance, the conjunction of condition ~LEFT

\*~ELITE\*POP can be interpreted as “a right-wing government in which the populist party at the government opposes the referendum”.

- ii) Second assumption: the trade-off between conditions might have a complementary explanation in which each condition has a causal role. According to Joppke (2008: 166), strong populist parties are catalysts for a right-wing government’s opposition to CL. Basically, Joppke states that the populist parties would be the source of the government’s ambiguous position in relation to the referendum. The single-policy referendum would be the ideal context for the populist party to run an anti-immigrant propaganda campaign against CL (POP\*~MULT). These two conditions might trigger the split right-wing government (~LEFT \*~ELITE).

In both assumptions the conjunction of condition *strong populist parties* (POP) and *Single-issue referendum* (~MULT) might be the source of negative messages towards the CL object which increase the unpopularity of objects put into referendum; meanwhile, the presence of a *right-wing split elite* (~LEFT\*~ELITE) might be the source of a weak and fragmented top-down propaganda in favour of the referendum object. Essentially, these four factors together indicate that on the one hand the high salience of the single-policy object and the populist campaign raise the unpopularity of CL object amongst the population, while on the other hand the ambivalent campaign of the split government is unable to provide positive information on CL object.

### *B) Cases covered by path 1 of the parsimonious formula*

We decided to discuss path 1’s cases in order to understand which assumption on the causal role of each INUS condition is met. Each case covered by configuration 1 is uniquely covered.

As presented in table 39, the cases covered by the solution formula refer to the same geographical area (Switzerland) but are divided into two subgroups of referendums with different jurisdictional

levels (cantonal and national) and different topics (extension of aliens' political rights and naturalization procedure facilitation).

*Table 39: cases covered by path 1*

	<b>Cantonal</b>	<b>National</b>
<b>Political rights policy</b>	CHBE94.2; CHGE01; CHSH01;	
<b>Naturalization policy</b>		CH94; CH04.1; CH04.2

Given the relatively high number of cases, we focus our attention on cases that have the most accessible data by considering different jurisdictional levels and topics. Specifically, for the first group we will examine the cases of Bern. 1994 (CHBE94.2) and Schaffhausen 2001 (CHSH01); meanwhile, for the second group we look at two Swiss cases 2004 (CH04.1 and CH04.2).

#### B.1) First group of cases: subnational level

The case of CHBE94.2 refers to a government counterproposal to the popular initiative CHBE94.1, which was voted on the same day in Parliament and in the ballot. In the counterproposal, CL issues were actively debated during the referendum campaign. Evidence exists that the right-wing populist parties used anti-foreigner arguments, which indicates a causal role of condition POP. Indeed, during the campaign, the SVP raised the issue of defending social and national cohesion against the "Zweiklassengesellschaft," (double-class society) between the Swiss and foreigners (SDA/ATS: 1994); they also highlighted the risk to Switzerland of losing of cultural homogeneity in institutions due to foreigners' inability to properly speak the Swiss German dialect.<sup>34</sup> The SVP's positions influenced government right-wing parties during the referendum campaign. Indeed, in the middle of the campaign, the FDP suddenly decided to oppose the counterproposal (Kiefer 1994, Van Liniger

<sup>34</sup> [https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting\\_brochure\\_be\\_1994\\_12\\_04.pdf](https://www.c2d.ch/files/voting_brochure_be_1994_12_04.pdf) (voting brochure)

1994). The FDP's decision came only after they had already shown support for the counterproposal both in Parliament and at the beginning of the referendum campaign.

The referendum held in Schaffhausen (CHSH01) was a variant of the total constitutional revision also voted on the same day by FDP. During the parliamentary debate, the FDP favoured the extension of political right to foreigners, but subsequently followed the SVP in the political campaign against the referendum (SDA/ATS 2000).

These observable implications corroborate the second assumption pointed out above. As highlighted by the second assumption, there is a direct trade-off between the presence of strong populist parties and the single-policy referendum (POP\*~MULT) and the split right-wing government (~LEFT \*~ELITE). The high salience of CL is determined by the fact the referendum is designed as a single-policy referendum (~MULT), which provides the structures for latent xenophobic sentiments among the population to be easily activated by populist parties (POP). Then, the action of the populist parties (POP) against the CL object triggers the causal process that leads the right-wing government to split over the issue (~LEFT \*~ELITE). Essentially the POP condition will raise the conflicts between different political actors inside the direct democratic arena.

The populists and the fragmented elite have a direct role in the referendum failure, the populist party through their anti-CL propaganda and the split government through their fragmented and weak propaganda in favour of CL.

## B.2) Second group of cases: national level

The cases of CH04.1 and CH04.2 refer to two government propositions to facilitate naturalization access for second- and third generation foreigners, respectively. The government separated the issues into two distinctive referendums voted on the same date of 26 September 2004. Every party at the government, with the exception of right-wing populist party SVP, supported the two referendums. In relation to this referendum, the SVP ran an aggressive xenophobic propaganda campaign by using

posters which depicted several hands in the intent to grab a pile of Swiss passports from a box, or posters that featured a woman wearing Burqa or the shape of an Arabic-looking man holding a Kalashnikov with hostile slogans such as “Massen-Einbürgerung?”, “Unkontrolliert einbürgern?”, or “Islamisten mit Schweizer Pass?” [“Mass naturalization?”; “Naturalization without control?”; “Islamists with Swiss Passport?”]. (cfr. annex 4).

The SVP also played an important role in weakening the government’s messages during the referendum campaign as part of the government through the SVP’s federal council member Christoph Blocher. Blocher, as chief of the Federal Department of Justice and Police, was also the person in charge of addressing the government’s official messages on the referendum object. However, despite his government role, he acted as an SVP politician by opposing the government’s view amongst his party members (Areal and Szalay: 2004; Schürch 2004) and by keeping a distant and cold position when he was required to step into the shoes of a member of government. Indeed, during the official press conference and official allocution, instead of defending the government position in favour of the two objects, he improperly behaved by merely explaining the content of the object without showing interest in defending the naturalization process (RSI archives: ID A659832; A1105942; A1082017; A10287). During the government campaign, Blocher never expressed any positive appreciation in favour of the two bills; nor did he defend the referendum object as enforced by the Swiss government’s political concordance rule (Van Foppa 2004). Basically, political concordance rule broke the political rule of collegiality and expressed negative appreciation towards two bills that he should have defended as member of the Federal Council; such behaviour was deeply criticized by other members of the Federal government and parliament (RSI archives: A10431, A10420)

The Swiss cases fit in the first assumption identified in the chapter above. Indeed, as highlighted in the first assumption, the division of the right-wing government (~LEFT \*~ELITE) was determined by the presence of strong populist parties’ seats inside the government (POP). In other words, the

government was divided because the populist members that sat in the government opposed the referendums.

The condition POP provides strong messages against the referendum object through aggressive xenophobic rhetoric, while at the same time the government division was the source of weak messages in favour of the referendum object. In these cases, the condition POP is directly the source of strong messages against the referendum object and also the direct source of the government weak messages through the action of the populist minister of justice and police Christoph Blocher. In summary, the trade-off relationship between conditions is different amongst cases covered by this solution formula despite the causal path is identical.

In the cases of CH04.1 and CH04.2, condition POP does not have a causal role in triggering government division as has been observed in cases CHBE94.2 and CHSH01, but is the direct source of government division through Christoph Blocher's actions. Essentially, in CH04.1 and CH04.2, the condition POP is directly responsible for weak government messages, and therefore the  $\sim$ LEFT\* $\sim$ ELITE's causal inference on the outcome is only possible in conjunction with the condition POP. Meanwhile, in CHBE94.2 and CHSH01, the conjunction of conditions  $\sim$ LEFT\* $\sim$ ELITE is triggered by the condition POP, but the condition POP is not directly involved in the right-wing government division causal role of providing weak messages.

*C) Path 2: a popular initiative is sufficient for a popular vote to fail (INI)*

Path 2 has been largely discussed above and displays the sole INI conditions as sufficient for the failure of CL policies. The conditions that only appear in the intermediate solutions are redundant for the following three reasons:

- 1) The condition *single issue referendum* ( $\sim$ MULT) is a component of the sufficient condition INI in the specific Swiss context;



- 2) As observed by cases examination, the condition *right-wing government* ( $\sim$ LEFT) is causally not relevant;
- 3) The condition *strong populist party* (POP) is either redundant or relevant depending on the cases' specific circumstances. From a set-theoretic perspective, this condition is not sufficient given that it only explains part of cases that it covers.

*D) Final remarks on the CL failure parsimonious solution*

The parsimonious solution provides some insight into the causally relevant conditions that lead to the failure of referendums on CL.

In relation to path 1, we can address the following conclusive points.:

- 1) Path 1 has a quite complex configuration of conditions, in contrast to our theoretical expectations which assumed that single conditions alone should be sufficient for referendum failure. The complexity of the path is due to the presence of a causal chain and a causal conjunction. Causal chains are produced whenever conditions work in a sequential order over an extended period of time, while causal conjunctions are conditions which work together in a specific situation (Blatter 2012: 13). From examining the cases it is possible to determine in which cases a temporal order of conditions exists and in which cases conditions work together. In the cases explained by a causal chain, the condition *single-issue referendum* ( $\sim$ MULT) provides the contextual circumstances for other conditions to be activated. In such a context the condition *strong populist parties* (POP) triggers the division of the *right-wing government* ( $\sim$ LEFT\* $\sim$ ELITE) over the issue. Meanwhile, in the cases explained by a causal conjunction, the condition POP is the direct source of the right-wing government's division ( $\sim$ LEFT\* $\sim$ ELITE).
- 2) The examination of cases reveals which conditions are directly linked to referendum failure. In this respect we can consider the elite division and the populist party as the factors that are

temporally close to the outcome of referendum failure. Indeed, the split elite propaganda and the populist anti-CL propaganda together provide on the one hand weak messages in favour to the CL object, and on the other hand strong messages against the CL object; together these messages lead to the referendum's failure.

- 3) The condition POP has a double role. It works together with other conditions in an interactive way by triggering the government elite split, and is an additive factor to the fragmented elite propaganda that leads to the referendum's failure. The presence of condition POP raise the level of conflict between inside the government during the referendum propaganda. Indeed it provokes the elite division and deprives the government of the necessary resource to influence voters' preferences on the issue through a strong one-side influx of information.

In relation to path 2 of the parsimonious solution, which considered the condition *popular initiative opposed by the government* (INI) to be sufficient alone for the votes' failure and which confirms our expectations, we can learn the following three points:

- 1) This path confirms our expectation of a relatively non-complex solution formula in relation to the outcome *referendum failure* (~OUT) due to the many hurdles of direct democracy that are translated into a single sufficient condition that leads to the outcome. It is sufficient to have the sole INI condition for a CL referendum to be unsuccessful.
- 2) The complex ontology of condition INI refers to two causal explanations of the referendum failure. The first is related to the opposition of the government and the second to the fact that popular initiatives are formulated as single-issue policies. The causal process that leads to referendum failure is therefore linked to the presence of these two causal processes. These two causal processes are directly linked to the high level of conflict inside the direct democratic arena and the vetoing power of voters in relation to unpopular object.
- 3) In more details, the INI condition is by itself sufficient for the failure of the referendum because the characteristics of the debate in the direct democratic arena do not provide room

for representative democratic actors to debate alternatives or compromises, or to reach consensus over the object. The popular initiative is de facto a more divisive way to propose object in the direct democratic arena than the mandatory or counterproposal referendum. This divisiveness occurs because the promoters of popular initiatives do not usually engage in negotiating consensus with the political elite, even though the government itself might be open to or in favour of the principle of the object; instead they decide to put the object as it is in a popular vote. In a popular initiative the support for the object is usually limited to the popular initiative's promoters, which implies a great opposition from the government and other political actors. Basically, popular initiatives provide little to no room for deliberation amongst the political actors involved. In contrast, the counterproposal or mandatory referendums are usually subject to a legislative deliberative process in which the political actors' conflicts are reduced; in such circumstances, the majority of the parliament usually must agree on the object to be put into referendum. The object put into referendum in this manner would receive broader support than in the popular initiative.

## **Conclusions**

This study provides methodological and empirical contributions, which are summarized and situated in the general academic debate below.

### **Major methodological contribution to set-theoretic analysis**

When we started this thesis, we did not have any methodological aspirations to contribute to the set-theoretic analysis debate. The research on the methodological field was primarily motivated by the requirements of this research and by the incomplete answers provided by the fsQCA literature in relation to such requirements.

#### *Fuzzy multiple attributes condition*

The first methodological contribution is linked to the transformation of concepts into fuzzy numbers. During the conceptualization and calibration processes, we developed complex conditions often built on complex linguistic elements. In this phase of our thesis, we realized that all over the QCA literature there were no complete answers on how to operationalize complex concepts into fuzzy numbers. Specifically, there were no responses in relation to the fuzzification of complex concepts, and on the process of transformation of linguistic elements into numeric scores. The existent literature on concept fuzzification is limited to the general suggestions on calibration made by Ragin (2008: 71-108), Schneider and Wageman (2012: 38-41), and Basurto and Speer (2012), or the approximate attempts made on concept formation in fuzzy logic made by Quaranta (2013) and Goertz (2006). However, none of the calibration or aggregation techniques proposed by QCA scholars provided responses on how to handle condition based on complex concepts and on how to deal with complex typologies of hedges, such as linguistic hedges and qualitative and quantitative hedges. In order to overtake this obstacle, we developed the idea of the fuzzy multiple attributes condition (FMAC), which refers to conditions built with different attributes. FMAC has several advantages, amongst which we can mention i) its flexibility towards different types of concepts, such as classic concepts

(Sartori: 1970), family resemblance concepts (Wittgenstein 1968), and radial category concepts (Collier and Mahon 1993); ii) its solidity in the representation of concept in fuzzy numbers considering natural language and set-logical thinking; and iii) its malleability in dealing with causal heterogeneity and empirical uncertainty. In relation to our research, the FMAC allowed us to operationalise complex conditions such as condition *left-wing/right-wing government* (LEFT/~LEFT) and *strong far-right populist parties* (POP/~POP). The use of FMAC also provided the appropriate context for robust findings, because conditions built on coherent theoretical knowledge and empirical data allow one to identify theoretical coherent causal configurations over empirical cases from different contextual extractions. FMAC conditions are malleable enough to deal with causal heterogeneity and empirical uncertainty, allowing us to identify, through the fsQCA analysis, homogeneous causal patterns across different group of cases. To a certain extent, the ontological complexity of our conditions allows us to generate intelligible understandings of our causal paths and make sense of our solution formulas.

FMAC has also been introduced into QCA's literature thanks to an article that appeared in *Sociological Methods & Research* (Veri 2017), and it has been developed in relation to empirical uncertainty in a working paper presented at the ECPR general conference 2018 and is currently under review in a top tier methodological journal (Veri 2018a).

### New coverage

The second methodological contribution is linked to the parameter of coverage, or the parameter of fit that measures empirical relevance. Behind this methodological finding, there was an urge to make the concept of empirical relevance more intelligible and straightforward. After our first fsQCA analysis, we observed relatively low coverage scores. The worry was that we would not have enough empirical evidence that supported our findings. We then decided to explore whether such low scores were intrinsic to the coverage measure proposed by Ragin. We analysed Ragin's coverage formula in

order to understand exactly what the formula calculates. In relation to this analysis, we realized that an underestimation of coverage occurs in circumstances where the outcome is dichotomous and has a crisp value (0,1) and the conditions are expressed by fuzzy membership as our condition design. Essentially, the coverage proposed by Ragin does not produce a standardized and readable score of empirical relevance in fsQCA solution formulas. We then developed a new coverage formula that refers to a complex ontology of empirical relevance which is expressed in fuzzy numbers and allows us to standardize a readable and comparable understanding of empirical relevance in fsQCA. The new coverage formula provides information on two distinctive levels of empirical relevance: i) the quantifiable dimension, and; ii) the qualitative dimension. The quantifiable dimension indicates how many cases have empirical relevance with respect to the population of cases that have a subset relation with the outcome. Meanwhile, the qualitative dimension determines the specific fuzzy relevance of the condition set with respect to the outcome set. In addition, this methodological contribution has been introduced into QCA literature through an article appearing in *Comparative Sociology* (Veri 2018b).

#### Contribution to the set-theoretic methods

These two contributions to the fsQCA represent major improvements to the field of the set-theoretic method in social sciences. They are two important tools that improve the quality of the analysis and the understanding of the results. Moreover, they provide a direct answer to criticisms offered by certain scholars regarding the fsQCA method.

Specifically, the FMAC approach is a valid answer to Lakoff's (2014) criticisms over the presumed rigidity of fuzzy logic in representing linguistic hedges. The FAMC and the innovative operators used in this thesis to aggregate FMAC's attributes demonstrate that fuzzy logic is a valid tool for representing concepts and transforming linguistic hedges into fuzzy sets. In such respect, FMAC opposes Lakoff's understanding of the fuzzy logic that unjustifiably ignored a range of operators that are able to capture conceptual combinations.

The new coverage formula is an additional measure which responds to the criticisms linked to the lack of empirical robustness of QCA results. Specifically, fsQCA has been recently criticized because of the presence of aggregation bias (Braumoeller 2015; Braumoeller 2017). According to Braumoeller (2017), in the analysis of sufficiency, the Boolean minimization automatically produced subset relationships. Basically, the aggregation bias produces false positive subset relationships despite the presence of random data. However, as recently discussed by Veri (2018c) the aggregation bias is not a problem that is intrinsically linked to the fsQCA method because it mainly produces ambivalent subset relationships between the solution's condition(s) and the outcome. The aggregation bias has a negative impact on fsQCA analysis only because Ragin's parameters of fit are not able to detect empirically relevant sets and theoretic subset relationships. In other words, the distribution of cases that result from automatic Boolean minimization is different from the distribution of cases that are produced by a theoretically meaningful subset relationship. Ragin's parameter of consistency and coverage are not able to detect whether a subset relationship is produced by chance or has a meaningful causal relationship. In relation to this shortcoming, the proposed parameter of coverage allows one to individuate the frequency of cases that are located in the diverse area of the XY plot and is therefore an instrument that allows the researcher to determine whether or not the sufficient solution formulas are the mechanical result of Boolean minimization.

### *Parsimonious solutions*

Cases examination confirms the validity of the parsimonious solution over the intermediate solution. The parsimonious solution's causal explanation is revealed to be more complete and more satisfying than the intermediate solution. However, despite our findings providing arguments in favour of the parsimonious solution, we do not make any general claims of the superiority of the parsimonious solution over the intermediate solution. This is because the reasons identified in our findings are only based on empirical context and not on theoretical or methodological context.

In our study, we identified at least four reasons for the redundancy of intermediate solution conditions in the parsimonious solution.

The first reason comes whenever the intermediate condition is operationalized into the parsimonious solution. In certain circumstances, the condition that appears in the intermediate solution is redundant because it is already operationalized by conditions that appear in the parsimonious solution. This is the example of the condition *non-popular initiated referendum* ( $\sim$ INI), which is a definitional component of the condition *multiple-issue referendum* (MULT) or condition *single-issue referendum* ( $\sim$ MULT) which is part of condition *popular initiative opposed by the government* (INI).

The second reason occurs whenever the intermediate condition's causal power is neutralized by another condition that appears in the parsimonious solution. This is the case of the condition *elite cohesion* (ELITE), which became redundant in the presence of the condition *multiple-issue referendum* (MULT), given that it is not necessary have a strong one-sided influx of information over an unpopular issue whenever the issue is not debated during the referendum campaign.

The third reason arises whenever the intermediate condition causal power is nested in the parsimonious solution term. This was the case of the condition *right-wing government* ( $\sim$ LEFT), which in the presence of *popular initiatives opposed by the government* (INI) became redundant. As demonstrated by our cases, right-wing governments do not actively campaign against the objects but against the fact the objects were put into a popular initiated referendum; through the attribute *government opposition to the popular initiative*, condition INI has already covered this role of right-wing government.

The fourth reason is found whenever there is ambiguous evidence on the causal power of the intermediate solution condition. This is the case of the condition *strong populist party* (POP), whose causal power appeared to be relevant only in a limited population of cases covered by the solution formula.



## **Key Empirical finding**

The main goal of this thesis was to understand under which combination of conditions are the attempts to extend citizenship rights by popular vote successful or unsuccessful. This question assumed that the direct democratic arena is a particularly hostile environment for citizenship rights extension due to the role of population as a veto player and the higher level of conflicts between the various democratic actors that participate in the political debate. The fsQCA analysis provided the solution to this question and identified distinctive and asymmetric causal paths for the success and failure, respectively, of CL reforms in the context of direct democracy.

### *The success of CL reform in the direct democratic arena*

The fsQCA analysis generated one sole sufficient causal path that leads to the success of referendum. According to this causal path, a *multiple-issue referendum* is sufficient for the referendum on CL to succeed. No other sufficient path or necessary condition exist.

In general, the sufficient solution term of *multiple-issue referendum* indicates that both hurdles of direct democracy, i.e., the role of the population as veto player and the presence of a high level of conflict amongst actors, must be overtaken for a referendum to be successful. Specifically, whenever the conflict amongst political actors is reduced, the competing interpretation of the issue at stake is also reduced. Basically, the divergences of the actors participating in the direct democratic arena over CL are reduced and hidden to the voters. This policy concealment deactivates the role of the population as a veto player over the issue.

From the solution formula of referendum success there are four observations to grasp:

First, the reduced extent of the solution formula of zero necessary conditions and one sole sufficient solution identified corroborates the assumption that the direct democracy is a hostile context for CL reform to be approved. Indeed, the absence of a necessary condition indicates that the outcome has

no clear-cut condition that occurs. Meanwhile, the presence of one sole sufficient path indicates that there is a limited and specific way for a referendum on CL issues to be accepted.

Second, the content of the sufficient path corroborates the success of the hidden strategy highlighted in our research hypothesis. The hidden strategy hypothesis has a pessimistic understanding of the electorate behaviour as a veto player. Indeed, it suggests that the sole explicit reference to a CL issue in the referendum question is enough for the population to act as a veto player towards the CL reform. In contrast to the open strategy that considered negative sentiments towards aliens latent, the hidden strategy considers that voters' negative attitudes towards aliens are already active and consequently there is no need of an agency factor, such as a populist party, to activate them.

Third, the solution term of *multiple-issue referendum* provides insight into the high level of conflict for CL reforms in the direct democratic arena. The conflicts between the various democratic actors that participate in the political debate are overtaken only by the presence of a multiple-issue referendum. As observed in the cases' analysis, *multiple-issue referendum* always refers to total constitutional revision. This types of revision are discussed in specific assemblies or parliamentary sessions that allow elite cohesion: this reduces the level of conflict between political actors during the referendum campaign. Essentially, total constitutional revision provide an additional deliberative space to the political actors that usually is inexistent in ordinary referendum question.

Fourth, conflict reduction in the direct democratic arena is only one component of CL object success. The other component is the deactivation pre-existent negative attitudes towards aliens amongst voters (voters veto power over the issue). The causal core that leads to the referendum's success is therefore strictly linked to the condition MULT itself. When the condition MULT appears, debates on CL are hidden from the population. Voters are not aware of the existence of CL reform, or when they are aware, such as in CHVD02 and CHFR04, they are required to prioritize their preferences across a range of different topics.

*The failure of CL reform in the direct democratic arena*

The fsQCA analysis generated one necessary condition and two sufficient causal paths that lead to the failure of referendum.

In general, the hurdles of direct democracy play a cardinal role in referendum failure. Specifically, whenever there are no attempts to reduce the conflicts amongst political actors (or if such conflicts are increased by a populist party), the competing interpretations of the issue at stake is also increased. In these circumstances, the pre-existent negative attitudes of the voters towards aliens find the ideal environment to be expressed in the popular vote.

From the solution formula of referendum success, four observations can be understood:

First, the necessary condition of *single-issue referendum* suggests that the sole explicit reference to a CL issue in the referendum question is necessary for the voters to activate their conservative attitude towards CL and therefore act as a veto player towards the referendum. This confirms the statements addressed above on the negative attitudes of the population towards the CL object itself.

Second, the necessary condition *single issue referendum* also provides the ideal context for increasing conflict amongst the actors involved in the direct democratic debate. Whenever the explicit question on CL reform is put up for a direct democratic debate, it is difficult to avoid an ideological conflict over the issue at stake. Essentially, political actors are facilitated by the context of the single referendum question to express their political views about CL during the referendum debate.


Third, the necessary condition is complemented by two sufficient paths. Both paths corroborate that CL reforms are opposed by the voters because of the high level of conflict inherent in the direct democratic arena. Indeed, in the first path, the conflict is inflated by the presence of populist parties and by a divided government; meanwhile, in the second path the conflict is high due to the absence of a deliberative arena (such as the parliament) which would allow compromises to be found between the popular vote promoters and other political actors; such deliberation could also increase support for the popular vote.

Fourth, the sufficient and necessary conditions corroborate the principle behind our hypothesis on CL failure, which considers the non-acceptance of a CL bill relatively easy due to the presence of the hurdles of the direct democratic arena. Indeed, the presence of the necessary condition *single-issue referendum* and the sufficient conditions activates the negative attitude of the population towards the reform and increases conflict amongst political actors.

### General empirical conclusion

The solutions terms for the success and the failure of the referendums on CL reform can be located at the conjunction of two axes: 1) the axis that determines the visibility of the object put into referendum; and 2) the axis that determines the level of conflict amongst political actors in the direct democratic arena. In other words, as highlighted by figure 16, each solution formula can be conceptualized by a graphical representation.

Figure 16: Solution formulas conceptualization



Owing to the unpopularity of CL objects put into referendum, the visibility of the object plays a central role. At the same time, the level of conflict between political actors involved in the direct democratic arena contributes to the referendum outcome. When the object is not visible to the voters and the level of conflict is reduced, the voters will accept the object; meanwhile, when the CL object is visible to the voters and the level of conflict is high, the voters will oppose the object and exert their veto power.

The condition MULT reduces the object's visibility and allows a low level of conflict, while the condition INI and the conjunction of conditions  $\sim$ LEFT\*POP\* $\sim$ MULT\* $\sim$ ELITE allow high object visibility and a high level of conflict. The necessary condition  $\sim$ MULT (highlighted in red) is located at the top of the X axis and at the end of the Y axis; this condition provides the necessary context for high level of CL visibility and the necessary context for a high level of conflict between political actors as pointed out above.

This conceptualization also provides an indication that conflicts and the nature of the object are mutually dependent in a direct democracy. Indeed, only the conjunction of these two axes produce the outcome of interest; condition(s) located along these two axes are not enough to produce the outcome of interest.

### **Limitations found in the thesis**

The limitations of this thesis are determined by the fsQCA methodology and the research design used that affected the interpretation of findings from our research. Specifically, it is possible to identify at least four points that clarify the limitations.

First, there are cases that remain unexplained because of the causal heterogeneity that establishes that a condition behaves differently in different contexts. In this respect, cases related to the collective citizenship framework remained unexplained by the conditions selected in this thesis because their specific context does not directly refer to the CL literature but to the EU literature.

Second, the fsQCA analysis usually produces solution formulas that rarely cover the whole population of cases analysed. As a result, there are cases that are not covered by the solution formulas. Specifically, in our thesis we identified a homogeneous causal pattern that only covers Swiss cases. The non-Swiss cases are not covered by any pattern and no sufficient configuration of conditions has been identified. Our general causal statements on CL in the context of direct democracy are therefore only valid for the Swiss context. The cases remaining uncovered are probably explained by other conditions that have not been considered in our research design. In order to identify such conditions, further specific case analysis should be conducted.

Third, the fsQCA analysis only produces causal static statements on sufficiency and necessity; it does not add inferential value by tracing how the combination of necessary and sufficient conditions affects the outcomes. In other words, the fsQCA analysis identifies sufficient and necessary conditions but not how these conditions interact to produce the outcome of interest. The temporary succession of conditions and the causal mechanisms that link the conditions together and lead to the outcome remain unexplained. In order to identify these causal processes, it is necessary to run a causal process tracing (CPT) analysis on specific cases covered by the solution formula (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 79-143). The CPT is a configurational technique that allows for theorization of the processes that link each condition together and identifies the temporal sequence between the conditions.

Fourth, the fsQCA analysis cannot be used whenever

the population of cases is especially low. In relation to our thesis, some subgroups of cases, i.e., the cases related to naturalization and those related to immigration policies, could not be analysed in an autonomous way because of the low number of cases.

Finally, the fsQCA analysis reveals statements of sufficiency and necessity with only the conditions available, implying that it might be possible to miss conditions that might not appear in the solution formula. In order to identify possible missing conditions, a further case analysis is needed. Specifically, it is suggested that both typical and deviant cases be examined; in these cases the same

solution path leads to different outcomes, which means that there are other intervening variables that have not been considered (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 209)

### **Recommendations for further research**

In this dissertation, we identified major methodological findings and interesting empirical results. These findings are also a starting point for other possible research trajectories from methodological and empirical perspectives.

### **Further methodological developments**

The methodological findings of this thesis allow for a more solid fsQCA analysis. However, the fsQCA still presents some limitations in relation to the strength of the results.

An important limitation, as pointed out above, is linked to the algorithmic minimization which mechanically produces sufficient subset relationships between the condition(s) and the outcome (Braumoeller 2017). The coverage measure presented in this thesis provides some tools against this type of aggregation bias; however, it does not provide a direct answer on the detection of meaningful subset relationships that are not subject to the aggregation bias. As previously discussed, the aggregation bias is a problem in fsQCA analysis because it produces false positive subset relationship results (Braumoeller 2017: 245) which Ragin's consistency measure cannot detect (Veri 2018c: 12). It would therefore be beneficial to develop a new parameter of consistency that is able to identify meaningful subset relationships between conditions and the outcome.

### **Further empirical developments**

In relation to the further empirical development we can suggest two potential types of studies. The first is linked to the limitations of fsQCA analysis highlighted above. Specifically, it would be interesting to operate a case study and comparative case study in order to seek correspondence

between the solution formula and specific cases covered by the formula, identify the causal processes that linked the conditions and the outcome together, and identify eventual missing conditions.

In relation to this approach, we can also suggest the use of the CPT technique to determine temporal sequences of necessary and sufficient conditions identified in the QCA and the causal mechanisms that tie each condition to the outcome.

The second possible development is linked to the content of the study. This research highlighted the fact that the direct democratic arena is not the ideal environment for CL reform due to the high level of conflict in the direct democratic decision-making process and the veto power exerted by the population when the CL object is visible. In the light of this finding, it would be interesting to examine whether the same happens with citizenship heavy reforms, and then compare those results with the results of this research. This would allow for a broad understanding of the conditions that lead to success and failure of citizenship reforms in the direct democratic arena and provide a better understanding of the hurdles of the direct democratic decision-making process for this type of reforms.

### **Concluding remarks**

We believe this thesis succeeds in bringing to the forefront the question of CL in the context of direct democracy and identifying the sufficient and necessary conditions for the success or failure of CL policy in the direct democratic context. We also believe that such results represent an important contribution to the field despite the limitations explained above.

More importantly, we hope this thesis provides a fresh perspective on citizenship studies and the fsQCA methodology and provides guidance for further empirical research and methodological discussion.



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## **ANNEX 1: CALIBRATION PROCEDURE DETAILS**

### *A) Outcome calibration (OUT, ~OUT)*

Our outcomes (OUT and ~OUT) are the result of the popular vote (Yes/No).

*Table 40: coding scheme crisp set OUT and ~OUT*

CRISP SCORE	OUTCOME	CONDITION ID
1	Yes	OUT
0	No	~OUT


Whenever the popular vote on a referendum or popular initiative is Yes, the calibration value will be 1, which means that the CL policies have succeeded. Meanwhile, whenever the vote is No, the calibration value will be 0, which means that the CL policy has failed.

### *B) Left wing government calibration (LEFT, ~LEFT)*

The condition left-wing (LEFT) versus right-wing (~LEFT) government has a fuzzy set membership.

The full membership of 1 coincides with the ideal typical left-wing government, while the full non-membership 0 coincides with the ideal type of right-wing government.

*Figure 17: Government ideology final fuzzy score*



As highlighted by figure 1, we decided to calibrate the ideology of the government in two steps: firstly, we calibrated each party by the government ideology fuzzy score; and secondly, we aggregated these scores considering the government's party composition.

### *B.1) Step 1; Political party ideological agenda*

Each government political party's ideological agenda is considered as a complex element composed by two fuzzy scores:

- i) The first score refers to the TBT and it defines the political agenda of each government party using theoretical accounts that define the left and right ideology ideal type.

Our ideal-typical theoretical account of a left-wing party is built on Bobbio's research (1996: 72), which defines left and right parties based on egalitarian versus anti-egalitarian attitudes. The more a party promotes egalitarian values, the more leftist it will be, while the more it promotes anti-egalitarian values, the more rightist it will be.

*Table 41: coding scheme of left-wing political parties of the Government (TBT)*

<b>FS SCORES</b>	<b>EGALITARIAN VERSUS NON-EGALITARIAN POLICIES</b>	<b>CONDITION ID</b>
<b>1</b>	High tax rate; systematic government spending, nationalized economy, equal access to welfare as fundamental right, acceptance of every type of immigration with moratorium on deportation for all illegal immigrants, cultural national values are not important.	LEFT
<b>0.9</b>	High tax rate for rich people, systematic government spending on social programs and infrastructures, equal access to welfare as a fundamental right, acceptance of every type of immigration with few exceptions, cultural national values are not important.	LEFT
<b>0.8</b>	High tax rate for rich people and/or market regulations, important government spending, equal access to welfare as important but not fundamental right, acceptance of every type of immigration with acceptance of political refugees, cultural national values are not important but seldom considered.	LEFT
<b>0.6</b>	Moderate tax rates for rich people only and/or structural market regulations, moderate government spending, guaranteed access to welfare, easy access to immigration for economic, familiar, and other purposes, cultural national values could play a role in the political agenda.	LEFT
<b>0.5</b>	Position impossible to determine	-----
<b>0.4</b>	Moderate tax rates with government spending, minimal access to welfare guaranteed only to citizens and residents, easy access to	~LEFT

	immigration for economic purposes (workforce) and rejection of illegal immigration, cultural national values have strategic role in the political agenda.	
0.2	Moderate to low tax rates with some government spending, access to welfare only guaranteed to citizens, reduction of legal immigration and rejection of illegal immigration, religious and/or cultural national values have a strategic role in the political agenda.	~LEFT
0.1	Low tax rates and reduced government spending, and/or free market with some exceptional low protections, access to welfare competitive and not always guaranteed, rejection of almost every type of immigration with few exceptions, religious and/or cultural national values central in the political agenda.	~LEFT
0	Low tax rates and reduced government spending, free market, competitive access to welfare, rejection of every type of immigration, traditional values central in policy making	~LEFT

Therefore, a party is considered left-wing whenever its agenda promotes policies that are based on the idea of equality. The ideal typical full membership of the condition is equal to 1 whenever we observe the maximum point of equality, while the ideal typical full-non-membership of each condition equals 0 whenever we observe the maximum point of inequality; the ambiguous point between equality and inequality will score 0.5.<sup>35</sup>

- ii) The second score refers to the EUT and deals with the empirical uncertainty; this score is the fuzzification of the empirical quantitative measurement of left and right ideology of each government party. The EUT is established through quantitative indicators which indicate how much the political agenda of a party is left- or right-wing. The empirical information is collected from the [Manifesto Project Data \(MPD\), which refers to political parties' ideology at the national level, and the Sotomo Institute of Zurich, which refers to political parties' ideology at the Swiss cantonal level.](#)

We used the direct method of calibration in order to calibrate such interval-scale data.

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
<sup>35</sup> We will assign the scores of each political party in the government on the basis of the general ideology of each party using the Norsk Senter for Forkningsdata description, secondary literature (e.g. Skenderovic 2009; Benoit and Laver 200), official government website, official party websites and the European Social Survey (ESS) <http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/>.

Table 42: *MPD data score*

FS SCORE	MPD SCORE	CONDITION ID
1	(-70) -100	LEFT
0,5	0	-----
0	70-100	~LEFT

Table 43: *Sotomo Institute data scores coding*

FS SCORE	SOTOMO SCORE	CONDITION ID
1	-51 (-60)	LEFT
0,5	0	-----
0	51-60	~LEFT

Figure 18: *Party ideology fuzzy score*

As displayed by figure 2, the final score of party political agenda was computed by using the WQM to aggregate the theoretical and empirical accounts of each party's ideology.<sup>36</sup>

### B.2) Step 2: *Government ideology's final score*

Once we had calibrated each political party in the government, we proceeded to the aggregation of the scores in order to identify the whole cabinet's ideological position. This technique allowed us to calibrate government ideology by considering the political agenda of each political party. Indeed, a

<sup>36</sup> Where  $\theta=1$  and  $\alpha= f:x$ . The value  $f:x= \frac{freq(x)}{xn}$  which is the frequency threshold ratio. For more details on the formula, and on the reasons on the values of  $\theta$  and  $\alpha$ , cfr. Annexe "Dealing with descriptive heterogeneity in fsQCA" currently under review at Sociological Methods and Research.

cabinet can be fully formed by leftist parties but have an overall political agenda less leftist than a leftist coalition government in which there are parties with other ideological views.


The cabinet composition also works as a radial category structure because coalition governments can include members from different ideological viewpoints but still belong to a specific political ideological family.

*Table 44: Government ideological composition*

<b>Leftwing government</b>	Leftwing parties hold the majority of the cabinet seats	LEFT
<b>Rightwing government</b>	Rightwing parties hold the majority of the cabinet seats	~LEFT

Indeed, a government is considered left-wing if the majority of the parties composing the government have a political agenda score of  $> 0.5$ ; meanwhile, a government is considered right-wing if the majority of the parties composing the government have a political agenda that scores  $< 0.5$ .

*Figure 19: aggregation process of LEFT/~LEFT*



The operator used to aggregate each political party's score was the WQM, which is suitable for radial category aggregation.<sup>37</sup> In appendix 2, we detail the calibration procedures and calculations.

### C) Strong Populist party calibration (POP, ~POP)

The condition *strong populist parties* (POP) versus *non-populist parties* (~POP) has a fuzzy set membership. The full membership of 1 coincides with the ideal typical presence of strong far-right populist parties, while the full non-membership 0 coincides with the ideal type of absence of strong far-right populist parties.

This condition has a complex definition that had to be adapted to our scope. Therefore, in order to fuzzify this condition, we decided to use the FMAC strategy detailed above. From this theory we could extrapolate at least two attributes related to our FMAC: 1) the strength of the populist party inside the country, and 2) the political agenda of the populist party, which must be far-right and anti-immigration.

In fact, as described by Howard (2010: 744-746), the influence that a populist party has over the government's policy depends on its electoral strength (electoral score during the election) and political agenda (being a far-right, anti-immigration, and potentially xenophobic party).

A third element of our FMAC was determined by the causal context itself, or the CL-related referendum's context. In such context, despite the fact that the theory only required strong far-right populism, we added the position of each populist party in respect to the referendums. This attribute refers to the CHA mentioned above.


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<sup>37</sup>Once the minimality principle is determined we calculate the frequency ratio (f:x) to apply to our fuzzy scores. The f:x is calculated using the minimal criteria of whether a government is within or outside the family. If, for example, a cabinet is composed of seven ministers, then the frequency ratio would be  $4/7=0.571428$  and the weight  $\alpha$  would be  $\alpha=(1-f:x)$  ( $=0.42857$ ) in the case where the government is composed primarily by leftist parties. Meanwhile, in the case where a seven-minister cabinet is composed primarily by rightist parties, the weight 0.42857 will be applied to  $\theta$  as explained above.

This attribute also has the role of activating the whole condition POP in the context of direct democracy. Indeed, the outcome may change depending on whether a given populist party participates in the propaganda against CL or not.

In summary, our FMAC is composed of three distinct attributes that are necessary and jointly sufficient in determining the final concept. These attributes are: 1) the electoral strength of the populist party, 2) a far-right political agenda, and 3) the populist party campaigning for or against the referendum.

*Figure 20: Populist party ontological architecture*



In order to proceed with the fuzzification of our raw data and address the empirical uncertainty, it was important to put in context each set of attributes for our FMAC. Below we detail each condition's attribute calibration.

- 1) The electoral strength calibration. The electoral strength can be measured by considering each populist party's electoral performance during the election that preceded the referendum. The electoral performance of a party is an ordinal quantitative measure expressed in a percentage. In order to calibrate an ordinal measure by considering the descriptive heterogeneity, we

decided to create a specific qualitative scale depending on the context of the raw data. As emphasized by Veri (2017: appendix), this process allows one to fuzzify raw data in reference to the context. Indeed, the concept of “political strength” has diverse significance in relation to the different electoral systems in different countries (Lublin 2014: 9). It would be ill-advised to establish a flat anchor of 0.5 on a specific percentage (such as 5% or 10% of the electorate), because the concept of strength changes in accordance with the electoral system. In particular, in a country in which the electoral system is proportional, a populist party would be elected in parliament even with relatively low electoral scores and that party’s influence in the legislature would be great. In contrast, the political opportunity of a populist party in a country with a two-round electoral system or single transferable electoral system is lower than in the proportional system.

In our specific population we defined two qualitative breakpoints. For proportional electoral systems, our point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is a percentage of populist voters equal to 4%, which is usually the minimum percentage of required parliament votes in countries in which there is an electoral threshold. For two-round and single transferable systems, the point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is a percentage equal to 9.99% because less than 10% is under the psychological threshold of a notable party. Cases without populist parties are considered to be fully outside the set (fuzzy score 0), while cases with over 20% of the votes will be considered fully inside the set (fuzzy score 1). By means of a logarithmic function, we calculated the fuzzy membership for all cases.<sup>38</sup>

*Table 45: Assigning fuzzy scores using a differentiated scale*

PROPORTIONAL SYSTEM		OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS		CONDITION ID
<i>FS SCORE</i>	<i>Electoral strength (%)</i>	<i>FS SCORE</i>	<i>Electoral strength (%)</i>	
<b>1</b>	>20	<b>1</b>	>20	POP
<b>0.5</b>	4	<b>0.5</b>	9.99	-----
<b>0</b>	< 2	<b>0</b>	< 3	~POP

<sup>38</sup> We use the fsQCA 3.0 software. Ragin, Charles, and Sean Davey. 2014. *fs/QCA [Computer Programme]*, Version 3.0. Irvine, CA: University of California.



- 2) The populist far-right political agenda is calibrated by using the same elements used in the calibration of government ideology highlighted above. The TBT is calibrated by using the categories displayed in table 41 and the EUT scale displayed in tables 42 and 43.

Therefore, in relation to the TBT calibration, when a party is openly xenophobic, far-right (neo-fascist or neo-Nazi) and xenophobic positions are given a score of 1. The cut-off point of maximum ambiguity (0.5) is set for parties whose definition of populism is not clear or who neither support nor reject immigration or have an unclear ideological position on the left-right spectrum. A score of 0 is the set of parties that are not populist (traditional parties), not far-right (left, center, liberal), and not anti-immigration

Once we determined the TBT, we proceeded with the calibration of the EUT. Similarly to the LEFT/~LEFT condition, we used empirical data from the Manifesto Data Project and the Sotomo Database.

- 3) Finally, in relation to the populist party attitude during the referendum campaign, we used the following scale:


*Table 46: coding scheme fuzzy set POP populist party attitude*

<b>FS SCORE</b>	<b>POPULIST PARTY ATTITUDE</b>	<b>CONDITION ID</b>
<b>1</b>	Against the popular vote	POP
<b>0.9</b>	Single members in favour of the popular vote	POP
<b>0.8</b>	At least a local section in favour	POP
<b>0.6</b>	More than 2 local sections in favour	POP
<b>0.5</b>	No official position taken	-----
<b>0.4</b>	More than 2 local sections against	~POP
<b>0.2</b>	At least a local section against	~POP
<b>0.1</b>	Single members against the popular vote	~POP
<b>0</b>	In favour of the popular vote	~POP

If the populist party is against the referendum it is assigned a value of 1, and if it is in favor it is assigned a value of 0. The cut-off point of maximum ambiguity occurs when there is no position taken towards the referendum or if 50% of the political party is in favor of the referendum.

The final POP condition was calibrated by the following scheme:

Figure 21: aggregation process of POP



Once all of these attributes were calibrated, we aggregated them with the AMBCFL because, as previously noted, this operator better expresses set relationships of sufficiency and necessity between attributes (Veri 2017: 6)

#### D) Popular Initiated Referendums (INI, ~INI)

The popular initiated referendum has a clear binary nature and will therefore have a crisp value of 0 or 1. Whenever the object is put into popular initiative and opposed by the government the score assigned will be 1, and whenever the object is not a popular initiative or is supported by the government the score assigned will be 0.

Table 47: coding scheme fuzzy set INI

CRISP SCORE	POPULAR VOTE	GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL POSITION	CONDITION ID
1	Popular initiative	Against popular initiative.	INI
0	Facultative referendum, mandatory referendum, counterproposal.	In favor or against the popular vote.	~INI
0	Popular initiative	In favor of popular vote	~INI

Given the asymmetrical nature of the condition, the non-membership referendum includes government counterproposal, facultative referendum, mandatory referendum, and popular initiative supported by the government.

E) Popular votes with multiple issue calibration (MULT, ~MULT)

Popular votes with multiple or single issues are also binary in nature and are based on a perfect symmetrical concept. Whenever a popular vote is expressed in terms of two or more policies, it is a member of the set *multiple issue* and will receive a score of 1. In contrast, whenever a popular vote only includes a single-issue policy it is a member of the set *single issue* and will receive a score of 0.

Table 48: coding scheme fuzzy set MULT

CRISP SCORE	MULTIPLY OF SINGLE ISSUE REFERENDUM	CONDITION ID
1	Multiple issues	MULT
0	Single issue	~MULT

F) Political elite split/cohesive calibration (ELITE, ~ELITE)

The degree of elite cohesion or division over a popular vote is a fuzzy concept given that there can be different degrees of cohesion or division. In general, whenever the government supports the referendum object in a cohesive manner we have a full membership of 1 (ELITE); meanwhile, whenever the government is split in supporting an object we have a full non-membership of 0 (~ELITE). In the circumstance that the government is split in opposing the object, we have a full membership of 1 (ELITE), and whenever it is cohesive in opposing the object we have a full non-membership of 0 (~ELITE). In relation to these scores, it is assumed that the outcome “CL success” would result whenever the government is cohesive in supporting the object or it is split in opposing the object: both cases have a score of 1. In the outcome “CL failure”, the full non-membership score

of 0 indicates that the government is split in supporting the object or it is cohesive in opposing the object.

The score was calculated considering the descriptive heterogeneity that distinguishes two typologies of governments: i) the coalition government, and ii) the single-party governments. The degree of elite division refers to an ordinal scale in which the division is calculated as a percentage of the seats that are opposing or supporting a referendum. Therefore, in order to address the descriptive heterogeneity, we used two calibration scales: 1) a scale for determining the degree of division or cohesion of a coalition government; 2) a scale for single-party government.

- 1) In relation to the coalition party government, the inter-party division<sup>39</sup> plays an important role in the determination of elite division. Indeed, the government can have an official position but one or more government party members can dissent and campaign against the government's official position. As a consequence, the government members could campaign on different fronts and present divergent messages to the electorate.
- 2) In relation to the single-party government, the infra-party division<sup>40</sup> and the division of the major opposition parties play an important role in determining the elite division. Indeed, when the single government party is divided, it will present conflicting messages to the electorate. The messages would be more ambivalent whenever the major opposition party is against the policy proposed by the government.

In order to operationalize elite division, we referred to Crum's (2007) elite's competitive and collusive model.

*Table 49: Elite division according to the government system*

	<b>ELITE COHESION</b>	<b>ELITE DIVISION</b>
<b>COALITION GOVERNMENT</b>	Government parties agree	Government parties are inter-divided
<b>SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT</b>	Government and opposition agree	Government party and opposition parties disagree and/or are infra divided

<sup>39</sup> We refer to inter-party division whenever two political party have divergent opinion on an object-

<sup>40</sup> We refer to infra-party division whenever a divergent opinion on an object exist inside the same party.

The degrees of disagreement determine the membership and the fuzzy score. The competitive model occurs whenever the political elite are both infra-divided and inter-divided. As displayed by table 49, in the coalition government when the division affects more than one party in the government, there is a full non-membership of division; when such division only regards one party, there is a smaller degree of division. Meanwhile, in the single-party government, when the division affects the ruling party there exists a full non-membership of division; when the government is opposed by the major opposition party there is still a competitive model but with a smaller degree of non-membership.

In order to address descriptive heterogeneity, we created two fuzzy scales, one related to the coalition government and one to the single-party government.

*Table 50: coding scheme fuzzy set ELITE 1*

<b>FS SCORE</b>	<b>ELITE SPLIT - COALITION GOVERNMENT IS PARTISAN OF CL EXTENSION</b>	<b>ELITE SPLIT - SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IS PARTISAN OF CL EXTENSION</b>	<b>CONDITION ID</b>
<b>1</b>	Government cohesive and opposition parties cohesive with the government's official position	Government cohesive and opposition parties cohesive with the government's official position	ELITE,
<b>0.8</b>	Government unified with radical left's campaign for the government position AND/OR the radical left party in the government intra-divided	Government and main opposition party unified AND extreme left parties against the government	ELITE,
<b>0.6</b>	Government unified with radical right campaign for the government position AND/OR radical right or right parties in the government intra-divided	Government unified AND opposition party supporting the government with intra-party division AND/OR extreme right parties against the government	ELITE,
<b>0.5</b>	No official government position (no campaign)	No official government position (no campaign)	-----
<b>0.4</b>	Government internally split with only the part of the right party opposing the government official position	Small infra-party division OR main opposition party against the government position	~ELITE
<b>0.2</b>	Government internally split with only the right party opposing the government's official position	Important/moderate government intra-party division	~ELITE
<b>0</b>	Government internally split between right, left, and center coalition parties	Strong government intra-party division	~ELITE

Table 51: coding scheme fuzzy set *ELITE 2*

FS SCORE	ELITE SPLIT - GOVERNMENT IS AGAINST CL EXTENSION	ELITE SPLIT - SINGLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IS AGAINST CL EXTENSION	CONDITION ID
1	Government internally split between right, left, and center coalition parties	Strong government intra-party division	ELITE,
0.8	Government internally split with only the right party opposing the government official position	Important/moderate government intra-party division	ELITE,
0.6	Government internally split with only part of the right party opposing the government official position	Small infra-party division OR main opposition party against the government position	ELITE,
0.5	No official government position (no campaign)	No official government position (no campaign)	-----
0.4	Government unified with radical right campaign for the government position AND/OR radical right party in the government intra-divided	Government unified AND opposition party supporting the government with intra-party division AND/OR extreme right parties against the government	~ELITE
0.2	Government unified with radical left campaign for the government position AND/OR radical left party in the government intra-divided	Government and main opposition party unified AND extreme left parties against the government	~ELITE
0	Government cohesive and opposition parties cohesive with the government's official position	Government cohesive and opposition parties cohesive with the government official position	~ELITE

Table 50 refers to the calibration of elite division in the event that the elite supports the referendum.

The table also considers whether the government is formed by a coalition or a single party.

Table 51 refers to the calibration of elite division in the event that the elite opposes the referendum.

The two tables calibrate the condition *ELITE* considering the outcome of CL failure, meaning that a positive value of score  $> 0.5$  should contribute to this failure.

The degree of membership was calculated considering ideological opposition. Indeed, opposition from the radical left is less dangerous than opposition from the radical right (Papadopoulos 1991): although electorally weak, the radical right is capable of determining some popular votes in its favor. The greater the lack of cohesiveness in the right, the lower the level of support and the lower the passage rate of the government's proposals (Kriesi 2006: 606).

## ANNEX 2: CONDITIONS' CALIBRATION

### CALIBRATION OF OUTCOME (OUT)

Table 52: Calibration raw data outcome OUT

	Case ID	Referendum result	OUT fuzzy score		Case ID	Referendum result	OUT fuzzy score
1	CH94	No	0	36	CHNE07.2	Yes	1
2	CH04.1	No	0	37	CHGL10	No	0
3	CH04.2	No	0	38	CHBS10.1	No	0
4	CH17	Yes	1	39	CHBS10.2	No	0
5	FL11	Yes	1	40	CHBE10	No	0
6	USANM08	No	0	41	CHVD11	No	0
7	USANM06	Yes	1	42	CHLU11	No	0
8	USAFL08	No	0	43	CHZH13	No	0
9	CHNE90	No	0	44	CHJU14	Yes	1
10	CHVD92	No	0	45	CHSH14	No	0
11	CHGE93.1	No	0	46	CHNE16	No	0
12	CHGE93.2	No	0	47	CHBL18	No	0
13	CHGE93.3	No	0	48	L15	No	0
14	CHZH93	No	0	49	CH92	No	0
15	CHBE94.1	No	0	50	FL92	Yes	1
16	CHBE94.2	No	0	51	DK92	No	0
17	CHBS94	No	0	52	F92	Yes	1
18	CHUR95	No	0	53	EIRE92	Yes	1
19	CHAR95	Yes	1	54	A94	Yes	1
20	CHAG96	No	0	55	SF94	Yes	1
21	CHJU96	No	0	56	N94	No	0
22	CHFR97	No	0	57	S94	Yes	1
23	CHSO97	No	0	58	FL95	Yes	1
24	CHNE00	Yes	1	59	CH00	Yes	1
25	CHGE01	No	0	60	CH01	No	0
26	CHSH01	No	0	61	M03	Yes	1
27	CHVD02	Yes	1	62	CH05	Yes	1
28	CHGR03	Yes	1	63	F05	No	0
29	CHFR04	Yes	1	64	E05	Yes	1
30	CHBS05	Yes	1	65	L05	Yes	1
31	CHGE05.1	Yes	1	66	NL05	No	0
32	CHGE05.2	No	0	67	EIRE08	No	0
33	CHSO05	No	0	68	EIRE09	Yes	1
34	CHJU07	No	0	69	CH09	Yes	1
35	CHNE07.1	No	0				

CALIBRATION OF LEFTIST/RIGHTIST GOVERNMENT

Table 53: Political party agenda (Theory)

Political parties <sup>41</sup>	Party ID	Political Agenda		Fs score
<b>FDP. The Liberals (CH)</b>	FDP	Low tax rates and reduces government spending, competitive but sustainable social welfare, easy access of workforce immigrant, civil liberties fundamental		0.2
<b>Christian Democratic People's Party (CH)</b>	CVP	Moderate tax rate and government spending, access to welfare guarantee, easy access of immigrant for economic, familiar and other purposes, religious values part of the political agenda; civil liberties fundamental		0.4
<b>Swiss People's Party <sup>42</sup>(CH)</b>	SVP	1990-1996	Low tax rate and reduces government spending, and/or free market with some exceptional protectionist low; access to welfare competitive easy access of workforce immigrant acceptable, traditional values central in policy making, security policies are important but civil liberties fundamental	0.1
		1996-2018	Low tax rates and reduces government spending, and/or free market with some exceptional protectionist low; access to welfare very competitive; Rejection and reduction of every type of immigrant, traditional values central in policy making, security policies could be more important than civil liberties	0.2
<b>Social Democratic Party (CH)</b>	SSP	High tax rate for wealthy and rich people, systematic government spending on social programs and infrastructures, equal access to welfare as fundamental right, acceptance of every type of immigrant with acceptance of political refugee, cultural national values could play a role in the political agenda, civil liberties fundamental		0.8
<b>Conservative Democratic Party (CH)</b>	BPD	Moderate tax rate and government spending, access to welfare guarantee, easy access of immigrant for economic, familiar and other purposes, cultural values important in the political agenda; civil liberties fundamental		0.4
<b>Liberal Party of Switzerland (CH)</b>	LPS	Low tax rates and reduces government spending, competitive but sustainable social welfare, easy access of workforce immigrant, civil liberties fundamental		0.2
<b>Independent Neuchatel (CH)</b>	IND-NE <sup>43</sup>	Michel von Wyss (Extreme left) close to the communist party.		0.9
<b>Alliance of independents (CH)</b>	LdU	Moderate tax rate and government spending, access to welfare guarantee, cultural values could play a role the political agenda; civil liberties fundamental		0.6
<b>Demokratische soziale <sup>44</sup>Partei Basel (CH)</b>	DSP	Right wing party of the Swiss Socialist Party, with position closed to the center-left		0.6
<b>Christian Social Party<sup>45</sup></b>	CSP	Higher tax for rich people, strong social value and interventionist action of the government, string defense of civil liberties		0.8
<b>Independent Fribourg<sup>46</sup> (CH)</b>	IND-FR	Pascal Corminboeuf, open to the issue of immigration with protectionist ideal in the agriculture, conservative view and values		0.4
<b>Swiss Green Party (CH)</b>	GP	High tax rate for wealthy and rich people, systematic government spending on social programs and infrastructures, equal access to welfare as fundamental right, acceptance of every type of immigrant with acceptance of political refugee, cultural national values could play a role in the political agenda, civil liberties fundamental		0.8
<b>Independent Lucerne (CH)]</b>	IND-LU	Marcel Schwerzmann is the independent member of the government in the Canton Lucerne, is considered bourgeois, he stand for low tax rates free market programs with some government spending <sup>47</sup>		0.2

<sup>41</sup> [http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/liechtenstein/](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/liechtenstein/)

<sup>42</sup> Skenderovic Damir, *The radical right in Switzerland*, Berghahn Books: New York..

<sup>43</sup> [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel\\_von\\_Wyss](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michel_von_Wyss)

<sup>44</sup> [file:///C:/temp/svp-003\\_1986\\_26\\_a\\_004\\_d%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/temp/svp-003_1986_26_a_004_d%20(1).pdf)

<sup>45</sup> [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre\\_gauche\\_-\\_PCS](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre_gauche_-_PCS)

<sup>46</sup> <https://www.cath.ch/tag/corminboeuf/> and <http://www.fr.ch/cha/fr/pub/conseildetat/corminboeufpascal.cfm>

<sup>47</sup> <https://livinginluzern.info/2015/03/22/understand-next-weeks-elections/>



<b>Democratic Party (L)</b> <sup>48</sup>	DP	Minimum government involvement in the economy spending, it stand for minority groups and immigration rights; civil liberties fundamentals	0.4 (0.2)
<b>Socialist workers party (L)</b>	LSAP	Mixed economy with state intervention in the economy and sustainability of the welfare system, civil liberties fundamental	0.8
<b>Green Party (L)</b>	DG	Grass roots democracy social concerns, aid to developing countries, civil liberties fundamental	0.8
<b>Christian Social People's Party (L)</b>	CSV	Moderate government spending, access to welfare guarantee, religious values part of the political agenda; civil liberties fundamental	0.4 (0.2)
<b>Progressive Citizens' Party (FL)</b>	FBP <sup>49</sup>	Conservative, cultural values play an important role on political agenda	0.2
<b>Patriotic Union (FL)</b>	VU	Conservative, cultural values play an important role on political agenda	0.2
<b>Conservative People Party (DK)</b> <sup>50</sup>	DKF	Conservative traditional party, tax reduction, in favor of free market economy, reduction of public spending, cultural national agenda important	0.2
<b>Venstre (DK)</b>	VD	In favor of free market economy, low tax and reduction of public spending cultural national agenda important	0.2
<b>Fianna Fail (EIRE)</b> <sup>51</sup>	FF	In favour of immigration and multicultural policies economic interventionist, Exclusive nationalist rights and strong national values	0.4
<b>Progressive Democrats (EIRE)</b>	PDs	Equal group right with some exception, Inter cultural approach, Moderately in favour to multicultural policies Low tax economic liberalism	0.4
<b>Green Party (EIRE)</b>	CG <sup>52</sup>	government spending on social programs and infrastructures, equal access to welfare as fundamental right, cultural national values could play a role in the political agenda, civil liberties fundamental	0.8
<b>Socialist Party of Austria (A)</b> <sup>53</sup>	SPÖ	Classic social democratic party which is also incline to taking into account new circumstances (.e.g. predominant position of the market economy, individualization of society, privatization and deregulation), access of immigrant for economic purposes (workforce) and rejection of illegal immigrants,	0.6 (0.8)
<b>Austrian People's Party (A)</b>	ÖVP	Christian democrat social party, combination of conservative forces and various social and economic groups, it advocate an ecologically oriented social market economy, access of immigrant for economic purposes (workforce) and rejection of illegal immigrants,	0.4
<b>Independent Austria</b>	IND-A	Nikolaus Michalek N/A	0.5
<b>Centre Party (SF)</b> <sup>54</sup>	KESK	Liberal conservative party, in defense of equal political and social rights, equal economic opportunity , social security	0.6 (0.4)
<b>National Coalition Party (SF)</b> <sup>55</sup>	KOK	Liberal conservative party, defense of civil liberties, defense of reduces government spending, competitive but sustainable social welfare, national cultural values has a strategic role in the party policies. Open to immigration and multiculturalism	0.4 (0.2)
<b>Swedish People's Party (SF)</b> <sup>56</sup>	SFP	Liberal party with social economic issue central in their policies. Strong defense of civil liberties	0.4 (0.2)
<b>Christian Democrats</b> <sup>57</sup> (SF)	SKL	Liberal party, in defense of equal political and social rights, equal economic opportunity, social security, cultural and traditional value are central in the party policy	0.4 (0.2)
<b>Norwegian</b>	AP	Advocate moderate form of socialism, with increasingly market. Liberal	0.6 (0.8)

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/luxembourg/82656.htm>

<sup>49</sup> Veenendaal WP. 2015. "A Big Prince in a Tiny Realm: Smallness, Monarchy, and Political Legitimacy in the Principality of Liechtenstein" *Swiss Political Science Review*, 21(2): 333-349.

<sup>50</sup> [https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Det\\_Konservative\\_Folkeparti](https://da.wikipedia.org/wiki/Det_Konservative_Folkeparti) (google translated) and Green-Pedersen C, and P. Odmalm. 2008. "Going different ways? Right-wing parties and the immigrant issue in Denmark and Sweden". *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(3): 367-381.

<sup>51</sup> [http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/ireland/parties.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/ireland/parties.html)

<sup>52</sup> Van Haute Emilie. 2016. *Green Parties in Europe*. Routledge: New York. 1996-212

<sup>53</sup> [http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/austria/parties.html/](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/austria/parties.html/) and Van der Brug W., D'Amato G. and D. Ruedin. 2015. *The Politicisation of Migration*, Routledge: New York: pp. 33-35

<sup>54</sup> [https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen\\_Keskusta](https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen_Keskusta) (google translated)

<sup>55</sup> [https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kansallinen\\_Kokoomus#Politiikka\\_ja\\_tavoitteet](https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kansallinen_Kokoomus#Politiikka_ja_tavoitteet) (google translated)

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.demsoc.org/2014/03/03/swedish-peoples-party-of-finland-sfprkp/>

<sup>57</sup> [https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen\\_Kristillisdemokraati](https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen_Kristillisdemokraati) (google translated)

<b>Labour <sup>58</sup>Party (N)</b>		principles into the ideological profile, strong welfare state funded through taxes	
<b>Swedish Social <sup>59</sup>Democratic Party (S)</b>	SAP	Social equality, strong supporter of egalitarianism and strong opposition of discrimination and racism	0.8
<b>Nationalist Party <sup>60</sup>(Malta)</b>	PN	National values central and fundamental in the political agenda, conservative from a cultural point of view but with economic liberal policies	0.2
<b>Socialist Party (F)<sup>61</sup></b>	SPF	Social democratic party that embrace market economy High tax rate for wealthy and rich people, systematic government spending on social programs and infrastructures, equal access to welfare as fundamental right, civil liberties fundamental	0.8
<b>Union for a Popular Movement (F)</b>	UMP <sup>62</sup>	Conservative party, liberal economy, free market, with important use of national values for strategic purposes, against illegal migration, civil liberties important and fundamental in the ideology	0.2
<b>Union for French <sup>63</sup>Democracy (F)</b>	UDF	Liberal conservative party with a wide range of policies and internal ideological diversion but lean on conservatism	0.2
<b>Spanish Socialist Worker' party (E)</b>	PSOE <sup>64</sup>	Marxist and anticlerical party that give considerable power to the Union, from the 90 it became more social democratic party with some Marxist elements	0.9
<b>Christian Democratic Appeal (NL)</b>	CDA <sup>65</sup>	Traditional values should be defend, open to a friendly immigration policies. Access to welfare guarantee moderate tax rate and government spending; civil liberties fundamental. The party represents a center position in terms of economy and defense related politics, combined with conservative leaning	0.4
<b>People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (NL)</b>	VVD <sup>66</sup>	Liberal tradition party, strong supporter of private enterprise and free market, fiscal responsibility, international cooperation and moderate participation in the welfare state	0.2
<b>Democrats 66 (NL)<sup>67</sup></b>	D66	Progressive liberal and radical democratic party. In favor of a mixed economy with market economics and government intervention, increase government spending in education, in favour of civil liberties.	0.4
<b>Republican Party (USA)</b>	PR	Low tax rates and reduces government spending, competitive but sustainable social welfare, civil liberties fundamental	0.2
<b>Democratic Party (USA)</b>	PD	Progressive liberal and radical democratic party. In favor of government intervention, in favor of civil liberties.	0.4

Table 54: Political party agenda (empirical data)

Party ID	MPD / SOTOMO SCORE
<b>FDP</b>	1992 (23.897); 1994 (23.897); 2000 (33.062); 2001 (33.062); 2004 (15.800); 2005 (15.800) 2009 (32.283); 2017 (22.1) / 1992 VD (33.48); 1993 GE (27.25); 1993 ZH (34.30); 1994 BE (33.38); 1994 BS (33.04); 1995 UR (27.17); 1995 AR (33.33); 1996 AG (40.24), 1996 JU (27.69); 1997 FR (34.39); 1997 SO (37.67); 2000 NE (32.27), 2001 GE (24.07); 2001 SH (34.43), 2002 VD (25.90), 2003 GR (34.86); 2004 FR (37.45); 2005 BS (36.07), 2005 GE (25.09); 2005 SO (37.52); 2007 JU (35.78), 2007 NE (39.55); 2010 GL (37.37); 2010 BS (37.59); 2010 BE (37.57), 2011 VD (31.02); 2011 LU (36.01); 2013 ZH (37.51); 2014 JU (30.78); 2014 SH (35.90)
<b>CVP</b>	1992 (-16.667); 1994 (-16.667); 2000 (13.491); 2001 (13.491); 2004 (39.216) 2009 (-10.400); 2017 (3.378) / 1993 GE (14.94); 1993 ZH (27.23); 1994 BS (19.56); 1995 UR (19.87); 1996 AG (25.24), 1996 JU (5.73); 1997 FR (22.52); 1997 SO (22.85); 2001 GE (14.91); 2003 GR (19.91); 2004 FR (23.66); 2005 BS (25.34), 2005 GE (17.23); 2005 SO (26.42); 2007 JU (9.50), 2010 GL (24.52); 2010 BS (34.19); 2011 LU (22.55); 2014 JU (15.25)
<b>SVP</b>	1992 (-6.061); 1994 (-6.061); 2000 (26.097); 2001 (26.097); 2004 (41.673) CH 2009 (43.113) CH 2017 (0.833) / 1992 VD (30.32); 1993 ZH (26.92); 1994 BE (37.59); 1996 AG (38.45), 2001 SH (41.81), 2002 VD (37.07), 2003 GR (36.26); 2010 BE (20.37), 2011 VD (42.97); 2013 ZH (37.91); 2014 SH (37.97)
<b>CSP</b>	2007 JU (-40.21)
<b>PBD</b>	2009 CH (12.987) / 2010 GL (27.37) 2010 BE (26.97)
<b>SSP</b>	1992 (-24.540); 1994 (-24.540); 2000 (-33.466); 2001 (-33.466); 2004 (-38.180); 2009 (-24.059) CH 2017 (-63.38) / 1990 NE (-42.26); 1992 VD (-49.52); 1993 ZH (-47.84); 1994 BE (-46.10); 1994 BS (-47.60); 1995 UR (-45.32);

<sup>58</sup> [http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/norway/parties.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/norway/parties.html)

<sup>59</sup> [http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/sweden/parties.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/sweden/parties.html)

<sup>60</sup> [https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partito\\_Nazionalista\\_\(Malta\)](https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partito_Nazionalista_(Malta))

<sup>61</sup> [https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parti\\_socialiste\\_\(France\)](https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parti_socialiste_(France))

<sup>62</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union\\_for\\_a\\_Popular\\_Movement](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_a_Popular_Movement)

<sup>63</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union\\_for\\_French\\_Democracy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_French_Democracy)

<sup>64</sup> [http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/spain/parties.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/spain/parties.html)

<sup>65</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian\\_Democratic\\_Appeal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Democratic_Appeal) and

[http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/netherlands/parties.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/parties.html)

<sup>66</sup> [http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/netherlands/parties.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/parties.html)

<sup>67</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democrats\\_66](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democrats_66) and

[http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\\_election\\_database/country/netherlands/parties.html](http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/country/netherlands/parties.html)

	1995 AR (-48.09); 1996 AG (-51.65), 1996 JU (-51.38); 1997 FR (-51.01); 1997 SO (-49.60); 2000 NE (-50.30), 2001 GE (-53.64); 2001 SH (-52.94), 2002 VD (-54.07), 2003 GR (-48.19); 2004 FR (-52.52); 2005 BS (-51.36), 2005 GE (-53.13); 2005 SO (-51.36); 2007 JU (-52.45), 2007 NE (-52.37); 2010 GL (-51.66); 2010 BS (-48.59); 2010 BE (-48.52), 2011 VD (-51.40); 2011 LU (-51.45); 2013 ZH (-51.91); 2014 JU (-50.96); 2014 SH (-45.26)
<b>LPS</b>	1990 NE (33.11); 1992 VD (39.08); 1993 GE (31.73) ; 1994 BS (32.96) 2000 NE (34.46), 2002 VD (35.01), 2005 BS (35.97), 2005 GE (30.90); 2007 NE (39.39); 2010 BS (37.59); 2011 VD (31.02)
<b>IND-NE</b>	N/A
<b>LdU</b>	1993 ZH (-22.09)
<b>DSP</b>	N/A
<b>IND-FR</b>	N/A
<b>GP</b>	2001 GE (-55.49); 2001 SH (-53.93), 2002 VD (-55.50), 2005 BS (-54.30), 2005 GE (-54.30); 2007 NE (-53.22); 2010 BS (-52.25); 2010 BE (-5.2), 2011 VD (-52.08); 2013 ZH (-51.90)
<b>IND-LU</b>	
<b>DP</b>	2015(-7.172)
<b>LSAP</b>	2005 (-25.147); 2015(-24.589)
<b>DG</b>	2015(-30.726)
<b>CSV</b>	2005 (-17.844);
<b>FBP</b>	N/A
<b>VU</b>	N/A
<b>DKF</b>	1992 (10.092)
<b>VD</b>	1992 (10.056)
<b>FF</b>	1992(-8.424); 2008 (-11.185)
<b>PDs</b>	1992(-2.917); 2008 (-5.815)
<b>CG</b>	1992 (-10.945); 2008 (-21.058)
<b>SPÖ</b>	1994 (-7.600)
<b>ÖVP</b>	1994 (4.800)
<b>KESK</b>	1994(1.266)
<b>KOK</b>	1994(-4.478)
<b>SFP</b>	1994(-7.692)
<b>SKL</b>	1994(5.000)
<b>AP</b>	1994 (-19.707)
<b>SAP</b>	1994 (23.786)
<b>PN</b>	2003 (-18.105)
<b>SPF</b>	1992 (-13.600)
<b>UMP</b>	2005 (-8.920)
<b>UDF</b>	2005 (7.205)
<b>PSOE</b>	2005 (-12.391)
<b>CDA</b>	2005 (2.467)
<b>VVD</b>	2005 (28.079)
<b>D66</b>	2005 (8.393)
<b>PR</b>	2002 (33.314) / 2008 (25.330)
<b>PD</b>	2006 (8.553)

Table 55: Political Agenda of each party final score

<b>FDP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>CH92</b>	0.2	0.26	0,219487348
<b>CH94</b>	0.2	0.26	0,219487348
<b>CH00</b>	0.2	0.2	0,2
<b>CH01</b>	0.2	0.2	0,2
<b>CH04</b>	0.2	0.34	0,243781337
<b>CH05</b>	0.2	0.34	0,243781337
<b>CH09</b>	0.2	0.2	0,2
<b>CH17</b>	0.2	0.28	0,225747672
<b>CHVD92</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565
<b>CHGE93</b>	0.2	0.17	0,189876553
<b>CHZH93</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565
<b>CHBE94</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565
<b>CHBS94</b>	0.2	0.13	0,176005663
<b>CHUR95</b>	0.2	0.17	0,189876553
<b>CH95AR</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565
<b>CHAG96</b>	0.2	0.09	0,161727968
<b>CHJU96</b>	0.2	0.16	0,186448117
<b>CHFR97</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565
<b>CHSO97</b>	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
<b>CHNE00</b>	0.2	0.13	0,176005663
<b>CHGE01</b>	0.2	0.2	0,2
<b>CHSH01</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565

CHVD02	0.2	0.18	0,193278239
CHGR03	0.2	0.11	0,16891637
CHFR04	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
CHBS05	0.2	0.19	0,196652836
CHGE05	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
CHSO05	0.2	0.11	0,16891637
CHJU07	0.2	0.09	0,161727968
CHNE07	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
CHGL10	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
CHBS10	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
CHBE10	0.2	0.14	0,17951234
CHVD11	0.2	0.11	0,16891637
CHLU11	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
CHZH13	0.2	0.14	0,17951234
CHJU14	0.2	0.11	0,16891637
CHSH14	0.2	0.11	0,16891637
CHNE16	0.2	0.2	0,2

<u>CVP</u>	Political agenda (theory)	Political Agenda (empirical)	Final score (1-WQM)
CH92	0.4	0.67	0,474357536
CH94	0.4	0.67	0,474357536
CH00	0.4	0.36	0,38637688
CH01	0.4	0.36	0,38637688
CH04	0.4	0.16	0,310652482
Ch05	0.4	0.16	0,310652482
CH09	0.4	0.61	0,460833977
CH17	0.4	0.46	0,419310754
CHGE93	0.4	0.29	0,361225131
CHZH93	0.4	0.17	0,314702011
CHBS94	0.4	0.24	0,342327336
CHUR95	0.4	0.24	0,342327336
CHAG96	0.4	0.18	0,318726682
CHJU96	0.4	0.42	0,406591765
CHFR97	0.4	0.21	0,330647079
CHSO97	0.4	0.21	0,330647079
CHGE01	0.4	0.29	0,361225131
CHGR03	0.4	0.24	0,342327336
CHFR04	0.4	0.2	0,326699671
CHBS05	0.4	0.18	0,318726682
CHGE05	0.4	0.27	0,353754433
CHSO05	0.4	0.17	0,314702011
CHJU07	0.4	0.36	0,38637688
CHGL10	0.4	0.19	0,322726052
CHBS10	0.4	0.12	0,294214386
CHLU11	0.4	0.21	0,330647079
CHJU14	0.4	0.29	0,361225131

<u>SVP</u>	Political agenda (theory)	Political Agenda (empirical)	Final score (1-WQM)
CH92	0.2	0.56	0,299143381
CH94	0.2	0.56	0,299143381
CH00	0.1	0.25	0,147063895
CH01	0.1	0.25	0,147063895
CH04	0.1	0.14	0,113132855
Ch05	0.1	0.14	0,113132855
CH09	0.1	0.14	0,113132855
CH17	0.1	0.49	0,208356141
CHVD92	0.2	0.14	0,17951234
CHZH93	0.1	0.17	0,122712514
CHBE94	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
CHAG96	0.1	0.09	0,096654367
CHSH01	0.1	0.08	0,093284315
CHVD02	0.1	0.1	0,1
CHGR03	0.1	0.11	0,103320942
CHBE10	0.1	0.23	0,141144172

<b>CHVD11</b>	0.1	0.07	0,089890117
<b>CHZH13</b>	0.1	0.1	0,1
<b>CHSH14</b>	0.1	0.1	0,1

<b>SSP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>CH92</b>	0.8	0.74	0,780512652
<b>CH94</b>	0.8	0.74	0,780512652
<b>CH00</b>	0.8	0.81	0,803347164
<b>CH01</b>	0.8	0.81	0,803347164
<b>CH04</b>	0.8	0.84	0,813551883
<b>Ch05</b>	0.8	0.84	0,813551883
<b>CH09</b>	0.8	0.74	0,780512652
<b>CH17</b>	0.8	0.94	0,84923495
<b>CHNE90</b>	0.8	0.92	0,841902607
<b>CHVD92</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHGE93</b>	0.8	0.9	0,85147
<b>CHZH93</b>	0.8	0.94	0,84923495
<b>CHBE94</b>	0.8	0.94	0,84923495
<b>CHBS94</b>	0.8	0.94	0,84923495
<b>CHUR95</b>	0.8	0.93	0,845557016
<b>CH95AR</b>	0.8	0.94	0,84923495
<b>CHAG96</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHJU96</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHFR97</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHSO97</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHNE00</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHGE01</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHSH01</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHVD02</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHGR03</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHFR04</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHBS05</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHGE05</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHSO05</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHJU07</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHNE07</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHGL10</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHBS10</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHBE10</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHVD11</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHLU11</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHZH13</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHJU14</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHSH14</b>	0.8	0.95	0,852936105
<b>CHNE16</b>	0.8	0.93	0,845557016

<b>PBD</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>CHGL10</b>	0.4	0.17	0,314702011
<b>CHBE10</b>	0.4	0.29	0,361225131
<b>CH09</b>	0.4	0.29	0,361225131

<b>CSP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>CHJU07</b>	0.8	0.92	0,841902607

<b>LPS</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>CHNE90</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565
<b>CHVD92</b>	0.2	0.09	0,161727968
<b>CHGE93</b>	0.2	0.13	0,176005663
<b>CHBS94</b>	0.2	0.13	0,176005663
<b>CHNE00</b>	0.2	0.12	0,172473565
<b>CHVD02</b>	0.2	0.11	0,16891637
<b>CHBS05</b>	0.2	0.11	0,16891637
<b>CHGE05</b>	0.2	0.14	0,17951234
<b>CHNE07</b>	0.2	0.09	0,161727968
<b>CHBS10</b>	0.2	0.1	0,165334398
<b>CHVD11</b>	0.2	0.14	0,17951234

<b>LdU</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>CHZH93</b>	0.6	0.79	0,796681
<b>GP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>CHGE01</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHSH01</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHVD02</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHBS05</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHGE05</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHNE07</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHBS10</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHBE10</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHVD11</b>	0.8	0.96	0,856660182
<b>CHZH13</b>	0.8	0.95	0,845557016
<b>IND</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>CHNE90</b>	0.9	N/A	0.9
<b>CHFR97</b>	0.4	N/A	0.4
<b>CHFR04</b>	0.4	N/A	0.4
<b>CHLU11</b>	0.2	N/A	0.2
<b>DSP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>CHBS94</b>	0.6	N/A	0.6
<b>DP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>L15</b>	0.4	0.58	0,453374
<b>LSAP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>L05</b>	0.8	0.75	0,780512652
<b>L15</b>	0.8	0.74	0,783687863
<b>DG</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>L15</b>	0.8	0.79	0,796681
<b>CSV</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>L05</b>	0.4	0.68	0,476423
<b>FBP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>FL92</b>	0.2	N/A	0.2
<b>FL11</b>	0.2	N/A	0.2
<b>YU</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>FL92</b>	0.2	N/A	0.2
<b>FL11</b>	0.2	N/A	0.2
<b>DKF</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>DK92</b>	0.2	0.39	0,257908
<b>VD</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>DK92</b>	0.2	0.39	0,257908
<b>SPF</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>F92</b>	0.8	0.64	0,750467
<b>FF</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>EIRE92</b>	0.4	0.59	0,455911
<b>EIRE08.1</b>	0.4	0.62	0,463219
<b>EIRE08.2</b>	0.4	0.62	0,463219
<b>PDs</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>EIRE92</b>	0.4	0.53	0,439970239
<b>EIRE08.1</b>	0.4	0.56	0,448154611
<b>EIRE08.2</b>	0.4	0.56	0,448154611
<b>CG</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>EIRE08.1</b>	0.8	0.62	0,744848978
<b>EIRE08.2</b>	0.8	0.71	0,771167945
<b>PR</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>USAFL08</b>	0.2	0.2	0.2
<b>SPÖ</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>

<b>A94</b>	0.6	0.58	0,593408
<b>ÖVP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>A94</b>	0.4	0.45	0,416191
<b>KESK</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>SF94</b>	0.6	0.49	0,565715
<b>KOK</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>SF94</b>	0.4	0.55	0,445473
<b>SFP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>SF94</b>	0.4	0.58	0,453374
<b>SKL</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>SF94</b>	0.4	0.45	0,416191
<b>AP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>N94</b>	0.6	0.7	0,635085
<b>SAP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>S94</b>	0.8	0.27	0,671541
<b>PN</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>M03</b>	0.2	0.68	0,321177
<b>UMP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>F05</b>	0.2	0.59	0,305234
<b>UDF</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>F05</b>	0.2	0.42	0,292347
<b>PSOE</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
<b>E05</b>	0.9	0.63	0,819939
<b>CDA</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>NL05</b>	0.4	0.47	0,42239
<b>VVD</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>NL05</b>	0.2	0.23	0,209873
<b>D66</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (1-WQM)</b>
<b>NL05</b>	0.4	0.41	0,403315

Table 56: Government composition and ideological family membership

Case ID	Political parties at the government	Left%	Ideological family membership
<b>CH94</b>	2FDP;2CVP;1 SVP;2 SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CH04.1</b>	2FDP; 1CVP;2 SVP;2 SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CH04.2</b>	2FDP, 1CVP, 2SVP, 2SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CH17</b>	2FDP; 1CVP;2 SVP;2 SP	28.6%	Right
<b>FL00</b>	5VU	0%	Right
<b>USANM02</b>	PR	0%	Right
<b>USANM02</b>	PD	0%	Right
<b>USAFL08</b>	2PR/IPD	0%	Right
<b>CHNE90</b>	2LPS, 2SP, 1Ind-NE	60%	Left
<b>CHVD92</b>	1PLS,1 SVP;2 SP; 1FDP	28.6%	Right
<b>CHGE93.1</b>	1FDP;2 CVP, 2LPS; 2SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CHGE93.2</b>	1FDP;2 CVP, 2LPS; 2SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CHGE93.3</b>	2FDP; 2CVP,3 LPS	0%	Right
<b>CHZH93</b>	2FDP, 1CVP, 1SVP, 1LdU, 2SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CHBE94.1</b>	2FDP, 3SVP,2 SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CHBE94.2</b>	2FDP, 3SVP, 2SP	28.6%	Right
<b>CHBS94</b>	2FDP,1 CVP, 2SP,1 PLS, 1PSD	42,8%	Right
<b>CHUR95</b>	2FDP, 4CVP, 1SP	14,3%	Right
<b>CHAR95</b>	6FDP, 1SP	14,3%	Right
<b>CHAG96</b>	2FDP, 1CVP, 1SVP, 1SP	20%	Right
<b>CHJU96</b>	1FDP, 3CVP, 1SP	20%	Right
<b>CHFR97</b>	1FDP, 3CVP, 2SP, 1Ind-FR	28.6%	Right

CHSO97	2FDP, 2CVP, 1SP	20%	Right
CHNE00	1FDP, 2 LPS, 2SP	40%	Right
CHGE01	3FDP, 1CVP, 2SP, 1GP	42.8%	Right
CHSH01	2FDP, 1SP, 1SVP, 1GP	40%	Right
CHVD02	2FDP, 1SVP, 1LPS, 1GP, 2SP	42.8%	Right
CHGR03	1FDP, 1CVP, 2SVP, 1SP	14.3%	Right
CHFR04	1FDP, 3CVP, 2SP, 1Ind-FR	42.8%	Right
CHBS05	1FDP, 1CVP, 3SP, 1LPS, 1 GP	57.1%	Left
CHGE05.1	1FDP, 1CVP, 1LPS, 2SP, 2GP	57.1%	Left
CHGE05.2	1FDP, 1CVP, 1LPS, 2SP, 2GP	57.1%	Left
CHSO05	2FDP, 2CVP, 1SP	20%	Right
CHJU07	1FDP, 2CVP, 1SP, 1CSP	40%	Right
CHNE07.1	1FDP, 1LPS, 2SP, 1GP	60%	Left
CHNE07.2	1FDP, 1LPS, 2SP, 1GP	60%	Left
CHGL10	2FDP, 1CVP, 1PBD, 1SP	20%	Right
CHBS10.1	1FDP, 1CVP, 3SP, 1LPS, 1 GP	57.1%	Left
CHBS10.2	1FDP, 1CVP, 3SP, 1LPS, 1GP	57.1%	Left
CHBE10	1FDP, 1SVP, 1PBD, 1GP, 3SP	57.1%	Left
CHVD11	2FDP, 1SVP, 1LPS, 1GP, 2SP	42.8%	Right
CHLU11	1FDP, 2CVP, 1SP, 1Ind-LU	40%	Right
CHZH13	2FDP, 2SVP, 1GP, 2SP	42.8%	Right
CHJU14	1FDP, 2 CVP, 2 SP	40%	Right
CHSH14	2FDP; 2SVP, 1 SP	20%	Right
CHNE16	3SP, 2FDP	60%	Left
CHBL18	2FDP, 1GPS, 1SVP, 1CVP	80%	Right
L15	6DP; 6LSAP; 3DG	60%	Left
CH92	2FDP; 2CVP; 1SVP; 2SP	28,6%	Right
FL92	2 FBP, 3VU	0%	Right
DK92	10 DKF; 9VD	0%	Right
F92	23 SPF	100%	Left
EIRE92	13FF, 2 PDs	0%	Right
A94	8SPÖ, 6ÖVP, 1 IND-A	53,3%	Left
SF94	8KESK, 6KOK, 2SFP, 1 SKL	35.3%	Right
N94	39 AP	100%	Left
S94	15 SAP	100%	Left
FL95	2 FBP, 3 VU	0%	Right
CH00	2FDP; 2CVP; 1SVP; 2 SP	28.6%	Right
CH01	2FDP; 2CVP; 1SVP; 2 SP	28.6%	Right
M03	14 PN	0%	Right
CH05	2FDP; 2CVP; 1SVP; 2 SP	28.6%	Right
F05	16UMP, 1UDF	0%	Right
E05	20PSOE	100%	Left
L05	9CVS, 6LSAP	40%	Right
NL05	8CDA, 6VVD, 2 D66	0%	Right
EIRE08	12FF 2CG 1 PDs	13.3%	Right
EIRE08	12FF 2CG 1IND-EIRE	13.3%	Right
CH09	1SVP, 1 PBD, 1 CVP, 2 FDP, 2 SP	28.6%	Right

Table 57: Final scores LEFT

	Case ID	Fuzzy score political agenda government OR FINAL SCORE?	Freq(x) – (1-f:x) Ration apply on <0.5 or > 0.5	Ideological family membership	Final score
1	CH94	[1-WQM] (0.21948, 0.21948, 0.29914, 0.47435, 0.47435, 0.7851, 0.7851)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,37288
2	CH04.1	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.1, 0.1, 0.8, 0.8)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,258338
3	CH04.2	Ibidem	Ibidem	Ibidem	0,258338
4	CH17	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.45839, 0.4066, 0.4066, 0.85247, 0.85347)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,307477
5	FL00	[1-WQM] (0.2, ..., 0.2)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	r Right (1-WQM)	0.2
6	USANM02	[1-WQM] (0.2, ..., 0.2)	1	Right (1-WQM)	0.2



7	USANM06	[1-WQM] (0.4,...,0.4)	1	Right (1-WQM)	0.4
8	USAFL08	[1-WQM] (0.2,...,0.2)	1/3 – 0.333 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.2
9	CHNE90	WQM (0.85147, 0.85147, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.769723
10	CHVD92	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.85147, 0.85147)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on < 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.372995
11	CHGE93.1	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.4, 0.85147, 0.85147)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.32743
12	CHGE93.2	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.4, 0.85147, 0.85147)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.32743
13	CHGE93.3	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.4)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.250649
14	CHZH93	[1-WQM](0.2, 0.2, 0.70711, 0.85147, 0.85147, 0.14853, 0.29289)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.289313
15	CHBE94.1	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.8517, 0.85147)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.229293
16	CHBE94.2	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.8517, 0.85147)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.229293
17	CHBS94	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.85147, 0.85147, 0.6, 0.2)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.302517
18	CHUR95	[1-WQM] (0.2,0.2,0.4,0.4,0.4,0.4, 0.85147)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.310867
19	CHAR95	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.85147)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.199586
20	CHAG96	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.14853, 0.90554)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.352546
21	CHJU96	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.4, 0.4, 0.90554)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.373517
22	CHFR97	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.358887
23	CHSO97	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.85147)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.277308
24	CHNE00	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.85147, 0.85147)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.262674
25	CHGE01	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.365982
26	CHSH01	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.1, 0.90554, 0.90554)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.237703
27	CHVD02	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.14853, 0.2, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.268452
28	CHGR03	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.14853, 0.14853, 0.85147)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.362518
29	CHFR04	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.355323
30	CHBS05	[WQM] (0.2, 0.29289, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.2)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.751952
31	CHGE05.1	[WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.752809
32	CHGE05.2	[WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.752809
33	CHSO05	WQM(0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.90554)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.264613
34	CHJU07	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.4, 0.90554, 0.85147)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.3771
35	CHNE07.1	WQM (0.2, 0.2, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.762659
36	CHNE07.2	WQM (0.2, 0.2, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.762659
37	CHGL10	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.90554)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.272252
38	CHBS10.1	WQM [0.2, 0.29289, 0.85147, 0.85147, 0.81547, 0.2, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.750464
39	CHBS10.2	WQM [0.2, 0.29289, 0.85147, 0.85147, 0.81547, 0.2, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.750464
40	CHBE10	WQM (0.2, 0.14853, 0.85147, 0.85147, 0.85147, 0.90554, 0.29289)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.752697

41	CHVD11	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.14853, 0.2, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.257984
42	CHLU11	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.90554, 0.2)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.286273
43	CHZH13	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.14853, 0.14853, 0.90554, 0.90554, 0.90554)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.247415
44	CHJU14	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.4, 0.4, 0.85147, 0.85147)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.366699
45	CHSH14	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.14853, 0.14853, 0.85147)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.172895
46	CHNE16	WQM (0.2, 0.2, 0.8, 0.8, 0.8)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.756881
47	CHBL18	[1-WQM] (0.8; 0.1; 0.4; 0.2, 0.2)	1/5 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.2056
48	L15	WQM (0.45839*6; 0.8*9)	9/15 – 0.4 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.740854
49	CH92	QWM (0.2,0.2, 0.30717, 0.496677, 0.496677, 0.8, 0.8)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,37288
50	FL92	[1-WQM] (0.2, ..., 0.2)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.2
51	DK92	[1-WQM(0.2, ..., 0.2)	10/19- 0.473668 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.2
52	F92	[1-1WQM (0.8, ..., 0.8)	12/23 – 0.4782 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.8
53	EIRE92	[1-WQM] (0.45839, ..., 0.45839)	8/15 – 0.4666 apply on > 0.5	Right (WQM)	0,455911
54	A94	WQM (0.6*9, 0.4*6, 0.5)	8/15 – 0.4666 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0.560773
55	SF94	[1-WQM] (0.54166026*8, 0.4583974*8, 0.4)	9/17 – 0.470588 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.476853
56	N94	[WQM] (0.70711*39)	20/39 – 0.48717 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0,635085
57	S94	[WQM] (0.633249*39)	8/15 – 0.4666 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0,671541
58	FL94	[1-WQM] (0.2, ..., 0.2)	3/5 – 0.4 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.2
59	CH00	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.14853, 0.8, 0.8)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,309366
60	CH01	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.29289, 0.14853, 0.8, 0.8)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,309366
61	M03	[1-WQM] (0.336675)	8/14 – 0.4228 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,321177
62	CH05	[1-WQM] (0.2, 0.2, 0.29289, 0.1, 0.1, 0.8, 0.8)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0,258338
63	F05	[1-WQM] (0.3071796, 0.29289)	9/17 – 0.470588 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.305234
64	E05	WQM (0.85147)	9/17 – 0.470588 apply on < 0.5	Left (WQM)	0,819939
65	L05	[1-WQM] (0.496677, 0.8)	9/17 – 0.470588 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.49288
66	NL05	[1-WQM] (8*0.4, 6*0.2, 2*0.4)	9/16 – 0.4375	Right (1-WQM)	0.33259
67	EIRE08	[1-WQM] (0.496677*12, 0.8*2, 0.45839)	8/15 – 0.4666 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.466881
68	EIRE09	[1-WQM] (0.496677*12, 0.8*2, 0.45839)	8/15 – 0.4666 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.467213
69	CH09	[1-WQM] (0.8, 0.8, 0.1, 0.49667, 0.2, 0.2, 0.29289)	4/7 – 0.42857 apply on > 0.5	Right (1-WQM)	0.360075

*CALIBRATION OF POPULISM (POP)*

Table 58: Populism raw data

Case ID	Populist parties <sup>68</sup>	electoral weight (electoral system)	Political agenda (theoretical)	Position towards referendum
CH94	SVP, Ticino League, SD, AP/Freedom Party of Switzerland (FPS) / EDU	22.8% (proportional)	Moderate and radical right/ xenophobic and anti-immigration	SVP (National) and EDU in favour / Ticino League, SD, AP/FSP and the SVP cantonal section of Sankt Gallen against
CH04.1	SVP, Ticino League, SD, AP/FPS /EDU	27.4% (proportional)	Radical right	No
CH04.2	SVP, Ticino League, SD, AP/FPS /EDU	27.4% (Proportional)	Radical right	No
CH17	SVP, Ticino League, SD, MCG, EDU	32% (proportional)	Radical right	No
FL11	No populist parties	0% (proportional)	N/A	N/A
USANM02	No Populist parties	0% (majoritarian)	N/A	N/A
USANM06	No Populist parties	0% (majoritarian)	N/A	N/A
USAFL08*	No populist parties	0% (majoritarian)	N/A	N/A
CHNE90	SD	Insignificant (proportional-10% quorum)	Far right anti immigrant	No
CHVD92	SVP	8.4% (proportionel)	Right anti immigration	No
CHGE93.1	SVP	1.5% (proportionel 7% quorum)	Right anti immigration	No
CHGE93.2	SVP	1.5% (proportionel 7% quorum)	Right anti immigration	No
CHGE93.3	SVP	2.3% (proportionel 7% quorum)	Right anti immigration	No
CHZH93	SVP, SD, EDU	24.6% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHBE94.1	SVP, SD, EDU	37.8% (proportional)	Right anti immigration	No
CHBE94.2	SVP, SD, EDU	37.8% (proportional)	Right anti immigration	No
CHBS94	SVP, SD, EDU	7,1% (proportional)	Right anti immigration	No
CHUR95	No populist	0% (proportional)	N/A	N/A
CHAR95	SVP	22% (proportional)	Right anti immigration	Yes
CHAG96	SVP, SD, EDU	20,2% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHJU96	SVP	2% (proportional)	Right anti immigration	Single voices against
CHFR97	SVP	8,4% (proportional)	Right anti immigration	No
CHSO97	SVP	6,4% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHNE00	UDC/SD	Insignificant (proportional- quorum 10%)	N/A	N/A
CHGE01	SVP	10,4% (proportional 7% quorum)	Far right anti immigratin	No
CHSH01	SVP	33.6% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHVD02	SVP, EDU, SD	12,6% (proportional)	Right anti immigration	no
CHGR03	SVP/EDU*	35,7%	Right anti immigration	yes

<sup>68</sup> FrP/DDP.; FN: National Front; SMP: Finnish Rural Party; FPÖ.; (Norway) ; Ny: New Democracy; MNR: National Republican Movement; LPF: Pim Fourtyn List

		(proportional)		
CHFR04	SVP	11,8% (proportional)	right anti immigration	no
CHBS05	SVP-EDU-SD	15,6% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	Single voice favor
CHGE05.1	SVP, MCR	17,4% (proportionel 7% quorum)	Far right anti immigration	no
CHGE05.2	SVP, MCR	17,4% (proportionel 7% quorum)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHSO05	SVP	17,6% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHJU07	SVP-EDU	6,3% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHNE07.1	SVP	15,6% (proportionel 10% quorum)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHNE07.2	SVP	15,6% (proportionel 10% quorum)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHGL10	SVP, EDU	26,6 (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHBS10.1	SVP	13,9% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHBS10.2	SVP	13,9% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHBE10	SVP, SD, EDU	31,4% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHVD11	SVP	15,6% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHLU11	SVP	22,3% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHZH13	SVP, SD, EDU	32,6 (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHJU14	SVP, EDU	6,4% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	SVP in favor EDU against
CHSH14	SVP, EDU	37,1% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHNE16	SVP	16,9% (proportionel 10% quorum)	Far right anti immigration	No
CHBL18	SVP	26,7% (proportional)	Far right anti immigration	No
L15	ADR	6,4 (proportional)	Moderate right, moderate nationalist	No
CH92	SVP, Ticino League, SD, AP/FPS / EDU	22,8 (proportional)	Moderate and radical right/ xenophobic and anti-immigration	SVP, Lega, EFU, SD, AP/FPS against/ but 3 cantonal section of SVP (BE, GL, JU) in favour
FL92	No populist parties	0 (proportional)	N/A	N/A
DK92	Danish Progress Party (FrP/DDP)	6,4 (proportional)	Moderate right, anti-immigration	Progress party against Referendum
F92*	National Front (FN)	9,66 (two round system)	Radical xenophobic right	FN against the referendum
EIRE92*	Sinn Fein	1,2 (single transferable)	Left, catch all populism	Sinn Fein against the referendum
A94	Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)	16,6 (proportional)	Radical xenophobic right	FPÖ against the referendum
SF94	Finnish Rural Party (SMP)	4,8 (proportional)	Moderate nationalist	SMP against the referendum
N94	Progress Party (FrP)/Centre Party	6,3 (proportional) / 16,3	Moderate right, welfare chauvinism/ agrarian moderate right wing, nationalistic, welfare chavinism	The end of the campaign it came out for yes <sup>69</sup> / against the referendum
S94	New Democracy (Ny)	1,2 (proportional)	Moderate right, welfare chauvinism	In favor of referendum
FL95	No populist parties	0 (proportional)	N/A	N/A
CH00	SVP, Ticino League, SD, AP/FPS /EDU	27,4 (proportional)	Radical right	SVP in favor/ Lega, SD, AP-FPS, EDU and 13 cantonal section of SVP against
CH01	SVP, Ticino League, SD, AP/FPS /EDU	27,4 (proportional)	Radical right	All parties against referendum

<sup>69</sup> Pettersen PA, Jenssen AT, O. Listhaug. 1996. "The 1994 UE Referendum in Norway: Continuity and Change": *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 19(3) 278

<b>M03*</b>	<b>No populist parties</b>	0 (single transferable)	N/A	N/A
<b>CH05</b>	<b>SVP, Ticino League, SD, AP/FPS /EDU</b>	27.4 (proportional)	Radical right	All parties against the referendum except 5 cantonal section of SVP that are in favour
<b>F05</b>	<b>FN, National Republican Movement (MNR)</b>	12.43 (two round system)	Radical xenophobic right	Against referendum
<b>E05</b>	<b>Espana 2000</b>	0.02 (proportional)	Radical xenophobic right	No data
<b>L05</b>	<b>ADR</b>	10 (proportional)	Moderate right, moderate nationalist	Against the referendum
<b>NL05</b>	<b>Pim Fourtyn List (LPF)</b>	6.3 (proportional)	Right, anti immigration	Against referendum
<b>EIRE08.1*</b>	<b>Sinn Fein</b>	7 (single transferable)	Left, catch all populism	Against referendum
<b>EIRE08.2*</b>	<b>Sinn Fein</b>	7 (single transferable)	Left, catch all populism	Against referendum
<b>CH09</b>	<b>SVP/SD/Ticino League/EDU</b>	29.3 (proportional)	Radical right	Against referendum

(\* non-proportional electoral system (Two round for France / single transferable for EIRE and Malta)

Table 59: Fuzzyfied score populism weight and position towards referendum

Case ID	Populist weight score	Political agenda theory	Position towards referendum
CH94	0.97	0.8	0.4
CH04.1	0.99	0.9	1
CH04.2	0.99	0.9	1
CH17	0.99	0.9	1
FL00	0	N/A	0
USANM02	0	0	0
USANM06	0	0	0
USAFL08	0	N/A	0
CHNE90	0	0.9	1
CHVD92	0.7	0.6	1
CHGE93.1	0.04	0.6	1
CHGE93.2	0.04	0.6	1
CHGE93.3	0.04	0.6	1
CHZH93	0.98	0.9	1
CHBE94.1	1	0.6	1
CHBE94.2	1	0.6	1
CHBS94	0.4	0.6	1
CHUR95	0	N/A	0
CHAR95	0.97	0.9	0
CHAG96	0.9	0.6	1
CHJU96	0.0	0.6	0.1
CHFR97	0.7	0.6	1
CHSO97	0.61	0.9	1
CHNE00	0	0.9	0
CHGE01	0.53	0.9	1
CHSH01	1	0.9	1
CHVD02	0.83	0.9	1
CHGR03	1	0.6	0
CHFR04	0.81	0.9	1
CHBS05	0.9	0.9	0.9
CHGE05.1	0.9	0.9	1
CHGE05.2	0.9	0.9	1
CHSO05	0.93	0.9	1
CHJU07	0.61	0.9	1
CHNE07.1	0.84	0.9	1
CHNE07.2	0.84	0.9	1
CHGL10	0.99	0.9	1
CHBS10.1	0.86	0.9	1
CHBS10.2	0.86	0.9	1
CHBE10	0.99	0.9	1
CHVD11	0.9	0.9	1

CHLU11	0.97	0.9	1
CHZH13	1	0.9	1
CHJU14	0.61	0.9	0.2
CHSH14	1	0.9	1
CHNE16	0.89	0.9	1
CHBL18	0.99	0.9	1
L15	0.61	0.6	1
CH92	0.97	0.8	0.6
FL92	0.	N/A	0
DK92	0.61	0.6	1
F92	0.46	1	1
EIRE92	0.02	0.2	1
A94	0.91	1	1
SF94	0.54	0.5	1
N94	0.91	0.6	1
S94	0.01	0.6	0
FL95	0	0	0
CH00	0.99	0.9	0.4
CH01	0.99	0.9	1
M03	0	0	0
CH05	0.99	0.9	0.6
F05	0.68	1	1
E05	0	1	0
L05	0.75	0.6	1
NL05	0.61	0.6	1
EIRE08.1	0.22	0.2	1
EIRE08.2	0.22	0.2	1
CH09	0.99	0.9	1

Table 60: Empirical raw data MPD/Sotomo Institute (Populism)

Party ID	Scores
SVP	1992 (-6.061); 1994 (-6.061); 2000 (26.097); 2001 (26.097); 2004 (41.673); 2005 (41.673), 2009 (43.113); 2017 (0.833)/ 1992 VD (29.05); 1992 GE (-1.99) 1993 ZH (-6.70); 1994 BE (-8.26); 1994 BS (-5.09); 1995 AR (-4.95); 1996 AG (-10.12), 1996 JU (7.41); 1997 FR (2.3); 1997 SO (-9.94); 2000 NE (-7.82); 2001 GE (-26.93); 2001 SH (-13.72), 2002 VD (-5.07), 2003 GR (10.32), 2004 FR (-20.66), 2005 BS(-29.90), 2005 GE (-30.95), 2005 SO (-27.82), 2007 JU (-25.22), 2007 NE (-17.07), 2010 GL (-27.04), 2010 BS (-28.12), 2010 BE (-11.53), 2011 VD (-18.24), 2011 LU (-34.71), 2013 ZH (-28.95), 2014 JU (-36.08), 2014 SH (-35.79)
SD	CHNE 1990 (-41.55)
FrP/DDP	1992 (25.641)
FN	1992 (39.960) / 2005 (27.564)
Sinn Fein	1992 (N/A) / 2008 (-13.607)
FPÖ	1994 (14.9)
SMP	1994 (13.084)
FrP	1994 (43.571)
SP	1993(-15.641)
NY	1994 (42.806)
MNR	N/A
Espana 2000	N/A
ADR	N/A
LPF	2005 (3.235)

Tables 61: Fuzzyfied score empirical political agenda

SVP	Political agenda (theory)	Political Agenda (empirical)	Final score (WQM)
CH92	0.8	0.44	0.700856619
CH94	0.9	0.75	0.852936105
CH00	0.9	0.86	0.886867145
CH01	0.9	0.86	0.886867145

CH04	0.9	0.86	0.886867145
Ch05	0.9	0.86	0.886867145
CH09	0.9	0.86	0.886867145
CH17	0.9	0.51	0.791643859
CHVD92	0.6	0.15	0.497493719
CHGE93	0.6	0.53	0.577610018
CHZH93	0.9	0.6	0.81240384
CHBE94	0.6	0.62	0.606739922
CHBS94	0.6	0.57	0.590169467
CH95AR	0.9	0.57	0.805170789
CHAG96	0.6	0.52	0.574572305
CHJU96	0.6	0.39	0.539166023
CHFR97	0.6	0.47	0.560029761
CHSO97	0.9	0.64	0.822516464
CHNE00	0.9	0.61	0.814882405
CHGE01	0.9	0.83	0.877287486
CHSH01	0.9	0.69	0.835882767
CHVD02	0.9	0.57	0.805170789
CHGR03	0.6	0.35	0.529937103
CHFR04	0.9	0.77	0.858855828
CHBS05	0.9	0.85	0.883647743
CHGE05	0.9	0.86	0.886867145
CHSO05	0.9	0.84	0.880454428
CHJU07	0.9	0.82	0.874147203
CHNE07	0.9	0.73	0.847132418
CHGL10	0.9	0.83	0.877287486
CHBS10	0.9	0.84	0.880454428
CHBE10	0.9	0.66	0.827768083
CHVD11	0.9	0.75	0.852936105
CHLU11	0.9	0.89	0.896679058
CHZH13	0.9	0.91	0.903345633
CHJU14	0.9	0.89	0.896679058
CHSH14	0.9	0.91	0.903345633
CHNE16	0.9	0.89	0.896679058

<b>SD</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
CHNE90	0.9	0.92	0.906716

<b>FrP/DDP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
DK92	0.6	0.75	0.653835

<b>FN</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
F92	1	0.85	0.952627944
F05	1	0.77	0.929677363

<b>Sinn Fein</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
EIRE 2008/9	0.2	0.36	0.249533

<b>FPÖ</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
A94	1	0.65	0.89861

<b>SMP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
SF94	0.5	0.64	0.550636

<b>FrP</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
N94	0.6	0.87	0.701641

<b>Centre party</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
N94	0.6	0.87	0.701641

<b>Nv</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
S94	0.6	0.36	0.536781

<b>LPF</b>	<b>Political agenda (theory)</b>	<b>Political Agenda (empirical)</b>	<b>Final score (WQM)</b>
NL05	0.6	0.53	0.57761

Table 62: Final score POP

<b>Case ID</b>	<b>Populist weight score</b>	<b>Position towards referendum</b>	<b>Political Agenda</b>	<b>Final score</b>
CH94	0.97	0.4	0.852936	0.544418467
CH04.1	0.99	1	0.886867	0.922207208
CH04.2	0.99	1	0.886867	0.922207208
CH17	0.99	1	0.791644	0.856751964
FL00	0	0	0	0
USANM02	0	0	0	0
USANM06	0	0	0	0
USAFL08	0	0	0	0
CHNE90	0	1	0.906716	0
CHVD92	0.7	1	0.497494	0.603666597
CHGE93.1	0.01	0.57761	1	0.07274
CHGE93.2	0.01	0.57761	1	0.07274
CHGE93.3	0.04	1	0.57761	0.146860932
CHZH93	0.98	1	0.812404	0.869589976
CHBE94.1	1	1	0.60674	0.726088477
CHBE94.2	1	1	0.60674	0.726088477
CHBS94	0.4	1	0.590169	0.515127039
CHUR95	0	0	0	0
CHAR95	0.97	0	0.805171	0
CHAG96	0.9	1	0.574572	0.688432951
CHJU96	0.0	0.1	0.539166	0
CHFR97	0.7	1	0.56003	0.649534346
CHSO97	0.61	1	0.822516	0.703286276
CHNE00	0	0	0.814882	0
CHGE01	0.53	1	0.877287	0.652140606
CHSH01	1	1	0.835883	0.888906892
CHVD02	0.83	1	0.805171	0.840984199
CHGR03	1	0	0.529937	0
CHFR04	0.81	1	0.858856	0.848876387
CHBS05	0.9	0.9	0.883648	0.889081959
CHGE05.1	0.9	1	0.886867	0.907667409
CHGE05.2	0.9	1	0.886867	0.907667409
CHSO05	0.93	1	0.88045	0.908196143
CHJU07	0.61	1	0.874147	0.710710834
CHNE07.1	0.84	1	0.847132	0.867408185
CHNE07.2	0.84	1	0.847132	0.867408185
CHGL10	0.99	1	0.877287	0.915684373
CHBS10.1	0.86	1	0.880454	0.886338995
CHBS10.2	0.86	1	0.880454	0.886338995
CHBE10	0.99	1	0.827768	0.8817517
CHVD11	0.9	1	0.852936	0.884699237
CHLU11	0.97	1	0.896679	0.925651277
CHZH13	1	1	0.903346	0.93500909
CHJU14	0.61	0.2	0.896679058	0.337310842
CHSH14	1	1	0.903345633	0.935008841
CHNE16	0.89	1	0.896679058	0.909238576
CHBL18	0.99	1	0.9	0.931128
L15	0.61	1	0.6	0.664830806
CH92	0.97	0.6	0.700856619	0.673922343
FL92	0.	0	0	0
DK92	0.61	1	0.653835	0.678463792
F92	0.46	1	0.952628	0.608223884
EIRE92	0.02	1	0.2	0.090184995
A94	0.91	1	0.89861	0.917214085



<b>SF94</b>	0.54	1	0.550636	0.613444765
<b>N94</b>	0.91	0.536781	0.701640934	0.62
<b>S94</b>	0.01	0	0.701640934	0
<b>FL95</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>CH00</b>	0.99	0.4	0.88686	0.550982153
<b>CH01</b>	0.99	1	0.886867	0.922207208
<b>M03</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>CH05</b>	0.99	0.6	0.886867	0.703827678
<b>F05</b>	0.68	1	0.929677	0.769107786
<b>E05</b>	0	0	1	0
<b>L05</b>	0.75	1	0.6	0.68556546
<b>NL05</b>	0.61	1	0.57761	0.648995483
<b>EIRE08.1</b>	0.22	1	0.249533	0.328276946
<b>EIRE08.2</b>	0.22	1	0.249533	0.328276946
<b>CH09</b>	0.99	1	0.886867	0.848876387

CALIBRATION POPULAR INITIATIVE OPPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT<sup>70</sup>

Table 63: Popular initiatives versus other popular votes (raw data and fuzzy score)

CaseID	Popular initiative	Government position	Final score
CH94	No	For the referendum	0
CH04.1	No	For the referendum	0
CH04.2	No	For the referendum	0
CH17	No	For the referendum	0
FL00	No	None (parliament Yes)	0
USANM02	No	For the referendum	0
USANM06	No	For the referendum	0
USAFLO8	No	For the referendum	0
CHNE90	No	For the referendum	0
CHVD92	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHGE93.1	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHGE93.2	No	For the counterproposal	0
CHGE93.3	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHZH93	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHBE94.1	Yes	None	1
CHBE94.2	No	None	0
CHBS94	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHUR95	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHAR95	No	For the referendum	0
CHAG96	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHJU96	No	For the referendum	0
CHFR97	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHSO97	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHNE00	No	For the referendum	0
CHGE01	No	For the referendum	0
CHSH01	No	None	0
CHVD02	No	For the referendum	0
CHGR03	No	For the referendum	0
CHFR04	No	For the referendum	0
CHBS05	No	For the referendum	0
CHGE05.1	Yes	For the popular initiative	0
CHGE05.2	Yes	For the popular initiative	0
CHSO05	No	For the referendum	0
CHJU07	No	For the referendum	0
CHNE07.1	Yes	None	1
CHNE07.2	No	None	0
CHGL10*	Yes	Against the popular referendum	1
CHBS10.1	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHBS10.2	No	For the counterproposal	0
CHBE10	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHVD11	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHLU11	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHZH13	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHJU14	No	For the referendum	0
CHSH14	Yes	Against the popular initiative	1
CHNE16	No	For the referendum	0
CHBL18	Yes	Against the referendum	1
L15	No	For the referendum	0
CH92	No	For the referendum	0
FL92	No	For the referendum	0
DK92	No	For the referendum	0
F92	No	For the referendum	0
EIRE92	No	For the referendum	0
A94	No	For the referendum	0
SF94	No	For the referendum	0
N94	No	For the referendum	0
S94	No	For the referendum	0
FL95	No	For the referendum	0

<sup>70</sup> [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/582041/EPRS\\_BRI\(2016\)582041\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/582041/EPRS_BRI(2016)582041_EN.pdf)

<b>CH00</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>CH01</b>	yes	Against the popular initiative	0
<b>M03</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>CH05</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>F05</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>E05</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>L05</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>NL05</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>EIRE08</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>EIRE09</b>	No	For the referendum	0
<b>CH09</b>	No	In favor the referendum	0

\*Glarus is a referendum request by the committee "Zusammen arbeiten, zusammenn leben, zusammen stimmen"

*CALIBRATION MULTIPLE VERSUS SINGLE OBJECT (MULT)**Table 64: Multiple issue versus single issue referendum (raw data and crisp sets)*

CaseID	Multiple object	Objects	Final score
CH94	No	Single policy law revision	0
CH04.1	No	Single policy law revision	0
CH04.2	No	Single policy law revision	0
CH17	No	Single policy law revision	0
FL00	No	Single policy law revision	0
USANM02	No	Single policy law revision	0
USANM06	No	Single policy law revision	0
USAFL08	No	Single policies law revision	0
CHNE90	No	Law revision : right of election of foreigner	0
CHVD92	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHGE93.1	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHGE93.2	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHGE93.3	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHZH93	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHBE94.1	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHBE94.2	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHBS94	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHUR95	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHAR95	Yes	Cantonal Constitutional total revision	1
CHAG96	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHJU96	No	Single policy: law revision	0
CHFR97	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHSO97	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHNE00	Yes	Cantonal Constitutional total revision	1
CHGE01	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHSH01	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHVD02	Yes	Cantonal Constitutional total revision	1
CHGR03	Yes	Cantonal Constitutional total revision	1
CHFR04	Yes	Cantonal Constitutional total revision	1
CHBS05	Yes	Cantonal Constitutional total revision	1
CHGE05.1	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHGE05.2	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHSO05	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHJU07	No	Single policy law revision	0
CHNE07.1	No	Single policy: constitutional article revision	0
CHNE07.2	No	Single policy: Law revision	0
CHGL10*	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHBS10.1	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHBS10.2	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHBE10	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHVD11	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHLU11	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHZH13	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHJU14	No	Single policy law revision	0
CHSH14	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHNE16	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
CHBL18	No	Single policy constitutional article revision	0
L15	No	Single policy law article revision	0
CH92	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization <sup>71</sup>	1
FL92	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
DK92	Yes	Treaty on economic, security, social policies	1
F92	Yes	Treaty on economic, security, social policies	1

<sup>71</sup>The agreement includes horizontal policies strictly related to the four freedoms: social policies (including health and safety at work, labour law and the equal treatment of men and women); policies on consumer protection, the environment, statistics and company law; and a number of flanking policies, such as those relating to research and technological development, which are not based on the EU acquis or legally binding acts, but are implemented through cooperation activities.

<b>EIRE92</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>A94</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>SF94</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>N94</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>S94</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>FL95</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>CH00</b>	Yes	Treaty on economic, security, social policies	1
<b>CH01</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>M03</b>	Yes	Membership to a supranational organization	1
<b>CH05</b>	No	Treaty ratification on free movement of people	0
<b>F05</b>	Yes	Constitutional revision	1
<b>E05</b>	Yes	Constitutional revision	1
<b>L05</b>	Yes	Constitutional revision	1
<b>NL05</b>	Yes	Constitutional revision	1
<b>EIRE08</b>	Yes	Treaty on economic, security, social policies	1
<b>EIRE09</b>	Yes	Treaty on economic, security, social policies	1
<b>CH09</b>	No	Treaty ratification on free movement of people	0

*CALIBRATION ELITE DIVISION OR COHESIVE (ELITE)*

Table 65: Raw data and calibration split/cohesive elite (ELITE)

CaseID	Gov Position	Parties against the government position	Fs score
CH94 <sup>72</sup>	Yes	Government unified for the referendum / far right not in the government against the referendum (Ticino League, SD, intra-party division in SVP and FDP)	0.3
CH04.1	Yes	Far right in the Government (SVP) and other small far right parties (SD; Ticino League) opposing the referendum	0.2
CH04.2	Yes	Far right in the Government (SVP) and other small far right parties (SD; Ticino League) opposing the referendum	0.2
CH17	Yes	Far right in the Government (SVP) and other small far right parties (SD; Ticino League) opposing the referendum	0.2
FL00 <sup>73</sup>	Yes	Government unified	1
USANM02	Yes	Government unified	1
USANM06	Yes	Government unified	1
USAFL08 <sup>74</sup>	Yes	Government unified	1
CHNE90	Yes	Government unified for the referendum / far right not in the Government against the referendum	0.6
CHVD92	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against popular initiative	0.6
CHGE93.1	No	Left in the government and extreme left not in the government for the popular initiative / Government unified in opposing the vote	0.6
CHGE93.2	Yes	Majority of the parliament accept but not extreme right in the government and a minority of center right	0.2
CHGE93.3	No	Right unified in opposing the initiative	0
CHZH93	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
CHBE94.1	none	Left in the government for the popular vote, Centre right and extreme right in the government against	0.6
CHBE94.2	none	Majority of the parliament accept but not extreme right in the government and a minority of center right	0.2
CHBS94	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
CHUR95	No	Left in the government for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
CHAR95	Yes	Government unified	1
CHAG96	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
CHJU96	Yes	Government unified	1
CHFR97	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
CHSO97	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
CHNE00	Yes	Government unified	1
CHGE01	Yes	Right in the government (FDP) and extreme right not in the government against the referendum	0.2
CHSH01	none	Majority of the parliament accept but not extreme right in the government	0.2
CHVD02	Yes	Extreme right (SVP) and right party (LPS) in the government against the referendum. FDP internally split	0.2
CHGR03	Yes	Socialist party against the Government	1
CHFR04	Yes	Extreme right and FDP in the government against the referendum	0.2
CHBS05	Yes	Extreme right not in the government against the referendum	0.6
CHGE05.1	Yes	Extreme right not in the government against the popular initiative	0.6
CHGE05.2	Yes	Extreme right not in the government against the popular initiative	0.6

<sup>72</sup> Swissvote.ch <http://fors-getdata.unil.ch/webview/>

<sup>73</sup> <http://www.liechtenstein->

[institut.li/contortionist/0/contortionistUniverses/397/rsc/Publication\\_downloadLink/EUDO\\_Report\\_Liechtenstein\\_2013.pdf](http://www.liechtenstein-institut.li/contortionist/0/contortionistUniverses/397/rsc/Publication_downloadLink/EUDO_Report_Liechtenstein_2013.pdf)

<sup>74</sup> <http://web.archive.org/web/20081023145013/http://tallahassee.fl.lwvnet.org/StateBallots.html>

<https://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/innews01.nsf/Articles/5183592BC0E44479852572AB00544901> <http://goaaba.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/alien-land-law-flyer-goaaba-2011.pdf> [http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/06florida.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/06florida.html?_r=0)

<https://marketcenter.bakerdonelson.com/files/Uploads/Documents/AREAA%20-%20Alien%20Land%20Law%20Article.pdf> Senate Joint Resolution 166

<b>CHSO05</b>	yes	Extreme right not in the government against the referendum and right in the government internally split	0.6
<b>CHJU07</b>	Yes	Extreme right not in the government against the referendum and right in the government internally split	0.6
<b>CHNE07.1</b>	None	Majority of the parliament accept but not the right in the government and the extreme right	0.2
<b>CHNE07.2</b>	None	Majority of the parliament accept but not the right in the government and the extreme right	0.2
<b>CHGL10*</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>CHBS10.1</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>CHBS10.2</b>	Yes	Far right and right in the government against the counterproposal	0.2
<b>CHBE10</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>CHVD11</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>CHLU11</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>CHZH13</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>CHJU14</b>	Yes	Right in the government against the referendum	0.2
<b>CHSH14</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>CHNE16</b>	Yes	Radical party at the government against with the populist party SVP	0.2
<b>CHBL18</b>	No	Left in the government and extreme left for the popular initiative / Government against the vote	0.6
<b>L15</b>	Yes	Government unified/ right wing parties at the opposition (ADR and CSV opposing the referendum)	0.6
<b>CH92</b>	Yes	Far right in the Government (SVP) and other small far right parties (SD; Ticino League) opposing the referendum	0.2
<b>FL92</b>	Yes	Government unified	1
<b>DK92<sup>75</sup></b>	Yes	Party outside the government (Progressive party and the Socialist Party) against the referendum, meanwhile the main opposition party (with the relative majority of the consent with 37.4%) Social Democrats had strong intra-party division because of internal leadership battle	0.6
<b>F92</b>	Yes	Small government intra-party division (jean_pierre Chevènement who left the PS) and opposition intra-party division (Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin campaign against), other opposition was from extreme left and extreme right party	0.4
<b>EIRE92<sup>76</sup></b>	Yes	Government unified, opposition from left parties non in government (green party and Democratic Left)	0.8
<b>A94<sup>77</sup></b>	Yes	Government unified / far right populist party FPÖ, Green party and other extreme left parties	0.6
<b>SF94<sup>78</sup></b>	Yes	KESK for but with strong intra-party division / Left Alliance VAS and Green party no official position but critical towards EU / Christian Union SKL and Rural Party SMP were against.	0.6
<b>N94<sup>79</sup></b>	Yes	Centre party not in government and extreme left not in government against / Liberal party against towards the end of the campaign / Labour party in government in favour but moderately internally divided	0.2
<b>S94<sup>80</sup></b>		Left party against and green party both not in government against the referendum	0.8
<b>FL95<sup>81</sup></b>	Yes	Government unified	1

<sup>75</sup> Hobolt SB. 2006. "How Parties affect vote choice in European Integration referendums": *Party Politics* 12 (5): 623-647.

<sup>76</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleventh\\_Amendment\\_of\\_the\\_Constitution\\_of\\_Ireland](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eleventh_Amendment_of_the_Constitution_of_Ireland)

<sup>77</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volksabstimmung\\_in\\_%C3%96sterreich\\_%C3%BCber\\_den\\_Beitritt\\_zur\\_Europ%C3%A4ischen\\_Union](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volksabstimmung_in_%C3%96sterreich_%C3%BCber_den_Beitritt_zur_Europ%C3%A4ischen_Union)

<sup>78</sup> Johansson MK, T. Raunio. 2003. "Partisan responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish political parties". *European Journal of Political Research*, 39: 235-241

<sup>79</sup> Saglie J. 2000. "Between Opinion Leadership and "Contract of Disagreement: The Norwegian Labour Party and the European Issue (1988-1994)" *Scandinavian Political Studies*. 23(2): 93-113 / Pettersen PA., Jenssen AT and O. Listhaug. 1996. "The 1994 EU Referendum in Norway: Continuity and Change": *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 19(3) 276

<sup>80</sup> Johansson M., T. Raunio. "Partisan responses to Europe: Comparing Finnish and Swedish political parties". *European Journal of Political Research*, 39: 236

<sup>81</sup> [http://www.c2d.ch/detailed\\_display.php?lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent\\_id=&sublinkname=results&id=38264](http://www.c2d.ch/detailed_display.php?lname=votes&table=votes&page=1&parent_id=&sublinkname=results&id=38264)

<b>CH00</b>	Yes	Government unified for the referendum / far right not in the government against the referendum (Ticino League, SD, EDU) SVP in government intra-party divided	0.6
<b>CH01</b>	No	Government divided against the referendum/ CVP, SP, for the initiative meanwhile SVP against finally FDP officially against but with big infra-party division / extreme right (EDU, Ticino League and SD against) and finally extreme left (GP and communist in favour)	0.8
<b>M03<sup>82</sup></b>	Yes	Government unified / Main opposition party (Labour party) not in government against the referendum	0.4
<b>CH05</b>	Yes	Far right in the Government (SVP) and other small far right parties (SD; Ticino League EDU) opposing the referendum	0.2
<b>F05<sup>83</sup></b>	Yes	Extreme right not in government the extreme left opposing the government. Main opposition party (Socialist Party) not in government intra-party divided	0.6
<b>E05<sup>84</sup></b>	Yes	Government unified / extreme left parties not in government against the referendum	0.8
<b>L05<sup>85</sup></b>	Yes	Extreme left groups and populist ADR not in government against the government position	0.6
<b>NL05</b>	Yes	Extreme left wing party not in the government and right wing party not in the government against the referendum	0.6
<b>EIRE08</b>	Yes	Against the right wing think-tank Libertas, the socialist party and other small groups	0.8
<b>EIRE09</b>	Yes	Against the right wing think-tank Libertas, the socialist party and other small groups	0.8
<b>CH09</b>	Yes	Far right in the Government (SVP) and other small far right parties (SD; Ticino League EDU) opposing the referendum, extreme left also opposing the referendum / However SVP divided with 1 section that supported the referendum and half of the Member of the Parliament of SVP that also supported the referendum <sup>86</sup>	0.4

<sup>82</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maltese\\_European\\_Union\\_membership\\_referendum,\\_2003](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maltese_European_Union_membership_referendum,_2003)

<sup>83</sup> Mamadouh V. 2009. "Establishing a Constitution for Europe during European Union enlargement? Visions of 'Europe' in the referenda campaigns in France and the Netherlands. *Journal of Cultural Geography* 26(3): 305-326 and Ivaldi G. 2006. "Beyond France's 2005 referendum on the European constitutional treaty: Second-order model, anti-establishment attitudes and the end of the alternative European utopia. *West European Politics* 29: 47-69.

<sup>84</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish\\_European\\_Constitution\\_referendum,\\_2005](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spanish_European_Constitution_referendum,_2005)

<sup>85</sup> <file:///C:/temp/referendum.pdf>

<sup>86</sup> [http://www.anneepolitique.ch/APS/ft/APS\\_2009/APS2009\\_I\\_2.html](http://www.anneepolitique.ch/APS/ft/APS_2009/APS2009_I_2.html)



**ANNEX 3: TRUTH TABLES, DIRECTIONAL EXPECTATIONS, ROBOUSTNESS TEST**

*Table 66: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the success of supranational organization referendums*

ELITE	MULT	INI	POP	LEFT	number	OUT	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
1	0	0	1	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0.738374	0.738374	0.738374
0	1	0	0	0	5	0	0.732098	0.732098	0.732098
1	1	0	1	1	2	0	0.541625	0.541625	0.541625
0	1	0	1	0	6	0	0.510712	0.510712	0.510712

*Table 67: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the failure of supranational organization referendums*

ELITE	MULT	INI	POP	LEFT	number	~OUT	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
0	1	0	1	0	6	1	0.489288	0.489288	0.489288
1	1	0	1	1	2	0	0.458375	0.458375	0.458375
0	1	0	0	0	5	0	0.267902	0.267902	0.267902
0	1	0	0	1	2	0	0.261626	0.261626	0.261626
1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

*Table 68: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the success of foreigner political rights extension referendums in Switzerland*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	out	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist.
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.302732	0.302732	0.302732
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.301710	0.301710	0.301710
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.270565	0.270565	0.270565
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.204348	0.204348	0.204348
1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0.180358	0.180358	0.180358
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.159100	0.159100	0.159100
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.152440	0.152440	0.152440
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	1	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

*Table 69: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the failure of foreigner political right extension referendums in Switzerland*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	~out	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	0	3	1	0.819642	0.819642	0.819642
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.795652	0.795652	0.795652
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.729435	0.729435	0.729435
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.698290	0.698290	0.698290
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.697268	0.697268	0.697268
1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Specify Analysis Cancel Standard Analyses

*Table 70: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the success of foreigner political rights extension referendums*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	out	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.302732	0.302732	0.302732
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.301710	0.301710	0.301710
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.270565	0.270565	0.270565
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.204348	0.204348	0.204348
1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0.180358	0.180358	0.180358
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.159100	0.159100	0.159100
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.152440	0.152440	0.152440
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	1	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Specify Analysis Cancel Standard Analyses

*Table 71: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the failure of foreigner political right extension referendums*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	~out	raw consist. ▾	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	0	3	1	0.819642	0.819642	0.819642
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.795652	0.795652	0.795652
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.729435	0.729435	0.729435
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.698290	0.698290	0.698290
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.697268	0.697268	0.697268
1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Specify Analysis   Cancel   Standard Analyses

*Table 72: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the success of individual citizenship extension referendums at subnational level*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	out	raw consist. ▾	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.302732	0.302732	0.302732
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.301710	0.301710	0.301710
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.270565	0.270565	0.270565
0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0.251774	0.251774	0.251774
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.243520	0.243520	0.243520
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.204348	0.204348	0.204348
1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0.180358	0.180358	0.180358
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	1	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Specify Analysis   Cancel   Standard Analyses

*Table 73: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the failure of individual citizenship extension referendums at subnational level*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	~out	raw consist. ▾	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	0	3	1	0.819642	0.819642	0.819642
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.795652	0.795652	0.795652
0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0.748226	0.748226	0.748226
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.729435	0.729435	0.729435
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.698290	0.698290	0.698290
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.697268	0.697268	0.697268
1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Specify Analysis    Cancel    Standard Analyses

*Table 74: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the success of individual citizenship extension referendums in Switzerland*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	out	raw consist. ▾	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.293808	0.293808	0.293808
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.291698	0.291698	0.291698
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.255071	0.255071	0.255071
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.213554	0.213554	0.213554
1	0	0	1	0	7	0	0.208135	0.208135	0.208135
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.179268	0.179268	0.179268
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.172902	0.172902	0.172902
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	1	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Specify Analysis    Cancel    Standard Analyses

Table 75: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the failure of individual citizenship extension referendums in Switzerland

pop	ini	mult	elite	left	number	~out	raw consist. ▾	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	0	1	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	0	0	13	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	0	7	0	0.791865	0.791865	0.791865
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.786446	0.786446	0.786446
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.744929	0.744929	0.744929
1	0	0	0	1	2	0	0.708302	0.708302	0.708302
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.706192	0.706192	0.706192
1	0	1	1	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

Table 76: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the success of individual citizenship extension referendums in the world

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	out	raw consist. ▾	PRI consist.	SYM consist
0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	1	0	1	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0.313926	0.313926	0.313926
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.293779	0.293779	0.293779
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.284735	0.284735	0.284735
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.266328	0.266328	0.266328
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.255071	0.255071	0.255071
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.208304	0.208304	0.208304
1	0	0	1	0	7	0	0.208135	0.208135	0.208135
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	1	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

*Table 77: Truth table analysis of sufficiency for the failure of individual citizenship extension referendums in in the world*

elite	mult	ini	pop	left	number	~out	raw consist.	PRi consist.	SYM consist
0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	3	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	0	1	1	0	13	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
1	0	0	1	0	7	0	0.791865	0.791865	0.791865
0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0.791696	0.791696	0.791696
1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0.744929	0.744929	0.744929
0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0.715265	0.715265	0.715265
1	0	0	1	1	3	0	0.706221	0.706221	0.706221
0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0.686074	0.686074	0.686074
1	1	0	1	0	2	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000

*Directional expectations:*

*For the outcome: success of CL policy (OUT)*

LEFT/~LEFT (presence and absence), because the rightwing government and leftwing government promoted and supported CL policies.

~POP (absence), because the absence and not the presence of a strong populist party may be linked to the outcome and not its presence.

ELITE (presence), because the presence of a cohesive government and not its pabsence may be linked to the outcome.

MULT/~MULT (presence or absence), because the outcome may also appear when the question is formulated as single issue or a multiple issue.

INI/~INI (presence or absence), because the outcome may also appear when the popular vote is a popular initiative or another typology of referendum.

*For the outcome failure of CL policy (~OUT)*

LEFT/~LEFT (presence or absence), because the popular vote may fail when the government is supported or opposed by right wing or when is left wing.

POP (presence), because the presence of a strong populist party and not its absence may be linked to the failure of a popular vote.

~ELITE (absence), because the presence of a divided government and not its absence may be linked to the failure of the popular vote

~MULT (absence), because the condition single issue referendum is necessary condition for the outcome CL failure, it therefore play a major role in the referendum outcome.

INI/~INI (presence and absence), because the popular vote may fail when it is a popular initiative or another typology of referendum.

### Robustness test

*Different consistency threshold:*

*Success of CL referendums consistency 1*

All the solution formulas have already a consistency 1 which indicate robust solution terms.

*Failure of CL referendums: consistency 1*

Table 78. Parsimonious solution CL failure consistency 1

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF:1.0000			
(1) INI			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.63333	(1) 0.63333	(1) 1.0000
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.645161	(1) 0.645161	(1) 1.0000
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.612903	(1) 0.612903	(1) 1.00000
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.574758	(1) 0.575758	(1) 1.0000
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.555556	(1) 0.55556	(1) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.63333/ (B) 0.645161 / (C) 0.612903 / (D) 0.575758 / (E) 0.55556			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A)1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1			

Table 79: Intermediate solution CL failure consistency 1

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF:1		ASSUMPTIONS: POP (PRESENCE) ~MULT (ABSENCE) ~ELITE (ABSENCE)	
(1) POP*INI*~MULT (2) ~LEFT*INI*~MULT			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.437944 (2) 0.407310	(1) 0.072043 (2)0.102677	(1) 1 (2) 1
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.445262 (2) 0.402532	(1) 0.112448 (2) 0.069719	(1) 1 (2) 1
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.423816 (2) 0.394171	(1) 0.099364 (2) 0.069719	(1) 1 (2) 1
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.398131 (2) 0.370282	(1) 0.093342 (2) 0.065494	(1) 1 (2) 1
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.383420 (2) 0.346625	(1) 0.096831 (2) 0.60036	(1) 1 (2) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A)0.509987/ (B) 0.524981/ (C) 0.493535 / (D) 0.463624 / (E) 0.443456			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1			

Solution terms for the failure of CL referendum are robust when consistency threshold is changed. The solution term INI path appears in every subgroup and is a solution formula considered in our analysis.

*Different frequency threshold*

*Success of CL referendum: frequency threshold 2*

Table 80: Parsimonious solution CL success frequency threshold 2

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1			
(1) MULT			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.666667	(1) 0.666667	(1) 1
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.666667	(1) 0.666667	(1) 1
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.600000	(1) 0.600000	(1) 1
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.600000	(1) 0.600000	(1) 1
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.500000	(1) 0.500000	(1) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A)0.666667 / (B) 0.666667 / (C) 0.600000 / (D) 0.600000 / (E) 0.5000			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1			

Table 81: Intermediate solution CL success frequency threshold 2

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 2.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1		ASSUMPTIONS: ~POP (ABSENT) ELITE (PRESENT)	
(1) ~LEFT*~INI*MULT			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.422156	(1) 0.422156	(1) 1
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.422156	(1) 0.422156	(1) 1
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.379940	(1) 0.379940	(1) 1
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.379940	(1) 0.379940	(1) 1
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.316617	(1) 0.316617	(1) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.422156 / (B) 0.422156 / (C) 0.37994 / (D) 0.37994 / (E) 0.316617			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1			

*Success of CL referendum: frequency threshold 3*

Table 82: Parsimonious solution CL success frequency threshold 3

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 3.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1			
(1) MULT			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.666667	(1) 0.666667	(1) 1
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.666667	(1) 0.666667	(1) 0.666667
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.600000	(1) 0.600000	(1) 1.00000
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.600000	(1) 0.600000	(1) 1.00000
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.500000	(1) 0.500000	(1) 1.00000
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.666667 / (B) 0.666667 / (C) 0.600000 / (D) 0.600000 / (E) 0.500000			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1			



Table 83: Intermediate solution CL success frequency threshold 3

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 3.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1		ASSUMPTIONS: ~POP (ABSENT) ELITE (PRESENT)	
(1) ~LEFT*~POP*~INI*MULT*ELITE			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.288456	(1) 0.288456	(1) 1
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.288456	(1) 0.266456	(1) 1
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.259610	(1) 0.259610	(1) 1
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.259610	(1) 0.259610	(1) 1
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.216342	(1) 0.216342	(1) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.288456 / (B) 0.288456 / (C) 0.2561 / (D) 0.2561 / (E) 0.216342			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 / (E) 1			

Solution term for CL success is robust in different frequency thresholds. This indicate high level of empirical evidence.

Failure of CL referendums: frequency threshold 1.

Table 84: Parsimonious solution CL failure frequency threshold 1

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: (A, B, C) 0.819642; (D) 0.820732			
(1) INI (2) ~POP*~MULT*ELITE (3) ~LEFT*POP*~MULT*~ELITE			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.633333	(1) 0.387833	(1) 1
	(2) 0.242344	(2) 0.057575	(2) 0.944780
	(3) 0.329599	(3) 0.082443	(3) 0.923258
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.645161	(1) 0.396768	(1) 1
	(2) 0.245340	(2) 0.055718	(2) 0.947085
	(3) 0.327328	(3) 0.079784	(3) 0.925071
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.612903	(1) 0.414424	(1) 1
	(2) NA	(2) NA	(2) NA
	(3) 0.318967	(3) 0.120488	(3) 0.92325
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.575758	(1) 0.446023	(1) 1
	(2) 0.231089	(2) 0.101355	(2) 0.930654
	(3) NA	(3) NA	(3) NA
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.555556	(1) 0.555556	(1) 1
	(2) NA	(2) NA	(2) NA
	(3) NA	(3) NA	(3) NA
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.815413 / (B) 0.821368 / (C) 0.733392 / (D) 0.677112 / (E) 0.555556			
<b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 0.967494 / (B) 0.96873 / (C) 0.96511 / (D) 0.9752 / (E) 1			

Table 85: Intermediate solution CL failure frequency threshold 1

FREQUENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000 CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: (A, B, C) 0.819642; (D) 0.820732		ASSUMPTIONS: POP (PRESENT) ~MULT (ABSENT) ~ELITE (ABSENT)	
(1) ~LEFT*INI*~MULT (2) POP*INI*~MULT (3) ~POP*~MULT*ELITE (4) ~LEFT*POP*~MULT*~ELITE* (5) ~POP*~MULT*ELITE*~INI			
	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
(A) Swiss aliens' political rights	(1) 0.407310 (2) 0.437944 (3) 0.099637 (4) 0.329599 (5) NA	(1) 0.072043 (2) 0.102677 (3) 0.057575 (4) 0.082443 (5) NA	(1) 1.00000 (2) 1.00000 (3) 0.875534 (4) 0.923258 (5) NA
(B) Aliens' political rights	(1) 0.402532 (2) 0.445262 (3) 0.096423 (4) 0.327328 (5) NA	(1) 0.069719 (2) 0.112448 (3) 0.055718 (4) 0.79784 (5) NA	(1) 1.00000 (2) 1.000000 (3) 0.875534 (4) 0.925071 (5) NA
(C) Individual citizenship subnational level	(1) 0.394171 (2) 0.423816 (3) NA (4) 0.318967 (5) NA	(1) 0.69719 (2) 0.099364 (3) NA (4) 0.120488 (5) NA	(1) 1.00000 (2) 1.00000 (3) NA (4) 0.923258 (5) NA
(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland	(1) 0.370282 (2) 0.398131 (3) NA (4) NA (5) 0.101355	(1) 0.065494 (2) 0.093342 (3) NA (4) NA (5) 0.101355	(1) 1 (2) 1 (3) NA (4) NA (5) 0.854781
(E) Individual citizenship in the world	(1) 0.383420 (2) 0.346625 (3) NA (4) NA (5) NA	(1) 0.096831 (2) 0.060036 (3) NA (4) NA (5) NA	(1) 1 (2) 1 (3) NA (4) NA (5) NA
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.69619/ (B) 0.691187/ (C) 0.614024/ (D) 0.564979/ (E) 0.443546 <b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 0.961921 / (B) 0.963059 / (C) 0.958608 / (D) 0.970424 / (E) 1			

Solution terms slightly change when the frequency threshold is equal 1. The path generated (path 3 in parsimonious solution) does not produce sense and is not theoretically interesting. This path only covered one case.

*Failure of CL referendums: frequency threshold 7 to 13*

Table 86: Parsimonious solution CL failure frequency threshold &gt; 4

<i>FREQUENCY CUTOFF: &gt;4</i> <i>CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: NA</i>			
<b>No solution formulas (A, B, C)</b> <b>(1) INI (D; E)</b>			
	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
<i>(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland</i>	(1) 0.575758	(1) 0.575758	(1) 1
<i>(E) Individual citizenship in the world</i>	(1) 0.555556	(1) 0.555556	(1) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (D) 0.575758/ (E) 0.555556 <b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (D) 1 / (E) 1			

Table 87: Intermediate solution CL failure frequency threshold &gt; 4

<i>FREQUENCY CUTOFF: &gt; 4.....</i> <i>CONSISTENCY CUTOFF: 1.00000</i>		<i>ASSUMPTIONS:</i> <i>POP (PRESENT)</i> <i>~MULT (ABSENT)</i> <i>~ELITE (ABSENT)</i>	
<b>(1) ~LEFT*POP*INI*~MULT*ELITE</b> <b>(2) ~LEFT*POP*INI*~MULT</b>			
	<b>raw coverage</b>	<b>unique coverage</b>	<b>consistency</b>
<i>(A) Swiss aliens' political rights</i>	(1) 0.282791 (2) NA	(1) 0.282791 (2) NA	(1) 1 (2) NA
<i>(B) Aliens' political rights</i>	(1) 0.332813 (2) NA	(1) 0.332813 (2) NA	(1) 1 (NA)
<i>(C) Individual citizenship subnational level</i>	(1) 0.324452 (2) NA	(1) 0.324452 (NA)	(1) 1 (2) NA
<i>(D) Individual citizenship in Switzerland</i>	(1) NA (2) 0.304788	(1) NA (2) 0.304788	(1) NA (2) 1
<i>(E) Individual citizenship in the world</i>	(1) NA (2) 0.286589	(1) NA (2) 0.286589	(1) NA (2) 1
<b>SOLUTION COVERAGE (RAGIN):</b> (A) 0.282791 / (B) 0.33813 / (C) 0.324452 / (D) 0/ (E) 0.286589 <b>SOLUTION CONSISTENCY:</b> (A) 1 / (B) 1 / (C) 1 / (D) 1 (E) 1			

Solution terms for the failure of CL referendum are robust when frequency threshold is higher than 2. The solution term INI path is causally relevant.

*Different calibration:*

Here we decided to discuss whether or not to run a fsQCA analysis with recalibrated cases.

Conditions presence or absence of *Popular initiative* (INI/~INI), prese or absence of *Multiple issue referendum* (MULT/~MULT) and the outcome *CL success or failure* (OUT/~OUT) and *Government ideology* (LEFT/~LEFT) have a straightforward qualitative threshold because they are conditions that do not rely on ordinal scales, therefore differences in kind is not mixed with the differences in degree.

Meanwhile condition *Strong far right populist parties* (POP/POP) and *Degree of elite cohesion* (ELITE/ELITE) do not have a clear qualitative threshold because at least one attribute of the concept is based on an ordinal scale.

The ordinal scale used for POP is the strength of populist party with a qualitative threshold of 4% for populist parties in a proportional electoral system and 10% for other electoral systems. However the cases under our examination presents strong populist parties with a minimum electoral result of 6.3% with the case CHJU07. This case is still well above the qualitative threshold of 4% established for proportional electoral system. The complexity this condition also refer to other attributes which scores are able to define with a certain degree of confidence that this case is not ambiguous.

The ordinal scale used for ELITE is the degree of division which was scalar, However ion the case of this condition the qualitative cut-off point is well defined by a theoretical model which is not subject to misjudgment.

## ANNEX 4: POPULIST PROPAGANDA POSTER

Figure 22: SVP's poster against popular initiative and the government counterproposal on extension of voting rights to foreigner (Basel Stadt 2010)



Figure 23: SVP's poster against the referendum on aliens' naturalization (Switzerland 2004)



Figure 24: SVP's poster against the referendums on aliens' naturalization (Switzerland 2004)



Figure 25: SVP's poster against the referendums on aliens' naturalization (Switzerland 2004)

