

Symposium:

Rethinking Comparisons

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Rethinking Comparison

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The articles in this symposium explore two fundamental questions in the study of politics: (1) why do we compare what we compare; and (2) how do the methodological assumptions we make about why and how we compare shape the knowledge we produce? Qualitative comparative methods—and specifically controlled qualitative comparisons—have been central to some of the most influential works of social science. Controlled comparisons drive studies on phenomena as varied as the preconditions of social revolution (Skocpol 1979), the divergent effects of working class mobilization (Collier and Collier 1991), and the consequences of social capital for state effectiveness (Putnam 1993). Indeed, controlled comparison is such a dominant force in political science methods training that two leading methods scholars note, “Nearly all graduate courses on comparative politics commence with a discussion of Mill’s methods of ‘difference’ and ‘agreement,’” which serve as the foundation for controlled comparative studies (Slater and Ziblatt 2013, 1302).

Yet, even as controlled comparisons have produced lasting insights and continue to dominate research designs, they are not the only form of comparison that scholars utilize. There is little methodological guidance in political science, however, for how to design comparisons that do not rely on control as a central element, and little epistemological insight on why such comparisons might

be compelling. As a result, scholars often eschew research designs premised on non-controlled comparisons and rarely explain the utility of such comparisons when they do. The consequences for knowledge are severe. When we limit the kinds of comparisons we make, we necessarily constrain the questions we ask and limit the knowledge we produce (Ragin 2004, 128).

The articles in this symposium reopen the conversation on comparison by exploring logics of comparisons that are not motivated by control. They ask, what kinds of questions lend themselves to non-controlled comparisons? How should we think through case selection? What kinds of insights about the world are non-controlled comparisons positioned to produce?

Three central components of the comparative method frame this discussion. First, the articles encourage political scientists to rethink what a case is. They do so by challenging dominant geographic conceptions of cases and engaging alternative types of cases, including political processes (how things happen), practices (what people do), meanings (how people interact with symbolic systems), and concepts (how people order the world). Second, the articles expand our notion of what it means to compare. They push political scientists to conceptualize comparison as a method that includes greater attention to the lived experiences of the people we study, the political concepts they deploy, and the ways those experiences and concepts shape their political

worlds. Finally, the papers expand the explanatory goals of political science. While many studies emphasize variations in outcomes (and we often encourage graduate students to think in these terms), these articles expand the possibilities to include variations (or lack thereof) in political processes, practices, meanings, and concepts.

Given how powerful controlled comparisons have been for producing knowledge, why rethink the practice of comparison? Our intention in laying out the value of non-controlled approaches to comparison is not to deny the utility of existing modes of comparison. Rather, it is to begin specifying logics of comparative inquiry that would be available to scholars beyond the already well-defined logics of controlled comparison. In so doing, we would suggest that by expanding modes of qualitative comparative inquiry, social scientists can both uncover new questions and drive innovations in how we answer existing questions. Rethinking comparison may also encourage us to revisit the kinds of sweeping questions that animated scholars as varied as Benedict Anderson (1983), Samuel Huntington (1968), and Charles Tilly (1990), but which do not necessarily lend themselves to controlled comparisons. Indeed, each of these scholars made major contributions to our understandings of politics while eschewing controlled comparisons. It is often difficult to tackle ambitious questions about power and governance while looking for cases that meet the standards of controlled comparison. Comparisons do not merely reflect the field and its subjects, they serve to constitute both. Therefore, if we can expand how we think about comparison, we can expand how we think about the world, and that will improve our understanding of it as a result.

Comparison: Controlled and Uncontrolled

Our interest in rethinking comparison emerges amid a revival of qualitative methods in political science, generally (Wedeen 2002; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2006; Schatz 2009; Brady and Collier 2010; Mahoney 2010; Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Ahmed and Sil 2012), and a renewed focus on controlled or paired comparisons, specifically (Snyder 2001; Tarrow 2010; Dunning 2012; Slater and Ziblatt 2013; Gisselquist 2014). Building on foundational work on controlled comparison (Przeworski and Teune

1970; Lijphart 1971, 1975; Skocpol and Somers 1980; Brady and Collier 2010; Slater and Ziblatt 2013), and the closely related strategies of paired (Tarrow 2010) and subnational (Snyder 2001) comparison, this recent work shows how the method can combine the best of both qualitative and quantitative epistemologies. Specifically, controlled comparisons allow scholars to trace dynamic causal processes, while accounting for the effects of confounding explanations, enabling generalizable arguments.¹ Not surprisingly, controlled comparative approaches dominate current best practices in qualitative research. Graduate students and professors alike look to select cases that hold alternative explanations constant or leverage variation in initial conditions or outcomes.² Indeed, Slater and Ziblatt (2013, 1302) note the “enduring ubiquity” of the strategy in qualitative comparative research.

We agree that controlled comparisons have important utility for scholars engaging in small-N work. Contemporary scholars have used controlled comparison to shed light on state capacity (Slater 2010), ethnic violence (Wilkinson 2006), and indigenous mobilization (Yashar 2005), just to name a few. Yet even as controlled comparisons have produced some of our most influential theories of politics, some scholars have been critical of their limitations. Scholars utilizing quantitative analysis have argued that research based on controlled comparison has limited the ability to generalize (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Geddes 2003), a problem that scholars utilizing a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods have tried to anticipate through “nested” research designs (Lieberman 2005). Scholars working from various qualitative traditions, by contrast, have argued that projects deploying controlled comparisons overemphasize their ability to address confounding explanations, while necessarily underemphasizing processes of diffusion (Sewell 1985, 1996a) and interaction (Lieberman 1991, 1994). The concern is that studies that rely on controlled comparisons may not be as predictive and testable as claimed (Burawoy 1989) and may push scholars to ignore research questions that do not immediately evidence variation that can be explained (Ragin 2004, 128).

1 This kind of comparison, often called the method of agreement and the method of difference, continues to reference Mill (1843), although scholars often fail to acknowledge Mill’s own discussion of the limitations of the approach (for an exception, see George and Bennett 2005). Regardless, what are often invoked as Mill’s methods of difference and agreement are ubiquitous in qualitative comparative work (for a discussion, see Slater and Ziblatt 2013) and remain central to the ways in which we question and evaluate comparative case research.

2 The approach to comparison and process tracing that George and Bennett (2005) lay out, and the qualitative comparative analysis methods that Ragin (2014) pioneered, are important exceptions here.

However, even as scholars have developed important critiques of controlled comparisons, they have been less effective in developing alternative approaches to comparison.³ A wide range of approaches to comparison appears in some of the most influential contemporary work across political science subfields. Yet, the logics behind the comparisons at the heart of these studies are rarely laid out and explored. Think, for example, of Benedict Anderson's (1990; see also 2016) important work comparing ideas of power in Javanese and European political thought. Comparison between Java and Europe violates virtually every tenet of how comparison should be executed. Anderson writes across different scales (an island versus a continent), different regime types (a monarchy and subsequent dictatorships versus a wide variety of regimes), and different religious traditions (an Islamic system with animist elements versus largely Christian systems). Yet, despite the lack of control, Anderson harnesses the friction between the different concepts of power to illuminate how ideas differently structure political practice in both settings. Had Anderson approached the comparison through the logic of control, he would not have been able to generate these insights. At the same time, however, it is not clear what the epistemology underlying these comparisons is, or why they are persuasive or insightful.

The important role that non-controlled comparisons can play in shedding light on politics is not limited to Anderson's work. For example, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) shows the similarly perverse legacies of indirect colonial rule through a comparison of South Africa and Uganda; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, Chapter 4) compare the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya to the Yellow Revolution in the Philippines to show how similar causal mechanisms were at work in very different episodes of contention; and James Scott (1998) compares German forestry management practices and the planning of Brasilia, among other things, to illustrate the effects of high modernist politics. Yet none of these scholars engages in a concrete discussion of their comparative strategy and why it makes sense for answering their research question.

This gap leaves graduate students and faculty alike without the tools to explain why their research designs—even absent variation on the dependent variable or intended to control for alternative explanations—will produce important insights. As a result, such work is risky. Because their logic is not broadly understood, such studies are often reserved for senior scholars with

well-established reputations, are published in outlets not necessarily geared towards political scientists, like area studies journals, or are simply dismissed. By elaborating why such comparisons should be compelling and providing scholars with a vocabulary to describe their approach, the articles included in this symposium begin to provide a foundation for expanding the possibilities of comparative inquiry.

Thus, even as we recognize the strengths of controlled comparison, the articles collected in this symposium make the case that non-controlled comparisons offer compelling theoretical contributions to our understandings of politics. They also take initial steps toward developing some of the different logics that might drive this kind of analysis. Where existing critiques focus on the challenges that controlled comparisons pose for researchers looking to generalize findings or to embrace causal complexity in historical analysis (see Slater and Simmons 2010), the articles collected here go one step further by encouraging additional types of comparison that are typically not addressed in comparative research strategies, including comparison of processes, practices, meanings, and concepts. Even as the essays in this symposium offer only initial elaborations of the varying logics driving non-controlled comparison, they make a strong case for recognizing the value of these kinds of comparison. The potential implications for political science research are significant. Not only does attention to different modes of comparison open new paths for political science research for example, by comparing perspectively versus juxtapositionally, as suggested in Schaffer's contribution to this volume—it may allow us to ask new questions altogether.

Expanding the Possibilities for Comparison

Collectively, the articles in this symposium suggest that scholars can rethink comparison by reframing how we understand what is to be compared, how to choose comparisons, and how the comparisons we choose advance our knowledge of the world. That is, scholars could rethink the most basic elements through which comparison is practiced and the ends to which it is pursued. Even as much work deploys non-controlled comparisons to make powerful arguments about politics, this symposium seeks to develop new logics that those not engaging in controlled comparisons can use to describe what their units of analysis are, how they select cases to make relevant comparisons, and what the goals of utilizing these new modes of comparison will be.

3 Tilly's (1984), Sewell's (1996a, 1996b, 2005), Locke and Thelen's (1995), and Ragin's (2004) work are important exceptions here.

What is to be Compared

While we agree that “the dazzling array of divergences and convergences across nation-states in the modern world...has long drawn scholars to the craft of comparative politics” (Slater and Ziblatt 2013, 1302), we argue that we should challenge ourselves to be open to how we think of the kinds of divergences and convergences to analyze. Political scientists often talk of “units of analysis” when they analyze these divergences and convergences—geographical areas and organizations are common examples. However, we would challenge scholars to think about the objects they choose, not simply as pre-existing units waiting to be compared, but as dynamic objects being actively created by the researcher.

In this symposium, Joe Soss poses this challenge most directly by proposing that we rethink the building blocks of comparison: cases. Soss highlights the tensions between the purposive, analytic fashion in which political scientists typically think of comparative cases and the dynamic and iterative process of “casing” that characterizes ethnography and interpretive research, broadly. Rather than conceptualize cases and approach research sites as predetermined variables and values, Soss proposes a more discovery-oriented approach through which scholars can draw on immersive experiences to ask, “what is this a case *of*?” Identifying what is to be compared through this lens would not only facilitate the more iterative approach that already defines much social science research (Koivu and Kimball 2015); it would also allow scholars to remain open to new concepts, meanings, processes, and outcomes that may enrich their own studies and contribute to scholarly knowledge more generally.

How to Choose Comparisons

Once we have a sense of what we are going to compare, the next step is to think about how we choose comparisons. Typically, political scientists use comparison to explain a given outcome. As a result, they tend to select cases by looking for variation on the outcome of interest or to control for alternative explanations.⁴ Yet, we cannot divorce the characteristics of a practice from the context in which that practice takes place. Indeed, in controlling away context we may overlook factors that play a critical role in producing the outcomes we study or dismiss potentially illuminating comparisons because they are

too different to generate even the illusion of control (see Simmons and Smith 2017). Therefore, we need to think very differently about what it means to select cases and what the relevant comparisons are. Rather than artificially controlling for potentially confounding variables, an expanded approach to comparison could challenge scholars to embrace and exploit tensions presented by complex causal or meaning-making processes.

Htun and Jensenius’ contribution to this symposium, which describes their ongoing research on women’s empowerment, exemplifies this expansive notion of case selection. To understand the consequences of states’ gender equity programs, they examine places where women’s empowerment means very different things (the United States, Norway, and Japan). Htun and Jensenius choose cases not for their variation on independent or dependent variables, but because they represent “extreme” visions of women’s empowerment. Through these “extreme” cases, Htun and Jensenius illustrate how the choice of comparisons can help us rethink conceptual categories and discover the right questions to ask in the first place—here, asking how different meanings of women’s empowerment have pushed countries to pursue radically different policies to achieve these diverse visions. More broadly, this approach provides a blueprint for how to think about case comparisons for the purposes of theory development, particularly when the concepts in question are difficult to operationalize and measure.

This notion of discovering concepts through comparison is the key insight of Frederic Schaffer’s contribution to the symposium. Schaffer reflects on the multiple forms of comparison political scientists deploy. Scholars most often understand themselves to be comparing *juxtapositionally*: placing “similar kinds of things side by side in order to catalog their similarities and differences.” Schaffer shows, though, how (often unstated) *perspectival* comparisons—“[analogies] between different kinds of things as a way to establish a vantage point from which to view one thing in terms of the other”—unwittingly shape how political scientists approach their work. For example, understanding the state as an “artificial man,” as Hobbes does, or examining politics as a “game,” as formal theorists do, carries theoretical judgments of which scholars may be unaware. By elaborating the effects of perspectival comparison, Schaffer challenges scholars to reflect on the implicit analogies that ground the juxtapositional comparisons

4 Some works of comparative historical analysis select cases to understand how different parallel processes happen (see Skocpol and Somers 1980), and many political scientists pay close attention to political processes in time to explain divergences in outcomes (e.g. Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2001; Slater 2010; see also Pierson 2004). Comparatively few, though, take the process itself as the “outcome to be explained.”

they construct. Perhaps even more powerfully, thinking about perspectival comparison as a valuable mode of comparison in its own right may help us *see* politics very differently—for instance, viewing the state as akin to a protection racket that extorts citizens for tax money in exchange for protection (Tilly 1985) or, from the vantage point of many young men of color encountering the police in democratic states, apprehending the state as closer to a giant vigilante organization that extrajudicially punishes them in the service of “protecting” other citizens (Smith 2019).

Building Knowledge through Comparison

Rethinking units of analysis and relevant comparisons may also involve rethinking explanatory goals of comparison. Typically, scholars use comparison to explain variation in a given political outcome. The forms of comparison that this symposium explores, by contrast, seek to expand the conceptual and theoretical categories through which politics are thought in the first place. Put differently, instead of being variation-seeking, the goals of comparison might be concept-seeking (Schaffer 2015).

In this symposium, Seawright elaborates the range of methodological objectives that might ground qualitative case-comparison, which include efforts to “sharpen conceptualization and measurement, allow exploration of the prevalence of a particular arrangement of causal capacities, and provide the raw materials for the construction of theories of causal moderation” (this issue, 12). While a critical methodological literature focuses on the deficiencies of qualitative case-comparison for causal inference, Seawright contends that it has ignored the crucial role qualitative comparison plays, not only in refining concepts, but in delineating the “micro-components” of causal explanation—that is, the “configurations of entities and causal capacities” which are bound to differ across contexts. In so doing, Seawright offers a valuable way to frame the utility of in-depth qualitative comparisons: they can shed light on the causal sequences operative in a case, and “no evidence from other cases need ever trouble that conclusion” (this issue, 13).

Read’s article places this broader discussion into an empirical context that reflects unique opportunities for creative comparison: the cases of China and Taiwan. Though Taiwan’s political transformation disrupted possibilities for control in cross-Strait research, Read contends that these changes present a chance to rethink how scholars frame political phenomena and build concepts. Read illustrates this through several

examples of cross-Strait research, including his own on neighborhood organizations. He found that, despite differences in organizational accountability, there were broad parallels between resident perceptions in China and Taiwan because of “similar webs of interpersonal networks” and a shared “vision of the proper state-society relationship” (this issue, 36). This discovery led Read to reframe his study as one on “administrative grassroots engagement”—a phenomenon he would not have developed had he eschewed the China-Taiwan comparison due to regime differences. Read thus illustrates how political transformations can present fruitful opportunities for conceptual and theoretical innovation, rather than exacerbate concerns of conceptual stretching and the violation of control. Social, political, and economic transformations may disrupt comparisons based on conventional categories of analysis, but they can also provide scholars opportunities to derive new insights from previously unexplored forms of comparison.

Rethinking the Building Blocks of Comparison

Rethinking what we compare, how we compare, and the concepts upon which we compare has potentially revolutionary consequences for the study of politics. In *The Spectre of Comparisons*, for example, Benedict Anderson (1998, 2) describes a moment early in his fieldwork where he encountered the Indonesian leader Sukarno’s interpretation of European history for the first time and how the seeming strangeness of Sukarno’s view of European leadership and nationalism induced “a kind of vertigo” in which, “For the first time in my young life I had been invited to see my Europe as through an inverted telescope.” This moment fundamentally restructured how he understood European politics. It is the type of vertigo-inducing encounter that the authors in this symposium may have had in conducting their own studies and which likely pushed them to shy away from “traditional” modes of comparison. Yet, even as scholars use un-controlled comparisons, there is a lack of language to describe the comparisons they deploy, nor are there clarified logics to guide future researchers looking to make similar comparisons. The goal of this symposium is, therefore, to start articulating why non-controlled comparisons can be compelling, when non-controlled comparisons might be helpful, and how non-controlled comparisons can be conducted.

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