

has only partial truth, and there's no knowing how far it is true. Even the absolutist moreover must admit that the Whole is not wholly true, but includes some falsity, e.g., 'Absolutism is false'. Ergo it is either true that absolutism is false, or else it is *not* the whole of truth. Further, absolutism is not 'general'. It requires a specific metaphysic, theory of judgment and logic of (internal) relation. It seems, however, to account for falsity. Falsity means the claim of a partial judgment to be true. But as *all* judgments are partial and *all* claim truth, what follows is (1) that all are false, and (2) that only absolutists err. The former consequence might be welcome, though it would not tell us what made them false nor what the distinction between 'true' and 'false' could mean. The latter means that the absolutist alone can be aware that the truth-claims he makes are false. His adversaries would not make them, if they thought them false. Lastly, the truth that all partial truths are only partly true cannot be applied to determine how true they are.

(f) There remain only the voluntarists. For them truth arises out of the interpretation of signs. Such interpretation is purposive and experimental, and continues till the impelling interest is satisfied. Now this theory is plainly 'self-critical'; it is willing to be tested by its working. It is also general enough, though it implies an activist epistemology. Error it explains as the 'anti-truth' which defeats it. Its applicability is assured, because it is built for application, and lets verification determine verity.

I trust that the necessity of compression has not entirely obscured the dialectical brilliancy of Dr. Boas's argument, which calls for criticism on one point only. Dr. Boas at times substitutes a proposition for a real judgment, as formal logic teaches its students to do. This is why he dismisses Logical Hedonism for failing to get any pleasure out of 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon in A.D. 1493': he has failed to notice that this is a paper 'judgment' or mere proposition, until it has been put in a context in which it is really asserted and its truth or falsity matters. The moment this is done, its emotional value will appear. Thus the 'hedonistic' theory will satisfy the four tests as well as the voluntaristic—a result foreshadowed by the fact that it often fuses with it into the conception of truth as the satisfaction of a purpose, and by the common charge that for a voluntarist truth is whatever he wishes to believe. So far from admitting, however, that "if 'true' is defined as 'agreeable' the two terms ought to be equivalent" (p. 193), Dr. Boas should have pointed out that the demand that truth should be desirable, satisfactory or agreeable, could not be converted into 'anything agreeable is true'. It cannot mean more than that it is a *species* of the agreeable, and if so its *differentia* must be stated. 'Logical hedonism' would thereby transform itself into the innocuous theory that truth was the pleasure or value arising from the satisfaction of a cognitive purpose. Which would be quite a good definition for human purposes.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

*Fichte et son Temps*. Vol. I. By XAVIER LÉON. Paris: Armand Colin, 1922. Pp. xvi + 649.

M. Léon has planned his work on a magnificent scale. In this volume he deals only with Fichte's life till the departure from Jena at the age of thirty-seven. Two more volumes will be required to complete his task. So large a book enters naturally into much detail. But M. Léon never allows the details to obscure the main outlines. In spite of the trees we can always see the wood, and this is the highest praise that can be given to the author of a biography.

As long ago as 1902 M. Léon published a work on the philosophy of Fichte which gave a most full and admirable account of it. In the present volume, in consequence, there is no very long exposition of the works published by Fichte in the period under consideration. It is his life, and the influences which affected him, of which we learn.

There are three things which are brought out very clearly in this volume. The first is that the ardent belief in the virtues and destiny of the German nation which is so marked in his later life was absent in his earlier years. He then looked to France for the salvation of the world (Fichte, unlike Hegel, was always convinced that the world was in a bad way, and required salvation very urgently). As late as 1799, he contemplated removing to the University of Mainz, which was just then in French territory, and hoped to be followed by many of his colleagues and pupils. It was not till the establishment of the Empire that he decided that France was not the destined saviour of the world, and that Germany was. This change of opinion took place later than the period dealt with in this volume, but it is sketched very effectively by M. Léon in his Introduction.

The second point which becomes clear from M. Léon's book is the tremendous position which Fichte held in Germany in 1799. No such position had then been held by so young a man since the beginning of modern philosophy. Berkeley and Hume, indeed, had published their greatest works when they were twenty-five and twenty-eight. But the *Principles of Knowledge* was only read by Berkeley's contemporaries to be laughed at, and the *Treatise on Human Nature* was not read by Hume's contemporaries at all. At thirty-seven Fichte was acclaimed as the thinker who had succeeded and had surpassed Kant. He was the leading philosopher in a nation which was more interested in philosophy than in any other subject.

Then came the accusation of atheism and his dismissal. M. Léon's account of this is full of interest. There cannot be the least doubt that, in any ordinary sense of the word, Fichte was at this time as much an atheist as Spinoza. "To believe in God"—so M. Léon sums up Fichte's position—"is not to affirm the existence of some unknown, mysterious, and incomprehensible being; it is to act conformably to duty" (p. 519). Fichte was accused of atheism in the ordinary sense of the word, and it is no answer to the accusation to say that he was not an atheist in a sense of the word which had been invented by himself. The question was whether he should be allowed to teach what is ordinarily called atheism.

There was only one answer to that question in 1799 for a small German state which was badly frightened by the French Revolution. The administration of Weimar, indeed, would probably have been content if Fichte had agreed not to teach the condemned doctrines, and would have allowed him to keep his chair. Kant had agreed to this course in connexion with his *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, but that was only an appendix to Kant's philosophy, while Fichte's philosophy centred round his doctrine as to God.

It would probably have been impossible for Fichte to keep his chair in any case, and the unfortunate letter to Voigt rendered the matter hopeless. "I would have dismissed my own son," Goethe wrote, "if he had allowed himself such language in relation to a government." Goethe was not only Goethe, he was a German official of 1799. But it may be doubted whether any University, in any period, would have retained a Professor who had written such a letter. Fichte himself, while maintaining that he was perfectly right, admitted that the Weimar authorities could not, from their standpoint, have acted otherwise (p. 620).

The author hopes to publish the remaining volumes in 1923 and 1924.

They will be expected with impatience by every student of the great days of German Idealism.

J. ELLIS M'TAGGART.

*Lotze's Theory of Reality.* By E. E. THOMAS, M.A., Late Fellow of the University of Wales. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921. Pp. 1, 217.

Lotze's theory of thought, our author says, 'has already been adequately dealt with by Sir Henry Jones,' and Mr. Thomas therefore restricts himself to Lotze's theory of reality. Indeed, he completes Sir Henry Jones's original project; for the preface to Sir Henry Jones's book promised a companion volume on precisely the subject of this one, and as Sir Henry apparently abandoned his design long before his lamented death, he left the field clear for another author (may we say for another Welshman?) to continue what he had begun.

On the other hand, this state of affairs is perhaps unfortunate for the younger author. Comparisons are scarcely avoidable, and there is nothing in the present book to match Sir Henry Jones's brilliant introductory chapter on 'The main problem of Lotze's philosophy'. Mr. Thomas, it is true, deals in part with the same general subject in his introduction (which is largely historical) and in his concluding chapter (on 'Lotze's achievement and influence'); but although he says the right things, he always says them tamely, and anyone who requires an introduction to Lotze (and is not familiar with Sir Henry Jones's book) will find it very hard to infer from this one why Lotze asked himself the questions that he did ask, why he reasoned as he did, and what manner of man he was. Lotze's *Stoff-Hunger*, his zeal for the ordinary consciousness; his consequent attempt to clip the wings of Hegelian idealism, on the one hand, and of scientific naturalism on the other hand, and the other aims which Sir Henry Jones portrayed so vividly, are treated here as if they were dead issues to be set down, conscientiously, in tolerable order.

Mr. Thomas, indeed, has so little sympathy with Lotze's *Stoff-Hunger* that he passes over the whole of the second book of the *Metaphysics*—the *Cosmology*—in his detailed exposition. On the other hand, his first six chapters make a fair attempt to deal with the first Book, and the eighth and ninth begin the discussion of Book III. (Psychology), although they turn very quickly to the treatment in the *Microcosmus*. Two chapters on the metaphysical import of the *Logic* come next, and Lotze's suggestion at the end of the *Metaphysics* introduces a chapter on "Moral Values as determining the nature of reality". The seventh chapter ('The passage to the human soul') gives no references except two (on the same page) to a section of the *Microcosmus*.

In view of Lotze's lengthy and involved philosophising it was, perhaps, inevitable that Mr. Thomas should circumscribe his discussion somewhat in the above fashion. Certainly, two of the main contentions of Lotze's general metaphysic—the attempt to prove that things are selves, and the place assigned to M—are fully discussed in this volume, and Lotze's third main contention—his doctrine of relations—is treated (although inadequately) at some length. On the other hand, the reader would be helped if the references were fuller, and if something of what is omitted were indicated in footnotes at least.

If the discussion is never very lively, it is always patient and painstaking. Mr. Thomas does not obtrude his own standpoint; he has no axe to grind; and he deserves all the praise which is due to these estimable qualities. *Per contra*, his book would have been far better if he had