

investigation, point to the immense value of these principles in problems of diagnosis, of infection, with its varied disturbances of metabolism, of anaphylaxy, in fact to the unlimited field opening up to the practical investigator. Yet the extreme caution against hasty conclusion and the careful exactitude which the author urges, and which this presentation of his work exemplifies, emphasize the magnitude of the task, and direct attention to its extreme importance. The contribution of this form of investigation to a fuller knowledge of somatic disturbance bears directly upon mental disease, as is shown by the work already undertaken upon metabolic changes in dementia præcox, here mentioned.

JELLIFFE.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRACTICAL. ECONOMIC AND ETHIC. Translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie. Macmillan and Company, London.

Croce represents in his thought the dynamic, creative principle underlying reality. Reality can be such only through becoming. His attitude of criticism toward all preceding philosophical systems, which he reviews in a comprehensive summary, is true to the principle of his own system. For he recognizes the incompleteness which they have shown on one side or another in their failure to comprehend and explain real values and their place in life and thought. He points out the confusion in terms or the mistaken premises which have obscured the vital meanings from the authors themselves or led them to untenable or barren conclusions. Yet in the true spirit of his own philosophy he values each system as a measured grasp of the truth, each contributing, however incompletely, yet no less appreciably to the fuller knowledge and more perfect making of reality toward which all tend. This is in one sense an unattainable goal, an ascent toward heights "without a summit" just because philosophy is conceived as creative of new truth.

Thus Croce's philosophy is a Philosophy of the Practical. The will is action, at once free and determined. It is determined by the situation which calls forth the action and yet free to perform, to choose the one course which by being put into activity proves itself the volition. What has been thus performed, the act of the will, must thus as the volition be the good. Evil cannot exist as a negative entity. Evil is rather a tendency toward the good which has not succeeded. It can "only exist in the good, which opposes it and conquers it, and therefore does not exist as a positive fact." The judgments that we form are based on the existence that might have been but was not and so are not literal and precise.

The discussion of the place of the passions in regard to volition and their control sets forth the multiplicity of indeterminations which surround the act of the will and savors of a recognition of the rôle of the unconscious in its influence upon the freedom of this will. Yet there is no clear recognition accorded the unconscious psychology. We feel that the author has in mind the formal static mechanistic psychology when he scorns the psychological approach to philosophy, and not the psychological valuation of that multiplicity of elements which he takes into account in considering the action of the will in the face of these multiple possibilities and its control of our inherited "habits."

Knowing and willing, or better practical activity and the theoretical, must presuppose one another. In order to know there must be a will to know, while at the same time there can be no will without previous knowledge. Knowledge itself contains a similar unity in duality, which Croce calls the esthetic and the logical. There must be first an esthetic intuition which

apprehends reality before philosophical reflection upon it is possible. Likewise, activity manifests this dual character. There is first the utilitarian or economic which implies the ethical. The economic is not necessarily ethical but the latter must always be economic. Thus he avoids the pitfalls of the utilitarian school which denies the moral, or the morality which rules out the economic.

A great deal of space is devoted to a refutation of casuistic forms of reasoning and the establishment of broader principles of logic. His own philosophy based on the apprehension of reality through becoming has no room for such limited interpretations and forms of reasoning. The concept of his logic is the synthetic concept of the spirit or reality, which includes the actualized reality and its opposites. Each individual act in this includes the universal. The relations of subject-object and individual-universal are in this logical concept. This reality is immanent rather than transcendental, penetrable by thought, but thus an uncompleted reality, always a beckoning goal of achievement.

Yet this is only a modern form of idealism which denies much of reality. There is no room in his negation of all but the act of the will for the duality which includes the material world, and which recognizes also the actual existence of pain, the opposite pole of the pleasure which he makes a quality of the act of will, and which accords existence to evil. For him there is only spirit. It satisfies him and his translator as well to "shake" themselves "free from the obsession of matter," which the latter says in his elucidating preface, Bergson never does. Neither perhaps can most of us, so long as we must accept reality as it meets us face to face. Yet with Croce as with Bergson the spirit is the creative force, and through it reality is our implement as well as our goal of achievement.

JELLIFFE.

NERVOUS CHILDREN. PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT. By Beverly R. Tucker, M.D., Richard G. Badger, Boston. The Copp Clark Co., Ltd., Toronto.

This book enters a field of recognized importance. It presents an appeal to parents and others who are seeking assistance as never before in the more complete understanding of the possibilities of their children for good or for ill in their nervous and mental development. Dr. Tucker outlines the most salient features of the anatomy and physiology of the nervous system and briefly discusses psychology. There is also a brief review of the relative influence of heredity and environment and of the meaning and importance of the development of habit. Eugenics and sexual hygiene are touched upon. Various distinct forms of diseases of the nervous system are described, including mental defect and "forms of insanity." A short chapter on Puberty and Adolescence closes the discussion.

This forms a convenient manual of elementary information serviceable to those to whom it is addressed, and offers suggestive guidance in watchful care, particularly in prevention of neurotic disorders with children. It seems, however, that the treatment is too purely descriptive and even there too hurried. There is after all no very definite practical course of action presented. Something that would be explanatory of the many neurotic manifestations of childhood, particularly the functional ones, which would give meaning to the symptoms which they are warned to observe is what parents are looking for and what would provide a basis for the surest prophylaxis. The slight appreciation of the interpretative attitude is evidenced by the author's summary acceptance of the sexual trauma theory, left behind by psychoanalysis for some years now. His paragraphs on hysteria, "neurasthenia" or on the "forms of insanity" prove that he has not followed the