

protoplasm, the resulting functional units, or cells, have lost much of their pristine versatility. In less cumbersome phrase, the author's, "the safest provisional hypothesis to make about the action of the neurones singly, is, in my opinion, that they retain the modes of behavior common to unicellular animals so far as is consistent with the special conditions of their life as elements in man's nervous system." He characterizes this attempt as "too premature and speculative to be of much value"; he hopes, however, it appears, that the "complexities of human behavior may be found in the end to reduce to compounds of very simple behavior-series in the neurones." Shades of William James and the mind-stuff polemic! are we then deemed (first fruit of the study of protozoan behavior) each a colony of interrelated amebæ, or overgrown and elaborated zoöthamnia, tactic creatures dominated by our immediate environment as much as a paramecium in an electric stream? This is a new sort of determinism, a shocking kind of protozoan materialism, and our pseudopodia will require time to recover from the shock. Or is it an idealistic mirage of the monadism of Leibnitz? Whatever it prove to be else, it certainly sounds more than Professor Thorndike ever meant to suggest in his sane treatise on the original nature of man. It seems not to have occurred to the author that the nature, as well as the hypotheses, might be *too* original, go *too far* back into the hot history of the swirling nebula, thus losing sight of the man because of the multitude (and wisdom) of the cells that incarnate him.

But a book is important, often, somewhat in proportion to its aggressiveness against the mind-traditions of the people. On this account, as well as for others already suggested, the present work is a distinct contribution to contemporary psychology, not to say physiology. It should, therefore, be widely read.

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DIE PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES ICH, IN IHREN GRUNDPROBLEMEN.
Konstantin Oesterreich. Vol. I. Leipzig, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1910. Pp. vii+528.

Some years ago the author undertook certain studies on the psychology of emotions. The first results of those studies were published under the title, "*Die Entfremdung der Wahrnehmungswelt und die Depersonalisation in der Psychasthenie*."¹ The present volume represents a continuation of those studies.

¹Journal f. Psychol. und Neurol., Vol. VII-IX, 1906-1907.

Stimulated by the fact that numerous observations on psychasthenic dissociations which he had come across in connection with his earlier studies remained not only unexplained, but unattached, as it were, to any basic psychologic doctrine or system, Oesterreich conceived that this in itself is a subject worthy of investigation. Accordingly, he devoted himself to the study of the literature bearing on dissociation of personality, with a view to throw some light, if possible, upon the psychogenetics of the process. The present is the preliminary volume, and is devoted mainly to the exposition of the material and data which the author has gathered.

The literature has been searched carefully and critically. In the preparation of the material for this volume the author has also paid some attention to the psychology of so-called ecstatic states. The great significance of ecstasy for the analysis of self-consciousness and dissociations of personality is shown by certain allied conditions encountered in psychasthenic states; and more particularly by the views, more or less traditional in philosophic and religious circles, about the "mergence of self," "annihilation of self," "union of self with divinity," and similarly expressed emotions on the part of religious and other ecstasies — all pointing to some underlying disorder of the feeling of self. A rich material awaits the labor of the keen-visioned psychologist in the auto-descriptive works of those who have experienced such mystical states. The psychological analysis of such works would throw much needed light on numerous problems in psychology, and would be particularly helpful in the study of the psychology and psychopathology of human personality. Oesterreich's own observations on this particular subject are reserved for a subsequent volume.

In the present his task is chiefly to collate those data of general psychology which bear most directly upon the phenomena or processes underlying the feeling or experiencing of selfhood. This is a very broad thesis. In a certain sense it amounts to a standpoint in psychology on the basis of which most, perhaps all, known facts of psychology may be rearranged and restated.

While this has not been done literally, most of the significant general topics in psychology have been taken up in turn and discussed in this work around the problem of personality.

The first chapter, about twenty-six pages in all, considers the relationship of sensations to personality. This leads to the discussions of the sensualistic theories of personality, in two subdivisions: (1) subjectivity of sensorial content, and (2) selfhood as determined by the general sensations.

The third chapter is devoted to sensations and emotions,

and their rôle as component factors in the synthesis of selfhood. Next are considered in order the following topics: The objectivity of mental contents, intellectual contents and selfhood, and the broader philosophical implications of the various theories. Two chapters summarize the problem of self-consciousness, both as an observable phenomenon and as a subjective experience.

The second part of the volume, consisting of nearly two hundred pages, is devoted to a discussion of the various aspects of the process of depersonalization, as follows: Changes in self-consciousness and successive dissociations, simultaneous dissociation, the psychic mechanism of compulsions and its bearing on the problem of dissociation, the psychic foundations of dissociation, the appearance of a secondary personality, the apparent doubling of the primary personality, the psychic schism in dissociation of self.

In the preparation of this volume the works of some three hundred different writers have been consulted. The authors most often quoted are Brentano, Ach, Goethe, Husserl, Meinong, Lippe, Stumpf and Sollier, all but the last German; but the Miss Beauchamp case of Dr. Prince, Flournoy's Helen Smith case, and various cases of Janet and Séglas have also been utilized to illustrate certain points.

The author evinces but little sympathy for the mechanistic standpoint in psychology. The sensualistic theories of personality he finds inadequate. In this respect he has changed somewhat his position since the publication of his former studies on the psychology of the emotions. At that time he was more friendly toward psychological atomism. But a growing appreciation of the heterogeneity of the psychical as contrasted with the homogeneity of the ordinary processes of external nature has made him more cautious.

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DIE PHILOSOPHISCHE AUFFASSUNG DES MITLEIDS. *Eine historisch-kritische Studie.* K. von Orelli. Bonn, A. Marcus & E. Weber, 1912. Pp. iv + 219.

Various religious systems uphold pity as a fundamental virtue. This alone testifies to the great significance of pity in the general make-up of what has been called "human nature." The subject, however, has received but scant philosophical treatment, and almost no attention on the part of psychologists.

But the sentiment of pity and its aberrations cannot fail to