

volume with the striking title of *The Biblical Book*. It is an English translation of a work by Joachim M. Cullen of Buenos Ayres. At least it is the translation of the first part of that work. It consists of meditations and prayers. And the author hopes that Protestants as well as Roman Catholics will use his prayers, even those addressed to the Mother of God.

Mr. Walter Jekyll, M.A., has made selections, and translated them, from some of the principal writings of Schopenhauer, and he has published the whole of the selections in a single handsome

volume, under the title of *The Wisdom of Schopenhauer* (Watts; 6s. net). The selections are made apparently with the double purpose of making Schopenhauer better known, and of encouraging the purely ethical movement of our time.

The first purpose is fulfilled admirably. All that is of characteristic value in Schopenhauer will be found in this volume. The second purpose may be fulfilled also. In any case, it is very likely that this easy translation will give the ideas of Schopenhauer a circulation which they have never had. And it will be chiefly among those who are interested in the Ethical Societies.

Identification of an unnamed Old Testament King.

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THE kings of Damascus, Syria's once famous capital, were influential factors in Palestinian politics throughout the whole period of Old Testament history; from the very necessity involved in their geographical position, their fortunes alternately coincided and collided with those of the smaller kingdoms of those of Israel and Judah, whom they endeavoured with varying success to play off against each other. In accordance with this policy of preserving the balance of power, Benhadad, king of Syria, lent his support to Asa, king of Judah, against Baasha, king of Israel (1 K 15-18 ff.), the result of which was disastrous, so far as Israel was concerned, and meant the loss of a number of cities in the Galilee district to the northern kingdom; while later, in pursuance of the same policy, Rezin of Damascus took the field with Pekah of Israel against Ahaz, king of Judah, which move had the effect of sending Ahaz headlong into the arms of the Assyrian colossus, the price of whose help was the practical as well as the theoretical acknowledgment of his suzerainty. But the reign of the unnamed king of Syria who is the principal figure in 1 K 22 took place between these two periods, *i.e.* about the middle of the ninth century B.C.

Mr. Luckenbill, one of the ablest of the younger school of Assyriologists, has shown in an article to be published in the *American Journal of Semitic*

Languages, of which the present writer has seen the manuscript and proofs, the extreme improbability, if not the actual impossibility, of the generally accepted identification of Benhadad, Ahab's contemporary, and the so-called 'Bir-idri' of Shalmaneser's inscription in which that king specifically mentions Ahab as one of the vassal kings in the opposing army of 'Bir-idri,' king of Syria, whose name we shall presently see should be transcribed 'Adad-idri.' The combined forces of this king Shalmaneser professes to have routed at Karkar, though the fact that he entirely failed to follow up his alleged victory makes one very suspicious of the truth of his statement; while the positive result of Mr. Luckenbill's investigation has been the practically certain discovery of another king of Syria whom we must identify with the unnamed king of Syria in 1 K 22, a king indeed already known under the incorrect name 'Bir-idri,' but a king entirely different from the Benhadad whom Ahab successfully defeated twice, and from whom he received the cities taken by that king's father from Ahab's father Omri.

BENHADAD AND 'BIR-IDRI.'

It is a well-known fact that Benhadad, the name of the king of Syria mentioned in 1 K 20 as Ahab's contemporary, differs from the name of the king of Syria mentioned by Shalmaneser, who

also was a contemporary, and according to Shalmaneser a suzerain of Ahab.

The only king of Syria of Ahab's time whose name is actually given in the Old Testament is a certain Benhadad, while the name of the king given by Shalmaneser has been transcribed by scholars as *Bir-idri* ('*ilu* 1M-idri').

This transcription owes its origin entirely to an attempt to identify the king mentioned by Shalmaneser with the Biblical Benhadad of 1 K 20, who has been quite gratuitously identified with the unnamed king of Syria of 1 K 22.

Undoubtedly, the unnamed king of Syria in 1 K 22, at whose hands Ahab met his death, is one and the same personage as the king of Shalmaneser's inscription, to whom Ahab, prior to his unsuccessful revolt, had been subject, and at whose behests he was compelled to accompany his overlord in the latter's apparently successful attempt to withstand the repeated onslaughts of the Assyrians; but the two other identifications of (1) the Benhadad, king of Syria, whom Ahab twice defeated, and who escaped with his life the second time purely as the result of Ahab's unseasonable clemency (1 K 20), with the unnamed king of Syria in 1 K 22, who completely vanquished Ahab, and (2) the identification of the Benhadad of 1 K 20 with the apparently all-powerful king of Syria mentioned by Shalmaneser, are both highly improbable, and are both alike based on the assumption that Ahab during his reign of twenty-two years can have only known one king of Syria, and that consequently all kings of Syria referred to as having any dealing with Ahab, whether in the cuneiform inscriptions or in the Old Testament, are necessarily one and the same individual; hence philologists have been at great pains to adequately account for the difference in the names given in cuneiform on the one hand, and Hebrew on the other, for this king of Syria whose reign coincided roughly with the reign of Ahab. They have accordingly mustered up all the philological possibilities at their disposal in their endeavour to show that the '*ilu* 1M-idri' is the cuneiform equivalent for Benhadad.

An examination of the two names will demonstrate the arbitrariness of seeking to identify them, while the improbability of the identification of the comparatively powerless Benhadad of 1 K 20 on the one hand, and the powerful unnamed king of 1 K 22, whose power is similarly attested by Shal-

maneser's inscription, on the other, has already been shown. In short, historic probability is against the generally-accepted identification of the two kings, while philologically the theory that the cuneiform '*ilu* 1M-idri' = Benhadad is shown by Luckenbill to be untenable.

'Benhadad' of course = son of Adad, the regular name for the storm-god, the ordinary cuneiform sign for this god being—'1M'; substituting its normal value in the name '*ilu* 1M-idri,' we get '*ilu* Adad-idri'; the second element in this compound name *idri* = 'my helper,' the Aramaic root '*adaru*, being equivalent to the Hebrew '*azaru*, *z* and *d* regularly interchanging. This *idri* is now known as an element of many Mesopotamian personal names of the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. Now the '-ezer' in the Biblical name of 'Hadad-ezer' comes from this same Semitic root = 'to help,' thus we have in *Adad-idri* the cuneiform equivalent of the Hebrew *Hadad-ezer*, though it should be mentioned that the Biblical Hadad-ezer, king of Zobah, lived in the time of David and therefore long before the period with which we are dealing. To this '*ilu* 1M-idri' Luckenbill gives its normal transcription—*Adad-idri*, a transcription which, apart from the anxiety to identify the name with Benhadad, would have been that given by all scholars, but the tacit assumption of the identity of the two kings—'Benhadad' and '*ilu* 1M-idri,' has evoked the very ingenious and the hitherto generally accepted reading '*ilu* Bir-idri,' the *Bir* without the ordinary determinative *ilu* (=god) being attenuated from *Bar*, the Aramaic equivalent of the Hebrew *Ben* = 'son'; the *idri* and *Hadad* were reconciled on the theory that here, as so often elsewhere, the *r* and *d*, which are both very similar in Hebrew and Aramaic writing, have been confused, hence the apparent discrepancy between the latter parts of these two names—the *-idri* and the *-hadad*: such might be a satisfactory argument on behalf of the identity of the two names, but the very dubious transcription of the cuneiform '*ilu* 1M' as *Bir*, and the implied assumption thereby of the existence of a West Semitic god of that name, whose name was thus identical with the Aramaic word for 'son' (= Hebrew *Ben*), which latter assumption, indeed, may or may not find justification in the existence of such names as Bar-rekub, Bar-šur, etc., in the Senjirli inscriptions, yet the uncertainty as to the existence of such a god, and the extreme improbability of the transcription *Bir* for 1M, for it is

purely conjectural, together with the fact that in the gods' lists in which are given the different names by which the deities were known, and the foreign gods with whom they were identified, *Bir* does not occur as the equivalent of the god '*ilu IM*,'—although the latter is identified with some sixty names among which are enumerated *Addu* and *Dadu*, accompanied with an explanatory note to the effect that he is known under these names in '*Amurru*,' *i.e.* Syria-Palestine—as also the historic improbability of the identification which the theory seeks to establish, dispose of the reading *Bir* for *IM*. And as the *IM* cannot be transcribed *Bir*, the only argument which has been brought forward by scholars for the identification of the all-important first part of '*ilu IM-idri*' with the first part of the Biblical Ben-hadad is at once shattered. The '*ilu IM-idri*' who holds his own against the attacks of Shalmaneser II., and to whom, as we learn from the latter's monuments, Ahab owed allegiance, is not to be equated with the Benhadad of 1 K 20, and thus the only reason for giving the '*ilu IM-idri*' a forced transcription no longer exists, and we are able to transcribe the first element in this name in the normal manner, *i.e.* by '*Adad*,' the whole name '*ilu Adad-idri*'

being the exact equivalent of the Hebrew '*Hadad-ezer*.'

Accordingly the king of Syria in 1 K 22, by whom Ahab was defeated and slain at Ramoth-gilead is Hadad-ezer, an entirely different personage from the comparatively impotent Benhadad of 1 K 20.

But one other point remains to be cleared up, and that is, with whom is the Benhadad, king of Syria, who besieged Samaria (2 K 6) in the reign of Jehoram, king of Israel, the second successor of Ahab, to be identified? With this point Luckenbill does not deal, but either the writer of 2 K 6 has given us the wrong name of the king of Syria in question, for Adad-idri succeeded the Benhadad of 1 K 20, some time before Ahab's death, and long before Jehoram's reign, or else another Benhadad came to the throne between Adad-idri and the usurper Hazael. But however that may be, Luckenbill has successfully established the identity of the unnamed king in 1 K 22, and we now know that Ahab had dealings with at least two kings of Syria, and not merely one, as had hitherto been supposed. Thus it is that philology comes to the aid of archæology, and is at times of even greater value to the historian of antiquity than the pottery of ruined mounds and the treasures of buried tombs.

Recent Foreign Theology.

Wendland on the Miracles.¹

PROFESSOR WENDLAND has produced the book on miracles for which many of us have been waiting. To name a treatment of the subject at once positive, modern, and intelligent, has for some time been difficult; if we had the present work in English it would be difficult no longer. Not that the line taken is wholly original; what is original is rather the quiet reasonableness and open-eyed knowledge with which a large number of wholesome ideas are systematically and convincingly expounded. Pope's line recurs:

What oft was thought, but ne'er so well expressed.

Wendland writes with buoyancy, his command of the subject is impressive, and, what is still more

¹ *Der Wunderglaube im Christentum*. Von Johannes Wendland, Professor der Theologie in Basel. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1910, pp. 134. Price M.3.

valuable, he is careful to bring out at each point the religious significance of the issues. As he puts it on the first page, faith in miracle is simply faith in the living God. The *living* God—not one who cannot or will not act in the world, or one who acts by iron necessity. Hence the definition: 'Miracles are acts of God producing a new condition of things not already latent in the existing texture of the world' (p. 8). One of the excellences in Wendland's position is that he distinctly rejects the old (Thomistic) view of miracle as contrary to the laws of nature. It is pure mythology to suppose that the course of events is subject to '*immutable laws*.' So far from that, God, just because He is alive, is perpetually and creatively active in the phenomenal sphere. Doubtless there would be a contravention of the world-order if we were entitled to think of the ideas of '*natural laws*' and '*the causal nexus*' either as metaphysically valid in the ultimate sense

or as exhaustive descriptions of reality. But this is just what they are not. Reality has other aspects, and these the categories of science and history can never apprehend. The strict equivalence of cause and effect is an unproved and unprovable dogma; so is the notion that nature is a closed mechanical system; the only legitimate principle of causality is that every event has a cause, and, in perfect harmony with that principle, we are justified in holding it to be always possible that God may open a new future, pouring into the world new streams of life and energy, and so rearranging even physical forces as to bring out new results. We must not confine His action to the physical order, much less put the physical order in His place. For God is transcendent as well as immanent, and 'no one form of divine operation is more direct than another.' On the contrary, the world is in living relation to Him; and miracles are but the product or expression within the phenomenal realm of His transcendent being. Nothing could be better than the passage in which Wendland replies to the familiar argument that miraculous action would be on God's part an impeachment of the unchangeable world-order He had Himself established. This plainly assumes that such an unchangeable order exists: but what if there is no such thing? And that there is no such thing is really presupposed in every view of human history which regards it as more than clock-work running down. In sober truth, reality is richer far than this. At every moment the condition of the universe admits of an infinity of possibilities in the future. And the demand of Christian faith in miracle, as Professor Wendland puts it, 'is at bottom that new beginnings occur, not springing of necessity from the previous state of the world. This contradicts no axiom of science, no law of thought.'

The writer sees with perfect clearness that it is futile to limit miracles to the past. He meets the statement 'Miracles do not happen now' with a direct negative. And he disposes of the notion that they occur only in the sphere of mind. It is impossible to split the one world in two with a hatchet. Faith is needed to perceive the reality of miracle, but—here his good sense comes out—it is illegitimate to insist on the recognition of the miraculous by either science or history. All they can say is: *Non liquet*, and their duty is to say it. Another point made very incisively is that Providence is inconceivable apart from

miracle. Any other view really amounts to describing God and His government of the world in purely impersonal terms; which is what always happens when the mechanical order is interposed between God and us, or when the 'natural laws,' which for special scientific purposes we have abstracted from the multiplicity of phenomena, are interpreted as being a *full* expression of the Divine will. It is meaningless to speak of God as ruling all things, except as we believe in the possibility of incessant new departures. New departures do not shatter the historical nexus; they enrich it. All this has, of course, a vital bearing on the question of prayer. Prayer does not change God, but it changes His operation by furnishing the necessary antecedent condition of His action. And the notion that the hearing of prayer is implicitly a disturbance of God's plan is defensible only—here we come back to basal principles—if the present condition of the cosmos is a perfect expression, a completely satisfactory manifestation, of the purpose of Eternal Love.

Wendland gives us principles; he does comparatively little in the way of applying them to the Bible narrative of specific miraculous events. Obviously, except where men hold verbal inspiration, there will always be considerable variety of exegetical opinion as to particulars. We may quote, however, his conclusions as to the resurrection of Jesus Christ. 'Questions of detail,' he writes, 'as to the mode and manner in which Jesus could manifest Himself to the disciples, must remain in shadow; for the supersensible will always evade exact investigation. But a real fact is at the basis of the appearances. Historical research may go no further than to ascertain the fact of visions. That they were not purely subjective visions, but the product of a transcendent reality,—this is the interpretation of faith; but it is an interpretation which is both right and inevitable.' H. R. MACKINTOSH.

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⊗ Theological Survey.¹

DR. IHMELS of Leipzig is fast winning his way to a place in the front rank of present-day German

¹ *Centralfragen der Dogmatik in der Gegenwart*. Sechs Vorlesungen, von D. Ludwig Ihmels. Leipzig: Deichert; 1911. M.3.80.

theologians. His style is the most simple and terse of any that we know. Committed to no one school, he is a conservative eclectic in the best sense. His elaborate treatise *Die christliche Wahrheitsgewissheit, ihr letzter Grund und ihre Entstehung*, now in a second improved edition, is a searching discussion of a burning question. Its exposition and defence of the Protestant position is conclusive. The briefer work mentioned below is equally excellent. The six lectures, delivered to school teachers at the suggestion of the Saxon Ministry of Education, discuss the trend of German thought at present on the central points of Christian faith. The work is a companion to a work on similar lines by Professor Kittel on O.T. religion which has appeared in an English dress. The questions discussed are truly central—the cry for Undogmatic Christianity, the Nature and Absoluteness of Christianity, the Nature of Revelation, the Person of Jesus, the Work of Jesus, the Certitude of Faith. Current views on these subjects are stated and criticised both in their truth and defects. In this way the position taken by Ritschl, Kaftan, Troeltsch, Dreyer, and especially the influence of Schleiermacher, are set in relation to the author's own views. Dr. Ihmels keeps the dis-

cussion within manageable dimensions by resolutely ignoring side issues and subordinate details. He points out that the protest made against dogma in religion is sometimes against all dogma, and sometimes simply against the traditional dogma of the Church, and has no difficulty in showing that if religion is essentially faith in God, knowledge and dogma are inevitable, and, again, that the dogma coming down from early days relates to facts of redemption in which the Reformation made no material change. The most valuable chapter, perhaps, is the last one, on Christian Certainty. It is conceded at once that religious judgments are judgments of faith, not of science in the strict sense, and so subjectivism to a certain extent belongs to them: but the same is true on all subjects outside the sphere of demonstration. In the last resort the security of Christian faith is rooted in the fact of experience. After discussing Kaftan's and Troeltsch's teaching on the question, the author finally accepts Frank's way of stating the truth as the most satisfactory. The notes appended at the end of the work amount to a substantial addition to the lectures, and the references to other writers are very helpful.

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Contributions and Comments.

Selah as 'Reverential Prostration.'

At the end of the article on 'Temple and Temple-service' in Cheyne-Black's *Encyclopædia Biblica* (col. 4955, below) Rev. G. H. Box states that the choir of Levites, to the accompaniment of instrumental music, sang the psalm of the day, which was divided into three sections; at the close of each section a body of priests¹ blew three blasts on the silver trumpets, and the people prostrated themselves in worship; the singing of the psalm closed the morning service, and the private sacrifices were proceeded with.²

I read this article for the first time on December 8, 1910, and it occurred to me at once that this *prostration* during the psalmody at the close of the morning service might be indicated by the Biblical *Selah*. I have since found (by looking up the references under *Selah* in the new edition of

Gesenius' Heb. lexicon) that this explanation was suggested fourteen years ago by B. Jacob, of Göttingen, in Stade's *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*, vol. xvi. (Giessen, 1896) p. 139 (cf. *ibid.*, pp. 144 and 170).³

At the end of his valuable paper, Dr. Jacob states that the etymology of *Selah* is unknown. I believe, however, that *Selah* is connected with the Heb. verb *salál*, which means originally *to throw*. The noun *selah* denotes *throwing down, prostration in adoration*. This is practically the explanation suggested by Hitzig in his commentary on the Psalms (Leipzig, 1863), p. 15. Hitzig, however, combined *Selah* with Arab. *ṣállâ* (Assyr. *ṣullû*), *to pray*, which is impossible. The original meaning of *ṣállâ*, *to pray*, is *to cause to incline* (the ear).⁴ Syr. *ṣělâ* means *to incline*, the reflexive *iqṣlêl* denotes *to bend*. In Ethiopic, *ṣalâwa* means *to incline* (the ear), and *ṣallâya* denotes *to pray*. The noun *ṣalôt*,