

we have spoken. His common sense, sufficiently apparent in his philosophical views, is also illustrated by his uncompromising attack on judicial astrology, and on magical pretensions in general, in the first and second books of the *Policraticus*. He has no faith in the objective truth of the stories of witchcraft which obtained credence in such high quarters as late as the 17th century. The Witches' Sabbaths, which some supposed witches assert that they have attended, are only dreams sent by evil spirits.* The one incident which John tells us of his boyhood in England is highly characteristic of his unsuperstitious temper. A certain priest, to whom he was sent to learn his Psalter, indulged in the not even now extinct practice of consulting the "magic crystal" by means of an innocent child. He attempted to use John, among others, for this purpose. "It happened that he made me, and a boy somewhat bigger than I, after some wicked preliminaries, to sit at his feet and attend to the sacrilegious business of this mirror, so that by our means there might be shown him that which he sought, either in nails smeared by some consecrated oil or chrism, or in the clean smooth body of a basin. When, then, after first uttering some names which seemed to me, by the horror I felt at them, child as I was, to be those of demons, and also making some preliminary adjurations which, thank God, I do not know, my comrade had declared that he saw some shapes, dim and cloudy indeed, I for my part turned out so blind at this business, that nothing appeared to me but the nails or basin and the rest of the things that I knew to be there before. So I was after this judged useless for this sort of practice, and was condemned, as a hinderer of these sacrilegious proceedings, not to approach to any such, and, as often as they had resolved to make these practices, I was shut out as an impediment to any divination. So gracious was the Lord to me in my tender age."† With this quotation, so illustrative of the rational piety and judicious scepticism of our author, we may for the present take our leave of him.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF MR. SHADWORTH HODGSON.

By G. F. STOUT, M.A.

"The Principle," says Mr. Hodgson, "which I think I have established beyond the possibility of reversal is that of Reflection. Whatever other parts of the system may be found to be untenable this

* *Pol.*, ii, 17.

† *Ib.*, ii, 28.

will stand." The first question, then, which confronts us in our present inquiry is: What does Mr. Hodgson mean by "Reflection"? On p. 100 of the *Philosophy of Reflection*, we find a general statement on this point which followed up in the same chapter by a more detailed analysis. The general statement is as follows: "Philosophy is distinguished from science by being an exercise of reflective as distinguished from direct consciousness. Its principle is the mode of self-consciousness and its method is prescribed by that principle; it consists in a repeated analysis of phenomena as they are *in* consciousness, as parts or states of it; and not in their character as objects outside consciousness, for consciousness to stand and look at. For objects in this latter character, as objects for consciousness to stand and look at, may be treated *also* as objects *in* consciousness; and this way of treating phenomena is therefore more general, being applicable to *all* phenomena, and not to those only which have the character of objects for consciousness to stand and look at; this more general treatment is the method of reflection."

With these statements then the Philosophy of Mr. Shadworth Hodgson stands or falls. Our first task, therefore, will be to make perfectly clear to ourselves what these statements mean. Now, it seems to me that their meaning is twofold. One part of it is clear and irrefragable: the other is in the highest degree obscure and dubious. The clear and irrefragable part is as follows: Between Philosophy and other modes of knowing there is this essential difference. In other modes of cognitions we have thoughts about things, but we do not think about our thoughts; we only think of the things. Objects are known, but the fact that they are known is disregarded; their existence alone is considered and relation of this existence to our cognitive consciousness is left out of count. We have ideas of things, but not ideas of our ideas of things. In Philosophy, on the contrary, objects are considered, not in their relation to each other in the way of causation and so forth, but in their relation to the thought which takes cognisance of them. Its method is, therefore, the method of Socrates, and it consists in the analysis of ideas. Objects are considered by it in their subjective aspect—in their relation to the consciousness which is aware of their existence or non-existence.

This is what I myself understand by the principle and method of reflection, and so far as Mr. Hodgson means this, and no more than this, I am absolutely at one with him. Throughout this paper I shall not advance a single criticism of the Hodgsonian philosophy which is not, in this sense, based on reflective analysis. Mr. Hodgson has appealed unto Cæsar and to Cæsar he shall go.

According, I impeach before the judgment seat of the reflective

method, Mr. Hodgson's own account of that method. I accuse him of having surreptitiously introduced into his exposition of the nature of reflection a baseless, false and mischievous assumption. He assumes that because consciousness refers to an object, that object is, *eo ipso*, a state of consciousness. He assumes that it is the very same state of consciousness which takes cognisance of it. To justify this accusation I have to prove two points—(1) That Mr. Hodgson actually holds the view imputed to him; (2) That this view is a baseless assumption surreptitiously introduced.

(1) In proof of the first point I adduce Mr. Hodgson's peculiar doctrine of objective and subjective aspects. According to this doctrine cognitive consciousness and the object cognised by it are not elements, but distinguishable aspects of one and the same existence. If we inquire what is meant by aspect, the answer is sufficiently clear and unambiguous. "*Aspect*, as a philosophical term, means a character coextensive with and peculiar to the thing of which it is an aspect. This is the formal definition. But for full understanding of it we must take into account Mr. Hodgson's emphatic and repeated warning against the confusion of aspects with elements. When we distinguish the aspects of anything, we do not distinguish parts composing it. Under each aspect we have the whole thing. Thus, every element of cognitive consciousness is also an element of the object cognised, and *vice versâ*. If any doubt remain as to the meaning of the term aspect, the following passage will remove it: "Be it observed" (and this is the root of the matter) "it is not sufficient to constitute an Existent that two opposite *aspects* are put together. For that you need *elements*. Otherwise there is nothing of which the aspects are predicable, or of which they are aspects. The requisite 'something,' the existent, which has the double aspect, must first be constituted; and this it is by its constituent elements." When, therefore, Mr. Hodgson says that thing and the consciousness are opposite aspects, he means that they are the same thing regarded from different points of view, just as the line AB remains the same line, whether we consider it as the line from A to B or from B to A. Hence he constantly speaks of objects as compounded of states of consciousness. Our consciousness of things is the perception that *the feelings and thoughts composing them* are felt; our consciousness of self is the perception that those feelings and thoughts are feelings and thoughts (*Philosophy of Reflection*, vol. i, p. 110). "If we take the objective aspect of complete empirical things we find our object matter consisting of solids in various combinations and in various modes of motion. . . . All other qualities of objects . . . are attributes, are states of consciousness which arise in nerve substance on its being brought into connection with

these solid moving objects. The resistance, solidity, and motion of the objects themselves are likewise subjective in the last resort; but this group of feelings or qualities are now sundered from the rest, and set apart in combination, to form the objects themselves" (*Ib.* ii, 70). We have separated one group of *states of consciousness* as "things," and referred the other states of consciousness to it as its qualities or attributes.

(2) In the next place we have to show that this identification of cognitive consciousness with object cognised is surreptitiously assumed, and that the assumption is baseless and false. It is surreptitiously assumed because the question of its truth or falsity is never raised. It is throughout taken for granted that the method of reflection consists in analysing objects into their component states of consciousness. Thus in the general explanation of the Method of Reflection which we quoted at the beginning of this paper, Mr. Hodgson says, "It consists in a repeated analysis of phenomena as they are *in* consciousness, or as *parts* or *states* of it," &c. Nor is this merely a provisional postulate afterwards justified. Throughout the whole book I find no indication whatever that Mr. Hodgson suspects himself of making an assumption. He evidently supposes that he starts without presuppositions. That consciousness and the object to which it refers are the same thing regarded from different points of view is for him as indisputable and ultimate as the fact of self-consciousness itself.

Now I maintain from the standpoint of reflective analysis that this assumption is baseless and false. Examine the relation of the process of thinking to the object thought of in any case whatever, and you will discover in every instance that the object is not and cannot be merely a modification or content or state of consciousness at the moment at which you think of, *i.e.*, have any kind of perception or idea of it.

It will be seen that I meet Mr. Hodgson's thesis not with a particular contradictory but with a universal contrary. This is in excess of what controversial logic demands. But my aim is not primarily controversial. My aim is to determine accurately what the verdict of reflective analysis on this vital question actually is.

The manifold absurdities to which we are inevitably led, if we identify the existence of an idea with the existence of the thing of which it is an idea, have been pointed out most lucidly and forcibly by Professor James. Thus in vol. i. of his *Principles*, p. 236: "If the thing is composed of parts, then we suppose that the thought of the thing must be composed of the thoughts of the parts. If one part of the thing have appeared in the same thing or in other things on former occasions, why then we must be having even now the very

same idea of that part which was there on those occasions. If the thing is simple its thought is simple. If it is multitudinous, it must require a multitude of thoughts to think it. If a succession, only a succession of thoughts can know it. If permanent, its thought is permanent. And so on *ad libitum*." It is some comfort to me that in challenging this doctrine I have Professor James for an ally.

The issue before us is this:—Can an object of thought as such be present in its entirety in the consciousness of the thinker at which he thinks of it? Now, when I say, Is it consciousness? I mean,—Is its existence at the moment an experience of the conscious subject at the moment?—is it at the time a modification or state of consciousness? Consider first the thought of a material thing as existing in space. When I perceive a tree, I have in my consciousness a certain complex of visual, tactual motor and other elements with their protensive and extensive forms, partly consisting of actual sensations and partly of revived residua of past sensations. But these experiences are not the object thought of. What I think of is the tree regarded as something existing and persisting independently of me and my fleeting consciousness. Even if we fully accept the "Psychological Idealism" of Mill, we must deny that the perceived object as it is perceived is a present modification of consciousness. According to this view it is a group of permanent possibilities of sensation. The postulate on which it rests as explicitly formulated by Mill is "that after having had an actual sensation we can conceive a possible sensation. Now to conceive a possible sensation as such is to think about a sensation without actually experiencing it. Thus even according to the sensational idealism of Mill, a physical phenomenon is not an appearance in the individual consciousness. Take next the case in which we explicitly think of a present sensation as such. If it is under any conditions possible for the object of thought to be wholly present in the consciousness of the thinker when he thinks of it, it ought to be possible in this case. If introspective knowledge is not immediate then no knowledge is immediate. Now it will be found by applying the method of reflective analysis that whenever we try to think about our own immediate experience, we can do so only by investing it with attributes and relations which are not immediately experienced. For example, I may think of a momentary appearance in consciousness as an occurrence in my mental history, an incident in my experience. But neither my experience as a whole, nor the position and relations of any part within that whole can be given as a present modification of any momentary consciousness. Again, I can think of the general nature of the content present in consciousness abstracting from the fact of its presentation. In this case also I

am obviously not thinking exclusively of the momentary appearance. The presented content is regarded as having a quality which remains identical through the flux of its appearances. In this last instance the content is generalised by thought. All generalisation in like manner involves an objective reference which transcends the momentary consciousness. What is essential to a general concept or a universal judgment is indefinite applicability. All generalisation implies the thought of an unlimited series of particular instances. But it is needless to point out that from the very nature of an infinite series it can only be thought of, not immediately experienced. We may close this series of test cases by considering the mental attitude expressed by the word *Desire*. Whoever desires, desires something. Now what is it that is desired? Is it an immediate content of consciousness? Is it actually experienced at the moment in which it is desired? To say that it is so is palpably absurd. If the object of desire were actually present in consciousness, the desire would be satisfied from the outset. In other words, it could never exist. In order to be able to desire the pleasures of eating, I must think of them without actually experiencing them. I may indeed experience them and at the same time desire their continuance. But their continuance is not an immediate experience at the moment of desire; it is something which is anticipated in thought. We are able to "look before and after, and sigh for what is not" only because thought can refer to an object which is not present in the consciousness of the thinker at the time.

My own reflective analysis of cognitive consciousness, so far as it is relevant to the present question, may be stated with all possible brevity as follows. In the process by which we take cognisance of an object two constituents are distinguishable. (1) A thought-reference to something which as the thinker means or intends it is not a present modification of his consciousness at the time. I say with emphasis, "as the thinker means or intends it," because this is just the point on which I appeal to the method of reflection. To say that the object of the thought is a present modification of the consciousness of the thinker, is to give the lie direct to the essential import of the thought. (2) The second constituent of the total state is some more or less specific content of consciousness which defines and determines the direction of thought to this or that special object. This specifying content we may call a presentation. Thus in the perception of a tree the reference to an object is circumscribed and directed by a plexus of visual and other presentation, including representations, &c. It is a material thing, not a mental occurrence, a tree and not a stone, an oak and not an elm. The thought-reference together with the presentation or specifying content through which the object is discriminated,

form in their union what in ordinary language is called an *idea*.* The word *idea* in its usual and untechnical signification is not synonymous with *presentation* as above defined. It includes an objective reference of which a presentation is the vehicle. A presentation is an idea only in so far as it fulfils the function of making thought discriminative.

For the reasons assigned I cannot accept Mr. Hodgson's doctrine of Subjective and Objective Aspects—his identification of the existence of the object cognised with the existence of the state of the individual consciousness which takes cognisance of it. I am, however, fully prepared to hear that I have misinterpreted his doctrine. I think it very likely that I have done so. But I should like to know what other interpretation can be put upon his words, and especially on the passages quoted, than that which I have given to them. To prevent misconception of my meaning, I must say a word about things in themselves. From my insistence on the distinct existence of thinking and things thought of, it may be supposed that I advocate the possibility of unknowable existences. I must therefore emphatically declare that this doctrine is as repugnant to me as it is to Mr. Hodgson. An existence of which nobody can have an idea seems to me to be an absurdity. The supposition takes away all meaning from the word existence. For where there is no thought there can be no meaning. The whole doctrine of the unknowable is consequently the quintessence of nonsense.

We now have considered the general doctrine of Subjective and Objective Aspects. But before quitting this topic we must very carefully examine a passage in the second chapter of the *Philosophy of Reflection*, in which Mr. Hodgson professes to give us a formal "Analysis of the 'moment' of self-consciousness or reflection, and the relation in which it stands to both the primary and direct states of consciousness." I say that he professes to give such an analysis, because, in point of fact, at this most critical and important stage of his task he drops in a most unaccountable and disconcerting way into a question of history. What makes the matter worse is, that the department of history into which he plunges without a word of apology or explanation, is the most difficult and obscure that there is. He proceeds, without apparent misgiving, to give us a chapter in baby psychology. He distinguishes three successive stages through which the earliest baby-consciousness passes. Primary consciousness comes first, then reflective in a rudimentary form, and then direct. We must, I presume, regard this mainly as an

* Except that in ordinary language the word "idea" is not used in the case of sense-perception.

illustrative hypothesis intended to set in a clear light the distinction and inter-relations of the three modes of consciousness (by showing how one may be supposed to arise through modification or development of another, the reflective growing out of the primary, and the direct out of the reflective).

Primary consciousness, we are told, consists in "a series of feelings and thoughts existing without their being referred to objects at the time, by the sentient being." In some way or other the perception of independent objects and the perception of a percipient subject supervene upon or are developed out of these primary states. "If we would avoid any unfounded assumption in our analysis, that is, any admission into our analysis as ultimate or unanalysable fact, of what is really analysable, we must begin by assuming no more than the series of feelings and thoughts *per se*, unreferred (by their subject) either to objects or to self. . . . The series of feelings and thoughts *per se* is the groundwork of the whole; and this must be submitted to further analysis in order to see whether it will or will not furnish us with an account, or become the analysis of the two other members of our object-matter, namely, objects and self."

Clearly Mr. Hodgson's position is that "primary consciousness" contains all the elementary constituents of direct and reflective consciousness. In order to explain the nature of reflective and of direct consciousness, we have only to show in what specific manner they are compounded out of the elements present in those primary states which are the groundwork of the whole. It is obvious also that when we view the matter in this way the analysis of the derivative modes may be stated in the narrative form as belonging at least to the problematic history of at least a hypothetical infant.

In order to follow this problematic history, we must first form a clear conception of what Mr. Hodgson means by "primary consciousness." To me this has proved a difficult task. I can indeed frame a fairly distinct idea of a series of immediate experiences without reference to an object. But I cannot understand how such a series can contain "thoughts" as well as feelings. A thought which thinks of nothing is to me a contradiction in terms.

To this point I shall revert later. At present it will be most convenient for me to explain how I myself conceive the possibility of an objectless consciousness.

It is easy to show that there is by no means a complete coincidence between the existence of presentations and their significance for thought. They may exist as possible material for discriminative thinking without being actually utilised to the full extent in which they are susceptible of being utilised. At this

moment I am thinking about psychological topics. I receive at the same time a multitude of diversified impressions from surrounding things which certainly enter into my total experience. But if I refer them to an object at all, I do so in a very indeterminate way. My thought-discrimination is very far from keeping pace with the differentiation of the sensory data as immediately experienced. To quote a writer who has fallen into undeserved neglect: "We may see leaves falling from the trees, birds flying in the air, or cattle grazing upon the ground, without affirming, or denying, or thinking anything concerning them, and yet perhaps . . . upon being asked a minute after we could remember what we had seen. A man may have beheld a field from his window a hundred times without ever observing whether it were square or pentangular, and yet the figure was exhibited to his view every time he looked at it." A single sweep of the eye takes in an indefinite multitude of sensory details. But to make each of these severally significant for thought would require a long series of successive acts of attention. Of course the total impression which they collectively constitute may be significant, as in our first glance at a landscape before we begin to observe its component parts. The essential point is the antithesis between the detailed determinateness of presentation and the comparative indeterminateness of discriminative thinking. The relative independence of presentation is perhaps even more strikingly illustrated by our organic sensations. These appear to be constantly present in every moment of waking life—perhaps even in sleep. But, for the most part, they enter our trains of thought only in the vaguest way, if at all. Occasionally we say I feel well, or I feel ill, or I feel tired, or I feel bright, or I feel dull. But for the most we do not take any definite note of our condition. When we do so, we are always aware, if we reflect on the point, that the sensations which determine our judgment are not created by it, but are prior to it.

The same point may be illustrated by that process of generalisation in which we have in our consciousness what Locke calls a "particular image with a universal signification." The particular image may be that of a plane triangle drawn in red ink on a white background; the lengths of its sides may be three, four, and five inches respectively; either its vertex or its base may be uppermost, or it may occupy some intermediate position. Now what we are thinking of may be the equality of the angles of any triangle to two right angles. In that case, the various details of the presented triangle which we have enumerated are irrelevant. They are without ideal significance. On this point I may quote Mr. Bradley: "We have ideas of redness, of a foul smell, of a horse, and of death; and as we call them up

more or less distinctly, there is a kind of redness, a sort of offensiveness, some image of a horse and some appearance of mortality, which rises before us. And should we be asked: Are roses red? Has coal gas a foul smell? Is that white beast a horse? Is it true that he is dead? we should answer, Yes." But the presented redness "may have been that of a lobster, the smell that of castor oil, the imaged horse may have been a black horse, and death perhaps a withered flower." These presentations contain much that is irrelevant to the idea. Ideal significance belongs only to that part of their content which determines the thought-reference.

Presentation considered as having an existence relatively independent of thought may be called *Sentience*, or *Anoetic* consciousness. Thought and sentience are fundamentally distinct mental functions.

The question may be raised whether a sentient being could exist entirely devoid of thought—a creature for which the meaning of the verb to be would have no existence. May not the oyster or, at any rate, the amoeba have such a consciousness, a mere immediate experience without any reference to an object? For my part I can only reply that I do not know and dare not guess.

But the problematic conception of such a being is in some respects instructive. In the first place, it would seem that in regard to it the antithesis of Subject and Object would be meaningless. The relation of content of consciousness to consciousness in general would be only a relation of whole to part—of a particular mode of sentience to the total sentience. In such a case the words of Reid would apply without reservation: "The sensation can be nothing else than it is felt to be. Its very essence consists in being felt; and when it is not felt it is not. There is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it—they are one and the same thing. In sensation there is no object distinct from the act of the mind by which it is felt."

Now what difference, if any, is to be found between this conception of anoetic consciousness and Mr. Hodgson's "primary consciousness." It would appear from his own words that we are to distinguish between a simpler and a more complex phase of primary experience, and it would also seem that the simpler phase is identical with what I have called anoetic experience. The passage to which I allude occurs p. 109: "Low organisms may clearly have feelings of heat and cold, pressure, light, and so on, without referring these to independent objects around them. Organisms better endowed have more complicated series of feelings; comparison of feelings becomes possible; groups of feelings can be put together and distinguished from other groups. But this is a process not of feeling only but

of *thought*; and still it has not been necessary to suppose any reference of these feelings, groups of feelings, or comparison of feelings to independent objects."

Now my difficulty is this. I can understand how it is that the simpler phase involves no reference to an object, being a purely anoetic experience. But I utterly fail to understand how the later phase grows out of this, or how it can be regarded as a more complex modification of it. *A fortiori*, I fail to understand the transition to the reflective stage in which subject and object are distinguished from each other. On the other hand, if I begin with the more complex phase of primary consciousness, I do not see how it can be properly described as objectless.

If it can compare its own feelings and put together groups, and distinguish them from other groups, it must be able to distinguish the quality of its experiences from their mere occurrence. Moreover, it must be able to think of their occurrence. It is not enough that the occurrence merely takes place. In short, one state of consciousness must be capable of taking cognisance of others, and of their relations. Such a consciousness is certainly not objectless.

Now, as I said, this puts me in a dilemma. If I begin with the simpler stage of primary consciousness I find an impassable chasm gaping between me and reflective consciousness. If I begin with the more complex, in which *thought* is possible, I do not see that there is any essential difference between them.

Let us try the simpler phase. How can it possibly "become the analysis," or contain the rational explanation either of the more complex phase or of the "moment of reflective consciousness"? Remember that we must on no account introduce an essentially new kind of element into this primitive experience. It must be regarded as through and through constituted by mere modifications of anoetic sentience.

These modifications have indeed a protensive and extensive form. But their protension and extension is merely experienced. It is not thought of. Now abiding strictly by the logical conditions of the problem, we inquire how can this objectless consciousness become capable of referring to objects, by mere internal development—mere unfolding of its own potentialities. So far as I can see the question is an absurdity. Mere changes in the order of the successive and simultaneous occurrence of these immediate experiences, or in their duration, or in their sensuous quality, are absolutely irrelevant. Manipulate them as you like, there is not the quiver of an advance towards the construction of the thought of an object out of a series of purely anoetic experiences.

Now let us try the alternative view. Let us begin with a primary experience, which can think of its own states, their qualities and relations, but not of physical things. Immediately we are overwhelmed by a flood of perplexities. How does this primary consciousness, which is also a thinking consciousness, get itself evolved out of the earlier primary consciousness which has no thoughts? If thought is really primitive, why does not Mr. Hodgson frankly and explicitly acknowledge it as a fundamental and inseparable element of human consciousness—at least co-ordinate with protensive and extensive form and with feeling? Above all, what is the essential difference between the comparing and distinguishing and identifying thought of primary experience, and that perception of an object which, according to Mr. Hodgson, first arises in the moment of reflection? Here I must again quote, “What,” asks Mr. Hodgson, “is the first and simplest reflection, which arises in the primary consciousness of an infant? The answer, which is given by introspection, is simple. It is this: these (primary) thoughts and feelings are not only thoughts and feelings, but bundles of constantly connected thoughts and feelings, that is, ‘things.’ The connection between them belongs to them. Therefore they are *things* as well as and without ceasing to be *states of consciousness*. They have a double aspect; that which was undistinguished has, I now see, a distinction into consciousness and object of consciousness.” Again, “Our consciousness of things is the perception that *the feelings and thoughts comprising them* are felt; our consciousness of self is the perception that these feelings and thoughts are *feelings and thoughts*.” The object in reflective consciousness is thus identified with certain relations connecting primary states. But the primary consciousness in its complex state itself comprehends thoughts of the relations between its states. Where, then, is the essential difference in this respect between primary and reflective experience? As regards the distinction between subjective and objective aspects I shall provisionally accept Mr. Hodgson’s account just for the sake of argument, though I must add, in parenthesis, that, considered as a narrative of something which takes place in the mind of a baby, this account seems to me to be grotesquely improbable. Taking Mr. Hodgson on his own terms, let us now examine the transition which he supposes his baby to make from reflective to direct or separative consciousness in which objects appear as things distinct and separate from the cognitive subject. I give it in his own words, p.114:—“Let us now endeavour to trace the method by which this direct and separative consciousness springs from the distinction of aspects drawn by reflection. Primary consciousness suffices to separate groups or bundles of percepts, existing simply as states of consciousness, from

one another, and the body of the observer is one of the groups. It is that group round which the rest seem to cluster; which is present when any of the rest are; and which is also present when feelings are experienced which have no visible and tangible existence outside the body, or at any rate only an imagined one; I mean such as heat and cold, internal bodily sensations, appetites, desires, and emotions. Upon this state of perception, reflection supervenes, whereby feelings and thoughts are distinguished as being at once feelings and thoughts as well as what we afterwards call 'things.' Two analyses have then to be combined, that given by primary consciousness into separate groups, and that given by reflection of every group into inseparable aspects. Some *hypothesis* has to be found which will render easy the holding together of these two analyses. The hypothesis adopted is, that all feelings belong to the body, and that this 'thing' which is already separate from other 'things' is different in kind from them, inasmuch as it is the abode and source of feelings; in other words the body becomes a person."

Now to me this passage is the most perplexing to be found in Mr. Hodgson's writings. In the first place what motive has this remarkable infant for framing a hypothesis? What difficulty is it in? It knows about certain groups of states of consciousness and it finds that one of these is constantly present together with each of the others as they successively occur. What more does it want? Why should it set about framing a hypothesis? Why does not Mr. Hodgson's philosophy satisfy it? But if this restless and mischievous infant will take it into its head to construct hypotheses, we have at least a right to expect that it will construct them out of no other material than that which it possesses, according to the inventory of its riches as given by Mr. Hodgson himself. But the hypothesis adopted is that the body is the "abode and source" of feelings. Now what does Mr. Hodgson's reflective baby know about "abodes and sources," or about what we call a "body"? How it can deliberately say to itself that a certain fixed order among certain of its conscious states is the abode and source of other fixed orders among other states, I cannot attempt to imagine. The infant occupying the Hodgsonian standpoint must know from the outset that its hypothesis is a lie. It knows that "things" are composed of states of consciousness grouped in a certain way, and it therefore must reject with infantile indignation the suggestion that they are separate from, and independent of, his consciousness, and that one of them is the house in which the rest are shut up, or the well from which they are drawn.

I do not see why the baby *should* frame any hypothesis at all in the matter, and still less do I see how it could frame the one

attributed to it. Having grasped the distinctive principle of Mr. Hodgson's philosophy, I do not understand why it should let it slip again. Still less do I see any reason why, having once got rid of it, it should on reaching years of discretion recur to it once more.

SYMPOSIUM—IS HUMAN LAW THE BASIS OF MORALITY, OR MORALITY OF HUMAN LAW?

I.—By PROFESSOR J. BROUGH, LL.D.

Problem.

THAT one thing is the "basis" of another may be made to mean almost anything you please. All depends on how you identify the things and interpret the relation.

As regards the things now in question—What Human Law is, may be thought definite enough, even although Austin has spent so much pains in elucidating the matter, but morality is a vaguer term, while the metaphor of base and superstructure is about as vague as metaphors are made. Of course the interpretation must be made which will give us a problem best worth discussing and most convenient now to discuss.

Human law in the sense determined by Austin may be discussed in its relation to either morality in Austin's sense, Positive Morality, or morality in the popular sense, Austin's Divine law. Its relation to positive morality offers an important problem to historical science, Which is the earlier form of social legislation? Does force residing in definite authoritative persons first give to society its cohesion, and so supply the sphere of social interaction within which positive morality subsequently grows? Or does society cohere by virtue of inner attractions between items of humanity, create for itself the atmosphere of positive morality, and then, as one among other advances in differentiation, lodge the enforcement of the deeper conditions of social harmony in a definite nucleus of authoritative persons?

A problem of a different kind, and one of practical rather than scientific interest, would be the mutual influence of positive law and positive morality in shaping each the content of the other, and as a consideration for the conscious legislator when he draws up his schemes.

Human law may also be discussed in relation to morality popularly so called, ideal conduct, Austin's Divine law. This latter phrase reminds us that it is objectionable to treat the two as having an