

the occupied territory. "Thus, throughout the past, we are presented with the anomaly of men fighting to maintain the institutionalized vestiges of the self-assertion of aggressive individuals on the occasions of long past upheavals."

It is the spirit of self-assertion arising from time to time within the subordinated elements that gives us constitutional development.

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The Philosophical Basis of Education. By ROLLAND MERRITT SHREVES, PH.D., A.M., A.B. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1918. Pp. xvi+290. \$1.50.

This book, by the publisher's announcement, professes to give "the sum and substance of philosophy and of education."

The author declares,

there is probably no field in which a greater amount of shallow literature has been perpetrated upon the reading public than in that of education, unless it be in the cheap novel class of literature. The whole educational issue has been so befogged for so many generations that it seems that clear thinking in this field is next to impossible. . . . If there is any one field of experience where the real issues involved are less clearly defined than in any other, it must be in education. If there is any field in which facts and laws are not clearly distinguished from purposes and ideals, again I say it must be in education (p. 218).

And again, "Clear, pure, deep, philosophical thinking is the only salvation for education, at the present time and for all time to come." The aim of the book is nothing less than by "clear, pure, deep, philosophic thinking" to clear up this confusion in education. It assumes the task of setting forth the nature, scope, and aims of science and philosophy, their relations to each other and the contributions of each to education, and particularly to trace the educational implications of "Voluntaristic Ethics."

The book is divided into five parts. These are: "The Aims, Scope and Methods of Science"; "The Aims, Scope and Methods of Philosophy"; "The General Relationship of Science and Philosophy"; "The Relation of Philosophy and Education"; and "The Educational Implications of the Ethics of Idealism." The distinction between science and philosophy is drawn on the usual and familiar lines. The function of science is "to render a complete and accurate descriptive

and explanatory account of the worth of human experience; that of philosophy, to show the deep meaning and value of human experience dealing as philosophy does with the world of ideals, purposes and values." The author lays great stress on the importance of this distinction. It is absolutely essential, he says, to clear away the confusion in modern educational thought. Philosophy is concerned with the aims of life; science, with the means.

This distinction being made, the author proceeds to discuss educational experience from the viewpoint of philosophy, and since philosophy includes metaphysics, epistemology, logic, aesthetics, and ethics, education is considered in each of these philosophical aspects with special attention to the last.

The conclusions reached are that the aim of life and necessarily of education, as determined by the idealistic philosophy, is self-realization, that science provides the necessary means for self-realization, and that therefore the educator, clearly perceiving the proper functions of science and philosophy and their relations to education, should utilize both in educational thinking and practice.

Readers with a metaphysical turn of mind will enjoy reading this book, as it is clearly written and enlightening with respect to the standpoints and teachings of the various systems of philosophy. To those who doubt the utility of metaphysical thinking and are skeptical with respect to its pretended depth and clarity it will be tedious.

The author makes a careful and proper distinction between descriptive and normative science, and then claims the whole of normative science for philosophy. It would be shallow thinking indeed to deny the necessity of ideals. This necessity appears to be accepted by the author as a justification of metaphysical philosophy. It does not follow, however, that because of the value of ideals the philosophical claim to the explanation of the "meaning of all life" and to the presentation of "a standard of all values" is warranted. Metaphysics began with the early Greeks to explain the ultimate nature of things before it knew anything about the immediate nature of things. It assumed the possibility of such explanation and disregarded the means. It was then, and is now, an intellectual discipline interesting to some minds but largely futile. We know now just as much and just as little of the ultimate nature of things, of being and reality, as did the Greeks. Normative science has its justification, but it is doubtful whether it can be or should be divorced from descriptive science. It is useless to try to confine the scientist to the descriptive aspects of his subject. He may and should

keep them separate in his own mind, but to assert the importance of normative science as a sufficient ground for, and justification of, the extravagant claims of metaphysics reminds one a little of the solicitous attempt on the part of the acquaintances of a waning respectability to secure for him a prominent place on the platform with the principal speakers. It is easy to overestimate the importance of metaphysics and epistemology to education.

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Personality and Conduct. By MAURICE PARMELEE. New York: Moffatt, Yard & Co., 1918. Pp. vii+283. \$2.00 net.

The task of the reviewer in the present instance is simplified by the fact that the book presents views upon which people are divided into two sharply defined and antagonistic schools of thought. It is therefore necessary to do little more than indicate the author's conclusions. Aside from two brief introductory chapters and an equally brief chapter of conclusion the book is devoted to three practical problems of social control, alcohol and drugs, gambling, and sex problems. The first two are treated in a rather perfunctory manner, and, with the exception of a somewhat dogmatic rejection of the principle of prohibitory legislation, call for little notice. One gets the impression that these subjects are introduced largely as curtain-raisers to the real drama of sex problems. The fundamental contribution of the book is a clear enunciation of the distinction between invasive and non-invasive conduct. This is an original and useful piece of terminology which is worthy of general adoption. It carries us to the heart of the social control problem, for the ultimate issue both in social theory and legislation lies in the social bearing of individual conduct; in other words, in the relations of personality and sociality, which the older thought summed up in the concepts of vice and crime. It need hardly be said that Dr. Parmelee believes in the maximum of individual self-direction as against coercive control. His disdain for anything that smacks of Puritanism is reiterated on every possible occasion. His theory of the play function of sex, tentatively presented in his *Poverty and Social Progress in 1916*, is here elaborated. He advocates trial marriages, finds prostitution on the whole to be necessary and useful, has a good word even for the pimp, and when he has occasion to refer to the social hygiene movement invariably uses the quotation marks of contempt. He would tolerate only a meager mini-