

KINDS OF VALUE OR CONSISTENCY.

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In his classic introduction to the *Microcosm* Lotze called attention to the wide chasm in modern life between labor and the things of the spirit, between science and appreciation, between economics and religion. In his *Studies in Logical Theory*, Dewey defines philosophy as a science of the method of experience, one of its chief problems being the relations of various kinds of reflective experience to each other, of science to esthetics, for example, and of both to economics, ethics and religion. No more important problem faces the philosophical critic of experience today, and we enthusiastically welcome the interest in it shown by some recent articles on meaning and value. Moore's discussion of Truth-Value,¹ that of Tufts on Ethical Value,² and that of Coe on Religious Value³ are timely contributions to this subject, while Dewey's review of James's *Pragmatism*⁴ and Montague's paper on The True, the Good and the Beautiful⁵ present the main problem and make important suggestions toward its solution.

Under the caption, 'What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical' (the review of James's *Pragmatism*), Dewey points out that "meaning will itself *mean* something quite different in the case of 'objects' from what it will in the case of 'ideas,' and for 'ideas' something quite different than in the case of 'truth.'" "In composing 'these different points of view' into a single pictorial whole, the *distinct* type of consequence and hence of meaning of practical appropriate to each has not been sufficiently emphasized." Dewey finds in James the necessary formula for each of three distinct kinds of meaning, 'the conceptual connotation or definition of an object,' 'the denotative existential reference of an idea,' and 'actual value or importance.' Correspondingly, the term practical means either 'the attitude and conduct exacted of us by objects,' 'the capacity and tendency of an idea to effect changes in prior existences,' or 'the desirable and unde-

¹ *Journal of Phil., Psy., and Sc. Meth.*, V., p. 429.

² *Ibid.*, V., p. 517.

³ *Ibid.*, V., p. 253.

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV., p. 85.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VI., p. 233.

sirable quality of certain ends.' In the discussion of James's book Dewey notes a certain vagueness resulting from failure on James's part to clearly define in some cases just the kind of meaning of the term practical which he has in mind.

"Granting the right of the pragmatist to regard truth and beauty no less than goodness as forms of organic adjustment or equilibrium," Montague "would deny the conclusion that truth and beauty are therefore mere forms of goodness." "This new pragmatic method does not justify some of those who call themselves pragmatists in identifying or confounding together the types of value which we call the true, the good and the beautiful." The article is aimed at the humanists and especially, we take it, at Schiller, and Montague is perfectly justified in this criticism. The above statement assumes a definition of pragmatism which very few pragmatists will accept as even fair. Truth or logical value, the paper asserts, is the consistency of a particular judgment content with the total content of experience. The former must be 'harmonious with that general system of which it is a part.' This is to 'make the judgment accord with the environment facts.' (To the present writer these two propositions do not mean the same thing at all.) The good, on the other hand, is a matter of conation rather than cognition. Conation is satisfied when its object conforms to it, while cognition is satisfied when it conforms to its object. The content of judgment or cognition is *given to* the individual, while desire or conation *springs from* the individual. "The environment presents its demands to the individual as facts, while the individual presents his demands to the environment as desires." When the former demands are satisfied we have truth; when the latter are satisfied we have the good. The conative attitude is prospective: the cognitive, retrospective. Beauty is the permanently, objectively and universally pleasurable. The distinguishing thing about beauty as a kind of value is that it is a harmony between the organism and the environment which is neither enforced by the latter upon the former nor achieved by the former over the latter, but found as something that simply happens.

Professor Dewey's classification is of course a very different matter from Montague's, so different that nothing but the fact that both deal with kinds of meaning and point out the necessity of making distinctions enables us to mention them together. Montague's assertion that the object of judgment or cognition is *given to* the judgment, the doctrine that the objective content of judgment is also the stimulus and given datum of the judgment process, is entirely inconsistent with

Dewey's position and also, as it seems to the present writer, with the facts of experience. Moreover, the object as the bearer of logical values differs in this respect, that is, in the matter of not being given to the judgment process, not at all from the object as the bearer of ethical or esthetic values. Montague seems to hold that objects enforce or determine judgment, whereas in Dewey's view objects exact, not judgments, but attitudes and conduct. From Dewey's standpoint that which controls is, by virtue of its control, objective, but the reverse proposition that the object controls and determines judgment is one against which much of his writing has been directed. The character of tending to produce changes in the world of fact, which Dewey ascribes to ideas, Montague ascribes to desire or conation. Their views as to the third type of meaning have nothing in common. The presupposition of Montague's paper, that according to pragmatism all values can be defined in terms of an adjustment between the organism and its environment, is incompatible with Dewey's whole position, unless we ascribe to these terms something radically different from their literal biological meaning. It is not important to our purpose that we discuss these papers here at length after indicating their tenor.

In Moore's paper it is held that "truth-value is not the satisfaction of a special instinct coördinate with the other instincts, but that it is the value of the entire experience of readjusting conflicting values through the process of redistribution of values effected by interaction with a wider and *relatively* more permanent range of relevant values." The author is 'painfully aware of the extremely general character of all this,' and proceeds to mention a long list of questions which the paper leaves unanswered. "We say in one breath that truth is a value belonging to judgment as such, and in the next we speak of ethical, esthetic and economic judgments. Does truth then belong only to one kind of judgments? Or are ethical, esthetic and economic judgments special forms of truth? Or are they all coördinate values belonging to every judgment? Or are they all stages through which every judgment passes? And if so, what determines these stages?" These are just the questions as to types and kinds of value which must come into discussion more and more, and it marks a stage of progress when questions are definitely formulated.

One of the obstacles in the way of mutual understandings and general advance is the ambiguity with which such terms as existence, meaning, value, fact and idea are used by different writers. Some speak of existence and value as varieties of meaning, fact being practically synonymous with existence and reality being a comprehensive

term for the entire universe within which these distinctions arise. Then there are the terms evaluation and importance, which possess a different connotation. The present writer fell into the practice of using the term consistency as the equivalent of value, meaning the tendency of reflective experience in all of its phases to keep up and maintain itself. Truth is a vague term, as are also beauty and the good. So many kinds of value are covered by each that it is next to impossible to use these terms in a classification of values. Consider, for example, the kinds of value represented by such terms as continuity or system, discreteness or exactness, thoroughness or totality, and by such heuristic principles as identity, conditionedness and conservation. Which of these is truth and, if all of them, how are they related to each other? Certain it is that they are essential or constitutive characters of any conceivable objective world. But in what order are they to be mentioned in the description of such a world? How are the principles of identity, conditionedness and conservation related to continuity, discreteness and totality? We may have a word to say concerning these questions in the sequel.

In Tuft's paper on 'Ethical Value' it is assumed that value is always attributive to objects of consciousness, and ethical value to objects of ethical consciousness. *The* object of ethical consciousness is conduct as expressive of dispositions which make the results of the conduct desirable to the individual. Ethical value is always rational and social, possessing intellectual as well as affective and instinctive elements. It is 'judgmental' and may by abstraction be both described and felt. On its volitional or intellectual side ethical value (1) implies at least a formal subject, active in the process of choosing or valuing—the only unqualified good is the 'good will.' (2) Ethical values refer to a system of ends, to a single standard of value. To economics 'all wants look alike,' but the world of morality is a unified whole in which various ends, each desirable in itself, require revision and reconstruction to become parts of a single personality. Hence the moral world has its law of contradiction just as the world of truth has. (3) Two *kinds* of choices characterize the moral world, namely, (*a*) that between the 'higher' and 'lower,' coinciding in part with the distinction between the more rational or ideal and the more immediate or sensuous, and (*b*) that between social and unsocial conduct. Ethical value implies the development of a rational or ideal and a social self. (4) Such a consciousness, in which choices and the agent of choice mutually determine each other, is one in which values are objective. It implies a moral order that is rational and social.

On its affective or emotional side, it has been held (1) that affective tone and ethical value are identical, (2) that there is a peculiar emotional tang or flavor which characterizes the ethical — sympathy, resentment, instinctive revulsion against what is 'low' and coarse, 'the feeling of ought,' etc., and (3) that there is nothing distinctive about the emotional or affective element in the ethical consciousness. Against the first view Tufts cites the objection of Plato and Aristotle that not pleasure but pleasure in right objects is ethical. The second or moral sentiment view has more to support it. For the higher-lower distinction there is probably some emotional basis in shame, disgust and contempt, while the social-egoistic distinction gets emotional color from sympathy and pity as these are fostered by sex feeling, parental feeling and sympathetic resentment. The feeling of ought or respect, and its opposite, moral enthusiasm or love for goodness, are more definitely related to ethical value, because they belong to the attitude in which something is presented as standard of action instead of being the outgrowth of one's own interests.

The paper goes on to mention four lines along which ethical values develop. (1) By rationalizing and socializing the elemental needs for food, shelter, and whatever maintains the life-process; (2) by the reflection of the individual upon group or class valuation; (3) from combinations of group or class valuation with emotional or utilitarian elements expressed in such terms as 'honor,' 'honestum' and the Greek 'kalokagathia'; and (4) by the emotional and instinctive recoil of the individual from certain acts whereby such conceptions arise as 'foul,' 'nasty,' and in part, 'impurity.'

Throughout this compact paper the fact is recognized that ethical values are rather demanded than constitutive of the world. They are neither given to nor anticipated by judgment. It is essential to them that they are simply and always demanded. And yet there are varieties of value in this field which are not always sufficiently emphasized. Take the distinction between the right (as distinct from the wrong), duty and the good, and the values represented by such heuristic principles as the moral maxim of Kant, the conception of the autonomy of the will, and that of a rational universe of conduct. We do not always appeal to these principles. Ordinarily, a conventional code, or other accepted standard, is applied. But when discrepancies arise between the various elements which compose such standards, it becomes necessary to revise and reconstruct them by reflection, and in such situations we resort to principles like these for guidance. A settled basis of organized habits is a presupposition of morality. Our

accepted, conventional standards of judgment are the formulations for these habitual points of view. But it is also essential to the moral life that it be in continual process of melioration to meet the ever-changing conditions of social life. The reflections through which this melioration takes place are under the control of an objective moral order founded upon such ideas of a moral democracy, the autonomy of the real will, or the maxim of the universality of ethical values.

In Coe's brief and very interesting paper on Religious Value, its double character is emphasized, namely, "its immanence in and partial identity with all values, and its transcendence of them as their ideal unity and consummation." "This double character gives rise to two opposed notions of religious value, one of which represents it as merely transcendent of other values, the other as merely immanent in them." On the one hand religion is said to deal with the spiritual rather than the material or sensuous goods; or with eternal rather than with temporal goods; or with reality as distinguished from phenomena, or with unity as distinguished from multiplicity." On the other hand, there is a tendency to identify religion with the esthetic, or ethical, or intellectual life. The paper concludes that "any kind of value may be a religious value, but only on condition of a certain inner self-transcendence whereby the particular value demands complete organization of itself with other values and ideally complete realization of the unitary whole." This implies the 'conservation of values' but only through the conservation of personalities. It implies also completeness of social value in an "ideal social being who satisfies, on the one hand, our desire to be completely understood, and on the other hand, our impulse to give ourselves in utter devotion to an object completely worthy of such ethical love." Religious value "is ethical value itself in its ideal completion and in union with all other values similarly ideal and complete." The sphere of religious value is social life and it differs from ethical value in that ethics of itself "takes into purview only a part of the social ideal that religion accepts."

All this seems to the present writer very near the truth. But religious value is neither identical with other values, nor is it merely more of the same kind as either or all of these. It is neither constitutive nor demanded of the world. Religious value is purposive without being deliberately so, and in this sense it is true that religion means the conservation of all values, as Höffding says. Esthetic and economic values are also purposive, but while esthetics represents the purposive aspect of the constituted and objective world, and economics that of the world of production and exchange, where values are de-

manded and imperative, religion has to do primarily with the purposive aspect of the entire life of purpose and conation. Attempts to identify religion with ethics or metaphysics or economics or social service leave the essentially religious demands of human nature unsatisfied and unexpressed. Ethical, esthetic and metaphysical elements are present in nearly all the conventional forms of religious worship, but they are not essential to it. One may be dissatisfied with all these, as for example in adolescent doubts, and yet be profoundly religious. He who doubts goes out like Abraham not knowing whither he goes, but he seeks a city which hath foundations whose builder and maker is God. He seeks that absolute uniqueness, perfection and individuality which are perhaps our most comprehensive experiences of value.

In a paper on 'Types of Consistency'¹ the present writer maintained that there are two types of value distinguished as habit is distinguished from accommodation. There is an organized and familiar type of values, made up of our established classifications and descriptions, which controls our judgments and also our attitudes and conduct under ordinary conditions. In dealing with new data we proceed deductively by first classifying the novelty and then proceeding to predicate of it all that is characteristic of the class. But when our 'established' classifications prove unsatisfactory and new data compel us to revise the fundamental conceptions upon which we have heretofore proceeded, whether it be in the realms of truth, beauty or goodness, we fall back upon a type of values which seems to grow right out of the nature of reflective activity. We lay aside for the time the technique which we have been accustomed to and proceed speculatively under the rubrics of wide-reaching heuristic principles until our technique has been reorganized.

Again, in different places we have tried to classify values into three groups, the constitutive, the imperative and the purposive, within each of which the two types of value spoken of above appear. For the content of each group it is certainly wise to adopt, so far as possible, a genetic classification. There is more than a mere analogy between the growth of the central nervous system and that of the mind. Secondary brain-centers overlies the primary and function as inhibiting and controlling influences in the life of the nervous system as a whole. Similarly, reflection overlies the simpler and more direct processes of immediate experience, its function being that of analyzing, reorganizing and so controlling immediate experience. There is such a thing as the experience of experience, and it does not characterize

¹ *Journal of Phil., Psych., and Sc. M.*, III, p. 457.

the lives of children and lower animals as it does adult human beings. It develops out of immediate experience and derives all of its materials from immediate experience. As it develops out of immediate experience the latter seems to unfold and differentiate into worlds of values which, in the observation of Lotze, are too widely separated in our modern life.

But how many? Values seem to be grouped already in both popular thought and scientific usage into three main systems which we might call the presentative, the motor and the purposive; and the adoption of some such tri-partite classification will consequently facilitate further work. But these distinctions of presentation, movement and purpose are characteristic of immediate experience as the psychologist analyzes it, and when immediate experience becomes reflective each of these characters becomes a tri-partite system, for reflection too is presentative, motor and purposive. Further reflection seems to indicate that the somewhat Kantian terms constitutive, imperative and purposive are more descriptive of the values within each group. The constitutive group will then include on the habitual side continuity or system, discreteness or exactness, and totality or thoroughness; and on the reconstructive side, such principles as identity, conditionedness or ground or sufficient reason, and conservation. The imperative group includes, on the habitual side, the right (as opposed to the morally wrong), duty, and the good; and on the reconstructive side, such principles as the moral maxim of Kant, the conception of the autonomy of the will, and that of a moral democracy or rational universe of conduct where real freedom is the possession and the characteristic of all. The purposive group of values will include, on the habitual side, art with its famous examples and conventionalized taste, economic institutions with their familiar and vastly significant laws, and individuality with its more or less conventional characteristics; and on the reconstructive side, esthetic taste pure and simple, the law of utility or want and its satisfaction, and absolute uniqueness or completeness.

Values seem to fall easily and naturally into some such system of groups and, while the names may be changed, some such classification seems to be comprehensive and desirable.