

philosophies, including that of Professor Ellwood; but the real test of a sociology is in invention and action. This means selecting crucial problems, throwing a white light on their ramifications, surveying each aspect exactly, giving the interests involved their relative and just valuation, and formulating means and end in a workable plan. An extension of the "social survey" is the enterprise which the present international tension calls for.

Professor Ellwood aptly concludes by saying that upon the university of the future rests a sacred responsibility to train youth to think and act in terms of social causation. "Social leaders" must be available. Just what, in the coming years, is to be the mutual relation between the social expert and the community to be guided? The question, still unpursued in a comprehensive manner, seems particularly congenial to the method of sociology, and well adapted, if successfully worked out, to free it from the burden of exhortation and apology under which the church and conventional doctrines of ethics now labor. Will this synthesis also be left to Mr. Wells?

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WHAT IS LIVING AND WHAT IS DEAD OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL. By Benedetto Croce. Translation from the Italian by Douglas Ainalie, B. A. London: Macmillan & Co., 1915. Pp. xviii, 217.

English readers of Croce's works already know him as a thinker who philosophises from a fundamentally Hegelian point of view. They will not be required, therefore, to find him maintaining in this book that the element of permanency in the philosophy of Hegel is the synthesis of opposites in the concrete universal. Only the concrete universal, it is held, and consequently only the Hegelian philosophy, can give an adequate conception of reality, for the reason that a reality is neither simply the one side of any pair of opposites, nor the other, nor yet again the mere opposites of the two, but their synthesis. Croce conceives Hegel to have made the attempt to render thought, which naturally tends to assume a rigid expression, as fluid as is the real. For he had no doubt that the real is fluid, and hence it was that Heracleitus appealed to him; and he felt at the same time that all previous philosophies had been unfaithful to this

aspect of reality. He was thus lead to the theory that the synthesis of opposites in the concrete universal is the ground of fluidity and development in reality.

But now Croce introduces a more important speculation, and this concerns that part of Hegelism which is dead. Opponents of Hegel have often ridiculed Hegel's essays into natural philosophy; and even those who adopt his principles usually consider that in such enterprises he was not happy. But they offer no explanation of the statements which give rise to their ridicule or silence. Opponents of Hegel tend to consider it a proof of the unsoundness of his philosophy that it could issue in such absurdities; while advocates of Hegel tend to regard the so-called absurdities as hard sayings or mere lapses. The one side says it was nonsense, the other it was rash to deduce dialectically the total number of the planets; but neither side offers any explanation of the fact that Hegel attempted the deduction. Such an explanation is proposed by Croce. He maintains that there is a radical error in Hegel's thought, that his many hard sayings are not mere lapses but the direct consequence of this error. He maintains, in fact, that Hegel did not distinguish between *opposites* and *distincts*; that he often believed distincts to be opposites and in consequence fallaciously applied the dialectic of opposites to them; and that in general he often treated distincts as opposites and opposites as distincts.

Thus, good and evil are true opposites and each is essential for development, hence, they must be synthesised in the concrete universal. But elsewhere art is regarded as thesis, religion as antithesis, and philosophy as synthesis, and this Croce maintains to be utterly mistaken. For art, says Croce, has a reality of its own, and is not in relation to religion what good is in relation to evil,—an abstraction. In short, art and religion are distincts, not opposites, and to them the *notion of degrees* applies, but not the principle of dialectic synthesis. Croce illustrates the theory from different sides of Hegel's work.

The whole book is highly interesting. As to the main position, there appears to remain some difficulty in deciding what is a pair of opposites and what a pair of distincts. The decision is usually reached by Croce by means of a criterion of unthinkability, opposites being unthinkable apart from each other, while distincts are not; but one is at an entire loss with regard to the meaning of unthinkability.

The style of the author is delightful, and is characterized by apt phraseology and pertinent illustration.

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PRACTICAL MYSTICISM. By Evelyn Underhill. London: J. M. Dent, 1914. Pp. xiii, 163.

The conviction that the world has a significance greater than appears on the surface of it, far greater than we can fully understand, is present at times to almost all of us, and lies at the root of the appeal that mysticism makes. The power and sincerity in the writings of the great mystics reinforce that appeal. But their writings are not only undeniably difficult, to most of us there is also something repellent in them. The ordinary student has, therefore, much reason to be grateful to Miss Underhill, whose gifts of exposition are very remarkable and whose sympathy makes light of stumbling blocks. Chief of these to the ordinary reader is the insistence recurrent in many mystical writings on the need for strange states of meditation, remote withdrawals into a region where there is no distinct thought and no definite image whatever.

The plain man would sweep the whole thing aside as morbid, if it were not for a lingering sense that reality is so strange it may be rash to exclude any method of approaching it. But to Miss Underhill the method of the mystics has an indispensable value. According to her summary, if I may put it into my own words, the world has two aspects: one, that of appearance (or "becoming" or "time" or "change"), and the other, that of something beyond all appearances and distinct from them, something which cannot be named unless we chose to name it pure Being or Eternity. In the end, however, these two aspects are realized as fundamentally united so that the complete mystic can return at will from his immersion into the world of eternity to a joyous union with the world of time. But as a necessary stage he must become aware of this "eternal" side, this something over and above all its manifestations, realize that it exists and desire a union with it. "*Non voglio quello che esce da te, ma sol voglio te, o dolce amore*" (quoted from St. Catherine, though not in the little book, but in the larger *Mysticism*, p. 298).