

of "our inheritance from God" in 1:13f, although seeing that elsewhere Paul in this Epistle thinks of what God inherits in the redeemed through Christ.

In particular does Dr. Lidgett fail to appreciate the form of Paul's conception of "the fullness," so prominent in the Epistle, because he takes no account of the philosophical use of the term which influenced Paul in its choice. Going quite beyond the usual views, our author still does not grasp fully the idea of the limitless Messianic love presented in the second part of ch. 3.

But while one may differ in details, one still cannot but be profoundly appreciative of the insight and range of this most noble discussion of the great masterpiece of Paul's interpretation of Christianity.

The primary emphasis on the spiritual aspects of the Church and the rejection of all formal and ecclesiastical ideals of "the ministry" are as true and as gratifying as they are unusual and surprising in an Anglican clergyman. This part of the work is worthy of careful study by all. The "high church" element is found in all denominations and needs such incisive teaching as this to reveal to spiritual minds the true spiritual nature of our religion. Again, I would emphasize my appreciation and commendation of this valuable volume.

W. O. CARVER.

The Problem of Knowledge. By Douglas Clyde Macintosh, Ph. D., Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale University. New York, 1915, The Macmillan Co., xviii+503 pp. \$2.50 net.

It is long since so daring an undertaking has come from a philosophical writer. Epistemology necessarily involves a philosophy. This our author clearly apprehends and boldly assumes. In the end he comes out on a clearly defined philosophical principle, although it is very properly stated with brevity in this volume.

The work for any proper criticism demands a wider acquaintance with the details of the history of philosophy and more time

for critical examination of all its statements than this reviewer can lay claim to. Not fewer than two hundred authors find place in these pages.

In general the work, if not professedly, undertakes to find on the principle of comprehensiveness a philosophy broad enough to recognize and include the essential truths in the many recent various and conflicting movements in philosophical thinking. Yet one does not need the author's denial at the end that he is an eclectic, for a sympathetic reader will have been little inclined to prefer the charge of eclecticism.

It takes a broad sympathy and a strong sense of the universal to reach with friendly grasp toward intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, toward realism, idealism and pragmatism. But such sympathy is needed for the present situation, and it is gratifying to find it here.

The author's method is a combination of the historical, the critical and the constructive. And this combination is applied in the fields of the metaphysical and the practical, and the two are harmonized. The result the author calls a "critical monism" which "departs fundamentally from the Kantian point of view, and looks directly to the sciences, in which * * * the pace is set for all philosophical undertakings." It is a monism involving "union of the attitudes of faith and skepticism," giving value to both deduction and induction as "irreducibly different" methods of reasoning, both essential to full truth and proof.

The curse of all systems is apt to be exclusivism. The present essay is in the direction of inclusion. The analytical arrangement of philosophical thinkers is a marvel of minuteness and cannot but be confusing to any but the thorough students of the history of philosophy. But the historical method presents the only adequate approach to the subject if it is to be handled with the constructive end of the writer. The criticisms are in part distributed with the views of the writers as given, in part, for types, summarized. The constructive sections fall at their proper places after each cycle in the historical-critical progress of the discussions.

Part I, two-thirds of the work, deals with "The Problem of Immediate Knowledge" under the divisions of "Acquaintance (Epistemology Proper)," and "Ways and Means of Knowing (Morphology of Knowledge, and Genetic Logic)." Part II discusses "The Problem of Mediate Knowledge" with its two problems of "Truth (Logical Theory)," and "Proof (Methodology)."

The volume is a noble one in its learning and its patient handling of so great a subject. And it is one more of the multiplying evidences that we are moving toward a comprehensive idealistic philosophy which makes room for a definite reality in the objective realm.

One may venture to suggest that personality could have found, even in such a discussion, with the method of this one, fuller recognition. Knowing is always a personal function and achievement. To be sure, and yet it were well to say so emphatically.

W. O. CARVER.

Subject and Object. By Rev. Johnston Estep Walter, Author of the Perception of Space and Matter, etc. Johnston and Penny, West Newton, Pa., 1915. \$1.40 postpaid.

This volume is worthy of attention on the part of those who are interested in the theory of knowledge. The author has fine power of clear statement. The first chapter, which occupies considerably more than one-third of the book, and discusses "The Subject," or the soul, is to this reviewer the strongest part of the discussion. His criticism of "the psychology without a soul" is very trenchant, and he knocks to pieces the position of those who resolve the soul into a mere stream of conscious experiences—a series of processes. But when he comes to deal with the perception of matter, our knowledge of the external world, he is not equally convincing. When he lays as a foundation of the certainty of our knowledge of the objective world, i. e., of matter, the postulate that extension is an attribute of our sensations and ideas, he is, to say the least, on extremely questionable ground. He may have high psychological authority for this