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THE SCOTTISH GEOGRAPHICAL MAGAZINE.

SOME GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION.¹

By H. J. MACKINDER, M.P.

I HAVE undertaken to say a few words on the question of the reconstruction of Europe, and on the influence which geographical conditions must have on that reconstruction, whatever the reconstruction itself may be. There are many reconstructions possible, but there is only one geography upon which they can be based, and therefore, although it is not possible for us to say anything at present of the conditions under which the reconstruction will have to be effected, it is perhaps useful and pertinent already to be taking stock of the geographical conditions which must affect any reconstruction.

In the speech that was made by Mr. Asquith at the Guildhall yesterday he made only one reference to the West and many references to the East. He told us that there were German intrigues on foot which in this country took the form of suggesting that Germany was ready to yield up Belgium, and that thus we British were fighting now not for the cause which took us originally into the war, but merely that the ambitions of our foreign Allies might be fulfilled.

Mr. Asquith thus referred to Belgium. In passing, I am not quite sure whether Germany would be content without tying Antwerp in some way to German destinies, but let that pass. What I draw your attention to is the fact that that was the one reference made by the Prime Minister to the West. But note what he said in regard to the East.

He referred to the Young Turkish movement which put away

¹ Report of a lecture delivered at a meeting of the Glasgow School of Social Study and Training, in Glasgow University on November 10, 1916.

Abdul Hamid. He referred to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908, when the Kaiser shook his mailed fist in the face of the Czar. He referred to the massacre of the Armenians. He referred to the fact that we at any rate should not be content with the restoration of Belgium, but that we should require also the restoration of Serbia. He referred to M. Venizelos, that great European statesman. That is to say, there were at least five distinct points at which he touched the East for one where he touched the West. Now that is a very important fact for us to keep in mind through the coming winter, for our patience is going to be tried this winter.

I have entitled what I have to say to you to-day "some" geographical considerations in regard to the reconstruction, and I did so purposely, because I felt that it was comparatively useless to talk about the conditions in the West. In the west of Europe there is very little change to be made in the matter of geography. It is quite possible that Alsace and Lorraine may change hands, but after all there is no great fundamental question involved in that. A very interesting economic question will, however, be involved, which is not perhaps generally realised. Within Lorraine there are very extensive iron deposits, while within Alsace there are very considerable potash deposits. In the age in which we are now living the ownership of the raw materials of the industry of the world is of even greater significance and importance than it has been in the past. In the transfer of Alsace and Lorraine which we hope will be effected, there will not only be a return to the *status quo* before 1870, but there will also be a transfer of iron and potash, whose full import was doubtless hardly realised in 1870, and the effect may be very curious, because if that iron, to think only of iron, passes into French hands, then there may be a competition within France which may go hard against the present French producers of iron and steel. But that, after all, is a minor though interesting speculation.

From the very beginning of the war I have felt that the greatest changes are coming in the East. The war began in regard to an Eastern question, for it was the murder at Serajevo which led to that ultimatum from Austria which brought about the first declaration of war, that of Austria against Serbia. I think it not too much to say that had it not been for the unsettlement of the Near East we should never have had this great struggle. It was that unsettlement which gave the opportunity, which furnished the temptation to German ambition at any rate in that direction. Well, then, I am going to ask your attention mainly to the South-Eastern, and to some extent to the Eastern front.

Let me launch in the first instance a generalisation which may not be complete, but at any rate, I think, has a good deal of content. We have the old Shakespearean division of robbers into land robbers and sea robbers. Now, it is a curious fact, and one which has been one of the great sources of disquiet in Europe, that very few peoples have conquered and settled both by land and sea. In considering the eastern seas we get rather an interesting commentary on that idea. Venice was a great Italian power for more than a thousand years. The Venetians only late in their history acquired considerable possessions

landward. But during the whole of their history they dominated the Adriatic, except when for a time the Genoese contested their domination. The result was that they formed settlements, Italian settlements, along the shores of the Adriatic, at Cattaro, Ragusa, Spalato, Zara, Fiume, Trieste, and other points. The result is that the northern Adriatic became an Italian sea.

You will notice that gulfs and bays are almost always named by sailors from the port to which they are bound. The Adriatic Sea is so known from the ancient port of Adria, to which the mariners of old times were bound. Later it was known as the Gulf of Venice. Constantly we find the same thing; in England, in Devonshire, you have a bay to which seamen sometimes gave the name of Bideford Bay and sometimes Barnstaple Bay, there being two sets of fishermen who were in the habit of calling at two different ports in the bay. And so you find it always everywhere—the sailor gives a name to the sea, and he names it from the port to which he is bound. These facts are all aspects of the same idea, namely, that the boatmen and seamen dominating a sea, treat that sea as a high road, settle round it, and have a tendency to give us the distribution of a race not on a land, but round a sea. I think it was Plato who described the Greeks as frogs squatted round a pond. The Italians from Venetian times squatted round the north of the Adriatic. Round the Aegean there are the Greeks. In neither case have you what in the jargon of diplomacy is known as a national hinterland to the ports. Entering by Trieste, you cross the Karst plateau and come into the land of the Slovenes, and then you cross the Karawanken mountains into the land of the Germans. In other words, the Italian is but a veneer, a coastal veneer, on the solid oak, let us say, of the Slavonian and German inland population. So is it all along this coast. Fiume, Spalato, Cattaro, Ragusa—Italian names all of them, but you have only to go to their suburbs, and certainly you need only drive a very short distance into the country behind them, and you are in the land of the Dalmatians—that is to say, of the Serbs.

Come to the Aegean, and what do you find there? If you take that larger Greece which M. Venizelos seeks to form, if you go to Salonica, you find that, though it is a Greek city and a Jewish city, yet a very short distance inland you come to Turkish villages, and to what we will call with caution Macedonian villages, for they are claimed in the German maps as Bulgarian, and in the Serbian maps as Serbian. The same is the case with Smyrna, on the coast of Asia Minor, a Greek city, if ever there was one, a great centre of commerce. But pass a short distance inland and you come to the land of the Turks, the only land which is inhabited by a great Turkish peasantry. The Greeks are all round the Aegean. They are a people of the sea rather than a people of the land.

The same thing holds in regard to the Baltic. There we have to note that, at the eastern end of Germany, Prussia thrusts a long limb, known by the names of the Provinces of Western and Eastern Prussia, along the coast of the Baltic, and to the south of this limb is Poland. You will find at the very end of the limb Königsberg, or Kingstown, a thoroughly German city. Similarly the German influence spreads on

beyond into the Baltic Provinces. St. Petersburg itself had a German name, which has been converted into Petrograd since the war began. Dorpat was a German University, though situated within Russian territory. The landed aristocracy of these coastal Baltic Provinces is almost entirely a German aristocracy. That is to say, in the later Middle Ages the Teutonic knights and the merchants of the Hanseatic cities, passing along the shores of the Baltic, founded their settlements eastwards right away to the very head of the Gulf of Finland, but inland, in their rear, there was no background of Germans, but there were Poles and Letts and Lithuanians. Thus there was founded in the Middle Ages a condition of things in the case of the Baltic exactly analogous to that which had come about in ancient times in the Aegean Sea, and in the earlier Middle Ages in the Adriatic Sea.

It is this extraordinary condition of things in the East which is at the root of half of our difficulties. We have a condition of things which in carpentry is described as veneering. There is a sea veneer or sea front of one race put on to a continental background of another race, and that is the normal condition of things in the region of which I am speaking, and every instance of that produces an international problem. Consider these problems at the present moment. The Italians are fighting their way towards Trieste. They regard Trieste as a portion of Italy, up till now unredeemed. But apart from its Italian language, it must be remembered that Trieste has a great economic position. It is one of the chief ports of Europe. And obviously no port can exist unless there is an area behind it into which it can distribute its imports and from which it can gather its exports. Trieste has been, was up till the declaration of war by Italy, the great port of a very large portion of Europe, and great engineering works have been constructed in order to facilitate the convergence of traffic upon Trieste. You have the oldest railway in Austria-Hungary, the Sudbahn, the southern railway, a great company railway that competes with the State railway, and runs on the one hand from Vienna and on the other hand from Buda-Pest to Trieste. And then in recent years a railway with a succession of three of the great tunnels of the world has been made from southern Germany through the Tauern, one of the great ranges of the Central Alps, and then southward and approaching Trieste through the Karawanken tunnel, and through the eastern slopes of the Terglou or Triglav, the last of the high Alps, by yet a third tunnel, and so to Gorizia, which is now, of course, in the hands of the Italians. Enormous sums of money have been spent in constructing these converging lines upon Trieste. There is yet another line, the Hungarian State railway from Buda-Pest. A conflict will arise in Trieste itself between the love which the Italians of Trieste must have towards the great homeland of all Italians and those vested interests which have grown up and have been solidified in these engineering works, those vested interests which make Trieste dependent upon trade drawn from the very centre of Europe, even from Vienna, where Trieste competes with Hamburg.

But the solid structure of Europe in rear of the Italian veneer at

Trieste is not simply German. In between the big German interior and the coastal strip that is Italian there is thrust a wedge of Slav people, the Slovenes of Carniola, of Laibach, close kin to the Serbs. The Jugo-Slavs, the southern Slavs, claim Carniola. But the effect will be to put a wedge of the future great Serbia between Trieste and the interior, which is German and Magyar, and feeds the port of Trieste with its traffic. There is one of the problems which geography offers, and history too, to the future congress which may assemble to settle the future of Europe. I can only imagine that some compromise must be effected which, while it gratifies the Italians and the Italian people of Trieste by allowing of the Italian tri-colour being flown on the buildings of Trieste, will at the same time avoid the erection of two successive customs' frontiers, one on this side and one on the far side of the Slav wedge between Trieste and the interior of Europe on which Trieste depends for its traffic. Some complicated measure, we may assume, will be necessary.

There is a similar problem in the case of Salonica. You have got the Greek of Salonica, but if the Serb of the future great Serbia is to have any comfortable access to the sea, it must be down the Morava and down the Vardar valley to Salonica. I chose that adjective "comfortable" purposely, because access to this coast of Dalmatia from such a place as Belgrade is essentially uncomfortable—the gradients for the mountain railways are very steep, and the opportunities for tunnels are not great. I cannot conceive as within practical politics any powerful Serbia—and to be useful to Europe and to the future peace of Europe, any future Serbia must be relatively powerful—without the possession of that great valley system of the Morava and Vardar, and free and uncontrolled access to the Aegean Sea at Salonica. But however much we may feel that the Serb deserves all the good things that fate can bring his way, on the other hand we have to remember that whatever hard things we may feel inclined to say about the Greek just now, we pledged ourselves to M. Venizelos a few months ago, and M. Venizelos, with the eye of a geographer and a statesman, has established himself at Salonica. There again you have got exactly the same problem of the great interior, consuming imports and producing exports, and the coastal veneer, which includes the port of Salonica, and that coastal veneer Greek and not Serbian.

The same thing is true when you come to Smyrna, a little bit outside Europe, but I always include Asia Minor in Europe; for I have no respect for the definitions that you find in your text-books as to what Europe is and what it is not. The text-books set children to learn precisely where is the boundary which separates Europe from Asia. But though I have spent a great many years thinking about things geographical, I say frankly I do not know where this boundary is. I know roughly where history would put it, and that is approximately along the Taurus range. That is the limit of the areas inhabited by Arabs. There is almost as great a difference between an Arab and a Turk as there is between a Britisher and a Turk. The two sides certainly of the Sea of Marmora belong to the same world of civilisation. Scutari, on

the Asiatic side, is but a suburb of Constantinople, while Asia Minor contains a peasantry of Turkish language, and very good fellows they are. Our trouble is that the Pashas of Constantinople are not good fellows. But the peasantry of Asia Minor are a solid fact, so many millions of them, and I do not suppose that Christian Europe is going to deal with the Turkish peasantry of Asia Minor as the Turkish Pashas have dealt with the Armenians. But that solid Turkish fact is an inland fact. Along the coast of the Aegean you have a Greek veneer, including the Greek port of Smyrna. The Italians have already pegged out some sort of claim to what is known as the Dodecanese group of islands, and they also have ambitions in the direction of a portion of the Greek veneering along the coast of Asia Minor. Europe, if we carry our success to the point that has been indicated by Mr. Asquith, if we carry our success to the point of ejecting Turkey from the domination of Constantinople, Europe will have to deal with that derelict Turkish peasantry of Asia Minor and with the Greek claims to Smyrna, complicated, perhaps, by some other ambitions. There again is exactly the same problem.

Then when you turn to the north, to the Baltic, what is the position there? You have the largest of all the peoples that do not figure on the political map of Europe, the Poles. You have something like twenty million people speaking the Polish tongue. The Poles used to own Prussia before Prussia was German, because, of course, the original Prussians were not Germans. They were the last people in Europe to become Christian. Their region was conquered by the Teutonic knights, and of course in the Middle Ages there were no qualms as to the methods that were to be employed by missionaries. The pagan was driven into the river, and he was told to come out baptized. That may account for some things that happen in Belgium to-day! But the net result of all that rough history has been that if the Polish twenty millions are to have an independent access to the Baltic, it must be by taking possession of Dantzic or Königsberg, which are important and undeniably German cities. There is a German veneer between Poland and the sea. You have got exactly the same problem at Dantzic that you have at Smyrna, that you have at Salonica, that you have at Trieste.

Let us turn from those facts to certain more general considerations. There are four great peoples whose destiny will have to be settled in the coming reconstruction. There are the Serbs, the Roumans, the Czechs or Bohemians, and the Poles. There is also another people whom I do not wish to put in the same category with these four, and that is the Hungarians or the Magyars. Perhaps I should add a sixth, the Bulgarians, whom I would put with the Magyars. Now consider each of these peoples for one moment, and let us take first the two peoples who have made their bid for empire, the Bulgarians, and the Magyars or Hungarians.

It is a curious point that the Hungarians and the Bulgarians historically have much in common. Essentially they were in origin both of them Turkish. They came down into this part of the world through the grassy steppe lands of southern Russia, and one band went to the

north of the Transylvanian mountains into Hungary, while the other went to the south of the Transylvanian mountains across the Danube. The Hungarians kept their language but accepted the Latin form of Christianity. The Bulgarians gave up their language and accepted the Slavonic tongue and the Greek form of Christianity. They differ in tongue, in religion, and yet the curious Turkishness in them both is obvious in their subsequent politics. The trouble has been that Bulgaria has aimed at making a Balkan Empire. The trouble is that the Hungarian has succeeded in maintaining the Hapsburg Empire. Both these peoples essentially are horse-riding peoples of the interior. They are settled in two very different lands, it is true, but they are both of them settled in the midst of other peoples. The Bulgarian has the Rouman to the north of him, the Serb to the west of him, the Greek to the south of him, and then, of course, he has had to struggle with the Turk intervening. The Magyar is neighbour to many peoples—to the German to the west, to the Czech and Slovak to the north, to the Ruthenian or red Russian to the north-east, to the Rouman to the east and south-east of him, and to the Serb and Croat to the south-west. He is ringed round with peoples to an even greater degree, counting them by numbers, than is the Bulgarian.

Now take the other peoples. The Serbs extend from the Adriatic to the Drave river, which is the first of the three great rivers—the Drave, the Tisza, and the Save—that run into the Danube. The Serbs occupy a wedge of land, gradually broadening to the south-east. They occupy the provinces, if you allow me to include the Slovenes as Serbian, of Carniola, of Croatia, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Montenegro, of Old Serbia or northern Macedonia, of the kingdom of Serbia as it was before the Balkan War, and of the southern portions of the Banat, and the southern portion of that tongue of land that lies between the Danube and the Tisza—a compact area with defined boundaries. Northward lies the Karawanken range, the last high range of the Alps in this direction, roughly dividing the German from the Slav. North-eastward the Danube divides the completely level, or all but level, plain of the Hungarian horsemen from the hilly, and presently from the mountainous and forested land to the south-west.

Then we move away to the east. Here we get the Roumanians. The Roumanian is an extraordinary fact in the racial geography of this region. The old Roman boundary, the boundary of the old Roman Empire, followed the two rivers, the Rhine and the Danube. But for one short period in Roman history, roughly two generations, there was a Roman venture beyond the Danube. There came a speculative fever into Rome. Gold was found in the Transylvanian mountains north of the Danube. Trajan conquered the land that was then called Dacia, and a fever seized Rome, like the South Sea Bubble which seized on London, and a Roman colony was founded round the Transylvanian mines, which colony has lasted to these days, and is to-day Roumania. You have here a language close kin to the Italian. Now, a very interesting fact is this, that the Roumanians inhabit all this mountain land of Transylvania, together with the glaxis to the east and the south of it,

which constitutes the two portions of the present kingdom of Roumania, Wallachia and Moldavia, and the boundaries are perfectly defined—the Danube to the south, and to the west, precisely—as nearly as in the facts of Nature you ever find a thing precise—precisely along the foot of the hills, and where the plain begins the Roumanian tongue gives way to the Magyar tongue, the Hungarian tongue. That is to say, that the hill men, the men of the forests, the men of the mines, stop at the foot of the hills, and the Magyar horsemen, whose wealth was in flocks and herds, begin and spread wherever the level plain extends, from the foot of the mountains in all directions. There are of course Saxon and Szekler enclaves in Transylvania, but they are minorities of mediæval introduction.

So you have in Serbia, Hungary, and Roumania three quite clear-cut distributions of peoples, except at one or two points. In the Banat you have some confusion, but elsewhere you have a fairly clear demarcation of people. In Bohemia and Moravia and on the border of the northern Carpathians you have a Slavonic people—Czechs to the west, Slovaks to the east—but really one people, a people in the very heart of Europe—a people occupying a curiously elongated and rather indefensible territory, a people divided into two portions—hill men to the east, and men of the plain to the west. The hills which surround Bohemia are inhabited by Germans. The Czechs are the people who have withstood the Hapsburgs of Vienna most energetically during this war. I believe it is a fact that no inconsiderable portion of the prisoners taken by the Russians have been Czechs and Slovaks, voluntarily passing over to the enemy.

Then there are the Poles. Of course, a kingdom of Poland has been founded under German "protection"; but that kingdom does not reverse the old division of Poland which was brought about by Frederick the Great, by Frederick the Second of Prussia, more than a hundred years ago. As far as I can gather there is no suggestion that in the German kingdom of Poland either Galicia from Austria or Posen from Prussia shall be included. Now consider the position of the Pole.

If we study the map of Europe from Moscow to Paris we see a succession of four great peoples, and I propose for a moment to consider the distribution of each of these peoples. First there is the Russian. Now there is nothing in which the ordinary political map of Europe—or, for the matter of that, the school text-books—is more deceptive than in regard to Russia. We are told that Russia is half Europe. I should prefer to say that the effective Russia is between one-quarter and one-third of Europe. What is the effective Russia—and it is rather important to seize this idea, for a reason that I will give in a moment? If we draw a line on the map from Petrograd eastward to the Volga, then along the Volga to its first great bend at Kazan, then southward to the second great bend at Tzaritzyn, and then southward along the river Don to the Sea of Azoff, we have defined the northern and eastern limits of the real Russia. Something like 120 million Russians, excluding the Poles, live in that great area of plain land which is included between the Baltic and the Black Seas, and is

defined northward and eastward by the Volga river. In all the area that lies to the north of Petrograd and the Volga, in all that vast area that extends right away to the Arctic shores, you have only some 2 million people—not more than one to a square mile, and even in parts not more than one person to 10 square miles. East of the Volga you have a desert area for the most part. In some places it is a salt desert, a region that is traversed by Cossacks and Kalmucks; only in one direction is there a belt of population. From the neighbourhood of Kazan along the Kama river there runs a belt of settlement which spreads out across the Ural range, and this belt extends through the wheat zone of Siberia two-thirds of the way across Asia—but that is really a colonial annexe.

The real Russia, the Russia that constitutes a great power in Europe—and that is the point—occupies only about half the area that is marked as Russia on the map of Europe, apart altogether from the map of Asia. For though we commonly think of Russia as a hyphen between Europe and Asia, the real Russia is entirely and wholly and obviously European. The real Russia that matters and counts lies between the Baltic and Black Seas. The Volga is the ditch which separates the more thickly inhabited area from the wilds beyond, and even in the case of the Volga the river-borne trade finds its out-port by canal to Petrograd. In so far as Petrograd is important among the ports of Europe, it owes its importance to this communication with the Volga. The more truly Russian ports are places like Riga on the Baltic and Odessa on the Black Sea. Most of the population lies between those places.

Now this real Russia, with its 120 million people, has near, though not quite, at its centre Moscow, and has in different directions Petrograd, Riga, Odessa, and Kieff. The cities are relatively small; in the whole 120 millions you have not, I suppose, an urban population of more than 10 millions. After you have named the cities I have just mentioned—Moscow, Petrograd, Riga, Kieff, and Odessa—the rest of the towns are relatively, as we should think, small—relatively, most of them, not more than Greenocks and Paisleys.

We come next to the Poles. The Poles are essentially a people established on the river Vistula. Their two historic cities are both on the Vistula—to the south is Cracow, and farther to the north Warsaw. As I have said, they are a people of some 20 million souls. They extend from the Carpathian Mountains almost, but not quite, to the Baltic, because there is a German veneer along the coast, and even in the case of the Russians there is a German veneer along the Baltic coast, and there used to be a Greek and afterwards a Turkish veneer to the south along the Black Sea coast, which was removed by Russia a hundred years ago.

Beyond the Poles you come to the Germans, a population of some 65 millions of people in the German Empire. Deduct, say, 3 millions for the Poles of Posen and the Danes along the border of Schleswig; deduct, perhaps, another couple of millions for Alsace and Lorraine, and you are left with 60 millions; add to that 10 million Germans in Austria, and you have some 70 million people. And so we have 120

million Russians, 20 million Poles, and some 70 million Germans. Then lastly you come to the French, roughly 40 millions of them—in fact, rather more than 40 millions if you include the Walloons of Belgium.

It is at once obvious, therefore, that we have got a grand division among four great peoples—the 120 million Russians with Moscow for their centre, 20 million Poles with Warsaw for their centre, 70 million Germans with Berlin for their main centre, and Vienna as a minor centre, and then 40 million French, with Paris for their centre; and there are no sharp boundaries within this succession of four peoples. Between the French and the Germans there was erected by the diplomatic foresight of Europe a barrier—the kingdom of Belgium and Holland, which was a single kingdom as it emerged from the Congress of Vienna rather more than a hundred years ago. Some Belgians and some Dutchmen have told me in recent times, just before the war, that they deeply regretted the events of 1830 which separated them. Then there is the Swiss Republic to the south, constituting the other portion of the barrier. There was left just a narrow entry, which is Alsace-Lorraine. The work, of course, of the Vienna Congress was not thoroughly done. If they had completed the barrier between France and Germany, if they had linked Switzerland up with Belgium and Holland, possibly events might have been different. At any rate, there would have been some considerable force to resist attack from either side. The problem of course now will never be solved in that way. France undoubtedly will remain as the neighbour of Germany to the east.

But how shall we solve the like problem on the eastern side? Is there to be a buffer state of Poland between Russia and the Germans. One thing is certain, that whatever the result of this war, the German race as an active agency in the centre of Europe will remain. It is not for me to solve the Polish problem. I have merely pointed out to you the existence of this people of 20 millions occupying the Vistula basin, but with no very definite boundaries eastward or westward, and with a German veneer along the Baltic coast to the north of it. And what about Hungary, a land with some 10 million Hungarians? I have often wondered that some statesman of genius never arose in Buda-Pest who saw that for Hungary there was an alternative, and that she need not have been what she is to-day, an appendage of Germany. The Hungarian, for the sake of exercising empire over the surrounding peoples, consented to base his own strength upon German support. Europe can have peace if we can erect on the Danube and southward to the Aegean Sea sufficient native strength to dam the ambitions, mainly of the Germans, and to a minor extent of the Magyars. There are 10 million souls in the Serb region; 10 millions in the Rouman region; 10 millions in the Magyar region; 10 millions in the Czech and Slovak region—peoples approximately equal in importance. You have the material there for a federation and a balance of power, but from the history of the Magyars we can hardly hope that it will be effective. What we can get, however, is a barrier formed partly by Serbia, a great Serbia, and partly by Roumania, a great Roumania, which will extend

across from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. And if we give Serbia access to the Aegean through Salonica, then we can afford to allow Italy enough for her strategical security along the Adriatic coast.

There are just two things I want to say further. The first is that I do sincerely trust that those of us who generously and in accord with our British history espouse the cause of the peoples who are seeking liberty—I do hope that we shall recognise that a purely racial solution is not necessarily the most stable solution. Even in our enthusiasm for the Serbs—and they deserve enthusiasm—we must recognise the position of Italy, with a coastline towards the Adriatic without a single port that can harbour a modern fleet; with a coastline such as that to-day her fleet defending her shores lies in Taranto harbour, and Venice with its art treasures is exposed to attack from the Dalmatian coast, where the Austrian fleet still in large measure rules. We have therefore to balance the legitimate needs, the vital needs, of our Italian Ally in this matter not merely with our generous impulse to create a great Serbia, but with the vital European necessity of creating a great Serbia, having a main exit to the Aegean, although no doubt also minor exits to the Adriatic, and compatibly with this we must put the minimum possible Slav population under Italian rule.

The other thing I would say is this. It is what I began with this evening—that as we exercise our patience and our constancy through the long-drawn later stages of this war, we should never rest satisfied with a return to what is known as the *status quo ante* in the West, but should keep before our minds this, that it was the East that caused the war. It was the Hungarian rule over a portion of the Serb and a portion of the Rouman race which produced the unrest that afforded the opportunity to the ambitious, and we shall have war again unless we prosecute this war to the point of solving in a firm manner these long-standing difficulties of the south-east which we know as the Near Eastern question. Primarily they owe their origin to the fact that the Magyars, Bulgarians, and Turks—horse-riders—have conquered the Slav and Romance interior, while the Italians and Greeks have put a coastal veneer round the seas, shutting out the main peoples of the lands from access to the open sea which has now become the great highway of the world, and certainly of civilisation.

These are some scattered thoughts pertaining, I hope, to many things that may occur in the near future. I have had no idea of being systematic. I have merely asked you to look at the map of Europe and to people it with certain facts, which facts I ask you to keep in mind, and steadily in mind, in the midst of the turmoil and of the rumours and of the flotsam and jetsam of facts which figure in the newspapers.

Let us never forget that a century ago a terrible war, of longer duration than we hope this war will be, came to an end; that the strongest powers, the conquerors in that war, were this country and Russia; yet the brains which made the new map of Europe were neither Russian nor British, but the brains of the Frenchman Talleyrand and the Austrian Metternich. Let us beware that a like thing does not happen again.