

## PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

### ETHICS.

*Ethics.* JOHN DEWEY and JAMES H. TUFTS. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1908. Pp. xiii + 618.

The appearance of this volume in the American Science Series, already so widely and so favorably known, is a matter for congratulation to authors, to publishers, and to the educational and philosophical public. That the book is well worthy to take its place beside James's *Psychology*, Remsen's *Chemistry* and Chamberlin and Salisbury's *Geology*, is what should be expected from the fact that the book was written by its authors. That it will satisfy every teacher in ethics is of course more than any one could hope. There are too many different views still current in the field of ethics to make it possible for any one to write a book now that shall meet the demands of the various teachers of the discipline. But in such a subject as this a text-book has another mission than that of presenting a generally accepted doctrine. It should present the important and typical concrete facts on which all ethical theory must ultimately rest; it should accompany these facts with some well worked out theory which is shown to be a reasonable outcome of scientific reflection upon these facts; and it should give both facts and theory in a form which is suited to the apprehension of those who are beginning to take up the study of the subject. Besides, it should be written in a manner to awaken interest, and as the matter treated is one which bears so directly upon the practical life of every member of society, the interest so awakened should be a personal interest in the practical application of the acquired insight to the actual problems that stare one in the face. The volume before us admirably meets all these requirements. The specialist may differ from the authors on matter of theory, but he cannot fail to recognize that the subject is handled in a scientific spirit and is made to appeal to the reader as a matter of vital interest to him. But the book is not merely a text-book. It is too original to be just that. It deserves to rank among the systematic treatises which every advanced student of the science must reckon with. Even the 'general reader,' who is not seeking entertainment but enlightenment on the ethical aspect of economic, political and social questions, will be repaid by making

more than a casual acquaintance with the volume. It deals largely with the moral problems of our own day and our own country, but it does not prescribe any rules for the removal of our social ills. It rather directs attention to the spirit in which the problems should be attacked if in the course of time reasonable solutions are to be found.

However, it is with the book as a text-book and a scientific treatise that this review shall deal. The volume is somewhat larger than the ordinary run of manuals of ethics. It is about half as large again as Mackenzie's popular handbook, which it will probably find to be its leading competitor. It contains enough matter to occupy a class very fully for a half-year, three hours a week; but with judicious selection of topics it could very profitably be used in much shorter courses. The references to the literature of the subject are copious but not overwhelming. The arrangement of the material is convenient: following an introduction which deals with the definition, the method, and the divisions of ethics, and with the criterion of the moral, there are three parts. Part I. is devoted to 'The Beginnings and Growth of Morality'; part II. to the 'Theory of the Moral Life'; and part III. to 'The World of Action.' Thus the theory of ethics is developed after an historical survey of characteristic periods of moral life in the past, and is introductory to the treatment of specific moral problems of the present.

Part I. was written by Professor Tufts, part II. by Professor Dewey, and part III. is divided between them, Professor Dewey having written the first two chapters, Professor Tufts the remaining five. But each author 'has contributed suggestions and criticisms to the work of the other in sufficient degree to make the book throughout a joint work.'

The account given in part I. of the beginnings and growth of morality is clear, concise and comprehensive. In general the work of gathering together the pertinent facts and presenting them in a manner that makes them easily grasped has been very ably done. There are some points, however, which call for comment.

Professor Tufts differentiates three levels of conduct: "(1) Conduct arising from instincts and fundamental needs. To satisfy these needs certain conduct is necessary, and this in itself involves ways of acting which are more or less rational and social. The conduct may be *in accordance with* moral laws, though not directed by moral judgments. We consider this level in the present chapter. (2) Conduct regulated by *standards of society*, for some more or less conscious end involving the social welfare. The level of custom, which is treated in Chapter IV. (3) Conduct regulated by a standard which is both social

and rational, which is examined and criticized. The level of conscience." "The motives in these levels will show a similar scale. In (1) the motives are external to the end gained. The man seeks food, or position, or glory, or sex gratification; he is forced to practice sobriety, industry, courage, gentleness. In (2) the motive is to seek some good which is social, but the man acts for the group mainly because he is *of* the group, and does not conceive his own good as distinct from that of the group. His acts are only in part guided by intelligence; they are in part due to habit or accident. (3) In full morality a man not only intends his acts definitely, he also values them as what he can do 'with all his heart.' He does them *because* they are right and good. He chooses them freely and intelligently. Our study of moral development will consider successively these three levels. They all exist in present morality. Only the first two are found in savage life. If (1) existed alone it was before the group life, which is our starting-point in this study" (pp. 38-39). Apart from the very questionable statement that 'savage life' does not exhibit any evidence of the third level, and from the seeming implication that there was a human period 'before the group life,' we may all accept this doctrine of the three levels of conduct. But when in an historical treatment of the beginnings and growth of morality, these three levels are treated successively, it may be difficult for the student to understand that the first level is not an historical level at all, when the other two levels are expressively recognized as historical. Pedagogically therefore I should have considered it much better to recognize only two levels, the level of custom and the level of conscience, if it is to be called that. The instinctive tendencies of the individual which find expression in group morality but which are controlled by group standards, should, I think, have been treated under the head of 'group morality,' along with 'the means which society uses' to 'elevate men and knit them together' (p. 51). Then it would have been easier to show how the level of 'conscience' was reached by the gradually emerging tension between the instincts controlled and the means used for their control — a tension which demanded for its removal a new means of control, or rather an integration of a new element or of new elements into the old means of control. This method would have seemed to be more in accordance with the treatment which is given of the growth of morality after the third chapter, which deals with 'the first level.'

Group morality is described in its more salient features, and it would be hard to get a better description which is equally brief and incisive. The development of the morality of conscience out of group

morality is illustrated by tracing the process in the case of the Hebrews and of the Greeks. These two peoples are chosen for this purpose because they offer characteristic differences in their mode of development. But it seems that these differences are over-emphasized, at least in certain points. Thus we are told that if "we distinguish in conscience two aspects, thoughtfulness in discovering what to do and hearty desire to do the right when found, then the Greeks emphasize the former, the Hebrews the latter. Intellect plays a larger part with the Greek; emotion and the voluntary aspect of will with the Hebrew. Feeling plays its part with the Greeks largely as an æsthetic demand for measure and harmony; with the Hebrews it is chiefly prominent in motivation, where it is an element in what is called 'the heart,' or it functions in appreciation of acts performed, as the joy or sorrow felt when God approves or condemns" (pp. 91-92). The 'wisdom literature' of the Hebrews shows us that at least a considerable number of the thinkers of that people exhibited thoughtfulness in discovering what to do, while the accounts we have of Socrates and the writings we have of Plato and Aristotle show on the contrary that these men had as hearty desire to do the right when found as perhaps any Hebrew ever displayed. Feeling as prominent in motivation could scarcely be more emphasized than it was by Plato when he made love for ideal types the highest and purest motive to right living. Nor did Aristotle seem to be deficient in ecstatic enthusiasm, and surely he showed in his acute analysis of will, which must have been the will he found among the Greeks, that the part played by feeling in motivation was as prominent in the Greek as in the Hebrew. The Cyrenaics and the Epicureans are witnesses to the same fact. This exaggeration of contrasts is only one of several such. But while the treatment is thus to a certain extent marred by excessive antitheses, the general impression it leaves is without doubt on the whole correct.

The section of this first part which deals with the mediæval and modern periods is quite brief, less than thirty pages being given to them; but this is not disproportionate, when we consider that the modern age is treated more in detail in part III. It is characteristic of the spirit of the whole work that of the thirty pages devoted to this subject here, ten are given to the discussion of industry, commerce and art in their influence on moral conceptions, without in the least suggesting that the moral is thereby materialized. On the contrary the economic life is shown to be progressively moralized, and the problems in this process of moralization are presented in clear form; and they are shown to be all at bottom the single problem of securing for every

member of society the social use of all that civilization produces (p. 192).

Part II., on the theory of the moral life, occupies a little more than a third of the book, extending from page 201 to page 425. The method adopted is a combination of criticism of previous theories with independent analysis of typical moral situations. The critical work is exemplary; it is searching and keen, but not disparaging; it seeks to ascertain the truth for which the theory criticized stands, as well as to discover the points on which the theory fails to do full justice to the facts. The result is that almost every criticism is a thoughtful appreciation of the author studied. The theory which Professor Dewey himself presents in the book is perhaps closest to Mill's utilitarianism and to Green's self-realizationism. It differs from the former in embodying the results of better psychological analysis; it differs from the latter in that the metaphysical foundations which Green thought he had to lay for his ethics are removed, and the theory thus becomes a scientific instead of a metaphysical theory of ethics. But while these affiliations are the most striking, they are not the only ones. Professor Dewey's ethical theory is rather a critical synthesis of practically all the previous historical theories.

The definition of morality is given in these words: "Conduct as moral may be thus defined as *activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon*" (p. 209). The moral thus has a place between merely instinctive or habitual or customary action on the one hand, and a type of habitual action on the other which results from reflective choices in the past. But the moral is never permanently left behind. "Every act is *potential* subject-matter of moral judgment, for it strengthens or weakens some habit which influences whole classes of judgments" (p. 211). The best outcome of deliberation and reflection and of actions performed under their control is not the formation of general rules of behavior, but the adoption of general principles. "*Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things.*" The "*object of moral principles is to supply standpoints and methods which will enable the individual to make for himself an analysis of the elements of good and evil in the particular situation in which he finds himself*" (p. 333).

The deliberation which thus distinguishes the moral from the customary action is "a process of active, suppressed, rehearsal; of

imaginative dramatic performance of various deeds carrying to their appropriate issues the various tendencies which we feel stirring within us. When we see in imagination this or that change brought about, there is a direct sense of the amount and kind of worth which attaches to it, as real and as direct, if not as strong, as if the act were really performed and its consequence really brought home to us" (pp. 322-3). "It is this direct sense of value, not the consciousness of general rules or ultimate goals, which finally determines the worth of the act to the agent. Here is the inexpugnable element of truth in the intuitional theory. Its error lies in conceiving this immediate response of appreciation as if it excluded reflection instead of following directly upon its heels" (p. 323). Thus deliberation is not a *purely* intellectual process. "We have had repeated occasion . . . to see how artificial is the separation of emotion and thought from one another. As the only effective thought is one fused by emotion into a dominant interest, so the only truly general, the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought, is the *generous* thought. Sympathy widens our interest in consequences and leads us to take into account such results as affect the welfare of others; it aids us to count and weigh these consequences as counting for as much as those which touch our own honor, purse, or power. . . . It translates the formal and empty reason of Kant out of its abstract and theoretic character, just as it carries the cold calculations of utilitarianism into recognition of the common good" (pp. 334-5).

But what is the good, and what the common good? Of course it is happiness, but what is happiness? Our ends are our happiness, not a means to it (p. 273). "All men love happiness — yes, in the sense that, having desires, they are interested in the objects in which the desires may be realized, no matter whether they are worthy or degraded. No; if by this be meant that happiness is something other than and beyond the conditions in which the powers of the person are brought out, and made effective; no, or if it means that all love that which really will bring happiness" (p. 274). "Not all anticipations when realized are what they were expected to be. . . . While they appeared to be happiness during the expectancy of desire, they are not approved as such in later reflection. Hence the demand for some standard good or happiness by which the individual may regulate the formation of his desires and purposes so that the present and the permanent good, the good in desire and in reflection, will coincide — so that the individual will find that to be satisfactory in his present view which will also permanently satisfy him. From happiness as a con-

ceived good we turn to happiness as *rightly* conceived good; from happiness as result to happiness as standard" (pp. 274-5). If we appeal to present valuation to settle the question we must take the valuation of good men. "Only upon the supposition that character is already good can we trust judgment, first, to foresee all the consequences that should be foreseen; and, secondly, to respond to each foreseen consequence with the right emotional stamp of like and dislike, pleasure and pain" (p. 279). This at first blush looks like a circular procedure, but Professor Dewey does not remain in the circle. There is a formal characteristic by which true good can be identified. "Harmony, reinforcement, expansion are the signs of a true or moral satisfaction" (p. 284). The question as to the true good, the standard happiness, then becomes this: "What is the good which while good in direct enjoyment also brings with it fuller and more continuous life?" (p. 284). The answer is: "In substance, the only end which fulfills these conditions is the social good. The utilitarian standard is social consequences" (p. 286). This standard defines the good man: "The genuinely moral person is one, then, in whom the habit of regarding all capacities and habits of self from the social standpoint is formed and active. Such an one forms his plans, regulates his desires, and hence performs his acts with reference to the effect they have upon the social groups of which he is a part. He is one whose dominant attitudes and interests are bound up with associated activities. Accordingly he will find his happiness or satisfaction in the promotion of these activities irrespective of the particular pains and pleasures that accrue" (p. 298).

When later in the book the problem of equating personal and general happiness arises, it is declared insoluble because it is artificial. "It assumes a ready-made self and hence a ready-made type of satisfaction of [or?] happiness. It is not the business of moral theory to demonstrate the existence of mathematical equations, in this life or another one, between goodness and virtue. It is the business of men to develop such capacities and desires, such selves as render them capable of finding their own satisfaction, their invaluable value, in fulfilling the demands which grow out of their associated life. Such happiness may be short in duration and slight in bulk; but that it outweighs in quality all accompanying discomforts as well as all enjoyments which might have been missed by not doing something else, is attested by the simple fact that men do consciously choose it. [Do not men consciously choose other ends as well, and would not this prove the contradictory thesis?] Such a person has found *himself*,

and has solved the problem in the only place and in the only way in which it can be solved: *in action*. To demand in advance of voluntary desire and deliberate choice that it be demonstrated that an individual shall get happiness in the measure of the rightness of his act, is to demand the obliteration of the essential factor in morality: the constant discovery, formation, and reformation of the self in the ends which an individual is called upon to sustain and develop in virtue of his membership in a social whole. . . . Our final word about the place of the self in the moral life, is, then, that the problem of morality is the formation, out of the body of original instinctive impulses which compose the natural self, of a voluntary self in which socialized desires and affections are dominant, and in which the last and controlling principle of deliberation is the love of the objects which will make this transformation possible. If we identify, as we must do, the interests of such a character with the virtues, we may say with Spinoza that happiness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself" (pp. 396-7).

It does not fall within the scope of this review to examine in detail the adequacy of this general theory. If the reviewer says, as he feels inclined to say, that the treatment fails to do full justice to one important side of morality, he can merely indicate what he means. The demands which others make of us, though they play a most important part in the actual moral situations that confront us all, are passed over too lightly. The ideal self which meets these demands in the proper spirit is admirably described in some of its aspects. But in the moral life a person is continually engaged in a social process of give and take, and this process is very complex. One phase of this process is his giving expression to his ideals as they apply to *others*, and his reception of the application of others' ideals by these others to himself. This is worked out in part I. by Professor Tufts in his description of group morality, but in part II. custom as *the embodiment of social demands* is made to retire too complaisantly, giving way to deliberation and to the social habits that arise from deliberative actions. The new custom that replaces the old custom is thus represented as too much the result of the person's deliberation and too little as still determined by social demands. If this side of morality were brought more to the fore, the ideal self which is depicted in these pages would be shown to have a powerful ally in the process of its own realization which now it seems to lack; or the presence of which at least is not adequately recognized.

Part III. deals with 'Social Organization and the Individual,'



'Civil Society and the Political State,' 'The Ethics of the Economic Life,' 'Some Principles in the Economic Order,' 'Unsettled Problems in the Economic Order' (two chapters), and finally 'The Family.' The discussion of the various problems thus handled is preceded by a short statement of the historical development of present-day conditions which give rise to these problems. This third part makes the volume perhaps the most practical of all the ethical text-books in our language.

The publishers have done their fair share to the production of a high-grade book. The print is open and sufficiently large, the paper light and strong, and the binding is uniform with that of the series. The proof reading has been carefully done, but still there are a few mistakes, typographical and otherwise, which remain, *e. g.*, 'bound' for 'bond,' p. 32, l. 29; 'Erinnys' for 'Erinnyes,' p. 122, l. 15; 'Philip' for 'Alexander,' p. 126, l. 17; the transposition of 'motive' and 'intention,' p. 256, l. 12; and 'of' for 'or,' p. 396, l. 5. There is an index of twelve pages.

I cannot close the review of such a book as this without expressing my admiration of the way in which the authors have accomplished their task.

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## VISION.

*Stereoscopic Vision and its Relation to Intensity and Quality of Light Sensation.* T. R. ROBINSON. University of Toronto Studies, Psychological Series, pp. 45 + 78, with 15 plates. (Serial number and date of publication not indicated.)

The author of this paper undertakes to contribute to the solution of the following problems: Under what conditions may pairs of images combine stereoscopically when they differ (*a*) in color and (*b*) in brightness? As was to be expected in such an investigation, the phenomena of luster as well as those of relief come in for consideration throughout.

The apparatus was a modified form of the stereoscope, and a set of stereograms. The stereograms consisted of various gray and colored surfaces, together with geometric figures in black, in white and in color. An episcotister was employed for the purpose of varying the conditions of presentation on one half of the stereogram. A final modification of the procedure consisted in reporting what changes occur when objects are observed through colored spectacles. The author has been at work upon this general problem, at intervals, for a decade or more. The essential features of his findings to date are as follows: