

II.—REALITY AS A SYSTEM OF FUNCTIONS.

BY GERALD CATOR.

I CALL those things functions of each other each of which is itself in the same degree as it is not-its-other.

Every function is analysable into a system of subordinate functions and these again into subordinate functions and so on endlessly. A function regarded under this aspect of plurality I shall call a functional system. Though, as I shall contend, everything that can be in any way referred to is a function and nothing at all else, yet since there arises in its due place in the involutions of the functional system, one function, to wit the human intelligence, as unaware of the functional structure of its object-world, it is desirable to have a word 'functionisable' to express the recognition of this structure as a potentiality, and another 'functionisation' to express the corresponding act.

My thesis is that functionisation—the becoming of a function itself-and-not-another is that in which the Realness of Reality and the Being of Being consists. The more functionised the more real. So far as anything is it is as functionised, as A-not-not-A.

To give some examples, matter, time and space are functions. A Human Life having any thread of unity is a function, so is the development of an idea or the history of a nation.

Each of these taken as a whole, is, in so far as it has distinctness, and it has distinctness by the simultaneous and correlative development of positive and negative relations.

It is important to note that functionisation is not a form imposed on a pre-existent matter of some kind but it entirely supplies both matter and form. Similarly a functional system never exists completed as something containing but not contained, but always taken as a whole it is a function opposed to its other.

Thus it is capable of endless analysis, for the elements resulting from each analysis will always be functional systems, and it is capable of endless synthesis, for the whole resulting

from each succeeding synthesis will always be a functional element, contrasted with and calling for synthesis with, its other.

Prop. I.—Proof of the functional structure of all possible content resting on its entire determination through a process which is a process of functionisation, viz., the continuous differentiation and integration of a continuum.

When I say the world, the universe or Reality the picture called up before my mind's eye is somewhat as follows:—

The Round Globe swinging through space, some picture of the distribution of Land and Water on it, the peoples, their industry and history, leading back to Rome, Greece, Babylon. Present events, political activities, reminiscences of scraps from the newspapers, *débris* of recollections of reading, the room I sit writing in, the scratching of the pen, the play of the firelight, the children sleeping upstairs, the fore-shadow of to-morrow's work.

Now that this world is functionally determined I may show in several ways, but of these the most suitable for the present purpose is to exhibit the breakdown of the attempt to draw a line between what is present to sensation and its Ideal extension.

Directly we attempt to do this we become aware of ideal elements in the very heart of the given and of a factual aspect in the Ideal. Nothing is merely given, nothing merely ideal.

The This-Now which supports the ideal extension, is apprehended as determined in illimitable time and space in which it occupies an unique place.

Alter anything however far back in time and however far off in space and you simultaneously give the This-Now a compensating re-determination. The Matter which bulks so largely in my this-now is there known in a concept which has a history dependent on my past studies, and on my having partly absorbed certain current philosophical and scientific ideas; it would not be for a savage as it is for me, his world is as his mind is: his lack of general words is not a mere lack of tools for expressing his ideas.

Any one who thinks of the senses as mere windows through which the mind receives information of an independent and ready-made world of sounds and sights may also think of ideas in a similar way.

But whoever has got over this way of thinking will understand that it is just as true, no more true, and true for the same reason, to speak of the *same* world as known by different

knowers as it is to speak of the *same* object as perceived by different senses.

It is in each case an inference of which the justification is *not* its verification by experience but that it effects an integration of experience. The verification itself where it occurs is only a special case of integration, for the fact verifying is as much ideal as the idea verified.

Finally the 'I-myself' at the centre of my this-now is quick with Ideality, intensely sensitive to every happening, mirroring every possibility, a function of infinite variables. The sort of man I believe myself to be, the history that I (sometimes) suppose myself to have had, the beliefs and dis-beliefs which I suppose myself to possess: all these not only are determinate only as loci, but even as loci they are the variable and precarious resultants of ideal activities of inconceivable complexity of actions and re-actions and re-reactions echoing back on each other, modifying, annulling, intensifying each other, entering into new cycles, going through evolutions of evolutions, a swarming seething life of which every part is at every moment balanced upon and supporting the whole, a veritable microcosm, containing its histories, its pauses, its romances, its tragedies.

It is no more true that the given this-now supports the Ideal extension than it is true that the extension gives rise to and supports the given 'this-now'.

Extension and given are interdependent, they rest on each other: the real is a construction from the basis of the ideal. Thus the whole universe, the given and the extension which is intimately continuous with it, is in its entirety a functional product, a product of contradiction disentangling differentiation and reaction.

The Given and the Ideal extension reciprocally constitute and determine each other by their difference from each other. The character of Basis so far as the given has it is not anterior to the construction, but is a *functionally bestowed characteristic*.

Prop. II.—Proof that everything nameable is functionally determined and that it is nothing but a function.

We are tempted to think of the functional system as something the being of which needs to be accounted for, that is we think of some primæval nothing the dispossession of which needs accounting for.

This is a great fallacy—there is no such *prima facie* presumption in favour of the aboriginal being of nothing, as against the being of something.

Take the most extreme case; think of that formless, timeless, spacelessness which would remain if God annihilated every trace of *Himself and of everything else*.

This 'nothing' is as plainly an ideal or functional construction as 'the universe' for it is a universal ablation, a negative reflexion of all possible being.

In short alter anything anywhere and you alter everything everywhere for everything is 'alter' to everything else, that this is so is the presupposition of all possibilities; Being and nothing alike arise within and depend upon their reciprocity. How necessary this reciprocity is we may see by this, that if everything could absorb its other it would annihilate itself in doing so.

If we cannot say at once: anything which was everything would fail to be even nothing, we cannot say it only because in regarding the everything as failing to be nothing we invest it with a character of exclusion and so we regard it as not everything, *i.e.*, as not including nothing, for nothing is something so far as it is 'not-anything'.

If the reader is a student of Idealism, he will find the route traversed in this paper so familiar to him that he may well be tempted to inquire whether there is anything at all novel about it, except the replacement of the ordinary terminology of subject and object by an awkward 'functional' terminology.

Now, though I am by no means in a position to claim or anxious to claim any degree of originality (since by doing so I should expose my conclusions to be criticised as nothing but the fads of an amateur speculator, whereas I believe that in very great measure they are the common possession of many thinkers of this time and of previous times also), yet I must say for myself what the reasons are which have led me to regard Functionalism as an improvement on Idealism not only as a terminology but also in substance.

The ego the 'subject' of Idealism is always clogged with the associations which cling to the subject, I myself; you, —Psychological Individuals with histories. The Psychological Ego, is so much besides a thinker of thoughts that inevitably its thoughts appear like mere passing accidents in its substance, like reflexions in a mirror.

Idealist thinking then starting with 'subject' loaded with these associations is exposed to a constant warping tendency to think of the subject as a thing, a substance.

For me subject and object are completely correlative functions, the subject is subject of the object and the object object of the subject. The object is not more dependent on the sub-

ject than the subject on the object. *Esse is percipere* for the subject and *percipi* for the object. This interdependence and co-relativity is complete, like that of the S. and N. Poles of a magnet. No object without a subject, no subject without an object. To such and such an individual subject such and such an individual object. They are a true functional pair of which the test is this, each would be the other in the other's place. So far as the same object is object for several minds, so far they are the same subject. So far as there is difference of subject there can not be identity of object. To the diffused undifferentiated object of early soul life corresponds a diffused undifferentiated subject, the differentiation of the subject proceeds *pari passu* with that of the object. By regarding the matter in this way we not only gain an apprehension of the *interdependence* of subject and object so as to see that there can be no subject without an object and no object without a subject, but we also learn to regard the subject side of Reality as an ideal construction equally with the object side, by doing thus we are entirely freed from the familiar difficulty of solipsism. I do not know my mind by experience simply and yours by inference simply. I, at least, so far as 'I' has definite import, and you subject to the same condition, are alike for me ideal constructions standing or falling together.

'I' arise in an experience which I then call 'mine' just in the same way as time or space or matter or indeed any other definite object of representation, whether present or absent, concrete or universal, material or immaterial, that is through the activity of a synthesising principle. All alike arise as, and all alike strictly speaking must ever remain, hypotheses, in principle at least, subject to correction. This is a direct and most vital consequence of the view adopted in this paper, and therefore I cannot insist too strongly upon it.

According then to the functional view the universe, matter and form together, is a system, a complete and therefore an exhaustive, an infinite, a self-conscious, a self-contained, a self-representative system.

Whenever within it is found independence, individuality, exclusiveness, uniqueness, isolation, the reason of these characters and their assignment to such and such points of the system must be sought in the inner necessity of the system itself, they and all other characteristics are functionally conferred.

Take as example the difference between ideal and real, consider how the idea of the inkpot now before your eyes differs from the thing itself and you will find the reason is

this, the idea is universal because ideal and ideal because incompletely determined, i.e. determined in an incomplete system, which, because incomplete, in turn is subordinate to an including system.

The real inkpot is completely determined and rests in its place in the ultimate system. The Real is real for no other reason than because it alone is *completely* ideal.¹

I have already done something (Props. 1 and 2) towards proving by analysis the functional view, but I now propose to give another proof by synthesis.

Prop. III.—The Functional view is true, because it is incapable of being false, every possible adverse suggestion is not only consistent with it but is necessary to it, that is every such adverse suggestion far from contradicting the functional view is one of the subordinate functions necessary to its completeness and as such ministers to and supports it.

Just so one can imagine that given a full insight into circumstances one might see in a given case of conduct the only way to act, the only honourable thing to do might be something indefensible, according to all ordinary rules. The point of the illustration is that in the end *all* apparent exceptions to the functional view are instances of it.

Let us consider that no possible representation can have other characteristics than functional ones, which therefore will place it in its own *unique* place in the exhaustive functional system. The Character which seems to resist inclusion in the functional system, derives its whole strength and being, its character of resistance too, from that system.

For the present purpose, and as I think for all purposes actuality, present existence, with all its determination, if so be *here* in the time series and *here* in space, is a matter of content—is a characteristic of content, a quality like redness or pungency. A merely possible object differs in content from the same object as actual, just as triangular differs in content from square, and therefore just as the completion of the series of geometrical figures will give rise to triangularity as well as to squareness and then to triangles as well as to squares, so in the ultimate functional system there must be actuality as well as possibility and then individual actuals, with all their individuating principles and entourage of accidents.

¹ I may refer the reader to my two previous papers on this same subject. The first published in *MIND* (N.S., 61) under the title 'The Structure of Reality,' the second in the *Monist*, October, 1908, 'Id quo majus cogitari nequit'.

What is your objection to this syllogism demonstrating the content of the functional system by means of the idea of completeness—

A complete system must include everything

The functional system is a complete system—ergo

Perhaps you distinguish, saying

A complete system (if it exists) must include everything, adding that, from the fact that I have what I suppose to be the Idea of a complete system, it by no means follows that such a system exists without the mind.

I answer that a complete system with all that belongs to its completeness is incapable of not existing. For you cannot avoid this—that if the system were complete it would include this your doubt of its actual actuality. Your doubt is in fact a function of the complete system; one of its necessary elements.

But from (1) 'if the system existed this doubt would exist' to (2) 'this doubt exists, therefore the system exists' is a perfectly good and stringent inference.

This inference it will be seen is in the form—If A then B to If B then A. Take a complete system and as it were draw a line across it anywhere so as to divide it into two parts, A and B, then since the system A + B is complete, all that is not B is A, and all that is not A is B, then A and B are functions, each is not-the-other; each in the other's place would be that other, for they differ only by their systematic positions. Therefore the complement of each, that which follows from each, which fills up the gap in Reality left by the inclusion of either alone, is precisely the other.

To summarise this argument. If your doubt of the actual existence of a complete system does not stand between it and actual existence, then nothing stands between and it exists. But your doubt does not so stand, on the contrary regarded as standing alone it is precisely that last determination which confers actuality.

Prop. IV.—The functional system because of its completeness is eternally and perfectly self-conscious at the point and in the mode dictated by its nature.

As complete or perfect (which is the same thing) the functional system must possess itself, be for itself, be object to itself as subject, and this is self-consciousness. Moreover only by making it self-representative, containing itself within itself, which again is self-consciousness, can its infiniteness be conciliated with its individuality and completeness.

By repetition of the same reasons, it is necessary that the

self-consciousness of the functional system should be entirely concentrated at and vested in its Functional Absolute, God—the Absolute. Absoluteness like all else is a functional determination, the Absolute would be nothing apart from the relative, and plainly this relativity of the Absolute to the Relative, this dependence of the Absolute on the Relative is no prejudice to its Absoluteness.

The independent to be that needs something to be independent of, for this is part of the meaning of independence, and similarly the Absolute needs something to be above external relation to.

By maintaining this we do not in any way taint or dim the Aseity of God, nor do we even inchoatively give the Universe anything like a pluralistic or Federal Constitution by making God in some sense only the first among equals.

For us as for S. Bernard, God is

Purus, simplex, integer perfectus constans sibi.

There cannot be any ideal of a non-functional Absolute which should be as it were the Real thing, the standard which our Functional Absolute invites comparison with and is condemned by. The Functional Absolute is the Absolute Simpliciter. Philosophy is every bit as much concerned as Theology in maintaining the incommunicability of God.

In accordance also with our functional view, we say now that in the Perfection of God's Self-Knowledge there is involved the Perfect possession of Other-Knowledge. Knowing Himself as Super-Being Super-One super-measure, *i.e.* above all measure and degree, He knows also in the intimacy of its presentation in its full detail and individuality all possible other. We are tempted to think of God as possessing a sort of bird's-eye view of the universe like one would have of a landscape from a balloon, a chequer work of fields and hedges, little toy cottages with smoke coming from the chimneys, little dots of men working in the fields. Instead of this way of thinking we ought to think of God as having a magnified view of everything. Compared to His Eternal Knowledge my present knowledge of my sensations, the feel of my pen, the taste in my mouth is phantasmic and unreal.¹ Neither should we think of God as lacking any kind of experience, for though as S. Thomas says, *desit sibi sensitiva cognitio*, as such yet He possesses it '*Eminenter*'. He does not know the freshness of the morning only through our senses, as object He possesses in Himself all objectivity, and as subject all subjectivity

¹ God working in man is more intimately present in him than man is even in himself. (The Encyclical *Pascendi*, official translation, p. 23.)

including that of sensitive creatures. He knows in eternity not as excluded from knowing in time. He lacks nothing.

We must now steer our course past one of the most dangerous rocks in all Philosophy by inquiring what is the relation between the Human or other finite intelligence and the Divine intelligence, and between the Human objects and the Divine objects. Also what is the corresponding relation between one human intelligence and another, and between the same human intelligence and itself when turned to different subjects or at different times.

I will here remark that the view which as I understand it is now held by Psychologists as to the structure of the mind, namely that it is an apperceptive system itself in some degree subordinate to a social consciousness and having other apperceptive systems subordinate to it,—the minds of the individual as it were on various subjects, seem to me to support very strongly the general functionalist view upheld in this essay.

For not only in this view is a mind regarded as a hierarchical system of ideas, a subsistent theory, not only is it shown as plainly a construction and not a datum, but for it the private mind of the individual enters as an element into a wider common-consciousness to which it stands in the same relation as the subordinate minds or apperceptive systems within it to itself. The whole process of the building up of a mind is presented as one of individuation by the differentiation of an original continuum.

A dictum of Aristotle's repeatedly used by S. Thomas, is that the knower and his knowledge are one, and the reader will see how entirely this harmonises with the view as to the absolute correlativity of subject and object maintained in this way.

But this view leads us as it led the scholastics straight up to a difficulty '*de Unitate Intellectus*'.

If the knower and his knowledge are one, then to one knowledge one knower. If the knowledge is absolute truth, then the knower is absolute mind. If the knowledge is universal, can the knower be individual and separate.¹

Again, on the side of the object if being is univocal, we who know (some) being therefore know what God knows, our in-

¹ Licet enim intellectus meus sit individuus et separatus ab intellectu tuo, tamen secundum quod est individuus non habet universale in ipso et ideo non individuat id quod est in intellectu—sic igitur universale ut universale est univocum et semper idem omnino et idem in animabus omnium non recipiens individuationem ab anima. (Albertus Magnus, quoted by Haureau, *Hist. de la Phil. Scol.*, p. 69. Vol. II.)

tellects are therefore so far indiscernible from His and since there can be no distinction without difference they are identical with His.

A Philosophy may be known by its difficulties ; and a Philosophy which like the Scholastic found itself fighting for its life *de unitate intellectus* cannot have been the first artless systematisation of common-sense notions that Prof. James would have us believe it.

The intemperate use of the principle of excluded middle is, I believe, responsible for a great part of our speculative troubles. We tend to infer far too hastily the falsehood of one statement from the truth of some other. Everything must have some one and no more real taste, shape, smell, colour, texture, every statement must be either true or false, if it is not wholly, universally, absolutely true then it is not true, that is, it is false.

I think I hardly believe at all in inconceivables, impossibles or intrinsic self-contradictions. In fact there is always some reference to context in what purport to be self-contained universal truths. Descartes chose the equivalence of the three interior angles of a triangle to two rights as one of those truths we cannot doubt and yet in non-Euclidean geometry we doubt it easily enough. How many of the painful crises of life arise from our having to choose between two right-wrong things. I am prepared to go further and to offer to replace the formula that a judgment cannot be true *if* it is false, by the formula that a judgment cannot be true *unless* it is false. A Real Judgment, judged in real life, not one of the simulcra we experiment with when reading Logic books, adjudicates something previously in doubt, is directed against some *prima facie* truth. If what it slays is a mere ghost, it, the slayer, is a ghost. Truth and falsehood are interdependent functions and the denial of a 'great error' is a great truth. A statement which is true when made in the midst of controversy and is therefore hotly denied, perishes of its success (as has often happened in theological controversies) if it succeeds so completely as to drive its adversary off the field.

There is always a need for His Majesty's opposition, if we are not to lose hold of some truth. This is not merely because we become lazy and forget the grounds of our Belief. It lies deeper and in the nature of truth. Correspondence *with* Reality is impossible unless the correspondents are different. The truth of a theory, the significance of its affirmation lies in this, that it *leads* to something, does not exhaust the subject and therefore in that it is *not* as it stands, as it is formulated, completely true.

Take for an example the Geocentric and Heliocentric astronomies. According to common sense if it is true that the earth moves round the sun which stands still, it is false that the sun moves round the earth which stands still. And yet Heliocentricism is but a half-truth though for astronomical purposes and for present day interests it is the larger half. If we treat it as wholly true it leads us to forget the relativity of motion. There is one aspect of the facts which can *only* be expressed by remembering the possibility of a Geocentric formulation. If this aspect is fully and vividly apprehended, it in turn will require for its full comprehension the apprehension of this aspect of it, *viz.*, that it is such as to have a tendency to exclude from Human Belief the Heliocentric formulation. Thus its falsehood, *i.e.*, its capacity for misleading, is part of its truth. Impossibility is a question of mental grasp and compass. Different minds can support synthesis elaborated to different degrees, that which for a low synthesis is impossible with some truth, becomes for a higher synthesis a complementary and confirmatory aspect of it.

Here is a rough pictorial illustration of the nature of error.

Given what ought at a given time and in given circumstances to be believed and supposing that the apperceptive rank of minds can be arranged in an ascending series, *a, b, c, d*. And that syntheses of the universe can be arranged in a corresponding series, *A, B, C, D*.

Then in each succeeding synthesis, propositions will appear as complementary which in the lower synthesis were contradictory.

To find out whether the truth of some particular proposition for a given man involves the falsehood of some one other proposition, see whether his mind is or is not of sufficiently high rank to contain the grade of synthesis which unites the two.

Further, in simple and in elastic minds at any rate, truth and error do not merely grow side by side like wheat and tares in a field, they are connected like the Siamese twins, kill the error and the truth will bleed to death.

A mentality is all of a piece, its error is as characteristic of it as its truth. *This* truth and *this* error; *this* error and *this* truth, are reciprocally connected as necessarily within a given type of mentality as three sides and three angles, three angles and three sides are in Euclidean space. If A then B, if B then A.

Concepts are instruments—instruments of knowing, and as such they must be adapted to the apperceptive level of the mind which has to use them. Even in the intellectual life

an ambition is possible which overreaches itself and an acceptance of my 'station and its duties' needs to be preached.¹ If for example we try to think habitually *sub specie aeternitatis* the only result is that we lose our grasp on time, without gaining a grasp of eternity, if we are too proud to be anthropomorphic, we pay the penalty in dimmed apprehension of God's personality. Thus the problem of how much in the way of knowing to attempt is for each of us a practical one, a housewife's problem of laying out our mental capital to the best advantage, we may fail either by attempting too little, or by attempting too much universality. And surely danger lies on *both* sides, we have to balance the advantage of gaining so much universality against the practically consequent loss of so much vividness and intimacy of apprehension. Just in the same way too little struggle for existence as in the tropics harms men by enervating them, and too much struggle as in Arctic regions, harms them by crushing them down.

Please note that these are only illustrations, intentionally overstated, and that I do not believe either men, or ages, or circumstances to differ from each other to anything like the extent these illustrations seem to suggest, and that in particular I do not consent to the idea of an intellectual *élite*, believing one thing themselves and conniving at the common people believing another.²

Now what started us on this long discussion about truth and error, was that some scholastics did not see how if our eternal truths differ from God's, they can be anything but false, since God's truths are purely true. I think our discussion will have given the key to the problem, our best truths are only half or three quarters or it may be nine-tenths true. God's truths are wholly true, they end in vision and exhaust reality. *Scientia Dei est causa Rerum*.

I propose now in the interests of the main discussion, the discussion as to the relation of Finite and Infinite mind, to apply these views to the question which seems most refractory of all: that of the relation of time and eternity.

¹ Et sic fit ut, ad ea quae sunt notissima rerum noster intellectus se habeat, ut oculus noctuae ad solem, ut secundo *Metaphysicorum* dicitur. (S. Thomas, S.C.G., Book I., chap. xi.) We cannot bear too much light.

² I should like to emphasise at this point that I do believe in a synthesis appropriate to the man plane of mind! which differentiates men as a 'species' of knowers from such Beings as angels, in a far more fundamental way than individual differences differentiate one human individual from another. The man plane of mind is a conception I gained from Prof. Laurie's *Synthetica*, and the extent to which I shall have made the importance and the legitimacy of this conception felt will be to a large extent the measure of my success in this essay.

We humans are as deeply committed as it is possible to be to the non-coexistence of events succeeding one another in time, and only a considerable amount of schooling in philosophical thinking can render us able even to understand the possibility of doubting the reality of time, or of recognising in our concept 'time' the presence of hypothetical elements. Of events which succeed in time the condition of the coming into existence of the latter is the going out of existence of the former. Yesterday is past and over and God Himself cannot make it otherwise. Please note that we only evade the difficulty if we think of God merely as knowing the future certainly as we know it conjecturally. He is not in time. Events do not approach Him from the future, swirl past Him, and float away into the past. We are often tempted to think that it is futile to pray for something which either in itself or in its causes is determined before the prayer is prayed, *e.g.* the pregnant mother's prayer as to the sex of the child she bears within her. But God cannot so regard it as futile, for to His Eternal Will the prayer though coming in the time order after the event may still in the eternal order be the cause of His decreeing it to be so.

Imagine a circle with an inscribed Polygon of N sides. The circle represents reality the goal of thought; the Polygon, the system of Ideas through which Reality is apprehended, then the Ideal system approximates to Reality in proportion to the number of side $n-2n-4n$ but can never coincide with it. Suppose further that the Polygon is actuated by some kind of spring which causes it, if left to itself, to lose contact with the circle at every other point, and then every other remaining point, so that if the sides were $4n$ at the moment of release they would pass through $4n-2n-n$.

For each of us the number of sides of our Polygon measures our apperceptive level at any moment.

Every one will have experience how this swells and shrinks, sometimes expanding and magnifying till one seems to be 'spectator of all time and of all existence,' sometimes shrinking into a painful blur in which we see men as trees walking, can apprehend and retain nothing. In the first state we have almost a foretaste of Eternity, events as they happen are received without jar into the places waiting for them. In the second state, for we are as much below the capacity of being surprised as in the first we are above it, we live the dull, hopeless, apathetic, momentary life of animals. The distance between our ideas and reality is thus measured by degree of apperceptive level; as the ideal expands, it expands towards the Real.

My second illustration is this. Take the circle as before : God as 'Subject-object' is the centre.

Suppose Radii, and then as it were move the centre outwards towards the circumference and let this represent a degradation of apperceptive level, in moving outwards and in still trying to synthesise the Radii, it as subject will undergo distortion and the correlative object will undergo an entirely parallel distortion ; increasing in degree according to the distance moved from the true centre.

Return to the instance of time.

Eternity is for God what time is for us. Time is eternity seen through human eyes, as the mind shrinks in apperceptive level, its eternity becomes more and more compounded with absolute discontinuity. Time is the product of this composition. Placing for illustration—God—the Angels—Plato—the writer—a rustic—an animal—a stone in a descending series—we see the character of the duration change Eternity—Aevum—Time¹ time² time³—till at the animal, there only remains a flicker of the light of eternity to serve to make the darkness visible, at the stone this has given out and the darkness is extinguished with the light.¹

We misinterpret our sentiments and do ourselves much injustice through taking too unrestricted a view of our immersion in time. Our interest in the future, in eternity and eternal interests, is *not* wholly dependent on there being a life beyond the grave. We are not wholly cut off from the future and the past ; for the past is not wholly not now and the future is not wholly not yet.

It is useful practice to suppose that perhaps some day we may recognise in the time-hypothesis only a half truth. The facts it covers might be otherwise theorised.

We can imagine something similar in the case of space, though not so easily. Thus unity is the first attribute of God and extension with its impenetrability is a sort of compromise between being and nothing.

Thus I look out over a beautiful landscape and I see extended beauty ; the extension a partially self-neutralising distortion of the self-possession of God ; the beauty a partially self-neutralising distortion of His Glory.

I suppose the conatural worlds of finite subjects, their objects, their Gods, to be in their particularity distortion effects, depending on their distance from God, and all their field of consciousness to undergo a corresponding modification, in terms of distance from God, all to be marked as it

¹ On the fading away of time as knowledge increases, see Bosanquet, *Logic*, pp. 271-6 (vol. i.).

were with the same 'local sign'. What His essence is to God, that the material object is to us, the active Infinity of God, becomes for us mere unfinishedness infinite relativity, as in time, space, infinite divisibility of matter and so on, God's Intellectus which is His essence, withers down in us to discursive reason, blundering forward 'step by step'.

Our self-evident first principles are to the Divine Word in which God sees all things, like the last degenerate representative of a noble family—their chief remaining characteristic, obstinacy and pride. Our personality, our self-consciousness, our very being are mere shrunken shadows of His. In comparison with His Being and His Knowledge, we are not, know not.

Yet as S. Thomas says of the human mind, *remanet in re quadam Infinitas*—this is the analogous qualitative identity of each of our minds with a virtuality of the Divine mind, because of this we, each of us and God, know the same world and not a numerically different representation of it.

Thus we can see the whole World in terms of God. God is the Absolute synthesis. He unites for Himself absolute unity with the exhaustion of every possible degree and variation of negativity. Every fleeting appearance is in its possibility necessary to God. He stands to the world in a Relation of irrelativity. He is the Absolute—the Absolute of the Relative. Finitude contributes to His Aseity; He as it were makes His enemies His footstool.

Thus appearance in all its modes is not as Mr. Bradley's work suggests an effect of '*imaginatio*,' it is in its place as real as reality, they live with the same life.

We have not to choose between the intelligible world as a kind of cold ballet of bloodless categories and this kind warm earth with its life of daily hopes and fears, its solidities and opacities, its abruptnesses and contingencies.

Our America is here—our common Daily Life Divine. The ideal in the sensible is for us that primary and supporting Real, which God is for Himself. By placing it at the heart of our knowledge, by accepting it as our primary real, we know as God in our place, and this is what I want to make the moral and the conclusion of this essay. The world, matter and form, is reason throughout; let us therefore trust our Reason and fear not illusion, for the deliverances of our Reason are the content of the Eternal Reason at the man plane of mind.¹

¹ P. Rousselot's *Intellectualisme de S. Thomas* shows very strikingly how great the gulf is which in Thomist Philosophy separates Divine from Human intellection. S. Thomas as interpreted by Dr. Rousselot is really an Idealist of Hegelian type. To this interpretation I humbly subscribe.