


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The Psychology of Justice

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUSTICE

By TADAICHI UEDA

Justice is the cardinal virtue of the social man. It has been extolled as the queen of all virtues, compared with which "neither the evening nor the morning star is so admirable." Paulsen describing it says: "Justice, as a moral habit, is that tendency of the will and mode of conduct which refrains from disturbing the lives and interests of others, and, as far as possible, hinders such interference on the part of others" (42, p. 599). The just man is the man who respects and jealously guards his own rights as well as those of others. Taken in this broad sense, justice, universal justice, as Aristotle called it, covers almost the whole field of social morality. To describe and analyze the sentiment of justice in all its multitudinous aspects, fascinating as is the task, is obviously beyond the scope of the present treatise. It was unavoidable that in my study much of this large vital theme should be left untouched. In not a few instances I have had to rest content with merely suggesting lines of thought yet to be worked out. In treating of the subject I have largely followed the rubrics indicated by the accompanying syllabus of the questionnaire prepared by Dr. G. Stanley Hall.

TOPICAL SYLLABUS, No. 29
(Academic Year 1909-1910)

JUSTICE

Kindly note the age and sex.

1. From observation and memory will you kindly make a list of cases where boys and girls have been unfair or unjust in games, lessons, talk about others, or treatment of them.
2. Describe a few cases where you or others tried to set things right and make them fair and just again; and tell how you or others came out in this effort.

3. Should those who are very unfair to others always be exposed and punished or should they be let go free if they can? *i. e.*, have we responsibility to see that the unjust receive their due?

4. In what cases would you tell of an unjust act, and when not?

5. Give one good case or more where you have tried to punish or avenge an injury done yourself or your friends?

6. What is the best story or case of justice or unfairness you have ever heard or read of?

7. How differently do you feel about being unfair to playmates, teachers, parents, strangers, friends, or God? How about their being unfair to you?

8. Have you ever done anything you thought you ought to be punished for and really longed to be punished, and were unhappy and felt isolated until you were? If so, describe such a case?

9. Describe the greatest injustice you have ever suffered; how you felt and what you did.

10. Describe the greatest injustice you ever inflicted upon another: how you felt and what you did.

11. What do you think about the importance of the sense of justice in the young? How would you cultivate it?

12. What influences in home, school, church, and community tend to suppress its normal development?

13. Do you feel at the bottom of your soul that this is a just universe, where good is sure to be adequately rewarded, and evil punished in the end? Have you ever doubted this? If so, how did the doubt affect you?

14. Can one person really bear the penalties of another's fault and let the guilty one escape?

15. If you feel deeply guilty for some bad act you have committed, describe your qualms of conscience and what impulses you have felt in such cases?

16. Should we pardon or forgive and how far; or ask it of others and when?

17. Should we not avenge real injustice?

Will you kindly select some of the above questions suitable for different grades and ask pupils to answer them in a composition?

G. STANLEY HALL.

CLARKE UNIVERSITY,

Worcester, Mass., Nov. 2, 1909.

The questionnaire brought in some 480 returns, which have kindly been placed at my disposal.¹ The main body of the returns is from normal school girls, and as such it represents a very limited circle of thought and experience. Moreover, the insignificant minority of male respondents put all comparison of sex differences wholly out of the question. Being placed at such disadvantages I have been careful through-

¹ My thanks are due to President G. Stanley Hall for this courtesy of placing these returns at my disposal, to those who helped us collect the material, and to the several hundreds who, at great personal sacrifice, took pains to respond to the questionnaire. It is also a pleasure to acknowledge herewith my indebtedness to President Hall for inspiration and encouragement, and to Professors William H. Burnham, Alexander F. Chamberlain and Dr. Theodate L. Smith for helpful criticisms and suggestions.

out not to draw too much from the material in question. However, in many respects the returns were of distinct interest and value, as may be seen, I hope, in the course of this study. Let it be said at the outset that I approach the problem with the spirit not of a doctrinaire, but of a student of psychology. To advocate any particular ethical theory is not my concern here. The present work is neither more nor less than a humble attempt, impelled by an intense dissatisfaction with the traditional casuistry, to restore the facts of the moral life to their natural setting, and thereby to gain some insight into their nature and meaning.

I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION

When we consider the stupendous fecundity of living organisms and then see how infinitesimally small is the number of offspring that reach maturity, we can form some idea of the pressure of the conditions of life. Amidst all sorts of difficulties and limitations, self-conservation means strenuous struggle and self-assertion. Very likely primitive consciousness originated in pain sensation (58, ch. 2). Pain calls forth actions, to be sure largely fortuitous at first, which have for their function the cessation of the painful experience. This may be effected either by fleeing from the source of pain or by its removal. In the course of such experiences, primitive pain is differentiated into fear and anger. With the advent of these emotions the gates of psychic life opened and the routine has put on a very exciting aspect. The struggles for space, air, food, shelter, and mate are no longer carried on in silence. All creatures groan and are in agony with the urgent impulse to live. The traits of character condemned to-day as "brutal" and "animal," together with other "angelic" qualities, have been evolved in the course of this world-old struggle for existence. Now man appears upon the scene as the superb animal of the sentient world, highly charged with the "ape and tiger promptings." Man, as Schopenhauer characterizes him, is the most complete objectification of the will to live, and is the most necessitous and jealous of all beings. His highly developed nervous mechanism makes man capable of rich and complicated psychic life. When these self-assertive beings are gathered together, the conflict of individual interests is inevitable. Man can little tolerate the encroachment of others upon his own interests and possessions, whatever he may do to others on his part. It is interesting to watch how slight an infringement of a right provokes disproportionate resentment. It appears that man learns how to get angry and jealous before he can pity and sympathize.

Watch children at play. The desire to win and excel renders their plays extremely exciting. Play is not always a peaceful occupation, but it abounds with temptations and opportunities to be mean and unfair. All sorts of tricks and devices are resorted to in order to win. Indeed, a certain amount of trickery is indulged in as a sort of necessary strategem. It constitutes, as it were, an integral part of play and little scruple attends the practice. Some even take delight in little tricks, and think themselves "smart" when undetected. But the situation presents a totally different aspect when viewed from the side of the cheated; for the stronger the desire to win and the keener the shame of defeat, the greater is the resentment for the unfairness of one's competitors. Such unfairness usually results in the breaking up of the play or in the ostracizing of the cheats. Again, the unwillingness and refusal to take one's share in the less attractive portion of a play is a grievance quite common among children. For instance, one will not be "it" when caught; another wants always to be the teacher at playing school. The question of who shall, or shall not, be the first, or "it," is of great moment, and occasions hot disputes. "To take turns" is a lesson which every individual has to learn upon entering group life. Reciprocity is an unwritten code of justice. J. H. Johnson's interesting account of the McDonogh Boys (30) may be read in this connection.

A glance at the general attitude towards cheating in lessons is also instructive. More than fifty different forms of cheating are reported in our returns. Some of them are very elaborate and ingenious; a few reveal somewhat serious forms of dishonesty.

Cheating in lessons is by no means uncommon among advanced students in colleges. Dean Briggs of Harvard is reported as saying: "The most anxious disciplinary work of the year was the struggle for the suppression of dishonesty in written work. This kind of dishonesty has baffled the authorities" (37). It is easy to conceive that when mere marks won in tests and examinations count for so much in deciding the standing of a student, and when the whole affair is more a matter of chance than of merit, circumstances might well induce a student to an act of momentary dishonesty. After all, examination honesty, as Dr. Hall says, does not represent "the finest type in the best field of this noble sentiment, justice" (22, II, p. 321). The atmosphere of the classroom is very different from that of the playground. Whereas in games and plays dexterity and adroitness are essential things and strategy finds justification to a great extent, truthfulness is the virtue most esteemed in school work. This makes cheating in lessons an intensely moral question. Those who have been led to dishonesty in their work experience a remorseful feeling, which is closely akin to that accompanying a deviation from truth, as in the case of lying. Just as every wilful distortion of simple truth is, in ordinary circumstances, unnatural and painful, so the cheats suffer much from troubled con-

science. Our returns on this point are very interesting; but, since the qualms of conscience arising from dishonesty in lessons do not, in my judgment, involve the question of justice, I need not dwell on them here.

By far the majority of our respondents think that dishonesty in class work wrongs other honest pupils. It is not the violation of rules of the classroom, or the disobedience to the teacher, or again the disregard of the traditions of the institution, that makes the practice essentially unjust. It is rather the fact that the cheats go not only unpunished, but even crowned with high marks and honor, while their more faithful, hardworking fellow-students receive scant or no recognition.

Prof. Barnes found a similar state of things among the university students whom he investigated (6). The chief arguments brought out by Prof. Barnes' respondents in condemnation of cheating were, that cheating wrongs honest students, and that it harms the institution. It wrongs honest students in that the cheat establishes a standard too high for any honest effort; it harms the institution in that by cheating the credit of the university would be impaired and consequently the value of its diplomas would be depreciated. Prof. Barnes laments that, "there is hardly a trace in the papers of that loyal devotion to Alma Mater of which we hear so much." "Even among university students," he continues, "the sense of the higher social self is only partially developed." (6)

Thus, cheating in games and lessons, trivial as it may seem at first sight, affords us opportunities to get some insight into the psychology of justice. Further, it would be of immense benefit to our understanding of the subject if we could genetically follow the growth of the sense of justice in children along these and many other lines.

In the struggle for existence the "will to live" becomes so intense and urgent that each individual strives for its satisfaction in the name of the right to live. Should he fall behind his fellows in the enjoyment of life, he feels as though robbed of his birthright, and loses no time in denouncing others on the ground of equality. The right to live, or the "natural rights," may be made roughly to include the right to the integrity both of body and mind, and the right to property. A bodily injury is the most overt and primitive form of injustice. It provokes intense anger and may lead to an act of retaliation. Murder, to this day, is requited by the death penalty. Not only is a direct injury to the body resented as a great offense, but also lack of the necessary means of subsistence is regarded as no less injustice. When this calamity comes in the form of some physical inclemency the cry of injustice is raised against Heaven; when it is due

to causes somewhat inherent in the existing social order, the social order is condemned, the condemnation usually falling upon those who are somehow or other exempt from suffering. In order that man may live he must work. "If any man will not work, neither shall he eat." But curiously enough this Pauline dictum does not always say the last word; for to work, or, in other words, to get a "job," is itself a problem by no means easy to solve. Thus the problem of work takes the form of the persistent problem of what shall I eat, and wherewithal shall I be clothed? Hosts of the unemployed raise their voices and cry out: "Give us work, give us work!" Even where their own laziness and apathy are to blame, persons imagine that they have full right in this matter to invoke Nemesis, the goddess of justice. Again, the workers demand a full share of the product of their labor, but the greed of the employers formulates the "Iron law of wages;" and the "war of classes" goes on and on. Then we hear another voice crying for a right to leisure and pleasure. With the increasing hustle and bustle of modern industry and commerce this call for leisure becomes louder and louder. "To be deprived of leisure is to be deprived of those things which make life worth living" (32, p. 111).

The presence of rivals arouses and intensifies the property sense. The distinction of 'mine' and 'thine' becomes punctilious. The things that are 'mine' are jealously guarded against intruders. This immense task of safeguarding private possessions is by consent turned over to the hands of the community and elaborate institutions and statutes have been devised in its service. The uneasiness arising from the desire for possession is so great and the vigilance it requires so strenuous that many have been led to seek peace and security in entire renunciation.

No less precious, indeed for the generality of men even more valuable, than material possessions is a good name or honor. Honor is the supreme thing in life. When it is gone life loses its meaning. Many have chosen death rather than survive honor. Nowhere else is an attack on a person more subtle and grievous. Well says the Bible, "Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council; and whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of the hell of fire" (Matt. 5:22). In all stages of culture and at all times and places, man is as keenly sensitive to ridicule and contempt as to praise and exaltation. Abusive and defamatory words are never uttered with impunity. Once the person who received such an affront was considered justified by

law in putting the offender to death. Westermarck says, on the authority of Mommsen, that "throughout the whole history of Roman law an attack upon honor or reputation was deemed a serious crime" (65, II, p. 141). In the thirteenth century, evidently under the influence of chivalry, the plaintiff in an English local court claimed compensation not only for the "damage," but also for the "shame" which had been done him (65, II, p. 142). Once false accusation was regarded more horrible than actual murder. In the law of the later Roman Empire a person making a criminal charge was bound to suffer, should he fail in proving it, the very penalty he invoked upon his adversary (65, II, p. 142). Paulsen calls the love of honor "the impulse of ideal self-preservation which aims at the preservation of the self in consciousness, in our own consciousness as well as in that of others" (42, p. 569). It is but natural, then, that the slightest reflection on personal honor should provoke violent reactions. Thus it becomes incumbent upon each member of a social group to respect and defend one another's honor. To defend the cause of honor both for oneself and for others has been looked upon as the most sacred task that a person is ever called upon to perform.

The phrase "struggle for existence" is a rather unfortunate one in that it suggests an undue emphasis on the bloody and destructive aspects of life. The picture is certainly over-drawn which represents "life in a state of nature" as a long dismal ravage of wolves and tigers "red in tooth and claw." If thrusting, parrying, strangling, killing and devouring are one side of the struggle for life, love, sympathy, sacrifice and coöperation are the other side of the cosmic drama (63). The Hobbesian gladiatorial strife of each against all, and the gospel of mutual aid so brilliantly enunciated by Kropotkin (33), are the two phases of the cosmic process, the one as natural as the other. Such virtues as mutual regard, self-restraint, sacrifice and service, arise out of life's necessity and are strongly inculcated.

It may be rightly said that the chief burden of rules of conduct is the adjustment of the individual to his social environment. The task of ethics, for Schopenhauer, is "to bring into the lists a combatant equal or rather superior to egoism and malice combined" (49, p. 87 f). Hobbes makes the covenant of peace, which is the first and fundamental law of nature, the foundation of the moral life. The Leviathan is the moral god born of this covenant, who ushers in a reign of terror over the selfish masses (25). Each surrenders his own claims only on condition of reciprocal concession on the part of others. This law of reciprocity finds expression in public opinion and expectation, the violation of which incurs immediate censure and condemnation.

If the sense of justice finds its fountain head in anger, we have another source of the same sentiment in sympathy or compassion. It might appear paradoxical that this sentiment, which is a most uncompromising expression of the instinct of self-assertion, should be rooted in part in sympathy. The misanthropic Schopenhauer, who found in compassion the very basis of morality, could not but be profoundly struck with the mystery of its operation, although he conceived a very ingenious, and, let us confess, plausible enough explanation of it (49). The highly susceptible and imaginative nature of man enables him to enter closely into another's mind and share his weal and woe. In the light of modern anthropological investigations we are justified in believing that ever since man became man he has been sympathetic and human as well as pugnacious and aggressive. Or we might rather say that he is sympathetic because of, and not in spite of, his pugnacity. Now, hunger, cold, helplessness, weakness, and deformity move men with compassion as nothing else does (20). Here we find ourselves at once in the heart of the problem of social justice. We find everywhere the duty of liberality enjoined with much emphasis, while niggardliness is detested as liable to punishment. Usury and extortion are abhorred, and the oppressors of the poor meet severe condemnation. There is a good deal of poetic justice in the laws and customs of primitive societies, based upon the principle that, "There shall be no poor with thee." Take, for instance, such a case as follows (Exodus 22:25-27): "If thou lend money to any of my people with thee that is poor, thou shalt not be to him as a creditor; neither shall ye lay upon him interest. If thou at all take thy neighbor's garment to pledge, thou shalt restore it unto him, before the sun goeth down: for that is his only covering." Every seventh year Jehovah's release was proclaimed, when every creditor was expected to release what he had lent to his neighbors (Deut. 15:1-2). While reaping the harvest in the field or beating the olive-tree, or gathering the grapes in the vineyard, one was instructed to remember the sojourner, the fatherless and the widow, by leaving some remnant for their benefit (Deut. 24:19-22). Through a similar working of the human mind, the same happy idea suggested itself to the Chinese. In the *Shi King*, or *Book of Poetry*, we read:

"Yonder shall be young grain unreaped,
And here some bundles ungathered,
Yonder shall be handfuls left on the ground,
And here ears untouched:—
For the benefit of the widow."
(54, *The Minor Odes*, Decade VI, Ode 8.)

The basis of man's claim to the right to live lies in the simple fact that he is a man. In this respect "all men are created equal." But how remote from realization such a longing is! Modern industrialism involves problems of immense magnitude which meet the seekers of justice at every turn. There is an extreme inequality in the distribution of wealth. It is estimated that in America seven-eighths of the families hold but one-eighth of the national wealth, while but one per cent. of the families hold more than the remaining ninety-nine per cent (27, p. 44). The presence of an appalling amount of poverty is indeed challenging. Hunter estimates that in the United States not less than 10,000,000 persons are in poverty (27, p. 60). These millions are doomed, in Carlyle's celebrated phrases, "to live miserable, we know not why; to work sore and yet gain nothing; to be heart-worn, weary, yet isolated, unrelated, girt-in with a cold universal *Laissez faire*, . . . to die slowly all our life long, imprisoned in a deep, dead, Infinite Injustice" (10, p. 210 f). The campaign against child labor and the like, which blasts life in its buds, and renders family life impossible, figures largely in the program of social workers. Their sentiment finds expression in a rather curious way in such a movement as the National Consumers' League, which demands as the obvious right of purchasers, that the food purchased should be pure and clean; that the garment bought should be free from poisonous dyes and the germs of disease; and that "both food and garments should leave his (the purchaser's) conscience free from participation in the employment of young children or of sweaters' victims" (32, p. 210). The care of the destitute and defective has been carried on with such enthusiasm and devotion, that it is cynically remarked by some, that in order that one may live in ease and comfort now-a-days one has only to be born defective or deficient. The cause of the weak, economically as well as physically, is taken up in the name of justice. The best charitable works to-day are being carried on, not in any spirit of sickly sentimentalism, but with well-guided enthusiasm for seeing justice established among men. Says one of the most eminent workers in the field: "If at times the moral fire seems to be dying out of the good old words Relief and Charity, it has undoubtedly filled with a new warmth certain words which belong distinctively to our own times; such words as Prevention, Amelioration, and Social Justice" (2).

The established fundamental rules of conduct are but so many expressions of the sentiment of justice. The Golden Rule, As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to

them likewise (Luke 6:31), or, in its Chinese formula, What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others (34, Analects, Bk. 15:23), has the self-evidence of intuitive truth and the stringency of the categorical imperative. Sympathy lends benevolence the imperative character of a law, and saves justice from rigorism and gives it a genuinely humane touch.

II. JUSTICE IN RELATION TO DIFFERENT CLASSES.

How differently do you feel about being unfair to playmates, teachers, parents, strangers, friends, or God? How about their being unfair to you? In our returns on this question the six classes of persons specified fall into two general groups with God, parents, and friends on the one hand, and playmates, teachers and strangers on the other. In point of respect paid, the former group enjoy unquestioned importance over the latter, towards whom one is disposed more readily to be unfair, and whose unfairness, in turn, does not hurt one so badly as when it comes from the other group. Morality is not of such a transcendent nature as has been imagined by the speculative moralists, but is of purely terrestrial origin, permeated with our emotivity. While this largely personal character of our conduct gives rise to much injustice, we do violence to human nature by entirely disregarding it, for to return good for good is a no less essential form of human justice than meeting evil with evil. "If ye love them that love you what reward have ye? If ye salute your brother only what do ye more than others?" To excel the "publicans and gentiles" is certainly a noble aspiration. But do we not say that "blood is thicker than water," and that "charity begins at home"? "It is the nature of the just to increase together with friendship," said Aristotle (4, Bk. 9, ch. 9). The Chinese doctrine of the mean teaches that, "the decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in honor due to the worthy are produced by the principle of propriety" (34, Doctrine of the Mean, 20; 5). Many who state that to be unjust to a stranger is just as bad as it is to be so to one who is near and dear to us, are nevertheless, led to contradict themselves by modifying their statements with a "but," a "still," or a "however."

(a) *God*. As one would naturally expect, God—the Christian God, and parents are the last ones whom most of our respondents would think of ever offending. However, we do well to ask at this point whether in placing God first they have not been simply following conventionality. We know that man is preëminently sense-minded. He is most certain

of what he has seen with his own eyes, heard with his own ears, and touched with his own hands. That which transcends his empirical world must necessarily remain very vague and foreign to him. Thus the sense of divine presence is seldom so vivid that it carries with it all the certitude of reality. Only gifted visionaries and religious geniuses can transcend the world of hard facts into the presence of the Infinite. It is also possible that in a theocratic society the relations between God and His people sometimes assume the intimacy of the human family just as the prophet Hosea could conceive of the relation of Israel to Jehovah in terms of conjugal relationship. When rules of conduct take on the form of divine ordinances their observance becomes a matter of great scruple and their violation causes an intense sense of sin. But for ordinary sense-bound minds, the simple facts that God can not be 'seen,' and that He too may not 'see' us, are sufficient to render impossible anything like a communion with the deity. The child's crude conceptions of the deity, which have been won with great pains, soon fade away into the light of common day, and humanity looms ever larger in religious life. Unfairness to the least of one's fellowmen is declared to be nothing less than unfairness to God (Matt. 25:45). Of injustice on the part of God, I shall treat when I come to the section of this paper on cosmic justice.

(b) *Parents.* To answer parental care and love with filial affection is a generic response of the human mind. To be unmindful of the loving kindness with which our parents brought us up is justly called the gravest of "three thousand offences." The absolute trust that parents put in the goodness of their children naturally inspires the children to remain true and faithful to them. To have betrayed the trust of parents is the greatest humiliation. Perhaps nowhere has filial piety attained such development and sanctity as among the ancient Chinese. As has been well remarked, filial piety is not merely a characteristic but a peculiarity of the Chinese people (55). Filial piety is for the Chinese at the root of all virtue. It begins with the proper care of the body, and ends with the glorification of the parent's name by distinguishing oneself in life. "Our bodies—to every hair and bit of skin—are received, and we must not presume to injure or wound them;—this is the beginning of filial piety. When we have established our character by the practice of the (filial) course, so as to make our name famous in future ages, and thereby glorify our parents:—this is the end of filial piety" (26a, ch. 1). The social and political ideals and circumstances of the time made it possible to found morals on family ideals.

The princes of states, high officials, as well as the common people could be the most efficient by being filial. With changing conditions of life new ideals arise. But the dwellers in the Far-East do not cease to sing the praise of the love of parents, which, as a common expression has it, is higher than the highest peak and deeper than the deepest deep. How remote such an ideal is from an Occidental mind! To quote an American author: "In Western countries, when a son becomes of age he goes where he likes, and does what he chooses. He has no necessary connection with his parents, nor they with him. To the Chinese such customs must appear like the behavior of a well-grown calf or colt to the cow or the mare, suitable enough for animals, but by no means conformable to *Li* (propriety) as applied to human beings" (55, p. 182). The classic teaching of filial piety found an even more congenial soil in Japan, although it underwent some marked changes there owing to the peculiar circumstances of the land of its adoption; for not infrequently filial duties came into conflict with the cause of loyalty, loyalty to the feudal lords and masters. In such a painful dilemma, however, precedence was invariably given to the latter (41).

Injustice on the part of parents, coming as it does from those in whom we put perfect trust, and from whom we expect nothing but goodness and favor, is extremely grievous and disturbing. To have one's integrity misjudged by those who ought to understand one thoroughly and sympathetically, to speak the truth and not be believed by them, and, what is more, to be falsely accused by them of some wrongdoing, is painful beyond measure. Unfortunately, childhood abounds, as our returns show, with unpleasant experiences of this sort. The offended child is angry, feels hurt, cries or sits in a corner without saying a word, finally becoming stubborn. Some secretly question the love of the parents. A girl of 12 even contemplated packing things up and leaving home; for then, she thought, her parents would miss her, and realize that she was not to be slighted. To our question (No. 11), What influences in home, school, church and community tend to suppress the normal development of the sense of justice, 124 out of 300 named favoritism as the most deplorable of all home influences. Parents are prone to incline in affection towards one particular child at the expense of the rest. In each family, one is likely to find a Joseph and, with him, his discontented brothers. The pet child attracts more parental care and enjoys more freedom and privileges than the rest. The struggle among children for parental affection is an exceedingly intense one. Each child feels that

he has an equal, or greater, claim upon his parents with any of his brothers and sisters. Thus, every action of parents towards their children is closely watched and weighed. Should there be the least violation of equity, the sense of injustice is instantly aflame. Sometimes such bitter experiences leave a lasting effect on the individual. A young woman writes, "Some of the most miserable times in my life have been spent because I thought my parents loved one of my sisters more than they did me." Others resent the father's treatment of his prodigal son in the Biblical parable (Luke 15:11-32) as cruelly unjust to the faithful, industrious elder son. Many grievances arise from administration of favors and punishments in home. In these matters the parents' attitude must be throughout steady and well principled, and not fickle or capricious. Lack of regularity makes a punishment unjust and deprives a favor of its grace.

(c) *Teachers.* From time to time complaints are made in our educational journals and elsewhere by "superintendents" of wide experience, that teachers are not respected and have but a very low standing in society. The same inference may safely be gathered from replies to our questionnaire. In 127 of our returns in which the six categories of people as specified in our question (No. 7) are graded in order of importance, the teacher comes last in 14, last but one in 48. In 23 she appears grouped with companions and strangers, while in 31 she comes next to parents and God, and in 14 in the same order with friends. Making ample allowance for the arbitrariness involved in the nature of our question and without insisting too much on the figures obtained, we may fairly say that the results given above are rather significant. This is all the more noteworthy when it is remembered that our returns are largely from normal school students who have, for good or ill, set their hearts on the teacher's calling. Of course individual differences are marked in pupils' attitudes towards their teachers. When, under favorable circumstances there exists mutual understanding and sympathy, the teacher is held in great esteem. But on the whole one is tempted to believe that pupils' estimate of teachers is very low indeed. Many represent teachers as "people who are there to hear our recitations and to give us lessons." Teachers are looked upon more as task-masters or fault-finders than as educators and the makers of character. When the task of education is carried on in a soulless, commercial fashion, there is always a danger of its degenerating into drudgery. Sympathy and encouragement, gratitude and admiration, give place to threats and intimidation, hypocrisy and dishonesty. Unfairness to

teachers does not, under such conditions, seriously trouble the conscience; for teachers, on their part, are very often unfair to their pupils. To cheat is one thing, to cheat the teacher is another. Indeed, some say point-blank that they have a triumphant feeling in "getting ahead" of teachers. A girl of 19 even states that, "I feel that I owe the least to teachers, but I am inclined to give them justice in order that I may do what is right."

In this, perhaps as in some other countries, the teaching profession apparently carries with it little honor. Teaching is regarded as one of many "jobs," and the teacher as a person who does so much work for so much pay. Teachers are not only not respected in society, but are looked down upon, sometimes even with pity as "fine fellows" in spite of their occupation and not because of it. Diverse factors converge to bring about this state of affairs. It may be that the ancient Roman custom where teachers were once chattel slaves has still a pernicious influence, and the teacher of to-day is made to suffer for the traditional teacher, or it may be that the teacher is somewhat like a hireling at the mercy of the school board, and the calling has become peculiarly repellent to ambitious minds. Very likely the question of low remuneration is the trouble; for certainly measured in terms of dollars and cents, the teaching occupation is anything but alluring. Lack of professional training and loyalty naturally tends to damage the dignity of the teacher. All these, reacting upon one another as at once cause and effect, conspire to aggravate the situation. Somehow or other, men and women of character, culture, and ability are loath to enter the teaching profession. The ambitious college youth is very likely to be offended on being asked whether he is going to be a teacher.

Such a state of things, be it confessed, is almost inconceivable to an Oriental mind. Thanks to the beneficent influence of Confucian teachings and, in Japan, to the precious traditions of Bushi, the love of culture and learning has been instilled deep into our minds. "If a man in the morning hear the right way, he may die in the evening without regret" (34, Analects Bk. 4; 8). As the minister of this *summum bonum* the teacher commands the honor and respect of all. He is not a utensil, but a man of culture and learning. Themselves belonging to the warrior class, the highest of the four social castes, and as the educators of warriors, teachers enjoyed the double prestige of birth and enlightenment. The respect paid them verged on reverence. When walking with the teacher care was taken not to step on his shadow! A maxim reads, "Thy father and thy mother are like heaven

and earth, thy teacher and thy lord are like the sun and moon" (41, p. 101). With all the baneful influences of growing industry and commerce, the happy traditions of centuries' standing are not likely, it is hoped, soon to suffer wreck.

(d) *Strangers*. In our returns, strangers form, as is naturally expected, the least favored group. The absence of mutual knowledge and understanding, not to mention any bond of affection, seems to justify such attitude. The thought that the chances are very small of ever seeing the same stranger again may perhaps lead some to act less considerately towards him; while, on the other hand, with a temporal removal of all social restraints there is a danger that the stranger fall into a state of relative irresponsibility. But it is also true that honor and good sense tend always toward fairness and kindness. One is instinctively averse to giving others a poor impression of one's personality. The fear, not altogether unfounded, of ungrateful and treacherous return make the use of a certain degree of caution and even suspicion towards a stranger necessary for self-protection. Strangers and newcomers are usually subjected to severe scrutiny before being received into confidence. There exists a vague, unconscious distrust of, and hatred against, members of other "tribes," nations, and races. However, it is highly improbable that groups of men should have ever lived as potential enemies in a state of predatory raids and pillaging. Louis Robinson's explanation of the shyness of young children as a reminiscence of a remote past when strangers and enemies were synonymous is far fetched, idle and unjust. Furthermore, a stranger amidst inconveniences and deprivations excites profound sympathy. Thus almost unbounded hospitality is extended to strangers. Without the least sign of grudge, without any claim whatsoever, food and shelter are shared with them. Many would rather suffer the pains of an empty stomach than to be guilty of the omission of hospitality (39). In many instances, hospitality forms the most important part of divine worship. The deity as the patron of justice took care of those unprotected such as the stranger, beggar and suppliant. It is not without significance that the god of strangers is the mightiest in the entire train of Zeus.

As showing the nature of moral ideal and judgment it is rather interesting to note how an apparently simple question like that of justice in relation to different groups of persons receives very diverse answers according to different ideals and traditions prevailing in a given *milieu*.

III. THE QUALMS OF CONSCIENCE.

In what follows I confine myself to the consideration of such specific forms of the qualms of conscience as arise from an act of injustice done to others. Into the origin and nature of conscience I need not now enter.

Restlessness. A wrong done is not easily forgotten. It remains before one's own eyes and rankles. The sense of guilt deprives mental activity of its flow and freedom, and the guilty is obsessed by the memory of the act. Efforts are made, sometimes desperately, to divert one's attention from the unpleasant experience. Some take walks or other physical exercise; others hum or try to sing; still others have recourse to strong drink or drugs. Indeed, some are successful in working off the qualms of conscience in this way. They can banish the matter from their minds with relative ease. With other types of mind and in other instances the painful experience forms an emotional complex and becomes a center of association. Jung's association studies have beautifully demonstrated how apparently innocent stimulus words touch the emotion complexes and call forth unusually great disturbances in reaction (31). A stricken conscience is abnormally sensitive. It reads its fear and suspicion into every trifle. "My heart beats fast when some one approaches," "When I see any one coming, I fancy that they are coming to see me about the act," "I am always afraid that I have been discovered," "I imagine that everybody is looking at me, and talking about me;" these are some of the expressions which appear frequently in our returns. In persons with a neurotic tendency, these insistent ideas become fixed and imperative and receive elaborate systematization. Obviously, such mental states cannot but affect the body in a more or less marked degree. The complaint most commonly made is of the loss of sleep. The proverb, "A clear conscience is a good pillow," is no mere figure of speech. Appetite suffers much. Sometimes an ascetic tendency is marked. Nervous strain is so great that a slight sound is sufficient to make one start. There are some disturbances of the vaso-motor system. The heart beats, now faster, now it seems to 'go down.' Headache is a very common symptom. A guilty conscience leaves its possessor with a helpless feeling of shame. He is ashamed of, and disgusted with, his own weakness and stupidity. He seems in his own eyes small and mean; while, on the other hand, the person he offended is sometimes idealized as innocent, pure and perfect. When intense this self-pity may rise

to despair and utter abandonment. The sense of guilt and shame, together with the fear of detection and punishment, heightens the consciousness of others, whose presence becomes peculiarly painful. The wronged person is carefully avoided as the unpleasant reminder of one's fault. Some feel like hiding themselves and being alone. Others lack courage to face the world. They can not look straight in others' faces. Downcast eyes and hanging head are expressions of a guilty conscience. The following excerpts from questionnaire returns illustrate these various manifestations of the sense of guilt.

1. F., 19. My conscience becomes so sensitive that in every conversation I engage in, in every article I read, I find something that seems to be directed to me.
2. F., 16. My conscience begins to hurt me and I want to go away by myself and unburden my woes on nature. In extreme cases, I pray to God for guidance.
3. F., 18. I become nervous and cannot do anything until I have had a crying spell or go somewhere so as to distract my attention from the act committed. The pangs of conscience fill me with fear and divert my attention from everything else except that one act.
4. F., 24. When I committed a very wrong act my conscience would not let me be happy, nor could I rest. I felt as if everybody could see in me the act I had done, and I felt that I did not have the strength to face the world again. I lost freedom of thought and action, for every thing would continually turn to that act.
5. F., 19. When I have done anything for which I feel deeply guilty, I usually feel two opposite impulses, one of hiding myself from the person to whom I have been unjust, and the other of striving harder to do right. As the first is usually impossible, I try to act on the second impulse.
6. F., 19. My first impulse was one of contempt for myself. I despised myself for being so weak, and felt downcast.
7. F., 19. I feel ashamed of myself, and my conscience pricks me. I have felt a mighty impulse to give up trying to do right when I had done wrong thoughtlessly.
8. F., 30. I remember at 18 years of age, of doing a really unjust thing to a girl friend. I did not want to see her. I would not go to a social gathering if she were to be there. I even avoided her friends. I felt as if she were perfect and I a terrible sinner. This feeling continued until matters were set right between us.

Apprehensions. Not only does a guilty conscience give its possessor no peace, but it sometimes fills the person with fear and apprehension. Thus he imagines all sorts of misfortune and calamities befalling him. Several of our returns describe such experiences. Persons wonder, What would happen to them, Where would they go should they die without confessing the wrong or rectifying it? What would become of their parents or friends, to whom they were unjust? and so on.

The ideas of sin and suffering are so inseparably bound together that a sin-sick soul in anticipation of punishment apprehensively broods over the consequences of its deeds, just as in other cases it acknowledges as a merited suffering whatever misfortune overtakes it. Singularly enough the fear that suggests itself most commonly in such a moment is that of death. Here, it is very probable that the story of Hell with all its horrifying and grotesque features, which usually has an active hold on children's minds, has served as a suggestion. But apart from this nursery influence, it is also very likely that the soul in a depressed state becomes an easy prey to such morbid fears. Clinical records abound with instances of this sort. Dr. Cowles' patient, described in his remarkable paper on "Insistent and Fixed Ideas" (11), had scrupulous doubts as to whether some simple acts, like walking, dressing or undressing, were rightly performed, and felt obliged to repeat them. "She did this, however, only when unobserved, and then could not help it." In connection with these doubts there arose fears of harm, even of death, happening to herself or her relatives. Commenting on this particular form of her apprehensions, Dr. Cowles says, "Upon the mental plasticity of childhood strong impressions were made by unpleasant ideas about 'trance' and the horror of being 'buried alive.' Apprehensions for herself and relatives were engendered in this regard." But we also find such apprehensions manifesting themselves in normal individuals, as is abundantly shown by the following quotations from our questionnaire returns.

1. F., 19. It worries me so much that I think of it all the time and cannot sleep. Sometimes I think of dying and wonder where I would go when I die.
2. F., 18. I always wonder and ask, what would God feel about it, where would I go if I should die without having repentance? I invariably make some act of contrition and a firm resolution never to commit the act again.
3. F., 18. When I feel deeply guilty, I always become morbid, I brood over imaginary tragic happenings. For instance, I fancy that I am very ill. When a child, I used to imagine myself dead.
4. F., 16. When I have been unkind to my mother I imagine all sorts of dreadful things, such as, "suppose Mamma should die before I asked her to forgive me, what would I do? What if it should cause her to be sick at heart?" Then I resolve never to do it again.
5. F., 18. When quite a small child, I told my mother a lie. I remember plainly how sick I was. I had a headache, and mother was so kind to me that it only made me feel worse. I tried to tell her all about it, but could not. I wondered what would happen if I should die without confessing the truth to mother. This thought grew upon me so that I was sure that I was going to die. Finally mustering all my courage I confessed my falsehood and was forgiven and I recovered almost immediately.

6. F., 19. When a child, I remember going down in the cellar next door to us with two other children and drinking cider with a straw through the bung-hole of a barrel. For days and nights the act haunted me. I saw myself grown up as a thief, dreamed of prison cells, and even seemed to fancy myself in torment in Hell, as it was pictured to my childish fancy. I dreaded to have my mother know of what I had done.

Miss Jane Addams has the following account of an experience in her early childhood:

"I recall 'horrid nights' when I tossed about in my bed because I had told a lie. I was held in the grip of a miserable dread of death, a double fear, first, that I myself should die in my sins and go straight to that fiery Hell which was never mentioned at home, but which I had heard all about from other children, and second, that my father—representing the entire adult world which I had basely deceived—should himself die before I had time to tell him. My only method of obtaining relief was to go downstairs to my father's room and make full confession. I always went back to bed as bold as a lion, and slept if not the sleep of the just, at least that of the comforted" (3, p. 2 f).

Confession. Confession comes as a natural relief to a guilty conscience. Giving discharge to pent-up feelings, it works a wonderful cure, as we shall presently see. But confession is a costly step involving honor. In order to maintain one's standing in society, a certain amount of secrecy would seem to be absolutely necessary. Were I to speak out in public all my thoughts and deeds, I should in all likelihood be branded as a dangerous person and ostracized from society. For the same reason, public confession is never entirely free from hypocrisy. Even where truthfulness is observed, either by force or by the confessor's own accord, it is not without some serious moral danger to the confessor. Persons making confession under emotional excitation may not fully realize, just at those moments, all that is involved in displaying their own wickedness and shame before the public, but when it is once brought home to them after the excitement has abated, the thought of lost honor proves too trying and discouraging for the strength of ordinary character. For the sanity of personality self-deception in this particular regard may be said to be necessary to a certain extent. So strong is the "resistance" that the chief concern of the psychoanalyst is to put the individual off his own guard (18). Alienists tell us that very often patients come to them in great agony under the sense of sin, but that upon being questioned as to what the matter is they make ridiculously trivial confessions remote from the true cause of the trouble. The act of confession is justly called the most painful form of all punishments. To confess or not to is a serious question before which one remains undecided even for years. Thus one person had

been wavering between the alternatives for three years; another, who is a Catholic, suffered five years of torture because of the practice of the church to which she could not conform.

A third had been brooding over her unjust acts for more than two years, and our questionnaire was made the occasion of her confession, for she summoned her courage and apologized to the persons she wronged. The thoughts of losing one's own moral standing and of falling in others' esteem are indeed humiliating. To let the mother or the teacher know that one is capable of the meanness there may be involved in the offence is certainly painful. Then, there is the fear of punishment, which is largely responsible for children's lies. A rather strong tendency is found to justify oneself, to try to find some excuses for one's own faults. Thus the person is tossed about by the conflicting impulses of self-condemnation and self-justification as may be seen from the following examples.

1. F. Many times I would wish to tell the person and ask her forgiveness. Indeed, I would be on the point of telling fifty times and even get a few words out, but evade off to something else.
2. F., 18. Religion has been both a stumbling block and a consolation. For a Catholic, confession forms one of the fundamental doctrines. It was this that haunted me. I was truly sorry for the act but hesitated telling it to another. Because of this I suffered, as nearly as I can recollect, five years of torture.
3. F., 20. I feel that I ought to apologize to the injured person; but this is the hardest thing for me to do. If I could possibly show the person, by any other means than apology, that I am sorry, what relief would that be!
4. F., 19. When I became very angry at a girl I said very disagreeable things to her. Later I became very sorry, and went to her and apologized. This was the best punishment I could possibly have, for I always dislike to apologize for anything I have done.
5. F., 19. At the age of ten years, I stole some money from my mother several times, in fact for about six months, without being at all suspected of the act. Oftentimes, however, I wished that mother would find me out and punish me to quiet my conscience. Many times I made up my mind to tell her and let her punish me so that I might feel better, but each time my courage failed me. I could not endure the shame of having lost my mother's confidence in me.
6. F., 19. Something within me accuses me and urges me to right the wrong. There is also an opposite feeling which tries to excuse the wrong and justifies me.

In spite of all this repression and resistance the inner restlessness becomes greater and greater until finally the individual "can stand it no longer." He feels as though he must now confess. There seems no other way open of escape from the pangs of conscience. Like a crying spell, the impulse to confess comes irresistibly and secures a safety outlet for pent-up feelings which have now reached the bursting point.

Even when little suspected of wrong doing, persons are led to confession simply to secure relief. The brilliant success of the Freudian psychoanalytic treatment sheds a flood of light upon our understanding of the emotional life. Lack of normal outlet for the emotions, which, owing to their unpleasant nature, are repressed and driven out of consciousness, is, according to the Freudian school, at the root of neuroses. The new mode of treatment consists in discovering the suspected repressed emotional experiences and bringing them into consciousness in order to facilitate normal reactions to them. The treatment, we are further told, has no curative effect if somehow there is no *Abreagierung* of the emotions (18). This accounts for the cathartic value of confession. Confession secures discharge of repressed feelings and puts an end to all restlessness secretly borne. There follows a feeling of relief, which theology calls forgiveness, justification, reconciliation or what not. One feels as though a heavy weight had been lifted.

Primarily, confession has not so much to do with redress of the wrong as with seeking relief from pent-up remorseful feelings. As Dr. Cutten puts it, "the value of confession seems to be in getting ourselves fairly and squarely before ourselves, rather than in the influence on or of others" (12, p. 125). Hence any means which secures this relief is welcome. Very often confession is made, not directly to the person wronged, but to some other individual. Very often it is the mother who has to act as the confessor. Others give themselves up in prayer, some burst into crying, and some go to nature and pour out their souls. There seems to be much more in common in crying, confession and penitential prayer than is usually suspected. Confession is usually accompanied by repentance, and almost always implies the asking of pardon. Although the natural impulse is to seek some restitution for the wrong done, yet it happens that in many instances humble expressions of contrition are all that an erring person can do in atoning for his deeds. Hence the sayings: "A fault confessed is half redressed," "Confession of a fault makes half amends."

1. F., 17. I seem to have a burning sensation within me and a large quantity of blood seems to rush to my head. If the feeling becomes almost intolerable, I feel as if I must confess and ask to be forgiven.
2. F., 18. My face burns and my eyes droop. I usually try to sing or hum some song, but it is all in vain. I try to talk, but my conversation seems to fall flat. I remain in a very unhappy state with tears about to flow, until finally I confess the wrong, and then the painful feelings disappear immediately.

3. F., 22. When about ten, my mother forbade me to go to the beach alone. One day, however, when she was out, I disobeyed her and went to the beach by myself, but returned home before my mother did. She brought me several little things because, as she said, I had been so good. I felt so mean, yet I dared not tell and for two or three days I could hardly eat with the terrible deceit on my conscience. Finally I confessed.
4. F., 18. It has always made me feel better after confessing to some one when I did anything wrong. My mother was my confessor in my early years, but lately my comfort has come through prayer.
5. M., 21. When about eleven, I stole ten cents from my mother's pocket-book. Mother accused my sister of taking it and punished her for it. It troubled me much but not enough to induce me to confess. I felt how unjust I had been to my sister and it kept on troubling me until one day I told mother the truth about the matter.

Punishment, self-punishment. Like confession, merited punishment has a calming effect on a guilty conscience, and is acknowledged by the person as a relief. However, this is not to be understood to mean that one courts punishment and longs for it, for we may be fully aware that we ought to be punished for what we had done, and still may feel relieved and happy when we are not. When the merited punishment does not come, instead of being unhappy and miserable, we may be so heartless as to be tempted to laugh at our own folly to have worried so much for what could be got over with so easily. But the desire to put an end to the painful suspense due to inner qualms may lead some to look upon punishment as a fitting means to the end in view. One may be afraid of the detection of his wrong-doing, and yet may secretly invite it. Again, by undergoing punishment, one actually suffers for his misdeed. This gives him a sense of having paid, in some measure, for his offence and, in so far, balancing the scale of retributive justice. This mode of looking at the situation is very marked in children, as we shall see later in this paper (7).

When the merited punishment does not come, or when it is not sufficient, some sort of self-punishment is not infrequently practiced. Owing largely to the influences of early education, children are often seen inflicting punishments upon themselves. But this is by no means confined to children. In its varied forms, self-punishment may be abundantly found among adults. It usually takes the form of depriving oneself of some privileges. Some abstain from having candy for a week or two, or for a month. Others refuse to enjoy their favorite dishes at dinner, or go without any dessert. Some go to bed an hour or two earlier than usual, thus cutting short their play

hours. Still others stay indoors the whole afternoon and force themselves to do all sorts of disagreeable tasks. These little efforts indicate how closely the ideas of sin and suffering, crime and punishment, are bound together in our minds. These ideas form links, as it were, in one psychic chain, which cannot be separated without violence. Dr. Cowles' patient, to whom I have already referred, became jealous of one of her schoolmates, beautiful in person and lovely in character. This jealous feeling developed into one of strong hatred. Under these circumstances, the original fear of harm which we have seen the patient had been suffering from, changed into the fear that harmful things might happen to her friend. This threw her into a state of severe self-condemnation as if she were guilty of desiring these harmful things to happen. Now she began to feel that she did not at all deserve all the comforts and kindnesses shown to her in the hospital. A denial of everything pleasant or desirable became binding. In the words of Dr. Cowles: "She had to make herself disagreeable and hateful to the people she liked the best and respected the most, just because they were sources of comfort to her" (11). "She had to speak unkindly to her favorite nurse, for example, and then cried because she had been compelled to do what would make her appear ungrateful" (11). The patient also felt that she had to deny herself, by way of punishment, of the comfort she derived from Dr. Cowles' visits. To quote again: "This became the prime issue in her struggle with her avenging conscience. She fought it for months, avoiding meetings with me, 'vowing' she would never tell me another word of her trouble, but just as often breaking her vows and talking freely whenever in my presence" (11). Finally the patient began to say that she must go from the hospital, her only hope and refuge; because, as she said, "I must be deprived of my greatest blessing."

These acts of self-denial, trifling as they seem, indicate further how delicate is the sense of the harmony of the inner life and its outward expressions. Man feels almost instinctively that contrition and worldly pleasures, however innocent, are irreconcilable. When the spirit needs fasting, even normal physiological functions, like eating, drinking, etc., not to say pleasures, are looked upon with abhorrence as something uncomely. Utter simplicity expresses the state of penance best. A person doing penance knows too well that luxury and merriment are not his lot. Of old, man put away soft clothing and wore a coarse garment of bark; and sackcloth and ashes are penitential emblems. This same feeling of the necessity for expiation appears in the questionnaire returns, *e. g.*:

1. F., 18. After I have done something wrong I have often wished my mother to punish me by denying me some privileges. If I still retained them, it often made me feel worse than ever. At times I have denied myself these privileges so as to punish myself.
2. F., 18. I have several times done things which I thought I ought to be punished for, and the more I thought about it, the more I wished to be punished, until finally I would go and do some work which I disliked very much.
3. F., 19. I have wanted to be punished and have occasionally inflicted childish punishments upon myself and I still do it.
4. F., 19. When I was about twelve I accidentally broke a very beautiful piece of China. Instead of whipping me, my mother talked very kindly to me. However, for many days I tried to save all my pennies to buy her a new one. In this way I thought I might punish myself by not having any candy.
5. F., 20. When about 13, I broke my mother's bracelet. I told her I did not know how it happened. In order to punish myself I would not eat any candy for a month.

Atonement. Perhaps the healthiest impulse that a guilty conscience feels is to make atonement for the wrong done. It marks the crowning effort of the penitent for the restoration of honor and justice. By this means is assured and perfected the relief and forgiveness resulting from preliminary acts of confession, which when unaccompanied by work may easily degenerate into indulgence and hypocrisy. Atonement, in its generic sense, is a vigorous and sincere thing. Much of our devotional and charitable works receive their incentive right here. In his highly suggestive study of religious phenomena, Dr. Leuba speaks with great emphasis of the feeling of unrighteousness and the efforts towards holiness as "the only apparent motive power in the deepest religious experiences" (35). The worst consequence of an unjust act is the sense of alienation from the wronged party, whether this be the deity or a fellow being. Just as confession aids in pacifying the troubled conscience and harmonizing the inner discord, so restitution helps to bring about the restoration of a shattered relationship. The sacrifice of self is the royal road to this end. Aristotle quotes an interesting remark of a Thessalonian who said: "In some particulars one must need act with injustice, in order . . . to do many deeds of justice." (Rhetoric Bk. I, ch. xii.) A devout Christian, who prior to his conversion had been leading the wretched life of a thief, would tell, for the glory of His name, the story of his former life as a sinner. He had made it a point, on certain days of the month, to walk through the town where his headquarters lay, with his pockets full of ill-gotten money. This he ungrudgingly gave out to as many poor and needy persons as he met in his round. This liberality seemed to have an expia-

tory virtue in it. In his delightful book, "Tales of Old Japan," Mitford narrates a little story of a swordsmith, which I cannot refrain myself from quoting here.

"At Osaka I lived opposite to one Kusano Yoshiaki, a swordsmith, a most intelligent and amiable gentleman, who was famous throughout his neighborhood for his good and charitable deeds. His idea was that, having been bred up to a calling which trades in life and death, he was bound, so far as in him lay, to atone for this by seeking to alleviate the suffering which is in the world; and he carried out his principle to the extent of impoverishing himself" (38, p. 50).

A number of cases illustrating the point under consideration are given in our returns. It often happens that after an act of disobedience persons become extremely obliging. A neglected duty induced one to work very hard the next time, even to the extent of doing unnecessary work. Another succeeded in appeasing her mother's displeasure by studying her lessons harder and thereby winning higher marks. Still another felt that she could not do too much for a girl friend whom she had long misjudged. A teacher punished one of her pupils too severely and afterward became very solicitous for that pupil. Of especial interest are the cases cited below where an act of injustice has developed a contrary kindly disposition. A girl, for instance, once treated a dog very unkindly, but this experience afforded an occasion of teaching her to be kind to all dumb animals. An unjust act to an old woman led a boy thereafter to entertain great respect for womankind.

1. F., 20. For several years I misjudged and ridiculed a person who is now one of my dearest friends because she was unconventional. Now every time she does something for me I feel ashamed of myself and feel that I cannot do enough to atone for my injustice.
2. F., 16. Often I have neglected to do my share of the work at home, I have done some work which was unnecessary only to clear my conscience.
3. F., 17. Once I did something which displeased my mother very much. By way of appeasing her displeasure I determined to work very hard in school and I got the very best marks I ever obtained.
4. M., 18. I once chummed with a crowd of young roughs. One night an old woman passed by us when one of the fellows called her a witch and threw a stone after her. And I did the same. I could not forget the incident nor that I stoned a woman. I could not tell anybody about it. From that moment, however, I have had a great respect for any woman.
5. F., 22. When still a child I dropped an ink bottle from my father's desk. In my great embarrassment, I called Leo, the dog, in and made him walk through the ink, while I hurried down from the room. Of course the dog was punished for my fault and I felt very sorry for him. From that time on I have tried

- to help dumb animals, and thereby to make amends for the injustice I did to the poor Leo so many years ago.
6. F. A little newsboy meddled with the rope while we were jumping with it. I noticed this and the next time he did it, I ran after him. Just then I happened to have a sharp stone in my hand which I had been using for other purposes. When I caught the boy, I hit him with the hand in which I held the stone, although I did not mean to hit him with it. The boy began to cry and, to my great regret, I noticed that his head was bleeding. I took him in the house, washed his hands and face, and gave him something to eat. Every evening after that, when my mother gave me my usual penny I watched for the little newsboy and instead of buying any candy, I bought a paper from him to atone for what I had done to him.

The development of a contrary sentiment is beautifully shown by the studies of the Freudian school. Whenever any feeling or desire against a person occurs which is likely to meet the censure and disapproval of public sentiment, it is immediately 'repressed,' and in its place there arise others perfectly harmonious with current moral judgments. Thus unreasonable hostility towards a person meets repression and is concealed beneath the opposite sentiment of solicitude.

To sum up, the guilty conscience renders one restless. An emotional constellation is formed around the painful experience, and everything seen, heard or read becomes associated with it. The consciousness of others is abnormally heightened and in abjection the person seeks solitude. In such a state one sometimes becomes an easy prey to apprehensions of harm or death befalling oneself or the aggrieved party. Accompanying, and in turn aggravating, this mental trouble, there are some vaso-motor disturbances. Confession is a costly step involving honor. Jealous of personal honor, the conscience-stricken person yields to the impulse to confess only after strong resistance. It may even be years before he betakes himself to confession, being tossed all the while by conflicting impulses of self-condemnation and self-justification. But at length the pent-up feeling of remorse reaches its breaking point, and then the person feels as though he must confess. There follows a feeling of relief. Punishment balancing the offence in a measure is sometimes welcomed as a fitting means of putting an end to the painful suspense of the guilty conscience. When the merited punishment does not come, self-punishment is often practiced. In its naïve form, this consists in depriving oneself of some privileges and pleasures, curiously illustrating the close association of the ideas of sin and suffering, of crime and punishment. Perhaps the crowning effort of the guilty conscience is seen in its strivings for atonement. Forgiveness and reconciliation can only be secured through a sacrificial

life. Of especial interest is the development of a contrary character through the mechanism of the "repression."

We have thus passed in review some of the manifestations of the guilty conscience; but the question naturally arises at this point, What about the other side of the story? How do we feel and what do we do on being made to suffer injustice? We may refer to biographical data for light on this topic. The author deeply regrets that he cannot discuss this important theme, but hopes to make it the subject of a further study.

IV. REVENGE, PUNISHMENT, AND FORGIVENESS.

Revenge. Every close observer of animal life cannot fail to see the tremendous significance in the battle of life of such emotions as anger, jealousy, hatred and their allied forms, which the casuistic moralists would like to weed out of human nature. These so-called noxious emotions are the weapons, so to speak, with which an organism safeguards itself against injurious influences. Stanley justly remarks that, "The rise of the back-boned animal is not more important for physiological morphology than the evolution of anger for psychical morphology" (58, p. 131). Revengeful emotion was evolved from anger. An injury to self-feeling as well as a physical attack may excite its outbursts. While functionally revenge tends to secure the survival of the individual, psychologically it is without reference to either present or future. It is pre-eminently retrospective, not prospective, in its nature. It is the instinctive desire to get even with the enemy, to pay him back in the same coin, perhaps with interest. Steinmetz's view (59) that revenge is originally undirected, is vigorously and ably controverted by Westermarck (64 and 65).

Should we not avenge real injustice? Very likely the refined modern conscience would take offence at the question and condemn it as objectionable. Accordingly one who brings up such a query is rebuked for his thoughtlessness and lack of good sense. The highly specialized institutions of modern society have brought about some radical changes in modes of life, so that the men of the present age have largely lost a sympathetic touch with primitive folk ways. Moreover, the restraints of the somewhat sophisticated decorum of civilized society tend to too much rationalization and hypocrisy. It rather argues lack of insight and narrowness of view to treat slightly psychic traits like revengeful emotion, which have so large a sanction from the cosmic process.

It is probable that in primitive societies self-redress was used in a larger measure than in civilized communities. Man took the law into his hands and used his own weapons to

wreak his wrath upon his adversary. The principle of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, reigned supreme. To say this is to detract nothing from the humanity of primitive peoples. It does not require a large amount of imagination to see that the whole matter was characterized by instinctive perception of justice. The complexity of modern tribunals does not necessarily mean the efficiency of the system. Complexity is one thing, competency is another. The failure to perceive this on the part of students has led to great confusion and fallacy, much to the disadvantage of primitive peoples.

Naturally enough, revengeful emotion finds the most uncompromising expression in blood revenge, for it is the reaction of an organism against the infringement of the most vital of all personal rights. "The avenger of blood shall put the murderer to death." Prior to the introduction of modern tribunals the custom of blood revenge prevailed very widely, of course under certain regulations. To avenge the death of one's nearest kin was regarded as a most sacred duty. This led Professor Sumner even to think that the notions of duty and social obligation first originated here (61). At any rate, the task was so binding that should a man fall short of it, there was nothing left for him but taunt, ridicule and disgrace. On being asked by one of his disciples as to the course to be pursued in the case of the murder of a parent, Confucius expressed himself as follows: "The son must sleep upon a matting of grass, with his shield for his pillow; he must decline to take office; he must not live under the same heaven with the slayer. When he meets him in the market-place or the court, he must have his weapon ready to strike him" (34, p. 114). The vendetta in Old Japan is a classical custom (38). As we should expect, men of the warrior class were intensely jealous of personal honor. A reflection on honor, be it ever so slight, was the last thing they could tolerate. Not only the slayer of their over-lord and parents, but also one who insulted them was the enemy with whom they should not live under the same heavens. Revenge was undertaken under public sanction and with a religious zeal. Many a pathetic story relating to incidents of this sort has come down to us. Upon entering the holy task men forsook fame and fortune, broke off ties of affection, suffered all manner of hardships and deprivations. Nothing could dissuade them from their sworn mission. With singleness of purpose, they endured all, and when finally the duty was gracefully and nobly discharged, they betook themselves to *Harakiri* with the consolation of a fulfilled duty. To this day, although the custom has

long since become a thing of the past, this loyalty and devotion, this unswerving faith in the cause of honor and justice, command the admiration of all. In many tribes which are under the Mohammedan influence the practice of blood revenge is said still to prevail. In Corsica and Sicily one finds to-day vendetta in operation in complete form.

Sometimes revengeful emotion is so intense and implacable that the enemy is slain at the feet of the murdered person, or at the latter's tomb. Further, to gratify the passion even cannibalism is resorted to. Thus the Solomon Islanders are reported to be addicted to the practice as the deepest humiliation to which they can subject their adversaries. In Fiji, where the scarcity of food might seem to afford some excuse for the horrible custom of cannibalism, revenge is said nevertheless to be at the bottom of the practice. The eating of part of the enemy's body marks the climax of hatred and revenge. When all other means of vengeance are exhausted, but to no avail, recourse is had to suicidal acts. The enraged person sometimes even hung himself at the door of his foe, swearing to pursue him "unto the seventh birth" with the added malice and agility of a spirit. Peculiar dread and superstition attach themselves to the curse and will of a person dying under such circumstances. For similar reasons the spirits of the persons who have met a violent death are greatly feared. Westermarck (65) dwells with great emphasis upon the significance in primitive life of the belief in the efficacy of curses; Sumner (61) likewise makes much of goblinism.

Thus far I have dwelt on some of the more extraordinary expressions of revengeful emotion. But in more or less modified forms we find it busy at work all around us. Our newspapers teem with accounts of its effects. Probably a full quarter of all the blood that is being shed every day may be traced to this source, so that the very word revenge at once suggests undue severity and bloodshed. However, as denoting a mental state, it does not necessarily imply all this. Manifestations of wrath vary in degree and form. Moreover, the tendency is for emotional expressions to become less and less somatic, and more and more psychic. The greater portion of human conduct lies beyond the reach of legal authority, and is largely left to personal settlement, thus affording ample field for retaliation. 423 persons (F., 391, M., 32) responded to our question, Should we not avenge real injustice? By real injustice was generally understood such gross criminal offences as murder, fraud, stealing and the like. 40 per cent. answered the question in the affirmative. Revenge is just, in the first place, for the satisfaction it gives of having paid

back the injustice suffered. Theoretically many do not approve of the procedure, but they admit that should the case be brought home to them, personal feelings would be too strong to be silenced by reason. 36 per cent. curtly condemn the idea of revenge, while 11 per cent. give religious reasons for disapproving it. Popular arguments set forth against revenge are, that it is not only of no use, but aggravates the trouble; that an injustice received affords no excuse for returning it; that by avenging an evil one would be committing no less evil than the original offence; and the like. Others choose to remain true to the Golden Rule; still others sing the praise of the teaching of non-resistance. These are all excellent reasons, but, after all, may they not all be reflections of sober moments, which in storm and stress could be denied thrice before the cock crow? Do not even the believers in the principle of non-resistance hope and pray that the unjust may be punished in the court of conscience, if not hereafter on God's judgment day? So long as suffering and torment are prescribed for the wicked, retaliation is simply a question of time, and well may the righteous rest contented. The Lord will punish sinners in the fullness of his time. "Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord." "He who will have a good revenge let him leave it to God."

Sharp and Otto (53) made a study on one hundred male students of the average age of 20 who attended the short course in agriculture in the University of Wisconsin. The purpose of their study was 'to discover the maximum number that can be induced to approve of retaliation.' Accordingly the most atrocious cases of murder and malice were chosen to evoke reactions. 92 out of the 100 would approve, under one condition or another, of the infliction of suffering or loss upon the wrongdoer, merely for the sake of causing suffering. Of these, 76 justified revenge on the part of the person wronged, before the question of punishment after death was raised. When ultimate impunity for the sinner was assumed, the number rose to 89.

Some of our respondents recommend the returning of good for evil, and the love of one's enemy, as the most effective way of revenge! By this means one heaps coals of fire upon the head of the unjust (Romans, 12:20), leaving him in utter shame and dejection. "Kindness and good deeds in return hurt the guilty conscience more than anything else," and "the person will come to see that you are a trifle above him, and are to be respected." Here we see a curious refinement of reaction against injustice.

As Dr. Hall justly says, "revenge seeks more than justice" (19). Now, it was impossible that man with his keen perception of justice should have given no serious thought to this fact. Indeed, the adoption of some system of compen-

sation as a substitute for reckless revenge was a very natural suggestion of human sympathy. For each offence, perhaps with the exception of murder, a definite amount of money was prescribed as its compensation. It is said that there is hardly any tribe in which it is not more or less customary to accept compensation and avoid a feud (62, II, p. 163 ff). Moreover, as Sutherland has pointed out, a settled life with possession of huts and other properties made the advantages of peaceful living more and more desirable. Nowhere could the consequences of rash and indiscriminate retaliation be more disastrous than in the case of blood-revenge. Naturally enough, accidental manslaughter was categorically discriminated from wilful murder. While no ransom may be taken for the life of a murderer who is guilty of death, justice pleads for mercy for a manslayer who has killed another unwittingly and unawares. Thus we have notably, but not exclusively, in Israel the provision of the cities of refuge where the unhappy manslayer could seek refuge from the avenger of blood and "declare his cause in the ears of the elders" (10a). This provision was made alike for all the children of Israel and for the stranger that sojourned among them. "Whosoever killeth any person unwittingly might flee thither, and not die by the hand of the avenger of blood, until he stood before the congregation" (Joshua, 20:9). It is at once refreshing and instructive to consider also the brilliant part played by primitive woman as the Peacemaker (10a).

Punishment. To a large extent, punishment is an expression of revengeful emotion, and retains much of its retaliative character. Justice demands that the culprit should suffer as the just requital of wrong-doing. Evil must recoil upon the head of its author. Justice demands further that the suffering be justly proportioned to the magnitude of the offence for which it is inflicted. This principle of duplicate or equivalent suffering has always been scrupulously observed. On this basis a very elaborate scheme of punitive justice has been formulated in many places, and the codes of many peoples bear upon them an unmistakable mark of the original feeling of retaliation.

Sutherland says: "Law originally was merely the body of customs that regulated by precedent the kind of retaliation or amount of substituted compensation to be exacted for a given injury" (62, II, p. 181). To quote from another author: "The retributive desire is so strong, and appears so natural that we can neither help obeying it, nor seriously disapprove of its being obeyed. The theory that we have a right to punish an offender only in so far as, by doing so, we promote the general happiness, really serves in the main as a justification for gratifying such a desire, rather than as a foundation for penal practice" (65, I, p. 91).

It is instructive to note, not for the purpose, however, of establishing a parallelism between the race and the child, that children's ideas of punishment also reveal this primitive retributive aspect, as has been shown in the studies of Miss Schallenger (48), Professor Barnes (7) and others. To the child's mind, punishment means the paying back of the injury received.

Naturally enough, younger children conceive punishment in terms of corporal suffering. In Professor Barnes' study (7), 4,000 children gave as many as 2,801 specific punishments, of which 1,174, or 34% were whippings. To many, whipping is synonymous with punishment. This appears also in Miss Schallenger's paper (48). Whipping is the most popular form of punishment with children, the popularity decreasing with age. In Professor Barnes' case, seven-year-old children gave twice as many cases of corporal punishment as sixteen-year-old children did. It is also interesting to note that threats and a forced promise, "not to do it again," are not mentioned quite so often as one would expect in view of the large use made of them at home. According to Miss Schallenger, at six years of age none out of 2,000 would threaten or demand the promise; at twelve, 35 would use threats and 15 demand the promise; while at fifteen 85 would make use of threats, and 35 demand the promise. Punishment in a way balances the crime, and herein lies its justification. "The most common reason in children's minds for considering a punishment just rests on the feeling that an offense can be paid for in pain," says Professor Barnes (7). Every tactful kindergartner knows that one of the important lessons that a child has to learn is to accept all the inconvenience, discomfort, pain or disgrace consequent upon his deed as his desert. She assures us further that if the task is skilfully undertaken the child as a rule accepts all this without rebellion.

Along with the conception of punishment as a penalty for the evil done, there has been in operation from the very beginning a prospective view of it as a means to an end. The ultimate end in view may have reference to the prevention of evil in the future by means of the intimidation of the culprit or of the mass, or to the reformation of the erring person. As soon as the administration of punitive justice fell into the hands of a third person or body, the vindictive sentiment became greatly toned down and the whole affair came to assume a decidedly social significance. This social emphasis tends to depersonalize the offense and to put its objective side in the foreground of interest. The "materiality" of the crime becomes all-important sometimes to the entire disregard of the personality of the criminal. To free itself of hostile elements became the chief concern of communal authority. At times this work of self-protection on the part of society has been carried on with gruesome ferocity, as we see, for instance, throughout the eighteenth century. Abuse of capital punishment in those days is indeed shocking. This

state of affairs, however, could not last long. The protest against it expressed itself in the reform movement in criminal procedure. In France, the Declaration of Rights in 1789 laid down the principle that "the right to punish is limited by the law of necessity," and in 1791 the Assembly proclaimed that "penalties should be proportioned to the crimes for which they are inflicted, and that they are intended not merely to punish, but to reform the culprit" (26, I, pp. 111-116). Criminal law is admirably defined by Saleilles as "an economics of social defense adapted to the demands of the sense of justice" (47, p. 4). Punishment must fit the crime. A fit punishment is accepted as something merited and just, while too severe a penalty arouses the sense of injustice. Several in our returns state, in another connection, that the punishment inflicted upon Shylock in the Merchant of Venice is altogether too great, and think that Portia might have been less cruel and exacting in her decision. Likewise the treatment of Jean Val Jean in *Les Misérables* calls forth a strong resentment. I myself remember very well, some years ago upon reading the novel, how profoundly and painfully impressed I was with the perversion and stupidity of the courts of justice which could condemn a person without ceremony to the convict prison and brand him as "dangerous," all for stealing a loaf of bread under dire necessity—unemployment, a widowed sister and her seven little ones in hunger!

When human sympathy takes the interests of the offender into consideration a new meaning is read into the function of punishment. Indeed, here punishment as such ceases to exist. Not the prevention of the evil, not the intimidation of the offender, but the correction and regeneration of the individual becomes the chief concern. The psychology of crime is extremely complicated. A whole set of adverse social influences conspire to give rise to one particular criminal act. Very often it is hard conditions of economic life, a tainted heredity, a bad upbringing, an inadequate education, that is to blame. And most of these factors lie beyond the control of the individual. In such a situation the wrongdoer becomes an object of compassion rather than of condemnation. When Westermarck says that, "It is not to be believed that in practice the infliction of punishment is, or ever will be, regulated merely by considerations of social utility" (65, I, p. 91), and that the "idea (that the true end of punishment as the reformation of the criminal) merely emphasizes the most humane element in resentment, the demand that the offender's will shall cease to be offensive" (65, I, p. 88), the

learned author, in his enthusiasm to derive all moral ideas from the retributive emotion, seems to have fallen into the usual pitfall of single theory advocates. It is somewhat characteristic of our day that public censure falls not so much upon the culprit as upon the social factors underlying his offence. This is particularly so when one deals with juvenile offenders, who, placed in an adverse environment at a time when the plasticity of their minds is greatest, are thus misguided and fall. In such circumstances, nothing could be more absurd and cruel than to throw these unfortunate souls into the jail reeking with all pernicious influences. To meet this situation the juvenile court movement was called into being. It proposes to undertake the task of a loving parent for these misguided children. "The child is not to be reformed, but to be formed," is the slogan of this movement (36, p. 30). Sympathy demands that, in dealing with wrongdoers, we give full recognition to the culprit's individuality in its aspect of possibility, and that all ways and means be exhausted to hasten the birth of a new personality. Not to consider the culprit's future is unpardonable, monstrous and unjust. At the same time justice resents the sickly sentimentalism which shrinks from facing the principle of desert, and tries to excuse the crime and the criminal under this or that pretext.

Forgiveness. We come next to the question of forgiveness. Should we pardon or forgive, and how far? Since the answers to these questions depend so much upon personal temperament and ideals, it has seemed to me that we could perhaps approach the subject of our inquiry advantageously by examining the different attitudes taken towards the question by persons of different temperament and *Weltanschauung*. For this purpose I shall take up, in what follows, (a) Christianity, (b) Stoicism, (c) Buddhism, (d) Philosophical Idealism, and (e) Greek and Modern civic ideals, and examine very briefly their several verdicts on the question of forgiveness.

(a) *Christianity.* Although the virtue of forgiveness is inculcated in almost all ethnic books of morals, it receives especial emphasis in the teachings of Christianity, so much so that the phrase 'Christian spirit' may be taken as almost synonymous with a disposition of readiness to forgive an injury. It is quite natural that this should be so; for the Christian God is a loving, forgiving father whose heart goes out to one lost sheep more tenderly than to the ninety-nine in the fold. Likewise, the Master was a friend, not of the sound and well, but of the sick and erring. Nothing could be farther from Him than to throw the first stone at the

sinner. The strivings for divine purity and perfection against surging passions and manifold temptations bring a sense of personal imperfection home to each believer. Who is there so bold as to declare before the God who searches out the inmost secrets of our hearts, that "I am pure and spotless"? "There is none righteous, no, not one." The knowledge of personal weakness and sinfulness teaches one humility. This expresses itself on the one hand, in the need of, and the faith in, the divine mercy and grace, and, on the other, in forbearance with fellow-beings. "Judge not that ye be not judged." So in our returns, the Lord's prayer is given by many as affording the best answer to our question. If we do not forgive others, how can we expect forgiveness from God? Do we not pray, Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors? The parable of the unjust steward (Matt., 18:23-35) is mentioned in our returns as a case of the most callous injustice six times out of sixty, where biblical stories are given. Forgiveness becomes a reciprocal duty. So long as we want others to forgive us our faults, which are many and great, it is only fair that we should pardon others with equal generosity. Appeal is made here to the Golden Rule. We should ask pardon only of those to whom we have been merciful, in which case, some assert, we have a right to ask pardon of them.

The consciousness that all are children of one loving God enables one to be tolerant with others in their faults, and solicitous of their welfare. Again, the individual is of infinite worth, of far more value than the whole world and the treasures that are therein. God's eternal wisdom takes account even of the least among the sons of men. Indeed, the confession and conversion of a soul marks a great event in the course of creation. The believers are therefore enjoined to forgive their erring brothers not only seven times, but as often as seventy times seven. Nay, they are exhorted not only to refrain from returning evil for evil, but to love even their enemies!

The ideal of purity and perfection often makes one hypercritical and over-scrupulous in regard to one's own conduct, and fosters an undue severity and rigorism towards oneself. This may sometimes rise to the intensity of a morbid antagonism between spirit and flesh. This hostile attitude towards oneself leads one to be intolerant of one's fellow pilgrims. To see how religious enthusiasm may sometimes border upon hatred and revengeful emotion, one has only to glance over the titles of the discourses of the Puritan divines, like Jonathan Edwards (40). The thought of the torture of the

wicked in unquenchable fire did not at all impair the glory of the blessed, but on the contrary, it augmented their beatitude. Notwithstanding the biblical injunction to be thoroughly sympathetic with offenders (Matt. 18:15-17) intolerance, frequently resembling hypocrisy, is somewhat characteristic of the dealings of the Church with those who have gone astray.

(b) *Stoicism*. The Stoic literature is permeated with the spirit of benevolence and forbearance. "The most perfect and best of all characters, in my estimation, is he who is as ready to pardon the errors of mankind as if he were every day guilty of some himself; and at the same time as cautious of committing a fault as if he never forgave one" (43, Bk. 8; 22). Let us consider how naturally this spirit of forgiveness proceeds from the general tone of the Stoic system. A state of apathy, free from all emotional disturbances is the goal of Stoic culture. The emotions are disturbances of mental health, and are, under all circumstances, faults to be suppressed and eradicated by reason. Of all emotions, anger and hatred are especially detestable. To a Stoic, a person in anger, with glaring eyes, twitching lips, the hair bristling and the hands restless, must appear the most hideous and miserable creature on earth. To yield to the rage of passion is to forfeit the dignity of the mind. The wise man living in the light of reason puts no faith or hope in anything which it is not in his power to control. He has found the highest good in the realm of reason, unmolested by any extraneous forces. Since he has no vanity, the wise man is untouched by honor or dishonor. Slandered and ill-treated, he remains unperturbed, calm and serene like a mountain lake.

"Freedom consists in raising one's mind superior to injuries and becoming a person whose pleasures come from himself alone, in separating himself from external circumstances that one may not have to lead a disturbed life in fear of the laughter and tongues of all men; for if any man can offer an insult, who is there who cannot?" (51, Dialogues, Bk. 2; 19). "Should the wise man once lower himself to the point of being affected by either injury or insult, he could never feel safe afterward" (51, Dialogues, Bk. 2; 13). "Remember that it is not he who reviles you or strikes you, who insults you, but it is your opinion about these things as being insulting" (17, Ench. 20). "Consider how much more pain is brought on us by the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts themselves, at which we are angry and vexed" (5, 11; 18).

Moreover, this life is fleeting. Why should we spend our days in anger, hatred and revenge? "Why do you not rather draw together what there is of your short life, and keep it peaceful for others and for yourself?" (51, Dialogues, Bk. 5, 43). Pessimism renders one magnanimous and enables him to

transcend petty concerns of life. The Stoics agree with the Socratic doctrine that knowledge and virtue are one. The good man is the enlightened man. This interpretation of virtue places the problem of sin and evil in a peculiar light. Sin and evil proceed from ignorance, from lack of understanding. "It is ignorantly and involuntarily that men sin" (5, xi; 18). It is of no more use to get angry at the ignorant than it is to be so with a maniac. Since virtue proceeds from knowledge, and since all men are capable of rational living, all that there is to be done with evil-doers is to pity them and teach them the way of reason. "Be well assured that nothing is more tractable than the human soul" (17, Discourses, Bk. 4; 9). "The wise man will not be angry with sinners. Why not? Because he knows that no one is born wise, but becomes so" (51, Dialogues, Bk. 4; 10). The wise man will treat wrong-doers as the doctor does his patients. The Stoics regard punishment as essentially a means of education, and not as a means of venting one's wrath. Furthermore, the Stoics see in humanity a republic of rational beings. All men are fellow-pilgrims to the Kingdom of Reason, and partake of one and the same life. Thus all merge in a common brotherhood. Such a notion of human brotherhood favors the growth of a most extended benevolence, gentleness and forbearance. "Human life is founded on benefits and harmony, and is bound together into an alliance for the common helps of all, not by terror, but by love towards one another" (51, Dialogues, Bk. 3; 5). "Will you not bear with your own brother who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from above?" (17, Discourse, Bk. 1; 13).

By way of summing up the tenets of Stoicism with particular reference to the subject under our consideration, I cannot do better than to quote the following passages from Aurelius. "It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong. And this happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was before" (5, v; 22).

(c) *Buddhism*. Perhaps no one has ever drunk more deeply of the misery and vanity of existence than did the Buddha and his disciples, and they reached the conclusion that in this world of senses all is suffering and pain. Most painful is the body with insatiable, vain lusts and cravings. "After a stronghold has been made of the bones, it is covered with

flesh and blood, and there dwell in it old age and death, pride and deceit" (15, ch. 11; 150). Looking upon the world as a bubble and a mirage the Buddhists turn their backs upon it and "wander alone like a rhinoceros." Above good and evil, beyond the reach of surging passions and desires, lives the Awakened One in perfect peace and serenity. Little does he trouble himself with good and evil; for the slightest signs of emotion betray the mind into fetters and bondage. "If a man looks after the faults of others, and is always inclined to be offended, his own passions will grow and he is far from the destruction of passions" (15, ch. 18; 253). "He abused me, he beat me, he defeated me, he robbed me,—in those who harbour such thoughts hatred will never cease" (15, ch. 1; 3). "Whatever a hater may do to a hater, or an enemy to an enemy, a wrongly-directed mind will do us greater misery" (15, ch. 3; 15). Here we have exactly the same trend of thought that we have seen in the Stoic literature, expressed now with keener perception and greater insistence. The Buddhists, like the Stoics, give primacy to knowledge. Virtue is born of right understanding. Evil-doers are such simply because they lack insight into the nature of things, and set their hearts on this or that object. Hence, they need enlightenment, not terror, pity, nor yet condemnation. Again, the Buddhists are at one with the Stoics in seeing in wrongdoing the suffering, not of the wronged, but of the doer. Then, knowing that no harm can possibly reach him from without, the enlightened man should leave off petty animosity and ill-feeling towards would-be offenders.

(d) *Philosophical Idealism.* It is not without interest to see what philosophical idealism has to say on our question. Let us listen to Hegel; for he has his own way of looking at the situation. In his philosophical system, mind is in a pilgrimage from sensuous certainty to the absolute certainty of the understanding, from the isolation of its self-certainty to the truth of the community of spirits. Perfected mind, for Hegel, is the world of many-related minds. Hegel's Absolute, then, is essentially a man of effort and distinctly a moral being, whose strength and glory rest in his power of overcoming obstacles on the way to moral perfection. Upon these two fundamental conceptions of the community of spirits and its militant moral nature stands Hegel's philosophy of forgiveness.

By confiding the inmost secrets of the self to others, the confessor has renounced his separate, isolated self-existence, and proclaimed his particularity as cancelled. By so establishing himself as continuous with others, he asserts himself

as part of the universal, which is the only reality. On the other hand, by hardheartedly refusing pardon to one who confesses, one refuses to establish spiritual communication with another. Such an uncommunicative, isolated character, by its stiffnecked attitude, fails to see the unity of its self in another life and consequently cannot reach objective existence. It has no concrete reality. When however the two reconcile, and desist from their existence in a state of opposition, the ego is expanded into duality and comes to the certainty of itself in its complete relinquishment. "It is God appearing in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge" (24, p. 682). The erring one who confesses his sin thereby annihilates it. "The wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scars behind. The deed is not something imperishable, the spirit takes it back to itself" (24, p. 679). The spirit manifests its sovereignty over nature and history by its majestic art of making what has been done as though it had not occurred. The hardhearted one who refuses pardon to the penitent, on the other hand, thereby proves himself to be "a form of consciousness which has forsaken and denies the very nature of spirit; for it does not understand that spirit, in the absolute certainty of itself, is master and lord over every deed, and over all reality, and can reject and cast them off and make them as if they had never been" (24, p. 677). This idea of mind passing over from the isolation of its self-certainty, through pardon of the wicked, to the reality of the community, is considered as one of Hegel's most profound and beautiful developments.

(e) *Greek and Modern Civic Ideals*. When we turn to another type of ethical thought in which ethics merges in politics—politics in the best sense of the term—we find a wholly different estimate of human emotions. In the old Greek conception, moral duties pass almost entirely into political. Good citizenship is the measure of all virtues. The individual recedes into the background, and is subordinate to the larger interests of the community. Plato and Aristotle betrayed a true Hellenistic trait when they conceived ethics in terms of politics. Now, civic excellency requires not the suppression and extermination of the emotions, but their intelligent exercise; for in civic life, apathy and indifference become distinct evils. Unlike the Stoics, who succeeded them, both the Academicians and the Peripatetics insisted upon the education, and not the eradication, of human passions. When properly trained in the golden mean, our emotions become wholly virtuous, comely to a noble character. Thus Aristotle is not slow to acknowledge the significance of anger and

revengeful emotions. He says: "He who feels anger on proper occasions, at proper persons, and besides in a proper manner, at proper times, and for a proper length of time, is an object of praise" (4, Bk. 4, ch. 5). He did not hesitate to say that, "by proportionate retaliation civil society is held together" (4, Bk. 5, ch. 5). Nor did the excellency of meekness blind him to the danger of its excess. "The meek man seems to err rather on the side of defect; for he is not inclined to revenge, but rather to forgive" (4, Bk. 4, ch. 5).

In old Greece, man was, in every sense of the term, a political animal. In accordance with this social ideal, Greek education consisted in the making of citizens. The state itself was its organ, and civic duties its curriculum. To transmit the fatherland, not only not less, but greater and better, than it was transmitted to them, was the highest aspiration of Greek youths. The passing of the manhood examination marked the crown of their education (13).

The present is the age of democracy. The principle of a government by the people and for the people makes every single individual in it indispensable as a social force. It requires a higher standard of civic excellence than is necessary in despotism. Each member of the democratic community must share responsibility as well as benefits with the rest. The appalling amount of misery and ignorance, vice and fraud, existing in our midst is a most eloquent challenge to the integrity of the modern conscience. The traditional conceptions of purity and righteousness, all those which are individualistic and quiescent, prove sadly inadequate, when the existing state of things hardly allows one to conceive these virtues in isolation from larger social considerations. There are in society a set of adverse forces in operation, which do not at all guarantee the survival of the best. To combat these constitutes the heart of the moral problem of to-day. In speaking of the hindrances to good citizenship, Mr. Bryce enumerates indolence, greed and party-spirit as standing in the way to true democracy (8). He also points out that the vast size of modern states makes the individual citizen seem infinitesimally small, so that there is a danger of fostering an attitude of indifference and irresponsibility. Still more lamentable, the same author thinks, is the effect of over-much sentimentalism, which is somewhat characteristic of the modern man. Good citizenship requires one to be angry when anger is called for. Indeed, a large portion of civic duties consists in battling against injustice. Paulsen deplors the absence of such militant virtue as "one of the most painful omissions in the morality of the New Testament" (42, p.

613). But, in the new light of social conscience, the Gospel of the Kingdom of God has undergone a remarkable transfiguration, and with all the vigor that is still left in her, the Church espouses the cause of social justice. Miss Jane Addams makes an eloquent and pertinent plea for full and sympathetic recognition of youthful passion for reform as a supreme moral resource (1). Nowhere else does one find a simpler, more straightforward, unadulterated expression of thirst for righteousness than in the spirit of youth. Educators, who watch the signs of the times, are more and more coming to the conviction that the way to social salvation lies in a vigorous civic training of the young. This implies, among other things, the cultivation of genuine militant civic virtues through the sublimation of the natural emotions.

Should we pardon or forgive? Here, as elsewhere, the answer is largely determined by personal temperament and ideals. Those who, keenly conscious of human frailty, strive for salvation in regeneration, and those who, convinced of the vanity of existence, seek comfort in the tranquility of mind alike will answer the question with an emphatic Yes. These will find their minds in accord with the views of Christianity, Buddhism, or of Stoicism. The militant souls, on the other hand, in their eagerness to see the reign of purity and justice, will staunchly say, No! Nothing short of reformation will bring satisfaction to them.

V. VICARIOUS ATONEMENT

The overwhelming majority of our 313 respondents do not think it possible for one person really to bear the penalties of another's fault and let the guilty one escape. It is true, a score of them cite cases where a person bore penalties in behalf of loved ones out of sheer devotion to them; but the stories usually end with the qualms of conscience the guilty ones had to undergo. By letting the innocent suffer in his place, the guilty one commits an added injustice. Moreover, vicarious suffering is only apparent. One hundred and thirty-four out of 313 are of the opinion that no real suffering is possible to an innocent person, because of his perfectly clear conscience. The sufferings of a sinner remain ever foreign to the just. "Whatever pain he may undergo is an expression of love, not an atonement for sin," as one puts it. Particularly in old days, voluntary vicarious suffering in behalf of lords, masters, parents, benefactors or elders was of rather common occurrence. Even vicarious suffering of a son for his father, in cases of capital punishment, was not unknown. Such devo-

tion and sacrifice spoke well for the son, though the father may have been a most depraved criminal. Here, however, what appeals to us is not so much the act of vicarious suffering as the courage, fidelity and genuine friendship exemplified in the deed. With the forgiveness and absolution of the original offence the heroic deed has nothing to do. So also the suffering and death of Jesus are looked upon by many as the consequence, on the one hand, of the unbelief and sins of the world, and of the love and devotion of Jesus, and through him, of God, on the other. The expiatory interpretation of the Cross is quite another thing.

It is rather striking that only 8 out of 313 respondents make allusion to Jesus' sufferings as possessing an atoning virtue. Of these eight, one says that Christ took upon himself the punishment of our sins, but that we too must suffer for them; "for real repentance means real suffering." Evidently, our respondents are familiar with the details of Jesus' life, of his passion and death, and the doctrines of the Church. Indeed some of them are apparently zealous Christians. Their silence, then, about the doctrine of the vicarious atonement of the Savior, is highly significant. However, when asked, in another connection, to give some of the best stories or cases illustrating justice or injustice (question No. 6), many responded with the crucifixion of Jesus, as the most tragic and unjust event in the whole history of humanity. The story received no less than 22 points out of a total of 200, of which number, again, biblical stories commanded 60. From this it can be plainly seen that the meaning of the cross as the emblem of Christianity lies elsewhere than in its supposed expiatory virtue. The extraordinary manner of Jesus' suffering and his violent and premature death in all his innocence and purity, love and devotion, calls forth no end of pathos in the hearts of men. Such a fate befalling so divine a person cannot fail to be the highest theme of meditation (21). The instinctive sense of justice, which sees in sin and suffering a causal chain, is lost in wonderment at the sight of the Cross, and is tempted to seek some hidden divine wisdom in the extraordinary event. May not all his sufferings be supererogatory, it asks? The idea of expiation might readily suggest itself, and possibly the doctrine of the vicarious atonement took its root in some such wholesome ethical impulse. But whatever the justification for it, pious souls resent any attempt to reduce this supreme revelation of the divine love into mere ecclesiastical formulae as little short of sacrilege.

Moreover, the sense of individual responsibility revolts against the notion of a scape goat. The unjust must suffer,

somehow, somewhere, sometime. An evil deed bears its fruit, it ripens, then the wicked suffer. "Not in the sky, not in the midst of the sea, not if we enter into the clefts of the mountains, is there known a spot in the whole world where a man might be freed from an evil deed" (15, ch. 9; 127). The deeds are immortal, and the law of Karma is abiding. It is against human nature to make light of one's faults. We have seen elsewhere in the present paper how seriously and earnestly a conscience-stricken person struggles under the burden of realizing that he has been unjust, and resorts to all possible means to obtain inner peace and reconciliation.

When the priestly writers in the Old Testament said that sin might be cleansed, washed away, wiped out and purified by means of a sacrificial offering, they were dominated by distinctly ritualistic conceptions. By sin was understood defilement unwittingly contracted. Purification required no repentance on the part of the offender. For a wilful moral offence sin-offerings were of no avail (56). The death of the sacrificial animal does not represent the death of the sinner. The sin is not transferred to the slain victim (9, p. 53). No exegetical support of the doctrine of the vicarious atonement can justly be derived from the New Testament. "No New Testament writer teaches the doctrine that the death of Jesus satisfies a demand of God that sin shall be punished, or is substitutionary in the sense that in it Jesus endures the punishment due to others" (9, p. 263 f). The Anselmic or judicial doctrine of the atonement, which regards the suffering of Jesus as the absolute, objective requirement of the punishment deserved by the sins of men, found itself bitterly opposed by what is generally known as the moral view of the work of salvation. Abelard, the historic champion of the latter view, regarding the work of Jesus, in life and in death, as a manifestation of the divine grace inviting sinners to repentance and love, entirely discarded the crude and irreverent notion that God could be appeased by the slaying of His innocent son. When later Thomas Aquinas came forward with the expiatory theory, we find Scotus close at his heels with a moral interpretation of Jesus' sufferings (46).

The history of the controversy that centered around the doctrine of the vicarious atonement may well be regarded as a record of the revolt of the moral consciousness against the external mechanical scheme of expiation. "This doctrine" (of the vicarious atonement), says Dr. Hall, "is the unpardonable sin of the church against both true religion and morals" (22, I, p. 269). The healthy, unsophisticated moral sense finds its best expression in the Dhammapada (15, ch.

12; 165): "By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one suffers; by oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified. Purity and impurity belong to oneself, no one can purify another."

VI. COSMIC JUSTICE

Moral intuition demands that virtue and happiness, sin and suffering, should go together. "Virtue is not left to stand alone. He who practices it will have neighbours" (34, *Analects*, Bk. 4; 25). Again, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness, and yet live, his escape from death is the effect of mere good fortune" (34, *Analects*, Bk. 6; 17). Plato thought it an unpardonable misstatement to say that the wicked are often happy and the good miserable, or that injustice is profitable when undetected, but that justice is a man's own loss and another's gain. Poets and story-tellers who teach these things are accordingly anathemized in his *Republic*. The virtuous are befriended by the gods, and in the end all things work for good with them. Just as the idea of perfection readily suggests that of existence, furnishing the ground for the classic ontological argument; so the good, the true, and the beautiful are conceived as enduring, destined to prevail over evil. Popular sayings, fables, folklore and novels give abundant expression to this faith in the law of compensation. Despite all absurdity and grotesqueness of details as works of art, the literature which embodies and clarifies this creed of the folk-soul is always delightful, even to a most unimaginative, pragmatic mind. An act of disobedience invites calamity; inordinate desires work destruction. The faithful win the day, and the innocent find vindication. A dutiful daughter at the mercy of her cruel stepmother is at last blessed by Providence, while her sisters are lapped in luxury only to hasten the final disillusionment and doom. In all religious speculation, the Greeks contemplated Fate and the avenging Doom relentlessly taking their course to the bitterest end, and with an almost devilish obsession leading men along the road of sin to inevitable ruin. The endless chain of cause and effect, which rules over the vicissitudes of life, is elaborated in the Pre-Buddhistic Hindoo faith. The destiny of a soul in each new birth is determined by its deeds in a previous birth. Each action of the soul, good or bad, must work out its full effect without fail.

So deep-seated in the human mind is this sense of retributive justice, that, when overtaken by misfortune and calamities, seemingly without cause, the reflective mind turns inward upon itself in vexation, there to find sufficient justification for what has befallen it. It has been, and is still, customary to

look upon unusual calamities as consequences of some previous wrong-doings. Once the healer pronounced the cure of the diseased by saying, "Thy sins are forgiven." Certain diseases which are particularly hideous and repulsive, such as leprosy, have been ascribed to heavenly visitation. The miseries of existence, with its tiresome toil and labor, are likewise accounted for by some theologians on the assumption of original sin, which, by the way, Schopenhauer calls the only metaphysical truth contained in the Old Testament.

However, in this world of stern reality, if there is one thing plainer than another it is the utter moral indifference in the order of things. The forces of nature rage with remorseless waste of life, and the course of man is anything but smooth and easy. "It is not always May." How manifold man's wants, how strong his desires, yet how scant his satisfaction! The irony of fate mocks his pretentious aspirations. With thwarted wishes and frustrated purposes man's days are, as it were, a continuous oscillation between the two poles of hope and despair, of joy and sorrow. Why do sufferings come upon the righteous, while the wicked flourish in luxury and idleness? Have we been cheated and fooled in our faith in the moral law of retribution? This constitutes the problem of evil which is as old as creation, and each wayfarer has to answer in his own fashion this riddle of the Sphinx.

Buddhism knows no Intelligence or Divinity who created this universe and who holds it in the hollow of his hand. It knows no Being whom man could hold responsible for the presence of evil and misery in the world. The origin of suffering the Buddhists see in the genesis of individuality. The fateful idea of the self gives rise to vain passions and desires which are essentially evil and painful. Salvation consists in banishing the delusive notions of "I," "Mine," "Me," "Soul," "Future," and the like. Here evidently the problem of evil is explained and solved in purely human terms, and it hardly becomes a question of justice. To ask whether this universe is friendly to man is idle and meaningless. Schopenhauer, in whose writings pessimism finds a most direct, naked and pathetic expression, attempts another explanation of the problem. "Why," he asks, "and for what purpose does all this torment and agony exist? There is only one consideration that may serve to explain the sufferings of animals. It is this; that the will to live, which underlies the whole world of phenomena, must in their case satisfy its cravings by feeding upon itself" (50, p. 22). Again he says: "If you want a safe compass to guide you through life, and to banish all doubt as to the right way of looking at it, you cannot do

better than accustom yourself to regard this as a penitentiary, a sort of penal colony" (50, p. 27). From this point of view the presence of evil in life involves no question of justice or injustice of the world order. For Hartmann, this world is the best of all possible worlds, but it is worse than none at all. Pessimism, however, affords Hartmann no ground to charge the Absolute with injustice. A kind-hearted God can only desire the good of his creatures. If they are miserable, so Hartmann pleads the cause of the Absolute, it is the fault, not of His good-will, but of His power. Such being the case, all we, His creatures, should do is, not to rage against Him, or to take refuge in quietism, as Schopenhauer bids us to do, but to pity the Absolute and redeem Him from all this suffering! (23).

But in a theistic philosophy, like that of Christianity, which acknowledges one supreme, intelligent, loving Being who created this world—of misery and woe, and who, seeing his work done, "clapped his hands in praise of it," the presence of evil becomes at once the problem of cosmic justice. The naïve religious optimism which makes light of human sufferings does not meet the facts of life squarely in the face. The current disciplinary view of suffering proves altogether too shallow. It is tasteless and insipid "like the white of an egg." "Doth the wild ass bray when he hath grass? Or loweth the ox over his fodder?" Souls in affliction are filled with an overwhelming sense of the divine oppression and tyranny. Then the plaintiff rises in "native god-created majesty," and audaciously challenges the Mighty One for response. In answer to our question (No. 13), Is this a just universe? 280 out of 320 or 87.5 per cent. say that this is a just universe; while 40 or 12.5 per cent. take the opposite view. The unmerited sufferings of the innocent, the prosperity of the wicked, hypocrisy and fraud in schools, churches, and in politics, are responsible for the scepticism of the latter group. Many have at times been overtaken by more or less serious doubt about the matter, when the universe puts on a gloomy hue. During these moody hours of doubt and abandonment, Faith, the pole-star of life, hides herself behind a thick gloom. Trust in God seems to be shattered, and a feeling of estrangement and isolation ensues, sometimes leaving lasting scars on the individuals. An extended biographical study will furnish many cases where calamities and disasters have absolutely shattered the faith in a loving God. But, according to our returns, this painful experience is, in ordinary cases, transient, and does not play havoc with one's moral life for any length of time. The pendulum swings

back, and equilibrium is soon restored. The wholesome instinct which craves for more abundant and joyous life acts as the counterpoise, and is ready to repress the painful thought. The "tender-minded" can hardly bear the thought that this universal frame is without a mind. Compromises take place, and one humbly commends oneself to the wisdom of God, which passes understanding. Thus one reaches the startling conclusion that, All things work together for good.

The momentum of life is so strong that when hedged in by adverse circumstances man takes refuge in transcendental speculation, and sees his wishes fulfilled in the world of thought and fancy. The irresistible impulse to live more abundantly creates hope against hope and conceives the whole superstructure of future rewards and punishments. The afflicted look forward to the great Beyond, where the hungry in this life shall sit at sumptuous feasts, the naked be clothed in silk and velvet, the sick and the weak enjoy perpetual youth and strength, and Death, the chief of all foes, shall be swallowed up in victory. The naïve hedonistic view of the future existence as the exact reverse of this, after the fashion of the parable of the Rich man and Lazarus, brings immense consolation to many minds.

To the moral consciousness of a finer type, however, such popular doctrine of rewards and punishments seems altogether vulgar and unworthy. Persons, like Emerson, with delicate moral sense take offence at the preacher's talk on Heaven and Hell. "Ever since I was a boy," writes the Sage of Concord, "I have wished to write a discussion on compensation; for it seemed to me when very young, that on this subject life was ahead of theology, and the people knew more than the preacher taught" (16). For Emerson "the tools in our hands, the bread in our basket, the transactions of the streets," are all the document from which this universal law of compensation can be gathered. Justice is not postponed. The world is orderly like "a multiplication table, or a mathematical equation." All things are moral. "In nature nothing can be given, all things are sold." Those who look at the order of things in this light have little need of expecting retributive justice in the hereafter. Virtue which does not find its reward in itself is no virtue at all. Future rewards are superfluous, and are not demanded by justice. In greatest deprivations the virtuous can be happy, while the wicked are restless among plenty. How to detach "the sensual sweet, the sensual strong, the sensual bright, etc., from the moral sweet, the moral deep, the moral fair," has been a great lesson in the education of moral consciousness. Says Dr. Hall,

"There is nothing that is teachable in morals quite so important as that there is a power that makes for righteousness and against unrighteousness at the helm of the universe" (22, II, p. 268). The conviction that right and good gain the ascendancy does not necessarily concern itself with the details of its fulfillment. It needs no superstructures of hedonism. While the belief, as it finds expression in Matthew Arnold's famous phrase, is extremely vague and indefinite in its contents, it is sufficiently definite to give life and zest to all human activities.

The vicissitudes of life necessitate a "transvaluation of all values." Now the mind assumes the lordship of the creation and rebuilds the universe after its own fashion. It is the discovery of the world of reason. Stoic education consisted in learning to wish that things should happen as they actually do. "Seek not that things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life" (17, Ench. 8). "Whoever, then, wishes to be free, let him neither wish for anything nor avoid anything which depends on others" (17, Ench. 18). The wise man does not ask Fortune for her gifts, but asks himself not to ask for them. Divested in this manner of all earthly dross, one looks upon the world and the gods, and behold! what a marvelous change one sees in the order of the universe. "The immortal gods are neither willing nor able to harm us" (51, Dialogues, Bk. 4; 27). "Like the kindest of parents, who only smile at the spiteful words of their children, the gods do not cease to heap benefits upon those who doubt from what source their benefits are derived. . . . Possessing only the power of doing good, they graciously and serenely bear with the faults of our erring spirits" (52, Bk. 7; 31). To pray to the gods that this or that event may not befall us is "the most ignominious degradation of humanity." He is base and vile who thinks ill of the order of the universe. In his folly, he wishes to improve his god instead of himself.

The Hegelians answer the problem of evil with their philosophical idealism, and say: "When you suffer, your sufferings are God's sufferings, not his external work, not his external penalty, not the fruit of his neglect, but identically his personal woe. In you God himself suffers, precisely as you do, and has all your concern in overcoming this grief" (45, p. 14). In this philosophical idealism, the problem of evil resolves itself into the question, Why does God thus suffer? We have seen, in another connection, that the Hegelian Absolute is essentially a man of combat. God suffers,

we are told, because without suffering God's life cannot be perfected, for virtue is most virtuous in the moment of victory over the tempter. "The justification of the presence in the world of the morally evil becomes apparent to us mortals only in so far as this evil is overcome and condemned. It exists only that it may be cast down" (45, p. 28). Those who are afflicted and smitten in life are summoned to take heart and join the holy war as "the minister of God's triumph." To quote again: "But suppose I resist the evil impulse, hate it, hold it down, overcome it, then, in this moment of hating and condemning it *I make it a part of my larger moral goodness*. The justification of the existence of my evil impulse comes *just at the instant when I hate and condemn it*" (44, p. 459). Such is the paradox of "perfection in imperfection."

With the advancement of science, natural phenomena have lost much of their ancient maliciousness. Everything is now known to take place, not according to the will and wisdom of a supernatural being, but according to impersonal, impassionate physico-chemical laws. Man has come to look upon the ways of nature with relative complacency and resignation, even foretelling her course with the pretentious exactness of a dictator. Instead of unwisely raging against the forces of nature, he now applies all his scientific knowledge to reducing to a minimum the disharmonies which exist between man and nature, and to securing the optimal conditions of life. From this viewpoint cosmic justice gives place to human justice. The problem has shifted from philosophy to ethics, from the cosmos to humanity. The main ethical forces today center around, and issue from, the ideal of social justice. Whether or not this is a just universe, certain it is that, in a large measure, life is what we make it. This is the creed of the modern empiricist (29).

VII. CONCLUSION

In the community of self-assertive beings like man, no question can be of more vital import than that pertaining to personal rights. The integrity of body, mind, and property is jealously guarded in the name of "natural rights;" the infringement of these, be it ever so slight, stirs the keenest sense of injustice. It appears that man's moral education began with anger. The psychology of justice begins with the psychology of injustice. Consciousness has a remedial function. Just as a well person scarcely feels the existence of the stomach, and only the sick live in constant awareness of it, so a man would never trouble himself with the question

of justice and injustice so long as everything goes on according to his wishes. Anger evokes fear in others, and fear leads them to prudence. Experience has taught man that happiness lies in the way of peace. This insight, embodied in the Golden Rule, represents the highest wisdom of life. This, however, is no mere utilitarian principle. Sympathy gives it a genuinely humane touch. Nothing moves man to compassion so profoundly as the sight of others suffering privation of life's necessities. Indeed, the problem of food and shelter constitutes the heart of social justice.

Moral intuition demands that virtue and happiness, sin and suffering, crime and punishment, should go together. But this world of stern reality presents abundant contradiction to the principle of desert; hence the persistent problem of evil. Many a soul has groaned under the painful idea of divine oppression, and despairing, cursed God and died. However, the momentum of life is so strong that often in adversity man can seek refuge in the realm of thought and fancy, and see his fond wishes fulfilled there. This psychic mechanism of wish-fulfillment, which is a protective means, is active in dreams, reveries, and religious speculation. The moral consciousness of a finer type, however, taking offence at the popular notion of future rewards and punishments, turns its eyes inward to find consolation and delight within itself. Men of this type do not quarrel with the order of the universe, but see in everything the unfolding of the law of compensation.

As has been shown in the section on the Qualms of Conscience, the suffering of the guilty conscience is intense. Peace comes back only after strenuous efforts for the restitution of the wrong. The sense of individual responsibility revolts from the notion of a scapegoat. Punitive justice demands that the evil should recoil upon the perpetrator. It even insists on the quantitative, as well as qualitative, equation of crime and punishment.

The ideal of social justice is more and more becoming the pivot for all ethical efforts. How to educate youth in the militant virtue of justice is the problem of moral education to-day. To ask pardon of others is extremely humiliating. The old sires were right who admonished the young not to do a thing for which they would have to bow their heads in apologizing. A high sense of honor leads one beyond fear and prudence to the love of honesty and righteousness, to the ideal of sportsmanship. Nothing appeals to the mind of youth so powerfully as the ways of the knight who detests taking advantage of the weak, and never leaves the oppressor unpunished. Much may be expected from the sublimation of the pristine

emotions of anger and sympathy through wise appeal to self-feeling. After all, the best moral education can only be achieved in coping with actual moral situations, whether in the playground, in the classroom, or in the market.

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