

feature too strongly. The distaste with which one viewed the title of this book, the mental confusion caused by being faced on the very first page by an involved sentence of fourteen lines, apparently quoted from the work as indicative of its scope and purpose, but which scarcely conveyed any intelligible meaning, the fact, obvious on merely turning the pages, that the author was not exactly on the level of the philosophical consciousness, were all calculated to produce a prejudice against the work, to a great extent removed when one had submitted himself to the task of reading it patiently through. This in itself was no light labour. Mr. Parsons' style is lumbering, confused and dull at the best, at the worst there are simply no words for it. At least Mr. Parsons' words are too long to quote to show how nearly to distraction he can drive his reader. Opening his book perfectly at random, I light on a sentence containing 203 words. In spite of all this, however, and of his rather curious set of interests and mode of speculation, Mr. Parsons has produced a work by no means to be altogether condemned. Those trained and interested in the technicalities of philosophy cannot be expected to regard it seriously, must, indeed, be expected to dismiss it contemptuously, but that numerous class of people who are taken up with religious-philosophical, mystic and spiritualistic movements are likely to be positively benefited by reading Mr. Parsons. A thread of rational connection—often thin enough—runs through his apparently disconnected topics, and, singular as these are he is certainly a man of sound common sense, and relatively to these others his methods are philosophical and his results valuable. He may be regarded as an ally of those who on more purely philosophical lines oppose Pantheism in religion and Absolutism in philosophy, who in one way or another struggle to preserve the real significance of finite personality and of the world we know in time; but he is an ally in a remote and barbarous scene of operations, fighting with rather disorderly and ill-equipped forces against fantastic and fanatical levies.

DAVID MORRISON.

*Studies in the Philosophy of Religion.* By GEORGE GALLOWAY, B.D., formerly Examiner in Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews. Blackwood, 1904. Price 7s. 6d. net.

The main purpose of this book is to furnish a proof of the validity of religion, and to show that man's reaching forth in all ages and countries to beings above himself whom he can never fully know is not a mere play of his fancy nor a vain excursion in a land of shadows, but that the object he thus seeks exists, that he stands in such a relation to that object and also to his fellow-beings that he is driven by necessity to make such efforts, and that these efforts accomplish to some extent their aim. The readers of MIND know Dr. Galloway to be an accomplished philosophical writer, well acquainted with modern speculation and capable of holding his own with its leading representatives. The Essays in this book were written at different times and to a certain extent, the reader sees, without reference to each other, yet they do, when taken together, furnish an argument of no small impressiveness. The three opening Essays may be regarded as introductory. That on "Hegel and the Later Tendency of Religious Philosophy," which stands first, traces the change in the interpretation of religion from the purely speculative method of Hegel to the empirical method of to-day, in which feeling is everything and doctrine a matter almost of indifference. The author does not commit himself to either extreme; he is a good deal of an anti-

Hegelian ; on the other hand, he is not a Ritschlian, but insists on the necessity of thought in the constitution of religion. In his second Essay, "The Natural Sciences, Ethics and Religion," he vindicates for Religion its place as an independent human activity to be interpreted from itself. It is not, on the one hand, to be judged by mechanical standards as a subsection of natural science, nor is it to be identified with Ethics, since the ideals to which the latter points are to be found completed and guaranteed only in religion. In this chapter, which is full, as the whole book is, of clear if somewhat rapid arguments on great problems, Dr. Galloway shows a true understanding of what religion is both in its inner nature and in its relation to other parts of human life ; and many passages are at a high level. He is never a mere apologist ; but is always conscious of the claims of the various departments of thought, and of the supreme position of general Philosophy.

In his third Essay, on "Religious Development, Its History and Interpretation," Dr. Galloway's step is scarcely so sure ; nor perhaps is the subject very essential to his general argument. Some of his statements are scarcely up to date ; as when the Sumerians in Ancient Babylonia are spoken of as if their presence there had never been doubted, or Prof. Robertson Smith's view of the origin of sacrifice is spoken of as generally accepted. The teaching of Buddha is contrasted with that of the Brahmins as if it had been a new thing in his mouth instead of having been prepared for centuries, as the Upanishads teach us. Other similar points might be mentioned ; but it is ungracious to complain that a writer who follows so many and so great studies as Dr. Galloway should be at fault about a few things in the great field of the History of Religion. His conclusions regarding the mode in which religion advances from one stage to another are I think correct. They will be found to be in close agreement with the views put forth on the subject in my *History of Religion* (1895) ; though his statement is of course much more ample. He has traced correctly the path by which religion advances to higher forms within a nation ; he has not, however, given attention to the rise of universal religions and the developments which this occasions in the nations to which they come. Nor does he mention the great periods at which a simultaneous religious renewal seems to have taken place in nations widely separated from each other.

The fourth Essay, "The Distinction of Inner and Outer Experience," appeared originally in this Journal. In it and in the fifth Essay, "The Ultimate Basis and Meaning of Religion" (of the sixth Essay, in which the Ritschlian position is criticised, it is not necessary to enlarge), we find Dr. Galloway's special argument by which the universal impulse of mankind to religion is to be explained and justified. His view sets out from a discussion of the nature of our knowledge of the world, which is held to result not solely from the activity of our own minds, as the post-Kantian thinkers held, but also from the activity of things around us, which, as we recognise in our fellowmen beings like ourselves, we recognise as "centres of experience" on a lower plane than ourselves, not placed where they are by any action of ours, and having in them something of animation. From this basis the author proceeds to the further conclusion that the life and activity by which the various centres of experience, human and otherwise, act according to their position, and make impressions on each other, are derived by them from God, of whose central and original activity they all partake, and who is present in them all though not to be identified with them, and expresses himself in them all, as the soul in the body. It will be seen that this view of the nature of things and of the way in which we know them is akin to the tendency of recent speculation as to the constitution of matter, which attributes

some degree of animation to substances formerly regarded as inanimate. If there is activity everywhere, man's knowledge of the world might be thought to be conditioned by that activity, though how this takes place our writer can scarcely be said to explain, much less to illustrate by any examples. Further, if there is activity in every part of the great system in which we live, the step is easy to regarding all this activity as one, and tracing it to a central source, God. This part of his argument also the author has by no means worked out. He acknowledges that the God thus reached is only a mechanical first agent, and goes on to say that ethical attributes have to be added to him by other processes and from another side of the human mind. But the value-judgments thus added to a being who was first attained by so realistic a line of speculation cannot alter his fundamental character, he will always have his being in energy rather than in thought. The present tendency of metaphysics no doubt brings this with it. With some of the great problems connected with the theistic position Dr. Galloway deals; the questions of the divine Personality and Immanence and of human freedom are handled in a fresh and modern style. But he is quite aware that many other great difficulties have to be dealt with before his position can be regarded as worked out. It will not be denied that his philosophy of God and man performs the office expected of it. The connexion between the two is so deep and so substantial that man is driven to seek for God; men having within them something of the divine activity cannot but set out to assure themselves, in spite of every reverse and difficulty, that that power is fully with them; nor can they fail to be interested in those other beings, akin to themselves, in whom something of that power is also present.

I have done no justice to the wealth of matter the reader finds in this book, but have confined myself to setting forth, no doubt inadequately, its central thesis. In a short preface Dr. Galloway speaks very modestly of his own powers, and says that what he offers is not to be regarded as a Philosophy of Religion. Yet the sketch he offers does furnish the outlines of such a work, and most of my criticism is merely to the effect that it is no more than a sketch. It well deserves to be completed.

ALLAN MENZIES.

*Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill).* By the Rev. JOSEPH RICKABY, S.J. London: Burns & Oates, 1906. Pp. xi, 234.

This volume in its original form was written in the years 1871-74, and since then it has been subjected to "much castigation and amendment". The author thinks the fact of moral freedom to be of vital importance, but he candidly declares, "While I am much concerned that my reader should not be a determinist, I am comparatively indifferent whether he accepts my explanation of free-will, or any other, or regards the process as inexplicable". The plan followed in these pages, suggestive perhaps of the Scholastic dialectic, is to quote successive passages from the thinker under review, each passage being accompanied by a criticism. A method like this has obvious limitations, but it has advantages. On the one hand, the reader has before him the *ipsissima verba* of the writers dealt with, and, on the other, the discussion tends to gain in point and definiteness. Father Rickaby's style is clear and simple, and he often shows much acuteness in controverting the arguments of the philosophers he criticises. As a rule he is fair even when he is least sympathetic.