

sitarianism, we are treated to the best writing and thinking he has yet given us, and this holds good particularly of his searching scrutiny of the meaning attached to expediency by Bentham and Hume. One striking circumstance is pointed out, namely, that "the beneficent reform [in criminal administration], for which Bentham deserves a large share of the credit, was in fact brought about by the substitution of the principle which he attacked, in place of the principle which he regarded as his own". His theory was expedience, but the great effects produced by his work had their sanction in justice. Reference must also be made to a convincing argument in favour of retributive justice as the one fixed standard by which all punishments should be determined.

It is curiously difficult to sum up the total effect of Mr. Benett's volume. Each paragraph, as it comes, appears to make its own contribution, and does make it; yet when we ask ourselves finally how much we have learnt, we are at a loss. The book would at least gain immensely by the insertion of a full table of contents. It closes, except for a valuable note on the misuse of terms, in a tone which is very characteristic. "The final stage of a nation, whose beliefs are based on a denial of free will, is a collection of individuals undistinguished from one another either by great virtues or great vices, but resembling one another in their respect for money, and well endowed with the instincts which lead to success in making it. A society so constituted would be incapable of further evolution."

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

*The Divine Right of Kings.* By JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS. Second Edition, with Three Additional Essays. Cambridge University Press. Crown 8vo. Pp. xii, 406. 6s. net.

The second edition of Mr. Figgis's work is accompanied by three essays produced since 1896, the date of the first impression. One of these, on Erastus and Erastianism, was written in 1900, and according to the author "it shares with the main body of the book the defect of being written beneath the shadow of the Austinian idol". The objection of Erastus to the interfering "discipline" of the Church is well established, but it is curious to find him exalted as a hero of liberty (p. 332). His system, as the author repeatedly points out, is only applicable to a State wherein the sovereign and subjects alike profess the true religion (p. 322). But such a State, even if it existed, would hardly guarantee the rights of individuals; sins and crimes would be identified externally and the civil magistrate would deal with both (p. 334). In any other kind of State Erastus admitted that the right of "discipline" lay in the Church. If we let abstract theory go, and judge by practical effects—as Mr. Figgis is inclined to do in the case of the Anglican clergy under James II. (pp. 211, 282)—we are immediately overwhelmed in difficulties. Who shall judge of the "truth" of the sovereign's religion, and what is to happen in the obvious case when the subject does not agree with his sovereign's view? Erastus himself departed to another city, but to the normal subject this course might not be convenient.

There is, however, much valuable information in the essay, and its matter fully justifies its inclusion in the book, since Erastus's clear conception of sovereignty links him with the upholders of the divine right of kings. The chapter on "*Jus Divinum* in 1646," too, is germane to the main thesis, asserting as it does the fundamental resemblance between the theory of the High Church Party, and that of the Presbyterian zealots. Both sought to make the basis of the State something higher

than mere utility. A keener appreciation of the doctrine of the "two kingdoms" has made Mr. Figgis realise more clearly the value of the Presbyterian revolt against State authority, but he does not like the "eldership," which he regards as a domineering meddlesome force, lacking the dignity but not the stringency of the Roman system. He does not mention the fact, that since Presbyterianism could seldom rely on the sword ("purged" armies were notoriously unsuccessful) its authority must have rested in some measure upon popular consent, and since the "eldership" was elective it is scarcely just to regard the system as a narrow oligarchy.

The essay on "Bartolus and the Development of European Political Ideas" is valuable and contains much information hard to obtain elsewhere, but it appears to be somewhat alien from the main body of the book. To Bartolus "the law was not so much a pursuit as a passion" (p. 349); to the doctors of the Divine Right School, it was secondary to the personality of the sovereign (p. 255), who was beyond the trammels of law altogether (p. 234).

On the whole the new edition of Mr. Figgis's book marks a modification of the writer's views on the divine right of kings; it remains none the less an exposition of the Austinian position. Sovereignty must be a clear-cut, definite thing. It is true that if two forces of equal magnitude act directly counter one to another, no operative force will emerge—merely a state of strain. In any other case may be produced a "resultant" force which will act freely along its own line. Is not "sovereignty" the "resultant" of a whole complex of forces?

J. D. MACKIE.

*Philosophy: What Is It?* By F. B. JEVONS, Litt.D., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Durham. Cambridge University Press, 1914.

This little book consists of five lectures delivered to one of the branches of the Workers' Educational Association. It is therefore addressed in the first place to those who are engaged in practical pursuits and who have not the time, if they have the inclination, to indulge in that serious study of the problem of knowledge and existence which is the business of the philosopher. Philosophy, in Dr. Jevons's view, comes at times to most, if not to all, men. It comes as a challenge—What does it all mean? What is the good of it all? And so far as a man accepts the challenge, and seriously reflects, and tries to find an answer, he is a philosopher. Personally of course any one may fall back on religious faith, or even on robust health, and satisfy himself that there must be both meaning and value in existence, but if he is really interested in his questions he will not be satisfied till he has understood and answered possible doubts. The purpose of the author is, therefore, to guide the inquirer through what we may perhaps be allowed to call the classical doubts which beset the philosopher and to indicate briefly but surely the path of safe conduct through them.

The first lecture deals with the distinction between philosophy and science. The sciences deal with particular sets of things, philosophy is concerned with the whole. And the demand of our rational nature that the whole shall be good, and that this good of the whole shall be distinct from, and more than, all particular goods, is in the final chapter shown to be the ground of the concept of God, which in Dr. Jevons's view, is the final reconciliation. But to reach this end of philosophy we