

IV.—PHENOMENAL SYMBOLISM IN ART.

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PHENOMENA may appeal to us either as significant or merely as indicative. They are merely indicative when our knowledge relating to them is empirical in character, for instance, when it is known from simple observation that if certain seeds are buried in the soil, certain plants will spring up therefrom. They must also be considered merely indicative in so far as any further knowledge we possess is ignored for the time. Significance of phenomena, depending on knowledge of the conditions or processes involved, is of one of two kinds according as phenomena are regarded as explicable or as expressive, as effects of inferred and calculated processes or as symbols of a content read in them intuitively or at least not reasoned out, consciously or unconsciously. The former is the point of view of science, the latter that of fine art and of practical insight and skill. A further notable difference is that the symbolical interpretation of phenomena is concerned very largely with qualities of life and mind of which there is immediate experience in consciousness, the causal or scientific interpretation on the other hand is concerned with truths of physics, chemistry and biology (in its lower ranges) of which there is no conscious experience. And from this it results that while in the former there are two independent lines of interpretation, the contemplative or æsthetic and the practical—thus the expressiveness of look, tone, gesture may be interpreted from the point of view either of art or of practical life—in the latter, where knowledge is mainly the result of theory-guided or of merely groping experiment, practical skill and insight are for the most part quite subordinate to theory, in other words they consist of applied science. It is true that there are, for instance, mainly practical architects and engineers, but in judging the character of the material they have to deal with they depend largely upon intuitive and symbolical interpretation quickened and developed through experience and so far their work is more nearly related to fine art than to science—this would explain the insight into constructive

problems shown so often in the history of architecture by men who were primarily artists; further, there are no corresponding sciences in the strictest sense of the term, since architecture and engineering regarded as sciences are concerned with phenomena—thrusts, resisting power of material, etc.—as calculable rather than as explicable. It is true again that the higher sciences deal with phenomena, but they do so only remotely; understanding phenomena in the strict sense, that is as meaning “manifestations to sense,” we cannot speak of, for instance, sociology as explaining social phenomena in the same way as we speak of optics as explaining phenomena of vision; in other words, we regard sociology as explaining primarily not the phenomenal facts of civilisation, but rather the underlying or implied states and qualities of consciousness (and of sub-consciousness). And it is because the matter of the higher sciences belongs to the class of facts of which we have immediate practical knowledge that there can be practical reasoning in social affairs for instance quite independent of theoretical sociology, just as there are independent practical and æsthetical arts—we might take our instance from the corresponding sphere, namely, sociological art. But here we touch upon a question considered at length in a previous paper,¹ namely, the relation between scientific and æsthetic and between speculative or contemplative and practical knowledge.

It is with the expressive or symbolical significance of phenomena that we are concerned here and we must therefore go on now to consider briefly, first, what it is that phenomena express, secondly, whether this expressiveness is essential or associative, read out of or into them, thirdly, what is the difference in this expressiveness according as it is regarded from the æsthetic or from the practical point of view.

In the writer's opinion that which phenomena express is the nature (either relatively or absolutely regarded) of reality² and they express it through the concrete ideas that they call up in the mind. These ideas are partly our own and partly they come from others. So far as such ideas are our own, phenomena are not the sole medium through which they are obtained; in addition there are states of consciousness, not interpreted as directly expressive of anything external to consciousness; these also supply the main key for the interpretation of such phenomena as are expressive of states of

¹ MIND, vol. xxvii., N.S., No. 105.

² In the present paper “reality” stands for the sensible world and its implications considered as realised truth, “actuality” for whatever can be regarded as actualised fact.

consciousness in others. So far as ideas come from others, they do so first through phenomena that are either in some sense imitatively expressive (as primarily in works of fine art) or functionally expressive or operative (as primarily in contrivances of practical art), secondly through reminiscent phantasms and ideas, revived, in new contents and combinations, chiefly by means of conventionally significant phenomena, verbal signs for instance. It should be observed at the same time that reminiscent phantasms may either be expressive of ideas, that is may stand to them in a causal relation, as in a piece of vivid description, or may be called up by them through association, that is may stand to them in a relation of effect. In the latter case they may facilitate the flow of thought but are not actively expressive.

Next as to the character, whether essential or associative, of phenomenal expressiveness. To the writer it seems that this expressiveness may be in great part essential and interpreted intuitively.¹ At the same time such interpretation is largely guided by each one's immediate knowledge of his own life and mind and further is progressive in character, being strengthened, enlarged and corrected through experience, internal and external. Association too is at least helpful upon the whole because most of that part of reality which a particular phenomenon habitually accompanies is that which it expresses directly or at the least something with which it is connected by intimate and essential links. Association however may be to some extent misleading and confusing; it may for instance cause a really unexpressive sound to appear full of expressiveness. Next, the degree in which phenomena (and reminiscent phantasms) are essentially expressive is very variable. Partly it depends upon the sense appealed to, being greatest in cases of sight and hearing, considerable in those of touch, pressure, and especially effort, inconsiderable with smell, also with taste, if indeed these last have any expressive power at all apart from association. Partly also it depends upon the content, varying in more or less direct ratio with the quality of the reality symbolised; thus, to take the feeling senses, tactual pressure may be very fully expressive of the quality of consciousness which prompts it, but a toothache is hardly, if at all, expressive of the condition of vital decay to which our reasoning capacity may trace it. It is possible that only phenomena symbolical of living

¹ The question obviously is to a considerable extent biological. Thus any admission of the formerly highly favoured view that expression is often the incipient form of once useful action would in some cases at least exclude the theory of essential appropriateness.

content and, as the last instance suggests, not all even of those are essentially expressive.

There should further be clear recognition of the distinction between the nature of phenomenal interpretation and that of æsthetic or of practical knowledge. In such knowledge the essential thing is the truth, the reality expressed, not the expressing phenomenon, the content not the form. Hence even if the relation in the mind between form and content should in all cases be merely one of association, it would not follow in the least that the knowledge itself, that is the sense of the relation between elements in the content, was founded on association alone. The point too may be emphasised here that phenomenal expressiveness, the expressiveness for instance by which a particular quality of build or of colour indicates vigorous life or a particular glance or tone indicates displeasure is always in some sense typical, that is symbolical, rather than direct in character. By what manner of appropriateness, if the relation is really essential, the type is related to that typified and how it conveys meaning to us are problems that perhaps transcend the human power of analysis. It may however be said briefly that the correspondence is between the physiological character of the sensation and the psychical or the vital or even perhaps the merely structural character of that which the sensation expresses. It should be observed further that the use of terms like "type" and "symbol" as describing the relation of form or medium to content differs somewhat from their ordinary use as describing the relation of some one aspect or feature of reality to another.

We may now proceed to a more particular consideration of phenomenal symbolism in nature viewed æsthetically and in fine art with reference to the varieties of such symbolism and their respective significance and importance. The data with which we are concerned may be regarded either as phenomena of shape, colour, sound, etc., or more subjectively as sensations of sight, hearing, etc. In some references one aspect is more suitable, in some the other, and though unfortunately the respective lines of division do not correspond perfectly, it will be better to use a dual than a uniform mode of description.

Forms¹ or visual appearances (shapes and colours or, more decidedly, colour-tones), the most important practically and perhaps æsthetically of phenomenal manifestations, are, as

¹ The term is often used with a narrower meaning as excluding colour and often with a wider as the correlative of content. The former use, it is believed, has here been avoided.

appealing to the sight, expressive in what is living either of psychical or, as in the case of non-conscious life, of merely vital content. They are also expressive through the sight of physical (non-vital) content but to a much smaller extent and in the main only indirectly, being expressive of it as first appealing to the feeling senses, mainly to touch, pressure, strain—this qualification holds also very largely as regards vital and psychical content, since expression, attitude, movement are in part interpreted reminiscently and sympathetically and of course as a rule unconsciously as due to muscular tension or relaxation and are only indirectly referred to states of body or of mind; they are further expressive in the same way of function-content, psychophysical in living features, as, conspicuously, a hand or a claw, purely physical in many manufactured implements, as a spade or a trumpet. Sensations of touch and pressure are expressive chiefly of physical or of vital content, but also of psychical content indirectly, that is through associated muscular reminiscence, as in the passive sensation of a kiss or a handshake. Muscular sensations, when due to our own vital or psychical states, as in clenching or grasping, do not express those states to us, though they may be otherwise expressive; but muscular reminiscences wakened for instance sympathetically by another's look or voice, or movements are vitally or psychically expressive of such.¹ Vocal sounds are expressive chiefly of psychical content, their appeal being in part directly to the hearing, in part through muscular reminiscence, primarily in the vocal organs; expressive reminiscence of the kind is mainly of voice-movement (pitch, rate, etc.) and only quite subordinately of the articulation of speech. Other sounds are expressive of physical content—thus they are described as "hollow," "muffled," etc.—but mainly as that is first interpreted through touch and pressure; yet many may be vitally or psychically expressive through the medium of muscular reminiscence, as in a firm or a faltering footstep. Of musical tone as of artistic form it will be best to speak later. It should be noted that expressivenesses of different kinds may also combine in a single complex expression. Thus the human form as a whole, especially the human countenance, is, as expressive of mind and soul, probably more deeply expressive than any other natural form, but features in that form express at the same time merely the qualities of living tissue. Obviously too the actual connexion between phenomenon and content

¹ The view that all phenomenal expressiveness really consists in muscular reminiscence might perhaps be plausibly argued but could not, in the writer's opinion, be satisfactorily maintained.

is less close where the latter is higher in grade. Phenomena may also carry an indirect or secondary expressiveness, one expressive through analogy of an alien content, frequently of some quality or abstracted idea without independent phenomenal expression in nature, and upon this truth all type, metaphor, allegory, are founded. The capacity for such expressiveness would seem to be greatest, relatively at least, in the inanimate parts of nature. Thus the sunshine is suggestive of joyousness, of triumph, of luminous insight; broadbomed hills are suggestive of enduring repose, of attained and final peace; rolling thunder appears to strike a note of wrathful warning or menace; the noise of wind and wave recalls human lamentation, and so forth; on the other hand, a view of sea or woodland in storm, while reminiscent perhaps of human fury, has also expressiveness of the primary kind, creating through the feeling senses an idea of elemental force. In addition to actual forms and sounds, natural or contrived, there are reminiscences of these, either exact or imaginative, existing only to the internal senses, pure phantasms, having a like expressiveness to that of their originals, less vivid but more plastic and symbolising often a greater depth and range of conceptual thought.

Æsthetic expressiveness, phenomenal and phantasmic, may also be considered on the basis of another distinction, that between natural and artistic expressiveness. Natural expressiveness is the expressiveness, either actually perceived or reminiscent, of natural formation or, in contrived forms, buildings for instance, of mere natural cohesion. Contrived forms, a bridge for instance, have also quasi-natural, that is functional, expressiveness; to engineers a bridge may also have a certain æsthetic interest as expressive of engineering thought, of solved engineering problems. Artistic expressiveness is either imitative or reminiscent expressiveness of phenomenon or purely of phantasm; this expressiveness usually is and, where it is purely artistic, must be in some degree selective and critical, gathering up and presenting in concentrated and quintessential condition the expressiveness of natural phenomena—regarded however as expressive of mind, the mind namely of the artist, all artistic expressiveness must be classed as natural. In art there is a considerable loss of natural poignancy, which is abundantly compensated in the interpretation and appraisal or, if one may use the term, in the mentalisation of reality. Further, art is expressive not only of the content of actuality regarded as a complex of perceived qualities but also, more explicitly than actuality, of the essential nature and the implications of that content, in

other words of the absolute character and significance of all that lies behind the phenomenal world. It should be noted at the same time as regards artistic expressiveness that only the place in art of phantasms, phenomenal or reminiscent, that is of sensible media, is now under consideration and that in the linguistic or literary arts, at least the content is not expressed in its entirety through the sensible media; the point will be referred to again later. Next, artistic expressiveness is very largely of that secondary kind noted above in which a natural form serves for the expression (metaphorical, allegorical, etc.) of an alien content. There is also another kind of secondary expressiveness in art, that in which forms or sounds suggested, for the most part unconsciously, by natural forms or sounds (chiefly vocal sounds) and analogically modelled on them are devised to express contents that are without adequate natural medium; the point, which has much importance in relation to the grouping of the arts, will be returned to later. A further difference between the æsthetics of art and of nature, arising out of the fact that art is purely æsthetic, is that we expect the one to be characterised by formal qualities met with only imperfectly and intermittently in the other. These formal qualities consist in the congruity by likeness or contrast of simultaneous or successive impressions. They have both a physiological and a psychological side or, to put it another way, they may be qualities either of phenomenal form or of content. Thus the muscular or other sensations experienced in the contemplation of a particular line or colour are a preparation for the continuation of or for certain variations from the same, and such concordant continuations or variations induce an easy and pleasant and consequently a receptive and appreciative state of mind. Similarly, as regards formal qualities of content, any given thought tends to induce a state of mind exceptionally receptive of certain thoughts, which according to circumstances are similar or contrasted thoughts, and exceptionally unreceptive of others. Formal excellence in art then, while distinct from, exists for the sake of, the essential excellence of art, to which it contributes by such a disposition of the parts as will make the most favourable total appeal to the mind's appreciative capacities. Hence too, what in itself is formally defective, harsh or abrupt for instance, may be capable of justification as subserving the æsthetic effect. Further, the relations upon which formal excellence depends are exclusively external relations of juxtaposition and succession. It should be noted

at the same time that to distinguish formal from expressive and especially from suggestively or indirectly expressive qualities is often extremely difficult. To take a definite instance, the agreeableness of the "golden section" rectangle is attributed to a just combination of unity and variety; based however on either of its narrower sides, it would certainly not present so pleasing an appearance, which seems to indicate that its strong suggestion of stability counts for something, just as the square, monotonous in form, is pleasing as figuratively suggestive of qualities of strength, rightness, trustworthiness—compare phrases like "fair and square" and so forth. In the same way various outwardly formal qualities are interpreted by Ruskin as essentially typical of Divine attributes. Frequently, it may further be remarked, this pervasive suggestiveness is as difficult to discriminate from reminiscences of natural expressiveness; as an example may be mentioned the impression of ideal quality and lofty aspiration derived from a predominance of vertical and upward lines in architecture, an impression partly due to the same suggestiveness as has given important secondary connotation to words like *upright*, *rise*, *high*, *lofty* and their contraries (this being derived from sources of very different kinds, chiefly perhaps from muscular effort in the eye and, reminiscently, in the whole frame), while partly it is due to reminiscences of plant-formation.¹

From the differences between natural and artistic expressiveness or symbolism we may go on to a consideration of the latter alone. Here we will be concerned largely with a distinction already indicated when it was stated that in addition to expressiveness founded upon a direct imitation of phenomenal symbolism there was in art expressiveness of a somewhat different kind in which forms or sounds merely suggested, for the most part unconsciously, by natural forms or sounds—the latter chiefly vocal—and analogically modelled on them are used to express contents having no adequate natural phenomenal expression. This modelling process has a twofold character, consisting in an amplification and a regularisation of characteristic features of the natural medium, which together result in a very great enrichment of expressive power. In the distinction the nature of the principal arts and their relation to one another to a great extent is rooted. Analogical imitation or, to use a more satisfactory expression,

¹ The above account of the nature of artistic form is, in the writer's revised opinion, inadequate; but it cannot now be altered.

analogical representation¹ is, in the writer's view, the essential principle of the sensible form in architecture and music and also a part-principle in painting and poetry. It will be best, however, to begin with the principle of direct representation. That sculpture and in the main painting are directly representative in medium and what it is they represent are sufficiently obvious matters. The arts of language are also directly representative, æsthetic prose as a rule entirely so, poetry in part. As regards the chief sensible medium of both, namely, expressive sound, it seems to the writer that this represents the speaking voice, that no piece of prose or poetry can be entirely effective in which the language fails to give full scope and opportunity to such a vocal movement—stresses, pauses, modulation of tone, etc.—as is most appropriate to the thought, and that in this the expressiveness, as distinct from the formal excellence, of the movement of prose and of poetry consists.² Next as regards the indirectly

¹ Perhaps no single word will express adequately the attitude of the artist to actuality. The term "imitation" is, however, generally unsatisfactory. Not only does it fail entirely as regards the creative and critical spirit in art, but it is never really the most suitable term. Thus it seems more satisfactory to say of a painter that he is representing than that he is imitating a landscape; again, in the case of a poet embodying in language his own mood, while there are elements of fitness in both the terms "representation" and "expression," to describe his work as "imitation" seems quite inapt. Indeed it is perhaps to effects of a *tour-de-force* quality that the last term applies most suitably. At the same time the function of the artist is not so much to represent as to re-present (within limits to remould) and this holds not only of fact but also of essential truth and in larger measure the higher the quality of truth dealt with. For the artist as such it is always necessary to depart less or more from the letter of reality in order the better to present its spirit; consequently the actual appears in art to a considerable extent not only as it is not out as it could not be. One of the most palpable illustrations of this is supplied by what is possibly the finest vehicle of art, the dramatic soliloquy, since men do not usually meditate aloud, still less in formed and rounded sentences or in verse.

In the present paper the term 'representation' is generally used for the relation of art to reality, 'expression' for that of form to content.

As showing how much of such expressiveness there may be even in single words the comparison may be useful of the two sentences *He is surely not there* and *He is certainly not there*. Between *sure* and *certain* there must be something like exact equivalence; but *surely* and *certainly*, the one deprecatory and apologetic, the other abrupt and overbearing in tone, are certainly far from equivalent. The difference seems traceable to differences in the vocal movement, which in the one case drags and seems to falter, in the other is brisk and unhesitating. And apart from this factor of expressive sound it seems difficult to understand how meanings are often so subtly and yet so surely differentiated. It should be observed further that if the meaning of a word is often influenced by the voice-movement in pronunciation, this voice-movement likewise is

representative arts, architecture and music, and the indirectly representative elements in painting and poetry. Architectural forms would seem to be based by suggestion and analogy mainly upon natural forms, that is upon forms of "nature" in the ordinary sense of the word; thus the resemblance, though, apart from primarily decorative features, it is never close or obvious, will reveal itself upon reflexion; good examples are the "sky-like dome" of Classical architecture and the branching and soaring pier in Gothic. In music on the other hand the analogies seem to be derived from conscious life, from the voice in essentially expressive utterance, not necessarily articulate, as in the linguistic arts, nor necessarily even human utterance. The suggestive element in the sensible forms of painting and poetry is far less broadly analogous and shows itself mainly in a certain modification of direct representation; in painting it seems to lie chiefly in tone (in the various connected meanings of the term)¹ as in the lowering of tone to gain an effect of repose; in poetry it is chiefly in the rhythm, which may be almost directly representative with very pleasing or striking effect, but as a rule is suggestively so in its most powerful appeals.²

To the difference between direct and analogical or suggestive expressiveness in the sensible forms or media of art there seems, in the writer's opinion, to be a parallel difference in the content. It is a difference rooted in the already noticed distinction in the data of knowledge (and, in spite of constant mutual qualification and interpretation, reflected in knowledge itself) between externally referred phenomena and states of consciousness. Where art-forms are directly representative

often influenced by the meaning. In either case words may be truly expressive in sound that are quite free from onomatopoeia, whether fairly direct, as in *splash*, *crash*, or indirect and analogical, as in *flash*, *dash*. (The onomatopoeitic quality of English monosyllables in *ash* is a point worthy of notice.)

¹ The light that never was on sea or land,

The consecration and the poet's dream.

² Compare in the above regard the following from Shakespeare:—

(i) O that this too too solid flesh would melt,
Thaw and resolve itself into a dew!

and

(ii) Love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds
Or bends with the remover to remove.

In the former passage the natural movement of the voice appropriate to the thought is reproduced with something approaching exactitude; in the latter it is reproduced with considerable amplification and regularisation.

of natural forms, the content primarily represents reality as revealed in phenomena, where they are analogically or suggestively so, it primarily represents states of consciousness in some measure dissociated from, if not further interpretatively and appraisingly reacting upon, such aspects of reality, that is, it primarily represents moods or tones of consciousness.¹ This view would seem to agree with the generally accepted interpretation of architecture and of music alike. In its analogical—largely unconscious—representation of natural forms architecture seeks to express not external nature but internal consciousness. Thus, to return to the examples already given, the Gothic column stands for aspiration, that spiritual aspiration which is often considered to be the pervading note in Gothic, while the dome, especially in its interior aspect, suggests the consciousness of social union in a world-wide or at least far-spreading community,² though characterisations of the kind are perhaps rather too explicit to describe generic frames of mind that may take widely varying specific forms. Music again in its content primarily represents the tone of thought, while the precise phase or feature of reality to which that tone is appropriate is generally, unless verbally indicated, a matter for individual application.³ Sculpture and prose on the other hand primarily represent reality in its concrete embodiment; both these arts show us the world, often in a new light and with fresh values assigned, yet in one sense as we see it daily ourselves, that is, their representation of it is not essentially pervaded with any sense of more being meant than meets ear or eye, any impalpable spirit of brooding reflexion, any resonant suggestion of spacious mystery imperfectly resolved and of uncaptured aspects of truth. Painting and poetry would seem to a considerable extent to combine the respectively objective and subjective points of view of the other pairs of arts, that is to represent the quality or tone of consciousness as stimulated by some particular aspect of reality and expressing itself in the context of an articulate rendering of the same. Thus the painter seeks to depict not merely portions or phases of reality but the particular appeal that these make to him, in other words his

¹ Such moods should be regarded as moods of thought, though of thought at once too vaguely general and too subtly precise for satisfactory expression in articulate language.

² Whence perhaps its frequency in metropolitan cities.

³ Thus in music the indirectness is simple, in architecture it is usually twofold; for in the latter the form is not only analogical in origin but allegorical (symbolical in the ordinary sense) in intention. A parallel contrast would seem to exist as regards the corresponding features of painting and poetry.

state of mind in contemplating them, and the latter or more subjective element he conveys primarily in tone and in colour-quality. Poetry again expresses both objective element and tone of thought, the latter primarily in the rhythm.¹ It is true that the above functions may to some extent be interchanged or exceeded, as when sounds recalling those of wings in flight, of mounting flames, of falling cataract, etc., are attempted in music. But such art will usually be limited in scale and partial in character, the expression somewhere between direct and analogical and the representation based on a corresponding compromise between objective and subjective aspects. Where an advance is made beyond this, where, for instance, music tries to reproduce natural sounds with something like exactness or to express movement directly, or where any one of the directly representative arts attempts analogical expression and the representation of mood alone in the spirit of architecture or music, the limits of sound art are probably soon overpassed. With regard further to the class of successful descriptive music based on the possibility of awakening phantasms of sight by means of phenomena of sound, it may be said that such music should perhaps be understood less as really objective than as expressive primarily of the mind's sympathetic response to such scenes and events; if there is at the same time a clear and sustained effort to represent rather than to suggest the external element as well, music is so far attempting, not necessarily with ill-success, the combined subjective and objective treatment characteristic of poetry.

It should be observed in respect of elements in the same art-form distinguished above that only in union are their potentialities completely realised. From good poetry in an unknown tongue well recited it would usually be easy to gather the general tone of consciousness represented; or, if the words, as read, were understood but the metrical principles unknown, the diction in its more palpable characteristics would obviously be quite intelligible. But most of what results from the union or fusion of rhythm with diction must

¹ Mill appears to have said that the prose-writer was "heard," the poet "overheard". Exactly how the terms were meant by him is not known to the writer; but some such distinction would seem to be involved in the distinction made above.

It may be questioned whether the style of painting known as "line-drawing" should not be classed with plastic rather than as an undeveloped form of graphic art. The connecting link might be found in low-relief sculpture, which approaches fairly close to representation on a flat surface. Such an arrangement would certainly improve the exactness of the above parallelism.

in either case be lost.¹ And the loss would usually be great. For on the one hand the moulding and quickening influence of poetic rhythm both enlarges the plastic character of appropriate language and energises such of its subtler implications, suggestions and associations, inherent or merely traditional, as are concordant with the theme, while on the other hand poetic diction brings out meanings in rhythm that apart from the clues thus provided would never be appreciated adequately.

This consideration of differences in the character of artistic forms has resulted in a grouping of the six principal or independent arts² into three pairs. The consideration of further differences will give a complementary grouping into triads, which, combined with the former grouping, will result in a symmetrical classification. This second division is the time-honoured division into arts of sight and of hearing, a division that in origin is quite naive, but where due to recognition of the sound-element in the linguistic arts as consisting primarily not in the sound of the words—this a very great extent has merely conventional significance—but in the voice-movement, it is broadly and securely based, form being the single sensible medium of architecture, sculpture and painting, sound the single sensible of music and the principle sensible medium of artistic prose and poetry. But there are other points of difference correspond-

¹ Most but not all. Apart from language there can be no such thing as rhythm, there is only the metrical pattern, which has small actual expressiveness; apart from rhythm (or its prose quasi-analogue) language is a mere medium of communication or aid to thought and memory. In the examples given, though one of the two elements is not understood, its influence in transforming metre into rhythm or language into diction is not wholly lost.

² The six independent arts, namely, architecture, sculpture, painting, music, artistic prose, poetry. Artistic prose, though invariably omitted, should surely have a place in any table of the arts. With regard to the distinction from non-artistic prose, it is important to notice that such a distinction is not really peculiar to this art. Artistic media are for the most part identical in origin and still largely so in fact with instruments whose purpose is not, as theirs is, the concrete expression of the nature of reality but simply the facilitation either of social intercourse and organisation or of mental processes, as reasoning and recalling. In the case of language this doubleness of function is fairly obvious, but it has hardly received adequate recognition. Thus the language—similarly also the illustrations—in strictly scientific writing is mainly a means of communication; consequently there is in such writing no indissoluble connexion between thought and its linguistic expression and the latter is an entirely secondary matter. The two functions however, distinct as they are, are by no means incompatible, indeed they are indissociable in the case of architecture, which is always largely instrumental and therefore can only rank as a partly independent art.

ing to and closely connected with the above. First, the artistic media of sound may be contrasted as phantasmic or as reminiscent or imagined with the artistic media of form as phenomenal or as actual. That is, in the former phenomenal actualisation is not indispensable; thus a musician can to a very great extent appreciate a piece of music from the score alone and the best musicians usually compose "in their heads". Prose and poetry again are more often read in silence than recited or delivered. But in the case of music appreciation of a composed work is certainly facilitated and amplified through actualisation, and the same thing holds perhaps of prose and poetry too, though to a much slighter extent.¹ The contrast between the entire and necessary phenomenalism of the arts of form and the partial and merely helpful phenomenalism of the arts of sound may partly be explained by the greater reminiscent power of the sense of hearing. But this superiority in reminiscent power is much increased through a further and closely connected difference of a fundamental kind, the difference namely that the parts of a work of art are distributed in the former art-group spatially, in the latter temporally.

Corresponding to these differences in the character of the sensible form or medium there is a difference in that of the content, primarily a difference as regards the relation to fact, actuality. Thus the architect seeks to represent in ideal form the characteristic and prevailing frame of mind proper to the function for which the building is designed;² the sculptor and painter reproduce forms and appearances and groupings of these, also idealising through selection, composition, emphasising of aspects. The musician, the prose-writer and the poet go rather more directly to the heart of reality, that is to essential truth, whether actualised or not; even when they compose dramatically, their most successful characters are usually in some sense the fruit of their own imaginative insight, and this holds to a yet greater extent of the actual theme, the plot, if the term is understood in its deeper sense.

The above considerations may be tabulated symmetrically as follows :—

¹It should be observed as regards the arts of language that the essential sight-element (as to which see later in the text) does not admit of actualisation.

²The subjectivity in architecture is therefore in one sense more that of users than of designer; but the two characters may of course be combined.

	Arts of Form— medium spatial, necessarily phe- nomenal; prevail- ing method quali- fied adherence to fact (actuality).	Arts (primarily) of Sound—medium temporal, prefer- ably phenomenal; prevailing method large indepen- dence of fact.
Medium analogically expressive, re- gularised; point of view sub- jective.	Architecture.	Music.
Medium directly expressive, unre- gularised; point of view objec- tive.	Sculpture.	Prose (art.).
Medium suggestively expressive, partly regularised; point of view objective-subjective.	Painting.	Poetry. ¹

In the opinion of many to attempt a symmetrical classification is as vain in the case of art as it would be in that of science. If however what has been said above is sound a symmetrical classification does in fact follow therefrom. At the same time anything like exact symmetry is not to be looked for. The reason is that the nature and relations of the several arts depend not only upon the internal or psychological factor, but upon the external also, the available symbol-material, that is, the natural expressiveness of dead and living matter and the further expressive potentialities latent in the former—in catgut for instance. It should also be observed that the two series regarded diagrammatically are not so much parallel as convergent; thus architecture and music present a marked contrast at some points, especially in this that the one is representative almost entirely of the social, the other largely of the individual consciousness.

The above classification of the arts has no reference to their order of development. There is no doubt a certain tendency for the simpler arts to develop earlier, but a similar tendency exists also in the case of the more directly representative arts, as is evidenced in the excellent drawing of the Cave-Men—graphic art, it should be noted, at first and up to a fairly advanced stage is directly rather than suggestively representative.² There are, however, two other factors that probably have exercised a far more powerful influence in this matter. The first is fitness in the materials and instruments

¹ The common sensible feature answering to the similarity in indirect expression is obviously in the case of music and poetry the feature of 'song' or 'melody,' in the case of architecture (especially architectural interiors) and painting it would seem to be the feature of expressive spaciousness.

² See earlier note on "line-drawing".

of an æsthetic art to serve the purpose of some urgently important practical art, notably the fitness of those of architecture and of prose and poetry to serve the purpose respectively of building and of speech. The second factor is the obviousness and accessibility of materials and instruments. Here also prose and poetry have been at a great advantage, while poetry has been at an advantage as compared even with prose, since the latter is dependent not merely upon speech, but upon written speech, and even after the development of writing is more hampered than poetry through the cumbersome of early scripts and even through the scarcity of suitable writing instruments. It is obvious too that as regards this factor music has been the least fortunately circumstanced of the arts, which may be the principal cause of its late development. At the same time advantage at the above points has perhaps been by no means an unmixed benefit. Thus the development of language primarily as an instrument of daily usefulness or rather necessity means that language has been formed primarily for an unæsthetic purpose (dependent in part, it is true, upon semi-æsthetic means) and has only been adapted as best might be to purely æsthetic uses; its imaginative quality has probably suffered in consequence; compare in this regard words restricted to æsthetic uses, as *sere*, *billow*, *steed*, *sable*, *robe*, with their more handy but less suggestive, less mentally resonant synonyms.

It may further be remarked that where practical motives become paramount and the æsthetic side of the arts sinks into mere subservience thereto, other features appear bearing no relation to the system set forth above. Thus popular music in its practical character as entertaining or inspiring is both eminently social and at times druglike in influence, operating now as a sedative, now, in martial music for instance, as a stimulant. These characteristics are naturally prominent in early music before the art has developed sufficiently to assert its æsthetic independence and they are the characteristics especially noted by Plato and Aristotle, who had only the rudimentary Greek music before them. Hence to commend as implying exceptional discernment the importance attached by those writers, on the ground of such characteristics, to the educational potentialities of music—the point was perhaps impressed on them by the cultural and disciplinary use of music in Greece, notably at Sparta—seems to indicate a misunderstanding of their true position.

We may now go on to consider more thoroughly the part that the several sensible media play in relation to the several arts. It has already been insisted upon sufficiently that the

arts of form appeal mainly to the phenomenal vision, while the arts of sound appeal primarily to the hearing, music at least preferably to the phenomenal hearing. Prose and poetry appeal to the hearing in unregularised and in regularised voice-movement and intonation, also—poetry chiefly—in non-imitative description of sound, also in rhyme, alliteration, expressive quality of word-tone, etc., and occasionally through more or less imitative representation, direct or suggestive of non-vocal sound,¹ and they also appeal to the vision; to the hearing they appeal ordinarily, that is in silent reading, as reminiscent not as phenomenal and to the vision necessarily so, in which connexion it should be observed that in the acted drama it is the sound-element rather than the form-element that is realised phenomenally, the spectacular part of acting being concerned with what in the purely artistic drama, as distinct from the mere stage-play, are only accessories. Another point worthy of notice here regarding the arts of language is that the rhythmic sound-element is always present, the visualisation and other sense-elements on the other hand are quite intermittent; thus, while it is true that all use of language is attended with visualisation of the weaker, associative kind, yet such visualisation has at the most merely negative æsthetic quality, that is, it should not suggest decidedly un-æsthetic images. In music too there is, of course, much imaginative or reminiscent visualising; but, while æsthetic in quality, it is perhaps chiefly secondary, suggested by rather than suggesting the frame of mind expressed, and so varies as widely as the individual interpretation. To the feeling senses the stronger appeal is made by the arts of form, but the appeal is to these senses almost wholly as reminiscent not as phenomenally affected. Thus there is present in the arts of form, especially in sculpture, the reminiscent “feel” (softness, weight, etc.) of the actual (in architecture) or the represented matter; it is also present occasionally and more faintly in the arts of sound. Important in the arts of form are the spatial muscular sensations (in eye and body), mainly as reminiscent, but in architecture largely actual. Sensations of effort and resistance are also awakened reminiscently in the arts of form, which are pervaded, either actually (in the case

¹ As in the second of these two lines of Tennyson :—

The moan of doves in immemorial elms

And murmuring of innumerable bees

where the representation is unusually direct. Imitative and non-imitative description of sound are strikingly combined in the same writer's lyric *The Splendour Falls*. Expressive quality of word-tone may be illustrated by the prevailing character of the terminal syllables in Milton's sonnet *On the Late Massacre in Piedmont*.

of architecture) or representatively, by the manifestation of the result or the operation of muscular activity or of natural forces.¹ Such sensations again are obviously recalled in the arts of sound, so far as these are based upon expressive voice-movement; as involved in the articulation of language, they are also utilised in the same arts; an instance is the reminiscent laborious energising of the vocal muscles, communicated thence to the locomotor muscles, resulting from the line of Pope

That like a wounded snake drags its slow length along,

or the quickening, but only partly muscular, effect of Browning's verses, *How They Brought the Good News*. Reminiscent muscular effort again, for instance the reminiscent climbing associated with architectural features like the Gothic tower² and column, is, as suggestively and figuratively interpreted, especially important both in architecture and in music. Lastly there is for expert artists the reminiscent feel of the material and tool in operation, as of marble and chisel, sensations of the kind being experienced in perhaps all the arts, as regards either creation or rendering.

A further important point is the relation in which in the respective arts the sensible medium stands to the conceptual content. In the first place, the part played by the medium appears to be one of relatively declining importance as we ascend in the scale of the arts; to put it another way, there is progressive immaterialisation. Such a tendency is obvious, as regards arts belonging to the same series, in the matter of bulk or volume. There is decline in the extent also to which either actuality or intensity is necessary or helpful. Thus in architecture actual substance and actual content are necessary; stonework for instance may waken reminiscences of tree-formation but it must also be expressive of its own nature and characteristic architectural qualities; a building again must both serve its purpose and express not only its purpose in a general way but also the design and structure belonging to it as building. In sculpture there is complete adoption of an alien form and effacement of all positive expression, but without positive disowning, of natural content.

¹ Reminiscences of a privative kind, namely, those arising from the representation of qualities like limpness and powerlessness, should also not be overlooked.

² Watching with upward eye the tall tower grow
And mount, at every step with living wiles
Instinct—to rouse the heart and lead the will
By a bright ladder to the world above.

—WORDSWORTH.

In painting actual solidity disappears and there remains mere superficial extension. In music there is still entire dependence on the symbol, but this, though preferably phenomenal, is not always necessarily so; the external factor too has neither extension nor continuous existence. In the arts of language the symbol is always in part at least purely phantasmic; further, as regards strictly essential elements, it can become phenomenal only in respect of sound, and even this degree of actuality is exceptional and unnecessary. To compare further the two arts, prose seems to gain more in being read aloud than does poetry, because the movement in the former has less suggestive quality and is closer to the natural movement in speech. The prose drama again probably gains more in being put on the stage; indeed, were it not for the fact that dramatists have been obliged by circumstances to keep theatrical and spectacular considerations constantly in mind, the best poetic dramas would perhaps lose more than they gain in being put on the stage; for against the increase in intensity and in realistic interpretation must be placed the obliteration of the ideal setting, the undue prominence of accessories, the obscuring of rhythmic expression where this does not coincide with a directly representative voice-movement and intonation, finally, though this of course is not inevitable, deliberate alteration for melodramatic effect, as when the closing passage of *Hamlet* is suppressed in favour of a sensational 'curtain'. There remains another very important point in connexion with the relation of æsthetic concept to symbol or sensible medium, namely, that in the case of the arts of language and only in their case the concept in its æsthetic appeal is partly independent of such medium, for the voice-movement, the single sensible element that is always present, and the other, intermittent sensible elements only supplement and amplify the meaning of the words. Yet this differentiation is perhaps rather too absolute, since the æsthetic concepts embodied in any work of art would appear to contain non-sensible elements of knowledge and reflexion not expressed but merely recalled by the sensible medium. Even then it might be objected that in the other arts the sensibly expressed element must be prior to the purely conceptual; but this perhaps is not necessarily so in the mind of the artist; or the same element may sometimes be prior in the arts of language too—thus in many short pieces and passages it may really be that the rhythmic inspiration due to the tone of mind suggests the linguistic character. In music too of course words are generally used, but, according to a widely held opinion, the medium in its perfect form

is wordless; further, where words are used, their part is mostly quite secondary, that is, they are not to any great extent directly expressive, but serve rather as clues to the expressiveness of the music; hence composer and librettist may be and usually are different persons, perhaps of very unequal artistic capacity.¹

With the features, to one regarding the arts in serial order, of declining sensible intensity and less materialised representation is connected perhaps in part the correspondingly increasing tendency to deal with themes of unrest, sorrow and evil in all its forms. Thus in architecture such themes would seem to have no place at all, unless it be held that a prison for instance should be more than mere building and should have expressively gloomy and forbidding features. In sculpture again, as tested by the practice of the best period, themes at least mentally reposeful are greatly preferred, and to a lessening extent the same is still true of painting in its rendering whether of nature or of man, though here even scenes of calm and peace are sometimes touched with a more sombre note as of "pastoral melancholy" or "the still, sad music of humanity". When we come to music there is an appreciable rise in the proportion of attention given to pain and distress, and in the arts of language this is yet more the case and the subject of moral evil now comes definitely to the front, though the outlook upon life of the greater poets is upon the whole one of qualified optimism. To the writer it seems that one cause of this tendency is the fact that since all actual pain and evil are distressing, the further an art-medium is from actuality the more capable is it of representing pain and evil in ways that do not distress so much as to interfere with æsthetic appreciation. This account obviously fails to meet the case of the drama, where themes of the kind are frequently handled with a near approach to and indeed a semblance of actuality. A further explanation may however be found in the distinction already noted between the spatial character of the earlier and the temporal character of the later art-group, since arts of the former group are unable to compensate for showing evil temporarily ascendant by showing it ultimately vanquished or surmounted except by means of a serial presentation of the theme in its successive phases, a device that has not been used very much by artists. There is indeed one sense in which the arts nearest to actuality are in the one group sculpture (with the kindred forms of plastic art, also

¹ If the perfect form of music is wordless, this would seem to imply or at least to suggest that the perfect form of architecture, all except artistic considerations excluded, is independent of sculpture and painting.

undeveloped or imperfect forms of graphic art) and in the other group prose; for these arts are the most directly representative and are able to reproduce the most literally. Hence these are the arts best suited, at a certain loss of their purely artistic character, to serve the, as a rule, only imperfectly artistic function of the effective commemoration or communication of fact.¹

¹ After what has been said as to the meaning of verse-rhythm, a few words may be permitted with reference to that sound-element which in modern stressed verse is its usual complement, namely rhyme. The function of rhyme would seem to be in the first place to carry the chief, namely the terminal, stress in a verse; otherwise this recurrent pause would tend, in most metres depending primarily upon stress, to give an unpleasantly jolting and halting character to the movement. The disadvantage can however be surmounted in other ways, especially as, in the case of blank verse, through the employment of the periodic sentence, where the terminal verse pause is necessarily less emphatic. Secondly, rhyme helps to idealise the utterance and to remove it from commonplace speech and so facilitates a boldly and freely plastic and suggestive use alike of rhythm and of language. It is true also that the necessity of rhyming suggests ideas. Such apparent helpfulness is however something of a snare, since there may easily be an overreadiness to accept suggestions of the kind as solving the rhyme-problem when a little more thought might give better results.

In English however rhyme is not a matter of sound only, sight-rhymes or spelling rhymes being also admitted on a considerable scale. For this the paucity of English sound-rhymes cannot in itself be held a sufficient defence. What really justifies a limited recourse to spelling-rhymes is the fact that writing, while not an essential part of the sensible medium in verse, is nowadays an indispensable accessory, indeed with really good visualisers the written symbol is never totally suppressed; consequently the effect of this symbol upon the mind must be taken into account. Whence of course it follows that, other things equal, the rhyming is to be preferred for instance of *feat* and *heat* to that of *feat* and *sleet*; but other things never are equal.