

REVIEWS

THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHARACTER. *By A. F. Shand.* Macmillan and Company, London, 1914. Pp. xxx+532.

In his preface the author says: "A great difficulty which I have found in the course of my work has been to collect the facts or observations of character on which I had to rely. Such material as I have obtained has been drawn much more from literature than from any other source; and this was inevitable, because psychology has hardly begun to concern itself with these questions." This reproach levelled against psychology rebounds on the author, for throughout the book he shows himself evidently unacquainted with those branches of psychology, notably the medical ones, that have contributed so brilliantly and extensively to the science of characterology. It need hardly be pointed out, further, that to rely on second-hand material, which cannot be checked, analysed, or immediately studied, as the living facts can is a procedure that is open to insuperable objections.

The author repudiates any analytical approach to his problems, preferring what he terms "a concrete and synthetic conception of character," and so "avoids breaking up the forces of character into their elements, and being driven to consider the abstract problem of their mutual relation." His method consists in assuming the existence of these forces, as part of his working hypothesis, and in formulating general laws based on a study of them. As he himself puts it, "It is in the first place a method of discovery rather than of proof;—a method reaching no further than a tentative formulation of laws; for organising the more particular under the more general; for interpreting the generalised observations which every great observer of human nature forms for himself, and by this interpretation making some advance towards their organization." It follows from this that the book is predominantly descriptive in nature, and in this field it must be said that the author has accomplished a great work, one that will be of almost indispensable value to future students of the various emotions.

The book is really a study of the emotions rather than of character, and so we have to pay special attention to what the

author has to say concerning them. As is well known, he formulated some years ago a special conception—it can hardly be called a theory—of the emotions, and the most novel part of the present work is the way in which this conception is expounded and elaborated in detail. He rejects the usual sense of the term in which it is taken to express a certain degree of elaboration of the affective aspect of the mind, and adopts a much wider definition in which the conative, affective, and cognitive aspects are all represented. “‘Emotion’ for us will connote not feeling abstracted from impulse, but feeling with its impulse, and feeling which has essentially a cognitive attitude, however vague, and frequently definite thoughts about its object.” He distinguishes, none the less, between an emotion and the entire system to which it belongs. It is the part of the system that is present in consciousness, there being two other parts that are not; namely, the processes connected with it in the body, and the executive part concerned with its outward expression and modes of behaviour. The three main primary emotions are fear, anger, and disgust; other are curiosity, joy, sorrow, self-display, and self-abasement. The four emotional systems of anger, fear, joy and sorrow have an innate connection not only with one another, but also with every other primary system. Most of the book is taken up with a very detailed study of the emotions just enumerated, and in this study the author insists on the functional point of view, constantly enquiring into the dynamic aspects and tendencies of the emotion under consideration. This is perhaps the only respect in which it could be seen that the book was written within the last forty years.

Mr. Shand's view of the relation between the emotions and the instincts has led to an animated controversy with Dr. McDougall, published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for 1914-1915. According to the latter writer, every emotion has a corresponding instinct, and is merely the affective aspect of this instinct. Mr. Shand, on the contrary, holds that there are vastly more instincts than emotions, that a given instinct may enter into several different emotional systems, and that each emotional system may at various times, and according to its needs, make use of almost any number of different instincts. The reviewer is unable to determine whether these different points of view have any further implications than a difference in the definitions adopted by the two writers. McDougall obviously employs the term

instinct in a much more comprehensive and inclusive sense than Shand does.

In the discussion of this interrelation there occurs, by the way, the following suggestive passage: "There are no fears so intense as those which arise in situations from which we cannot escape, where we are forced to remain in contemplation of the threatening events. There is no anger so intense as when the blood boils and all the sudden energy that comes to us cannot vent itself on our antagonist. *The arrest of an instinct is that which most frequently excites the emotion connected with it*; and therefore we feel the emotion so often before (or after: Reviewer) the instinctive behaviour takes place, rather than along with it." This seems to after-shadow the modern views on intrapsychical conflict and abreaction.

Another conception peculiar to the author, first propounded in 1896, is that regarding the sentiments. Sentiments, in the author's sense, are "those greater systems of the character the function of which is to organize certain of the lesser systems of emotions by imposing on them a common end and subjecting them to a common cause." A constant conflict seems to go on between the organizing tendency of these sentiments and the tendency of the constituent emotions to achieve freedom and autonomous action, a conception quite in harmony with the modern views of "complex-action," although Shand's "sentiments" are far from being synonymous with either "complexes" or "constellations" in our sense. The implications that follow from his conception of the sentiments, and the importance he attaches to it, are well shown by the following interesting passages. "The result of the modification which the systems of the emotions undergo in man, and especially the multiplication of the causes which excite and sustain them, is (1) to make man the most emotional of animals, and (2) to render possible the debasement of his character. For that which is a condition of his progress is also a condition of his decline,—the acquired power of ideas over emotions, and the subsequent power of each indefinitely to sustain the other. Hence the existence of the emotions constitutes a serious danger for him though not for the animals, and the balance which is lost when the emotions are no longer exclusively under the control of those causes which originally excite them can only be replaced by the higher control of the sentiments. There are then three stages in the evolution

of emotional systems; the first and primitive, in which they are under the control of the stimuli innately connected with their excitement, undergoing a certain change through individual experience, but not radically altered; the second, in which they become dangerous and independent systems; the third, in which they are organized under the control of the new systems which they are instrumental in developing." "There are three principal stages in the development of character. Its foundations are those primary emotional systems, in which the instincts play at first a more important part than the emotions; in them, and as instrumental to their ends, are found the powers of intelligence and will to which the animal attains. But even in animals there is found some inter-organization of these systems, or, at least, some balance of their instincts, by which these are fitted to work together as a system for the preservation of their offspring and of themselves. This inter-organization is the basis of those higher and more complex systems which, if not peculiar to man, chiefly characterize him, and which we have called the sentiments, and this is the second stage. But character, if more or less rigid in the animals, is plastic in man: and thus the sentiments come to develop, for their own more perfect organization, systems of self-control, in which the intellect and will rise to a higher level than is possible at the emotional stage, and give rise to those great qualities of character that we name "fortitude," "patience," "steadfastness," "loyalty," and many others, and a relative ethics that is in constant interaction with the ethics of the conscience, which is chiefly imposed upon us through social influences. And this is the third and highest stage in the development of character, and the most plastic, so that it is in constant flux in each of us; and the worth that we ascribe to men in review of their lives, deeper than their outward success or failure, is determined by what they have here accomplished."

We have given some indication of the positive side of the book, one which deserves great praise for both its matter and style. On the negative side we have to remark on the following important omissions. As was mentioned to start with, no acquaintance whatever is shown with either the methods or findings of what may broadly be called medical psychology, the only psychology that has at its disposal the material on which a science of character could be founded. That the important work of Klages on characterol-

ogy is not considered may be accounted for by the fact that there is not a single German reference given in the whole book. In the second place, the genetic point of view is almost completely overlooked, one of cardinal importance in such a field. Thirdly, the whole subject of the unconscious is treated as non-existent. It is a complete misnomer to entitle a book on descriptive psychology "The Foundations of Character" when no notice whatever is taken of that region of the mind where the very springs of character take their source, and where the most fundamental features of character are to be found. Last, but not least, is the absence of any study of the sexual instinct and emotions, surely of cardinal importance for any investigation of character. Apart from the general contributions made by this instinct to character, one thinks of such clearly-cut pictures as the masochistic, *voyeur*, and anal types of character.

An inadequate index closes an unsatisfactory, though in many respects valuable, book. We note no fewer than twelve references to "Seneca," but none to "sex" or "shame;" sixteen to Hudson, but none to Freud, Janet, Prince, Adler, or Klarges.

ERNEST JONES.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By *William McDougall*. Published by John W. Luce & Co., Boston, 1910.

Although this book was published a few years ago, nevertheless it seems sufficiently important to the reviewer to have it brought prominently before psychopathologists.

In the introduction McDougall reminds us that the instincts are the prime movers, the mental forces, the sources of energy, the springs of human action, the impulses and motives which determine the goals and course of all human activity, mental and physical. These instincts, being the fundamental elements of our constitution, must be clearly defined, and their history in the individual and the race determined. For this purpose, comparative and evolutionary psychology is necessary, for the life of the emotions and the play of motives in mental life are the least susceptible of introspective observation and description. "The old psychologising," says McDougall, "was like playing 'Hamlet'