

ance of the quadrumana to account for the special peculiarities of mankind, Mr. Murphy thinks that Intelligence has guided the whole course of organic evolution, from the root upward. Again, while the former author regards this Intelligence apparently as external to the organism, the latter considers it as immanent. The phrase "unconscious intelligence" which he applies to its lower forms might even remind one of Von Hartmann. On the other hand, Mr. Murphy disclaims the imputation of pantheism, and seems to consider himself a theist, though on this point he speaks with apparent reserve. The new edition leaves us as much in the dark as to the nature of the immanent Intelligence as did the former one (if not even more so): and it must be confessed that the reader lays down the book with no very clear conception of its ultimate intention.

On the whole *Habit and Intelligence*, now as before, represents that class of beliefs which form convenient resting-places between two theories, the old and the new. At bottom it is a compromise, a reconciliation between evolution and design. Like most other reconciliations, it will doubtless satisfy for a while a certain number of timid and inquiring minds, just as Hugh Miller's reconciliation of geology and Genesis satisfied similar spirits in a past generation. But Mr. Murphy is too conspicuously candid, honest and manly for a good apologist. He admits too much and allows the strong points of his adversaries too easily. The new chapters state with great clearness the principal difficulties in the way of accepting natural selection as the sole cause of organic progress: but they also state with too great emphasis the reasons for not regarding these difficulties as final.

GRANT ALLEN.

Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins. Prolegomena zu jeder künftigen Ethik. Von EDUARD VON HARTMANN. Berlin: Duncker, 1879. Pp. xxiv. 871.

It was in 1869 that Von Hartmann took the reading world of Germany by storm by the publication of his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*. Since then edition has rapidly followed edition (the most recent being the 8th, published last year, in two volumes), and its author has sent forth at short intervals other striking compositions from his productive workshop. Now, to show that the creative energy is still unspent, we have a freshly-written volume of 870 pages on a department of thought hitherto neglected by him. This last performance will hardly have the success of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, lacking the charm of a novel theme and that audacity of imagination which characterised the earlier work; but it is marked by an originality of treatment and artistic completeness somewhat unusual in a treatise on morals. Von Hartmann, as is well known, possesses in a high degree the ability to write for the general public without being superficial, the power of handling the profoundest themes of thought and life without incurring the

reproach of learned dulness. He always refuses to look through other people's spectacles, and accordingly makes the reader feel that the problems he is dealing with are really personal problems, not merely abstract questions to be debated in the schools as matter of speculative curiosity. But again, our author is anything but a merely "popular" thinker in the sense that he carries the discussion just far enough to satisfy the demands of common sense. On the contrary he has perhaps an inordinate desire to probe things always to their very bottom, and is never satisfied unless he has carried to its extreme consequence the principle he finds himself logically necessitated to accept. Thus, in the present book, although it is called, and is for the most part, a *Phenomenology*, or examination of moral *phenomena*, he cannot refrain from adding a third section on the *Urgrund* of morality or an account of *absolute* moral principles. I mention this merely as a characteristic of the author, without pronouncing on its wisdom or unwisdom. The English mind tends to err (if error it be) too much on the other side for a reader not to feel a shock of pleasant surprise when he takes up a book, professedly addressed to the world at large, which considers a final metaphysic indispensable to the regulation of the commonest life.

Before entering upon his main task, namely, an examination of the genuine moral consciousness, Von Hartmann devotes about a hundred pages to a consideration of Pseudo-morality, or those principles on which the human mind first relied to guide its action, and which, though really non-moral, were a necessary propaedeutic to the rise of a true moral consciousness. These pseudo-moral principles are Egoism and Heteronomy—the principles of Self-Love and External Authority. In the main these correspond with the principles of Antiquity and the Middle Ages, at least so far as the Greek and Scholastic philosophies are concerned. It was the well-being of the *individual* which Greek (and Roman) Ethics always assumed to be the final court of appeal in matters of conduct, whether that well-being was positive or negative pleasure, or the negation of pleasure in the form of apathy or indifferentism. The natural mind has no doubt with regard to the attainability of happiness, and the sympathies are for a long time too weak to allow of any regard for the happiness of others, except as an enforced limitation to the demands of self-love. But this *naïve* belief in the attainability of private happiness cannot last. The hindrances to personal enjoyments are far too many for any one living in the busy world, subjected to restraints on every hand, to imagine that Individual Eudaemonism is terrestrially realisable. Despairing of happiness *here*, the individualist throws his glance beyond the confines of earth, and fondly imagines blessedness *there*. This transcendent eudaemonism is exhibited in the ethics of the early Christians, but in that form is no more capable of satisfying the requirements of the moral consciousness, than terrestrial egoism. For, the social continuity being interrupted by death, everything that is most precious here being unknown there, there is no support given to just those forms of activity which are the most prominent in earthly

life. A transcendent egoism, moreover, which finds its moral norm in the principle: That is right which will lead to heavenly happiness, needs a revelation of the celestial code, thus paving the way for the next principle of Heteronomy, or External Authority.

He who deliberately makes his own happiness his end is forced to surrender one pleasure after another, in order to retain some chance of happiness at all. And this course continues, until it is at last found that the positive eudaemonism, with which the individual started, has become negative eudaemonism. Hedonism passes into Cynicism. First apathy, then contempt for life. The Stoic's self-renunciation, or moral indifferentism, passes into utter disgust for every form of earthly action. But there is one step more to take. Life being discovered to be worthless, why consent any longer to bear its daily burden? The choice lies between Suicide and Asceticism. If there be no future life, suicide would be the more rational; if this life be not all, asceticism might be the more prudent course, but only at the cost of rendering continued existence utterly valueless, and thereby rendering it utterly meaningless. Egoism has thus ended by becoming "bankrupt". Its last word is Self-renunciation, denial of the principle itself. But a man who has discovered the vanity of the search for personal pleasure, if he shrinks from the practically logical consequence of his guiding-principle, will only be able to evade that consequence, by surrendering his self-confidence and submitting to an authority outside himself. The Egoist has gained something by the practical discipline of life—he has learned the *necessity of self-renunciation*, and that is the contribution of this pseudo-moral Egoism to the erection of the moral fabric. But there is something more wanted before the human mind can become truly moral: there is the need of an engrained reverence for Law. And that reverence must be gained through obedience to rules authoritatively imposed from without. Von Hartmann briefly reviews the various forms of Heteronomy, the authority of the Family, the State, the Church, the Divine Will, and shows the relative value of each, according to the intellectual elevation of those submitted to the rule; but they cease to be sufficient as soon as the individual regains the self-trust which the failure of his first attempt at self-guidance led him to renounce. Summoning up courage at length to criticise the authorities which profess to offer an infallible help, he discovers that they are only mediately authorities, that they are only to be trusted so far as they repose on right reason and pure feeling. At this stage the heteronomous education is completed, and henceforth the rule of action can only be *autonomous*, the genuine moral consciousness being now born.

We now enter upon the main theme of the book. This second part has three divisions—the Springs of Morality, the Ends of Morality, the Ultimate ground of Morality; the largest space being given to the Springs of Morality. These are the subjective principles of Taste, Feeling, and Reason. The question to be answered first is: Do we instantaneously give expression to feelings and judgments on actions, entirely without regard to their bearing on personal well-

being, or without reference to their conformity with any external code? The answer is that we do, and in a three-fold form. Goodness or badness is implied in our æsthetic judgments, we feel drawn to or repelled from certain modes of conduct, and we peremptorily judge this course to be right and that to be wrong. It should be observed that the question is not here raised as to the genesis of these mental phenomena. The inquiry is one merely of matter of fact, not of psychological origin. It would not be possible in the present notice to review in detail all the forms of the subjective moral principles here described. Under the head of Taste, the author treats of the principles of Harmony, Perfection, and the Ethical Ideal. The justification for taking Taste first is not that it is the more elementary psychical form, yielding in that respect to Feeling; but because it is more independent of the special object-matter, and therefore seems better adapted to lead the mind to acknowledge the reality of subjective morality as a general form of consciousness.

Indispensable as Feeling is as a moral factor, it is an error to found a system on this most subjective of all principles. Love, compassion, even the feeling of duty itself, have a moral value, not in their own right, but only so far as they unconsciously serve an end; in other words, they must be *rationalised* before they can be pronounced ethical. Feeling and Taste are particular and concrete in their application, but the Moral Law is general and abstract; hence Reason must be taken into the account as the third and highest subjective principle. Von Hartmann treats at great length of the rational impulse. A discussion of Moral Freedom leads him to examine fully the Free Will controversy, his conclusion being that the belief is the result of a confusion of self-positing with immediate-positing in willing, and irreconcilable with the fundamental conditions of moral life. The highest form of subjective rationalism is to be found in the idea of purpose or design. The world can only be rationally conceived as a system of graduated ends. Refuse to admit the idea of purpose (*Zweck*), and Morality becomes impossible; for if there be no objective ends on which the subjective principles of autonomy may repose, there is nothing for it but to fall back upon the pseudo-morality of Egoism, or the arbitrary commands of any power which may have strength enough to enforce obedience.

We must pass on then to the objective ends which the subjective principles of Taste, Feeling, and Reason unconsciously imply, and from which they receive their moral character. A man, who has come to perceive the impossibility of setting-up his own happiness as end, will find no difficulty in positing the happiness of others as the proper end of action. Social Eudaemonism is an objective moral end largely recognised, not least in England; John Stuart Mill's essay *On Utilitarianism* being recommended to the inquirer as furnishing the best statement of the doctrine. The recommendation is not very easy to understand, however, because when Hartmann comes to examine the essay critically, he can hardly find language strong enough to express his contempt for its superficiality and confusion of

thought. He holds that Mill either failed to see that Egoistic and Universalistic Hedonism are radically opposed principles; or in order to bribe common sense to accept the severer doctrine, perpetrated the pious fraud of representing the endeavour after other people's happiness as the same thing as furthering one's own. The identity of private and public interest herein implied is phenomenally impossible, individuality necessitating antagonism to the very end of the chapter. The stress laid by Mill on Sympathy, and his demand for a Religion of Humanity, should be regarded as unconscious admissions that a phenomenally objective rule cannot be independent, but on the one hand requires the support of subjective feeling, and on the other points to a deeper ground of Morality in the metaphysical unity of the human race. Suppose, now, the principle of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" to be erected into an exclusive objective moral end, the consequences would, in the view of our author, be anything but desirable. A serious attempt to maximise happiness would lead to an equality of possessions, the abolition of motives to exertion, the reign of ignorance, and finally a reversion to the most pernicious of all principles—the diffusion of beliefs and illusions for the sake of their agreeableness. Thus, all that the world has so painfully striven for—refinement of life, art, science—would go down in the flood of common-place comfort, tasteless art-products and Jesuitism. One cannot help suspecting that Von Hartmann, like the less-gifted of his countrymen, has been scared by the rapid growth of late years of the party of Social Democrats. Such plausibility as his description of the consequences of Social Eudaemonism possesses, is only obtained by the very unphilosophic procedure of ignoring many of the circumstances of the case, the result being a trivial solution of an unreal problem. In considering what is for the happiness of other human beings, the idea of happiness, as conceived by the cultured few, will form a not unimportant element, so that that universal re-animalisation, which our author announces as the social-eudaemonistic goal, would be a simple impossibility. With regard to the degradation of science and art, it is very doubtful whether the best work even now is done as a result of the pressure of competition. Certainly the highest genius is not productive, either through the stress of competition (which does not exist for it), or with an eye to an appreciative public (which is usually at first lacking). But by the time the levelling process contemplated has gone to extreme lengths, we may suppose the love of truth and beauty will be so firmly rooted, that bad art and pleasant fictions will be condemned even by the many.

Besides General Happiness, our author cites another objective principle—the Development of Culture. Allowing Social Eudaemonism full right as a moral principle applicable to an existing generation, the principle of Evolution is needed to supplement it, in view of humanity being a continually growing organism. As the happiness of the individual must often be sacrificed for the welfare of the community, so the interests of an existing society must be made to bend to the well-being of the future of the race. This is a point of view which

has no doubt hitherto been imperfectly adopted. Indeed, it could hardly well be otherwise, seeing that Evolution in the elaborate form of the doctrine as we now know it is so recent. It is, however, probably owing to the slight regard that is paid to the needs of the future, that our books on ethics have such an air of unreality about them, and that so little has yet been done towards a scientific system. Von Hartmann of course lays great stress on this aspect of morality, as his philosophical system as a whole is in effect a Philosophy of Progress, with Teleology as its corner-stone. The pursuit of general happiness now appears in its true light, as means to the awakening of consciousness, wherein consists the *raison d'être* of Humanity. The moral world-order is the complete expression of the two one-sided principles—Social Eudaemonism and Development of Culture. When we severally play our parts in this world conceived as a system of ends, freely surrendering our own welfare, or the welfare of a lower end for the sake of a higher, we are then first truly moral. One thing is clear by this time, that Morality cannot be divorced from theoretic Philosophy. It may be shown most convincingly that man possesses impulses of a social nature, that the pursuit of private pleasure is doomed to disappointment; still it is possible to deny the objective validity of the so-called social principles, and in spite of the failure of Egoistic Hedonism to assert the Absoluteness of the Ego. Von Hartmann rightly calls such a mental condition "the most horrible that can be conceived"; but he avers that to that state we must all come at last, if our view of the world leave no room for an objective Teleology. Phenomenal objective principles hang in the air unless they are based on absolute moral principles which affirm the identity of the essence of the individual with the essence of the absolute. We are driven on to a Metaphysic of Morals, because, on the one hand, the subjective principles can furnish no general rules, and are dependent on the constitution of the individual; on the other, the objective principles, not being *my* principles, have no constraining force. Nor will any mere combination of them suffice; they can only attain their proper influence when the aim of the world is proved to be my aim, and my aim would have no significance unless it were the aim of the whole. The foundation of Morality then is supplied by four principles—the *monistic* principle of the essential identity of individuals, the *religious* principle of essential identity with the absolute, the *absolute* principle of absolute teleology as that of our own essence, the principle of *redemption* (*Erlösung*) or negative absolute-eudaemonism.

The objective principles of right conduct (to which our subjective consciousness pointed) were two—that it was our duty to further the general happiness, and that we were bound to sacrifice the well-being of a lower order of existence for the sake of a higher. The endeavour after the utmost possible happiness through a continual process of self-renunciation—such was found to be the content of right and moral action. But man's life is a fraction of the Universal Life, his purpose is a part of the Universal Purpose. Transfer the notion of Eudaemon-

ism (Happiness) to the Absolute, and regard the world-process, human activity included, as a necessary aid to its attainment, and we have at once Social Eudaemonism and the self-denying principle of Evolution made intelligible. The essence of all is One: that essence is non-blessed. It endeavours after blessedness, an unattainable state, but which can only be so demonstrated, when the absolute essence is illuminated through the full development of consciousness. The author of the *Phenomenology of the Moral Consciousness* is still eloquent in praise of Schopenhauer, and has not receded from the stand-point of the "Metaphysic of the Unconscious". Perfect Duty and true Religion are one—to work to the utmost for the enlightenment of the Absolute Will, and to do that work reverentially and lovingly, feeling that we are labouring to abridge the pains of a God, the term of whose suffering is at the discretion of his creatures. The difference between this theology and that of the Christian Church, for instance, is that we each and all are the very God who is awaiting deliverance.

Von Hartmann considers he has now solved all the difficulties in the way of a Theory of Moral Obligation. The challenge, as I understand it, which he throws down to contemporary moralists is—to explain our moral consciousness (1) without basing morality on ontology, and (2) without accepting the ontology which he propounds. He is less concerned for the second point than the first. He thinks his own Pessimism the only metaphysical creed capable of satisfying all the requirements of the problem; but should that opinion prove to be ill-founded, the reasons for a metaphysical support to morality would remain in full force.

W. C. COUPLAND.

ΠΕΡΙ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗΣ. *The Fifth Book of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle.* Edited for the Syndics of the University Press, by HENRY JACKSON, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: University Press, 1879. Pp. 125.

The correction of a few oversights in Bekker's text and critical notes—sums up the value of this edition. It is to be regretted, however, in the interest of those students who use Zell and Michelet, that Mr. Jackson has not printed his collation of El. along with that of Bekker's MSS. ; for Zell and Michelet derive their knowledge of El. CN. and CCC. entirely from Wilkinson (1715), and an examination of Book V. in CCC. has convinced me that Wilkinson's collation is worse than useless, giving a perfectly false idea of the character of the MS. which closely resembles K^b without being a transcript of it. It is probable that he is as misleading with regard to El.

Mr. Jackson's extensive re-arrangement of the Book is scientifically inadmissible even as an hypothesis, because it cannot be decisively tested. His test, *lucidus ordo*, is not decisive, for the author or ancient editor may have been satisfied with much less order than Mr. Jackson is; and supposing "Dislocations," as he says, to have taken