

IV.—“MATTER AND MEMORY.”

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PART I.

THE intuitionist or immediatist Method of Henri Bergson is a phase of the revolt against belief in a rational, or rather merely rational, Absolute. So long as philosophers can regard Reason as “sovereign of the world,” and such that it is seen, even though darkly, in the mirror of our conceptual thought, a method such as Hegel’s imposes itself. Our wider concepts are not mere *substitute-facts*, symbols which may be unlike that for which they stand, but are “Universals” partaking of the essential character of the “sovereign” power. Hence a method which displays the articulation of concepts becomes compulsory—all else of theoretic worth must be treated as quite subordinate to this end. And here I must contend that Hegelianism and the dialectical Method are intertwined—that the secret of Hegel must be taken along with this much-abused, but strictly relevant, method, or left. A bowdlerised or modified Hegelianism is self-slain. If the Concept or Notion is *prius*, if all seemingly other reality is just its precipitate or showing, then a *conceptual* dynamic must be looked for and found. And in the “contradiction” which “above all things,” we are told, “moves the world,”¹ there is proffered a principle of movement, a hypothetical dynamic, which meets a want. Some such principle *must* be forthcoming. And dialectic, which is held to be illustrated in the rethinking of things by the true philosopher, would seem to be the only one which is available. Accordingly, Hegelianism proper stands or falls with the dialectic. And those neo-Hegelians who reject the method, are in that very

¹ Dialectic (a contention not always borne in mind) is not merely a philosopher’s method. It is the “universal” power. Hegel urges that even “the physical elements prove to be dialectical. The process of meteorological action is the appearance of their dialectic. It is the same dialectic which lies at the root of every other natural process.” Cf. Wallace, *Logic of Hegel*, p. 128.

act severing their ties with Hegel and tramping away once and for all into hostile camps. They have to fall back on a non-rational factor, if only to account adequately for a London fog.¹

Mr. Pogaon, to whom we owe the translation of "Time and Free-Will" (*Les données immédiates de la Conscience*), notes Bergson's rejection of the conceptual method which he regards as "the dominant tradition in philosophy. For [Bergson] reality is not to be reached by any elaborate construction of thought; it is given in immediate experience as a flux, a continuous process of becoming to be grasped by intuition, by sympathetic insight." Concepts break up this flux into stable, but dead, parts, the primary values of which are merely practical. To get at reality in its living movement we must break out of the prison of concepts and immerse ourselves, as best we may, in the flux. It is at this point that we hark back to the teaching of Schopenhauer; herald of pragmatists, Bergsonians, and other radical empiricists, myself included, alike. Schopenhauer waged war tirelessly on the Concept and urged, with contempt for the discursive understanding, that wisdom lies "in the perception," i.e. in concrete appearances. He held also, like Bergson, that intellect has been forged for practical ends and, working with concepts, does not reach ultimate philosophical truth. Schopenhauer, it must be admitted, does not think always up to the height of his intuitionist gospel. The preacher has not reformed fully his own practice. But he has voiced the need for a change in metaphysical method, and this initiative, once scouted by verbalising "university-philosophers," is being endorsed in many independent and progressive quarters to-day. Observe, by the way, that under the new *régime* metaphysics may retain all its old breadth of view. There is no call for radical empiricists to confine their outlook to the limited appearances of which they and other human experients happen to have been aware. They ought to be prepared to supplement these appearances very freely at need; to feign knowledge of a macrocosm in the shape of truth-claims, many of which are unverifiable at the moment in full. Appearances, they must contend, are to be taken at their face-value and are real; and further they are such as to invite us to go beyond them imaginatively on the great scale. A *probably true* system, which includes the limited empirical data and which suffices, at any rate, for the guidance of our lives, is wanted. It will be recalled that even

¹ Cf. preceding note.

Dr. Schiller has penned an ontology which goes far beyond appearances such as present human, or even superhuman, experiences could confront. From the reality of the soul or finite centre he toils up the ladder of inference towards precosmic and post-cosmic being. Such attempts seem legitimate, if it be that appearances, despite the limitations of our direct knowledge, suggest strongly in what directions our speculative supplementations of them must be risked.

Modern panpsychists owe a further debt to Schopenhauer in respect of what Mr. H. W. Carr describes (in connexion with Bergson) as "the magnificent *élan vital*, into which the whole of existence is gathered together and whose immense *poussée* has evolved innumerable lives". That which is labelled by Schopenhauer, and most unhappily, THE WILL is just this giant psychical life—the Immemorial Being of Schelling, which creates extra-logically, not in the way contemplated by finalism, still with the certitude of instinct. And it is just this universal creative life whose plunge into the time-process and space I have sought to describe in the course of my own conspectus-biography of the "Ground".¹ Schopenhauer, by the way, seems to have thought that an intuitionist method leads to an immediate discovery of this Ground. But in this matter his dominantly mystical bias has carried him too far. Direct awareness does not go beyond the 'psychical continuum'² which constitutes the territory of the finite centre. This continuum, however, serves as a jumping-off point for inferential thought; a point whence I can rise by symbolic supplementation of my direct knowledge on to a level where there obtains a wider life. My vision cannot reveal *immediately* that which only a veritably cosmic experience could show. Inference, then, for a being on the human level, is essential; there is available no direct experience such as the ideal of a world-intuition requires. It is owing to our limitations in the quarter of direct feeling that the intuitionism of the mystic has to be helped out by the circuitous theorising of the philosopher.

What attitude will an intuitionist and panpsychist, who is not pragmatist, tend to take up in the matter of Truth? Here we must enter on the hazardous path of prediction, but a suggestion, not perhaps wholly unsatisfactory, can be made. Mr. J. E. Russell³ asks what is the something,

¹ Since penning the *Individual and Reality* I have taken the further step of labelling this Ground the 'Cosmic Imagination'. I shall justify this step more fully in a special work in which the origin and import of Nature and the main phases of conscious life will be discussed.

² *Individual and Reality*, p. 77.

³ "Truth as Value and the Value of Truth," *MIND*, October, 1911.

other than value, which characterises a true idea. Well, the essential character of "Truth" is that it is a *partial* awareness of reality, whether this awareness happens to possess a value or not.¹ Sometimes this awareness is of aspects of presented reality. No correspondence hypothesis of truth covers this situation. The truth here lies within the reality—is the more illuminated portion of it, the focal glow-point of attention as contrasted with the barely aware fringe. But very often the reality, in which I want to aware aspects, is not presented. And in this case I have to feign its presence—feign direct awareness of it—in a substitute provided in an imaginal or verbal-conceptual way. If, however, later I want to "verify" the substitute, I must, if possible, attain direct awareness of the reality and discover whether the substitute is like it, represents it sufficiently well to subserve my interests, theoretic and practical. In other words, the *Correspondence* between idea and its object must be tested. Owing to the narrow limitations of direct experience, I must aware many truths which imply Correspondence, but, again, there are many others which do not exhibit this feature at all. Thus awarenesses of perception, nay even the all-important awareness of the psychical continuum,² do not show it. At the other extreme I note competing systems of philosophical truth which arrange hosts of propositions in various arbitrary ways. These, not being themselves Reality at large, must represent, symbolise it ideally, in not too lamentable a fashion, or stand condemned. An ideal representation of this sort may be treasured by folk who want to preserve it intact and who resent any further effective appeals to the reality which it served to translate. Once created, in fact, a system is often kept aloof from its 'object'; and its guardians may even justify this aloofness, rolling their eyes skyward in the peace of faith. The truth-pemmican of propositions is believed to possess somehow an intrinsic excellence, all its own: there are preposterous conservatism in the history of thought. What now must the despiser of the pemmican, the radically reforming genius, do? He must inquire whether the substitute-fact, or system *corresponds with*, mirrors or represents sufficiently, the reality for which it seeks to stand. And he will find, perhaps, that the major part of it, when tested, consists of truth-claims rather than truths and that a "system," at best, is only

¹ In moods of idling and reverie it can hardly be said to possess any value. It moves towards no interest.

² Cf. *Individual and Reality*, p. 77, on the "whole-feeling" which attests this.

a propositional make-shift, furnishing a thin and inferior kind of truth to be desired only when direct intuition has failed.

An 'idea' which, as in the cases of "judgments" of perception, is in and of 'reality' is true, because awareness of it is *at the same time* awareness of its 'object'. Nothing can be referred more properly to reality than that which is already there! And this fundamental type of truth lies behind all the later indirect and symbolical devices which our limitations enforce. Truth, at its best, is a partial but direct awareness of the reality or object. If, however, a direct awareness is not to be had, there must be found or made a substitute-reality; awareness of the like being for practical purposes, and *quod* likeness, awareness of what it is like to. Note here that a *complete* direct awareness of all reality—of all aspects of the universal psychical life or Ground—in simultaneous presence would transcend truth. The total illuminated would be truth and reality at once. Truth would be both abolished and preserved; would be the awareness aspect, reality the content aspect, of the awared whole.

Truth being the partial awareness of reality (an awareness which may or may not possess a 'value'¹), the method which does not play overmuch with desiccated concepts, but goes directly to reality itself, will, other things equal, be the best. Intuitionism, which is the method of the mystic as well as of certain system-framing philosophers, is indicated whenever direct experience is such as to furnish it with the required field. The vice of most intuitionists and mystics is that they pretend too often to intuit when they have no direct experience in front of their talking.

What now is error? There can be no false appearance in directly awared feeling. An idea may be relative to, and coloured by, all other contents of the continuum wherein it shows, but this feature does not rob it of truth. Here the idea is also awareness of its 'object'. And the 'object,' again, is real in a relativity, which supports and does not destroy the reality of its phase.

Error, then, characterises only the *substitute-fact*. And we seem to be able to say pretty clearly in what error consists. "There are Centaurs in Arizona" is sheer error. Now in this case there is a direct awaring of contents imaginatively which is as real as anything in the universe can be. But this *reality* on one level of my conscious experience is not *true*, because it does not represent the other possible reality—Arizona etc., as it might be awared directly by me. It is not a substitute

¹ *Vide supra.*

which, when tested, is found to be sufficiently like the reality of *primary* interest. And because it is no true substitute, it is *also* without value. I want to aware directly the fauna of Arizona *as it is*, if I am merely interested in knowledge. I want to do so equally, if I intend to move in the matter of a hunting-expedition aright. But direct awareness being temporarily impossible, I have to proceed on the principle: Awareness of the like is *quid* likeness, awareness of what the like is like to. If the makeshift awareness is unlike what the direct awareness will be, then the makeshift awareness is untrue. And consequently, but only consequently, of no value.¹

What is the error of materialism? Materialism is the hypothesis that the universe is matter in movement. And what is matter? A concept which is also a command²—a word which bids us attend to complex realities *as if* these were only resisting-extensions. If you take the concept, not merely as useful for certain purposes in mechanics, physics and chemistry, but as equivalent somehow to reality at large, you are a materialist. And your error is just this. In awaring directly this gaunt concept you are feigning awareness of the indefinitely richer universe. But in this case the 'less' is not such that it can stand for the 'greater'. Matter is a pauper-denizen of the conceptual world. A substitute-fact, *real* on its own level, it is not full enough of content to be regarded as *true*—as adequately symbolic of the larger reality for which, in your metaphysics, it stands. Awareness of it is not to a sufficiently complete degree awareness of the universe. You cannot glimpse in and through it the general character of reality. In other words, your initial purpose is thwarted.

What is the error of Faith? The objects of Faith are real, at any rate in their own domain, the private imaginary world of the believer. The error lies in taking these objects as true *as well as* real—in regarding them as substitute-facts for reality, which, to attest itself, would have to appear in another way, but does not.

¹ Value may attend truth with the loyalty wherewith Gravity haunts Mass, but the attendance is not identity.

² The concept Matter is thus not purely theoretic. This intention-aspect of certain concepts is very interesting, especially in those cases in which the veiled intention has not been realised or is not realisable at all. My present concept of a thousand-sided figure includes an intention not carried out, but *assumed* to have been converted into fact in a mental world. My concept of "round square" is real and can be a subject of predicates, but in this case the intention, which is the very soul of the concept, is not merely not carried out, but cannot be carried out at all.

Enough has been said for present purposes respecting Method and Truth. I propose now to discuss certain alleged deliverances of Intuitionism which are found in Prof. Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, certainly the most difficult and, to my thinking, much the most important of his three chief works. And I will lead up to the subject by examining briefly a vital contention which is put forward in *Time and Free-Will*. My object is to throw into relief a very unsettled problem respecting space: a problem which recurs in *Matter and Memory* and seems not to receive that decision and consistency of treatment which are required.

The drift of *Time and Free-Will* is as follows. The first of the three chapters discusses "The Intensity of Psychic States," and it is urged that the so-called degrees of Intensity are differences not of quantity, but quality. There are not two sorts of Quantity, Extensive and Intensive. Sensations, emotions, ideas are not Phenomena which show growth and diminution; are not magnitudes which can be compared as greater and less. To treat them as magnitudes is to import into the sphere of the inextensive symbolism derived from experience of space—of size, distance, juxtaposition, of container and contained and so forth. This treatment may be of practical convenience, but it must not be regarded as truthful. And the issue is a vital one. It "may be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties presented by certain philosophical problems do not arise from our placing side by side in space phenomena which do not occupy space, and whether, by merely getting rid of the clumsy symbols round which we are fighting, we might not bring the fight to an end. When an illegitimate translation of the unextended into the extended, of quality into quantity, has introduced contradiction into the heart of the question, contradiction must, of course, recur in the answer."¹ Having urged that Intensity is qualitative, Prof. Bergson, in chapter ii., proceeds to free the topics of "Duration" and "succession" from the incubus of this Space-symbolism, and fares thence to consider the now greatly (as he surmises) simplified, if not almost abolished, problem of Free-Will. A false Space-symbolism, he thinks, has been vitiating all previous discussions of the closely-allied enigmas of *Time and Free-Will*. The "Intensity" chapter is, therefore, indispensable.

In reviewing this work recently I submitted that Bergson accepts uncritically the old philosophical superstition to the effect that 'psychic states' are unextended and that this

¹ *Time and Free-Will* (Author's Preface).

initial error invalidates his entire argument.¹ The point involved is, of course, of capital importance. I shall, therefore, offer no excuse for repeating my original criticism of this portion of the work. I must add that the alternative view that 'psychic states' are, or may be, spatial is vital to my own panpsychistic philosophy in which space (the origin of which has been discussed tentatively) is made to continue right through the history of Nature into conscious life.

Bergson tells us that "even the opponents of psychophysics do not see any harm in speaking of one sensation as being more intense than another, of one effort as being greater than another, and in thus setting up differences of quantity between *purely internal states*. Common sense, moreover, has not the slightest hesitation in giving its verdict on this point; people say they are more or less warm, or more or less sad, and this distinction of more or less, even when it is carried over to the region of subjective facts and unextended objects, surprises nobody."² Truly an "obscure point" is involved, but has M. Bergson succeeded in throwing light on it? His solution is to the effect that the so-called 'more' and 'less' always refer to qualitative differences. My reply is that they imply qualitative differences, but, along with these, quantitative variations as well.

I might urge, at the outset, that it would be difficult to justify the description of sensations as 'purely internal states'; a subjective idealism is implied, the same false idealism which clung to Schopenhauer when he too discussed sensations as "wholly subjective states" and invented an intuitive understanding, armed with the category of causality, to extrude and so make them into objective fact. "Sensations" are not primarily internal possessions whose outwardness is just thrust upon them or inferred.³ But I will ignore this side of the matter, more especially as M. Bergson occupies a far more defensible position in *Matter and Memory*, and get to essentials. It is to be urged, not that certain contents of my experience are external rather than internal,

¹ *The Quest*, April, 1911. Not having at that time read *Matter and Memory* I was unaware that Bergson wobbles disastrously on the question of space. Thus sensations which in *Time and Free-Will* are regarded as "subjective facts and unextended objects" are described in the later book as occupying, and having positions in, space.

² *Time and Free-Will*, p. 1. The italics are mine.

³ Cf. *Individual and Reality*, pp. 71-72 and 187-189. The "sensation" is, emphatically, an abstraction: a late product of that same "dissociation" which carves particular objects out of the original psychical continuum. Among English thinkers Martineau, so far as I am aware, was the first writer who recognised to the full the importance of "dissociation".

but rather that all the contents of my experience, 'external' and 'internal' alike, whatever their residual features may be, are spatial. And we have only to look at experience intuitively to find that we can aware this important "truth" directly in the "reality" itself.

"My experience," as Mr. Bradley puts it, "falls within my own circle."¹ True, the contents of this circle are continuous with not-given content of a wider reality; not-given content which penetrates and saturates all that the circle contains. But for me, at any rate, only the little circle is flooded with light. The entire external spatial world, as I know it directly, is just so much experience within the circle. So far, so good. But note that to assert this is to assert that a portion of my experience is spatial, a portion which includes all those 'psychic states' which analysis, i.e. attention, carves out of perception. The jar, of which I am aware, is obviously spatial. You may aver, indeed, that my awareness or consciousness of the jar is not spatial, but how are you going to divorce awareness or consciousness from contents of which I am aware? And even if you succeed in accomplishing this task, you have not done what is required here. I am concerned now only to maintain that the contents just noted are spatial. And I have no need to multiply arguments; it suffices just to attend to the jar intuitively and record the deliverance in words. A superhuman metaphysician who could become aware directly of my experience would have to return the same verdict as I. Were he conscious of my jar, — a particular object carved out of the continuum of my "circle" — he, too, would be aware of a spatial fact. And as there is no evidence available outside the said fact, he would admit at once that this, as indeed all other contents of my perceptual life, is extended.

But the superhuman would concede more than this. The memory-image of the jar is as spatial as was the jar perceived. For is not the image considered a truthful one only in so far as it resembles the percept? In visualising this image I am aware of varied colours, lights and shades; and to be aware of colours, etc., which bound one another, is to be aware of that manner of appearing which we abstract as 'space'. Again in picturing the movements of balls on an imaginary billiard table (and who has not played billiards in bed?), I am aware of positions, directions, shapes, sizes and distances with great clearness. In visualising, also, the rush of an imaginary motor-car I am aware, in a faint form, of move-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 346.

ments similar in kind to those which occur in my external or perceptual experience. How natural that this should be the case! All sensations alike, as James and others have urged, show a primitive 'extensity'. This 'extensity,' however loth psychologists may be to say so outright, is only another name for spatiality. Sensations and sensation-complexes being primitively spatial, images which profess to copy them must be spatial as well.¹ We might, therefore, deduce this spatiality, were it not that we can always observe it in fact.

Belief in spatiality is not, however, the same thing as belief in space. Space as mere *room* for static coexistence or movement is a conceptual invention. The spatiality of images is that of a continuum, related contents of which appear in this manner. But the conceptual device of an internal room, which is merely filled with loose floating images and is independent of their coming and going, is created as soon as convenience prompts. It may be useful to discuss discriminated images as if they crowd the pre-existing, but once empty, hall of the "Mind". This concept of Ideal or Internal Space, independent of the contents which may show in it, lies behind the doctrine of the *Tabula Rasa*, and takes high rank in the array of useful fictions.

It is, not, then, a false symbolism which asserts spatiality of 'psychic states'. Had M. Bergson been thinking more of *contents* and less of the consciousness of them, his intuitionism would have forced him to alter his view.² Commonsense seems justified in speaking of 'more' or 'less' even in the regard of an emotion. If I may be allowed to cite from the *Quest* article once more: "M. Bergson may be perfectly right in urging that in the case of an alleged growth or diminution of the intensity of an internal phenomenon, there is always a *qualitative* change. Indeed, this seems to me obvious—in cases like the increase of anger, or the diminution of sexual love, for instance, obtrusively obvious. But I submit that there is a quantitative change occurring *as well*. The 'increased' anger in colouring more content, in invading more of my inner life, does really and not metaphorically fill a larger internal space. And when psychologists write about the '*massive*' character of the emotion, they imply this internal

¹ "Surely when you recall (visualise) a mountain in memory, there are represented not only its colours, etc., but its spatial form. If the latter is not copied more or less satisfactorily, it is absurd to talk of the image of the mountain being present at all. Obviously the 'extensity' is copied, there is a *magnitude* floating in the experience of the 'internal sense'. Kant failed wholly to appreciate this fact" (*The Quest*).

² Cf., however, the subtle change of front in *Matter and Memory*.

space or are using a significant word idly. The spatial rendering of the phenomena of internal experience is not mere *symbolism*: it is truly descriptive of the character of the realities in question." I have sought to show elsewhere that the finite centre, whose contents are just discriminated from one another, but not divided, is *itself spatial*, having its place and extent among other finite centres in that psychical ground or Cosmic Imagination wherein everything to which I can attach a name 'lives, moves and has its being'.

Bergson's "Pure Duration" is the unfolding *qualitative* multiplicity of conscious states, in which there is no succession, and no separation, but an interpenetration of unlike elements. Some will recall that Royer Collard writes that Duration (which, like M. Bergson's Duration, lies not in the object by itself, but in us) is presupposed by succession, and that our feeling of duration rests on the *continuity* of our *activity*. From the combination of Collard's view with belief in the psychical continuum sprung, perhaps, the doctrine of "Pure Duration". M. Bergson, however, is for an intuitionist verification of it. He bids us make an effort and get out of our practical awareness of successive discretes back into Duration. "Pure Duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present states from former states."¹ Is he urging us toward that awaring of the psychical continuum, toward that Whole-Feeling, which, I have averred elsewhere, is at least as real as any alleged minor 'impression' or 'idea' can be?² Clearly so. Once more, then, the space-difficulty is thrust on my notice. I find myself unable to live "Pure Duration". There is awared a continuum of changeful feeling, but this continuum exhibits a spatial character as well. The subject-object distinctions and the discriminations within these may lapse almost completely, with the result that my circle of experience becomes momentarily quite a solid feeling whole. Still the co-existence of aspects, with their vague bignesses and places and directions, etc., persists obstinately within the whole. Space, and not merely Duration, pervades the finite Centre.

I cannot gather from *Time and Free-Will* how M. Bergson's world of independent spatial objects enters into the flux of my conscious states, nor why, since it enters, it does not saturate the said flux with space. Difficulties arise which are insoluble on the lines followed by this book.

¹ *Time and Free-Will*, p. 100.

² *Individual and Reality*, p. 77.

Sufficient, indeed, is the appalling query—How, if *sensations*, like all ‘psychic states,’ are non-spatial, does a spatial world which is discussed as, in some unintelligible way, a *datum* of knowledge, invade my experience? There is no answer worth the trouble of penning. Shall we deal with the haunting difficulty in another way? Does or does not a spatial world appear in my “circle” of experience? It appears at first as a continuum undiscriminated within itself which, later, is broken by attention into particular objects and sensations. The sensations are specially noticed aspects of this directly awared continuum, and they are necessarily as spatial as the larger tract in which they are noticed and named. This surely is the only solution which an intuitionism, which looks straight at reality, can commend. For intuitionism the non-spatial sensation ought not to exist.

Intuitionism, in fine, does not bear out the view that ‘psychic states’ are non-spatial. To look at and into my percept and image of a mountain is to be aware of them as spatial. If, however, ‘psychic states’ are spatial, and if, accordingly, there is no radically false “space-symbolism” which obscures our thought about Intensity, Duration and Succession,¹ the complex problem of Free-Will, which M. Bergson’s preludial chapters are designed to “simplify” or even abolish, is with us still. Not that these preludial chapters, even if we were to endorse their results, lead to an illuminative treatment of Freedom. M. Bergson, even at the close of his researches, is unable to define Freedom or show how a free act is to be understood. Why this reticence? Free acts, he urges, are relatively rare, acts that are not free are usual—cannot intuitionism, which awares somehow the difference, record it verbally in some not too preposterous a way? A further consideration deserves notice in this regard. M. Bergson ought not to locate this “rare” Freedom only in provinces of volition wherein the “whole personality” (as contrasted with merely superficial psychic states) is acting. On the lines of his interpretation of continuity, the “whole personality,” conscious and sub-conscious, is always penetrating each of its states. Strictly speaking, he ought to regard all our acts as free. And by this conclusion would hang difficulties.

¹ It is important, however, to discriminate between the view that psychic states are spatial and the crude and quite unjustifiable view that they are so many discrete, but associable, unit-elements “in” a “space” other than their own co-existence. M. Bergson appears to have missed this distinction. He can keep both the continuity and the spatiality of psychic life, if he so desires.

Is it clear, on the other hand, that Bergson's act, which involves the "whole personality," is free in the vital sense for which Libertarians ought to care? I agree with him that reality is psychical, continuous, creative; I allow, further, that materialistic determinism and associationist atomism are nonsense. But what if the "whole personality," with all the novelties emergent therein, is thrust into being by a *vis a tergo*? Freedom is not implied in the fact that the *vis* is continuous and creative! Here once more the trouble is that M. Bergson has only the naturalistic and crude associationist thinkers in view; he says nothing which discredits a determinism such as Dr. McTaggart, for instance, sees fit to profess. Let us make no mistake as to what a true Libertarian must exact. It is not enough to urge that *novelty* is born in the process of volition. Novelties are always being born, even in the cases of those ordinary conscious activities which even M. Bergson does not regard as free. And they are being born always, as I have urged elsewhere, in all processes even of the pettiest sub-conscious 'chemical change'. No: what the Libertarian requires is recognition of a leaven of spontaneity in the conscious making of the novelty. And if that leaven be present, *we ought to be able to point out the critical place wherein it works*.¹ It will hardly be present in the "crisis-act," unless the crisis admits of some leisure for deliberation. It will be present rather in the long and uneventful mouldings of conduct, inward and outward, of which a crisis constitutes only the test. There are crises in which our actions seem to proceed fatally from conditions in which are present what we have created more or less freely for our personalities in the long-ago. It is very often work in the past quiet times of peace that counts, when the war-drum beats unexpectedly and our personalities are launched swiftly into act.

I pass to *Matter and Memory*. We confront here dualism characterised, however, by a toning-down of the popular hard contrast of "matter" with "spirit". And first touching the concept of "matter" which figures so prominently in this work.

Matter is defined, doubtless to the surprise of many readers, as an aggregate of 'images'. Obviously this peculiar meaning of the word 'image' requires to be made clear and justified. We are to understand, then, a "certain existence which is more than that which an idealist calls a *representation*, but

¹ I have attempted to discuss this "spontaneity" (in *Individual and Reality*, pp. 230-232, 273) as an ectype of the spontaneity native to the primeval psychical ground.

less than that which the realist calls a *thing*—an existence placed half-way between the 'thing' and the 'representation'. This conception of matter is simply that of common sense."¹ The plain man is no Berkeleyan—he does not hold that "the object before him, which he sees and touches, exists only in his mind and for his mind, or even, more generally, exists only for mind". He believes, too, that the object, which exists in itself, exists pictorially as it is perceived, "image it is, but a self-existing image. This is just the sense in which we use the word image in our first chapter."

But, of course, here arises an initial difficulty about "common sense". It is true that the plain man believes that concrete *Nature* exists more or less as it is perceived, with its secondary qualities intact. But, when he tries to define, a mere conception, '*matter*,' the pictorial tends, even in his case, to disappear. Testing the point recently, I asked a plain woman—may she never peruse this article!—what meaning she attached to the word '*matter*'. "Oh! no, colours, sounds, smells and so on are not matter, I mean by matter *solid stuff*." And I surmise that this '*solid stuff*' of common sense is just the rough form of the '*matter*' in which mechanical philosophers put their trust, the extension-inertia phantom whose importance in the history of thought is easily understood.² '*Matter*' is a novelty of the conceptual world, a pseud-entity, an intellectualised form of the habit of attending to certain aspects of sensible reality as more important practically than are the others. And towards the invention of this pseud-entity common sense moves unreflectively, impelled by the need which this very useful fiction subserves.

What we require, in the regard of dualism, is not a theory about '*matter*'. Having invented matter ourselves, we ought to know all about it. We shall do well, however, to use this anæmic pseud-entity aright, not to suppose, for instance, like the materialists, that it exists autonomously and contains the potencies of all that reality can own. There exists not, and never has existed, outside of men's conceptions, a *material* world. There exists *Nature* of the type that we perceive sensibly, but that is a very different story. *It is with the problem of Nature, not with the already solved riddle of matter, that we have to deal.* And Nature, while, of course, it has aspects which you can work into skeletal schemes, mechanical and

¹ Author's Introduction to Eng. trans. of *Matter and Memory*, vii. and viii.

² *Individual and Reality*, pp. 90-96.

'sub-mechanical,' is, after all, sampled genuinely only in concrete intuition, in experiences in which 'secondary' qualities and even emotional colourings lie blent. It is only defective attention which narrows sensible reality into a *material* world.

PART II.

Chapter I. deals with what my body means and does in connexion with the *selecting* of 'images' for conscious presentation. We are not, at this stage, to be obsessed by the various metaphysical theories as to the 'reality' or 'ideality' of the so-called outer world: Back to the facts!—as they come to unsophisticated awareness.

Objects as they are perceived or as they may be perceived, the '*self-existent images*' already noted, interact in ways which we generalise as laws of Nature. My body which I know both perceptually, as also from within "by affections," is one of them. Cerebral process is only an image within this minor image. The brain is a phase only of the 'material world'¹ and does not *contain* it. "Eliminate the image which bears the name material world, and you destroy at the same time the brain and the cerebral disturbance which are parts of it" (p. 4). The external images transmit movement to the body-image and the body-image responds to them in movements. The body-image acts like the other images, save that it seems to "choose, within certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives". Assuredly it does not *beget* the rest of the images. These latter may "*be without being perceived* . . . present without being represented"² (p. 27) [in perceptual picturing], but anyhow their source is not in the brain. The nervous system as a whole is a "mere conductor" transmitting, sending back, or inhibiting movement (p. 40). The brain is no more than "a kind of central telephonic exchange" (p. 19). It adds nothing to what it receives.

Are we to discern an Antinomy lurking behind the familiar assertion that Nature, for each one of us, arises with the happening of certain events in a brain. We seem badly bogged, for instance, if we say that the brain exists *within* Nature, and anon that the brain somehow *contains* Nature.

¹ I have suggested already that it is better not to use the term *matter* when we are discussing *Nature*. Matter is a phantom of the conceptual order.

² On objects as existing outside our perceptions, cf. the observations on the unconscious, p. 183. The 'unconscious' also plays an important part in Bergson's theory of pure memory.

And writers of the calibre of Schopenhauer and Bain have floundered very seriously in this morass. I recall that some twenty years ago Dr. Lewins, in the making of an incoherent solipsistic creed yclept "Hyloidealism," sunk to its very depths. On the one hand, he treated conscious life as "vesiculo-neurosis in activity" and, on the other, he resolved the world, which of course must include the "vesiculo-neurosis," into a subjective show.¹ There is a way out of the trouble, if it be that the word 'brain' has two clearly distinguishable meanings and that there are plural *shadow-Natures* as well as a giant macrocosmic Nature of which we can speak.² But the statement that the brain is the birthplace of the 'images,' to which M. Bergson invites our attention, cannot be accepted in its popular-naturalistic forms, without monstrous difficulties at once rising into view.

It cannot be said that, in the main, "I represent to myself nothing but the molecular movements of cerebral substance"—for how in such pitiful movements can there lie the actual world that is known? Obviously this contention, as M. Bergson urges, is nonsense. I must submit further that such concepts as the 'molecular movements' of mechanical philosophers need not concern theorists as to the relation of conscious perception and body. They are useful fictions thrust on the universe, not concept-substitutes which answer to fact. Moving resisting-extensions ought to have no place in serious metaphysics. *Concrete* natural movements (which imply qualitative change) happen in what is already psychical in character. There are no barely mechanical processes in Nature. No one has ever perceived them and no one, I must add, can even imagine them. No empiricist ought to tolerate belief in them. Verbal concepts, however, allow us to *intend* facts to be, whether the intentions are capable of existing sensibly or not, and in this conceptual sphere alone lies such tenuous reality as mechanics possess.

As panpsychist I have to interpret Nature just by expanding that vision of it *which I have already*—empirically! Psychical processes are either found or can be supposed everywhere, even in that indefinitely vast portion of Nature which, not being perceived by me, has to be imagined or conceived. But when I do this, I have, also, to note that M. Bergson's view to the effect that the brain receives only 'movements' cannot be true. For the brain, as a phase of the psychical

¹ Mr. Bradley has some remarks on this kind of difficulty, which he treats with his usual subtlety in *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 264-265.

² Cf. my *Individual and Reality*, pp. 159 ff., where the assertions 'the brain contains Nature'—'Nature contains the brain' are reconciled.

continuum of Nature, is being invaded always by content-activities which the term 'movements' does not symbolise adequately—by contents *e.g.* such as 'secondary' qualities, with the orders in which these come. Once, indeed, that we transcend the category of "Mechanism," the problem of Nature is transfigured, and legions of artificial man-made 'intellectual difficulties' disappear. Intuitionism, which is the higher empiricism, ought to clear discussion by first dismissing the existents ('matter,' 'force,' 'energy,' etc., etc.) of mechanical philosophers as absurd—as not empirically confronted or attested at all. "Look at Nature," it ought to say, "there are no merely mechanical phenomena in what you perceive. All distinguishable phases here are aspects of sentient experience—are psychical in character. And when you want to expand your direct vision of Nature you must make your conceptual expansions of one tissue with what has been sensibly perceived." Is it worth while to wage a protracted guerilla war against Naturalism, or crude Dualism or Materialism? Is it not better to demolish their capital city outright—to point out that no such Nature, as they talk about, can exist or has ever existed outside human heads?

Is M. Bergson taking the 'molecular movement' folk too seriously, or is he, perhaps, playing, in amused cat-like fashion, with his mouse? The concluding chapters of the book show that he does not believe in the mechanical philosopher's world, and suggest that it is really panpsychism which holds sway at the back of his mind. On the other hand, his thought oscillates. And we shall find that the ghosts of a defunct mechanismism haunt and mar his treatment of some of the most serious issues which he undertakes to decide.

What now is Bergson's solution of the problem of conscious perception? First note that the 'motor response' hypothesis of cognition has pointed his thought. I refer to the "Cross-section" hypothesis which was carried so far by William James. "The theory of Evolution is beginning to do very good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of reflex action. Cognition, in this view, is but a fleeting moment, a cross-section at a certain point of what in its totality is a motor-phenomenon."¹ James is emphasising the physiological accompaniments of cognition. And the view seems delightfully congruent with his belief that 'intellect is built up of practical interests'. But it works amiss. For there are certainly many cognitions which, though they show a practical side, have issues obviously not embodied in motor

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, ii., 313 (Macmillan).

response. What, for instance, has thinking about the genesis of Nature, the awareness of space, the Absolute, the schematisation of Kant's categories, and the like, to do with such response? However, suppose that we are to consider, not all the modes of conscious awareness, but only *perception*, is the motor response hypothesis of sterling worth? At this juncture we return to Bergson. He, too, has said that the body only transmits or inhibits movements, but he wants *also* to know (what the above-cited passage from James ignores provisionally) why and where perceptual cognition supervenes. What is *pure* perception—i.e. perception freed from the memories which saturate it in fact? Well, he regards the brain, with its many motor mechanisms offering scope for "an ever larger number of possible actions," not as a place of *fatally* determined relations between stimulus and response, but rather as a centre of indetermination, in which, towards the higher end of the animal series, actions become less and less necessary.¹ Perception is essentially related to action—to the guiding of response. It is a mode of choice which prepares actions, whether these are merely nascent or anon accomplished. It "consists in detaching from the totality of objects, the possible action of my body upon them. . . . It creates nothing; its office, on the contrary is to eliminate from the totality of images all those on which I can have no hold, and then, from each of those which I retain, all that does not concern the needs of the image which I call my body." Idealism, he urges, is right in saying that all realities have a kinship with consciousness, whence, indeed, the basic justification for his use of the term 'images'. But 'images outrun perception,' and hence idealism is not entirely satisfactory. "It is just these images that science and metaphysic seek to reconstitute, thus restoring the whole of a chain of which our perception grasps only a few links. But in order thus to discover between perception and reality the relation of the part to the whole, it is necessary to leave to perception its true office, which is to prepare actions. This is what idealism fails to do."—An initial criticism must be to the effect that M. Bergson has only the more 'subjective' of the idealist schools in view. Since by the use of the word 'images' he is suggesting that all realities have kinship with consciousness, in a word, are psychical in character, and since, further, he is urging nothing which objective idealism cannot endorse,

¹ It must be noted, however, that in *Time and Free-Will* it is said that "we are rarely free" (p. 231). But if even we high animals are rarely free, what of conscious spontaneity on its lower levels?

he is demolishing only those one-sided idealisms for which conscious finite centres or a conscious god aware all that reality is and owns. Even Mr. Bradley (who is held by some to be too 'subjective') allows that there may obtain fact outside the experiences of finite centres; fact of which his Absolute, not being a person, cannot be aware in any human sense of the term. A further objection. Is it accurate to aver that the "obscurity" of idealism is due to the fact that it considers conscious perception and its conditions, as if only a question of 'pure knowledge' were involved? Surely all serious modern idealists allow that, historically speaking, perception grew up in practical alliance with the evolution of organisms. Consciousness, as even Schopenhauer has urged, emerged as the slave of body. And now we stand at some distance from rethinking the *fait accompli*, as if animal interests and actions had never influenced the forms emergent in perceptual life.

But to return to the main issue. Bergson has said that the brain only receives arrests and transmits movements. However, were it only to receive *mechanical* movements, there would not be perception in and through these of the 'images' which are external to body. But movements of the above order are at best symbols. We have to get rid of abstract mechanics and to suppose an extended *continuum*, psychical in character, in which lies the body. The activity of the body will then "appear to illuminate all those parts of matter [Nature?] with which at each successive moment it can deal" (p. 309). "Everything will happen as if we allowed to filter through us that action of external things which is real, in order to arrest and retain that which is virtual; this virtual action of things upon our body and of our body upon things is our perception itself" (*ibid.*). Perception, our virtual action, is, therefore, *selective*. And the neurosis said to be allied with it is not its cause, but its *continuation*, the active response already begun. All this is sun-clear. If we "restore to movement the unity, indivisibility and qualitative heterogeneity denied to it by abstract mechanics"¹. . . see in sensible qualities *contractions* effected by our memory" (p. 36), we reach a psychical Nature, of which the body is a mere phase. The rest of Nature interpenetrates this body. And out of

¹ Cp. William James, who regarded concrete movement as a continuous feeling "only decomposed into elements—successive portions successively occupied by the moving body—when our education in discrimination is much advanced". This attitude is implied in all panpsychism which emphasises continuity. And it is the recognition of this concrete movement which Bergson brings to bear against the familiar arguments of Zeno.

the totality of penetrating images certain are attended to and reacted on; and these are just the objects perceived. Of the universal "plankton" perception catches only a few animalcules in its net.

Having reached a psychical Nature by another route and equally affirming belief in the interpenetration in question, I can have no quarrel with the *general foundations* of this explanation. Intuitionism dictates the lines on which such inferences, supplementing our direct knowledge, have to be framed. We have here, of course, a heritage which has come down from the objective idealism of Schelling, whose Nature, already psychical, merely shows its character overtly to conscious life. But when we pass from consideration of the general foundations to that of the superstructure, there may well arise different interpretations of the facts.

Can it be alleged, for instance, that "our representation of things would thus arise from the fact that they are thrown back and reflected by our freedom"? (p. 29). For we are assured in *Time and Free-Will* that "we are rarely free" (p. 231). And yet . . . perception goes on! Evidently the limited freedom contemplated in *Time and Free-Will* is not the all-pervasive freedom which is being invoked here. The freedom, then, not being ours, is it the spontaneity of the cerebral processes which is at work? These, like all natural processes, are certainly creative, aglow with novelty. But, again, must a novelty, emergent in or from them, express freedom, i.e. be of the type of those *special* voluntary processes which I label 'free'? I have tried to suggest elsewhere how novelty emerges in Nature, and this emergence is ordinarily, no doubt, as fatally determined as anything can be.¹ The point to be emphasised is that to create is not necessarily to create freely.

There is imperfect coherence between *Time and Free-Will* and *Matter and Memory* touching freedom as also touching the problem of Space.

Again, in what sense is it true that perception detaches from the 'totality of objects' the 'possible action of my body on them'? Is the 'totality' in question the entirety of objects—of the 'self-existent images'—constituting Nature? Or is it merely a name for the very limited sensible continuum which occupies my "circle" of experience and out of which, as Martineau among British thinkers showed so ably, are carved the objects and sensations which popular philosophy

¹ "Can be." I posit a spontaneity-side in all the "conditions" whose coming together issues in an event. Cf. *Individual and Reality*, pp. 156, 276-281.

has been prone to consider as if they came 'detached'. There is, in truth, never separation, but preferential attention, for even in analysis the continuum remains undivided and whole.

If we suppose that pure perception isolates its objects out of the entirety of Nature (which may comprise so much more than the familiar world explored by science), we are in the region of miracles. 'Images outrun perception'—indefinitely. Is the entirety of Nature present at every 'centre of indetermination' at which selection goes on? Such a view would ask too much from the genuine, but easily overstated, truths of 'interpenetration' and 'continuity'.

There is selection in perception. But is it not of aspects of the *limited* sensible continuum present in the cortex? And the selection, it may be suggested, is primarily made rather for us, than by us exercising our "freedom". The selective urgency proceeds, at the outset at any rate, from the cerebral processes themselves. Remember that we are no longer discussing the mechanical cerebral processes of the materialist or crude dualist. We are considering processes which are themselves psychical and which, in ordinary outward perception, visual and other, *we could only aware mediately and from the outside*. The esoteric life—the nuclear reality—of the cerebral processes, may comprise the very content of which; in perceiving, we are directly aware. And there exists an, at any rate, tolerable hypothesis as to why this content is relatively so limited in the regards both of variety and amount.¹

What now of M. Bergson's belief that "in pure perception we are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch the reality of the object in an immediate intuition" (p. 84)—are *in things themselves*?

Of course, as Martineau, not without German inspiration, urged so admirably, perceived objects do not result from grouped 'sensations,' but imply dissociation; the carving out of things from a primitive continuum. And the objects in question are not inferred into externality, but are directly felt to be what they appear. The continuum is the first confused object and the attentions concern only its aspects. We aware, then, such objects just as they are—in the continuum. *But where does the continuum itself lie?* Surely it is part of the psychical life-content of the cortex, of that rich life which, for our very narrow human experience, is almost lost in the subconscious.—Now this cortical life is certainly continuous with the life of Nature which envelops it. And happenings in this enveloping Nature interpenetrate and colour cortex-happenings. Consequently, when I aware

¹ *Individual and Reality*, pp. 159-167.

directly the *shadow-object* called a 'tree,' I am *also* in a manner aware of the trans-cortical fact which casts the shadow — of the so-called thing-by-itself (which, like our workaday sun, must be held present *wherever its influence works*). On the other hand, I am not aware of the complete trans-cortical tree, and, in fact, part of the business of science consists in teaching me in symbols, often, it must be allowed, exceedingly poor, what this very complex tree is. This nuclear reality, which 'telepaths' multiple versions of itself in all directions, is part of that macrocosm, which, as I should urge, belongs to the Cosmic Imagination.

If, however, the nuclear reality, as archetypal, is not adequately known through its ectypes in human experience, there is justification for some form of the old belief in the thing-by-itself. But, after all, the thing-by-itself is only *more* of the same kind of thing that already we know sensibly. And it is the peculiar limitations of human existence (not an inherently unknowable character) which part the thing-by-itself from our present experience. The nuclear reality might be known entirely and directly—if I was, say, a super-human of an exalted grade.

We reach, in fine, this result. The belief in Things-in-themselves is not wholly illusory. The 'self-existent image,' as M. Bergson would call it, is not the same as the 'image' of which I am aware and which exists only for my experience. But potentially, *i.e.* under conceivable novel conditions, it is knowable through and through. And, indeed, there may exist beings who include it, and even our phantasmal knowledges about it, in a direct experience.

If now we abandon the world of mechanical philosophers, we must hold steadfastly to our decision. Thus the brain, if it be a psychical complex in a psychical Nature, cannot be such that "it adds nothing to what it receives" (p. 19). Nothing can announce itself in the cerebral region without being altered thereby.¹ Further, though we have to accept continuity and penetration as characterising Nature, we must recall also that between the cortex and other 'self-existent images' there may exist distorting media which alter what they convey. Even within a psychical macrocosm we may be confronting objects in great measure peculiar to our circles of experience.

¹ Even in the case of light which must qualify the macrocosm as well as the objects which I perceive, we have according to M. Bergson "contractions" to bear in mind. And these contractions introduce "more differentiated moments" into the "diluted" events which they contract. Cf. p. 275.

How, now, are we to use M. Bergson's views in the regard of *Dualism*? What precisely is the character of the alliance between Spirit and Brain? Is there a monad which "selects" the perceived presentations, and, if so, what is its relation to the cerebral processes which, as now re-interpreted, are found to be psychical themselves? Does the monad "detach" objects actively, or is it just the process of "detachment" hypostatized? Are we not, in this treatment of perception, driven back on all the difficulties about the soul which beset Lotze? Much will be heard later of Spirit in connexion with Memory, but Spirit must first have presentations before it can recall them, and we want to know how, if dualistically conceived, the partnership of Spirit and brain works?

Later, however, we have the statement "that the humblest function of spirit is to bind together the successive moments of the durations of things" (p. 295), by which act it comes into contact with matter [Nature?] and is first distinguished from matter. This binding, even in respect of concrete perception, implies memory. "In concrete perception memory intervenes, and the subjectivity of sensible qualities is due precisely to the fact that our consciousness, *which begins by being only memory*, prolongs a plurality of moments into each other *contracting* them into a single intuition" (p. 292). It is not shown, however, how Spirit comes into contact with "matter," so that "the plurality of moments" is felt in its consciousness at all. If its work at first is to "contract," it must get a grip on the data to be contracted. And its relation to brain-action, in respect of the grip, remains quite obscure.

Again, in respect of the "contractions" which condense an indefinite multiplicity of events, *e.g.*, in the sensible quality "red," is it necessary to appeal to Spirit? Does Spirit work unconsciously or consciously in thus condensing sense data for insect and man? If unconsciously, could not the unconscious nervous processes do the work equally well? And, if consciously, does this gifted oversoul work *simultaneously* with the phenomenal consciousness of bee, black-beetle, or man? Is it conscious alike of the plurality to be contracted and of the contraction which it is able to effect? Note that Spirit is not enjoying any sinecure. At first it was useful just to 'detach' objects from the 'totality of objects,' but now it has, also, to "contract," and thus, in a manner, to create, that which is to be detached. And while thus "contracting" natural events into qualities, and so far *altering them*,¹ it has also to place us as percipients in the

¹ "To perceive consists in condensing enormous periods of an infinitely diluted existence into a few more differentiated moments of an intenser life" (p. 275).

actual presence of the contracted events themselves.¹ Is it not being asked to do a little too much?

A fundamental difference, according to M. Bergson, between perception and *affection* is that the one is outside, the other within my body. The organism does not merely reflect action received from without—it absorbs also a part of it. When, for instance, this absorbed action damages a sensitive element, there arises pain which is felt where it happens.² "Pain is nothing but the effort of the damaged element to set things right—a kind of motor tendency in a sensory nerve. Every pain, then, must consist in an effort,—an effort which is doomed to be unavailing . . . a *local effort*" (p. 56). Do we gain enough, however, by labelling pains in this way as 'efforts'? What definition of effort has the writer in mind? Granting (as I agree) that there is truth in the absorption theory and in that of the local struggle [as notified to the cortex], is the peculiar speciality of pain sufficiently understood? Perhaps there is no better account to be given than that which describes pain as a feeling of thwarted life. But the attempt to connect this account with the behaviour of nerve-tissue would require a fuller theory of Nature than the one M. Bergson formulates in this book. We should have to leave the shelter of general assertions respecting 'penetration' and 'continuity' and descend into detail—into the depths where the *minor psychical centres*, which make Nature discrete as well as continuous, struggle and interact.

In later portions of the work M. Bergson rejects the crude atomistic realism which sees in "matter" a composite made up of more or less independent extended parts as unlike spirit as conceptual ingenuity can make them. He endeavours to tone down the familiar contrast of Spirit and Nature, and, getting rid of the absurdly artificial world of realism and mathematical symbology, finds that "the material universe itself, defined as the totality of images, is a kind of consciousness, a consciousness in which everything compensates and neutralises everything else, a consciousness of which all the potential parts, balancing each other by a reaction which is always equal to the action, reciprocally hinder each other from standing out". Spirit also on its side is made to approach this Nature. In *Time and Free-Will*, as we shall recall, "sensations," "feelings," "passions," "efforts," etc., are treated as "inextensive," and, consequently, not to be discussed as quantities. But in *Matter and Memory* a truer

¹ "My consciousness of matter is not subjective, for it is in things rather than in me" (p. 306).

² Even when felt in the toe of an amputated leg?

view is advanced. "We must make up our minds to it. Sensation is, in its essence, extended and localised."¹ "My actual sensations occupy definite portions of the surface of my body."² "Material extensity is not, cannot any longer be, that composite extensity which is considered in geometry; it indeed resembles rather the undivided extension of our own representation,"³ and so forth. It is true that Bergson still regards *pure* memory as unextended, but only so long as it is not "actualised in an image."⁴ The memory-images with which ordinary introspection deals are extended. Obviously Spirit and Nature—from whose wealth perception merely extracts its own—have come very close together, and the puzzle why M. Bergson has elected to be a dualist will recur. This consideration brings us to a brief notice of his views on "Memory". If the shadowy dualism, now alone possible, is to be defended, a barrier not of degree, but of kind, must be erected between pure Perception and memory, on the side of which Spirit shows its distinctive character.

Two forms of Memory are discussed—one embodied in "motor mechanisms," the other in recollections which are not dependent on the integrity of the brain. The one is akin to bodily habit and *acts* rather than *re-presents* the past. And the recognition effected by it lies in consciousness of a special attitude adopted by the body, as in the case of a dog greeting his master (p. 93) where the perception mechanically calls a familiar attitude into being. The other form of Memory "records, in the form of memory-images, all the events of our daily life as they occur in time"; it conserves the past integrally with *all its dates and detail* "regardless of utility or practical application". Recognition, effected by this memory, is "intellectual"—the image which emerges from virtuality in the sub-conscious coalescing with the object to which attention is drawn. "In it we take refuge every time that, in the search for a particular image, we remount the slope of our past" (p. 92). This is the true imaginative, as opposed to the repeating or mechanical memory. Brain lesions merely prevent it from "actualising" images which fuse with sensation and so take on spatial forms as revealed to introspection.

No one is aware directly and always of this integrally conserved past. 'Accordingly, there is resort to the hypothesis of 'internal unconscious states'. Consequently we have to take note that the Intuitionist method, pure and simple, fails

¹ P. 180.

² P. 179.

³ P. 237.

⁴ P. 181.

at this point. It must be supplemented, as I have urged already, by circuitous inference. A similar necessity marks the belief, also espoused by M. Bergson, in unperceived "material" objects.

The first criticism which I offer is that M. Bergson, in contrasting these two forms of memory, makes the motor or habit-memory too mechanical. He contends that "*no trace of an image can remain in the substance of the brain*" (p. 164). Now no one need take seriously the crude physiologists' ways of discussing images as "slumbering, whether as a physico-chemical modification of certain cells or under some other form" (p. 146), and so forth. There are no barely physico-chemical processes in Nature; the category of thinking applied is too inadequate for the facts. And in disposing of belief in the mechanical Nature set up by atomistic realism, in moving towards panpsychism,¹ M. Bergson ought to have got beyond the interpretation of the habit-memory which he now supports. Is he haunted by the ghosts of defunct mechanical hypotheses? Why cannot the brain retain or reproduce memory-images in some form—nay, *consist* inwardly and in part of these? All nature-processes, including, of course, neuroses, are psychical in character. Doubtless there are aspects of Memory which can be discussed as if they are "mechanical," but these same aspects, if we are concerned with truth and not with merely "practical" expositions, must be regarded in a more adequate way. Take the case, just cited, of the dog who greets his master. And allow that the perception evokes a familiar "attitude" of the body. You will have to concede that this attitude characterises a body itself psychical and that, accordingly, the brain must consist of contents akin to the very memory-images which M. Bergson excludes!

The habit-memory, in short, presupposes images just as much as does the other; there remains, however, the inquiry as to whether these images are "stored" or reproduced only on call. Here we take note of that "cerebral memory" which, in a former work, I contrasted with a "spiritual memory" in potency which is independent of brain and "in which both perceptions and ideas are upheld just as they were originally given".² The images of the habit-memory

¹ "No doubt also the material universe itself, defined as the totality of images, is a kind of consciousness" (p. 313).

² Cf. my *ballon d'essai*, *The Riddle of the Universe* (1893, p. 356). I referred, like M. Bergson, to the experiences of persons dying or in trances as attesting its reality. Here also lie the memories of former earth-lives, all educible, perhaps, at some future stage of our evolution.

are often inconspicuous or seemingly absent, but that may be only because the economy of life tends to thrust them below the conscious level. Such absence, as M. Bergson would be able to admit, may be presence in the realm of the sub-conscious—a presence which helps to determine why the habits of the brain are just what they are.

But the main interest lies for the present less with Bergson's motor or habit-memory than with the "recollections" of the "spontaneous" or imaginative memory. It is impracticable to attempt here a *précis* of the interesting researches to be found in *Matter and Memory*—the discussion is a many-sided one and must be studied at first hand. Of vital significance, however, seems the contention that this second memory is independent of the brain and that the facts of 'cerebral localisation' in no way invalidate, but rather bear out, this view.¹ "The alleged destruction of memories by an injury to the brain is but a break in the continuous progress by which they actualise themselves."² But, if we are to concede the independence, how are we to think about the working, of this spontaneous memory? The reply is that complete perception "is only defined and distinguished by its coalescence with a memory-image which we send forth to meet it. Only thus is attention secured. . . . But on the other hand . . . the memory-image, if it remained pure memory, would be ineffectual. Virtual, this memory can only become actual by means of the perception which attracts it. Powerless, it borrows life and strength from the present sensation in which it is materialised. Does not this amount to saying that distinct perception is brought about by two opposite currents, of which the one centripetal, comes from the external object, and the other, centrifugal, has for its point of departure that which we term 'pure memory'? The first current, alone, would only give a passive perception with the mechanical reactions which accompany it. The second, left to itself, tends to give a recollection that is actualised—more and more actual as the current becomes more marked. Together these two currents make up at their point of confluence, the perception that is distinct and recognised."³

The recollection which is "attracted" by a perception and just completes it comes into the present, I gather, in a spontaneous way. But suppose that we are interested in

¹ *Matter and Memory*, p. 160.

² *Ibid.*, 131-162, for a most able discussion of the bearing of the 'cerebral localisation' facts on the question of memory.

³ Pp. 162-163

a recollection for its own sake. In this case "we become conscious of an act *sui generis* by which we detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in the past in general, then in a certain region of the past. . . . But our recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; and as its outlines become more distinct and its surface takes on colour, it tends to imitate perception. But it remains attached to the past by its deepest roots, and if, when once realised, it did not retain something of its original virtuality, if, being a present state, it were not also something which stands out distinct from the present, we should never know it for a memory."¹ The home of the emergent recollection is 'pure memory' which lies in the sub-conscious, unattached to the present, unextended. Pure memory is powerless "as long as it remains without utility". The result of the 'condensation,' the recollected image, "is a present state and its sole share in the past is the memory whence it arose". It is sensational and extended. It is one of those things which are "being made," as contrasted with past things which are "*made*" (cf. p. 193). In so far as my "sensori-motor present" requires, in a practical reference, the illumination derivable from past experience, pure memory is condensed into guiding images. Movements mark out the field of possible action and thereby determine what images are to be condensed. Useless memories are inhibited by the present attitude of the body which attracts only what lights action and leaves all else merely virtual in the night of the unconscious.

There is much in the above-cited account which requires comment. How, for example, does a percept 'attract' a memory-image? For 'attraction,' if we are not playing with metaphor, presupposes a lessening of (or *nisus* to lessen) spatial remoteness, and memory, while virtual or 'pure,' is not supposed to be extended and juxtaposed with present existences at all! How is the merely virtual, which no longer acts, provoked into the form of an image? The difficulty is formidable. Elsewhere there are passages which represent the *body* as taking up an "attitude" towards an object which may "*call back* its memory-image" (p. 120) or—ought we not rather to say?—may provoke the pure memory to *actualise* this image. But how can the *body* succeed, unless somehow it contains the percept? We did

¹ P. 171.

not understand how a *percept* can be said to 'attract' a virtual image, but we shall be utterly at a loss to conceive how the body, which does not contain the percept, can do so! Recall that we are told that "no trace of an image can remain in the substance of the brain" (p. 164). If there were a "trace" present in a subordinate *cerebral memory*, a way might lie open to the deeper memory; an image therein (if it be that images are preserved there integrally) rising once more to the conscious level as the "trace," growing intense, furthered it.¹ But a bare mechanical attitude is out of touch with the hypothetical sub-conscious images and *a fortiori* with a merely virtual memory.

A part-source of this confusion is near to seek. M. Bergson has not allowed panpsychism to permeate thoroughly his thinking. Although in one passage he declares that the 'material universe' is a kind of consciousness, he assumes, nevertheless, that the cortex contains movements indeed, but no imagery. But since the cortex is part of the 'material universe,' it is surely, like this, psychical in character. And like other 'material' objects, it must have an inward as well as an outward side (as perceived). It may possess an inward aspect where lie contents such as memories. No mere movements happen within it—rather qualitative content-changes which are more than, but include, spatial re-arrangement. It must be treated as 'eject' as well as object. If so, it is a field in which images can be either stored or reproduced. And we have to ask to what extent this subordinate cerebral memory enters into our voluntary life and how it is allied with that deeper memory in which M. Bergson and I alike believe.

The other part-source of the confusion is the contention that the deeper memory must needs be "virtual". "Virtual" can only mean that it is such that, under conditions *not always complete*, it can become spatial and sensational, etc. The trouble is that these conditions cannot be completed! Not from the side of the percept or body, as we have just seen. And not from the side of the pure memory. For the pure memory is a "*made thing*" which belongs to the past and "*the past is essentially that which acts no longer*" (p. 74). Theoretically, then, the pure memory can do nothing whatever. But you will find, nevertheless, in following M. Bergson's oscillatory thought, that it rises from its decreed trance to do a good deal, *e.g.* when he rings it up for a spell

¹ A prenatal memory might emerge in this way. Cf. *Individual and Reality*, p. 355.

of "spontaneous" work or when our past indwelling in our characters is found to influence each and all of our present acts.

There is another way of discussing a 'spiritual memory,' on which, however, I cannot dwell now. Suffice it to suggest that memories which are sub-conscious, and independent of the brain, need not, for that, be non-spatial. If memory-images, as directly known, are spatial, why not the inferred sub-conscious memories as well?¹ Such memories may be allied with a superphysical organism just as the vaguely defined cerebral memory is with the life of our familiar body.² Take note here, that if you want to preserve memories, as does Bergson, *integrally*, with dates and details complete, you must suppose them persisting as concrete images, or rather as an image-continuum (for we require no floating ideas)—you must not banish them to a mystical realm of 'virtuality' in which they are non-spatial, non-sensational and indeed quite transformed. But I cannot do more than indicate such contentions now.

Verily Intuitionism has to be supplemented freely with inference. How little we know or, at present, can know by direct vision!

When M. Bergson says that in recalling the past I "replace" myself in it, am I to take his words literally? For the actualised images, at any rate, are present facts and the 'pure' memories, whence they emerge, are not confronted at all. And even if they were confronted, they would not resemble the lapsed primary realities for which memories are supposed to stand. The watch which I owned twenty years ago and which is no longer part of the 'material world,' is not mirrored faithfully even in 'pure memory,' for the virtuality of the watch-image is neither spatial nor sensational, is a sort of novel mental Thing-in-Itself. How, then, do I place myself in the past? Well, I have a direct awareness of a past in the 'specious present,' and I can date certain images, in whatever way I explain their coming, in this direction. But these images do not resurrect what once was—at most they are continuous with certain of my gleanings from it. The watch itself has vanished; and even the watch memory I confront now is not a mere reinstatement of the original memory. It is a continuation

¹ "Non-perceived material objects," which are spatial, have to be imagined as a kind of "unconscious mental state" (p. 183). Hence M. Bergson will find no difficulty in imagining spatial unconscious memories.

² Cf. *Individual and Reality*, pp. 336-340, and elsewhere.

of it, but this continuation, though considerably modified, prolongs the original memory in time. Just as *in space* the sun can be said to be present wherever its influence is felt, —even though the nuclear orb is far away,—so *in time* the watch is present in the first memory of it and through the first memory in the last memory. Thus in recalling a memory, however derived, I am in a manner continuous with its remote primitive object—I am, at the same time, both aloof from and in touch with the past. There is a more formidable riddle to be solved when we come to ask why memory, which is not merely an endowment of conscious life, should occur at all. I shall deal with this basic riddle in the course of penning my new work.

The foundations of the new dualism are now laid bare. The radical distinction between Spirit and Nature must, according to M. Bergson, be stated in terms of *time*. And the dividing line is found in his Memory. "We can understand that spirit can rest upon matter and consequently unite with it in the act of pure perception . . . it is distinct from matter in that it is, even then, *memory*, that is to say a synthesis of past and present with a view to the future, in that it contracts the moments of this matter in order to use them and to manifest itself by actions which are the final aim of its union with the body,"¹ and anon "if, in fact, the humblest function of spirit is to bind together the successive moments of the duration of things, if it is by this that it comes into contact with matter and by this also that it is first of all distinguished from matter, we can conceive an infinite number of degrees between matter and fully developed spirit—a spirit capable of action which is not only undetermined, but also reasonable and reflective. Each of these successive degrees, which measures a growing intensity of life, corresponds to a higher tension of duration and is made manifest externally by a greater development of the sensorimotor system."²

The hypothesis of the 'virtual' memory is not, I have endeavoured to show, satisfactory. I have now to take note of a further and most formidable difficulty.

"Spirit borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds."³ Prior, then, to the 'union with the body' there is no virtual memory, since no perceptions drawn from "matter" have gone to constitute it! What, then, is this "unfed" and memory-less Spirit which comes to body? Here is a novel Thing-in-Itself which is characterless. It

¹ *Matter and Memory*, p. 294.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 295-296.

³ P. 332.

'contracts'—it 'detaches'—it creates ever-novel phases of 'tension'. But all this activity is subsequent to the union with the body. And I am unable to discern either what is working or how precisely the work is being done.

I have no space in which to dwell on what I believe to be the exaggerated importance attached to motor response in this work. Motor activity is, after all, only a department of our larger activities and it is far from clear that even perceptions are always harnessed to adaptive movements.¹ On the higher æsthetic and intellectual levels conscious activities may show only incidental relations to motor responses and often none at all. Nothing could be more misleading than to bring all my spiritual life into the business of moving about the body or parts of it.

I have not discussed M. Bergson's accounts of general ideas, association, the different planes of consciousness, and much else. My criticism has concerned only fundamental difficulties which a work, admirable in point of style and interest, has suggested.

¹ My perceptions of drowsiness on awaking, for instance. Hours of this experience may leave me a merely cognitive consciousness.