

II.—MORAL SENSE, MORAL REASON, AND MORAL SENTIMENT.

By E. W. HIRST.

IT is matter of general agreement that we approve or disapprove of conduct. It is, also, usual to ascribe such functions to a 'Conscience'. As, however, controversy upon the psychology of Conscience has just been revived, especially by Dr. Hastings Rashdall, it is desirable to see how far recent discussion has cleared the issues and helped towards a satisfactory solution of the problem.

I.

There is, at the outset, the well-known doctrine of the *Æsthetic Intuitionists* that we distinguish the ethical nature of actions by means of what they sometimes speak of as an inner 'Sense,' called by Hutcheson a 'Moral Sense'. By this comparison of Conscience to a 'Sense' it was intended to emphasise the immediacy and ultimacy which are often found in moral judgments. Nor can it be denied that, in proportion as character is mature, there is apparent in ethical deliverances just that immediacy and ultimacy to which the school drew attention.

But almost from the very beginning this doctrine of a Moral Sense has been subjected to criticisms now quite familiar. It has been pointed out that the activity of a sense is mostly special in kind, implying differentiation of organs with appropriate functioning, whereas the moral consciousness has cognitive, affective and conative aspects which indicate that the mind as a whole is at work.

It must, however, be conceded that the term 'sense' was badly chosen to express the teaching of the pioneers of the school. Indeed Shaftesbury regarded this moral 'Sense' as more than a power of observation, as even a Spring of action, as a 'kind of Affection towards Affections,' and as provoking in a man 'concern' for the good or ill of the species. Such functions, it is, of course, impossible to ascribe to a mere

sense. Moreover, Hutcheson allowed that this 'Sense' could be trained, much as musical taste is developed by cultivation. Indeed the real view of the School is more accurately represented by the idea of a Moral Taste; and Shaftesbury declares that this so-called Sense 'feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and disagreeable in the affections, and finds a foul and fair, a harmonious and dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any musical numbers or in the outward forms and representations of sensible things'.¹

Dr. Rashdall, in his recent book, *Is Conscience an Emotion?* appears to us scarcely to do justice to the real teaching of this school. We cannot find, as he declares, that either Shaftesbury or Hutcheson held that moral approbation was 'simply a particular sort of feeling or emotion'.² There is, on the contrary, distinct recognition by these writers of the cognitive aspect of moral experience. The Moral Sense was operative, they said, only so far as a man could 'think about' his actions. 'If a creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect on what he himself does, or sees others do, so as to take notice of what is worthy or honest; and make that notice or conception of worth or honesty to be an object of his affection, he has not the character of being virtuous, for thus and no otherwise he is capable of having a sense of Right and Wrong.'

Hutcheson even went so far in his recognition of the intellectual character of the Moral Sense as to hold that it supplied 'justifying reasons' for action, although such justification was not of a discursive nature, but depended upon 'some immediate disposition or determination of soul'.

Nor do we follow Dr. Rashdall in his further criticism that 'on the moral sense view there is simply no meaning in asking which of the disputants is right and which is wrong. A colour-blind man is not wrong when he sees no difference between a red light and a green one. . . . Mustard is not objectively nice or objectively nasty. It is simply nice to one man and nasty to another, and that is the whole truth about the matter. . . . If morality were a mere matter of feeling or emotion, our moral judgments would be in exactly the same case.'³

Now both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were aware of the lack of uniformity in moral judgments, and Hutcheson especially urged that the moral 'sense' could be trained like

¹ *Characteristics*, ii., 29.

² *Is Conscience an Emotion?* (Fisher Unwin, 1914), p. 3; cf. also, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 149.

³ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 31.

musical taste. Shaftesbury in his *Rhapsody* is at pains to point out, in answer to objectors who say that right and wrong are mere matters of opinion, the extravagance and absurdity of their objections, and remarks that 'all own the standard Rule and Measure, but in applying it to things, disorder arises'.

And these admissions do not necessarily compromise the 'objectivity' of moral distinctions when once it is realised that they are 'sensed' in a quasi-aesthetic manner. Doubtless, there is no appeal beyond sense when sense is physically understood and the immediate experience alone regarded. If a food tastes nice, so far it is nice. But this is scarcely 'the whole truth about the matter'. For there is a certain 'objectivity' even in matters of physical taste. It is commonly agreed that mustard is yellow and pungent. Anyone who said that mustard was purple would be regarded as 'colour-blind,' and the very idea of colour-blindness is a testimony to the existence among men of a certain normality in physical vision. Dr. Rashdall himself goes very far in this direction when he admits that 'it may indeed be contended that there is an æsthetic, and, therefore, an objective element even in gastronomic matters. If so, we must substitute some pleasure of a still more purely sensuous type.'¹ But is it possible to find a pleasure so 'purely sensuous' that it is destitute of any objective element? If it is to be identifiable at all, it must have objectivity.

Objectivity is still more clearly traceable in judgments of art. In spite of the diversity of opinion as to what in particular is beautiful, the appreciation of beauty is no merely subjective experience. A particular poem or picture is beautiful, not simply because some one has said so. No doubt the opinions of connoisseurs are influential and supply guidance. But the beauty of an artistic object never rests on the mere *ipse dixit* of the critic. There exist canons of beauty. And it is always assumed that the critic could justify his judgment by reasons capable of making an objective appeal. In a Note² Dr. Rashdall admits, as he had done in his larger and earlier work,³ that the æsthetic judgment may be objective, but goes on to say, incorrectly as it seems to us, that 'this is not recognised by those against whom I am arguing'. Surely the 'Moral Sense,' as above understood, may possess an objectivity similar to that of æsthetic judgments, and compatible with diversity in indi-

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., note, p. 146.

² *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 172.

³ *Theory of Good and Evil*, note, p. 178, vol. i.

vidual opinion. And we have the interesting statement of Shaftesbury that virtue is 'really something in itself and in the nature of things: not arbitrary or factitious . . . constituted from without, or dependent on custom, fancy, or will: not even on the Supreme Will itself, which can no way govern it: but being necessarily good, is governed by it, and ever uniform with it'.¹

Diversity in individual opinions compromises neither the 'impartiality' nor the 'consistency' of moral judgments. Their impartiality and independence of individual opinion may not, and does not, prevent actual differences of individual view due to personal circumstances and causes. And as for the criterion of 'consistency,' no doubt the verdicts of the colour-blind disagree with those of the normal-sighted, but such disagreement does not disprove the existence of normality in human vision, but only shows its possibility of perversion in the case of some whose organ of sight is judged peculiar. Nor is the apparent inconsistency of moral judgments due to different verdicts on the same case. Absolute inconsistency could be established only where the cases were proved to have been regarded in strictly the same way. But such proof is impossible, if for no other reason than that in concrete experience cases never are precisely the same. To expect such a state of things would be to demand in the sphere of human activity a uniformity which is quite unsuitable, because mechanical. It is to be remembered in passing that Adam Smith tried to correct those diversities of judgment in the 'Moral Sense' which are due to the partiality of thought caused by the agent's self-love, by his doctrine of Sympathy with the judgments of an ideal and impartial spectator. But it does not seem possible to do away altogether with all instances of diversity. Some of the so-called 'inconsistencies' are natural and inevitable. Nor does Dr. Rashdall obviate them by his own theory of Conscience.

There is, however, one grave weakness in the Moral Sense doctrine. As has often been indicated, it does not sufficiently secure the 'authority' of morality: it does not differentiate the Moral from the Æsthetic judgment in respect of the quality of obligation usually ascribed to the former. Shaftesbury, indeed, makes little difference in this respect between the two kinds of 'knowledge'. In the *Inquiry* he writes: 'When we say, therefore, of a creature that he has wholly lost the sense of right and wrong, we suppose that being able to discern the Good or Ill of the species he has at the

¹ *Characteristics*, ii., 267.

same time no concern for either'. Shaftesbury does not sufficiently elucidate this element of 'concern' as distinguishing the moral consciousness. But it is an experience of this kind, an experience of constraint, which is an essential characteristic of the ethical, as it is not of the æsthetic, judgment. The term 'Sense' suggests rather 'passivity' (not absolutely so, of course), though, as expounded by Shaftesbury, the 'Moral Sense' is a spring of action, a strong motive, and a bias of the nature towards conduct of a particular kind. Of course, those whose æsthetic taste is bad will feel more or less 'constrained' by the antagonistic judgments of their fellows who accept different canons or come to different conclusions. In the same way, too, those who are not normal in their moral taste will in some way be 'constrained' by the pressure exerted by a different ethical fashion.

But when all similarity between the two types of judgment has been allowed for, it will be found that the 'obligation' to cultivate correct views on art essentially differs from the duty of manifesting right conduct. For correct æsthetic opinions seem to depend on a certain involuntary factor, on 'a kind of mental capacity';¹ and this fact considerably modifies their obligatory nature. Moreover, the obligation to a right æsthetic taste primarily regards the intelligence, whereas that of the moral judgment exercises a direct constraint over the will. Accordingly, moral judgments deal with the regulation of life as a whole, and have to decide what place the cultivation of art and the formation of a good æsthetic taste shall take relatively to that whole. Thus moral obligation is of an absolute kind; its authority is complete and supreme. We say a man 'ought' to do right as we do not say he 'ought' to think correctly about art; nor do we blame those whose æsthetic judgment is at fault as we condemn those whose conduct is bad.

Shaftesbury, it is to be admitted, has little to say respecting the 'claims' of the Moral Sense when these are no longer presented by sheer strength. For one thing, he overlooked the power of the 'self-affections' and their tendency to assert themselves to such an extent as to disturb the 'balance' of the passions. He, therefore, is practically silent about the need for self-denial and the obligatoriness of virtue.

And yet, in the discovery of moral 'authority,' is it possible on merely psychological lines to get much further than the Æsthetic Intuitionists reached? Sooner or later, the mind must arrive at what, for direct experience, is simply

¹ Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 183, note.

an ultimate value. Indeed, it is interesting to see that Dr. Rashdall, 'rationalist' as he is in his psychology of conscience, coincides in this view. 'We have no reason for believing anything,' he says, 'except the fact that we cannot help believing it.'¹ He also observes that 'the existence of a distinct category of moral obligation or value must be a matter of immediate consciousness'.² Duty is duty, he insists, simply because it is 'an inexpugnable notion'.³ Even Butler, the champion of the magisterial function of conscience, does not proceed far beyond this point. He does no more to secure the authority of conscience than by naming it 'a principle of reflection' whose 'superiority' is self-evident, and whose supremacy is 'natural'.⁴ In other words, 'he gives a mere psychology of the moral life. . . . He is willing in the main to rest in the immediate and authoritative approval of conscience, without investigating the object of its approval or the basis of its authority.'⁵ Surely, as a matter of immediate experience, this seems all the authority that can be got. It is, however, not all the authority we need, nor all that is obtainable. Indeed, both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson confess that the 'authority' for the Moral Sense must be shown elsewhere, by having recourse to a law outside that given by human nature, *i.e.*, to the law of a Divine Superior promulgated with sanctions of reward and punishment. Hutcheson, in particular, remarks that the Moral Sense needs 'corroborating' by religious belief, and that 'the word "obligation" is sometimes taken for a strong motive of interest constituted by the will of some potent superior to engage us to act as he requires'. This seems to base obligation on the constraint exerted by the hedonistic motive. But he goes on to say: 'In describing the Superior who can constitute obligation we not only include sufficient force or power, but also a just right to govern: and this justice or right will lead again to a moral faculty'. In such a passage, Hutcheson seems to realise the need for a justification of the alleged (by him) magisterial function of the Moral Sense which in his *System of Moral Philosophy* he affirms to have 'a dignity and commanding nature of which we are immediately conscious'—a statement, however, which, being written several years later than Butler's *Sermons*, may reflect their teaching.

So much, then, may be said regarding the School of Moral Sense and its view of the objectivity and authority of moral judgments.

¹ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 39. ² *Op. cit.*, p. 94.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 39. ⁴ *Sermon on Human Nature*, ii.

⁵ Seth, *Ethical Principles*, 9th ed., p. 177.

II.

It is necessary, in the second place, to examine the views of those who regard Conscience as essentially Rational or Intellectual in nature. These views have been most recently urged by Dr. Hastings Rashdall, whose lectures and published works have placed all students of ethics under lasting obligation, and whose contributions to the psychology of Conscience, in particular, deserve the fullest respect and the most careful examination. Nevertheless, the writer finds it difficult to accept his teaching on the nature of Conscience as it is developed in the chapter on 'Reason and Feeling' in the *Theory of Good and Evil* and latterly in his book *Is Conscience an Emotion?* Dr. Rashdall strenuously maintains that only as moral judgments are the work of Reason can their objectivity and authority be assured. Reason, he says, enunciates for our moral guidance certain axioms,—which turn out to be those maxims of 'Equity' and 'Rational Benevolence' of which Sidgwick makes so much use in his *Methods of Ethics*. But no sooner have these been mentioned than the author admits that they are only quantitative principles, and have no direct relation to conduct: they concern only the distribution of 'good' after its nature has been otherwise determined. Whether such quantitative maxims are of any primary and essential importance in Ethics is closely connected with the question as to the nature of 'good'. If they are given such an importance they demand, at least, that good shall be quantitative and measurable. The axiom that the greater good ought always to be preferred to the less is really inapplicable save as goods are commensurable both within the life of the individual and also as between the individual and the community. Any qualitative differences of good must be expressible in terms of quantity. Other individuals, also, become of no more significance than to supply additional units to the aggregate of good. Even the axiom of Equity that 'one man's good is of as much intrinsic worth as the like good of another' becomes cogent in itself only as 'like' means 'equal quantities of'.

This attempt to make a rigorously quantitative application of the axioms to Ethics reveals, we think, its own irrelevance. The axiom of Equity, for instance, which regards of equal worth equal quantities of good in the lives of different men, allows no authorisation of the act whereby a man in battle gives his life for his neighbour and thus, so far from 'equating'

or merging his 'good,' negatives and eliminates it.¹ Neither does the axiom show any relation to the real crux of the ethical problem. The individual is prone to prefer his own 'good' to that of others, not because it is quantitatively superior, but really because he has a bias that leads him to exalt himself and subordinate the claims of the rest of society. This is a qualitative experience of superior worth, and no merely quantitative considerations can show it to be unreasonable. For it is a case where the 'part' is supposed greater than the 'whole'; in other words, where the individual uses society as a means to his own ends.

Dr. Rashdall seems at first² to contend for this rigorously quantitative application of the axioms, though he afterwards appears to shrink from it. He says later that 'goods' are commensurable 'only for the purpose of choosing between them'. He instances the case of a man's having a sum of money to spend, and being in doubt as to whether it is best spent on Churches, Colleges, or Hospitals. Strictly speaking, on Dr. Rashdall's view, the man's duty can be decided only by statistics of results. What is more is that any man having the same sum of money to give must allot it in the same way. Duty, if it differs at all, does not differ for individuals, but only according to the amount of substance to be used or energy to be expended.

Now if 'goods' are commensurable 'only for the purposes of choice,' such a condition would not appear to be more than a practical limitation. There does not seem anything in such a condition to forbid their being really commensurable at any time; and, in spite of what Dr. Rashdall says, there does not appear to be any reason why 'a certain amount of one good should not be regarded as a sufficient and satisfactory substitute for another,' much in the same way as a sovereign may be expressed in paper, gold, silver, or copper.³ Which form value takes would then seem to depend on 'taste'—in which case the teaching in question would seem to reduce to a particularly crude form of Moral Sense doctrine!

¹ Clearly he eliminates 'his own' good. Nor by dying does he equate it with an increased aggregate of good save on the difficult supposition that his mere death makes a contribution of maximal quantity. Besides, do men die to swell an aggregate?

² *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. ii., chap. i.

³ Indeed, Dr. Rashdall categorically says: 'It is always right to choose the greater good. Such a doctrine implies that goods of all kinds can be compared, that we can place goods of all kinds on a single scale, and assign to each its value relatively to the rest.'—*Ibid.*, ii., 38.

Another difficulty is created by Dr. Rashdall's contention that this choice between 'goods' has relation to the effect of our conduct on other people,¹ and that as far as the individual is concerned there is really only one 'good,' i.e., his duty.² 'For the agent himself it can never, we have admitted, be right to prefer his own lower to his own higher good, for the simple reason that to do right is always his own highest good.'³ But why, if there is a sole good for ego, should not 'good' also be sole for alter? Otherwise we have a glaring instance of that Dualism of the Practical Reason to which he himself has drawn attention in another place.

No doubt we constantly compare alternative ways of acting, but in such comparisons we do not measure 'goods' against one another, but rather ways of realising, promoting, or expressing good. Dr. Rashdall admits⁴ that eating and drinking are 'good' only as conducive to virtue. And our choice as to what will be so conducive is limited. The content of a man's natural satisfaction is settled for him by his instincts, and cannot be quantitatively transposed or varied. Conceivably, some persons may get more happiness out of Art than the pleasures of the table, but unless they ate and drank their very joy in Art would soon fail. And Dr. Rashdall goes far when he allows, as he does, that the 'raw-material' of virtue and vice is the same. Where some choice as to the line of his duty is necessary, the agent must primarily take into account, on the one hand, his circumstances and opportunities, and on the other, his abilities; and then make his actions organic with some controlling purpose. And though, in our opinion, there is only one intrinsic good—duty or virtue—yet, as Mr. Moore has shown in his *Principia Ethica* by means of his principle of 'Organic unities,' 'good' may take the form of a 'whole,' containing as 'parts' constituents which in themselves are not 'goods,' but, nevertheless, inseparable from 'the good'. If, for instance, 'man's inhumanity to man makes thousands mourn,' it is easy to see how man's love to man will include and guarantee human happiness. For the rest, it may be granted that virtue has a quantitative aspect, as has the life of the body, but in neither case does it follow that quantity is of the essence of either.

In his recent work,⁵ however, Dr. Rashdall admits that the real ethical judgment is not primarily quantitative in character, but is rather 'a judgment of value which affirms

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, ii., pp. 42, 43.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 43.

that such and such things are good'. What these things are he hints¹ when, in stating that pleasures differ in quality, he declares that æsthetic culture and intellectual activity are essentially higher forms of good than 'eating,'² goodness or the good-will possessing the highest intrinsic value of all. And the judgment which asserts these superiorities, he says, 'must be a judgment of Reason'.³ 'The notion of intrinsic superiority or right to prevail—which is implied in calling the experience "higher"—is something more than an emotion: it is an intellectual concept.'⁴

Now, it seems to the writer that the intelligence which gives such verdicts must, at least, lack 'objectivity'. For it is not the common view that we are more 'moral' when we are 'thinking' than when we are eating, or that ethical quality attaches to the mere form of activity, the traditional opinion being that moral quality resides in the motive. Once let moral quality depend upon the inherent nature of our activity as being intellectual or physical, then it will follow that none of our so-called 'lower' forms of activity like eating can be indulged without compromise, nor the so-called higher forms exercised without merit. There are times, of course, when the only moral proceeding is to eat food, and when it would be wrong to prefer the study of Plato to the work of mastication. The inferiority of a drunken debauch, which is described as a lower pleasure, does not arise from its physical nature, but from its unsocial motive. A similar physical breakdown, arising from the accidental taking of a drug, would not be denounced as immoral. And similarly the so-called 'higher' pleasures of art and culture are 'higher' only because they tend to be less immediately selfish. There is such a thing as an anti-social æstheticism, and there are also clever scoundrels. At the present time, nothing is more denounced than German 'kultur'.

But apart from the question whether such judgments of value are correct or incorrect, it is far from clear that value is 'an intellectual concept' or that moral objectivity is founded in the Reason. For no consciousness is purely cognitive, and it is impossible that a 'thought-satisfactoriness' should exist in the mind separate and alone. Rather does it seem that consciousness is primarily appetitive in nature, uses thought in its service, and is, moreover, affectively toned. Dr. Rashdall admits this to some extent when he

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

² *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

says: 'Invariably moral judgments imply facts of feeling as part of their ground'.¹ But he goes on to discount this admission by saying 'those feelings need not be the feelings of the person making the judgment,' and implies that they are an 'object' rather than an essential constituent of the judging process. 'They are part of what the moral judgment pronounces to have value.'² It is, says Dr. Rashdall, because I know what pain is that I condemn the sticking of pins into other persons. But to stick pins into a man is not wrong on the mere ground that 'it hurts'. Doctors and dentists hurt others and are not condemned. It is surely through the operation of a certain social instinct within us that we are led to condemn the arbitrary infliction of pain, as we are led to approve its infliction when the intention is beneficent; just as, for the same reason, we approve the squeamishness felt in relation to cannibalistic practices, but disapprove 'a closely analogous repulsion' connected with the work of dissection.³

Yet, when we come to inquire more closely into the psychology of such approval and disapproval, Dr. Rashdall insists that 'the judgment of value . . . is not dictated by the feelings,'⁴ which are, it would seem, never more than the object of the judgment; and he further contends that there may be persons who pronounce such judgments without any accompanying feeling whatsoever.⁵ 'To know that an act causes pain in others,' he says, 'is all that I want to enable me to condemn it.'⁶ It is clear from this that feeling is not regarded as having any organic or essential part in the consciousness of value. We do no more than judge 'about' feeling. This view seems indefensible. It appears to imply, as we have just remarked, that there can exist a purely critical consciousness, feeling entering not as an actual experience, but as merely remembered or imagined. And, in addition to this difficulty, we fail to understand how an affective state, whether remembered or imagined, could be evaluated by a purely cognitive consciousness. 'The proposition that pleasure is good and pain bad . . . is one,' we are told, 'that can be assented to without any emotion whatever.'⁷ Surely the problem is here conceived in a purely abstract manner. It is always some concrete pleasure or pain on which we pass judgment, not, as it seems to us, on the

¹ *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 154.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 155.

³ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 152, and *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 156.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i., p. 164.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, i., p. 169.

⁶ *Ibid.*, i., p. 169 sq.

⁷ *Theory of Good and Evil*, i., p. 170.

ground of a mere rational principle, but rather because of the furtherance or otherwise of some great life-interest, which from the psychological point of view is a process in which feeling or emotion plays an essential part. Curiously enough in one place Dr. Rashdall remarks: 'Even our most abstract thinking is dominated by purpose or interest of some kind'.¹ And yet after admitting that it is always the satisfaction of some desire that is pronounced satisfactory,² he maintains that the part satisfied is the 'intellect'.³

Dr. Rashdall likens too closely the judgment of value to the judgment of fact, whatever similarity may exist between them. 'An object which has merely a meaning for thought, *i.e.*, significance—cannot possess value as such. It must in addition have a meaning for practical experience—it must have some biological significance—it must relate itself to the satisfaction of some vital need.'⁴ 'The worth-judgment of an individual expresses the "affective-volitional" meaning of an object for a subject.'⁵

And while the two kinds of judgment may be too widely separated, there remains the distinction between 'judgments all of whose elements may be theoretically apprehended, and judgments which contain constituents which demand an emotional constataion'.⁶

It is unnecessary, in this connexion, to inquire whether in the worth-experience the element of feeling or desire is the more fundamental, whether in the affective-volitional process it is a 'need' or an 'interest' which is sought to be satisfied. Suffice it to say, the affective element is essential to the value-consciousness.⁷

The 'Rational' school of moralists emphasise one element in the appreciation of virtue, but err in making it exclusive. Though the Moral Sense doctrine is defective, yet in stressing the affective aspect, it recognises the presence of a factor essential to the experience. 'Conscience,' whatever it is, must, at least, involve the activity of the whole nature; and we must, therefore, look for its explanation, not in terms of emotion or intelligence, alone and apart, but along the lines of the mind's natural development.

¹ *Op. cit.*, i., p. 173.

² *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 174.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁴ J. L. McIntyre, *Proceedings Aristol. Soc.*, 1904-1905.

⁵ W. M. Urban, *Valuation*, p. 28.

⁶ 'The Problem of the Value-Judgment': D. W. Fisher, *Phil. Rev.*, Nov., 1913.

⁷ 'The values of life are found and enjoyed by us rather than rationally apprehended; and though thought is active in the formation of judgments of value, it does not play an exclusive part.'—Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 358.

III.

Now it is clear that the mind never works by 'faculty,' but as a whole. One psychosis differs from another, not because it contains any element lacking to the other, but only in respect of its complexity of development. And Mr. A. F. Shand has shown us that 'mental activity tends, at first unconsciously, afterwards consciously, to produce and sustain system and organisation'. There is, for instance, the system of the primary emotions and appetites on which our characters are built up. There are the more complex systems formed out of emotions, their excitants and tendencies, which may be called Sentiments, of which Love and Hate are typical examples. The Sentiment of Love, in the form of the Parental Affection, is the primitive sentiment of human nature, based, as it is, upon instincts which are biologically of fundamental importance. The Parental Sentiment is at first operative in the small family group. Subsequently, as the family group comes to be extended by natural growth, intermarriage, and the adhesion of outsiders, the Parental Sentiment enlarges to the more comprehensive Tribal Sentiment. All research goes to show that it was out of this Tribal Sentiment that Morality was born. Morality is, in its origin, 'group-morality,' and the fundamental moral principle was 'Thou shalt stand by thy kin,' tribal custom being the first rule of duty. If, then, Conscience in its primitive form is a regard for the Tribe, its approval and disapproval, it will be obvious that as Westermarck says,¹ 'there can be no moral truth in the sense in which the term is generally used'. That is to say, there can be no deeds, as such, which are intrinsically right, 'right' being at first simply the individual's (probably selfish) regard for what the Tribe demands or prohibits in the interests of its own biological survival. As Hobhouse reminds us, 'Rules of Conduct have risen under the conditions of group-morality, and are tarnished with brutalities incident to the struggle for existence. They have been infected by gross conceptions of magical influence and spiritual resentments.'² But, in spite of the bewildering variety of these rules and their mixed origin, behind them all is the supreme obligation imposed by blood-relationship and neighbourhood to maintain loyalty to the clan. It is clear that there may be as many different systems of customary rule as there are tribes, and that the only kind of ethical objec-

¹ *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, vol. i., p. 17.

² *Morals in Evolution*, p. 547 (1915 ed.).

tivity can be found, not in the detailed practices of the groups, but in that spirit of loyalty common to them all. True, the objectivity was limited, in that the devotion was restricted to each several group. Absolute objectivity, in the case of such a Sentiment, would mean that the object of devotion was so widened as to include a number of groups into a larger unity, until humanity itself was encircled.

As morality in its beginnings is based on the fact of blood-relationship, so its growth, by the inclusion of wider groups into its scope, is negotiated by an extension of the same basis of kinship. Dr. Rashdall remarks: 'I am much more interested in one individual or small group of individuals than in thousands of others who are known to me merely as human beings enumerated in the Census. It is only my Reason which objects to such partiality.'¹ By 'Reason' is here meant the axiom of 'equity':—'one man's good is of equal intrinsic value with the like good of another'.

Now, while undoubtedly this idea of 'equality' has done noteworthy service in Law and Politics from the days of the Roman Stoics to the time of the French Revolution and after, and is still a notion with which we have to work, the narrow scope of the original tribal sentiment would seem to have been widened, not, it is true, by an avoidance of ideas (for intellectual processes play an important part in the development of sentiments),² but by thought congruous to the character of the sentiment. And it seems to us that the widening has taken place, not by means of any conception so quantitative as that of equality, but by the more 'vital' notion of the 'unity' of those outside with those inside the group. The Stoic based his teaching of world-citizenship on the ground that all men were alike the inhabitants of one and the same city, even the city of Zeus. 'Thou art a citizen of the world and a part of it.'³ The notion of the 'equality' of all races before the law, usually regarded as an offspring of Stoic teaching, would seem to depend on the more fundamental idea characteristic of Stoicism that, underlying the life of all men, there is a 'unity,' i.e., the presence in Nature and Humanity of an all-pervading Divine Spirit or Reason. 'The whole universe which you see around you, comprising all things both divine and human, is one. We are members of one great body. Nature has made us

¹ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 162.

² 'All intellectual and voluntary processes are elicited by the system of some impulse, emotion, or sentiment, and subordinated to its end.'—Shand, *Foundation of Character*, p. 67.

³ Arrian, *Discourses of Epictetus*, ii., 10.

relatives when it begat us from the same materials and for the same destinies.'¹ Again, 'Slave yourself, will you not bear with your own brother? he has Zeus as his forefather, is a son of the same loins as yourself and the same descent'.²

Some may and do regard this development of the Tribal into the Humanitarian Sentiment as due to 'Reason' interpreted as 'the impulse toward a coherent whole'.³ But 'Reason' so understood is scarcely the same as 'Reason' as interpreted by Dr. Rashdall, much as he commends Prof. Hobhouse's teaching.⁴ Reason, according to the former, is 'intellectual' rather than conative; it is 'the faculty of apprehending axiomatic truths'.⁵ Whatever we call the universalising tendency by which Tribal develops into Humanitarian Sentiment, the 'whole' thereby effected is not a union of different 'things' into a concept, but a unification of 'selves' by Love. In such a 'whole' the 'parts' exist in some sense for themselves. And the enlargement of the simplest societies does not proceed by means of the influence of any idea like that of equality, but by the notion of an expanding unity, based, at first, upon blood-relationship, intermarriage, and neighbourhood.⁶

Conscience, therefore, is in its origin 'an imitation of Tribal government set up in the breast' of the individual. The social pressure of the Tribe exerted through the Chief gave to the Tribal Sentiment an element of constraint—a constraint of fear which, united with that of the 'love' latent in tribal loyalty, gave to such a Conscience its 'authority'.

From the very beginning, however, a religious form of constraint was exerted through the 'totem' which expressly guarded the unity of the Tribe. Men feared to offend against the community on grounds of religious scruples; for they shrank by any act of 'irreverence' from bringing disaster on the people or incurring anger in their god.⁷ Nations came to have their national gods. The patriotism of Greece and Rome possessed a religious basis. Both Stoicism and Christianity base their doctrine of universal brotherhood on a doctrine of a Divine Fatherhood which, however, is differently conceived in the two cases. Indeed,

¹ Seneca, Ep. xcv.

² Epictetus, quoted by Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, p. 564 (1915 ed.).

³ Hobhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

⁴ *Is Conscience an Emotion?* p. 83.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 134.

⁶ The worship of a physically universal object like the sun or moon tended to destroy tribal narrowness. Cf. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 113.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

Religion and Morality have always been inseparably connected and reciprocally influential.¹

Thus the Religious Sentiment, by combining with the Moral Sentiment, adds to the latter that element of Reverence which is peculiarly characteristic of conscience as we know it.² Shaftesbury was, therefore, suggestive when he spoke of conscience as a reflected sense, by means of which there arises 'another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves (*i.e.*, Pity, Kindness, etc.) which have been already felt and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike'. To the point, also, is the remark of Rauh: 'Notre vrai guide n'est ni l'instinct, ni une pensée transcendante, c'est la réflexion sur l'instinct'.³

In this 'Reverence' are mingled the restraint of Fear and the Impulse of Love in different proportions according to the nature of the religious attitude. And thus Conscience passes over into a Reverence for, or Faith in, Humanity as being a 'unity'.

Whether this attitude is justified, and the authority of conscience, so interpreted, established is a question for a Metaphysic of Ethics. Even the leaders of the Moral Sense school, as we have seen, felt the need for a speculative vindication of their position. From the point of view of consciousness, obligation is a matter of direct experience: duty is 'intuited,' as we say. Its full ground can be made good only by subsequent theory; and in this sense, of course, every moralist is a 'rationalist'. How we come to know what is right is one question; how we know that what we take to be right is 'really' so, is another, and yet necessary question.

¹ Cf. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, 9th ed., p. 313.

² Cf. Mellone, *Principles of Psychology*, p. 255.

³ Quoted by Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, vol. i., p. 155, note.