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***The Psychology of Religion.* George Albert Coe. University of Chicago Press. 1916. Pp. xviii, 365. \$1.50.**

Luther A. Weigle

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ing. Of importance second only to the letters themselves are the annotations and elucidations of the editor interspersed throughout the book. The charge so often made against technical works, that they mean nothing to the man not an expert, cannot hold in this case, for even the unversed reader will be able to find his way with the help of the editor's guide-posts. Worthy of notice are, finally, several letters in facsimile, and especially the fine portrait of Wesley, which exhibits all the forcefulness and strength of his dominating personality.

This collection does not claim to contain all of Wesley's letters. Hence its value is conditioned by the sense of proportion evinced by the editor in selecting the material at his disposal. Criticism is easy as regards an individual's personal judgment. In this case, however, very little of an adverse nature is in place. For purposes of research, indeed, other works in addition to this must be consulted. We miss, however, a few letters which may well have been included, such as the one written to Lady Huntingdon, Sept. 14, 1772; the circular letter to the members of the United Societies, Oct. 18, 1776; and the letter to Miss Bishop, Oct. 18, 1778, which contains the following characteristic and discriminating remark of Wesley: "I find more profit in sermons on either good tempers or good works, than in what are vulgarly called Gospel sermons. That term has now become a mere cant word. . . . Let but a pert, self-sufficient animal, that has neither sense nor grace, bawl out something about Christ, or his blood, or justification by faith, and his hearers cry out, 'What a fine Gospel sermon!'" (Works, VII, p. 241 f., 3rd American Ed.).

Until we get Wesley's correspondence in full, critically annotated, George Eayrs's collection will take its place beside Curnock's standard edition of the Journal as an additional source of the life of England's St. Francis.

A. W. NAGLER.

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION. GEORGE ALBERT COE. University of Chicago Press. 1916. Pp. xviii, 365. \$1.50.

The psychology of religion, Professor Coe holds, "is properly nothing but an expanded chapter of general psychology." The phrase well indicates the general character of his work. The book stands out among those of its field for its fidelity to empirical fact, for the consistency with which it maintains the point of view and

employs the methods of natural science, and — what follows from this — for its value as a contribution to general psychology.

The discussion of methodology is especially clear and adequate. The psychology of religion must be analytic, of course, and structural, for religious experiences, like all others, "have a mechanism." But these experiences concern themselves increasingly, as we move upward in the scale of religions, with *ends* or *values*, with the *realization* of life; and the psychology of religion therefore should be predominantly functional. Professor Coe is not content, however, with current notions as to what the functional point of view in psychology may mean. In Chapter II, on "The Psychology of Mental Mechanisms and the Psychology of Persons," with an appendix on "The Specific Nature of Mental Functions," he investigates functionalism itself, showing the inadequacy of the merely biological point of view, with its formula of adjustment to environment and its ultimate reduction of functions to nutrition and reproduction. He presents a suggestive list of what he calls the "preferential functions" of "mind defining its own direction." He conceives psychology to be, more than a structural analysis of states of consciousness or an objective description of behavior, "an empirical science of self-realizations, or, in short, of selves." With respect to physical nature, "the business of mind is far less adjustment of ourselves to environment than adjustment of environment to ourselves." In social relations, no person is "a merely given environmental fact; neither is simply accommodated to the other, but both are in process of becoming persons, even in the act of social adjustment. Accordingly that to which we adjust ourselves in our social functions has to be defined as an ideal toward which we coöperatively move." Human functions are not merely complex cases of subhuman function; they are "just what they seem to be from a fully achieved human point of view."

The chapters on the origin and development of religion in the race are compact, with little of concrete detail; yet one feels back of the generalizations here set forth the great body of anthropological material from which they have been derived. No definition of religion is attempted at the outset; it is described provisionally from the functional point of view as "the progressive discovery and reorganization of values." Among early men religion is present because its functions are performed, rather than because any particular type of belief prevails. Such early religion comprehends every interest and value; it springs directly out of instinctive behavior; it grows peculiarly out of the social instincts that underlie

custom and group-organization; it is fundamentally anthropomorphic. It is in origin continuous with magic, though the two tend to grow apart, religion organizing life's values socially while magic seeks some particular value individually or at least independently of the larger social order. The idea of God is not in the beginning an intellectual hypothesis, the product of controlled thinking, but the spontaneous expression of the *Einfühlung* of intensely real experience. The differentiation of religions is primarily functional rather than structural; it is bound up with the differentiation of human activities, interests, and values.

The development of religion is pictured in bold lines in suggestive chapters on "Religion as Group Conduct," "Religion as Individual Conduct," and "Mental Traits of Religious Leaders." Three types of religious group are distinguished: (1) the religious crowd, in which coöperation is produced by the suggestion of mass movement, by suppression of inhibitions and disregard of individual variations; (2) the sacerdotal group, whose unity is that of fixed authority, priestly control, and the systematized suggestion of ritual, code, and education for conformity; (3) the deliberative group, in which individuals are stimulated to reflection and to the free expression of thought and desire, and where final unity results from the organization of a social will which does not suppress but expresses the discriminative wills of its members. Corresponding to these groups, three types of religious individuals are described: the impulsive, the regulated, and the self-emancipating. Religion has been too often regarded as essentially restraint of individual variation. At its best, it is democratic. It stimulates to self-expression and self-discovery, to purity of inner life, to freedom of conviction and of action. Roughly corresponding to these groups, again, are three types of religious leader: the shaman, the priest, and the prophet.

The heart of the book lies in Chapters XIII, XIV, and XV, on "The Religious Revaluation of Values," "Religion as Discovery," and "Religion as Social Immediacy." Professor Coe combats vigorously the notion that human nature remains always and everywhere the same. Human desires change; mental functions evolve; genuinely new wants are achieved; human nature can be reconstructed. It is in religion that this process of creative human evolution centers. Its law "is most acutely revealed in the religious revaluation of values that is characteristic of prophecy, the sense of sin, the attribution of ethical character to God, the hope of life after death, and faith in the possibility of a fully socialized society." In this process, men progressively discover *reality*. They not only find

themselves; they come to know and love aright other persons, human and divine.

In prayer, religion consciously expresses itself. Prayer is essentially conversation with God. At its best, it is "the culmination of the self-and-*socius* consciousness that makes us persons." "It starts as the assertion of any desire; it ends as the organization of one's own desires into a system of desires recognized as superior and then made one's own."

With respect to the future life the view is maintained that one cannot set a limit to the working of the "principle of personal-social integration that is no appendage of the physical conditions of life, but a user of these conditions for purposes of its own." It may yet "use death as a resource rather than submit to it as a defect of life."

Chapters on conversion, the subconscious, and mysticism are interposed at appropriate places. Conversion is viewed as a particular instance, more or less intense and abrupt in character, of that self-realization within a social medium which is characteristic of religion in general. The too ready use of the conception of the subconscious in explanation of certain religious experiences is subjected to a keen and constructive criticism. "Religious experience tends to focalize itself where individuality is most pronounced, not at its obscure outer edges; where self-control is at its maximum, not its minimum; where the issues are those of society as a deliberative (or potentially deliberative) body." The term "mysticism" is limited to that historical current which in Eastern religions seeks absorption into an absolute that is without predicates, and in Christianity has been bound up with Neoplatonic notions of God and the technique of the *via negativa*. So defined, mysticism is shown to be the diametrical opposite of social immediacy in religion.

This is, in short, the psychology of what most of us will recognize as our religion, or as the religion we could desire. Intended primarily as a handbook for beginners, the book is a notable contribution to the development of a comparatively new science — especially in its discussion and application of the functional point of view, in its modification and reinterpretation of the current "conservation of value" formula, and in the place that it gives to the ethical and the social, to freedom, initiative and originality, to democracy and human brotherhood, in religion.

Necessarily, the psychology of religion cannot tell the whole story. It deals only with religion's human, natural side. Professor Coe is more consistent than many in keeping strictly to the scientific

point of view. Yet we come to know that his God is real — no god-idea merely — and really to be known of men. Despite the somewhat negative trend of the chapters on conversion, the subconscious, and mysticism — which he uses more or less as foils for his main argument — this becomes clear in the chapters on religion as the discovery of reality and as social immediacy; in the occasional warning against a subjectivistic or solipsistic inference; and in the preface, where he sets forth, with just a shade of defiance, a list of his own attitudes with respect to religion and the psychology of religion. The reviewer confesses to a wish — for the sake of the “beginners” at least — that this part of the preface had been replaced by a chapter at the end of the book, dealing with the relation of the psychology of religion to its philosophy in the same clear-sighted way that the opening chapters deal with its relation to biology and general psychology.

There is a bibliography covering nineteen pages, of titles bearing directly upon the psychology of religion rather than upon its anthropology or theology. It is a significant evidence of the recent growth of the science that almost all have been published since the appearance of Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* in 1899. A second, topical bibliography gives excellent guidance to the student.

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THE VALIDITY OF THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE. GEORGE A. BARROW, Ph.D. Sherman, French, & Co. 1917. Pp. xii, 247. \$1.50.

Dr. Barrow's book has two features which call for especial appreciation. First, its independence; other writers are not quoted, or even alluded to. This is refreshing, for in most current philosophical or theological writing the author begins with an historical review which frequently exhausts his own energy and a reader's patience, and engages in so many side-skirmishes that the main drive of his argument misses its aim. But Dr. Barrow sets forth his own thought, and leaves to an instructed reader the business of relating it to that of others. To be sure, he has the exceptional advantage of working in a comparatively untilled field, for with all the present prattle about “religious experience” there has been hitherto no serious attempt at analysis and discrimination. But it is highly creditable to Dr. Barrow that he has turned away from pious twaddle and undertaken a thorough-going investigation of noteworthy independence. Secondly, the book has the rare merit