

which seeks to understand the system from within. Thus the conception of an intuitive knowledge of the outer Nature that lies behind the veil of *Maia* (as in the "divinatory" insight of the Indian Philosophy) seems to contradict the principle elsewhere laid down as cardinal, that the pathway to reality lies through the *subject* and not through the *object* of ordinary knowledge. Dr. Hasse expresses this by attributing to Schopenhauer two distinct ways of treating irrational knowledge (pp. 140 ff.), as leading to the knowledge of the real (1) directly and independently of rational knowledge, (2) gradually and indirectly through rational knowledge.

The thorough discussion of other difficulties that beset a theory of intuitive metaphysical knowledge (sub-rational or supra-rational, for both forms appear in Schopenhauer) is of special interest at the present day.

Dr. Hasse insists that to understand Schopenhauer's attitude we must rely on his own statements about the nature and value of irrational knowledge rather than on the use he makes of it in his system of metaphysics. If a complete epistemology is to be extracted from the works of Schopenhauer, it must undoubtedly be summed up in some such formula as that given by Dr. Hasse. But, as Dr. Hasse admits, Schopenhauer always tends to look at the question of knowledge from the standpoint of metaphysics or psychology. This is specially true of his attitude towards irrational knowledge; his account of rational knowledge is full and complete, being in essence the Kantian account, with important modifications derived from the Berkeleian nominalism and idealism; but his theory of irrational knowledge seems to merge into his metaphysics. The course of Schopenhauer's thought appears to have been something like this. If there is knowledge of ultimate reality, all its characteristics must be diametrically opposed to those of phenomenal knowledge, because the real is entirely different from the ideal. The artistic genius has universal intuitions distinct from the abstract concepts of scientific knowledge, the Indian philosopher has a vision of a concrete reality utterly different from phenomenal reality. Therefore these give a higher truth. Why this "therefore"? Because reality is *Wille* and not *Vorstellung*. These intuitions verify the metaphysical theory. In some of his moods Schopenhauer is ready to accept any experience of an abnormal nature as providing a supernatural intuition, and, as in the case of the *Traumorgan* (p. 137), erect it into a special faculty of truth. However we may disagree with M. Bergson's notions of an empirical and intuitive metaphysic, which Dr. Hasse seems inclined to contrast unfavourably with Schopenhauer's, his methods are not so arbitrary as this.

The book displays on every page the learning and balanced judgment of the author. It is provided with copious references both to the literature of Schopenhauer and to the philosopher's own works. The latter would have been more serviceable to the general reader if they had been made in a fuller form; as it is, the citations are made by the volume and page of the Reclam collected editions, and are thus useless to any one who has not these at hand.

C. M. GILLESPIE.

*Hegels Sämmtliche Werke*; Band vii.: *Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie*. Herausgegeben von GEORG LASSON. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1913. Pp. xxxviii, 513. M. 7.

This seventh volume of Lasson's edition of Hegel's works gathers together Hegel's minor writings on Politics and on the Philosophy of Right. On Politics there are three essays, "*Die Verfassung Deutschlands*" (1802), "*Verhandlungen in der Versammlung der Landstände des Königreichs*"

Württemberg im Jahre 1815 und 1816" (1817), and "Über die englische Reformbill" (1831). On the Philosophy of Right there are two: "Über die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts" (1802), and "System der Sittlichkeit," written probably a few years later.

It cannot be claimed that these writings are among Hegel's most important works. But they merit more attention than they have hitherto received: and it is something to have had them collected into one convenient and accessible volume. There is an affinity of problem and of treatment throughout that gives it much more than a formal unity. The essays on politics, of course, are largely concerned with matters of local and temporary importance. But they are not devoid of significance for modern political thought. The settings and circumstances of the problems have changed: but the problems themselves remain, possibly even in more acute and urgent forms than in Hegel's day. It is undoubtedly true, e.g., that Hegel was moved to write his criticism of the English Reform Bill by fears which experience proved to be, at the moment, groundless. But it is equally true that the difficulties that Hegel saw in the path of a new democratic country were no mere figments of his imperfect understanding, but do still, in gravest truth, beset all self-governing communities.

The main value of the essays lies in the light that they shed on the development of Hegel's philosophical thought. They show his lifelong and profound interest in the activities of social and religious life. They prove that from 1802 onwards, Hegel's system was substantially complete. And they witness to his conviction that his system was thoroughly relevant to actual facts and history.

From beginning to end, Hegel's central doctrine is that "the facts of social and religious life are conclusive proofs of Objective Reason, and are therefore the key to the understanding of Reality as a whole" (ix). The institutions of political communities are the meeting points of subjective and objective mind, or the sphere of the realisation of positive freedom. The problem of all three of the essays on politics is just the problem of Freedom. In the English Reform Bill, written in the year of his death, he distinguishes between 'formal' and 'real' freedom. But precisely this same distinction is implied in his essays of 1802 and 1817. Indeed, it is to the prevalence of a false and abstract notion of freedom that he traces all the troubles of Germany and of Württemberg.

The same fundamental notions are examined in his two writings on the Philosophy of Right, and examined in such a way as to presage their fuller and more systematic treatment in the 'Rechtsphilosophie' itself. Both of the essays carry the marks of the Romanticism of Schelling: but they both of them definitely outlined the problem that engaged the whole strength of Hegel's maturer ethical and political reflexion. Their theme, at bottom, is the reconciliation of subjective and objective right achieved in the inner agreement between the moral freedom of the individual members of the State and the moral spirit of the community. Most significant of all, perhaps, is the powerful criticism of both the empirical and *a priori* methods in previous ethical speculation. It is through this criticism that Hegel puts himself at a profounder point of view than either of these, from which he can achieve the fruitful constructions of the Rechtsphilosophie.

Hegel's "Introductions" to his several works are supremely interesting: but none of them furnishes an easy entrance into his system. He has not been generous in the matter of propædæutics, and one is at once in *mediis rebus*. If this volume does not conduct the reader very far into the system, at least it leads him by a way that is comparatively easy and not uninteresting. It is all the more valuable for that. And its

value has been heightened by the editor's very competent and helpful introduction, which makes the initial steps as plain and smooth as they can well be made.

H. J. W. HETHERINGTON.

*Thomisten Schriften, I. Philosophische Reihe, Bd. I. Thomas-Schriften, I. A. MICHELITSCH. Graz and Vienna, 1913. Pp. xii, 252.*

The series of which the present work is the opening volume is intended to consist mainly of translations of the works of St. Thomas and his pupils. Of the great value of such a series to students of philosophy I need hardly say anything. If all the volumes are as thoroughly done as the first the result should be that St. Thomas will become as accessible to future historians of thought as Aristotle or Kant. Naturally enough this opening volume is concerned with the bibliographical material available for the understanding of Thomas. We have a careful enumeration of the extant authorities for the biography of the saint with a full account of the character and present location of the MSS. in which they are contained and an adequate summary of the facts they record. On this follows a very careful list of the extant MSS. of the whole or parts of the Thomistic corpus, and a full account of their distribution over the various libraries of Europe, as well as a reproduction of the ancient lists of the saint's works contained in the biographical sources, the records of the process of his canonisation and the early catalogues of mediæval libraries. We are promised in a second volume a critical treatment, based on these materials, of the problem of the authenticity of individual works, and in a third, a discussion of the "spurious" works. I can but congratulate Prof. Michelitsch on the thoroughness with which his initial "spade-work" has been performed. The net results of his researches in the libraries of Europe have been digested into a series of exceedingly useful tables or conspectuses, and the volume has been enriched by several excellent plates including a reproduction of an authentic portrait of St. Thomas procured at Viterbo and a facsimile of an autograph page of the *Summa contra Gentiles* from a MS. in the Ambrosian Library at Milan.

A. E. TAYLOR.

*Die Hermeneutische Antinomie in der Talmudischen Literatur: von Prof. Dr. ADOLF SCHWARZ, 1913. 211 pp. M. 7.*

This work is a continuation of the author's studies in the logic of the Talmud. They are of great value to specialists in the Jewish Oral Tradition, with the mysteries of which Dr. Schwarz has a profound acquaintance. There would seem to be no other works in any European language which are as helpful to those who would master the rabbinic reasoning. The study has rarely been pursued except by members of the Jewish community, but (at least in the present writer's opinion) it is indispensable for the understanding of the New Testament, of which the earliest portions in their earliest form are saturated with rabbinism. Where Dr. Schwarz appears throughout to be mistaken is in identifying principles of interpretation with the logic of science. His phrase *Hermeneutische Antinomie* seems to mean "modes of detecting and reconciling inconsistencies in the legislation and theology of the Old Testament"; something analogous to these is to be found in the Aristotelian criticism of Homer, but their connexion with logic appears to be slight. The value of his works appears however to be very slightly affected by this misconception, as we deem it, and, like its predecessors, this book will be read with profit by students of its subject.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.