

## CRITICISMS AND DISCUSSIONS.

### PANLOGISM.

A reply to Dr. Carus's reply (October number of *The Monist*) would involve a very lengthy paper. The issues raised open up a controversy of very extensive scope: in fact practically all the questions differently answered by the "monistic positivism" of my kindly and accomplished critic and by my own Neo-Leibnitzian monadism. And in view of the space occupied by me in the last *Monist*, I lack the effrontery to pen the long essay required.

Let me say here that all the issues are treated—some at considerable length—in my *Riddle of the Universe* (Arnold: London and New York). Those, however, who desire a succinct statement of the *ground-principles* of my system, may be referred to the essay in the July number of the *Free Review* (London: Swan, Sonnenschein) entitled "The New Monadism." Pending the publication of my developed system, I have nothing to add to the arguments there advanced. Let me observe in passing that no one who reads this essay will echo Dr. Carus's opinion that my monads are "substances which, for the sake of ridding them of gross materiality, have been reduced to atomic size." Size is a space-attribute, and space, in my view, only a form of perception *and ideation* of a monad. The monad or self (Kant's "transcendental subject") is not in space, but contrariwise space is in it. I have dealt in the *Riddle* with this issue at length and cannot understand how one who reads it can fail to follow my meaning.

I must just glance in passing at Dr. Carus's theory of Immortality. Jesus is immortal because his words are immortal. "The words of Jesus are his soul." "Christ lives where the word of Christ is received and where it becomes the motive of conduct." This is a *Comtean* immortality only. Jesus or John Smith is not destined to enjoy or suffer a perpetuity of *conscious* life: they only pass on ideas or "thought-forms." Let me point out some considerations bearing on this doctrine:

1. The immortality is verbal. Indeed, it is not even this. The slow freezing of the planet, nay, even the perishing of certain human stocks, would terminate it! Jesus would no longer persist, were there no terrestrial beings to repeat his words or act on his teachings.

2. It cannot be said that the "thought-forms" would even persist *as long as* men lived to receive them. And why? Because no two people can "think" exactly the same thoughts; *there are as many Christianities as there are persons*, and the name Christianity stands not for any definite persisting standpoint, but for a myriad-faced, *always changing process*. The "thought-forms" of Jesus, Dr. Carus, a bishop, and a tramp (all "Christians") are so many different psychological phenomena; and labelling certain vaguely-resembling portions of these phenomena as "Christianity," does not at all hide their vast differences. Jesus on Comtean lines does not persist at all—he has merely *started* an ethico-psychological process which is always changing its shape. Ideas ABOUT Jesus's ideas are not the ideas of Jesus!

3. The "immortality" is of no ethical value. Men who do not believe that *they* persist after physical death will not—taking communities into view—uselessly vex themselves with painful self-culture or "progress." They will degenerate; (a consideration, however, of no relevance where the *proofs* of persistence are being discussed).

There is much else to be said against this Comtean view of immortality, but the above considerations will for the present suffice. E. DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

#### EDITORIAL COMMENTS.

I should have preferred to publish Mr. Fawcett's comments on my reply to his "Panlogism" without further remarks, were it not that his explanations of my view of immortality might then seem to be acknowledged by me as being correctly stated. Therefore, I wish to add a few words which shall set the reader right, at least as to the main point of the subject.

Mr. Fawcett, who regards my view of immortality as Comtean, still insists on making a difference between a man's self and his soul-forms. He grants to some extent the immortality of the latter, but he thinks that the repudiation of a self-soul as a separate entity renders it illusory. Mr. Fawcett forgets to tell us what a soul would be without its peculiar ideas, sentiments, and aspirations. He assumes the existence of two things, (1) a soul in and for itself, a monad, and (2) the life and deeds of a man. Thus Jesus would be (1) a Jesus-monad and (2) his life consisting of his preachings and the moral example he set for mankind.

According to the immortality which I proclaim, Jesus is not a self in itself which preached certain theories, but his life, consisting of his preachings and his actions, was he himself. Jesus did not have the logos, but he was the logos, the logos being the truths which appeared in him; and this logos according to the Christian doctrines of the Fourth Gospel is an eternal, omnipresent reality in the constitution of the world. The logos was before Jesus was born and continued to exist after his death. It was at the beginning and will remain forever and aye even though this earth of ours break to pieces.

Mr. Fawcett would be clearer about the true nature of the self if he only proposed to himself the question, "What am I?" "What is Jesus?" "What is Mr. Smith?" He will find upon a proper analysis that every man consists of the memories of all deeds done in his own life as well as in the lives of his ancestors. He is the product of a long process of evolution, and as he is the continuation of the past, so in the future he will be the continuation of the present. Every organ-

ism is a system of memories, and memories are the immortalised previous reactions upon the outer world ; they are the preserved deed-forms of innumerable acts committed in past ages ; and there is no surd left which might give occasion to the belief in a soul-monad or a self-soul, a transcendental subject, a metaphysical substratum of our being, assumed to exist in addition to the real facts of our soul-life.

It is true that everything in the world, man's soul included, is subject to change, but it is a change in which every event is preserved forever, and the laws of nature are immutable and eternal. There is a change in identity and an identity in change ; there is permanence in transiency, and transiency in impermanence. The belief in something that would be absolutely permanent and absolutely self-identical (whether we call it monad, or self, or subject, or *âtman*) is as gratuitous as the belief in absolute transiency and absolute change.

Experience teaches us that this world does not consist of matter and motion alone, but there is a formative factor which conditions the forms, the qualities, the suchness of things. The world is regulated by law, and its formative principle depends upon definite and intrinsically necessary relations which we develop in the so-called formal sciences, especially mathematics, arithmetic, and logic. The arrangement of thoughts cannot be made arbitrarily but must, in order to agree with the reality that surrounds us, follow definite lines, and in the same way every action determines its consequences with the same necessity that causes the circumference of a circle to remain everywhere at an equal distance from its centre. The totality of such conditions as constitute the cosmic order of the world is in its religious application called the *logos*, and the *logos* is an immaterial presence, and an inalienable feature of existence, the actuality of which does not depend upon the existence of supposititious monads, or subjects, or selves or what not.

Mr. Fawcett calls that philosophy which upholds the omnipresent reality of the *logos*, panlogism, and tries to replace it by his monadology. He tries to make out that the ideas we think are foreign to our being and that for instance the *Logos* that became flesh in Jesus would be of no account unless Jesus's soul consisted of a monad which would have to be regarded as his self. In recapitulating my views of immortality Mr. Fawcett tacitly assumes that I believe in the annihilation of this monad self in death, while I claim that such a monad self has no existence and can therefore not be annihilated, while the real facts of which we consist remain living and effective presences in our after-life.

And our after-life is as little unconscious as our present life which is the continuation of our former lives. To be sure there is a break in the continuity of consciousness in death ; but this break is on the same principle as the break that occurs in sleep. Every morning we wake with fresh consciousness and renewed energy, yet the memories of our former life-experiences remain the same and their preservation constitutes the preservation of our being. Thus every new life starts with a fresh consciousness, but if we analyse its organisation we find that it consists of innumerable memories of deeds done since the remotest past in its ancestral existence.

As to the indestructibility of everything that is valuable, true, and good, we trust that if this world breaks to pieces, the *Logos* will reappear in other worlds. Nay, we believe that on other planets on which the same conditions prevail as on this, our earth, the *Logos* is present now, and it makes little difference whether he be Joshua, of the tribe of Juda, or Gotama, of the tribe of Shakya.

Whether or not Mr. Fawcett has overcome panlogism I must leave our readers to judge for themselves.

P. C.