


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# The Psychology of Propaganda

RAYMOND DODGE, PH.D.\*

The Great War has left us many disturbing legacies. We have a great social burden in the care of the bereft, the wounded and the diseased. Our burden of debt and taxation will outlive the generation. Prejudice, mutual distrust, social unrest, and political chaos rest heavily upon us. Not the least of our troublesome relics is the curse of propaganda, the greatest of indoor military sports. Propaganda antedates the War but its previous existence seems relatively mild and inoffensive. Only occasionally did it appear in the open. All that is changed now. Propaganda as the great art of influencing public opinion, seems to be a permanent addition to our social and political liabilities.

Paper bullets, according to Mr. Creel, won the war. But they have forever disturbed our peace of mind. The war is long since over, all but saying so; but our consciousness of the immanence of propaganda bids fair to be permanent. It has been discovered by individuals, by associations and by governments that a certain kind of advertising can be used to mold public opinion and control democratic majorities. As long as public opinion rules the destinies of human affairs, there will be no end to an instrument that controls it.

Propaganda of some kind is doubtless as old as human society. One of its earliest, and until recently one of its most famous varieties was religious propaganda. But there seems to be no essential differences between religious, political, and business propaganda, except the ends it serves, and the license under which it operates. The expansion of propaganda to political fields was directly conditioned on the growing power of public opinion in government. As physical warfare is less and less resorted to in settling disputes, propaganda warfare is bound to become of greater relative importance. Under a League of Nations, propaganda will rule the world unless something is done to curb it.

It seemed to me and still seems a stroke of genius that set the program for this session. This is not alone because religious education may on occasion use the art of propaganda and must study it to use it safely and effectively. The main point seems to me to be that the tremendous forces of propaganda are now common property. They are available for the unscrupulous and the destructive as well as for the constructive and the moral. Any agency with enough cash and brains can develop a formidable propaganda for any purpose under the sun. This gives us a new interest in its technique, namely, to enquire if anywhere there is an opportunity for regulative and protective interference with its indiscriminate exploitation.

For a few moments then it becomes my task to withdraw your attention from propaganda as an art, to its natural history. What sort

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of a mental fact is it, and what are the mental laws that underlie it? These are the questions that are involved in a psychology of propaganda.

Unfortunately for our scientific analysis, nobody seems to be able to determine just what the distinguishing marks of propaganda really are. It is difficult to draw any clear-cut line between advertising and propaganda on the one side, and between propaganda and education on the other.

Speaking generally, propaganda is the art of making up the other man's mind for him. It is the art of gaining adherents to principles, of gaining support for an opinion or a course of action. So are some forms of education, so at times is advertising.

Probably the commonest popular connotation of propaganda involves something underhanded or sinister. Advertising and education stand out frankly for what they are. Propaganda tends to hide both its nature and its intention. To label a story propaganda would immediately rob it of most of its power to influence opinion. This popular view is certainly not an adequate one. It may be that it has grown out of the malignant varieties to which we have been exposed for war purposes.

Until recently the most famous historical use of the term propaganda made it synonymous with foreign missions. It was Pope Gregory XV who almost exactly three centuries ago after many years of preparation, finally founded the great Propaganda College to care for the interests of the Church in non-Catholic countries. With its centuries of experience this is probably the most efficient organization for propaganda in the world. But religious propaganda is much older. Christian propaganda against Judaistic interpretation of prophesy relating to the Messiah reaches back to the earliest years of the Christian Church. Probably most apologetics is propaganda. No religion and no age has been entirely free from it.

Similarly political propaganda is very old, reaching a climax of classical effectiveness in the impassioned orations of Demosthenes against Macedonian aggression. Whatever one may think of the counter-agitations, it would be impossible to characterize all these cases as sinister. We would be compelled to place in a similar category most of our own missionary enterprises, our revivals, campaigns for the enlistment of men in the Navy, campaigns for liberty loans, for food saving, for near-East relief, red cross, community chests, and the like.

The one characteristic that seems to differentiate all such enterprises from simple education is their emphasis on the feelings and their appeal to emotional logic. An appeal to the emotions may be sinister or it may be benevolent. Whether it is regarded as one or the other will often depend on the point of view of the judge rather than the absolute content of the appeal.

But may not simple unemotional argument be used to propagate a principle or an opinion? Undoubtedly it may. But as propaganda, argument is so notoriously ineffective that it would seldom deserve the

name. A discussion of the principles on which the League of Nations is based may be a strictly intellectual exercise. One would not commonly call such a discussion propaganda, even if it were an educative process and intended to influence the mental life of students. As far as it remained true to the canons of logical thinking it would be an informative process resulting in the increased experience of the listener. But if my informant should begin to appeal to my passions and prejudices, if he should argue for or against the League on grounds of patriotism or loyalty to persons or parties, he ceases to be a mere informant. A new mental factor is added which separates the discussion from a purely educative process. It has become propaganda.

Where emotional logic appears directly in the discussion we may call it primary propaganda. There is another variety in which, on the basis of some emotional appeal, an attorney takes his position on a question and uses his intellect to present the best possible case to his hearers. Emotional logic may not appear in the argument, but the fact that it is presupposed in the prejudice of the attorney justifies us in regarding it as actually present. Such a case might be called secondary or implicit propaganda.

Direct propaganda tends to be relatively honest and aboveboard. One recognizes the emotional appeal, rejects it or accepts. In secondary or implicit propaganda there is usually no way of proving from his utterance what the prejudices of the speaker may have been motivated by. It is this secondary propaganda that is consequently the most insidious, the most dangerous, and the most offensive. Consciously or unconsciously it is bound to distort the facts. They are transmitted through an imperfect medium and tend to take their color from the medium. The paid attorney prejudiced in favor of a cause, and unscrupulous in his methods of propagation, is the cause of most of our indignation against propaganda, and propagandists.

Even if we have not yet found the true logical differentia of propaganda, we have at least come upon a common and a significant characteristic, and one that should repay our study. Our school training included the conditions of proof by formal logic. But the uncharted courses that determine conviction by prejudice are largely matters of mystery. Whether exclusively or not, it is these uncharted courses that are commonly used by the propaganda pirates.

The fact that conviction is often determined by feeling rather than by reason is neither new nor especially humiliating. It is a commonplace of our experience. Aristotle recognized the fact and gave it a place with the fallacies. Bacon regarded it as one of the causes of the low estate of science in his time. The common human tendencies to estimate facts according to their personal consequences are just as real now as ever and probably no more so. It is sufficient to legally disqualify the judgment of partisan, friend, or relative. This is not an imputation of dishonesty. Partisans, friends and relatives are naturally incapacitated for objective judgment. Conversely, whenever feelings can be aroused

we may commonly predict the judgments. On this law depends the art of the spellbinder, and the soap-box orator. It is the chief reliance of the professional propagandist.

One of the classical psycho-analytic case histories is probably familiar to some of you as Breuer's case of the water glass and the puppy dog. A young lady patient was utterly unable to drink water from a glass. It was a deep embarrassment. Even under the stress of great thirst in warm weather and the earnest effort to break up a foolish phobia, the glass might be taken and raised, but it couldn't be drunk from. That was a curious affair, "pathological" you would probably call it. That correctly names it. But one must remember that every pathological case is only an exaggeration of some normal tendency. The abnormal not infrequently shows the central tendency of a mental mechanism with the clearness of an experiment. The psycho-analytic method disclosed the following facts. Underlying this particular phobia was an intense antipathy to dogs. The young lady's room-mate had been discovered giving a dog a drink from the common drinking glass. The antipathy to the dog was simply transferred to the glass.

The case is simple enough, quite commonplace in the annals of hysteria. But let us examine the mechanism. Suppose that I had wanted to keep that drinking glass for my own personal use. Suppose that I knew the antipathy of Miss X. to dogs. What a perfectly simple and effective expedient it would have been in the absence of other good motives to capitalize that antipathy by allowing her to see the dog drink out of the glass. The case would then have been a perfect case of propaganda. It represents the natural history of propaganda in very simple and very complete form. All propaganda is capitalized prejudice. It rests on some emotional premise which is the motive force of the process. The emotional transfer is worked by some associative process like similarity, use, or the causal relationship. The derived antipathy represents the goal.

This is the fundamental scheme of all propaganda that utilizes the emotions as I think most propaganda does. Let us consider the famous Navy enlistment poster by Christie with the legend, "Gee! I wish I were a man." The motive force of the appeal comes from that vigorous, red-cheeked American girl as she reacts on a normal young man's hunger for social approval. To transfer that motive force to enlistment in the Navy is the trick of the uniform and the legend. The subtle connection between social approval and enlistment is none the less strong for its suggestiveness and sketchiness.

A cartoon discloses the anatomy of propaganda more completely than any other kind. It must all be there in compact form for those who run to read. I know of no pictures that succeed in stirring the great moral forces of humanity and turning them into propaganda like the cartoons of Raemaker. But they are more tragic than is necessary for our purpose. We are likely to be carried away by their art to forget the artifice which is our immediate concern.

The Berlin *Ulk* in 1916, just before the Egyptian campaign collapsed, pictured a burly John Bull waving a whip over a prostrate female figure labeled "Egypt." Two gleams of light pierce the gloom as the twin Sir Galahads, Germany and Turkey, come rushing up from the distance shouting: "We'll finish you this time, you old slave-driver." The Berlin *Ulk* knew very well how violent the emotional force of that slave-driver appeal was. They had Raemaker clearly enough in mind when they tried to turn the sting against Britain.

In those same dread days when we were anxiously facing the unknown, DeMar in the Philadelphia *Record* pictured a balky little donkey hitched to an impressive load of preparedness plans. The traditional pachydermatous G. O. P. quizzically looks over the back fence while Uncle Sam admonishes the donkey, "Pull, damn ye, or I'll have to get an elephant." Probably the central emotional force came from the instinct to self-preservation, but the whole thing is alive with direct and indirect *motifs* down to the balky donkey. The sting in the case was a real threat.

About the same time, Tuthill in the St. Louis *Star* pictured the naked foot of American unpreparedness about to descend on the spines of the Mexican cactus. The emotional force in this case came from an imaginary event that is merely suggested. A similar suggested calamity appeared in the Des Moines *Register and Leader* apropos to the arming of merchant ships. President Wilson was made to stand on a partially dislodged overhang of a precipitous cliff below which yawned the bottomless chasm of "War."

If one were to make a catalogue of all these passionate premises one would find that they ran the entire gamut of human experience. The most fundamental and primary appeals would be those inborn tendencies to emotion that we call the instincts. The great self-preservative, social, and racial instincts will always furnish the main reservoir of motive forces at the service of propaganda. They will have the widest and the most insistent appeal. Only second to these in importance are the peculiar racial tendencies and historical traditions that represent the genius of a civilization. The racial superiority consciousness of the German operated as a never-ending motive for their "*Aushalten*" propaganda. The consciousness of racial superiority had been cultivated so long that it was almost as solid a foundation as instinct. Similarly, the moral superiority consciousness of the Yankee became the basis for all sorts of propaganda before and during the war. We Americans have a notable cultural premise in our consideration for the under-dog. Few things outside our consciousness of family will arouse us as surely and as universally as this modification of the protective instinct.

The most commonly exploited motive during the various drives was our new-born social consciousness, focusing in patriotism, combined with our dread of social disapproval. Buttons, placards for the doors, public solicitations, and the visitation of committees were freely used to exploit these emotional premises.

✓ In addition to the group tendencies that arise from a community of experience, individual propaganda may use every phase of individual experience, individual bias and prejudice. I am told that first-class salesmen not infrequently keep family histories of their customers, producing a favorable attitude towards their merchandise by way of an apparent personal interest in the children.

Apparently any group of ideas with an emotional valance may become the basis for propaganda.

I have spent some time in going over that remarkable collection of war posters that has been gathered for the future historian of culture by Clark University, and I have tried to compare the fundamental drives of the different countries as they were expressed by their own draughtsmen. It would need a great deal more study than I was able to give to arrive at satisfactory generalizations, but it was difficult to escape the conviction that our artists indulged in much more easy sentimentalism than those of either Britain or France. It is difficult to find a British poster as sentimental as "Gee! I wish I were a man." There are not many American posters with the same sublime dignity as Pryse's, "The only road for an Englishman." But I am reaching beside my mark.

The question as to the mechanism by which the emotional tone of one experience gets transferred to another associated experience seems at first sight like a simple extension of the fundamental laws of association. But the circumstances are such that the old laws of association will not apply.

When I speak the words "hot tamales," those who know from experience what those words mean have a certain mental picture or image or memory that resembles the original experience point for point, and is distinguishable from it in brilliance and in setting rather than in kind. Such a replica of experience is forever elicitable by the words. But if I should say the word "satisfied," those who know what the word means perfectly well may not have the remotest suggestion of really being satisfied. Hot tamales will be recalled to mind by the name. Satisfaction will not be so recalled. Names are adequate for the association of intellectual processes. But if one would reassociate an emotion he must first catch his emotion.

Obviously emotions are not capable of association on equal terms with ideas and concepts. Strictly speaking, emotions can build neither judgments nor arguments. They are not capable of recall nor generalization. They are not subjects of attention.

Of course emotions may be re-aroused even though they are not subject to recall. The name will not serve to re-arouse them but an emotional experience may. However frequently and vigorously I might repeat the word anger, your anger will scarcely be re-aroused. The situation merely bores you. But I am sure that I can arouse your indignation if I remind you of the clever German trick by which under cover of diplomatic protection they plotted against the industries of our



country in comparative security. If now while that emotional complex is still aroused I remind you that the same old foreign propaganda office is still working overtime and that when everything is ready for new propaganda against the demands of the Allies it simply uncovers a new monarchistic or bolshevistic plot, throwing us into a panic on demand; you may likely find your indignation turned against the German Foreign Propaganda Office.

This would not be a logical process, it really wouldn't be an intellectual process at all. One idea aroused an emotion. Another idea quite disconnected with the first by any logical bond tends to take its emotional tone just because it occurred in the same conscious context.

It is a curious situation but it may be better understood if we remember that ideas as the results of shifting stimuli are in constant flux. One could not hold an idea steady if he would. Emotions, on the other hand, are relatively slowly changing states with only two great tonal differences. The simplest interaction is a sort of radiation or spread of the emotion over the whole content of consciousness. The rule seems to be that an emotional attitude when once aroused tends to radiate over all concurrent conscious processes.

The joy in a college athletic victory radiates from the specific home run that may have caused it to all the surroundings and circumstances. It includes the whole team as a matter of course, but, quite illogically, it includes opponents and even spectators. Everybody is a good fellow. The day is a wonderful day. The year even may become a great year. Similarly, the attitude of cheery enthusiasm to live and work and produce may infect by radiation many who are connected with it merely by contact. The converse is equally true of the influence of depression.

The whole theory of dignified and worshipful settings for religious services has a basis in this fact of emotional radiation. The worshipful setting becomes a kind of propaganda for the attitude of worship. Conversely the use of sacred rooms, sacred objects, and sacred words for trivial and undignified purposes is common propaganda for the sacreligious. The dual demands in modern church life for a sacred worship place and for a place to be the center of the social life is commonly met by two buildings. In view of our law the extra building has its very clear psychological justification. But I shall venture to ask how far such a divorce of functions as is represented by the church building and the parish house may be responsible for the common delusion that religion is something apart from life. It seems to me that the Church cannot afford to lose its worshipful sense of the presence of God, but I am convinced that now as often before in the history of the Church one of its great needs is to bring the sense of the presence of God into common life.

During the war, I, like the rest of you, not infrequently had new burdens thrust upon me that I felt quite unprepared to carry. More than once when burdened with the feeling of great responsibility, and at least twice in the relief of satisfactorily completed obligations, I have wandered about the town or city in which I happened to be with a

longing in my heart to sit for a few moments in the great quiet of the House of God. With one exception under such circumstances I looked in vain for an open church. I don't know why one should expect anything of the sort. It wasn't the time for churches to be open. But I noted that there was not a town so small as not to have its movie palaces ablaze with light. With all my sophistication it was difficult not to feel that the moving picture theatres were doing something that they believed in, in a different way from what the Church believed in what it was doing. I have no right and less intention to criticize. I do not know the answer. I am a mere psychologist. But it is clear to me that the closed churches and the open movies have very different values as propaganda.

In addition to the utterly illogical general radiation of emotion the transfer may be more specific, following any of the many systematic connections of ideas in consciousness, and not infrequently achieving an appearance of logical defensibility. The radiation may be spatial, temporal, causal, symbolic, or it may take any of the other forms of accidental association.

Radiations occur from a circumstance to a place. The traveler's fallacy suffuses a town or city with the emotional glow of comfort or discomfort. I have never seen land anywhere else that so appealed to me as those wonderful cliffs on the south-east coast of England that one first sees after an Atlantic voyage. I hope to go there sometime by land to learn if their charm is all an illusion of emotional transfer from the ending of the voyage. The home town, the birthplace, the house where a dear friend has lived and died—what a strong emotional value such places have! Conversely, what a wretched place in memory is the town where we were robbed at the hotel or where we met some other disillusionment of human nature.

Palestine is packed so full of transferred values that it is difficult for the ordinary child to regard it as a place at all like other places. It is a part of his great fairyland. I for one am not sure that the efforts to visualize it in its ordinary squalid commonplaceness is any real advantage. Our religious traditions are full of these appeals.

One of the commonest radiations is from persons to things. Things that belonged to friends, letters that we treasure from sweetheart or from wife, relics of the family or of departed great ones have an emotional value that only the initiated know. There is no power of mind over body that they may not on occasion exercise. Relics are never trivial things to the soul that makes the connection with the wonderful past. They are ever potential material for miracles. Conversely, in the curious philosophy of clothes, things give fictitious value to persons. Vestments, rich raiment, jewels, insignia of office, are not without propaganda value. They arouse and sustain a consciousness of importance that radiates to the personalities which they cover.

Religiously perhaps the most significant radiations are those between symbol and reality. No man is so superior to popular prejudice

that he could endure the name Judas in a Christian community. It is a perfectly good name, easily spoken, characteristic in sound, and reasonably euphonious but it carries an emotional value that would foolishly but inevitably radiate to the man. Such a name would be a serious handicap. Similarly, each of us probably treasures, often from the remotest childhood, good names and evil ones. The origin of their emotional values is usually discoverable in their association with real or fictitious persons. But once set and while still unanalyzed the good or evil name like a phantom may still operate to bias our first estimates of character.

The psychological power of the curse and the benediction, of the creed, the cross, or the flag, all show the effect of emotional transfer between symbol and reality. The persistence with which creed has been mistaken for substance only emphasizes the importance of the transfer and its possibilities for propaganda.

The vulgar craze to inscribe one's name in public places is not of simple psychology. But through all the hunger for conspicuous position, for possession, for fame, or for eternal life runs a persistent confusion between symbol and thing symbolized, between name and personality.

Of the many other avenues of emotional transfer let me mention only one, the radiation from function to thing. Doubtless the most conspicuous case of radiation of this sort is our respect for money. The classical economic example is Robinson Crusoe's gold pieces. It was a severe wrench for him to realize that without a market gold pieces were of less worth than a single needle. The climax of the common radiation from function to thing in money is found in the miser. Here the functional value is siphoned dry and transferred completely to the thing. Conversely, at least one of the evils of gambling is the degradation of the medium of exchange to a plaything.

Similar transfers from function to thing occur more or less in every aspect of our religious life. The Bible itself is an example. It carries the great religious traditions of the race. This high function gives the books themselves peculiar radiated value. The Bible must be bound differently from ordinary books, and it must also be handled and carried differently.

The multiform ramifications of emotional force have recently been disclosed to us by the psycho-analysts in the enormous complications of sex feelings. Their radiation to objects, signs, symbols, and rites, to the whole tissue of our social consciousness, is more easily understood than their sublimation in art and science. But the fundamental mechanisms are the same that we have been discussing. In a similar way the tender feelings radiate to weaker objects of every conceivable sort, to lost causes, to philanthropies, war derelicts, European or near-East relief, poodle dogs and canary birds.

So intricately are all these tendencies interwoven in our consciousness that no one may pretend to disengage the tangled web of any human mind, to say here are the original feelings and here are the derived.

Each derived tendency becomes in turn a motive force, and each original is reacted upon by each of its derivatives.

In a psychology of propaganda our interest centers in the process rather than in the product. But it is noteworthy that at every stage of development one's prejudices seem so fatalistic. One stands over against them as it were so helplessly that there is an almost universal delusion that feelings are incapable of voluntary control.

I crossed the Atlantic once with a gentleman who had come to this country as a poor boy. He had done more than moderately well in business. But in the twenty odd years of absence, in spite of faithful letters, he had lost all active affection for old scenes and old friends. When I met him he was making the long and none too comfortable journey back to prove to himself whether the old love was dead or merely slumbering. It was a pathetic bit of human life. The old love would not return on demand. My friend seemed absolutely helpless and dependent only on fate as he watched the shores of the fatherland come into view, with the hope that somehow proximity would accomplish the miracle and return the lost affection.

Equally fatalistic, final and inevitable seems the reality of affection when it is present. At any given moment it seems as though it would never change. One swears that his love is eternal. But the sophisticated know that this apparent fatalistic permanence is an illusion, an illusion of the relatively slowly changing. It is possible to plot the course of the changes and to predict with reasonable certainty how each incident will modify it.

A pathetic case fell under my observation not long ago. Two youngsters were married, a bright eager lad of eighteen and a beautiful girl. They were head over heels in love. He had a job as butcher's clerk. In spite of poverty they were happy and content to work hard for each other. But as the years sped on and he watched the boys of the village pass out to places of responsibility, to their own businesses, to competence, things began to worry the butcher's clerk. He could not get enough ahead to start anything for himself, or even to move where wages were better. In the long brooding process, all the limitations and the interminable series of apparent catastrophes led back to the fatal marriage. "If it had not been for that," he would have been able to do justice to himself. Could there be but one outcome to a mental course like that? Many a home would be happier if men and women realized that affection is neither inevitable nor uncontrolled, that its growth and decay follow definite laws, determined by radiations from associations that are under voluntary control. To endure affection must be cultivated like all the other treasures of life.

These mechanisms of emotional transfer are not primarily the laws of propaganda. They are primarily the laws of our mental life which propaganda on occasion may exploit for its own ends.

There are three limitations to the processes of propaganda that we have been considering. The first is emotional recoil, the second is the

exhaustion of available motive force, the third is the development of internal resistance or negativism.

The most familiar of the three is emotional recoil. We know only too well what will happen if we tell a boy all the things that he likes to do are "*bad*" while all the things that he dislikes are "*good*." Up to a certain point the emotional value of bad and good respectively will be transferred to the acts as we intend. But each transfer has an emotional recoil on the concepts good and bad. At the end a most surprising thing may happen. The moral values may get reversed in the boy's mind. Bad may come to represent the sum-total of the satisfactory and desirable, while good may represent the sum-total of the unsatisfactory and the undesirable. To the pained adult such a consequence is utterly inexplicable, only because he fails to realize that all mental products are developments. There is always a kind of reciprocity in emotional transfer. The value of the modified factor recoils to the modifying factor.

The whole mechanism of the transfer and of the recoil may best be expressed in terms of the conditioned reflex of Pavlov. The flow of saliva in a dog is a natural consequence to the sight and smell of food. If concurrently with the smelling of food the dog is pinched, the pinch ceases to be a matter for resentment. By a process of emotional transfer, on being pinched the dog may show the lively delight that belongs to the sight and smell of food. Even the salivary secretions may be started by the transfigured pinch. It was the great operating physiologist Sherrington who exclaimed after a visit to Pavlov that at last he understood the psychology of the martyrs. But it is possible to so load the smell of food with pain and damage that its positive value breaks down. Eating values may succumb to the pain values instead of the pain to the eating values. This is the prototype of the concept bad when it gets overloaded with the emotional value of the intrinsically desirable. The law of recoil seems to be a mental analogue of the physical law that action and reaction are equal and in opposite directions.

The second limitation to propaganda occurs when the reciprocal effects of transfer exhaust the available motive forces of a mind. Propaganda certainly weakens the forces that are appealed to too often. We are living just now in a world of weakened appeals. Many of the great human motives were exploited to the limit during the war. It is harder to raise money now than it was, harder to find motives for giving that are still effective. One of my former colleagues once surprised and shocked me by replying to some perfectly good propaganda in which I tried to tell him that certain action was in the line of duty, to the effect that he was tired of being told that something was his duty, and that he was resolved not do to another thing because it was his duty. There seems to be evidence that in some quarters at least, patriotism, philanthropy, and civic duty have been exploited as far as the present systems will carry. It is possible to exhaust our floating capital of social motive forces. When that occurs we face a kind of moral bankruptcy.

A final stage of resistance is reached when propaganda develops a negativistic defensive reaction. To develop such negativisms is always the aim of counter-propaganda. It calls the opposed propaganda, prejudiced, half truth, or as the Germans did, "Lies, All Lies." There is evidence that the moral collapse of Germany under the fire of our paper bullets came with the conviction that they had been systematically deceived by their own propagandists.

There are two great social dangers in propaganda. The first is its concentrated power of destruction of the established order. Great destructive power in irresponsible hands is always a social menace. We have some legal safeguards against careless use of high-powered physical explosives. Against the greater danger of destructive propaganda there seems to be little protection without imperiling the sacred principles of free speech.

The second social danger is the tendency to overload and level down every great human incentive in the pursuit of relatively trivial ends. To become blase is the inevitable penalty of emotional exploitation. I believe there may well be grave penalties in store for the reckless commercialized exploitation of human emotions in the cheap sentimentalism of our moving pictures. But there are even graver penalties in store for the generation that permits itself to grow morally blase. One of our social desiderata, it seems to me, is the protection of the great springs of human action from destructive exploitation for selfish, commercial, or other trivial ends.

The slow constructive process of building moral credits by systematic education lacks the picturesqueness of propaganda. It also lacks its quick results. But just as the short-cut of hypnotism proved a dangerous substitute for moral training, so I believe we shall find that not only is moral education a necessary pre-condition for effective propaganda, but that in the end it is a safer and incomparably more reliable social instrument.