

The Treaty of Charlottenburg

THE treaty signed by Great Britain and Prussia at Charlottenburg on 10 October 1723 seems to have been concluded at short notice. There is no hint of any preliminary negotiation either in the dispatches of James Scott from Berlin¹ or in those of the Prussian envoy to George I, Baron von Wallenrodt.² Townshend's letter of 8 September, cited below, shows that it was in contemplation then, and the full powers used by him and Carteret are dated the previous day.³ But they were for concluding treaties with any of the king's German neighbours, not with Prussia specifically, and those given to the Prussian ministers bore even date with the treaty. Certainly both the British government and Frederick William I were anxious to draw the existing bonds of alliance closer, but on the other hand George I was cool in the matter, and Bernstorff and his following in the Hanoverian ministry were not less jealous of Prussia than of old. Before speculating on the particular conjunction which produced the treaty, it will be well to examine the position of Prussia, and secondarily of Sweden and Denmark, in this year 1723, and particularly in their relations with George I and Peter the Great. Notice also must be taken of the alarm excited by the cruise of the Russian fleet. I have shown in a previous article⁴ how the efforts of France, after the peace of Nystad, to make alliance with Russia were thwarted by the insistence of George I that he must be included as a principal party.

Since George had forced upon Frederick William the treaties of 1719 with Great Britain and Hanover,⁵ a reasonable accord between them had been maintained by their joint contentions with Austria and by their common interest in defending protestant liberties in Germany. But there was still a lack of harmony on other questions. With the great issue of the time, the settlement of southern Europe on the terms of the quadruple alliance, Frederick William would not concern himself; and, in spite of all

¹ Record Office, Prussia 17.

² Königliches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

³ The original, Staatsarchiv, Berlin; a copy in the king of Prussia's ratification. Record Office, Treaties 411.

⁴ *Ibid.*, xxvi. 278.

⁵ See the author's *George I and the Northern War*, ch. xxiii.

that George could do, he steadily refused to be involved in any action against Peter the Great. On the other side Hanoverian jealousy obtruded itself constantly, and Robert Walpole in England, resolute against expensive entanglements abroad, withheld Great Britain from giving support on German and Polish questions to the extent that Frederick William desired. Thus, when in 1722 proposals were made for the formation of a defensive protestant league, James Scott at Berlin was informed that, although there was 'no doubt to be made of the views of the Papists', there were 'no solid hopes of success', for such a league would be encountered 'by a strict Confederacy on the part of the Catholicks, and would naturally produce a warr, where the zeal and forwardness of England would scarce be better supported than we have been in other engagements'. Care must be taken, it was said, that Great Britain should not be drawn 'into such hazardous and burthensome projects. . . . Your Court might set an example by exerting itself, where they see their representations may be of use, but I cannot help doubting of their courage and steddiness in this matter.'⁶ In another dispatch it was stated that the king would not share in the expense of raising opposition to the candidature of the electoral prince of Saxony for the Polish throne: 'those who are nearest will take their own measures as to the bestowing of their money,' just as the king had had to bear the whole charge 'when dangers have threatened us nearer home'.⁷ And when conferences at Berlin were proposed to concert measures for the defence of the protestants in Poland, Scott was authorized to attend them indeed, but only to listen and report, the king suspecting that their real object was to further Prussian interests in Poland.⁸

Indeed, reminders of backwardness on the part of Prussia to assist George I on occasion, while ever ready to seek his aid in schemes of advantage to herself, were frequent. Thus Townshend in the second dispatch cited:

I cannot conclude without making this one observation as to the Court of Prussia, they are perpetually upon all, even the most remote occasions, teasing the King to join hand, heart, and purse wherever their interest is concerned, and in return whenever His Majesty proposes to them any thing relating to his service and security, he is sure to meet with nothing but cold assurances of there being no danger, no need of any precautions; these joined to some trifling objections to what His Majesty proposes are to serve as a full answer for their not joining with the King our Master. . . . Keeping up a good correspondence with them, you may, however, take proper opportunities of letting them see that they ought to be as earnest in the King's interest, as they expect He should be in theirs.

⁶ Townshend to Scott, 24 July (o.s.) 1722, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 53.

⁷ The same, 7 September (o.s.).

⁸ The same, 6 November (o.s.).

And in February 1723, it being recalled how in 1719 the treaty of Vienna had been rendered ineffectual by Prussian opposition, and how in 1721 the proposed defensive league with Hesse and Denmark had been refused,⁹ Scott was again ordered to do nothing but listen and report, and 'keep them from pursuing wrong and dangerous projects'. Experience, he was told, had shown that it was very difficult to gain the Prussian court to any scheme which did not promise it extravagant advantages, a late instance of which was the coolness shown towards the plan for removing the duke of Holstein-Gottorp from St. Petersburg,¹⁰ so soon as it appeared that the king of Prussia was expected to contribute to his support. The proposal to remove that negotiation to Stockholm had seemed to show a desire to throw the whole burden and expense upon his majesty.¹¹

With George's particular enemy, Peter the Great, the dangerous neighbour and the desirable ally Frederick William insisted on maintaining the best terms. The Russian ambassador at Berlin, Alexis Golovkin, received all possible assurances both in regard to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp and on other matters, and he on

⁹ *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 408-70. An alliance with Denmark without Prussia was not considered sufficient. Townshend wrote to Whitworth on 6 October (o.s.) 1721: 'As to what you say about an alliance with Denmark, I easily conceive the advantages of it; but at the same time considering the personal weakness of that King, with the poverty and low circumstances of his Kingdom, we shall run too great a risk of being drawn into excessive expences by engaging with him alone. If Prussia could be brought to joyn in such an alliance with Denmark and us I should then think it would put the King's affairs into a much better situation both with regard to the North and to the South, and such a treaty would be desirable above any other thing. But I believe there is little hopes of prevailing with the Court of Prussia to enter into any engagement of that kind; they being for the most part carried away with by-views, and narrow selfish notions, besides that altho they are masters of so great a number of troops, they are not remarkable for courage or resolution. So that the little bargains they may have made with the Duke of Holstein, and the fear of the Czar, will be invincible obstacles to any concert of the nature I have mentioned.' (British Museum, Add. MS. 37386). Whitworth agreed (to Tilson and to Bothmer, 21 October, *ibid.*). The 'little bargains' referred to a reported agreement with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp that if with the help of Prussia he should obtain the crown of Sweden, he should give up to her the remainder of Swedish Pomerania. Wallenrodt actually informed the British government of the desire of the king of Prussia to have Stralsund and Rügen, saying, however, that he would not proceed in the matter without King George's approval. The latter, on being informed, said that he would not oppose the project, but foresaw the difficulties of its realization (Tilson to Whitworth, 13 October (o.s.) 1721, *ibid.*). Whitworth, replying, favoured the proposal, but Count Bothmer shortly informed him that Wallenrodt said that in the present circumstances it must be postponed (28 November, *ibid.*).

¹⁰ *Akte*, xxvi. 296.

¹¹ Townshend to Scott, 1 February (o.s.) 1723, *loc. cit.* There was some truth in this accusation, for Frederick William stated plainly in 1724: 'Es ist bey Uns bishehr eine beständige maxime gewesen, bey der Wir auch ferner bleiben werden, in dergleichen Neue Tractate Uns nicht zu engagiren, wann Wir nicht dabey ein considerable advantage finden. . . . Ohne acquirirung eines solchen advantage, glauben Wir, dass es besser vor Uns sey, freye Hände zu behalten' (to Mardefeld at St. Petersburg, 26 September 1724, Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

his part made corresponding professions, promising accomplishment of the much-desired Brandenburg-Courland marriage—the tsar, he said, held to the treaty for it concluded in 1718, though he hesitated to proceed in the matter at present for fear of rousing jealousies in Poland—and stating that the Russian ambassador to the king of Poland was ordered to act in unison with the Prussian envoy.¹² After the break-up of the Polish diet of 1722, adverting to conciliatory advances from Vienna, which he thought might be designed to involve him in measures prejudicial to the tsar or to France, Frederick William declared, I hold to the Russian emperor, not to the Roman.¹³

It was desired indeed at Berlin, as at Paris, to effect a reconciliation between George I and Peter the Great, and from the same motives of self-interest. But when Frederick William made a formal offer in London of his good offices to that end, it was met with suspicion as due to a desire to forestall the mediation undertaken by France and to substitute Prussia for that power in the alliance to be made with Russia and Great Britain. One of Wallenrodt's chief arguments, Townshend wrote, was 'the necessity of our coming into measures with the Czar in order to prevent him putting himself intirely into the hands of France'. He was answered politely, if falsely, that the king having no quarrel with the tsar, no reconciliation was necessary; had it been, the good offices of the king of Prussia would have been preferred to those of any other prince.¹⁴

But at the end of 1722 a change in Prussian feeling towards Russia began to manifest itself, a change which Whitworth had foretold a year before.¹⁵ Thus Scott on 16 January 1723: 'Par

¹² Golovkin asked for money for the tsar's use in Poland, and Frederick William agreed to supply some, but asked that it might be repaid soon, as General Schwerin (his envoy) wanted it for bribery himself.

¹³ Solov'ev, *Istoria Rossy*, book xviii, ch. 2. Whitworth wrote on 6 December 1721: 'If the Emperor thinks to mortify the K. of Prussia by an alliance with the Czar, He will find himself extreamly mistaken in the event; for the Czar makes his court to the K. of Prussia more than ever, and will probably prefer his friendship always to that of the Emp', as more convenient for his views about Poland, his aims at having a share and authority in the business of the Empire, and the plan which the court of France is laying with him for that end' (to Townshend, British Museum, Add. MS. 37387). The scheme secondly referred to, for incorporating Livonia in the empire and so obtaining for the tsar a seat and vote in the diet, was started, says Whitworth, by Urbich, the Russian envoy at Vienna, soon after the battle of Poltava.

¹⁴ Townshend to Whitworth, 6 October (o.s.) 1721, British Museum, Add. MS. 37386.

¹⁵ 'Autant que je puis juger, le plan de cette Cour à présent est, de n'entrer dans aucun engagement touchant les affaires du Nord, de part ou d'autre; mais quand Elle aura veu ses espérances du côté du Czar remplies, ou frustrées, car l'une ou l'autre aura à peu près le même effet, Elle pourra peut-être changer de sentiment, surtout si l'on Luy puisse montrer un plan solide' (to Bernstorff, 27 January 1722, British Museum, Add. MS. 37387).

¹⁶ Record Office, Prussia 17.

toutes les conversations que j'ay eues depuis peu avec Mr le Baron d'Ilgen, et son gendre,¹⁷ je dois juger que ces deux Messieurs sont contraires aux vues des Russes, et qu'ils font aussi tout ce qu'ils peuvent pour y rendre contraire le Roy leur Maître.' Principal causes which he noted were jealousy of the Franco-Russian alliance believed to be making and anger at the tsar's failure to carry out the Courland marriage-contract.¹⁸ He concluded that the Prussians were not so inclined to be closely allied with the tsar, as had been supposed. In these deductions Scott was correct, as is shown by a definite statement of the king of Prussia's intentions sent to Wallenrodt. After reference to the danger threatening from the Russo-French negotiations, and particularly to the reported proposal to hand over Bremen and Verden to the duke of Holstein-Gottorp in compensation for his share of Sleswick, the rescript declared explicitly that in all matters arising in the north the king would stand firmly by the king of England for the maintenance of their conquests, and would resist with him any attempt, under any pretext whatsoever, against Hanover or other state of the Empire, in the same manner as though it were made against Prussia. The assurances to this effect contained in a letter to the king of England Wallenrodt was ordered, when presenting it, to emphasize out of his own mouth.¹⁹ Later, commenting on the bad condition of the tsar's affairs, Scott wrote :

Ce qui me persuade plus que toute autre chose que les affaires des Russes vont en déclinant c'est la manière dont on en parle icy. Votre Excellence sçait jusques à quel point cette Cour a poussé la complaisance pour les Moscovites, lorsqu'on les a cru dans la prospérité. Présentement on entend dire que ce sont des gens qui n'ont ni foy ni loy, et qui ne méritent nullement les regards qu'on a témoigné pour eux. . . . Enfin, My Lord, autant que je suis capable de juger on est peu content icy des Russes.²⁰

¹⁷ Scott's opinion of Ilgen and his son-in-law Cnyphausen may be noted. The former 'is of long experience in affairs, and is very laborious, but is thought to be naturally of a fearful temper, and easily cast down and discouraged. . . . Monsieur Kniphausen in my opinion hath the best parts, and a head the most turned for business of any I have known here; he is generally thought to be indolent, and lazy; but I doubt these qualities in him are more affected, than natural. He knows his Master perfectly well. . . . I have always found him and also his father-in-law well inclined towards us, and no great friends of the Russ, but the truth is, there can be no great stress laid upon these their inclinations in a place where more regard is often had to the advices and oppinions of military men, even of the lowest rank, than to those of a first Minister' (6 July 1723, *ibid.*).

¹⁸ As a further cause Scott mentioned the tsar's omission to send the king of Prussia certain tall recruits promised in exchange for eighty Prussian sailors sent to Riga, at the rate of one giant for two sailors (17 April, *ibid.*). Frederick William, as is well known, took offence on this head more to heart than others of greater importance; there are many instances of this in the dispatches.

¹⁹ Rescript to Wallenrodt, 5 January 1723, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

²⁰ Scott, 17 April 1723, Record Office, Prussia 17.

Peter the Great, however, was desirous of maintaining good relations. (Chancellor Golovkin having come to Berlin in May, Mardefeld at St. Petersburg was informed that he had given assurance that the sincerity of the tsar's intentions was absolute, and would be proved by the proposals which he would make on his (Golovkin's) return.²¹

In her relations with Austria, Prussia was not very far removed from war. George I in his disputes with the court of Vienna had the German ministers there more or less on his side, but, in the case of Prussia, to the influence of those who were promoting measures against the protestants was added the particular hatred of Prince Eugene. Diplomatic intercourse was broken off in October 1721, when the Prussian resident was expelled from Austria in consequence of the firm stand taken by Frederick William in regard to his reprisals upon his catholic subjects, and for two years all efforts to heal the breach failed, whether by the British envoy, General de St. Saphorin, to whom Prussian interests were confided,²² or by the Russian resident Lanchinsky,²³ or by the king of Poland, desirous of reconstituting against the tsar the Vienna alliance of 1719 with inclusion of Prussia.

On this matter also views at Berlin were now open to change. Although Frederick William always cordially detested Augustus II, in 1723 he began to give some attention to his overtures. As late as January in that year Scott, advocating a league between the emperor and the kings of Poland and Prussia as a 'contre-batterie' against Peter the Great, received from Ilgen the reply that his court would have nothing to do with that of Poland, as it was not to be trusted.²⁴ And Frederick William warned the Russian court of what was on foot.²⁵ But somewhat later renewed advances by Augustus had better success, and early in April General Seckendorff, formerly in the Prussian and now in the Austrian service, and also in the Saxon as governor of Leipzig,²⁶ came to Berlin. Personally agreeable to the king of Prussia, he was well received, and when he visited Berlin a second time in May in the company of

²¹ Rescript to Mardefeld, 25 May, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

²² 'Je ne sçay rien de plus difficile icy, où toutes les choses le sont beaucoup, sinon de réunir la Cour Impériale avec celle de Prusse, et d'y établir une confiance réciproque' (St. Saphorin, 21 October 1721. Record Office, Germany, Empire, 44). And such is the burden of his further dispatches, which include direct correspondence with the king of Prussia.

²³ Who was ordered in the autumn of 1722 to proffer the tsar's good offices, though cautiously, and without exhibiting undue zeal. The reply which he received was polite but reserved (Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*).

²⁴ Scott, 16 January 1723, Record Office, Prussia 17. He thought, however, that a combination, in which George I should take the place of Augustus II, might be favourably considered.

²⁵ Through Mardefeld (rescript to him of 2 February, Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

²⁶ St. Saphorin, 10 April 1723, Record Office, Germany, Empire, 49.

Count Flemming, the king of Poland's first minister, their arguments procured the signature of a 'punctuation' of six articles designed to serve as the basis of a future treaty.²⁷ Scott, after Flemming left on 4 June, wrote that a foundation seemed to be laid for a good understanding, which 'may very much conduce to the keeping of the imperial and czarish courts within bounds'.²⁸ But Frederick William instructed his ministers at London, St. Petersburg, and Warsaw to let it be known that he was ignorant of the king of Poland's intentions, and would enter into no new relations with the Polish court. The discussions, he protested, had been limited to certain differences respecting trade and boundaries.²⁹ Little came of the agreement beyond a restoration of diplomatic intercourse between Austria and Prussia. When Seckendorff and Flemming arrived at Prague, where Charles VI was spending the summer for his Bohemian coronation, they found small disposition to enter into their plans. Flemming, St. Saphorin wrote on 19 September, was leaving completely disabused of his hopes of success.³⁰ But the affair gave Frederick William an opportunity to testify his sincerity towards George I. Immediately on the signature of the agreement he communicated it to him in a personal letter, saying that nothing was yet concluded, and that, if he would let his sentiments on the subject be known, they would be conformed to entirely.³¹

Towards the end of June the British court removed to Hanover. George I was accompanied by both his secretaries of state, Lords Townshend and Carteret, their duties in England being taken over for the time by Robert Walpole and Thomas Pelham-Holles, duke of Newcastle. His arrival was immediately followed by that of Frederick William of Prussia, who was returning home from a visit of inspection to Cleves and Wesel. He stayed five days, and so had full time to discuss the European situation in all its bearings. As soon as he had departed the court adjourned to Pymont for the waters, returning to Hanover on 22 July. Then all minds were occupied with the news of a great armament which

²⁷ Copies in French and German, Record Office, Prussia 17. The preamble stated that the articles were intended to re-establish harmony between the kings of Poland and Prussia as electors. It was agreed (1) to adjust differences as to frontiers, commerce and cartel in accordance with the laws of the empire, (2) to promote a reconciliation between the king of Prussia and the emperor, (3) to work thereafter for a reconciliation between the king of England and the tsar, (4) to preserve the constitutions and liberty of Poland, especially in regard to a future election, (5) the king of Poland to do what he could to promote an accommodation between Prussia and the republic of Poland, and (6) to arrange a time for a conference to conclude a formal treaty, which other powers might be invited to join.

²⁸ 5 June, *ibid.*

²⁹ Roscript of 25 May, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

³⁰ Record Office, Germany. Empire, 50.

³¹ 1 June, Record Office, Prussia 17, the French version of the agreement therewith, the German with Scott's of 10 July.

Peter the Great was preparing at Cronslot and Reval,³² whose destination no man knew, though its probable objective, many thought, was to place the duke of Holstein-Gottorp on the throne of Sweden. There was no hint of such a thing, Townshend wrote, in the dispatches of William Finch from Stockholm, but the Hanoverian minister there, Colonel Bassewitz, had sent word that the Russian and Holstein ministers were about to leave the country, 'which confirms His Majesty in the opinion that the affair is concerted there, and will soon break out.'³³

The state of affairs in Sweden was briefly as follows.³⁴ The Hessian king, Frederick I, had lost almost all credit. Not only had he to bear the chief blame for the peace of Nystad—it was held that from fear of his rival, the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, he had agreed to terms even worse than was necessary—but he was accused of courting in his progresses of 1722 popularity among the peasants with the view of recovering what he could of the royal prerogatives abolished in 1719.³⁵ To the active opposition, therefore, of the Holstein party was added that of all those who would maintain the present democratic constitution; practically the whole of the upper classes.³⁶ And the stoppage of English

³² The news, exaggerated as usual, came from the Prussian and Danish ministers at St. Petersburg, and was forwarded by Scott on 20 July and by Lord Glenorchy from Copenhagen on the 27th (Record Office, Prussia 17, Denmark 46). A list of the fleet assembled at Reval, forwarded by Finch from Stockholm on 17 July (o.s.), showed twenty-four of the line, six of them of eighty-eight guns or more, and seven frigates, with eight admirals and 14,000 men. But resident Jackson wrote four days later, on the authority of one who had seen the fleet, 'in all respects it falls far short of what the list makes it' (Record Office, Sweden 32, 33). Of the Russian fleet in 1722 an eyewitness wrote (Record Office, Russia 9): 'No English sailors below a Boatswain in y^e Service & the Russian sailors are fainthearted & unskilfull & there is not men enough for 30 ships, & y^e Shippes do not last above 8 years before they are rebuilt because the Timber is bad, & many of the Shippes are rotten & now repairing. Also all y^e ships of y^e English names are so rotten that they do not goe to sea. They have no method in victualling their ships for they know not how to pickle any meat, but only dry salt it, & their meat is grass fed of 3 months in the summer which will stink in a months time as I have known.'

³³ Townshend to Robert Walpole, 30 July, private, Record Office, Regencies 4.

³⁴ For particulars see the dispatches, Record Office, Sweden 30 to 33; Bestuzhev's reports in Solov'ev; Stavenow, *Sveriges historia intill tjugonde seklet*, vii. 53 ff.

³⁵ Complaints of the senate's delays, says resident Jackson, and expressions of desire for restoration of the king's authority were general among the peasantry. He instances petitions presented and returned with the observation that 'the King was very desirous to redress their grievances but had no power to do it', an insinuation disliked even by those most devoted to him. (See Jackson, January and February 1722, and secretary Richard Poley, 17 January and 12 September (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 30, 31).

³⁶ Thus Finch on 5 August (o.s.) 1723: 'The Act which has passed the Diet in favour of the Duke of Holstein was carry'd thro' rather by those who pique themselves upon being true Patriots and firm to the Form of Government than by the Holstein party, and was consented to as a point which might counterballance any design of settling the succession in the King's Family, and might show His Majesty, that every step made for raising the first would but raise the second' (Record Office, Sweden 32).

and French subsidies deprived Frederick of that means of influence. When the riksdag assembled in January 1723 the three higher estates and their grand secret committee³⁷ were found to be all but unanimous in the resolve to resist any extension of the royal authority; when, indeed, the peasants' estate presented a resolution in favour thereof it was summarily rejected and its authors were thrown into prison.

Moved by this principle of restraining the king, the riksdag forced upon him measures in favour of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, and in particular the grant of the title of royal highness, implying his right of succession to the throne. Michael Bestuzhev, who had come in February 1722 as minister from the tsar, and was openly courted by the Holstein party, had already presented a request for this, as well as for recognition of the tsar's imperial title, and the demand was pressed by the duke's privy councillor Bassewitz, who arrived soon after the meeting of the riksdag and to whom Frederick was compelled, against his declared will, to grant an audience.³⁸ Although, in spite of warnings from Campredon at Moscow,³⁹ he strenuously resisted⁴⁰—and Queen Ulrica was even more recalcitrant—he was forced to give way and to send letters to the tsar and to the duke conceding the required titles.⁴¹ In fact, the result of the proceedings of the riksdag was to reduce the royal authority almost to a cipher. It was ordained that, if the king refused to sign the conclusions of his council, the council might sign in his name, and that all dispatches from ministers abroad should be sent to the president of the chancery for consideration by a secret committee.⁴² After the close of the riksdag Frederick practically ceased to interest himself in political affairs.

All this by no means implied submission to the tsar. He was still the enemy to be feared, and the man to whom the Swedes looked for protection against him was still George I. The only notable exception was Count Vellingk, who of old had governed

³⁷ Composed of 100 nobles, 50 clergy, and 50 burghers. Its function was to examine in strictest secrecy into the conduct of affairs generally, and especially of foreign.

³⁸ He had informed Campredon at Moscow that he would not receive Bassewitz, unless he came before the meeting of the riksdag (extract from his letter of 24 September (o.s.) 1722 with Finch's of 6 February (o.s.) 1723, Record Office, Sweden 32). And it was said that he had sent orders to Finland to have him arrested on his way, but that Bestuzhev had found means for their evasion.

³⁹ Who wrote: 'Je vois avec peine que ce prince rejette la proposition de tout accommodement avec le duc de Holstein. . . . J'ai pris la liberté de faire là-dessus les plus justes représentations, qu'il m'a été possible, au roi de Suède. S'il ne veut pas en profiter et que les suites ne soient pas heureuses, il ne pourra s'en prendre qu'à lui' (26 December 1722, *Sbornik* xl. 416).

⁴⁰ He told Finch that he would not grant the title nor any other such 'inlet' into Sweden (Finch, 17 April (o.s.) 1723).

⁴¹ Translations with Jackson's of 21 July and 5 August (o.s.), Record Office, Sweden 33.

⁴² Stavenow, p. 57.

the lost province of Bremen. He was for a complete accord with Russia and an inquiry into the negotiation of the treaties of 1719-20 with Hanover and Prussia, producing a list of the bribes which had been given to the senators responsible. But he made little impression, says Finch, for the other members of the senate were jealous of or interested against him; and the chancellor, Count Horn, the most powerful man in Sweden, gave assurance that nothing disagreeable to the king of England would be brought forward in the riksdag.⁴³ And Frederick, in spite of George's continued refusal to assist him financially—in answer to a pressing appeal in January 1723 the latter pleaded the heavy indebtedness of the nation and the expenses incurred in connexion with the 'Atterbury plot'⁴⁴—still expressed his intention of maintaining a constant attachment.⁴⁵ On the other side Finch was ordered to say that George I in no way concerned himself with the interests of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp; ⁴⁶ this in consequence of declarations to the opposite effect made by Bassowitz. The latter thereupon complained to Townshend, recalling a memorandum delivered to the duke at Hanover in July 1719, which stated that George would willingly see him accepted as successor to the Swedish throne and would use his best offices to that end, though he could not then treat him as the heir, and must refer the question of the restitution of Sleswick to the negotiations for peace. Townshend replied with a polite letter of excuse, explaining why the king could not and would not interfere in the domestic affairs of Sweden.⁴⁷ And in June Finch reaffirmed to King Frederick his orders in the matter.⁴⁸

The other power which had to fear a Russian attack was Denmark. When, in March 1722, news came of the tsar's naval preparations, everything was made ready at Copenhagen for defence, and Westphalen was sent back to St. Petersburg, principally with the object of discovering the tsar's intentions. He was instructed to ask, in return for recognition of the imperial title, withdrawal of the request for exemption from the Sound tolls and a guarantee of Sleswick. Further, approaches were made to Sweden for a defensive alliance, and the old proposals for treaties with Great Britain and Hanover ⁴⁹ were renewed. The former met with scant welcome; the Danes were too much hated in Sweden,

⁴³ Finch and Jackson, 2 January (o.s.) 1723 and later dispatches, Record Office, Sweden 32, 33. For the bribery, see *George I and the Northern War*, p. 356.

⁴⁴ Copies of Frederick's letter of 28 December 1722 (o.s.) and of George's reply and dispatch to Finch of 12 February (o.s.) 1723, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155.

⁴⁵ Finch, 13 March (o.s.).

⁴⁶ Townshend to him, 19 March (o.s.), Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155.

⁴⁷ Copies of Bassowitz's letter of 12 May, with the memorandum of 22 July 1719, and of Townshend's reply of 20 June, *ibid.* 248.

⁴⁸ Finch, 29 May (o.s.).

⁴⁹ See *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 190-1, 259, 272-4, 303-4.

and the Russians too much feared; it was held that no alliance could be less useful than that of Denmark, and that it was to the interest of Sweden for the duke of Holstein-Gottorp to have Sleswick back.⁵⁰ But in the latter case ear was given to the Danish proposals, for it was the time of the 'Atterbury plot', and ships and soldiers were wanted from abroad in case of need. Drafts for treaties with Great Britain and Hanover were sent to Copenhagen and communicated also to St. Saphorin at Vienna, he having expressed the opinion that the Vienna alliance of 1719 might be reconstituted with inclusion of Denmark.⁵¹ But dissension on certain points—in particular the questions of wrecks on the Danish coasts and of trade with Norway, and the refusal of the Danes to furnish naval succour outside the Baltic—could not be composed, and the fear of a Jacobite rebellion died out.⁵² Moreover, the making of the treaties was not well looked upon at Paris, Dubois opining that they would both prejudice Campredon's work in Russia and be insufficient to stay the tsar from infringing the Swedish treaties, if he meditated doing so. Better, he thought, to hold them back as an inducement to him to be tractable, though he agreed that, if Denmark were attacked, it would be necessary to defend and protect her.⁵³ Accordingly Frederick IV, always ready to transfer his confidence from one minister to another, now gave heed to the counsels of his minister of war and marine, Admiral Gabel, a declared opponent of alliance with George I, and the Russian minister at Copenhagen, Alexis Bestuzhev, reported him willing to come to terms with the tsar. Bestuzhev attributed the hostility hitherto displayed towards Russia to the two Holsteins⁵⁴ and the Hanoverian envoy, General Bothmer, and recommended a firm attitude, continued patronage of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, renewal of the demand for exemption from the Sound tolls and for recognition of the imperial title, and bribery,⁵⁵ the foundation, he alleged, of Bothmer's influence. In March 1723 Gabel brought him to see the king privately. Frederick IV, he reported, pro-

⁵⁰ See E. Holm, *Danmark-Norges Historie i Frederik IV's sidste ti Regeringsaar*, pp. 68-73.

⁵¹ St. Saphorin, 11 and 14 March 1722, Record Office, Germany, Empire, 46; Townshend to him, 23 March (o.s.), *ibid.* 42. See also (Prussia 105) a draft for a dispatch to Lord Whitworth at Berlin, not sent, entering fully into the question of communicating the scheme to the court of Prussia.

⁵² For particulars of the above see Record Office, Treaty Papers 4, extracts of General Bothmer's dispatches from Copenhagen of April to August 1722. Also Holm, pp. 98, 99.

⁵³ Schaub, 20 and 27 May 1722, British Museum, Add. MS. 22522; Carteret to him, 12 May (o.s.), *ibid.* 22517.

⁵⁴ The grand chancellor, Ulrich Adolphus, Count Holsteinborg, and privy councillor John George Holstein.

⁵⁵ To the grand chancellor 10,000 ducats, to the other Holstein 6,000, to privy councillor Lente 6,000, and to councillor of state Hagen 3,000.

mised that, if the tsar would guarantee to him Sleswick and the duke definitely resign his claim thereto, then he would allow the latter the title of royal highness and help him to obtain the Swedish crown; and if the tsar should endeavour to deprive Hanover of Bremen and Verden in favour of the duke, or should invade Mecklenburg, he would not only not oppose him but help him, giving his fleet the use of the Danish harbours. But if, in spite of these offers, the tsar should reject his friendship, then he must not be surprised if he made alliance with King George. He would recognize the tsar's imperial title, and remit the Sound tolls on receiving free of cost a supply of hemp, pitch, and tar to serve as an excuse for the remission at other courts. A present of 3,000 ducats should at once be sent to Gabel.⁵⁶

But all this came to nothing. Peter the Great, Solov'ev comments, was not ready to deprive the duke of Holstein-Gottorp of all hope of recovering Sleswick, only in order to secure the neutrality of Denmark in a possible war with George I. There was nothing for the Danes to do in 1723 but to prepare again for defence, and they prepared.⁵⁷ And the proposals for alliance with Sweden were brought forward once more. Finch had wind in April of a discussion on the subject in the secret committee of the riksdag, and forwarded a copy of a letter from the king of Denmark accepting with pleasure definite proposals made in one from the king of Sweden of 8 March (o.s.).⁵⁸ But nothing had resulted when the news of the sailing of the Russian fleet intervened. Immediately on receipt of it at Copenhagen anxiety for the treaties with George I revived. Lord Glenorchy reported:

This Court begins now to be sensible of their danger and have none to depend on for assistance but England, wherefore the Ministers desired me to propose to His Majesty to enter into an alliance for the common good and to send fourteen or fifteen ships into the Baltick, which joined with the fleet here will put a stop to the progress of the Czar.

To his reference to former backwardness on their part they had replied, he said, that they were now sincere, and hoped that a fleet would be sent, if not at once, then in good time in the ensuing spring.⁵⁹ But Townshend was of opinion that neither Denmark nor 'this side of the Empire' were in danger.

His Danish Majesty has too great a force by sea and too many troops at command to give room to such a very wary prince as the Czar to make

⁵⁶ Solov'ev, *loc. cit.*, and Holm, pp. 78-80.

⁵⁷ Holm, pp. 81, 82.

⁵⁸ Finch, 3 and 10 April (o.s.) 1723, Record Office, Sweden 32.

⁵⁹ Glenorchy to Robert Walpole, 27 July 1723, in cipher, Record Office, Denmark 46. Walpole wrote to Newcastle: 'There was another letter came y^e Post before from L^d Glenorchy wth offers from y^e King of Denmark to enter into an im^ediate Treaty wth His Majesty, the effect of their great fright, but that I have refer'd to Hanover (2 August (o.s.) British Museum, Add. MS. 32086).

any attempt that must certainly prove unsuccessful, and the making any impression on these parts of the Empire will be attended by so many ill consequences, that his Maty cannot conceive how any practicable enterprize on these coasts can be formed. That there has not been such an alliance, as they may now seem to wish for, was entirely their own fault.

If however, contrary to reason and expectation, the tsar should think of disturbing the king of Denmark, the latter knew that the king of England would always be ready to do what could in reason be expected for his preservation, so that he 'need not abandon himself to counsels unworthy of his honour and dignity'. If the Danes were so much alarmed and really desirous of a defensive alliance, they had better send some one to Hanover to treat.⁶⁰

Campredon's opinion was in consonance. The Russian fleet, he had lately written, could not stand against that of Denmark, especially if it were true that an English squadron were to join it, nor did a descent on Mecklenburg appear more practicable, opposed as it would be by the emperor and the whole empire, and the tsar having lost most of his cavalry on his Caspian campaign. He might, perhaps, be intending to attack Dantzic, having cause to do so, but his finances were exhausted, and he had sent 18,000 men under General Matyushkin to the Caspian. It was more likely that the king of Sweden's conduct had given him the occasion, which perhaps he sought, to establish the duke of Holstein-Gottorp on the throne of Sweden immediately.⁶¹

In accordance with Townshend's suggestion the Danish general Lövenörn, now envoy at Berlin, was sent to Hanover to try, as Lord Glenorchy expressed it, 'how his Majesty is disposed to enter into measures for the common good and security of the Baltick.'⁶² But he had no success, and of his unfavourable report secretary Hermann wrote: 'On s'inquiète ici [at Copenhagen], et le Ministre de Russie s'en rit.'⁶³ Frederick William of Prussia also had recourse to Hanover. While doubting that the Russian expedition meant anything, he instructed Wallenrodt to ascertain exactly the king of England's sentiments, in order that he might conform to them.⁶⁴ It was replied that it was thought best to wait, because the blow would have fallen before measures could be taken to prevent it. Ministers, Wallenrodt said, thought that the Swedes themselves might have invited a Russian intervention, and that it depended on the Swedish army whether a revolution took place

⁶⁰ Townshend, 30 July and 3 August, and further similarly 10 August, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 5.

⁶¹ Campredon, 5 July, *Sbornik* xlix. 352.

⁶² 17 August, Record Office, Denmark 46. Lövenörn stayed at Hanover during September.

⁶³ 27 November, Record Office, *ibid.*

⁶⁴ 'Allermass Wir auch in allen Unseren übrigen Consiliis und Actionen zu thun aufrichtig gemeinet sind' (rescript of 24 July).

or not ; nor were they entirely satisfied with the king of Sweden's conduct.⁶⁵ Later he wrote that Bernstorff had twice submitted a letter to the king to sign, inviting the king of Prussia to consult upon measures to be undertaken against Russia, but he had refused, Townshend opposing from the opinion that evil might result, if the answer should not be what was expected.⁶⁶

But it was thought necessary at Hanover to take measures of precaution against the Russian danger, and in the first place to have in hand a sum of British money for use as occasion might require. The plea employed by Townshend in setting forth the proposal to Robert Walpole was that a conquest of Sweden would give the tsar the control of its ports,

and we might in a little time see Swedish and Muscovite squadrons in conjunction at Gothenburg, able to terrify and distress all the coasts of Great Britain. . . . The King, tho' mighty tender and unwilling to make any proposal, that should seem to burthen his Kingdoms ; yet seeing in this exigency . . . that nothing but a good summ of money . . . can be of service to help us, has ordered me with the utmost secrecy⁶⁷ to open this affair to you. . . . You will please therefore to cast about in your thoughts how you may have at command, with the least noise possible, one or two hundred thousand pounds, if necessary, to be disposed of to prevent the kingdom of Sweden's falling under the disposal of the Czar.

The plan was, if the present king of Sweden should be overthrown at once, then, in the interests of Great Britain, to be as well with the new monarch as might be, but on the other hand, if he should be able to make a stand,

then to have a summ of money ready to assist the king of Denmark and other princes, who would be exceeding jealous of such an exorbitant accession of power to the Czar, to stand by his Swedish Majesty, and to oppose the efforts of the Muscovites, and the Swedish faction.

The king being bound by his last treaty to succour the king of Sweden in such a case, parliament would undoubtedly sanction such a disposal of money for the good of the kingdom. To think of equipping a squadron would be folly ; even if the lateness of the season allowed it, the cost would exceed the sum now asked for.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Wallenrodt, 28 and 31 July.

⁶⁶ The same, 11 August. Bernstorff, he says, was also opposed by the Hanoverian privy councillors Eltz, Busch, and Alvensleben, as also by Court-Marshal Hardenberg, who was beginning to gain credit. The first three, we learn elsewhere, had stood in opposition to Bernstorff for some time past (Plessen to Robert Walpole from Pymont, 7 July 1723, Record Office, Regencies 4).

⁶⁷ Because the matter, ' if it should take the least air in England, might do great hurt to publick credit, and consequently to our other domestick affairs.'

⁶⁸ Townshend to Walpole, 27 July, very secret and to be confided only to the duke of Newcastle, Record Office, Regencies 4 (original) ; printed by Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole*, ii. 253, but dated in the old style.

Carteret, inheritor of Stanhope's forward views in foreign policy, and himself the enthusiastic partisan of Sweden when ambassador at Stockholm in the last years of the war, strongly supported the proposal, as also did the Hanoverian ministers. But Walpole, intent upon restoring the financial credit of England, objected. Humouring the king's views in his official reply to Townshend, in a private letter to him he expressed dissent as strongly as he dared.⁶⁹ And he wrote to the duke of Newcastle :⁷⁰

The other letter w^{ch} I wrote to L^d Townshend, being to be seen both by the King and L^d Carterett was so calculated accordingly, and I hope I was so good a Courtier as both to please His Majesty, and to defy L^d Carterett from being able to impute to me either want of zeal or readiness to serve His Majesty in any thing that He had at heart.⁷¹

The substance of that letter was that I could answer for £150,000 betwixt Mich. and Christmas, in case His Majesty came over time enough for y^e Parliament to pass the Land-Tax before Christmas.⁷² I did not forgett to make such a state of y^e Revenue, as show'd the service I was to undertake neither easy nor insignificant, but treated the occasion, if necessary, in such a manner as I thought would not be disagreeable to the King, and that our friend ⁷³ can take no advantage of.

I had not indeed time to take a copy of that letter, or else y^r Grace should have seen it.

But notwithstanding what I wrote in publick, I must own my apprehensions are great upon this occasion, & if an emulation or endeavour to outvye one another should transport us into any rash engagements, I dread y^e consequences, w^{ch} made me write in y^e manner I did, and if I had not been afraid of displeasing L^d. Townshend at this distance in a point where I do not know his way of thinking, I should have enlarged a great deal more upon y^e topick of caution.

The duke of Newcastle was not helpful. He shared with Townshend the apprehension of a Russian invasion and with Walpole the fear of discontents at home.⁷⁴ After discussing the circumstances, he stated the dilemma to be that if the tsar became too strong he might 'at once upset us', while, 'if an opposition be made by sending a fleet, or granting a subsidy, that may create ill humour amongst our friends.' He relied on Walpole's great

⁶⁹ 23 July (o.s.), printed by Coxe, ii. 263; an unsigned draft, Record Office, Regencies 4.

⁷⁰ 25 July (o.s.) British Museum, Add. MS. 32686.

⁷¹ Carteret was already the enemy, and the discreditable intrigue, which was to deprive him of his office of secretary of state, was in conception. (The original correspondence thereon, Record Office, Regencies 5. Ballantyne in his *Lord Carteret* writes from it with truth; Coxe's account is biased.)

⁷² In his private letter to Townshend Walpole said that the £150,000 could be raised out of the provision made for the king's staying abroad over Christmas, if he returned sooner, but not otherwise.

⁷³ Carteret.

⁷⁴ The demand would 'certainly give new life to the Jacobites, and may possibly occasion a breach among our friends'.

ability and on the zeal of parliament to find an expedient, and thought that while Townshend, being on the spot, must be a better judge of the gravity of the affair than they at home, yet Walpole's hint of caution to him could certainly do no harm.⁷⁵ Later Townshend wrote that the king was entirely satisfied with what Walpole proposed, hoped that the money would not be wanted, and would only ask for it in case of necessity. Bernstorff and Carteret, he said, had laboured to keep up the scare, but the king was steady, and most complimentary to Walpole's capacity for business.⁷⁶

Another demand was from the king of Sweden for £10,000. The grant of this Townshend bitterly opposed, finding that the money was to be employed, not for defence against the tsar, but to influence the riksdag. Bernstorff, he told Walpole, had pressed not only for it but for the dispatch of six or eight British men-of-war to act with the Danish fleet; but 'His Ma^{ty} is firmly resolved not to assist Sweden with a farthing of money till the case of the treaty shall actually exist' and some effectual measure be proposed to avert the common danger.⁷⁷ Accordingly Finch at Stockholm was instructed that the advance could not be proposed to parliament, as it did not come under the treaty with Sweden. The king's father, the landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, Townshend observed, was more nearly concerned and would doubtless find the money; ⁷⁸ if he would not, how could it be required of the king of England? If it appeared that the tsar would use his forces to create disturbance in Sweden, and threatened its coasts, then the king would punctually perform his engagements; and though it was too late in the season to send men-of-war, 'would take all others the best and most effectual measures he can to support the King of Sweden against any hostile attack whatsoever.'⁷⁹ Finch replied that people of the best sense were of opinion that the tsar was only making a demonstration. He had waited, he said, upon the king and communicated his master's assurances. There was general satisfaction thereat, and the secret committee of the riksdag had pronounced the offer to be 'the most generous and the most à propos that could be', and it had been unanimously resolved, if the tsar came near the coast, to break up the riksdag

⁷⁵ Newcastle to Walpole, 26 July (o.s.), the original, Record Office, Regencies 4; a copy, British Museum, Add. MS. 32686.

⁷⁶ To Walpole, 10 and 11 August, Record Office, Regencies 4.

⁷⁷ 6 August, private, Record Office, Regencies 4; printed by Coxe, ii. 258, but without a date. Townshend went on to advocate afresh the larger proposal, and to assure Walpole of the confidence which the king showed in them as against Carteret and Bernstorff.

⁷⁸ 'The Landgrave has large territories, and cannot fail of getting a greater sum than that when he will at a moderate interest.'

⁷⁹ Townshend to Finch, 2 August, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, Regencies 4.

and rescind the acts passed at his desire. 'People here are very jealous of the Czar's meddling with the domestick affairs.'⁸⁰

One ground on which Walpole objected to any help being given to Sweden was that in Russia it might be made 'a pretence to prevent a reconciliation betwixt the King and the Czar, w^{ch} I taste very much, and my politicks are in a narrow compasse, if we keep perfectly well wth France and the Czar, I am under no apprehensions of foreign disturbances, w^{ch} alone can confound us here'.⁸¹ But when he wrote this, apprehensions had been laid aside, for news had come first that no Russian galleys had sailed from Cronslot,⁸² and later that Peter the Great had left the fleet suddenly and returned to St. Petersburg, on advices, it was said, that the Turks had occupied Georgia and were threatening Derbent.⁸³

The supposition that Peter the Great designed to subjugate Sweden with a view to an attack upon Great Britain seems to us absurd, but it shows, at least, in what estimation his power was held. Perhaps he wished to intimidate the Swedes into accepting the proposal made by Bestuzhev to King Frederick privately at the end of 1722 for an offensive and defensive alliance, including conditions for the nomination of the duke of Holstein-Gottorp as successor to the throne and joint efforts for the recovery of Sleswick for him. Bestuzhev was then answered that such a treaty could only be considered if the king of England were made a principal party to it.⁸⁴ But after the business of the titles had been carried through he reintroduced the subject formally, and the Swedish ministers then told those of George I that they did not think fit to reject the proposal, provided that the condition above stated was allowed. They suggested that the king of England's requirements in regard to the treaty of Nystad might thus be satisfied and his differences with the tsar be accommodated.⁸⁵ Townshend in reply to Finch's report of this stated that an indispensable preliminary to any such negotiation would be a declaration on the part of the tsar that he was ready to enter into a perfect friendship with the king of England and to forget the past, when the latter would be ready to join the alliance proposed as a principal party. It was believed,

⁸⁰ Finch 5 August (o.s.).

⁸¹ To Newcastle, 31 August (o.s.), British Museum, Add. MS. 32686.

⁸² Townshend, 10 to 17 August, Record Office, Regencies 4. On 20 August he wrote decisively, 'the Czar has not the least thought of disturbing Sweden.'

⁸³ Glenorchy and secretary Hermann from Copenhagen, 31 August and 7 September, Record Office, Denmark 46. On 10 September advice, dated 25 July, was received from Abraham Stanyan at Constantinople to the effect that the pasha of Erzerum, appointed seraskier, had taken Tiflis and the whole province of Georgia without opposition (Record Office, Turkey 24). Carteret's reply to this of 22 September, British Museum, Add. MS. 22519.

⁸⁴ Finch, 19 December (o.s.) 1722, Record Office, Sweden 30.

⁸⁵ Finch, 31 July (o.s.) 1723, *ibid.* 32 and Regencies 4.

he said, that the only matter requiring accommodation was the expulsion of the tsar's minister from London; but in that it was to the king, if to any one, that satisfaction ought to be given, and so far as he was concerned, the incident might be forgotten.⁸⁶

Full particulars of the negotiations which ensued are to be found in the correspondence of Townshend and Finch,⁸⁷ but they do not concern us now. Briefly, the Swedes offered their mediation between George I and Peter the Great, and, when it was refused by the former, turned to make alliance with the latter. George's position in the meantime was greatly strengthened by the signature of the treaty of Charlottenburg, and to that we may now proceed.

It is probable that the queen of Prussia, George's daughter, had some share in the inception of the treaty. She came to Hanover on 23 July, immediately upon the return of the court from Pyrmont. In her hurry to be there she arrived three days before she was expected,⁸⁸ and she stayed till 10 August. She had many private conversations with her father, but, unfortunately, she carefully excludes any reference to what passed from the affectionate letters which she wrote to her husband daily.⁸⁹ She says that, while she has much to report, she will wait to do so by word of mouth on her return home. The single thing which she reveals, apart from mention of the affection exhibited by her father and of her expectation of success in all her 'petits articles', is that, immediately upon her arrival, she pressed him to pay a visit to Berlin. There seems to be no reason to doubt the statement of the margravine of Baireuth, then the Princess Wilhelmine of Prussia and one of the persons concerned,⁹⁰ that the principal subject of discussion was the double marriage between the two royal houses, which the queen had so much at heart and had urged so long. She has it also that George was wanted at Berlin in order that he might see for himself that certain reports of her unfitness to be Prince Frederick's bride were untrue.⁹¹ And this is corroborated by what Wallenrodt wrote on the queen's departure. Having been informed

⁸⁶ Townshend to Finch, 26 August 1723, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, Regencies 4.

⁸⁷ Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 155, Sweden 32.

⁸⁸ The excuse devised by Wallenrodt was that she had not seen her father for seven years, and on her last two journeys had had the ill fortune to arrive too late (25 July, Staatsarchiv, Berlin).

⁸⁹ Königliches Hausarchiv, Charlottenburg.

⁹⁰ See her Memoirs.

⁹¹ As, in Wallenrodt's phrase, 'kränklicher Constitution und particularen humeur.' The reports were ascribed to Wilhelmine's discarded governess, M^{lle} Leti ('par dépit ihres Abschiedes'), who was now at Hanover under the protection of the countess of Darlington, the duchess of Kendal's rival. How M^{lle} Pöllnitz ('ein vergifteter Drache') and other Hanoverian ladies came to Berlin to make a close inspection of the princess is related in her Memoirs.

of the reports, he says, at Pymont by the duchess of Kendal⁹² and Townshend, he had resolved to lay them before the queen immediately on her arrival, and also to inform her of the state of parties at the Hanoverian court. She determined to try at once to persuade her father to go to Berlin, in order that he might be disabused of this and of other insinuations. And she managed so prudently as to gain the duchess of Kendal's confidence, without offending the opposing party. He doubted whether the queen would have written anything on these matters, as such was not her habit, but suggested that a positive invitation should be sent; everything, however, to himself should be put in cipher, in order that Bernstorff might not be informed, for he was so curious, and so alarmed at the queen's private interviews with her father, that he would certainly have the dispatches opened.⁹³

But the marriage cannot have been the only subject of the conversations, and it may well be supposed that the queen suggested, at least, a closer political union between Great Britain and Prussia. This, we know, was favoured by her husband, and strongly advocated by the British ministers. And they must have had a much more important thing in view in bringing George I to Berlin, the impression, namely, which the visit would make upon the courts of Europe. It was natural for him to call at Hanover on his way back from Westphalia, and natural for his queen to travel to see her father, but a special journey of the king of England to Berlin was calculated to inform Europe that the two powers intended to act in foreign politics in unison. Frederick William instructed Wallenrodt to cultivate the friendship of the duchess of Kendal and Townshend, as they seemed to be the best inclined to Prussia, and to find out what King George really meant and what might be expected from him. It was not known, the rescript said, what further deference could be shown, or what potentate of Europe's friendship could be more convenient and useful to him. A letter was being sent inviting him to Berlin, and requesting him to signify his positive resolve.⁹⁴ Wallenrodt was shortly informed by the duchess of Kendal that the king had characterized the letter as a very obliging one, and he expressed confidence that the visit would take place; when, however, was uncertain, but probably on the king's way to his hunting at the Gührde.⁹⁵ George, on his side, through his envoy Scott, intimated the most sincere assurances of his desire to be well with the king of Prussia, both on account of their near relationship and of the

⁹² Now definitely associated with the Walpole-Townshend party in the British ministry.

⁹³ Wallenrodt, 11 August, *Staatsarchiv*, Berlin.

⁹⁴ Rescript of 17 August, *ibid.*

⁹⁵ Wallenrodt, 21 August, *ibid.*

necessity of defending protestant interests in Germany.⁹⁶ And Townshend wrote on 8 September :

The King of Prussia has made all imaginable court to the King our Master, and has used all possible endeavours to gett him over to Berlin. His Maty has certainly very little inclination for this journey, and has not hitherto declared his resolution upon it ; but I live in hopes that he will conquer his aversion, and not refuse so trifling a compliance, which may open the way to a better understanding between the two Crowns. A neighbouring Prince so nearly related, so well affected to the Protestant cause, who has a standing force of 80^m men and such an extent of dominions as the King of Prussia, is certainly worth gaining even upon much harder terms ; and I am satisfied nothing would contribute more to bring the Czar to reason and to facilitate our treaty with him, than the renewing our antient alliances with Prussia, which I shall therefore labour all I can.⁹⁷

But still George could not be persuaded to give a decision. The duchess of Kendal, pressing him on the subject, was answered that he was too greatly overcome by affairs to be able to resolve.⁹⁸ He was anxious, besides, to get as soon as possible to the Göhrde, and, as Wallenrodt testifies, he was not in good health ; indeed, when he came to Charlottenburg, a seizure at his first supper nearly made an end of him.⁹⁹ However, after an audience on 25 September, Wallenrodt flattered himself that his arguments had made a serious impression, and that the journey would be undertaken,¹⁰⁰ and at length, on the evening of 8 October, he arrived. The visit lasted five days and passed off excellently.¹⁰¹

To conclude a treaty in two days was rapid work, but the settlement of the terms need not have been difficult, for it was, in form, only a renewal of those of 1661 and 1690,¹⁰² with alterations suited to the present circumstances. The first clause, after reciting this, established a faithful, firm, and perpetual friendship,

⁹⁶ Scott to Ilgen, 30 August, and the reply in suitable terms, 4 September, *ibid.*

⁹⁷ To Robert Walpole, Record Office, Regencies 4 ; printed by Coxe, ii. 266.

⁹⁸ Wallenrodt, 19 September. 'Die grossen Intriguen der Weiber,' he wrote, 'halten den König ab von einer festen resolution darüber.' Previously he had written (15 August), 'Je mehr man selbigen zu einer Sache pressirt, je mehr man ihn difficiler macht.'

⁹⁹ Of which the margravine of Baireuth gives a graphic account. Townshend says that, arriving late after travelling more than 100 miles that day without eating or drinking, as was his custom, he ate too heartily in a hot and crowded room, and fainted (to Walpole, 9 October, Record Office, Regencies 5).

¹⁰⁰ Wallenrodt, 26 September.

¹⁰¹ A printed account, with Scott's of 16 October, Record Office, Prussia 17. Another in the *Lettres historiques*, lxiv. 532. More interesting is that of the margravine, who remarks on the coldness of George's manner and relates how he examined her closely from top to toe by the light of a candle.

¹⁰² Hence, presumably, the curious mention of Cleves and Juliers in the secret article, Cleves having long been Prussian. The duchies, the succession to which was now in question, were those of Juliers and Berg.

alliance, and confederation by land and sea, and went on: 'On s'évertuera à avancer les intérêts mutuels, et à maintenir l'un l'autre réciproquement dans les royaumes, provinces, états, droits, commerce, immunités et prérogatives quelconques dont ils se trouvent maintenant en possession soit dedans ou dehors de l'Empire, sans exceptions, et à se secourir mutuellement en cas de trouble ou d'attaque.' Clause 2, reciting the fact that the treaty of 1690 was partly offensive against France, stated that it was renewed only so far as it was defensive, and not otherwise. Under clause 3 the mutual succour was fixed at 8,000 infantry or their equivalent in money at the rate of 10,000 Dutch florins per 1,000 men per month, or, in the case of aid to the king of Prussia, a strong squadron of the line, if he so desired. Were he called upon to send troops to England, he was to furnish their ordinary pay, and King George was to raise it to the English scale. But if the troops of either party were called out elsewhere, then he who was succoured should not be called upon to provide anything but bread and forage. By clause 4 the king of Prussia undertook to provide, on notice given, an additional force of 8,000 foot and 2,000 cavalry of his own or of hired troops on the same conditions as his father had supplied them for the war in Flanders, to be paid by the king of England at the same rate as the most favoured Prussian corps had been paid in that war. If by this action he incurred the resentment of any power, King George undertook to take his part 'hautement', and not to allow him to suffer harm, but to repair to him any damage done; employing for this purpose, on demand, as many troops and men-of-war as should be necessary. The last two clauses provided for exchange of ratifications within six weeks and for counterpart copies.

There were two separate articles. The first expressly declared that, Charles II having been possessed only of dominions appertaining to the crown of Great Britain, the present treaty extended to all the states, rights, dignities, and prerogatives of the king of England within the empire. The second bound the latter to do his best to obtain the inclusion of the king of Prussia's principality of Neuchâtel, comprising the counties of Neuchâtel and Vallengin, in the treaty about to be made by France with the Swiss Confederation as a member thereof; so that should war break out between France and the empire, and the king of Prussia be obliged to furnish his contingent of troops for the service of the latter, the principality should be exempt from attack. A secret article renewed the obligation of the treaties of 1661 and 1690 that, if there should be no heir to the house of Neuburg, the king of England should support the Prussian claim to Cleves¹⁰³ and

¹⁰³ See last note.

Juliers; an agreement which, when it leaked out, supplied fresh fuel to the jealousy of the court of Vienna.¹⁰⁴

From Berlin George travelled straight to the G6hrde, and Townshend signified him to be 'extremely pleased with his noble and affectionate entertainment', and added his warmest thanks for the civilities shown to himself, especially by Ilgen and Cnyp-hausen.¹⁰⁵ Wallenrodt, too, reported that the king had received him most graciously and expressed his contentment with his visit, and that the duchess of Kendal, who had worked so hard for it, was charmed at its good effect. He himself, he said, was offered a lodging at the G6hrde, to the jealousy of the other foreign ministers, who had to put up at Danneberg. He could not sufficiently express what a change he found: 'alle Leuthe nach des K6nigs Exempel voritzo wollen Preussisch seyn;' whether they were so in heart, events would show, 'wenigstens m6ssen sie sich voritzo sehr contregniren.'¹⁰⁶

It remains to surmise, in default of direct evidence, why the treaty was made. The general intention of the British government is clearly expressed in private letters of Townshend to the two Walpoles. While, he wrote, no further engagements were taken on the British side than 'the renewal and confirmation of our old Treatys', yet, in his private thoughts, he greatly appreciated the value of what was done, since the military support lost by the sinking of the Dutch republic would be replaced by the fine army of Prussia. The king, he said, would now be able 'to act more independently from the houses of Austria and Bourbon, and preserve the peace of Europe with less submission to the terms of either'. The treaty would endure, would sound well in England, and so on.¹⁰⁷ And again:

We fix the King of Prussia in our friendship, which was a most necessary point to be sure of in this juncture. As the present situation in Holland is extremely weak, and under such disorder and confusion, we could not doe a better thing, than to cover ourselves with this alliance, which must inspire more respect towards the King, both in the Emperour and the Czar, since His Majesty is now at the head of a mighty force by land, as well as Master of the most powerfull fleet in Europe. And it was time to strike in, and prevent the effect of Count Flemming's designs and negotiations by securing the King of Prussia to England in our own way.

He went on to remark how agreeable the treaty must be to France, how an impression was already noticed upon the imperial and

¹⁰⁴ The treaty, Record Office, Treaties 411; copies and papers in connexion, Treaty Papers 59 and British Museum, Add. MS. 22519.

¹⁰⁵ To Scott and to Wallenrodt, 15 October, Record Office, Foreign Entry Book 222.

¹⁰⁶ 27 October, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

¹⁰⁷ To Robert Walpole, 18 October, Record Office, Regencies 5.

Saxon ministers, how it was approved in Holland, and what an advantage it was to have 18,000 to 20,000 auxiliaries at call, whether for support of guarantees or for defence.¹⁰⁸

But, apart from these general views, there must have been some special reason to account for the suddenness of the conclusion. It can hardly have been the scare of the Russian Baltic expedition, for that was past, as has been said, by the end of August. Nor was there any marked increase of acuteness yet in relations with Austria; the negotiations connected with the Congress of Cambray, though making little progress, were still not without promise of success. Of what was uppermost in Frederick William's mind we have knowledge from the papers at Berlin—an alliance between France and Russia, intended, in his phrase, to bridle Germany.¹⁰⁹ This has been noticed above, and the fear was particularly evident at the beginning of 1723, when, in a memorandum addressed to their master, Ilgen and Cnyphausen spoke of advices both from St. Petersburg and Paris of the advanced state of the negotiations. They pointed out its menace to Prussia, and recalled the fact that the treaty of Amsterdam of August 1717 entitled Prussia to be included in any fresh treaty between Russia and France. No doubt, they said, France wanted to play the pipes in the north; ¹¹⁰ and they suggested that the king of England, who had so great influence with the Regent, could best work to bring the project to naught, a better plan than for Prussia to be included in the treaty, for that would make great noise and rouse great jealousy in Europe. God, they concluded, had given his majesty so much strength and power, that he would be welcomed as an ally on any side.¹¹¹ Frederick William approved of this, and noted upon it that it would be well to excite the fears of George I in regard to Bremen and Verden; hence the reference to this cited above. And when Wallenrodt reported that the king of England consented to act as desired, satisfaction was expressed, and it was promised that all possible information should be sent to him privately.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ To Horatio Walpole, now at Paris, 25 October, British Museum, Add. MS. 22519. And similarly to St. Saphorin (27 October, Staatsarchiv, Hanover): 'Nous avons conclu un Traité, . . . et nous avons par là renoué et reserré plus étroitement l'amitié intime entre le Roy notre maître et celui de Prusse, que tous les bons Serviteurs de sa Ma^{te} jugeront sans doute être un Ouvrage très à propos, très utile, et des plus salutaires.'

¹⁰⁹ To Mardefeld, 2 January 1723, printed in *Sbornik* xv. 213.

¹¹⁰ To which Frederick William noted, 'Ist wahr.'

¹¹¹ 2 January 1723, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

¹¹² Rescript of 2 February, *ibid.* From those of 5 and 10 January may be quoted the following sentences: 'Weilen die neue Alliantz zwischen Frankreich und Mosken Uns so wenig, als dem Könige in Engelland etwas gutes ominirt, so werden die dortigen Minister hoffentlich ihr bestes anwenden solche Alliantz annoch, wo möglich, zu verhindern.' And, 'Werden Wir auch Unseres Orts alles, was Uns möglich, thun, damit diese Alliantz zu keiner Consistenz kommen möge.'

In February, indeed, Mardefeld was informed that the apprehensions entertained were unfounded, though he must keep carefully on the watch; but in August fresh warnings were sent him of a likely alliance between Russia, France, and Sweden.¹¹³ And still, after the treaty of Charlottenburg was signed, fears were maintained.¹¹⁴ When that of February 1724 between Russia and Sweden became known, the belief was expressed that France had had a leading hand in it, in order to form a northern league which, when the occasion arose, might hold in check the forces of Prussia and Hanover in the empire.¹¹⁵

Such, then, was Frederick William's principal fear, and it happened that, in August and September 1723, the court at Hanover lay under a like apprehension. Chavigny had come from Paris with the proposal that, instead of a triple alliance between France, Russia, and Great Britain, the two former powers should make a separate treaty first, to which Great Britain might accede subsequently. George I would not listen to this. And at the same time came the news of the death of Cardinal Dubois, on whom hitherto the maintenance of the accord between Great Britain and France had chiefly depended. The new secretary for foreign affairs, the Comte de Morville, was found to favour seriously the policy of a separate treaty, which Dubois had only, in the last moments of his life, suggested.¹¹⁶ Seeing that, on the communication of the treaty of Charlottenburg to France, the new idea was definitely laid aside, it seems probable that the main object of that treaty was so to impress the French court as to produce this very result. To quote Carteret, who anticipated the most intimate union henceforth between Great Britain and Prussia,

Ce Traitté nous fournira un argument très solide, pour faire revenir la Cour de France de tout empressement à se lier avec le Czar, si ce n'est en signant conjointement avec le Roy le Traitté avec Sa Maj^{te} Czarienne.¹¹⁷

And similarly Chambrier, the Prussian resident at Paris :

Le Traité . . . fait icy un très grand bien aux Anglois, puisque le Comte de Morville n'osera plus continuer à leur insçu ses négociations en Moscovie, et que cela l'obligera désormais à s'attacher à eux totalement, dans la crainte de se perdre s'il continueroit la route qu'il avait enfilée depuis quelque temps. Ainsi selon toutes les apparences les Anglois vont avoir icy plus de crédit que jamais, à quoy Votre Majesté contribue beaucoup.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Rescripts to Mardefeld, 9 February and 21 August, *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ To the same, 16 November, and to him and to Wallenrodt in January and February 1724, *ibid.*

¹¹⁵ To Wallenrodt, 11 April 1724, *ibid.*

¹¹⁶ See on this *ante*, xxvi. 303-7.

¹¹⁷ To Schaub at Paris, 24 October (o.s.), British Museum, Add. MS. 22519.

¹¹⁸ 6 November, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

Frederick William readily agreed to the communication of the treaty to France; indeed he wanted to inform Michel, the French secretary at Berlin, and Chambrier at once. Scott, however, objected that its ratification must be waited for.¹¹⁹ Chambrier, therefore, was only instructed that it was agreed to inform the duke of Orleans of it privately, and that he must see Schaub and learn what orders he had received.¹²⁰ Later he was told, in reply to his dispatch above cited,

Vous aurez soing aussy de trouver adroitement, et faire valoir cette nouvelle Alliance d'une telle façon, que si sa conclusion donne du plaisir au Duc d'Orléans, elle tienne à moy, aussy bien qu'à l'Angleterre, lieu de mérite auprès de la France, et que, par là, cette Couronne soit engagée d'avoir pour moy d'autant plus de considération.¹²¹

When the communication had been made, Morville, says Chambrier, showed sensible pleasure, saying that nothing could be more agreeable to France than to see Great Britain and Prussia more closely united, and that he himself had done his best to procure a good intelligence between them.¹²²

In November Frederick William paid a ten-days' return visit to George at the Göhrde. Scott reported him on his return 'mighty well pleased' with his reception, but said that Ilgen still complained of Bernstorff's behaviour, and he would do what he could 'towards the hindering of their particular squabbles'.¹²³ That Frederick William was resolved to maintain the best relations with his father-in-law was shown by his frank conduct in December, when a report spread that he was renewing his alliance with Peter the Great. In a long letter to George I he explained that the treaty in question was only for the marriage of the duchess of Courland to Prince Charles of Brandenburg;¹²⁴ and he sent to England as evidence the counterpart of the treaty delivered by Golovkin together with Peter the Great's original letter, and asked that if George entertained the smallest further doubt he would please to express it, when all further explanation necessary should be given. George replied with assurances of perfect confidence

¹¹⁹ Scott, 30 October, Record Office, Prussia 17.

¹²⁰ Rescript of 30 October, Staatsarchiv, Berlin.

¹²¹ The same, 20 November.

¹²² Dispatch of 7 December, *ibid.*; and similarly Schaub and Horatio Walpole, *ante*, xxvi. 306.

¹²³ 23 November, Record Office, Prussia 17. Frederick William, however, had one cause for dissatisfaction, in that he was obliged to go hunting instead of shooting, as he wished, being ashamed to cry off when George, twice his age, he said, preferred it. 'Man schweitzet Horrible,' he wrote, but found himself extremely well after the exercise (*Briefe . . . an den Fürsten Leopold zu Anhalt-Dessau*, p. 236).

¹²⁴ Substituted for the candidate of 1718, the margrave of Brandenburg-Schwedt. Droysen considers this treaty to have been an effect of that of Charlottenburg (*Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, iv. ii. 350).

and sympathy, saying, however, ' J'étois bien aise de remarquer que Votre Majesté connoit si bien les desseins et les manières du Czar, que de ne pas prendre des nouveaux engagements avec Luy, se contentant seulement de tirer de Luy l'exécution de ceux qu'il avoit pris cy-devant.' ¹²⁵ In answer Frederick William wrote in the following warm terms :

Monsieur mon Frère

L'on ne scauroit estre saisi d'une plus vive reconnoissance que je l'ay été à la lecture de la Lettre que Vôte Majesté m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire ce 17 de Janvier, et par la quelle Elle m'a assuré avec un vray excès de bonté de ce que je souhaite le plus dans ce monde, à sçavoir de l'amitié et de l'affection véritablement paternelle qu'Elle a pour moy.

Je prie Vôte Majesté d'être persuadé qu'il n'y aura jamais rien d'assés impossible que je ne vueille tascher de faire, pour me conserver un si grand bien.

La confiance que j'ay cru Luy devoir faire des affaires de Courlande, et dont Vôte Majesté me tesmoigne estre si satisfaite, sera toujours la moindre des preuves que je mettray en usage pour Luy faire voir que je n'ay rien de réserve pour Elle, et qu'il n'y aura jamais quoy que ce soit, que je ne Luy sacrifie avec plaisir lors qu'il sera question de Luy marquer mon attachement à Sa Personne Sacrée, à Ses intérêts et à Son service, car on ne peut estre ny avec plus de devouément ny avec plus de vénération, que je le suis et le seray sans cesse

de Vostre Majesté

le très devoues Fils

F. GUILLAUME R.¹²⁶

J. F. CHANCE.

¹²⁵ These documents, Record Office, Royal Letters 46, King's Letters 52. Frederick William's letter (original) is of date 21 December; Peter the Great's (in Russian) of 1 October (o.s.); George's reply (draft), 17 January (o.s.) 1724.

¹²⁶ 12 February 1724, Record Office, Royal Letters 46, original.