

death of his father cannot have been due to a general weakness of will as his prompt and decisive actions in the case of Polonius and of Guildenstern and Rosencrantz bear witness. Nor were external conditions prohibitive. There was, rather, a special inhibition to this particular act. This may be traced to a complex involving childhood repression of sex affection toward his mother with accompanying jealousy of his father, the latter being concealed by a compensatory solicitude. Hamlet's inability to act is due to the dread of arousing to consciousness this submerged complex. Shakespeare is supposed to have had a similar hidden complex. "The new life which Shakespeare poured into the old tragedy was the outcome of inspirations that took their origin in the deepest and most hidden parts of his mind."

TEACHERS COLLEGE,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

H. A. RUGER.

THE IDEA OF THE SOUL.

The Idea of the Soul. A. E. CRAWLEY, M.A. London: A. and C. Black, 1909. Pp. 307.

In this book Mr. Crawley conceives that he has for the first time applied 'the verified experimental results of psychology' in the interpretation of the facts concerning the animistic beliefs of savages made known by anthropology and folk-lore; and that from this marriage of the two sciences there legitimately issues a "solution of the most important and far-reaching of all sociological questions, the genesis of that great conception which divides man into body and soul, and the universe into matter and spirit." It is in this unpretentious manner that the author puts forward a new hypothesis concerning the origin and early development of the idea of the soul. He proposes to introduce 'exactness of method' into anthropology, and thereby to put an end to the discord of opinions which still prevails in that science. The soul, Mr. Crawley is convinced, did not owe its origin to the dream-experience, nor to hallucinations, nor to a tendency of early man to conceive of natural causation in anthropomorphic terms, nor to the personalization of the idea of 'vital energy'; all these explanations are for him not psychological enough. In its primal form the soul was nothing more or less than the memory image — "the sensory, chiefly visual, image in memory, of the whole personality or totality of the person or object." The idea thus has at once a simpler and a less dubious genesis than has often been ascribed to it; it is not the product of an illusion nor of any abnormal experience, but the primitive formulation of a psychological fact — namely, that the image is dis-

sociable from the percept though derivative from it, and that thus, through the power of memory, the mental world is numerically distinct and qualitatively different from the world of objects, from which its content is none the less drawn. From the contrast between the characteristics of the memory-image and those of the percept Mr. Crawley proposes to explain the well-known peculiarities of the soul in savage belief — its vagueness, tenuity, general similarity in form to the body, reduced size, duplicability, survival of bodily death, and the like.

The evidence for all this consists partly in an accumulation of ethnographic data, partly in reasonings concerning what 'must have been' the processes by which the primitive mind arrived at the soul-concept. Neither part of the argument is characterized by sound scientific method. The anthropological facts which Mr. Crawley adduces — with an abundance which will make his long chapter of over one hundred pages on 'pre-scientific psychologies' somewhat serviceable as a work of reference — are largely beside the mark. For, by Mr. Crawley's own confession, none of these psychologies belongs to the 'first stage of mental evolution' (p. 25); they are all removed by an indefinitely long development from the truly primitive. They therefore throw no direct light upon the problem of genesis; and the author scarcely even attempts a cogent proof that the several features of these soul-beliefs of savages actually known to us are such that they could conceivably have developed from no other antecedents than the one which his hypothesis recognizes. Furthermore, he jumbles together under the name 'soul' entities of the most diverse sort, which in some cases have nothing in common save the fact that European describers of savage beliefs have, *faute de mieux*, used the one name to designate them. There are, in particular, two notions which, for most races in the stage of savagery, seem to be tolerably well differentiated: the notion of the death-surviving spirit-double of the individual person or thing, and the notion of life-force (*mana* or *orenda* or *manitou*) or of the quantum of that all-important stuff which is allotted to an individual. The latter idea unquestionably tends among some races towards personification and towards the assumption of certain of the aspects of the spirit-double, but even where there is such a partial similarity, the two conceptions often remain significantly distinct. I cite only a single example of Mr. Crawley's unwarranted identification of the two. Among the Batak and other peoples of the Malay Archipelago, we learn from J. Warneck's valuable monograph (*Die Religion der Batak, ein Paradigma für animistischen Religionen des Indischen Archipels*, 1909), three ideas are plainly distinguished by

the terms *roha*, *begu* and *tondi*. The *roha* is, in Warneck's phrase, a man's *Personenbewusstsein*, his Ego; it is what thinks, feels, wills. The *begu* is the spirit which survives after death, usually to make much trouble for the living; the world is terrifyingly well-peopled with these restless and malicious spirits, and the most engrossing concern of the Batak is to elude, placate, or overpower the *begu*. Quite other is the *tondi*. It is defined as *Lebenskraft*, *Lebensmaterie*, or *Seelenstoff*. It has apparently several attributes of personality (the account is somewhat self-contradictory on this point), and during lifetime it is ordinarily 'in' the body. But primarily it is the source of power or skill or fertility; and it is characteristically thought of in quantitative terms. It is ascribable in some degree to almost everything, but some things and some persons have much more of it than others. It is present in exceptional degree in some parts of the body — the head, the liver, the blood. Chiefs have more of it than common men. It is transferable; the Batak warrior drinks the blood of a slain enemy to absorb the latter's *tondi*. Sickness means the loss of the *tondi* — which by no means implies loss of consciousness. At death, a man's *tondi* permanently leaves him, and what lives on, his shadowy self, is only the *begu*; his *tondi* now animates other beings. The two conceptions are, for the Batak, 'pragmatically' wholly different; and a separate genetic explanation must probably be sought for each. In the three pages which he devotes to the Batak, Mr. Crawley speaks of *tondi* simply as 'the soul,' and fails to make clear how essentially distinct are the several notions for which the one English word is employed. A similar lack of careful discriminations characterizes most of his use of anthropological material, and renders it impossible to assign any considerable weight to this part of his work.

The author's *a priori* arguments from psychological considerations are, however, scarcely more impressive. He assumes — what needs proving — that the significant and pregnant elements of the idea of the soul originated at a stage in mental evolution in which men were incapable of separating in thought the details of a percept from the percept as a whole, or of forming 'abstract' notions of generic qualities, or of regarding the objects presented in consciousness as being other or more than what they seem. On the ground of these assumptions Mr. Crawley rejects the dream theory and other rival hypotheses. But under such conditions the characteristic content of the soul-idea could just as little have arisen from the memory-image. Mr. Crawley sometimes seems to mean that a memory-image *is* the idea of the soul; thus dogs, to whom we have, I suppose, plausible

analogical reasons for ascribing visual and other imagery, would be classified among the animists. Such a view, however, is not an explanation of the genesis of the idea of the soul as spirit-double or as life-force, but only a queer use of language. It is only when the image ceased to be taken as a matter of course, when it was generalized into an 'abstraction' or made the starting-point for an inference, that it could have engendered any of those concepts and those beliefs which anthropologists have designated as 'the idea of the soul.' Not until reflection began vaguely to contrast image and percept, to consider the meaning of their relations of similarity and difference, and to infer that an objective counterpart of the former continues to exist even when *not* remembered by anybody else, could the transient memory-image have been transformed into the death-surviving double. If, therefore, other theories are to be rejected because they presuppose, for the explanation of the origin of the idea, mental processes that are 'late' in development, Mr. Crawley's own hypothesis must be given up on similar grounds. If, on the other hand, it be once recognized that any account of the genesis of the beliefs about 'the soul' which we now find among savages must credit the originators of those beliefs with some rudimentary powers of intellection, Mr. Crawley's explanation appears to have no advantage over others. It has, indeed, some peculiar difficulties of its own. One of these lies in the fact—explicitly recognized by Mr. Crawley (pp. 210, 250 f.)—that a man's visual memory-images are not primarily of himself but of other people. Hence, originally, A's soul would exist only by grace of B and C. Mr. Henry James's ingenious story *The Private Life* has a hero who, though endowed with all the social graces, and the observed of all observers when in company, lapsed into nonentity when no one was present to observe him. He had no private life. Thus, by Mr. Crawley's hypothesis, must it have been with the primeval soul. To discover that he himself, no less than B, had a soul, A must have depended upon B's report, or upon a somewhat complicated inference: "Since I sometimes see a vague, intangible double of B when B's tangible body is not present, B must similarly see a double of me when I (from my own point of view) am not present to B; *ergo*, I possess a soul." However this might have come about, we should at any rate expect that the eventual generalized conception of the soul would show some traces of the fact that souls originally lived and moved and had their being, not in the persons *of whom* they were souls, but in the minds of other persons. Why, again—if Mr. Crawley's hypothesis be true—is it that savage A does not consider that he is meeting the

soul of B whenever he visualizes B? Or is it Mr. Crawley's contention that the savage does so — that his very memory is at all moments infested with terrifying ghosts of other men and things, to which he ascribes just the same sort of effective reality which he ascribed to the grosser objects of perception of which the 'souls' are images? Some such consequences seem properly implied by the hypothesis; and they appear sufficient to reduce it to a good deal of an absurdity.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY.

MENTAL FUNCTIONS IN PRIMITIVE PEOPLES.

Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures. L. LÉVY-BRUHL. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1910.

Bruhl's work appears as the third volume of the *Travaux de l'Année Sociologique* published under the direction of M. E. Durkheim. B. endorses the motto of the school of writers headed by that *savant*, that social phenomena have laws of their own (p. 2). The same applies to those 'collective representations' which lie at the root of social facts. B. sets out to determine the most general laws which govern such representations (p. 3). The interpretations of primitive life and thought given by Tylor, Frazer, Lang, and others, must be condemned, for they have disregarded the fundamental question: can the facts of primitive life be explained along the same lines as the facts of civilized life? (pp. 6-7). Led by the postulate of the psychic unity of mankind, these authors assume a general animism (p. 14). But that animism is invariably derived from the psychology of the individual. The resulting interpretation of primitive man's beliefs and institutions is necessarily artificial. If we want a firm foundation for our researches, we must remember that collective representations impose themselves upon the individual. They are for him a matter of belief and not a product of his reasoning (p. 16).

The rest of the volume falls into four parts. Part I. deals with "Les représentations collectives dans les perceptions des primitifs et leur caractère mystique." The representations of primitive peoples are not, B. believes, in a strict sense representations at all; for into the make-up of each representation enter emotional and volitional elements which form with it an indecomposable whole (p. 28). Not a single object is represented without such an emotional setting. For this reason the primitive man perceives nothing as we do (p. 37). Mystic properties form an integral part of his representations and cannot be excluded from them (p. 39). Thus an object and its material copy, for instance, are not regarded as one and the same thing