still who sing our great hymn of praise, and joyfully say, 'We believe that Thou shalt come,' it does not mean that they are misled. In his new volume, entitled *Christus Crucifixus* (Hodder & Stoughton; 6s.), the Principal of the Clergy School in Leeds has no hesitation in joining the small band of expectants. Mr. SIMPSON takes the words of Frances RIDLEY HAVERGAL, 'our modern English St. Cecilia,' and makes them his own: and he knows that as he makes them his own, and that fervently, he is not misled:

Thou art coming, O my Saviour,
Thou art coming, O my King,
In Thy beauty all-resplendent,
In Thy glory all-transcendent;
Well may we rejoice and sing;
Coming! In the opening east
Herald brightness slowly swells;
Coming! O my glorious Priest,
Hear we not Thy golden bells?

In the article in the *Expositor* by Canon WINTERBOTHAM, to which reference has just been made, there is an interesting exposition of a familiar and important verse in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is the verse, 'We behold . . . Jesus, because of the suffering of death crowned with glory and honour, that by the grace of God he should taste death for every man' (2[9]).

'Crowned with glory and honour'—when? We have held—have we not all held hitherto?—that the crowning took place at the Ascension. Canon WINTERBOTHAM holds that it took place at Pilate's judgment-seat.

'What the author had before his mind's eye was certainly not that "crown of pure gold" with which He was (figuratively speaking) crowned when He sat down at the right hand of God, King of kings and Lord of lords. It was obviously that other crown, of thorns, with which His mother, the Jewish Church, crowned Him in the day of His espousals—when He purchased to Himself the universal Church to be His bride for ever. What the sacred writer saw was Jesus as Pilate led Him forth wearing the crown of thorns and the robe of mockery.' And for proof of it Canon WINTERBOTHAM refers his reader to the original Greek.

And what is the advantage? The advantage is that 'no conceivable "glory and honour" could ever come near to the moral dignity of that supreme self-sacrifice.' It may be that 'all the crowns of empire meet upon that brow' in heaven above. But it is the *moral* splendour, the *spiritual* dignity, of the Redeemer which must hold and fascinate every Christian eye, and that shines out resplendent in the Crucifixion.

Taoism, its Christian Affinities and its Defects.

BY THE REV. P. J. MACLAGAN, M.A., D.PHIL., SWATOW.

II.

What is Tao?

THERE are other passages which might be quoted to illustrate the metaphysical meaning of Tao; but I do not know that they would add much to the light or glimmering of light we may have already gained. If, then, we ask what did Lao-tsze mean by Tao, it must be admitted that the answer cannot be very definite. We may almost be inclined to take up Lao-tsze's own words and say, 'How vague! how confused! How confused! how vague!'

It may perhaps help us to notice some of the

various translations that have been given by eminent scholars of this word Tao and its companion Teh. Our Classic, *e.g.*, has been called by Julien, 'Le Livre de la Voie et de la Vertu.' If I may revert to a distinction I have already indicated, 'way' and 'virtue' are rather what the words Tao and Teh may mean than what Lao-tsze means by them. For it is quite true that Tao means 'way,' in the literal sense of a road to be walked on; and in any description of the psychological genesis of Lao-tsze's doctrine, the mental process by which he came to it, this primary meaning of Tao might have to be taken into account. But in translating the Classic, while we might make 'way' fit in with Lao-tsze's practical philosophy, and the use in the New Testament of 'the way' for Christianity is an interesting parallel, we should find it difficult to make it carry for us all the metaphysical meaning that Lao-tsze puts into Tao.

Professor Parker suggests 'providence' and 'grace' as a translation for Tao and Teh. This translation too suits some passages, as, *e.g.*, where we are told that 'the Providence of Heaven is to take from abundance, to make up what is enough' (77, Parker's trans.). But even here 'Providence' may easily suggest to us more of knowledge and purpose than we have any right to attribute to Lao-tsze's Tao. And in other passages 'Providence' as a translation for Tao will not fit at all. We can hardly intelligibly speak of 'possessing Providence' or 'undergoing instruction in Providence' or 'being good hands at Providence' and 'using it to educate the people.' Again, several authorities have suggested 'nature'—*natura naturans*, as they explain, not *natura naturata*, as the equivalent of Tao. Professor Legge demurs, but on grounds that are hardly relevant or adequate. It may be that, as he says, *natura naturans* is a figure of speech, mere barbarous phraseology. It may be that Tao never had such a signification (*i.e.* lexically). But when he admits that the term 'nature' is handy and 'often fits so appropriately into a version,' he has granted probably as much as any one would care to claim. Legge himself shows good reason for declining to translate Tao, and seeking only to associate with it Lao-tsze's ideas. Accordingly following, as he says, chap. 25 of the Classic, he speaks of Tao as 'the spontaneously operating cause of all movement in the phenomena of the Universe.' This, I think, is true as far as it goes. I fail, however, to follow Legge when he goes on to say of this spontaneously operating cause, 'The Tao is a phenomenon; not a positive being, but a mode of being.'

Looking for ourselves at the passages we have had before us, we may say, I think, as much as this. (1) Tao is Lao-tsze's ultimate metaphysical principle. There is no room for any other existence superior to or even co-ordinate with Tao. (2) Tao is the origin of this world of definite things and is immanent in all things, their essence. (There is no means of determining the question which may occur to us, whether Tao is all in the things in which it is immanent, or whether there is unexhausted overplus of Tao not yet coined into visible and tangible objects). (3) Yet Tao is not, or is not only, the indefinite stuff (ὕλη) of which things are the definite modes. It is, if I may borrow the terms, force as well as matter, operative in all that goes on. (4) When we seek to define it, it eludes us; it is the perfect indefiniteness of which nothing can be said; it may be called Pure Being, only inasmuch as it is not inactive it is rather Pure Becoming. (5) It is Pure Being endowed with the apparently inherent tendency to become, or to give rise to, this world of definite things, and then to operate in these things as in fact we find them operating. If it is necessary to venture a translation of these key words Tao and Teh, I would render them by 'spontaneity' and 'spontaneous action.' Lao-tsze himself says, 'Man takes as his law the Earth: the Earth takes as its law Heaven: Heaven takes as its law Tao: Tao takes as its law Spontaneity': or as Legge gives it, 'its being what it is.'

Before passing on to discuss other aspects of Lao-tsze's thought, I should like to pause here, and from the standpoint of the Christian missionary consider what we already have before us. My subject is 'Taoism, its Christian Affinities and its Defects.' I shall not delay to point out in detail the defects of Tao as the ultimate principle of existence, its poverty, for instance, as vague and indeed unknowable, compared with the infinite wealth of that spiritual principle whom we call God. It is more agreeable and more profitable to look at what I have called the Christian affinities of Taoism. I begin with this as the most obvious point, that Lao-tsze is in earnest in his search for unity. He must think back and back, behind things, behind even what his fellows called God, to find the root of the universe. And if affirming Tao as his ultimate principle Lao-tsze dethrones

Ti, I demur to his being on that account accused of atheism or suspected of irreligion. No doubt with an indefinable and unknowable ultimate you can have only a very attenuated religious life. What Lao-tsze has to say of man's conscious and deliberate relation to Tao we shall see soon. Here let us recognize that it is not loss, or that it is at least final gain, to have sublated and taken out of the way a limited God, a mere disposer of events, a deistic God supreme but not ultimate, and so not absolutely supreme, who as a particular Being makes up along with subordinate spirits and the world of visible things the universe as we know it—to have a God of this kind taken out of the way in favour of some form of Monism. For Taoism is in intention monistic. Of Tao are all things, and Tao is in and works through all. No doubt Lao-tsze admits, as we shall see, in men and, I think, even in nature, the occurrence of acts and processes which are not in accordance with Tao, and which therefore imply in their subjects some distinction from Tao. This is not consistent in a strict Monism; but can any Monism be consistent? At any rate in Tao, the origin of all things and the immanent principle in all, we have a possible basis for a doctrine of God not only more philosophical but also more truly religious than the Deism—perhaps we should rather coin a word and say the Spiritism—which in Lao-tsze's mind it displaced.

I have said that we may find in Lao-tsze's doctrine of Tao a basis for a doctrine of God. Let it be frankly recognized that there is no use searching the *Tao Teh King* for any encouragement to attribute to Tao any of the attributes of consciousness. Is it at all possible, then, to raise Tao in moral and religious value? in short, to metamorphose Tao into God? I have spoken of Christian affinities. I would suggest here as a more fitting term for what I mean 'susceptibilities.' We have already noted in Lao-tsze something like intellectual dissatisfaction with his conclusion in Tao when he says, 'I do not know whose son it is.' Now, if I were speaking with a disciple of Lao-tsze, I think that I would fasten on this point of the inadequacy of Tao as ultimate principle, an inadequacy which Lao-tsze seems himself to feel. Tao does not explain itself. It is still inevitable that we put the question, 'Whence is it?' 'Whose son is it?' And not explaining itself it fails also to explain other things. If it is an answer to their 'whence,' it is no answer to their 'why.' I should then make use of the other meanings of the word Tao, which means 'way' certainly, but which also means 'reason' and 'speech.' And I would ask the Taoist why he drops these higher meanings and their spiritual implications. I would try to induce him to discard the negations of his Tao, and to approximate to that Christian Taoism which we have in our Chinese Version of St. John's Gospel, 'In the beginning was Tao, and Tao was with God, and Tao was God. All things were made by Tao, and without Tao was not anything made that hath been made'—a Taoism which gives us a richer conception of Tao and of Ti, and a truer and more satisfying relation between them.

This illustrates what I mean by the Christian susceptibilities of Taoism, the occurrence of words and phrases which are not originally of any Christian sense—as unqualified, unknowable, Tao is not Christian—but which are in some measure patient of a Christian interpretation, or may be deflected to Christian uses. In spite of an appearance of sophistry and a real danger, perhaps, of sophistical abuse, this is, I think, a legitimate apologetic method; and, if I am not mistaken, we can discover instances of its use in the early Christian apologists in their dealings both with Jews and with pagans. Perhaps even St. John's use of the term Logos is a case in point of the Christian appropriation, with apologetic intent, of a current philosophical term, and its deflection to a greater or less extent from its current philosophical meaning. I know that this apologetic procedure seems to some persons not only sophistical but also dangerous to the purity of Christian thought; and such persons would point to St. John's adaptation of the term Logos as the beginning of what they call the disastrous Hellenizing of Christianity. I confess that I am not so convinced of the disastrous character of that process, and that I think reasons can be found for a more favourable judgment of it, still short of accepting as sacrosanct the theological determinations of the early Councils, if we are more thoroughgoing in our doctrine of Providence and in our belief in the guidance of the Spirit of Truth. And I venture to suggest whether as Christianity in its extension through the world and its persistence through the ages is brought into contact with various phases of thought, its adoption and adaptation of the terms in which great thinkers have expressed their imperfect solutions of the riddle of existence, is not part of that enrichment of the city of God of which

we read in the words, 'They shall bring the honour and the glory of the nations into it.'

I apologize for this digression and make haste to return to Lao-tsze. I have begun with what is most abstruse, his metaphysic, because, as his first chapter has hinted to us, it is one of his glories as a thinker that his metaphysic determines all his thinking. If one were to seek to contrast him with the other great master of Chinese thought, Confucius, it might be said with as much truth as epigrams usually have, that while Confucius is a moralist, Lao-tsze is a philosopher. Only if we put it in this way we must beware of thinking that the moral interest is any less strong in Lao-tsze than it is in Confucius. The *Tao Teh King* is singularly devoid of biographical detail; but Lao-tsze gives us a hint or two even there of the impulse that urged him to think. I shall not yield to the temptation of trying to construct 'a conjectural history' of Lao-tsze's thought. Still we may remind ourselves of the circumstances of his age. It was the time of the decay of the Chou supremacy, a time of decadence and of political and social disorder. From the more historical notices which we have of the state of things in the time of Confucius, we can tell pretty well what it must have been in the time of Lao-tsze, some fifty years earlier. As in all such times of social disintegration men were driven back on themselves. There were those who withdrew from the turmoil; and so we have the recluses of whom we have glimpses in the Confucian Analects, and more imaginary descriptions in the writings of Chwang-tsze. In them we see one effect of that social disorder and unsettlement which, acting on a different mind, compelled Lao-tsze to seek a remedy for its ills and so made him a philosopher—a philosopher who, if the accounts we have of him are to be trusted, finally acknowledged defeat by mysteriously withdrawing from the ken of that and every future age through the Western Pass.

For this state of moral and political decay both Lao-tsze and Confucius propounded their remedies. Confucius represents the conservative reaction. The method of Confucius, which he practised so far as he could individually and officially, and which he urged the rulers of his time to adopt, was to revive and reinforce the institutions and ceremonies of what he looked back to as the Golden Age of Chinese History. It is related that Confucius once went to visit Lao-tsze to question him on the subject of ceremonies. Lao-tsze replied to him, 'The men about whom you talk are dead, and their bones are mouldered to dust; only their words are left. Put away your proud air and many desires, your insinuating habit and wild will. They are of no advantage to you. This is all I have to tell you.' Whatever we may think of the historicity of the anecdote, it accurately enough reflects Lao-tsze's standpoint. He will have nothing to do with the artificial resurrection of a past age by the reimposition of traditional rules and ceremonies. Neither the dead hand of the past, no, nor any external rule whatever, must be imposed on the spontaneous life of the present.

Yet it might almost be thought that dependence on the past was an invariable feature of Chinese thought. For Lao-tsze, too, has his Golden Age to which he looks back, in an antiquity more distant even than that which Confucius was fain to recall. His Golden Age is the age of instinctive morality, the gradual loss of which he more than once deplores. 'In the highest antiquity the people did not know that there were their rulers. In the next age they loved them and praised them. In the next they feared them. In the next they despised them. Thus it was that when faith in the Tao was deficient in the rulers, a want of faith in them ensued in the people' (17). 'When the great Tao ceased to be observed, benevolence and righteousness came into vogue. Then appeared wisdom and shrewdness, and there ensued great hypocrisy. When harmony no longer prevailed throughout the six kinships, filial sons found their manifestation; when the states and clans fell into disorder, loyal ministers appeared' (chap. 18). 'Thus it was that when Tao was lost, *its attributes* (Teh) appeared; when *its attributes* (Teh) were lost, benevolence appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness appeared; and when righteousness was lost, the proprieties appeared.' So then the Golden Age to which Lao-tsze looks back is that highest antiquity before Tao was lost, the age of instinctive morality when goodness did not know itself as goodness, and so the separate virtues were not distinguished. You will have noticed Lao-tsze's suggestion that the emergence of some evil is needed to call forth its opposite good. Lao-tsze, however, would not say *felix culpa*, but rather *virtus infelix*. The whole development is for him degeneration. So far does he carry this thought, that he would have us cut off our sageness, benevolence, and wisdom to attain

our true life. If we take his words strictly, it might even seem that to him the remotest antiquity is the time of Tao without *its attributes* (Teh)—for it was only when Tao was lost that its attributes appeared—the time of spontaneity without spontaneous action, which is, I should suppose, about as near as one can get to the idea of pure potentiality, a primitive Nirvana from which we have fallen. At any rate, in this calling forth of good by its corresponding evil, Lao-tsze had before him a concrete case of the law of association of contradictories, and this law of thought no doubt had its own influence in Lao-tsze's thinking, suggesting undeveloped unity as origin and in a sense as goal, or justifying the adoption of such a suggestion. He had the law clearly before him, for in his second chapter we read, 'Existence and non-existence give birth the one to the idea of the other; difficulty and ease produce the one the idea of the other: so with length and shortness, height and lowness, the musical notes and tones, the being before and behind. Therefore,' continues Lao-tsze in his abrupt way, 'therefore the Sage manages affairs without doing anything, and conveys his instructions without the use of speech.' The link of connexion is this. Anything positive is accompanied by its inevitable shadow. It is better, therefore, to abide in the indefinite, *i.e.* the instinctive life, and not advance to the definiteness of a life of deliberation and regulation. That this is the connexion is made more evident by Lao-tsze's next paragraph, which holds up for our imitation the quiet processes of nature.

(*To be continued.*)

The Great Text Commentary.

THE GREAT TEXTS OF REVELATION.

Revelation xx. 12.

'And I saw the dead, the great and the small, standing before the throne; and books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of the things which were written in the books, according to their works.'—R.V.

Introduction.

This verse belongs to the sixth of the visions described in these chapters. It is the vision of the Last Judgment. And although it occupies only five verses (20^{11-15}), it contains all that the Apocalyptic writer has to say about that great assize which is to follow the resurrection. There is no more impressive picture even in this book where such pictures abound. It says so little, and yet all is said. The throne, dazzling with the whiteness of the Divine purity; the Judge, reverently indicated, but not named; the whole material fabric of the universe gone, fled, so that there are not even rocks which men may call upon to fall on them; 'the dead, the great and the small, standing before the throne,' and, besides, nothing but the books in which their works are written, and that other book, the Book of Life.[1]

[1] C. A. Scott, *The Book of the Revelation*, p. 298.

The subject is the Judgment of the Dead. It may be treated in four parts: (1) the subjects of the judgment; (2) the ground of the judgment; (3) the evidence; (4) the acquittal.

I.

The Subjects of the Judgment.

'I saw the dead,' says the Seer, 'the great and the small, standing before the throne.' It is often said that this judgment is a judgment of the wicked only, and therefore only for condemnation. But the context suggests that the judgment is extended to all humanity; and only in that sense can the wording of the passage itself be taken. The phrase 'the great and the small,' which is of frequent occurrence in the Apocalypse, is a synonym for all men (except where it is expressly limited, 11^{18}).[2] 'The dead, small and great, will stand before God; *all* will stand, all the righteous, as well as all the wicked, from the Apostles downwards. St. Paul is very express upon the fact that he himself will be judged, "He that judgeth me is the Lord" (1 Co 4^{4}). "Who will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who

[2] *Ibid.* p. 299.