

intuitive knowledge" in the cells of the human brain. Such action, to exist, must be above the human, must be supernatural; but we have no evidence that it is. If it were a superhuman impulse for the direction of human conduct it would be more in evidence, *it would be more certain*, it would be more constant. The intuition with which we are acquainted gives merely an occasional manifestation, and that manifestation is colored by the individuality of the person through whom it comes. In short, intuition shows no higher origin than does thought. It is nothing more than cerebration, reflex cerebration, and holds no value beyond that. Its value is no greater than the experience of the individual through whom it is manifested, or that is given to it by chance.

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CROCE'S USE OF THE WORD "INTUITION."

Benedetto Croce is a leading Italian scholar whose theory of esthetics forms an essential feature of his philosophy. One difficulty in following his thought lies in the significance of his fundamental terms, among which the idea of "intuition" presents unusual difficulties. Croce's conception of intuition is apparently different from that of Kant and also from its interpretation in mystical writings. In Kantian literature the word "intuition" translates the German term *Anschauung*, which denotes a state of mind in which an object is presented to the vision of the eye. It is the object as it is perceived by the sense of vision.

Anschauung or intuition may be either the function of beholding or the thing beheld which is the product of the function, the actual process as we feel it, as it works out and mirrors the sense impressions received in the pictures that appear before our eye. These pictures are chemical modifications of our retina, but in the psychical interpretation which they receive they lie outside of us as things or objects of the surrounding world. This is *Anschauung* in the Kantian sense.

The term *Anschauung* created a difficulty for the translators of Kant, but they cut the Gordian knot by translating the word by the corresponding Latin term *intuitio*. The unfortunate feature of this word is that it has served as a mystical description of the visions of our imagination,—not the actual sight of our eye but visionary

ideals such as the dreams of a prophet, be he genuine or a fanatic,—or as poetic conceptions expressed in some visualized or visible form.

Poetical dreams of this kind come to the real poet not by the slow and elaborate process of argument but by a prophetic insight,—by a sudden enlightenment comparable to a flash of divine inspiration. This is intuition in the mystical sense.

We need not here enter into details as to the psychology of mystical intuition, its natural origin and development in the realm of the subconscious, and its sudden and unaccountable appearance in consciousness in such a manner as to lend itself readily to a mystical interpretation. Suffice it to say that the uncritical observer receives the impression that even in his own visionary experiences he is dealing with divine inspiration. Intuitions are described as coming to the poet by revelations from on high, and therefore he claims that he does not shape his thoughts himself but discovers them, the subconscious process remaining hidden. He is conscious only of the result which is suddenly presented; the vision is shown to him as if it had existed and is seen only by him because he is a favorite of the Deity, of the muse, or whatever the mystical source and power may be called.

Kant's term *Anschauung* is very different. It does not contain the slightest element of mystic thought. It has reference to the sensation of sight and may frequently be translated by the word "sensation" itself. The difficulty of translating the German word *Anschauung* consists in the fact that there is no English word of Saxon derivation expressing the meaning of that which has become an object of sight, and just as the word *Anschauung* is indigenous German, so the English language should have an indigenous Saxon term to express the meaning of the word *Anschauung*. It is a peculiarity of English words derived from the Latin that they express abstractions. Thus the Latin translation *intuitio* implies the idea of an abstract designation, while a Saxon word composed of purely Saxon elements with the same meaning as *intuitio* would naturally refer to a concrete process of well-known and daily experience. It is for this reason that some time ago, while discussing the difficulties of Kantian philosophy, I proposed the adoption of a purely Saxon word "atsight" to fill this gap in the English. The word "atsight" denotes that which is at sight, so that it can be seen and is actually beheld. The difficulty of the term consists in its newness, but it is easily understood by its etymology and is justified

by analogy. As the eye pictures what is presented to it by being at sight, so the process of looking into the nature of things is called "insight." Thus the difficulty due to the newness of the word can easily be overcome. The Latin word "intuition" exactly translates this new word "atsight," but we must beware of the mystical meaning of it, and, when reading Kant, we must remember that Kant's term *Anschauung* excludes the mystical from its meaning and that this difficulty is presented only in translations.

A new difficulty presents itself when we read Croce's expositions. It seems to me that Croce uses the term "intuition" in a third sense which has an element of each meaning. Unless I am greatly mistaken the visionary element is not absent, and the intuition of the poet is in so far added as Croce distinguishes his term "intuition" from both concept and sensation. Sensation is simply the crude material received by the senses, while intuition embraces what Croce calls "expression," which means that it is worked out into a concrete vision poetically presented, not as a mere definition of an idea but as an artistic picture in all details and concretely individualized.

Whether this view is correct ought to be established by a critical student of Croce's philosophy, or, better still, perhaps Professor Croce himself will tell us whether we have rightly understood his theory.

As to the essential significance of his esthetics we are glad to say that we agree with him thoroughly, although we approach the problem from a slightly different angle. Whatever may be the artist's definition of beauty is a matter of secondary importance, but it is essential to know what art is, how it originates, why it exists and what is its purpose.

Art has been defined as a presentation of beauty, but how often does art present the ugly, the terrible, the dastardly. Tragedy is described by Aristotle as the highest product of art, and it is a struggle between the good and the evil, in which the good suffers and succumbs. Art has been characterized as an imitation of nature; but music is not an imitation of bird songs, otherwise one of Beethoven's sonatas would be a gross aberration from the art ideal. Music builds up a world with its own laws in the realm of tones. It is an original creation at best parallel to the actual world in general, but not an imitation of nature. One feature, however, is noticeable in all arts. It is this, that art presents the world-conception of the artist in concrete definite instances. The artist imitates

nature in the sense that he builds up a world and delineates it before our eyes. The tragedian pictures life as a struggle and points out how a good cause may triumph while its hero sacrifices himself, and the landscape painter portrays human sentiments, or as the Germans say *Stimmung*, in the shape of clouds and trees and atmosphere. In the creations of the artist the chief thing is the spirit or mood which dominates them. Art may describe something beautiful or something ugly, something real and natural or something non-existent, a world of laws extending through infinite space—it is always a creation, always the production of a world, always a description of life and the laws of life.

EDITOR.

FOUR-PLY PANDIAGONAL ASSOCIATED MAGIC SQUARES.

Mr. Frederic A. Woodruff has sent us three original magic squares, one each of orders 8, 12 and 16. The two smaller squares

1	32	34	63	37	60	6	27
48	49	15	18	12	21	43	54
19	44	52	45	55	42	24	9
62	35	29	4	26	7	57	40
25	8	58	39	61	36	30	3
56	41	23	10	20	13	51	46
11	22	44	53	47	50	16	17
38	59	5	28	2	31	33	64

Fig. 1.

1	140	81	36	77	100	73	104	9	108	113	28
143	6	63	110	67	46	71	42	135	38	31	118
25	116	105	12	101	76	97	80	33	84	137	4
119	30	39	134	43	70	47	66	111	62	7	142
16	125	96	21	92	85	88	89	24	93	128	13
131	18	51	122	55	58	59	54	123	50	19	130
15	126	85	22	91	86	87	90	23	94	127	14
132	17	52	121	56	57	60	53	124	49	20	129
3	138	83	34	79	98	75	102	11	106	115	26
141	8	64	112	65	48	69	44	133	40	29	120
27	114	107	10	103	74	99	78	35	82	139	2
117	32	37	136	41	72	45	68	109	64	5	144

Fig. 2.

are four-ply, pandiagonal and associated, and the one of order 16, besides having these features, is also Knight-Nasik.

Mr. W. S. Andrews writes us that these squares are very interesting mathematical curios inasmuch as they probably present