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Aristotle, Metaphysics, X. (I.), 6: 1056B 27–32

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exx. gr. Virg. *Aen.* x. 90, Lygdamus II. 30, Phaedrus, III., *praef.* 6 (where see Schwabe's note).

There were two etymologies for *Feretrius* (see Plutarch *Romulus* XVI., and Marcellus VIII. *ferire* and *ferre*. The ending *arma ferebant*, then, is above suspicion. But something in the line remains questionable.

When one reads in Silius Italicus, that faithful echo of so many Propertian phrases,

est, Orfite, munus
est, ait, hoc certare tuum, quis opima volenti
dona Iovi portet feretro suspensa cruento
(V. 166-8)

it tempts to imprudences, such as to conjecture *Iovi feretris* for *suis umeris*. But this would be an error; the tray which Romulus used, *fabricato ad id apte ferculo* (Liv. I. x. 6), is not essential; the essential is that the victor must himself carry the spoils, *ipse* . . .

spolia . . . *gerens* (*ibid.*): *suis umeris* is therefore unimpeachable. But not so is *victa*. Can *victa arma* = *victi ducis arma*? I do not believe it could mean anything but 'the defeated side.' The word apparently needed here is *vota*. The general vows the spoils, as in vv. 15, 16:

votis occupat ante ratis,
'Iuppiter, haec hodie tibi victima corrueat Acron':
voverat

The *vota ante rata* are his *omen certum*; and after his victory he bears in person the spoils which he has vowed:

seu quia vota suis umeris huc arma ferebant.

Broukhuyzen's *huc* or Heinsius' *huic* for *haec* is absolutely necessary to the notion of the poem, viz. the connexion of a site and a story.

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ARISTOTLE, *METAPHYSICS*, X. (I.), 6: 1056B 27-32.

ὀλίγα δ' ἀπλῶς τὰ δύο· πλῆθος γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλειψιν ἔχον πρῶτον. διὸ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπέστη Ἀναξαγόρας εἰπὼν ὅτι ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα ἦν ἄπειρα καὶ πλήθει καὶ μικρότητι· ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ 'καὶ μικρότητι' καὶ ὀλιγότητι· οὐ γὰρ ἄπειρα, ἐπεὶ τὸ ὀλίγον οὐ διὰ τὸ ἕν, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ δύο.

THIS passage has generally puzzled interpreters. Bonitz dismisses the matter with a laconic 'nec magis ea intelligo, quae Anaxagorae obiicit b 28-32'; and Barthélemy St. Hilaire, remarking that no explanation is given by Alexander, concludes that as the MSS. furnish no variant, the passage remains profoundly obscure. Nor does Mr. W. D. Ross by his rendering contribute a thoroughly satisfactory solution. His version runs: 'For this reason Anaxagoras was not right in leaving the subject with the statement that all things were together, boundless both in multitude and in smallness—where by "and in smallness" he meant "and in fewness"; for they could not have been boundless in fewness, since it is not one, as some say,

but two, that make a few.' It is true that the translator by construing the words ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν . . . καὶ ὀλιγότητι as parenthetical and definitory of μικρότητι, succeeds in imparting a certain unity of structure to the passage, the clause οὐ γὰρ ἄπειρα etc., following naturally upon the statement that precedes the parenthesis, and supplying the called-for explanation. But on material grounds it is difficult to accept the translation of ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν as 'he meant,' and there seems no special linguistic reason why this form should have been used rather than the familiar βούλεται, ἐθέλει. Of course the special difficulty of Ross's translation consists in the fact that it involves Aristotle in what appears to be an absurd interpretation of Anaxagoras' position. That Anaxagoras should have asserted the impossibility of a limit to smallness is in itself intelligible (though not a conclusion Aristotle could have accepted without special reference to the important distinction of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, *Metaphysics* 1048b 14-17), and is sufficiently attested by the remains (Diels, *Vorsokratiker*, fr. 1 and 3). But that

he should have meant fewness rather than smallness is neither intrinsically likely, nor does it appear from the context. Assuming, then, that the words ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν are to be understood in the natural sense, not as correcting Anaxagoras' expression but as rectifying his thought, we have still to determine what Aristotle can have meant by asserting that Anaxagoras should have thought of fewness, in this connection, instead of smallness.

Perhaps the key to a solution is to be found in observing exactly what it is that is asserted to be wrong. It is not Anaxagoras' statement as such (for the words οὐκ ὁρθῶς can hardly be limited to their application to εἰπών), but the fact that he stopped short where he did—in a word, that his statement is inadequate. Naturally, then, the words ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν etc., will have reference to the respect in which this deficiency of statement is to be understood. If that is so, an interpretation comes into view. Anaxagoras maintained that all things were together, boundless both in multitude and in smallness—that is, in what Aristotle assumes are meant to be understood as two opposite directions. But, argues Aristotle, in this we have an imperfect opposition; for multitude, to be precise, is opposed, not to smallness but to fewness. This interpretation, which is in line with the general purport of the passage, differs from Mr. Ross's in finding a direct antithesis intended between the words οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἀπέστη . . . εἰπών on the one hand and ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν on the other, instead of passing over the latter clause as merely parenthetical and concentrating exclusively on the remaining antithesis between the more widely separated clauses ἦν ἄπειρα and οὐ γὰρ ἄπειρα etc. If, however, we understand the ἔδει δ' εἰπεῖν as answering to the preceding ἀπέστη εἰπών, it becomes a problem to explain the connection of the concluding sentence, οὐ γὰρ ἄπειρα, with what goes before; and the success of the view here offered will depend on whether the explanation gives as easy and natural a transition of thought as that which it is meant to supersede.

The question is really one of emphasis and orientation; and for this

reason it would be well to remember that Book X. of the *Metaphysics* is best understood as an independent or semi-independent excursus, of a kind sufficiently frequent in Aristotle, in the field of those familiar, yet philosophically significant distinctions—one and many, identity, likeness, otherness, difference, equal, great and small—which everyday language holds in suspension but does not stereotype in exact oppositions. Such inquiries, following linguistic cues into the realm of logical and metaphysical analysis, are highly characteristic of ancient philosophy; and so far as Aristotle is concerned, the only question is their relation to the group of writings in which we find them incorporated. From the standpoint of this problem Book X. has proved somewhat of an enigma. Ravaisson, for example, complains that the reflections on the one and the many, etc., which form the substance of the book, though not in themselves irrelevant, have been allowed to develop, out of all due proportion, into an episode which breaks the continuity of the work (*Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, vol. i., pp. 95-6). Such objections are really based on a misapprehension, and have been satisfactorily disposed of by Jaeger (*Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles*), where the writer, by his theory of cognate but relatively independent μέθοδοι (*op. cit.* II. Teil, Kap. 1-2), indicates an alternative to the extreme views that would regard a work like the *Metaphysics* either as a systematic treatise or else as a collection of unconnected monographs. Thus Book X. (according to Jaeger embodying the eighth Methodos) has a somewhat peculiar but not at all unintelligible or irregular independence (*vide* pp. 172-3); and this allows us to take the analytic niceties of the theme at their face value, as representing an independent inquiry only loosely integrated with what precedes and what follows.

Keeping this in mind, we may return to the opening sentence of the passage before us. The argument is that *absolutely speaking* two is few and not, as in the special sense that has just

been disposed of, many. Whereupon it occurs to Aristotle that his statement quite incidentally throws light upon what was with him a familiar subject of criticism—Anaxagoras' theory as to the infinite mixture of things (cf. e.g. *Metaphysics*, 1007b 25 seq.; *Physics*, 187b 7 seq.). Here, then, he interjects, we can see how it was that Anaxagoras went wrong when he said, stating the case inadequately (*ἀπέστη εἰπών*), that things are infinite both in multitude and in smallness. He could never have said so if he had not overlooked the fact that not smallness but fewness is the natural opposite of multitude. In a word, Aristotle's point is that Anaxagoras' error as to the infinite character of things was due to his faulty way of formulating just one of those oppositions which it is the specific business of the present inquiry to render exact; and the purport of the passage can be got only if we remember that the criticism directed against the Anaxagorean tenet is only an aside or afterthought. The force of the con-

tention might be brought out by saying that Anaxagoras would not have fallen into the error of declaring that things were infinite if he had formulated the respect in which infinitude is possible by means of the exact antithesis of *πλῆθος* and *ὀλιγότης*; for it is clear that things are not infinite in *one* at least of these respects.

If this reasoning holds good it appears to render the passage at once internally coherent and historically intelligible. The translation would run: 'But, absolutely speaking, two is few, for it is the first number characterised by deficiency. This is what makes it wrong for Anaxagoras to have been content with the assertion that all things are together infinite both in multitude and in *smallness*, instead of saying "in multitude and fewness." Had he said so he could not have asserted that they are *infinite*, because what is few is determined by two and not, as some maintain, by one.'

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APOTHEOSIS.

APOTHEOSIS is ordinarily defined as that process by which a man is raised to divinity. The term is assumed to be a Hellenistic coinage, and, as a matter of fact, it does not occur in extant writers until after the time of Alexander. The idea, however, cannot have come to the Greeks so late, and is admittedly a primitive one. From time immemorial, men had become gods at their death, both in Asia and Greece. The only question is whether, when the term Apotheosis was devised, it was meant to imply no more than this ancient and familiar change of mortal to immortal.

As far as the coinage itself is concerned, we have such compounds as *ἀποθεώω* and *ἀποθέωσις*, in which, with simple formative elements, the word *θεός* is welded to the preposition *ἀπό*. Now, *ἀπό* in composition has a number of different senses, some of which have been so worn away, that the compound has, only in a slightly intensified degree, the force of the simple. We need cite

only the commonest examples, such as *ἀποκτείνω* and *ἀποθνήσκω*. Since there is a *θεόω* and a *θέωσις*, that may possibly have happened in the case of the words under discussion, although it is scarcely probable.

Again, a very common use of *ἀπό* is in connection with place relations. In this sense it is closely associated with *ἐκ*. However, the relation between the two is not precisely the same as that between the Latin prepositions *ab* and *ex*. We find that as prepositions, *ἀπό* and *ἐκ* are practically interchangeable, e.g. in Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 2, 7, 2, *λαμβάνομεν δὲ οὔτε ἐκ τῆς γῆς οὐδὲν . . . οὔτε ἀπὸ τῶν οἰκιῶν*. In composition, too, we find that for most compounds containing *ἀπό* there are compounds with *ἐκ*, which are so alike the former in meaning that they often take their place. Side by side with *ἀποθεώω* and *ἀποθέωσις*, we have *ἐκθεώω* and *ἐκθέωσις*. Thus, in speaking of Alexander, Aelian (*Var. Hist.*, 2, 19), *αὐτὸν τότε ἐκθεοῦμενος*,