

THE PLACE OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES IN MODERN EDUCATION,

AND THEIR BEARING ON THE TRAINING FOR CITIZENSHIP IN A FREE STATE.*

It will be noted that among the subjects to which the Academy has given some attention from the beginning of its work belongs the wide field of education, and I have been asked on one or two occasions why an Academy of Political and Social Science should concern itself with education or educational problems which seem to belong rather to a society for the promotion of pedagogy than to ours. In reply we may say that education has become one of the great branches of public administration. This century will be known to coming generations very largely for the fact that education has become a function of the state. It is becoming to an increasing extent, secular. It is passing in an ever larger proportion from the control of the church to the control of the state. If you were to look over the budget of any of our great modern cities for the eighteenth century, you would find that education, as a subject of expenditure on the part of the community, played almost no part whatever; whereas, if you examine the budget of these cities to-day, you will find that it is one of the largest departments of public administration, that it involves an expenditure oftentimes in excess of that of any other single branch of public service. Now this passing of education from the hands of the church, and private individuals, or of private associations and corporations, into the hands of the state, cannot have occurred without a deep and fundamental reflex effect upon the

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methods, spirit and attitude of education itself. The questions relating to educational organization, to educational integration, have become among the most important falling within the general field of the political and social sciences. So that, so far from our having gone out of our way in giving so much attention to these problems, we are really face to face to-day with the question of education as never before. We must give therefore an increasing rather than a decreasing attention to a subject which thus presents itself at many unexpected points in the problem of city and state government, and from all present indications is destined to assume an ever-increasing importance.

There is another and perhaps an even more intimate aspect to the relation of the Academy to educational questions, and that is, the relation of the subject-matter to the cultivation of which the Academy is devoted, to the great problems of education higher and lower in this and other countries. The social sciences, using that term in the broadest sense, are concerned with society, its organization, its history, its characteristics, its relationship to other sides of the history of mankind, etc. It is natural that as our knowledge of these subjects increases, it should assume a new and more important relation to pedagogical questions in the narrowest sense of the term than it had in the earlier days. It is therefore appropriate for an organization of this kind to give a somewhat special attention to this particular subject in these times when every man, and possibly every woman, is called upon at one time or another to express a judgment or possibly to undertake an action, prompted by, or at least based upon, some theory in regard to these fundamental questions. I have no apology to make, therefore, for the topic which I have chosen to discuss and to which I wish to call your most careful consideration.

What is the relation of the political and social sciences; those subjects to the cultivation of which the Academy is devoted, toward the great problems of modern education,

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and what is their bearing upon the problem of training for citizenship in our modern free states? It will be, perhaps, as well if, for the sake of clearness, I lay down in a somewhat direct and dogmatic way the proposition which I propose to advance for your consideration, and in regard to which I shall offer certain suggestions. I propose, then, this thesis: that the political and social sciences, or perhaps better, that the subject-matter of the political and social sciences must be utilized for purposes of education or instruction in all grades of our educational system, from the university to the kindergarten. I mean that politics and economics, using those terms in the largest sense, or that the subject-matter of these sciences, must become a constituent part of the educational curriculum, using that term in the largest sense, of our system of intellectual, political and industrial training.

I am aware that, in using these terms, the sciences of politics and economics, I am assuming something which many able authorities would maintain stands in need of proof; namely, that these subjects are real sciences. I know a distinguished college president, who in opposing the development of these subjects in college, said, not long ago, that there was nothing, no branch in this whole field, to which the name science could be strictly applied. They were at most subjects of investigation and research of more or less value, evidently implying in his remarks that they were of less value. Now it is undoubtedly true that you may make a definition of the term science which will exclude from that designation political economy even in the highly developed and complicated formulæ of the mathematical school, or in the only less complicated and somewhat attenuated formulæ of the Austrian school. If, for example, you make a definition of science which would include only mathematics, or a subject similar to mathematics, it is evident that none of these subjects would properly fall under the term science. Or, if you included under that term only such a subject as inorganic chemistry or mathematical physics,

these topics might be excluded in the same way. I am not, however, much concerned about this particular proposition.

Whether the so-called political and social sciences are really sciences or not, or whether they are merely subjects for investigation and research, or whether they are mere aggregations of more or less interesting facts, is for my purpose a matter of indifference. Whatever they may be from this point of view, my proposition is that this sort of instruction, the information we have about these particular subjects, is destined to be utilized more and more in our educational system. Perhaps in order to place the proposition in a clear light, we may take an analogy from the history of the natural sciences. The whole group of natural sciences as they exist to-day were at one time nothing more than subjects of investigation and research, and they stood if not absolutely outside of, certainly in no intimate relation whatever to, the educational system as such. They were not subjects of instruction in the educational institutions; they were not instrumentalities or means of educational training. They formed the subject-matter of investigation on the part of isolated scholars; men sometimes, it is true, who were professors in universities, but men who were compelled to carry on their investigations largely outside of the university, because of the non-recognition given by the university system to these subjects. They were above all, topics for an academy, in the sense of a body of investigators who, without any necessary relation to the educational system of the country, were carrying on their various researches into these and other subjects. We find that after a while the natural sciences, as they became more distinctly differentiated, as the number of people interested in them increased, as the results of investigation and research in the respective fields became more valuable, passed into the universities as a part of the curriculum, as a part of the means of instruction, as an essential element in the educational system itself. They became in the first place, in

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the universities on the Continent, not merely subjects of investigation and research, but also means of giving a professional training to people whose future vocations and pursuits were based upon a knowledge of the content of these subjects. Thus, in the universities, they became of importance in connection with a training for a medical career, with the training for an agricultural career in a large way; they became, in a word, the basis of professional instruction in the schools. This remained for a long time their sole function. But, as their content increased, as the bounds of knowledge were pressed ever farther into the region of the unknown which surrounds mankind, they began to have a reflex effect upon the cultivation of all branches of learning, even those which like philosophy and grammar and literature had stood most completely outside of all relation to the development of these subjects. They began to influence in a most profound way the attitude of students and investigators in every other department of human science. It soon became evident, as a result of this development, that natural science had come to have a new relation to educational problems. The time had come when this new relation was to be realized by a change in educational methods, in educational curricula, and educational machinery and organization. Natural science became a recognized element of general training, a recognized element in the culture of the educated man. It was thus passed down into the sphere of secondary training, and in the first place, in this country, in what might be called the upper part of secondary training, namely the college.

The opposition offered to the introduction of this element into our educational system was so prolonged, so severe and so bitter, and the progress for a time seemed so slow, that many men despaired of the time ever coming when the proper claims of this department of human knowledge should be recognized. And it is interesting to note that the establishment of the American high school side by side, and for a

time out of connection with the college, was one of the most efficient instrumentalities in the introduction of the natural sciences, as a means of education and training. The high schools beginning under auspices and under conditions which put them to a certain extent in antagonism with the colleges, tried from the very first to assign a large part in their scheme of education to training in natural science. Those of you who have followed the history of this movement know well under what discouragements it was carried forward, and even within ten years it has been possible to hear distinguished college presidents, and distinguished college professors, declare that natural science is not a proper subject of instruction for pupils in the high schools; that natural science should be reserved, if not for the post-graduate student, at least for the college student in the last year or two of his course. But the logic of events has been too strong for such mediæval theories of education, and so far from being content with the introduction of instruction in the natural sciences into the lower grades of colleges and into the upper grades of high schools, the effort is now making to carry down instruction in these subjects through all grades of schools, even into the very kindergarten. The wisest and most progressive educators are standing to-day for the introduction of the study of natural science, under the term nature study, into the very lowest grades of our schools. We are beginning to recognize that the study of the external world about us is not only valuable as a means of intellectual discipline, but that no education can be complete, no education can be well rounded, no education can be natural and in harmony with the conditions under which human beings must live and grow, which does not from its very beginning incorporate as an essential element the systematic study of the great world of nature about us. It is not merely a question of information about botany, or zoology, or geology, it is a question of the mental attitude of the individual, of the generation, of the race, one may

say, toward all problems which confront it. There is no doubt that when this instruction has become an essential part of every grade of our school work, we shall have a new, a higher, a better developed scheme of education than we have thus far elaborated. The notion that the study of things must be preceded by the study of words, or that the formal training of grammar and philology and philosophy, and the formal training in æsthetics which we may obtain from literature, must precede a study of nature which was the idea of the old education, and continues to be the policy upon which our educational system, as a whole, is based at present—I say such an idea must give way before the sounder view that the study of nature is fundamental and elemental, that just as from the very beginning the child comes in contact with nature in his unconscious education, so he should come into conscious contact with nature when the period of his conscious education opens. Nature study, then, will not follow, but will accompany; and if there is any question of precedence, will probably precede, the kind of education and training characteristic of our educational system up to the present. Thus nature study has become, or is becoming, an essential part of every grade of our education. So, I believe, will social study in the same way become an essential and necessary part of every grade of our systematic education.

This development will, in my opinion, occur, because, in the first place, of the importance of these subjects and studies to the welfare of modern society in general, and especially to the welfare of modern free societies, of which ours is a type.

Human society, for the first time in history, is coming to itself, is becoming conscious of definite ends and purposes toward which it is striving; of the possibility of setting up certain ideals toward which it can ever struggle. It is reflecting upon its own constitution, the ends and purposes of its own existence, as never before. I do not mean to say,

of course, that there have not been men in preceding ages who have reflected upon these important and fundamental problems of human existence. The philosophers of Athens and Rome, the leaders of mediæval and early modern thought, concerned themselves with these questions to a very considerable extent; but the number of people who are interested in these subjects to-day is so enormously greater than ever before, the belief of modern society in the possibility of self-improvement and ultimate perfectibility is so much more vivid than at any preceding period in the life of humanity, that we may fairly say we have entered upon a new era in this respect. Now it does not take a reflecting society or community very long to come to the conclusion that the possibility of attaining to such ideals as it may set before itself turns among other things upon its own knowledge of the underlying principles of social organization, of the tendencies and forces at work in social, political, industrial and commercial life. These questions are destined, therefore, to receive an ever-increasing attention. The sciences devoted to these subjects must therefore increase and not decrease, must wax and not wane, must be multiplied and not diminished.

One may object to this argument from the philosophic point of view that human progress in social, political and industrial lines is very largely unconscious; that human beings secrete institutions as bees do honey; that the part which the individual or the generation, or the sum total of individuals or generations, have in determining by conscious volition the progress or discipline of human society is so infinitely small as to minimize to the lowest point the importance of all such considerations as I am advancing. It will be pointed out that at no period in the history of the world has anyone been able to prophesy the lines along which human society would develop. At no period in the history of the world has anyone been able to point out the direction in which subsequent development would take place. Indeed,

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some people even say that the effort of every generation is devoted to undoing the well-meant efforts of former generations which were directed toward accomplishing certain definite ends under the impression that along that line lay the hopes of human progress. They will call attention to the fact that the Athenian, who saw the former power depart of his beloved city, which to him stood as the very eye of Greece and all the world, as the very light of the world set upon a hill, no matter how wise, no matter how philosophic, he might be must have felt that the end of the world had indeed come when the Macedonian legions encamped at the foot of the Acropolis and the sceptre passed forever away from the Athenian democracy. Yet this even, so far from marking the end of Athens and the end of Greek culture, was only the beginning of its influence over a large part of the known world; an influence which shows itself in countless directions in the Orient even down to the present day. How much more completely must he have felt that the end of Greece had come when the Roman eagles were carried into every separate valley and planted upon every separate hill-top in his beloved land! And yet the final subjugation of Greece by the Romans marked not the end of Greece, Grecian influence and Grecian civilization, but the very beginning of the widest and most permanent sphere of influence ever opened to that wonderful people. The western world to-day is at every point different and better because of the fact that Greece existed, and Greece was enabled to exercise this influence by virtue of the fact that the Roman people, by their military and political genius, brought to the civilization of Greece an agency and instrumentality through which it could project itself into the unborn centuries, and through which it could set its stamp upon all generations which followed it.

You will remember how Cicero and Cato, and the men of their type in the last days of the Roman republic, thought that the end of the Roman state had come, that civilization

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was to be swallowed up in a despotism or barbarism, and the sun of Roman genius was to be obscured by a never-ending night. No philosopher of that day could have seen that the end of the Roman republic was in reality the beginning of the life of Rome, that from the very days of Julius Cæsar was laid the foundation of that empire of law, of organization, of civilization, which makes Rome an ever-living and ever-present force in every village and hamlet of the civilized world to-day.

How could any man have seen in the dark days in which the Roman Empire was overthrown, and the wild barbarian hordes poured down over southern Europe from the north, when the light and life of letters and science and culture seemed to have been extinguished once for all, how could any man have seen or believed that all this was simply the beginning of a new era which should throw far into the background in material and moral advancement, the most glittering achievements of the human race up to that time? As a result of this circumstance, that in this field prophecy is perhaps impossible, that a shaping of ends to results seems to be difficult, it has happened that in all the great eras of human history many of the best and purest and most upright minds of the time have been enlisted in the support of institutions, and the support of policies, the very destruction of which was necessary to the next stage in world advancement. This is the irony of fate, surely the tragedy of history, that, owing to our ignorance on these subjects, we may be struggling and striving all the time with all our energies to maintain institutions, to preserve policies fundamentally opposed to the truest and best interests of mankind, properly understood.

There is a certain justification in this point of view. It is difficult to give a thoroughly satisfactory answer to it, and yet for our purpose possibly the briefest answer is the best. We are impelled by an inner necessity, if we work at all, to work toward ends, if we strive at all, to strive toward

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ideals. We are compelled to select the best we know and to direct our efforts in the wisest way we know to these ends, and certainly, if there is anything in human science, or human knowledge, the fuller and more complete our knowledge becomes, the more accurate and the more satisfactory must our prevision become. We are driven by this inner necessity, before referred to, as moral beings to select an end not merely for ourselves, but for the society of which we are a part, and to put forth our best efforts, based upon our best knowledge to the accomplishment of such an end. The cultivation of these sciences, therefore, which have as their function, investigation into the nature and constitution of human society, must assume an ever-wider and more important place in our society.

But there is a special reason why these subjects must acquire an ever-increasing importance to us in the United States of America and ultimately to all other modern nations. We have adopted a theory of government quite opposed in some respects to that underlying any other great political organization, and based upon what is essentially and fundamentally a very different state of society from that which has characterized any nation in which similar experiments have been tried. We are trying to-day to govern a great political community upon the theory and principle that every man, and perhaps before long every woman, is a political expert, entitled to have an opinion upon all political questions, and upon all social and economic questions which may become political, and in this age of the world, there is scarcely any economic or social question which may not also become political. In doing this we are flying not only in the face of all political history, but also in the face of some of the most fundamental principles of our modern social and industrial organization itself. If there is any one principle which we may say characterizes the modern industrial system more than another, it is that of the division of labor, it is that of setting aside in our body

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economic and body industrial, either by force of law or more commonly by force of circumstances, or of will of the individuals—I say it is the setting aside of certain people to perform exclusively certain social functions, resting the welfare of our body economic upon the final harmonious out-working of all these different occupations. We are not content with having a maker of boots, but we divide the business of making the boot into twenty-five or thirty different occupations in each of which certain individuals occupy themselves, one may practically say, for their entire lives. We set aside the business of curing people by the administration of drugs to a peculiar class in the community known as physicians, and we prosecute anybody who undertakes to prescribe without having the recognition of the community which is involved in the right to practice medicine. We set aside certain people for the cultivation of the law and others for the cultivation of theology.

Yet, in strange contrast to all this, we make the business of politics, the business of governing and ruling the state, the business of controlling by the power of the state, the lines along which human society shall develop—we make this, or attempt to make this, the business of everybody. We undertake to say in theory, if not in fact, that one man's opinion upon these subjects is as good as another; that the average man and woman in our society has sufficient knowledge and skill and understanding, or is sufficiently under the dominion of people who have the knowledge, skill and understanding to make it practically a safe thing to entrust the control of this most important of all businesses to the common man. No other country has ever attempted this. No other country attempts this to-day; at least no other country which may be for an instant compared in population, in wealth, in the complexity of its social and industrial problems to the United States. No country in the ancient world ever tried such an experiment.

The Athenian tried the problem of such government on a

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small scale, but he was careful to limit the number of people who might take part in this government in a very narrow way, feeling that no man could take part intelligently in governing who did not have an opportunity to prepare himself especially for this sort of work. The whole organization of the state was ultimately made to conform to the condition that the individual Athenian citizen should be put in a position to post himself upon political problems, upon political ideas, and upon political notions, upon political policies in such a way as to be entitled to an independent and intelligent judgment upon the same. To do this, however, it was necessary that the great mass of the people should be abject slaves, to the few citizens, for only in this way could the latter secure the requisite leisure and time to study and understand these grave, political problems. The state went even further, recognizing that no man could attend to the business of earning a living and yet be entitled to have that kind of an opinion which the theory of the Athenian state implied he must have, unless he were a citizen of wealth and resource; the state provided that the citizen should be paid for the performance of his political duties. This was not as it is sometimes depicted, a degeneration in the world of politics. It was an absolutely essential outgrowth of the whole theory and practice of the Athenian government.

The same thing was true of the Roman state. It was a mere handful of people whose material and economic welfare was based upon the plundering of the rest of the world, upon whose shoulders was placed the management of the Roman state. The average Roman could take part in the political management of the Roman Empire because and by virtue of the fact that he had at his disposal practically a sufficient number of slaves to support and take care of him while he gave his attention to politics.

The government of England to-day is in the hands of what may be called governing classes, people whom the entire mass of the community look up to as entitled, *par excellence*,

by their training, by their financial resources, by their hereditary connections, to the work of directing the political policy of the state.

In Germany, which has been the scene of many struggles between the government on the one hand and the so-called representatives of the people on the other, the average man is still of the opinion that in the case of a dispute between the king and the commons, which to his mind is the case of a dispute between the king and his neighbor Rhoderick Schmidt, whom he may have helped to elect to the House, and whom he knows to be a merchant or a farmer, like unto himself—I say, in case of such a dispute, the average man sides with the king, because he says, “It is his business to govern, and he knows more about this matter than my neighbor, good fellow though he is.” In other words, nearly all other countries are still conducting their governing on the plan that there is a certain class in the community set apart by heredity, by wealth, by social position, to have the controlling and governing voice in shaping the political policy of the society.

We have thrown that theory overboard entirely. We have perhaps gone to the other extreme, and it looks sometimes as if we considered that intelligence, and wealth, and social position were absolute disqualifications for the kind of service we expect of our representatives. At any rate, we have put into our representative bodies in many instances, poverty, ignorance and corruption, villainy and crime itself.

We are proceeding, then, in our government to-day upon the assumption that the average man is not only a patriot, is not only upright and honest, is not only desirous of doing the best he can, but that he is also an expert in the business of governing, or at least, in a position to pass upon the work and proposals of those who are actually doing the governing. How can our government succeed unless we realize this assumption by training each individual for his duty as a citizen?

The subject-matter of these sciences, then, being of such fundamental importance to modern society in general and our own American society in particular, I think there is little doubt that it must assume a new relation toward our education. It must become the subject-matter of instruction in all grades of our educational system. I do not think it is possible for any great department of human learning which is of fundamental importance to the intellectual, moral, political and social training of the mass of the people to remain forever entirely outside of all connection with education. Just as the great field of natural science has been seized and its results exploited, so to speak, by educators for the purpose of the intellectual and moral training of all members in our society, so I believe the subject-matter of the political and social sciences will be utilized in the same way by our educators, in as extensive and fundamental a way.

I may venture to make one other remark before I pass from this aspect of the subject. Modern pedagogy emphasizes the fundamental necessity of the element of interest on the part of the child who is to be educated in the subject-matter of his instruction before the best results can be accomplished. It is a principle of wide and ever widening application. We cannot hope to work out the best results in a political way through the machinery of the modern free state unless every individual in that community becomes thoroughly and profoundly interested in political questions as such, and I am using that term "political questions" in a large sense, as questions in regard to which a politically organized society may be required to have a positive policy. Now I do not think that it is possible to develop this interest in any large way in the masses of the people, unless the conscious consideration of these questions be taken up as an integral part in all grades of our educational system.

We can only make the average man an expert in political matters by rousing his permanent and fundamental interest

in political things. Men will give their time and thought and feeling to things in which they become profoundly interested, about which they are deeply concerned. One of the great justifications for the introduction of natural science into all grades of our schools is to be found in the desirability of interesting the average individual in our society, in the world of natural phenomena about him. We ought to bring him to see in the flutter of every leaf upon a tree, in the flight of a passing bird, in the roar of the waves of the seashore, in the growth of the daisy at his feet, in the silent sweep of the stars above his head, a fact of interest and moment to him, the consideration of which will lift him out of himself and up into the higher sphere of intellectual effort and usefulness. I do not believe that he can get this interest, at least not in any large numbers, unless our educational system is directed toward producing this interest in him, toward bringing this sort of thing into relation with the things in which he is already interested, toward giving him an appreciation for these interesting and important natural phenomena.

The same thing is true of the phenomena of our social life. Our laws, our institutions, our economic and social and industrial relations are full of the most interesting phenomena, offering the most valuable material for thought and reflection and study, the consideration of which will lift the individual man and woman out of the narrow round of the routine duties characteristic of the ordinary life up into the larger sphere of communion with the great thoughts that have made our world for us, and with those larger thoughts which have made the universe in which we live. If we can get this interest for these things, we shall find an increasing attention and an increasing devotion to these subjects on the part of every man and woman in our society, but to do that I think these subjects in some form must be brought to the attention of our children as systematically and as regularly as nature itself is brought to them, in the best integration

and by the best presentation which modern educational methods can give.

Thus far, I have dwelt upon the desirability of utilizing the subject-matter of the political and social sciences as means of instruction in our schools from the point of view of their importance to our social welfare. It seems to me that the certainty of a more extensive utilization of this same subject-matter for educational purposes may also be based upon what may be called the pedagogical or educational availability of these sciences as means of instruction from two points of view, what may be called the purely disciplinary or liberal training, and what may be called the informational or special training. I would not wish to be understood as divorcing these two considerations; they are really not two distinct qualities of these subjects, but rather two aspects, two sides of the same thing. I think it is not too much to say that the tendency in modern pedagogy at present is toward recognizing a similar or equal value for the purpose of training and instruction in nearly all branches of human science. The old idea that a liberal education can only be obtained from an extensive study of the classics, that strength of mind and purpose can only be derived from a detailed study of mathematics has disappeared along with many another equally defective notion as to the pedagogical nature of various disciplines and branches of knowledge. I do not know that it would be fair to say to-day that there is a consensus of the best opinion in favor of the view that all subjects of study are of equal educational value, but certainly the tendency of modern philosophic and pedagogical thought has been steadily in the direction of recognizing the truth of this principle in regard to an ever-increasing number of subjects. Human science is becoming so large in its scope, so multiform in its variety, that no one man can hope to master even the rudiments of it in the course of a single lifetime. We must, if these different departments are to be adequately cultivated, look forward to an ever-increasing specialization

in many directions, and it would certainly be an unfortunate outlook for the race, if this increasing specialization were to be accompanied by decreasing discipline of the human mind.

Now the subject-matter of the political and social sciences from whatever point of view it may be considered offers most valuable material to the educationist. No one who has studied political economy, as it is set forth in the great treatises on this subject, can help realizing that the mastery of the line of argument adopted in economics must result in mental development just as surely and as truly as does the mastery of propositions in geometry. No one can take the trouble to understand the celebrated proposition of John Stuart Mill, "that a demand for commodities is not a demand for labor," without feeling that he has made as definite and as distinct an advance in his power to grapple with abstruse questions as would have been occasioned by the mastery of a difficult proposition in Euclid. If the general public, if our clergymen and our newspaper writers, understood this proposition and what it means—a proposition which may almost be called the *pons asinorum* of economic students, we should certainly be spared many of the elaborate and misleading expositions by our newspapers and other so-called leaders of public thought upon the subject of luxurious expenditure. The notion that the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars upon an evening's entertainment is productive expenditure of wealth in a narrow economic sense would not commend itself to anyone who understood the proposition referred to.

John Stuart Mill's theory of international trade; his presentation of the subject of rent, of wages, and many other similar topics as discussed by him and subsequent writers, to say nothing of the refinements of the Austrians, offer an abundance of material for purely disciplinary or formal training; material which, while quite as difficult and obstinate as mathematics or logic, has the great advantage of appealing to some types of mind as of far more interest than mathe-

matics, and is consequently for those particular persons, a better material for formal or disciplinary training than the latter.

The same thing is true of politics in the form of constitutional law. No youth can master the line of reasoning pursued by the great jurists, who have developed a theory of constitutional law based upon our constitutional system, without feeling new virtue come into him, without experiencing a new sense of power, without undergoing a real process of development. Education has been defined by some one to be "a development of the power to draw distinctions." And the power to understand and appreciate the distinctions which our jurists have drawn in the process of elaborating the set of constitutional principles upon which our system of state and federal government rests can only be the result of a serious and valuable discipline.

Aside from this mental discipline, this formal training, which in an eminent degree may be made the accompaniment of such studies, they have the additional value of imparting information relating to the conditions of life under which the modern citizen is placed which cannot be without its effect in interesting the individual in these social, political and industrial problems, which face our modern state. And if, with this formal training, we can secure this interest, we shall have gone a long way toward laying the foundations for an intelligent and useful citizenship. The highest value of these subjects from this point of view, from the point of view of the formal or disciplinary side is perhaps attainable only in our high schools, or in the upper grades of our high schools and of similar institutions. But the youth or maiden of sixteen or seventeen can grapple with and understand some of these problems which I have indicated, in such a way as to derive very great benefit from the pursuit of these subjects.

If the line of thought thus far adopted is a sound one, it is evident that we are face to face with the important problem

of the adjustment of this branch of instruction, of this department of human science in our educational system to the other branches of instruction in the various grades of our educational scheme.

While I cannot go in any great detail into the discussion of this question, there are some salient points so important that they cannot be passed over without at least a cursory notice. The term university in our modern educational system is coming to be applied to the great system of professional schools whose curriculum is based upon an extensive secondary training. It includes a complex of medical, law, divinity and philosophical faculties, comprising under the latter head the so-called advanced or graduate work in pure science which is made the basis of special training for people who are looking forward to an academic career. The university in the true sense is an institution organized for a twofold purpose, that of promoting original investigation and research, that of widening the bounds of human knowledge, and secondly of furnishing a specific professional training based upon the utilization of the highest results of human science for this purpose. Now in this department of our education certainly the political and social sciences must assume a most important part, and with every passing year a more important one. As subjects of study and investigation, they certainly may lay claim to a fair share of the attention of these great foundations, organized for the promotion of human science. There is, moreover, an increasing number of callings in the community, proper preparation for which would certainly include a period of study of these subjects. As our civil service becomes more thoroughly developed in this country, as our standard of efficiency and our ideas of what a civil service system ought to be in a great country like this rises, we may be sure that a professional training looking toward qualifying people for these important and difficult positions will certainly be required. There will come a time when we shall expect an American consul to be a man who knows

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something of industry and trade and commerce, who has some knowledge of the inter-relations of the great industrial and commercial machinery of the modern world; when we shall expect the men who are at the head of the important departments in our municipal governments and of the important departments in our national and state governments, to have some expert knowledge of the subject-matter underlying the administration of their offices. When that time comes, the universities must offer special professional instruction looking to these places, based upon the political and social sciences. Certainly the great business of managing and directing the newspaper in the modern world is another department of life in which the presence of experts in these subjects is absolutely essential, if these so-called leaders do not become mere blind leaders of the blind. Surely the men who make politics a business, and draw up our laws for us, and shape our administration, ought to be men with knowledge of these subjects, such as at present they have not. When we do come to require this knowledge, the place to obtain it will be in the university under the leadership of men who make the study of these things and instruction in these things their life work. These departments are, therefore, in connection with our universities, bound to increase and multiply, to be developed and expanded, and made more serviceable for the important function which they are destined to fulfill.

There are not wanting signs that this development has already begun. Our great universities in this country have in the last twenty years begun to make more or less adequate provision for the cultivation of these subjects. In no place is it at present adequate; in no place is it at present more than a mere beginning; in no institution has more than a fraction of the effort and time and money been devoted to this department of human knowledge which is given to natural science.

I may note here, that the question of the suitable or-
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ganization of this instruction in the university is a mere matter of detail; and yet it is not by any means an unimportant matter of detail; on the contrary, it may have the most profound effect upon the manner in which our whole educational scheme may develop. Thus, if we organize the political and social sciences in such a way that that they can be set over as a group of social sciences against a group of natural sciences, we may be very certain that they will be more adequately cared for, than if, grouped together under one head, or one science, they be set over against some one division of the natural sciences, like chemistry or physics. It is interesting to note that for some time in this country there was a tendency to recognize this co-ordinate position of the political and social sciences, as over against the natural sciences. And we had the school of political science, organized in Columbia in 1881, for just the kind of advanced work which I have been describing; we had the school of political science organized at Cornell, at Michigan and at Wisconsin. The only place in which the organization was fairly well carried out was at Columbia, and there are not lacking a good many signs at present of a determined attack upon this claim of the political and social sciences to be considered as a group of equal importance and equal dignity with the natural sciences, or with the historical and philological sciences. The question will probably ultimately be decided by the final development and arrangement and organization of the sciences among themselves, and I am free to say that, in my opinion, we have no indications at present which enable us to determine what that final classification of the sciences is to be. There are tendencies at work in political economy which would reduce it to a mathematico-physical science, others which would hold it in its present relation to the moral sciences. There are tendencies which would reduce politics to history, and others which would reduce history to politics. There are claims that economics is the basal science of all social

sciences, etc. The arc of the circle is not as yet sufficiently large to enable us to determine the size of the circle, or indeed whether it is a circle at all, whether it may not be an ellipse, or possibly a parabola or an hyperbola. But for the present, the immediate problem before our universities from this point of view is the relation of this group of subjects to the old historical subjects of university instruction, history, grammar, and philosophy on the one hand, and to the newer subjects grouped under the head of natural sciences on the other. As said above, the question is by no means unimportant. In our modern universities, for example, a certain sum of money is set aside for the purchase of books, which is to be divided up among the departments, and according as this group of subjects constitute one department, or is broken up into several distinct departments, will it receive a small, or, in the aggregate, a large proportion of the total available funds of the institution. The money may be divided more and more among the various departments of the institution which are to be developed and, according as these subjects are grouped as one department, or broken up into a number of departments, will they obtain a small or, in the aggregate, a large proportion of the university's revenue. In the University of Pennsylvania senate, for example, this whole group of subjects, is represented by one man, while the field of natural science, pure and applied, is represented by six or seven men, and the field of the old subjects by as many more; language itself being represented by no less than three. In Columbia University this group of subjects has a position and a dignity which secures for them a much larger share of university attention and university support than in the University of Pennsylvania. In the University of Chicago, out of some fifteen departments organized with head professors, three are assigned to this general field, but it is interesting to note that the number in the field of natural science is steadily increasing, and from all present indications will soon far

outweigh the relative position at first assigned to the social sciences. Those of us who believe that these subjects represent a large and vital portion of human science must exert our efforts upon all occasions, and in all legitimate ways, to secure for them their proper and adequate attention, even in what seems to be the small matter of university organization.

The relation of the political and social sciences to what may be called secondary and college education is no less important than that to the great field of professional or university training. The condition of higher education in the United States is at present in many respects so chaotic that it is difficult to classify sharply and draw the line between what is professional, what is higher, what is secondary and what is elementary. But leaving to one side all such education as may be considered professional, whether it be given in the upper years of a college course, or in the strictly graduate years of university work, let us turn our attention for a moment to what may be called preparatory or secondary work, such as is involved in the high school curriculum, and in the first two years of our most advanced colleges. Calling all that work secondary, therefore, which comes after the elementary school and prior to the professional work of the university, what is the relation of the social and political sciences to this department? The number of people who attend the universities in any country is very small. The average condition or height of education in a country at large depends to a far greater extent upon the number of people who may take this liberal or disciplinary training, which is characteristic of secondary education. And the effort has, of course, been made to extend and invigorate this branch of our education in the United States, but thus far without that marked success which we might hope for. As a result of this we find that a large proportion of persons who are taking the so-called professional education of the university, that in law, medicine, theology, have not taken

this preliminary or secondary work, but have gone directly from the elementary school into the professional school. There are many different causes which have conspired to bring about such a result, but prominent among them certainly is the fact that within a comparatively recent date our colleges and universities threw the whole weight of their authority in favor of the view that there was only one road to the higher education, that through the study of the classics and mathematics, and that no one could claim to be cultured who had not spent years of his life in the pursuit of what we sometimes call the formal sides of culture. A great epoch came in the history of education when the adherents of natural science succeeded in establishing a college curriculum based upon the study of the natural sciences as the old classical curriculum had been based upon the study of the classics and mathematics. When this second road was opened to higher education, it was found that a vastly larger number of the youth of the country desired a liberal or disciplinary culture, than had desired, or had been willing to take it through the medium of the old training. We are face to face to-day with the necessity of opening up still other roads to this same end of a liberal and general culture, to cast up still other highways than those which rest upon the classics and the natural sciences. One road in our view lies certainly through the study of the social sciences. A liberal curriculum may be laid out having for its nucleus the great field of social science, the study of man in his political and economic institutions, which shall be as valuable as either of the other courses. With this is indicated our view as to the relation of the political and social sciences to this problem of secondary education, at least from one point of view. We must work out a secondary curriculum based largely on these subjects.

The University of Pennsylvania made the first movement in this direction, in the establishment of the Wharton School of Finance and Economy, some fifteen years ago. As this

experiment was the first, so it has remained the most successful of the kind up to the present time. It is not destined to remain without imitation and without a profound reflex influence upon the course of college education throughout the country. The president of the University of Chicago has announced that a department with similar ends and aims and with similar methods is to be opened in that institution, as soon as the requisite funds are forthcoming. The plan has received the assent of all the academic authorities, and is simply waiting for the financial support necessary to its inauguration. The University of California, that wonderful institution, one of the most remarkable in the United States, is at work at present upon a similar project which it is believed will be launched within a year or two. I have no doubt myself that the establishment of such a curriculum in every one of our great institutions would be attended by another large increase in the number of those young people in the community who aspire after a higher education, but who are not attracted to the study of either the classics or natural sciences as at present conducted.

The considerations which I have thus far adduced relating to the college, or higher, secondary curriculum, apply with equal force, it seems to me, to the high school or lower secondary curriculum. Everyone is aware, who has followed the history of the public high school in the United States, that it has begun to influence very profoundly the attitude of the colleges upon the subject of popular education. The high school was the first constituent part of our secondary educational system which insisted that training in the natural sciences, being universal in character, ought to enter into all grades of our education; that secondary education must not be devoted to the mere study of grammar and mathematics, while the study of all other branches of knowledge should be deferred until the close of the period which the average child could devote to education. It insisted that natural science must become a constituent part of the

education of the high school, and high school curricula have been worked out based largely upon training in natural science. I do not doubt but that we must work out exactly the same kind of a problem in connection with instruction and training in the social sciences. And there are not wanting signs at numerous places in the country that so-called commercial high schools are to be developed, whose curricula will be based to a very large extent upon the subject-matter of these same political and social sciences.

We now come to the third and last of my propositions, in regard to the relation of our education to the subject-matter of the political and social sciences, and that is that our elementary schools must also make a place in their curricula for the elements of these subjects, which we have been discussing. The period of elementary education is perhaps not altogether as clearly defined as one might wish, but for our purposes, I should take as the period suitable to elementary education the school life up to thirteen or fourteen years of age, the time at which the pupils in our public schools are ready for the high school, the period usually covered by the compulsory school laws, the period which, roughly speaking, has come to be pretty generally accepted as extending from the sixth to the fourteenth year. It is in this period that the question of the relation of these sciences to the general training for citizenship in a republic becomes of special importance. If every man, and possibly, in course of time, every woman, in our society is to be called upon to take an active part in the work of governing, or of passing upon the success with which other people govern, or to have the privilege of passing judgment upon the adoption or rejection of great questions of public policy, it would seem to follow as a matter of course that every citizen ought to have some specific and special training to prepare him for this important duty. Now the number of young men or women who enter our high schools or our colleges, or our universities is very small indeed. If we are to do anything effective in this

direction, we must begin with the boys and girls in those institutions of our school system in which the great majority of them are to be found, and they are the elementary schools.

It is not necessary, I presume, at this time to enter upon an elaborate argument in favor of the view that there is need for a more general, a more fundamental, a more satisfactory training for citizenship in our society than we have at present. We need only to look about us to see ample evidence that our society, political, social, economic and industrial, is suffering from a thousand and one defects which would be remedied if our sense of civic duty were quicker and our knowledge of civic relations more ample and thorough. The tendency to sacrifice the public interest to private interest, the shameless betrayals of trust in our city and state governments, the outrageous exploitation of the weak and unfortunate by the strong and unscrupulous, the combinations of the rich and the poor to plunder the public at every possible point, are such common phenomena of our social and public life in every direction that they have almost ceased to attract public attention. Now the training for citizenship necessary to bring about a new state of things in these respects is, of course, an extremely broad one. It implies that training for citizenship, which comes as a result of all the complex forces of life in a free state, which work together to make or to mar the character of every citizen in it. The training in the family, in the school, on the playground, in the church, in business, in politics, in all the various relations of life, goes to make up that complex resultant, the good, or the bad citizen. The only point I care to urge in this immediate connection is that specific instruction in the nature, constitution and relationships of human society in its political aspects, should be a part, indeed, an important part, a part which has been hitherto overlooked and neglected, in this great and comprehensive process of developing the intelligent and conscientious citizen. A man is a citizen by virtue of the fact that he lives in society, that.

he must enter into social relations with a vast number of human beings in immediate or remote proximity to himself, and according as he bears himself in these relations wisely and conscientiously or the opposite, will the outcome of human society be a blessing or a curse. We have to develop, of course, a social consciousness in the child as it grows up through the family, and the school, and prepares itself to emerge into the wider relations of political and industrial society. And if we can only develop the right social ideals in the child, can only develop the right mental and moral social attitude in the youth, we need not be afraid of the result, for society, government, politics bear the same relation to these social ideals, these social standards, these social views, that the fruit or the blossom bears to the bud or the seed. If we can get the right attitude and the adequate knowledge in the green tree, the dry will surely take care of itself.

I am not sure that I have sufficient knowledge of the curriculum, of the difficulties and possibilities of elementary instruction in our schools as they exist, to outline in any satisfactory way exactly what form this specific instruction in the elements of political and social science shall take, in order to secure the highest social results. But I am sure that the burden of working out this problem rests upon the school teachers and the university experts alike, and it can only be solved by their persistent co-operation. Just as it has taken two generations of work on the part of our elementary school teachers, on the one hand, and of our scientists on the other, to prepare the subject-matter of the natural sciences to become a mental pabulum for the children in our elementary schools, so it may possibly be another generation or two before this same problem can be worked out for the political and social sciences; but it is my firm belief that worked out it must be if our social progress is to be as continuous, as rapid, as our social welfare demands.

I do not mean by this, of course, that it is necessary to

introduce into the lower grades of schools systematic subjects of instruction which we shall call politics, and economics, or sociology. But certainly from the very earliest life of the child in the school, to the last day he continues in it, the management of the school itself, in all its relationships, in the classroom, on the playground, etc., ought to be such as to tend steadily toward developing the social instinct and the social attitude which will finally blossom into the fruit of perfect citizenship. In what manner in connection with this unconscious training specific instruction in the constitution of government and society, and in their relation to the citizen and the citizen's relation to them may be introduced, I cannot undertake to say at present. That is a practical problem of school pedagogics. But I am inclined to think that it may be done much earlier than is at present supposed, and I am convinced that every passing year will demonstrate even more imperatively than our past development has already demonstrated, the necessity of beginning this instruction as early as possible.

The practical solution depends on the hearty co-operation of layman, school teacher and university professor, and to this work the interest of modern society summons us all alike.

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