

tained probable results with reference to the "Old Testament," results of which Dr. Illingworth takes account when he speaks of the doctrine of the Fall (227). "The account in Genesis is obviously mythological in form." Yes, obviously, but to whom? To the critic, but not to uninstructed opinion. And this method which has been successively applied to the history of the church, and to the "Old Testament," Dr. Illingworth rejects when he comes to the "Fourth Gospel," by arguments which would have prevented any advance upon the historical conceptions of the middle ages.

I wonder how the "concrete" method affects the case of Cyril of Alexandria? Julian, we are told, would have been unknown to us but for Cyril: "it was the Christian who survived." Yes, as the Alexandrian prince-bishop, "whose Christianity did not succeed in making him just," (Harnack, "History of Dogma," iv, 174), or (to quote a more orthodox writer) in whom "dogmatic interests overpowered all other considerations" (Westcott, *St. John* xcvi).

The absence of references makes it difficult to estimate Dr. Illingworth's indebtedness to Newman's "Grammar of Assent." Newman also has a great deal to say about concrete knowledge and real assent. His whole treatment of the subject however is much more systematic and argumentative than Dr. Illingworth's. Certitude is based by him upon the convergence of many probabilities, not upon the use of presumption drawn from practice.

The student of ethics is concerned, more than at first sight appears, with this "concrete" method. It encourages that prejudice against systematic thought, which is one of the weaknesses of the Anglo-Saxon mind. At any time such a result ought to be deplored, but above all at the present, when every thing is being subordinated to the most immediate and obvious utilities, and when the wider and deeper relations of things are passing out of the common view. The "concrete" method is part of the equipment of the advocate and rhetorician; it has no place among the instruments of disinterested inquiry.

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THE DAWN OF DAY. By Friedrich Nietzsche. Translated by Johanna Volz. New York: Macmillan & Company. 1903.

In this new translation of "Morgenröthe" English readers may see Nietzsche perhaps at his best. In experimenting upon the

public it is not clear why the selection has thus far been from his more violent moods. There was ground for omitting his first book—"Die Geburt der Tragödie," and it may be said that in translating "Der Fall Wagner" the public attention would, at least, be startled. Portions indeed of the "Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen" would have reached this end quite as effectively, at the same time showing the reader far more of Nietzsche's resources.

It is common to call the "prosepoem" Zarathustra, the author's chief performance. It is, however, so marred by the unhappy evidence of egomania as to put the tolerance of the reader to a severe test. I once heard a man described as striking fire at the very suggestion that anyone was more radical than he. Nietzsche's passion is for every extreme of opinion. No one shall outdo him in startling utterance. It is his delight to shatter every idol that attracts worshippers, that mankind approves; *anything* in education, art, letters, religion, politics is ground enough for the Titan's wrath. That men should show interest in a "social question" and reforms, appears to him mere "instinkt-entartung." As Wagner grows popular and pays tribute to the "vampire," Christianity, he becomes "the arch enemy to his own craft." Wagner is henceforth a "breeder of hysterics," and is classed among Nietzsche's sicknesses. The saint becomes to him the sneak; pity and sympathy mere signs of invalidism and decay.

There is, I believe, no truer name for Nietzsche than the "aristocrat of anarchism." Every form of democracy excites his loathing because it implies sympathies and equalities that are only names to him for degeneracy. "What then is good? It is anything that gives the feeling of power, that gives force to the will. It is power alone that elevates humanity. What is bad? Everything from which weakness springs. What is happiness? The feeling that power is growing in us. Not contentment but more power:—above all not peace but war and struggle, not virtue but toughness and valor. Virtue and power are one and the same."

He says somewhere "aristokratischer Radikalismus, das gescheiteste Wort, das ich bisher über mich gelesen habe." No extremer individualism has anywhere been expressed than in "Zarathustra." I remember no passage so contemptuous against the Socialists as the end of paragraph 203 in "Jenseits von Gut und Böse." Social reforms and all extension of protecting functions for the weaker in the social struggle excite his instant hostility. "Who cannot swim against the tide, by that very fact should be engulfed."

In the "Dawn of Day" (*Gedanken über moralischen Vorurtheile*) this imperious instinct appears in its least offensive form. "I will yield in great things as in small, only to that law which I myself have given," asserts itself as in *Zarathustra* but with less insistence. The book is composed of five hundred and seventy-five paragraphs upon every conceivable subject that could be classed under "Moral judgments:" art, education, politics, manners, science, religion. It is, I think, the fourth volume of the translations. If this finds readers, several other volumes are promised in the immediate future. The book contains no trace of argument, but is a succession of flashes of unequal brilliancy, but never lacking the stimulating shock. It would be difficult to open a page on which one could not find a telling thought. He finds fault even with his favorite Schopenhauer, because he does not present "a passionate history of the soul." Nietzsche, at least, does this. It is pleasant that in this volume, begun in 1880, the unhappy malady to which he at last succumbed, had not worked its wreck upon him. It is full of splendid bits of critical insight which put us in debt to the translator, Johanna Volz, who has done the work with something more than fidelity, and, that, in spite of extraordinary difficulties, inhere in the most remarkable literary style of any modern Prussian writer.

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OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM IN THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS.

By Adolf Guttmacher. Baltimore: The Friedenwald Co. 1903.

One of the most gratifying features of this book is the title page. The author is the Rabbi of a prominent Jewish congregation, and it is a healthful sign of the times to find one occupying an official position in the Jewish church extending his studies to the New Testament. If there is ever to be brought about a better understanding of each other by Jews and Christians, it can only be hoped for by each studying in a broad and unprejudiced spirit the religion and the religious records of the other. As yet Jewish scholars have done little towards the elucidation of the Christian scriptures and in view of considerable prejudice still existing in certain Jewish circles (by no means all) against the study of the New Testament, Dr. Guttmacher is to be commended both for his courage and for his spirit. It is also gratifying to