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ANOTHER WARNING VOICE FROM 1805.

By Major-General T. B. COLLINSON, R.E.

1793–1801.

The Pith of the Lesson.

IN the year 1790, when the great French Revolution was beginning to look threatening to the peace of Europe, and when most other States began to get themselves into war condition in anticipation of a storm, Great Britain, that country of bold and practical minded people, disbanded the very respectable Army she then possessed, dismantled her admirable Navy, and sold her naval stores. The lion did not wait to have his claws cut, but deliberately cut them himself, and that without the excuse of one atom of love, nor even of the quiet reserve of a great heart, but simply from the exigencies of Parliamentary warfare interpreting a selfish policy of isolation. The balance of political parties in Great Britain at that time prevented the Government of the day from preparing for war, and the opposition used for their purposes the national ignorance of continental politics. There were other States in Europe which, for their own selfish interests, abstained from joining in the war against French dominion long after Great Britain had heartily begun; but Great Britain was then especially, as she is now pre-eminently, the one power, which, by her geographical position, her character and her resources, could interfere most effectually and with least danger to herself, in preventing the spread of war in Europe, Hence we must acknowledge that this laggardness of the people and opposition of the rulers in preparing to take their part at the beginning of the disturbance, has, from an historical point of view, an aspect of selfish isolation. They had had many lessons in the course of their history on evil consequences and uselessness of such a policy of separation, but they persisted in burying their heads in their island nest in the hope that the hunters would not see them, and in shutting themselves up in their stronghold in the hope that the fire raging in the town would not reach them; and the result was that they themselves afforded to

their posterity a stronger example of those consequences than any of their predecessors. A long drawn war of 20 years, and a debt of which we seem never to be relieved, was mainly the effect of their taking the course, in 1790, directly contrary to what appears now to have been the right one.

This proposition, so difficult to impress on the minds of the English people, is demonstrated, I think, with sufficient clearness in the histories of those times. From the beginning to the end of that long war, the speeches, letters, and reports of the statesmen, admirals, and generals read like one continuous commentary on the mistake of being unprepared for war at the beginning—a mistake which took 15 years of the war to rectify. The very statesmen who at first opposed the idea of interfering with the progress of the Revolution, were at last most energetic in taking those measures against it which, if adopted at the commencement, might have prevented the desolation of Europe. It is surely no excuse to say that in this long period of tribulation, the plants of a better liberty took firm root in every State, and that Great Britain reaped a harvest of glories that would never otherwise have flourished: the plain duty of a country placed in the world in the position of Great Britain, is to preserve the peace; and that is the only and sufficient argument for the maintenance of its war forces.

The form this continuous commentary took, is the best evidence of the truth of the proposition: like the repeated chorus of some song of lamentation, comes the cry of one minister after the other—O! for an expeditionary force to send on to the Continent—O! for a well equipped body of trained troops—O! for 50,000 disciplined soldiers! But 50,000 disciplined soldiers are not to be bought at Covent Garden Market every day in the week: such an article requires some years to grow in; it is a perennial plant, and the attempt to substitute for it, annuals trained by forcing to look like the real thing, may make a flower show, but produces no fruit. And so the war ministers of the day found it, one after another: for they all attempted for some years to supply the deficiency, which they all felt, by making the general Militia act the part of Regulars—an expedient which gave satisfaction to no parties concerned, except perhaps to the enemy. It was felt to be an unfair application of this old constitutional force to make it a sort of recruiting depôt for the Regulars; it was equally unfair to the Militia to expect them to do the work of regular soldiers in foreign expeditions; and to the commanders of those expeditions, to expect them to act as if their whole force was composed of equally trained soldiers. But, it will be said, the troops of the French Revolution were at that time equally untrained; that is true, but it is also true, that when there was a fair field, the French Revolutionary troops at that time were beaten; and had they been met by a properly trained force, under a good commander, the French Revolution would have been considerably curtailed in its proportions.

The first Failure.

The British people were roused from their position as indifferent

spectators in 1792, and very suddenly. In June of that year, the King dismissed Parliament without a prospect of having to disturb that position of economical isolation; in about a month afterwards, Royalty in France was put an end to, an event which touched the feelings of the English greatly, but not enough to disturb their peace. In another month, however, their pockets were touched by the occupation of Holland: and this was a blow which brought Parliament together again about six months after their peaceful separation, to re-establish the dismissed Army, to reconstruct the dismantled Navy, and to re-purchase the sold stores. The first idea on going to war was quite worthy of the bold British race, namely, to attack the enemy at once, and in the part where he had inflicted the injury on us; and the first operation of this long war was the siege of Dunkirk. This expedition is, therefore, highly interesting to us, as a pregnant example of the first performance when there was so much promise—in spirit. Time was when an expedition into France would have brought all the youth of England together as for a holiday excursion, with the prospect of successful enterprise, and the French would have remained at home in anxious preparation. In 1793 the British Government, after three weeks' labour—of which those who have been in our War Office at the outbreak of a "little war" will be able to form an idea—got together 35,000 British and Hanoverian troops, and leaving the Dutch and the other opponents of the French to their own devices, undertook this little independent operation at Dunkirk. The French already dealing with troops by the 100,000, brought a superior force upon this isolated expedition, and such was the defective condition of our Navy, that they attacked the British besieging force by sea as well as by land; and this first episode resulted in a failure to the British arms.

It was a fair example of many other such unsuccessful expeditions with which the war on land was carried on in a desultory manner for the next 15 years. All undertaken from the feeling of the necessity of attacking the enemy on his own weak points, and all failing from the want of a sufficient strength of properly trained and properly equipped soldiers. Early in the war, Mr. Pitt pointed out the necessity of so doing: "The power of Great Britain at sea, however irresistible "on that element, could not, in the nature of things, make an adequate "impression upon an enemy whose strength was concentrated on land."[1] But the absence of the only efficient means to produce that required impression was shown by the successive attempts to modify the Militia so as to feed the regular Army with the best kind of soldiers available. They had no others, and what they had of these were so few and so unfitted for the work, that these little isolated attempts of a few thousand men at one point and another of Europe, "this warfare of pigmies," as Napoleon afterwards called it,[2] only encouraged the enemy and discouraged the people of Great Britain.

The Result.

In 1797, four years of this kind of warfare resulted in Great

[1] "Ann. Reg.," 1794. [2] Dumas.

Britain being shut up in its own islands, with one of them in rebellion, and threatened with an invasion. It may be doubted whether the French at this period contemplated a serious invasion, but the threatening attitude they assumed had all the effect they intended, of still more discouraging Great Britain from attempting any exploits on the Continent. It was, it must be confessed, a humiliating position for this country to be placed in, and drew from Mr. Burke an eloquent denunciation of this timid and futile war policy: "Who would have "credited that 200,000 men were kept in England and 80,000 in "Ireland for the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence; and "that by its very constitution the greater part of this force was dis-"abled from defending us against the enemy by one preventive stroke "of active hostility. And who would have believed that a fleet of "500 ships, the best appointed that this country ever had upon the "sea, was for the greater part employed in the same system of un-"enterprising defence. What must be the feelings of those who "remember the former energy of England, in seeing these two islands "with their extensive sea coast treated as a garrison—and a garrison "powerless to sally—allowing itself to be besieged by an inferior "force and a shattered fleet—and with merely the menace of an "attack?"[1]

At this period, however, the British Fleet, as it had often done before, came to the rescue of the national honour. The naval victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown, in 1797, and of the Nile, in 1798, first roused the true war spirit of the people: that spirit had, however, to fall and rise several times yet before it stood at the level of steady success. Naval victories do not give permanent power, and the truth of the above warning of Mr. Pitt was shown in 1799, in a fresh expedition to Holland, and the defect of our war organisation was again shown in its failure. Once more the Navy, under Nelson, at Copenhagen, in 1801, raised the dormant war feeling, and this time the first success on land by Abercromby, in Egypt, seemed to give a prospect of a turn in the tide of war: showing that it was defect of organisation only, and not of spirit in the people, that had hitherto checked our arms on land. But the nation had not yet learnt the lesson that no amount of enthusiasm, and no dominion of the sea, will compensate for the want of deliberate preparation for war on land. This new war spirit that had arisen in Great Britain, and which in 1790 might have been effectual in preserving peace, was now overshadowed by the superior organisation that had arisen in France under the genius of Napoleon, whose moral power alone, one may say, forced England to consent to a nominal peace in 1801.

Its Lesson Lost.

Thus the first part of this great war was nominally brought to a close by this forced peace of Amiens in 1801—a peace which was no peace—a mere armed truce, for the purpose of lulling the people of Great Britain into a false security, while Napoleon was consolidating

[1] Alison, vol. iv, p. 181. 1797.

his power in Europe for the more effectual subjugation of England. For what were the respective positions of the two parties after eight years of war? Great Britain was all powerful at sea, and had gained some colonies, which were highly advantageous for the preservation of that power, and for the extension of her commerce. In consequence, indeed, of that sea dominion, her commerce had gone on increasing in a marvellous manner throughout the whole war; and she was induced to believe that it only required peace with her one great enemy to perfect that sea dominion and make her mistress of the commerce of the ocean. But the great enemy had very different intentions in his mind. He had never deviated from the ideas he had confidentially expressed in 1797: "Let us concentrate all our activity "on the marine, and destroy England; that done, Europe is at our "feet."[1] The year before he made this hollow peace he said, "England must be overturned, war to the death with England"[2] And throughout all his proceedings during the peace, for extending and perfecting his control over the various countries on the Continent which had been subdued by his arms, he always kept in view the design, on the first favourable opportunity, of conquering that island-power which was the great obstacle to his supreme dominion in the western world.

And yet those same exigencies of Parliamentary warfare, which had in 1790 diverted the nation from the right view of the state of the Continent, again interfered to foster their erroneous views of sea security and unlimited commerce, and with the same result. Such Army as they had, was disbanded, the fleets were dismantled, and the ships and stores collected during the last eight years, were sold.

So difficult is it for the British mind to learn the lesson of its proper duty in the world. So ready are our people for the sake of that ocean commerce to rely on our security from the troubles of the Continent. And if the mistake of that policy were so strongly brought home to them, by the imminent danger of the next three years, how much stronger ought it to be impressed upon us in these days, when we have no longer the same security from invasion, and are infinitely more dependent on the Continent for existence.

The Preparations in France.

First Conception of Project.

It was in 1798 that Napoleon first had his attention turned to the idea of invading England with a large force from the coast immediately opposite to it. And whatever his real motive may have been for declining the undertaking at that time, he recorded a professional reason for doing so, which is of some value to us now; and that was, that however practicable it might be to pass over a sufficient body of men, notwithstanding the superiority of the British at sea, to make good a footing in England, it would be impossible to reinforce them.[3]

[1] "Confid. Corresp. de Napol.," Alison, iv, 212. [2] Alison, vol. iv, 220. 1800.
[3] Thiers, "Consul. et l'Emp.," x, 13.

So, when he had obtained the supreme power in France, and had no other enemy to deal with but Great Britain, and he had resolved to take that opportunity of striking a decisive blow against her, he did not forget that question of reinforcement; and he swept away the difficulty with his usual force, by resolving to take over reinforcements and all at once.

There are some curious points of resemblance between this projected invasion of Napoleon and that of the Spanish Armada in 1588. Napoleon had nearly as great power in Europe as Philip II had, and at the moment England was his only enemy; he had the resources of Holland, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland, besides those of France, at his disposal; he prepared with great care during two years an enormous armada of ships and troops, and stores of all kinds; he had not the command of the sea as Philip had, but that was more than counterbalanced by his superior genius; his favourite Admiral died at the moment when all was ready, and he had to trust the pith of the expedition to an inferior man. The winds of Heaven were against him as against the Armada; but the real cause of failure was the same in both; the Franco-Spanish navy, enthusiastic and high spirited as the men were, was not a match at sea for the British sons of Neptune.

There was this further point of resemblance, that both expeditions were conceived and worked out by one man, and the real scheme of each was kept secret to the last moment. But the difference of the two men made a total difference in the character of the two expeditions, and in the two schemes. Napoleon was a soldier and a statesman of the highest genius, and fully capable of arranging the details in the most efficient manner, as well as of devising a strategic plot most calculated to ensure success, military and political. The one expedition was a "toro" in a bull ring, going at his object by brute force, the other was the "toreador," who by skill and intelligence seeks to overmaster the animal. This was very much the difference between Napoleon and his present antagonist Great Britain; to the ingenious toils of the one were opposed the unskilful courage of the other.

Napoleon began to think of the subject as soon as he had made peace with Austria in 1800, because England was the only power then likely to oppose him; and as he was not by any means prepared for such an undertaking then, he was willing to make peace with her in 1801, for the very purpose of better completing those preparations. When Great Britain herself broke the peace in 1803, he was compelled by the feeling in France to resume the project energetically, although he himself would have preferred a delay of some years to ensure a preparation sufficient for the enterprise. And when Pitt returned to office in 1804, and began to stir up Russia and Austria again to oppose him, Napoleon found it necessary to act at once, and he put his mighty shoulder to the wheel accordingly, and the machine moved.

Details of Vessels.

The whole scope of this wonderful contrivance for circumventing England will come better later on in this account; at present we shall

deal with the details of the preparations. As he could not expect to keep the command over the "narrow seas" for very long, he naturally selected the shortest passage for his troops across, and consequently he was limited in the size of the vessels he could use to those which could conveniently enter the ports in that part of the French coast immediately opposite England; then it was important that they should be movable by oars as well as sails, and be flat-bottomed, so as to be easily beached on the English coast. These were all the conditions imperative, as far as the transport of the troops was concerned; it only required the presence of a protecting fleet to complete the scheme. Napoleon's genius, as will appear further on, was shown in his plan for deceiving the British Government, and indeed everybody else as to his real plot for ensuring the passage. Instead of confining his vessels to these conditions for mere transport, he had them constructed capable of fighting their way across against men of war; and so completely did he work out this idea that nobody in England or France, except the three men in the real secret (and one British Admiral who divined it) had a notion that he had any other intention of effecting the passage, and the British Navy were most completely put on the wrong scent, until the fox was on the point of getting into the hen-roost.

With this view, he had the main body of his transport-vessels constructed of three kinds. One, a good sea boat, of as large a size as practicable, and well armed for fighting and not carrying many troops; one both a sea boat and a rowing boat, rather smaller in size, not carrying so heavy an armament, but more tróops; and to each one of these two descriptions was to be attached a powerful rowing-boat also carrying troops, so that the sailing and the rowing boats were to mutually assist and protect each other. And in the disposition of the troops in the vessels, his first idea was to have some of each arm in each pair of vessels. Thus, the large gunboat, with its rowing pinnace, was to carry a company of infantry and some artillery, and horses; the small gunboat, with its pinnace, was to carry a company of infantry, a field piece with the rest of the gunners, and some cavalry and horses. Each pair of vessels was to carry a proportion of provisions (for 20 days) and military stores as well. Thus, whatever the numbers of pairs of vessels that landed on the English coast, they would find themselves with a proportion of each arm, and with ammunition and provisions.[1]

This idea was so far modified, that apparently each gunboat was eventually independent of the rowing boat. According to M. Thiers (who had access to the official correspondence), the arrangement of the three kinds was as follows:

The large gunboats, or *chaloupes canonnières*, were brigs, with an armament of four 24- or 36-pounders, a crew of 24, and 100 infantry, besides ammunition and provisions.

There were about 320 of them.

The small gunboats, or *bateaux canonnièrs*, were barks, carrying one 24-pr., and a field-piece and ammunition waggon, all ready for action;

[1] Dumas, xii, 265.

a crew of only 6, and 100 infantry, or artillery or cavalry, and 2 horses, besides ammunition and provisions.

There were about 550 of these.

The pinnaces, or *péniches*, were 60 feet long, and had, according to M. Thiers, 60 oars, but, according to Dumas, 18 banks or thwarts of oars, which is more likely, and only a few sailors, 60 soldiers, a howitzer, and a small field-piece.

There were about 320 of these.[1]

Besides the above, which were considered as the fighting part of the flotilla, there were nearly 500 vessels for carrying the remainder of the horses and artillery, including a siege-train, and nearly 500 vessels for carrying the rest of the provisions (for 3 months for the whole force) and stores, and non-combatants. There were altogether about 2,300 vessels in the flotilla. Most of the fighting portion of the flotilla were constructed, the others were purchased from the local fishing trade. There are two tables from Dumas at the end of this paper, giving the details of the whole flotilla.

Difficulties of Assemblage.

The construction and assemblage of all these vessels, within a few months as was intended, was not done by a stroke of a pen like an English contract now-a-days. Timber had to be felled and converted all over France and Belgium, naval stores to be made and purchased, and these materials collected within waterway of the ports. By stirring the old feeling of France against England, Napoleon got many of the cities to make vessels at their own expense; his correspondence at this period contains an amount of detail on all these matters, that shows at once what a master mind was guiding the whole, and how little local independence there was.[2]

The worst part of the business was moving them when ready to the appointed places of rendezvous along the coast infested with those hornets of British cruisers. These places of rendezvous were Boulogne, the centre and principal, with Ambleteuse and Vimereux north of it, and Etaples south of it. They were selected from being the first ports south of Cape Grisnez, and being opposite the south coast of England at the narrow part of the Channel. It was indispensable that the whole flotilla should be assembled so close together as to be certain of starting simultaneously. The vessels had to come from all the ports as far as the Scheldt on one side and Brest on the other; and the systematic arrangements for their safe conduct deserve our notice, as examples of coast defence. Besides permanent batteries on all the headlands of the coast, field batteries of even 16-pounders were stationed at intervals, which followed the detachments of vessels along the shore. The French coast generally is favourable for the manœuvre, being shallow and sandy; and the flotilla being of light draught could keep under the guns on shore, and out of range of the large English vessels, and even beach if necessary. The attempts of the watchful British cruisers, under Sir Sydney Smith, to prevent this movement,

[1] Thiers, iv, 414. Dumas, xii, 304. [2] Dumas.

formed a series of little sea episodes during those two years; but though they also had some vessels of light draught, they did not succeed in materially interrupting the gradual assemblage of the flotilla; and the failure was owing chiefly to the heavier guns of the French, a point Napoleon had pressed on his own artillery. Heavy guns in coast batteries is the moral of that story.[1]

But perhaps the most remarkable part of the whole preparations, to an English mind, was the enlargement of the several harbours of rendezvous to hold the flotilla. In England, if such a proposition had not stopped the scheme altogether, it would certainly have been done by contract at a huge expense; Napoleon made the troops who were to embark form the harbours for the flotilla they were to embark in. Timber was felled in the neighbouring forests to make quays and piers, and the excavation was done by relays of soldiers, under the directions of the scientific engineers of France. The sea defences of each post were multiplied so as to make an attack from the sea hopeless, and heavier guns were expressly made by Napoleon's order for them; to get range, mortars were laid on the sand between high and low water, so that they were covered by the tide; at Boulogne alone there were 500 guns in sea batteries; we have few places now with so many.[2]

The French Troops.

The troops employed by Napoleon on this great enterprise were selected from those available in France. In 1803, he had altogether an army of about 480,000,[3] and, as he was at peace with the rest of the world, he calculated on being able to allot 150,000 altogether to assist towards the invasion of England; but with his usual prevision he took special means to keep up and even increase the strength. His measures for recruiting his army, and their effect on France, are not encouraging towards compulsory service. The population of France about that time was nearly 30,000,000,[4] and by the laws of conscription which then existed he was at liberty to take 60,000 men of 20 years of age every year, in war time;[5] but, of course, he easily evaded this restriction, and during his reign he took on the average 200,000 per annum, which was then the whole number of 20 years of age in each year,[6] a drain which must have materially assisted in producing the fact that the population of France has not increased since that time at the rate of the English population. We pay heavily for our Army, it is true; but a nation can recover from a money expenditure much easier than from the loss of its young men.

Napoleon formed camps near the ports where the flotilla was preparing, for the double object of assisting in the work and re-organising the French Army, which now for the first time was arranged in permanent divisions, with a permanent staff over each.[7] And knowing from his own education the necessity of careful training for the artillery, he

[1] Dumas. James.
[2] Thiers, iv. Dumas, xii.
[3] Thiers, iv.
[4] Statesman's Year Book.
[5] Thiers, iv.
[6] Alison, v, 411.
[7] Dumas.

began with that branch before the others; a precaution, for the want of which, we shall find the English Commander-in-Chief lamenting. The camps were at Ostend, Dunkirk, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples. The troops in the two former were gradually brought to Ambleteuse, in the flotilla, as it became ready, so that all parties got *bonâ fide* experience in the work they were to do.[1] But Napoleon, like Cæsar, wished his soldiers to be capable of turning their hands to everything; he not only had them practised at embarking and disembarking, but in rowing, and working the vessels, and in using the cannons.

The fighting flotilla was organised in divisions to suit those of the Army. A battalion of infantry consisted of 800 men, and 2 battalions, made a demi-brigade; 9 large gunboats were required for a battalion, with the proportion of artillery and horses; 18 for a demi-brigade. The whole flotilla was arranged in divisions of 18 vessels; 6 such divisions, each commanded by a naval officer, with a proportion of transport boats for stores attached, formed "an escadrille" under a Post Captain. The vessels lay in harbour alongside the wharves in tiers of nine, so that each battalion could march direct to the tier it belonged to, and on to the nine vessels. And to keep up the connection between men and vessels, one-fourth of each company were kept on board their boat for a month at a time, and worked it during that time. The bulk of the stores were kept always on board; the whole force of men could embark in two hours; the horses in four or five hours; they were put in slings, and so transferred from the innermost vessel to the others.[2]

Remarks.

Every General is not a Napoleon; but without any disrespect to the personal qualities of our Generals, we may ask, how many of them would take an interest in, or even wish to see, their troops employed in forming basins for the Navy, or in rowing or working boats, or even in learning gun drill? How many would be prepared to make any proposition about artillery, or to discuss, like Napoleon, surrounded with scientific men of all kinds, the whole bearings of the project, naval, military, and civil? Napoleon said once, that science was superior to arms; but we appear to act sometimes in our Army nearly on the contrary supposition; we seem to think that it is sufficient for a General to know his drill, and that the soldier should practise nothing else all his life; and the result is, that we have seldom a General qualified by practice to take in the whole branches of warfare into his calculations in the way an Admiral has to do with a Fleet, and that our soldiers at the outset of a campaign are at a loss to do anything but fall in and march. The care and thought bestowed by Napoleon himself on these matters gave new feelings to his troops, and a confidence in the result of their labours they did not

[1] It appears by the table from Dumas, at the end of paper, that in July, 1805, there were still about 400 vessels at Calais, Dunkirk, and Ostend: probably store transports.

[2] Dumas, x and xii, 304. Thiers, iv, 486.

feel at first. We are a nation whose whole warfare is made up of such expeditions; how often do our Army and Navy rehearse together the parts they are to play so often in their lives? and yet the British soldier has quite as much time for all these things as the French soldier had, and he is better qualified by nature to rise to the occasion. Our Officers and men have, I believe, higher personal qualifications for soldiering than any other race; but these qualities are in great measure wasted by the system which tends to keep each branch of the Army within its own little groove; and we train a portion of our officers very carefully for war, and then make little or no use of this expensively educated section during the long years of peace. This adherence to the purely tactical part of the military profession is a foreign tradition, quite contrary to the English character, which of itself naturally takes the more comprehensive spirit of the sailor, and is not slow to take advantage of the science of the day. We shall never have a really English army until we enlarge our notions about the duties of the profession.

British Attacks.

The British cruizers appointed to watch all these proceedings did not allow them to go on during those two years without many attempts to stop them. Besides the constant waylaying of the flotilla as they crept, one detachment after the other, along the French shore to the rendezvous, there were several direct attacks upon them in harbour by bombardment or otherwise. Our naval Officers now would no doubt think, as they did then, that it would not be a difficult matter to destroy them in that manner, but none of the attempts at that time succeeded. Even Lord Nelson failed in two attacks on Boulogne in 1801, where there was already a portion of the flotilla collected; and the great cause of failure seemed to be the superior size of the French guns. As the British ships got bolder in their attacks, Napoleon made larger guns and mortars, and fired the guns at high angles. It is true that, now-a-days, bombardments look more hopeful with our powerful and accurate guns; but it must be recollected that the flotilla presented a fair mark even to the guns of those days; there were generally one or two hundred of them moored in the roadstead, close together, and yet, neither by French nor English account, was there much injury done to either flotilla or forts, and their close packing and other precautions saved them from several attempts at boarding. Our torpedoists will also be disappointed to hear that one or two attempts with new and ingenious machines of that kind failed completely, and not so much from any defects in the machines themselves, as from accidents of time and place and the precautions of the flotilla, to which such inventions in all ages are liable.

Upon the whole, indeed, there seems to be no doubt that the French naval and military forces felt more confidence in the prospect of success in the flotilla in 1805 than they did in 1803, and really began to believe in the possibility of forcing their way across the narrow channel in spite of the British Fleet; the Minister of Marine (Admiral Decrés) declared at last, that with the loss of about 100

vessels and 10,000 men, the flotilla would arrive on the English shores.[1] "We must lose some men in every campaign," observed Napoleon[2] upon this; but these two were in the secret.

The Transit.

The arrangements for the actual transit over the strip of sea were these. On the signal being given by Napoleon, which would be towards high water time, as only half the vessels could get out in one tide, about half the number of troops would at once embark in their respective vessels, in each of the three ports of rendezvous, and lay outside off the ports till the next tide; in the meantime the horses would be put on board the transports, and at the next high water the remainder of the troops would embark, and the whole would move on at once to the appointed places on the English coast. The force from each port was to move in three lines—the large gunboats in the van line, the small gunboats in the rear, and the pinnaces in the centre. The naval Commander-in-Chief of the flotilla (Admiral Bruix at first, and, on his death, Admiral La Crosse) calculated on moving in a calm at the rate of three miles an hour, with the help of their oars; they anticipated and hoped for a calm, or even for a fog, so as to escape the British men-of-war; and they calculated on the passage, even in a calm, not occupying more than twelve hours. They were not afraid of night-time, as the troops had been practised in embarking and disembarking, and moving the vessels during the night.[3]

Whether such an expedition would have succeeded in reaching the English shore in the face of any respectable naval force is a doubtful question. Admiral Lord Keith, who commanded the British naval force opposed to it, thought they would never attempt it without having the command of the Channel; we know that Napoleon did not intend them to attempt it, but it seems certain that the French naval and military commanders, who were not in his secret, had made up their minds to try it, and that after some experience.

It has indeed sometimes been doubted, whether Napoleon seriously entertained the idea of invading this country—whether the whole affair was not a blind to deceive the world, including the French themselves. But I think no one can read his letters on the subject during those years, showing his earnest attention to every detail in the affair, and his anxiety when the action of the plot began, without coming to the conclusion that his mind was really set upon the attempt. But the strongest evidence of all is, that it was on the point of being completely successful; his calculations of the probabilities of success were so carefully made, that the failure was due, not to fault in the design, but to defect in execution.

Other Preparations.

The consideration of the points of attack on the English coast, and of the whole scheme, will come better in subsequent parts of the

[1] Thiers, iv, 417. [2] Dumas. [3] Dumas, xii, 305, 312.

account; but we may record in this part the other preparations for the affair on the French side.

At Texel, Napoleon had compelled the Dutch to provide a war fleet, and transports and troops, which with a French contingent formed a separate expedition of about 25,000 men, prepared for long sea voyage.

At Antwerp, he had commenced the docks and quays, which were but the beginning of the great works he contemplated there and at Flushing; and no doubt if he could have postponed the attempt on England, as he wished, till these were finished, the Scheldt would have been chosen as the point of departure of a large naval and military force. As it was, the Belgians were occupied in providing part of the flotilla, which was moved to Ambleteuse when ready.

At Brest, there were 21 French ships of the line and transports besides, and about 25,000 troops: forming another complete expedition for long sea voyage.

At Rochefort, there was a small squadron and a few thousand men.

At Toulon, there were 11 ships of the line and 9,000 men; and at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, the Spaniards were bound by the treaty with Napoleon of January, 1805, to have 30 ships of the line and 5,000 troops.

It must be recollected that all these war squadrons, and their troops and transports, were blockaded in their respective ports by the British ships; and it will be seen, subsequently, that the troops at Rochefort and Toulon and part of the Spanish forces were employed in the West Indies; and that the two great expeditions of Texel and Brest never moved at all.

At the beginning of 1805, Napoleon had available, towards the invasion of England, the following land and sea forces. Of these nearly 200,000 men, about 10,000 must be deducted for the West India expedition, and 40,000 at Texel and Brest together, for whom there was not transport; leaving 150,000 who could have been embarked for the invasion.

FRENCH NAVAL AND MILITARY FORCES PREPARED TOWARDS THE INVASION OF ENGLAND, 1805.

Places.	*Troops.*			*Ships of the Line.*		
TEXEL.....	French 18,000 Dutch 12,000[1]		Marsh. Marmont	Dutch	5	
BREST.....	French	25,000	Genl. Angereau	French	21	Admi. Gantheaume.
ROCHEFORT .	„	4,000	.....	„	6	Admi. Missiessy. Admi. Lallemand.
FERROL .... CADIZ..... CARTHAGENA	Spanish	5,000	.....	„ Spanish „ „	5 10 14 6	Admi. Gourdon. Admi. Grandallana. Admi. Gravina.
TOULON	French	9,000	.....	French	11	Adm. Trevillo. Adm. Villeneuve.

[1] Dumas, x, 90.

Boulogne ..	French	Ambleteuse.....	23,727	Marsh. Davoust.
		Boulogne	30,627	Marsh. Soult.
		Etaples	20,527	Marsh. Ney.
		Reserve	38,801	Gen. Baraguay d'Hilliers.
		Staff and Non-combat.	9,233	
		Total.....	122,915[1]	
	Horses....	14,654	Officers	1,023
			Troops.....	6,065
			Artillery.....	7,566

Totals:—196,000 troops; 78 ships of the line.

The Land Preparations in England.

Unready in 1804—*as in* 1588.

If there were some points of resemblance between the preparations for the invasion of England in 1803 and those in 1588, there are more between the preparations for resisting it at those two epochs. The general organization of the forces of the country had been, indeed, much altered since the days of the Tudors; the permament Royal Army had been increased, the old constitutional Militia had been put on a settled footing by Act of Parliament, and a new edition of it in the shape of Volunteers had been established; and the whole was placed much more under the central authority of the Government. But there was just the same blindness to the danger in the Government itself, the same mistaken parsimony and the same bewildering fuss when the supreme moment arrived. There was, indeed, the same enthusiasm in the country; at the first sound of the trumpet of victory the English war-spirit broke forth, as it did in the days of Elizabeth; but the very centralising of the authority, which ought to have led that enthusiasm, by its own supineness wasted it away. The counties were ready to act as ever, but they had no longer that spring of local power to act: the men of Kent had no longer the responsibility of defending Kent. It was a better system, no doubt, to have a powerful central authority, but that authority having failed to do its duty, as in 1588, there was no independent local action to fill the gap as in those days.

Now this is not merely a question of historical interest; we have a much more serious concern in it, for the same defects still exist and

[1] Dumas, xii, 33, but an actual "state" of those embarked, at page 304, gives the following:—

"*Embarqués.*"

Infantry	76,728
Cavalry.....	11,610
Artillery	7,560
Non-combatants	17,476
	114,554
Horses	7,304

M. Thiers, iv, 488, gives the field guns as 400.

will lead to the same imminent danger in the next great war we are engaged in. We have gone on improving the condition of the permanent Royal Army, and elaborating a system on paper, and at the same time we have been accumulating more and more power in the central Government, and more and more sapping that local spirit which is after all the essence of English action. And this has resulted from the form of Parliamentary Government now existing in this country: not indeed directly, because in all civil questions that come before Parliament, the importance of local government is always strongly insisted on, but the jealousy of Parliament has prevented any Government from ever trying to put the system of defence of the country on a broader, more permament, and more local, and therefore more national, basis, although a proper system of that kind would on the whole tend to deprive the central Government of some of the military power they have now got possession of.

The defensive measures began in England at the same time that the Revolutionary Government in France began to threaten them with invasion. Neither side appeared to be very much in earnest in the matter: the French apparently did not care to do more than make desultory descents upon Ireland and England, and the English felt so confident in the naval guard they kept on the narrow seas, that they did little on land but call out the Militia and arm the old existing coast batteries; and under the reactionary influence that brought about the peace of 1801, even this small expense was economized. The trained troops were disbanded, the guns and stores sold, and the ships paid off, which had been slowly accumulated during the eight years of war, and all in order that the Government of the day should gain popularity by reducing the estimates. Very heavily we are paying for that one year's popularity.

Very different was the feeling twelve months after, when the terrible Napoleon, who now directed the energies of France, and who had struck down one enemy after the other on the continent, now turned the undivided forces of his genius and of his kingdom upon what was known to be his most ardent desire—the crushing of England by one overwhelming blow. The popular Government of peace was speedily dismissed to make way for the only man who was felt to be a match for the dreaded enemy, William Pitt. And in 1803, after a peace of Great Britain's own making and own breaking, the country had to begin almost *de novo* in creating a fleet and an army and defences, with the foe looking in at the gate. That the country escaped being conquered was no merit of that popular Government, nor of the Parliament; it was due under God's Providence to national characteristics, which from time to time save England in spite of Governments.

The Six War Departments.

I cannot but congratulate His Royal Highness the present Commander-in-Chief. The record of all these struggles to get ready for the impending blow is contained in the correspondence of the various departments concerned. I have been allowed to look over some of the

records left by his illustrious predecessor the Duke of York; and I cannot but congratulate His Royal Highness that he has but a Secretary of State to deal with, and that in peace, instead of the task of his royal uncle, who had six different independent departments of the Government to consult, in face of a war *à l'outrance*. There was the Colonial Minister, who guided the general operations of the war; the Secretary at War, who raised the forces; the Master-General of the Ordnance, who provided the war stores and commanded the artillery and engineers; the Treasury, who provided the supplies; the Home Office, who controlled the reserve forces; and the Admiralty, who conducted the naval defence. The Commander-in-Chief and his Generals of districts might propose plans of defence; but any one of these political chiefs might upset the whole by putting in or leaving out his own little independent spoke. If a coast battery was to be altered, the proposition must be submitted through the General of the district to the Commander-in-Chief for his general approval; to the Master-General for the guns; to the Secretary at War for the pay of the gunners; to the Treasury for their food; and to the Admiralty for the coast signal. That any defences were ready by 1805 is in itself a memorial of the energy of the British character which could overcome so cumbrous a machine of war.

The machine still exists. It has been put together in a new form, in one large case, and labelled WAR DEPARTMENT; and many people believe it to be an entirely new engine, capable of being set in motion by one person. It does very well for show in peace time, but try to set it to work for any practical purpose, and it will be found that the old limbs are there still with the rust of ages on them, and particularly stiff in their connecting joints. And the most curious arrangement about this old machine for a practical people, as we profess to be, is that the man who has to work it, is specially selected on account of his total ignorance of its details, and in order to insure inexperience, he is changed at uncertain times. I am not thinking of the permament officials in thus speaking of the War Department, I know well how hard they work for the nation; it is the Government and Parliament, who are to blame, who being responsible to the country for providing an efficient war machine, allow this overworked old affair to go on.

The Force Available.

Throughout 1803 we find from the records that the Commander-in-Chief and his Generals were occupied in discussing a scheme of defence; about the middle of it, he expressed a confident hope that there would shortly be devised some means of impeding the enemy from advancing into the country; what then we may ask had the six independent departments been about, when after eight years of expectation of invasion, the Commander-in-Chief of the land forces, is still in an attitude of doubt as to the defence? In October of that year His Royal Highness made a general report to the Government on the scheme of defence he proposed: and this document is well worthy of the attention of all future defenders of the country; for though many of the conditions are quite altered, the local peculiarities

and the general principles remain the same. He calculated on having, in 1803, and he actually had in 1805, at his disposal for the defence of the United Kingdom, about the following force:[1]

	Regulars.	Militia.	Volunteers.	Sea Fencibles.
In Great Britain and the Channel Islands	70,000	56,000	330,000	16,000
In Ireland	25,000	25,000		10,000
Total	95,000	81,000	330,000	26,000
Total 526,000				

There were then in the East Indies and in the Colonies about 50,000 regulars and Colonial corps.

The Commander-in-Chief had, therefore, for the defence of Great Britain (as the troops in Ireland could not be removed under the circumstances) about 126,000 of what in the loose military ideas of that day, they called Regulars, that is to say regular Army and Militia. He wanted 20,000 more, and 20,000 on the top of that, for the expeditionary corps which never was ready to start: not a very extravagant demand considering the character of the troops, and the character of the 180,000 Napoleon had available to bring against him. The Militia had been embodied during the previous eight years, and had been considered as the legitimate reserve and feeder of the permanent Army; and there was therefore not much difference between them: few of them had seen real war, or had any experience out of the United Kingdom. Hitherto the country had depended mainly for its land forces on the voluntary recruiting for the regular Army and on the old constitutional Militia: and the insufficiency of this provision for the defence of the country, may be judged from these comparative statements: From 1783 to 1800 the regular British Army had had about $\frac{1}{500}$ of the whole population of the kingdom *per annum*:[2] during the same time the French Army had taken about $\frac{1}{100}$ of their population per annum,[3] or nearly the whole such population of 20 years of age each year: and at the present day the Prussians take *in peace time per annum* $\frac{1}{300}$ of their whole population for their regular army.[4]

But in 1803-4 the Volunteer force, which had hitherto existed rather on sufferance, took a prominent and permanent position in the defensive elements. Now, the very existence of such a body, rising up

[1] At the end of the paper are tables showing the actual strength of the different forces and their disposition. I have not been able to get that of the Volunteers later than 1803; the number in 1805 was greater. Alison ("Hist. Europe") says in 1804 there were 190,000 regulars (including those abroad), 110,000 militia, and 400,000 volunteers; the highest numbers of forces of all kinds I find mentioned during that war were 800,000.

[2] Alison, iv, 212. [3] Alison, i, 356; vi, 411.

[4] "The Military Forces of Great Britain," by Major-General Sir L. Simmons, 1871.

spontaneously as it did at the beginning of the war, was a moral force such as few countries have been fortunate enough to possess. The mighty Napoleon was trying at this very time, in 1803, to rouse artificially in France that spirit, which in England was almost overpowering in its free growth. The Volunteers had as yet been only a comparatively small supplement to the Militia; but in 1803 the Government being frightened not out of their wits, but into them, then commenced that series of experiments, which continued up to 1812, on the raising of a British army, and which will be found a mine of study to the inventors of such schemes at the present day. It was the first of these, an attempt to raise a sort of *levy en masse* of the country, that drove the whole of those liable to its operations in a body into the ranks of the Volunteers. Thus these 330,000 recruits, who had suddenly sprung out of the ground, were, though equally enthusiastic, of a different character to those which had gradually grown on to the Militia, and the Commander-in-Chief very properly did not trust very much to their assistance in his scheme of defence.

And unless we alter our ideas upon the subject of Great Britain's war requirements very considerably, this is precisely the general character of the force which the future Commander-in-Chief will have to deal with in preparing to defend the country against future invasion. A few Regulars, a partially trained and hurriedly increased Militia, and a vast crowd of Volunteers. Whether the 150,000 experienced soldiers of Napoleon would have forced their way through those spirited defenders of their country up to London, is a problem we can only approximate to, by considering the advance of the Prussian Army, in 1870, through the whole French regular army and over a distance three times that of London from the coast, up to Paris. As we did in 1588, as we did in 1797, as we did in 1803, so are we doing now; we are trusting entirely to that one line of defence, the guarding of a narrow strait of sea by our ships. We have really at the present time no arrangement at all for increasing largely and at once the number of regular troops in the United Kingdom, any more than we had at any one of the times above mentioned: and yet that was felt at each of the epochs to be the one effectual security against such a fearful danger.

The Commander-in-Chief's Report.

In considering the defence of the Kingdom in 1803, the Commander-in-Chief took the coast between Norfolk and Portsmouth, as the most vulnerable part—it must be remembered that the threatened points of departure of the invader extended from Texel to Brest—and that the kind of vessels constructed for the great French flotilla, implied a short passage. He then describes the numerous practicable places for the enemy's landing on that coast: and lays down the maxim, far more applicable now than then, that "The period of "the enemy's greatest weakness would be that of his landing:" and in order to take advantage of this weak moment, he proposes to distribute part of what he calls his regular forces, that is of the 126,000 above mentioned, in camps along the coast within easy march of

it; the volunteers of the counties concerned to proceed on the appearance of the enemy to reinforce these regulars. He then discusses the possible advance of the enemy from some point of this vulnerable coast upon London; for he assumes, as almost every military man, either invader or defender of England, has assumed, that the object of the enemy would be to reach London by the shortest possible line, without turning aside for any purpose if he could help it. And he draws attention to the serious danger, which still remains as a matter of very great concern in our defensive system, that there are no good natural positions between this vulnerable coast line and the capital, on which a decisive battle could be fought with advantage: hence he argues on the necessity of strengthening artificially such as do exist, in order to gain time for the forces to accumulate to oppose the enemy's advance. The tremendous difficulty of the problem was to him, as it is still, in the "dangerous proximity of "the capital to the coast." And he saw no way of escaping the risk of losing the capital, but by intrenching and defending it.

Napoleon's Plan of Attack.

The weak part of this system of defence appears to be in scattering the regulars too much: as the whole defence depended on them. The general principle was that the regulars were to remain in their districts, and the volunteers were to march to reinforce them: the whole concentrating towards London. But as the volunteers were not to move until the enemy appeared, the commander must have had little notion of Napoleon's speed of movement if he expected to have time to assemble them between the coast and the capital, in a position to oppose him.[1] An inspection of the map accompanying this paper will show how very much scattered the English land forces were just before the expected invasion.[2] We have no authoritative account of the lines of attack on which Napoleon proposed to move: but we know that he asked for the command of the channel for only six days,[3] and said that he would be in London in five days,[4] and that his naval officers calculated on performing the passage by rowing the boats of the flotilla in twelve hours at the utmost, and that 120,000 men could have been carried in the flotilla; hence we may conclude that the mass of his forces were to be landed on the coasts of Kent and Sussex. This is confirmed by

[1] The rate of march for the troops from inland, mounted on waggons, was calculated at 25 miles a day; and it was expected that the volunteers who assembled at Leicester would be in London in seven days from the first alarm of the enemy's appearance.

[2] In the scheme for the Mobilisation of the Army, which was published in the Army List for December, 1875, this defect has been avoided. The bulk of the Regular forces and of the Militia, are to be concentrated at certain fixed places in the United Kingdom, in war time, and formed into eight army corps, together constituting the movable army for the internal defence of the kingdom: and the bulk of the Volunteers are to form the stationary garrisons for the permanent defensive works.

[3] Dumas.

[4] Alison, v, 150, quoting Montholon.

a French map of the channel which I have seen, and which indicates six places of landing on those coasts, viz., Brighton, Newhaven, Hastings, Shorncliffe, Dover, and Deal, with routes from each to London. Other landing places are marked at Swanage (west of the Isle of Wight), in the Bristol Channel, and at Harwich on the east coast, with routes also up to London; but these would probably be the feints to be made by detachments from the fleets at Brest and Texel. If the main body were really to land at these six places, then following the ideas expressed by Napoleon himself of securing one of his flanks on the Thames, they would probably have advanced in echelon from the right, and thus have prevented both their flanks from being turned. The above map, by the references on it, evidently was connected with the scheme of invasion at that period.[1]

Fortifications and Guns.

The fortifications of the south and east parts of England were in a wretched condition for a country to go to war with. The fortifications enclosing Portsmouth existed, and those enclosing Portsea were completed or nearly so; and Blockhouse Fort, Southsea Castle, and some coast batteries in Stokes Bay. At Dover the Castle, the citadel on the western heights, and some sea batteries existed. At Chatham one or two of the small forts on the lines only existed. At Sheerness Garrison Point was fortified, and on the Thames, Tilbury Fort and two or three batteries below it were all the defences. On the coast between these places and up north to Yarmouth, there were batteries which had been constructed since 1793: but these and the whole of the other works had been partly dismantled during the short lived peace of 1802. As to the rest of the coast of Great Britain in 1803, there was not a general from the north of Scotland down to Land's End who did not write to represent the defenceless state of his district.

Mr. Pitt, in 1804 (when he returned to office), like Lord Palmerston, in 1859, gave a new start to the fortifications of the country. About that period were commenced at Portsmouth the Gosport Lines, the Hilsea Lines, Fort Monckton, and Fort Cumberland. At Dover the lines on the western heights were constructed as field works. At Chatham also the lines were made as field works, and one or two of the detached forts commenced. And the lines at Sheerness. Along the coast between Portsmouth and Yarmouth, those extensive series of Martello towers and coast batteries now existing were begun. At Plymouth, the lines round the dockyard were made as field works, and field redoubts constructed on the neighbouring sea heights; the citadel and some of the sea batteries existed before.

But not many of these works were ready to resist the attack if it had been made in 1805; indeed, the towers on the east coast were not begun till 1808; and the deficiency of guns was loudly complained of. The inadequate ideas on this subject might be judged from the total

[1] The points of debarkation and the routes to London as shown on that map are marked on the map accompanying this paper.

number of garrison guns (from 42 to 6 pounders) in fortresses and batteries between Sheerness and Dungeness, including Dover, in 1803, being 335, and with only 30 rounds per gun of ammunition: Napoleon having 500 garrison guns at Boulogne alone. Also that the Commander-in-Chief in 1803 calculated on having 480 field guns available for the defence of the whole of Great Britain, with 150 rounds per gun: Napoleon having 400 ready to embark in his flotilla, besides some 2,000 pieces belonging to the vessels themselves. And the reserve of small arm ammunition in the fortresses and fixed camps was at the rate of 60 rounds ahead for about 230,000 men. Lord Chatham (Master-General of the Ordnance in 1803) ingenuously remarks that he could supply the guns, but the difficulty was to get gunners, officers, and horses, and seems to think it a satisfactory explanation to say that "goodwill and numbers will not supply the "qualities necessary in artillery:" it would have been rather more so if that undisputed truth had been taken into account in 1790. And to the Commander-in-Chief's reiterated representations of the want of proper fortifications for the arsenals and dockyards, he returns the regular answer, which has been handed down among other parts of the old machine, "it has been referred to a committee." One can fancy the committee sitting steadily through the crisis, and making a most valuable report when it was all over. As to the entrenchments for strengthening the various positions between the coast and the capital, selected for making a stand at, except the two camps now existing at Colchester and Shorncliffe, and a position at Chelmsford, I cannot find that anything was done at all; except, indeed, a brisk correspondence as to whether it was the duty of the Commander-in-Chief or the Master-General of the Ordnance to make them.

We are now in a better condition as regards the defence of our naval arsenals, thanks to Lord Palmerston; but the coast line, especially that "vulnerable coast line" and the mercantile harbours, are not much better on the whole now than they were then: the batteries and guns for the most part are almost as obsolete as if those of 1805 still remained. On the east coast particularly, that coast which was directly threatened by Napoleon's Texel expedition, and opposite which a possibly new enemy has sprung up since his day, the towers and batteries of 1808 are still the main defence, and as regards the guns of the present day, are almost as they were left in 1812. Remember the two morals on this subject, one from England and the other from France:—"The period of the enemy's greatest weakness "is that of his landing:" and "les bâtimens Anglais furent contraints "de tenir le large—par l'effet des pièces de fort calibre."[1]

The Defence of London.

The project for defending London included Highgate on the north, and Sydenham and Woolwich on the south, and had a circuit of 46 miles—a large scheme for that day. But when we learn that 170,000 men were considered as the necessary garrison, that the greater part

[1] Dumas, xii, 42.

of them were to be furnished by London itself, and that the entrenchments were to be made in a few days, after the landing of the enemy, one begins to doubt whether it was seriously intended to carry out such a project, which would hardly have delayed the capture of the capital for a day. That was all, however, the Commander-in-Chief could hope to do,—to put as much obstruction as possible in the direct way of the enemy—between him and the great prize he sought. And this must be the principle of all projects of defence of the Kingdom: so that on whatever point of the coast an enemy may land, it will be certain that he will have to fight his way through a succession of obstacles up to London, the last and greatest of all being close to the capital itself. Mr. Pitt saw that. In discussing the defence in Parliament at this time, he said: "It is in vain to say you should not "fortify London because your ancestors did not. If, by the erection "of works such as I am recommending, you can delay the progress "of the enemy for three days, it may make the difference between "the safety or the destruction of the capital. It will not make the "difference between the conquest and the independence of this "country; for that will not depend upon one nor upon ten battles: "but it makes the difference between the loss of thousands of lives "and millions of property, and of confounding the efforts and "causing failure in the enterprise of the enemy."[1] Napoleon saw it, for on the map I have mentioned before, there is an entrenched camp marked on the north side of London, from which he intended to defend his prize: and long after, at St. Helena, in discussing the general question of fortifying capitals, he said: "A great capital is "the country of the flower of the nation; it is the centre of opinion, "the general depôt: it is the greatest of all contradictions to leave a "point of such importance without means of immediate defence."[2] And he enumerates the rapid conquests he made of Austria, Prussia, and Spain, owing mainly to the defenceless state of their capitals at the time; and the loss of his own kingdom, in 1814, from the same cause; to which we may now add, its protracted defence in 1870, in consequence of the deliberate adoption of his advice in time of profound peace.

Other Preparations.

Several other points of great importance in the defence of the country are discussed in the Commander-in-Chief's correspondence. *The removal of the inhabitants from the coast, and the removal or destruction of live and dead stock*, is a very serious question: though full regulations were laid down at the time about it, on the whole it was left to be carried out too much at the last moment. Some steps towards it ought to be taken always on declaration of war. Napoleon trusted much to capturing a large number of horses in England.

The accumulation of provisions at the central points of assembly of the forces, though much considered, was not sufficiently provided for, judging by the reports of some generals; too much dependence was apparently placed on local resources, especially on village ovens for

[1] Alison, v, 160. [2] Alison, v, 161.

baking bread. As all property taken for the use of the troops, or destroyed on advance of the enemy, was to be paid for by the Government, at fair rates, it would have been better, on both counts, to have made depôts of live and dead stock at central points on declaration of war, and to have fed the forces from them, replenishing them from the coast. We shall see further on Napoleon's opinion as to false economy on this head.

Depôts of Military Stores, at the central points, do not appear to have been sufficiently attended to; the arsenals and fortresses were depended on for these articles. But those places would have quite enough to do in issuing stores in bulk, without having to deal with troops in detail. And if the formation of such temporary depôts is left to the time of imminent danger, there will be the confusion and waste, such as has happened on more than one occasion since those days. The first thing Napoleon began with was the depôts for artillery and military stores.

Corps of local Pioneers were established all round the coast; and the correspondence shows how much impressed the Commander-in-Chief and his generals were with the importance of such local bodies, for assisting in forming entrenchments, in making and destroying roads and bridges, inundating marshes, &c. The Railway Engineer Corps was intended partly to supply this want at the present day; but however valuable and indispensable such a corps would be for special works, it is to the local corps of Volunteer Engineers we must look for the chief assistance in this respect. But if these corps are to take the place of those pioneers, who were so much in demand in 1803, they should be practised in their own localities on the description of work they will have to do, and not treated as ordinary infantry volunteers.

Remarks.

The whole of this part of the story may be in effect summed up in these words: "*Great Britain declared war first, and then began to "think about preparing for it' afterwards.*" Not the first nor the last time she has done so; the old story was precisely repeated in 1854. There was plenty of energy in 1803 when they did begin to prepare, no lack of war enthusiasm everywhere, but the alarming feature of it all, the terrible tone that pervaded it throughout, was that it had to be done as it were under fire, in presence of the enemy. While Napoleon's single genius was rapidly arranging his forces for action, the British war authorities were still discussing what system of defence they should make, and the British Parliament was fighting about the general principles on which the forces should be recruited. It was not the want of warlike spirit; there were 7 or 800,000 men under arms, almost every man of whom had enlisted of his own free will; but not one quarter of them knew anything of drill or discipline. And nothing had been settled as to the positions they were to occupy or how they were to get there, or how to be provisioned when they got there; no defences had been prepared, no guns mounted. When Napoleon calculated on the disaffection of a large

portion of the English people to their constitution he showed how little a foreigner, even of the highest intelligence, understands our national character; but when he prophesied the indecision and confusion of the British Government, he laid bare the weak point of the country, of which future enemies may still take advantage.

For the indecision as to our war policy exists still, and therefore the confusion that will arise on a declaration of war may be confidently foretold. We have been told lately by a high political authority that the old maxim, *si vis pacem para bellum*, is now to be interpreted, "If you wish for peace, prepare for peace." If that means that you are to make no preparation for war whatever, then that was exactly what happened in 1793 and 1803; with a result each time not encouraging to that interpretation. But if it means that you are to make every requisite preparation to defend yourself when and wherever you are attacked, then that is exactly the interpretation I should wish the British Government to give to the old Latin proverb.

We are not so prepared at present. Our present condition, from a war point of view, as compared with 1803, may be generally stated thus: our external cares and liabilities have multiplied manifold; we have more dependencies to look after, much more ocean wealth exposed to attack, very much greater dependency on foreign food; and we are more liable to invasion. These are all against us. On the other hand, we have double the population, with probably double the wealth per head, and improved weapons to defend ourselves with. Upon the whole, it must be allowed that our general condition is *less secure* from vital injury by an enemy than in 1805; and an evidence of it appears in the successive panics that come over the country upon every threat of war. Well did the Duke of York demonstrate this when he said of the state of affairs in 1803: "A panic generally "arises from a danger which has not been foreseen. A high-spirited "people never despond when they feel themselves possessed of the "means of resistance." If this view of our position is correct, as I think it could be shown to be by details, our preparations for securing our position ought to be so much the more carefully made beforehand.

Our Present Land Forces.

Now, in the first place, what land forces have we actually available? The whole of our peace establishment of all ranks and all kinds, and to defend all parts of our empire, is, according to the Statesman's Year Book of 1875, about 500,000. This number, in proportion to population, is about one-third of the maximum number of all sorts, raised to defend our then empire during the war of the French Revolution. Where are the other two-thirds to come from in case of war? Recollect, we are in a worse general position as regards an enemy than at that time; we therefore cannot do with less than the same proportion of land forces in war. Indeed, when we consider the character of the change in our position, that a material part of it consists in more distant and extended responsibilities over the world, we must expect to require a greater proportion to population than was

required in 1805. Then, again, consider the character of the forces. About 200,000 out of the 500,000 are regular troops, belonging to the Queen's permanent Army; better drilled, better disciplined, and better conditioned altogether than what were called Regulars in 1805. We have, therefore, as regards the regular troops, an advantage in quality, and not so great a disproportion in quantity. But there is another standard for armies to be considered besides population, and that is, the force the enemy is likely to bring against you; and it will be found, on consideration of the present standing armies of Europe, as compared with those of the Great Napoleon's days, that they have not only doubled in strength, and have also improved in drill and discipline, but that far more effective and sure means are now taken to increase those numbers of trained troops rapidly and largely in war.

What measures have we now for increasing rapidly and largely those 200,000 regulars? I don't think it is putting the case too strongly to say, that we have absolutely none worth mentioning. There is a so-called Army Reserve. I wish to speak with respect of the attempts by Lord Cardwell to improve our Army; there are two of his measures which bear upon this part of my subject—the Army Reserve and the Localisation. But when one hears of 30,000 as a high result anticipated from the first, one is reminded of a former Army Reserve in 1803, of which Mr. Windham said, in 1805, that it was "like a turnpike gate which men were paid to go *through*, and no "more made an army than the lobby of the House of Commons made "the members. . . It was like Harlequin's horse, the only fault of "which was that he was dead." The same epitaph, I fear, would do for both reserves: "*Requiescit in pace et non in bello resurget.*" Now, bearing in mind that it was "trained soldiers" that were in demand in 1803, not recruits, not Militia, not Volunteers; that the question as put to Parliament even in 1806, and by a Whig Minister, was: "How are we to ensure to this country what unquestionably it has "never had, a never failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers?" I think we shall not be going beyond the mark, in 1876, in putting the requisite reserve of the regular army at nearer 300,000 than 30,000. And at the back of these should be the Militia and the Volunteers; not a militia which has the distinction of regulars without the training; not volunteers which, as was said of those of 1803, "were as much an army as a man's picture is himself;" but which shall both of them together form the old constitutional force, the armed people of England, prepared, as Pitt said of them, "to fight on their own soil for everything dear to the individual and "important to the State." These men would form the garrison of England, while the regulars formed the moving army. No amount of ironclads could in these days give the same strength to the defenders, and hesitation to the enemy, as the knowledge that two such bodies could be called into existence at a few days' warning.

Preparation for Mobilisation.

That is one preparation required. Another which, like the former,

can only be properly done in time of peace, consists in the arrangements for concentrating all the forces when raised, at suitable places in the country selected beforehand, for collecting the necessary war stores and provisions at these places, for constructing field works in positions carefully planned before, for taking possession of certain railways and telegraphs and occupying certain lands, so that, on declaration of war, all these questions will not have to be discussed by Committees at the War Office, as in 1803; but that that declaration, *ipso facto*, will be the authority for Generals of districts, in concert with Lords-Lieutenant of counties, to proceed at once to carry out the plans lying all ready drawn up in detail in their offices. We know that a great deal has been already done, and is doing, towards this essential preparation, especially in the lately created Intelligence Department of the War Office, which has at once shown its value by commencing to perform that important service towards the defence of the country, hitherto almost unattended to, of collecting the necessary information to enable the war authorities of the country to decide upon the above questions; and the constitution of the different army corps, &c., published in the Army List for December, 1875, shows how carefully and fully that Department has considered this subject. But after these Officers have completed their valuable labours, if it is not to be all lost labour and waste paper, the Government will then have to do its part, in putting the whole arrangements on such a practical and permanent footing, that the two local authorities above mentioned—the civil and the military—will have both the legal power and the practical means of carrying them out, without further direction from either Parliament or Government; so that we shall not have, as happened in 1803, to discuss a Defence Act under the excitement of external war, as well as under the internal disputes of party politics, and parade, as they did, our family jars before the world at a time when the thoughts of the whole country should be turned solely towards its defence. And to satisfy the country of the efficacy of the arrangements, they should be put to practical proof by making the Autumn Manœuvres an opportunity of collecting forces by railway on different parts of the coast to meet an actual debarkation from our fleets.

Localisation of Authority.

And yet, notwithstanding Reserves, Defences, and Acts of Parliament, there will still be confusion and delay, unless a more real *localisation of authority* is established than exists at present. Lord Cardwell's Localisation Act came in with such a flourish of trumpets, that many people believed that it completely effected this object; they should be made aware, therefore, that it merely connected the regular regiments with the militia regiments, and left the powers of local General Officers almost as limited as ever, and even reduced that of Lords-Lieutenant of counties. Now, in 1588, the counties paid for their own troops and own defences, and hence each county had an interest and a pride

in making both efficient, and they showed by their acts that they had. Two centuries after, the system had so completely changed, that between 1793 and 1814, there must have been about twenty different individuals, who conducted the whole defences of the kingdom from London, each coming new to the work, each independent of the other, each with his own crotchets, which he insisted on having discussed by Parliament, as the one original and only effectual panacea for security. And if we have war in 1876, there will be two or three gentlemen in Pall Mall, who probably began to study military matters for the first time about twelve months ago, who, with the help of the electric telegraph, will equally decide on the movements of a General's army, the issue of an extra ration to Private Smith, the firing of an extra round of ammunition, and the purchase of a palisade; and these gentlemen may be changed at any moment for two or three others, who will have equally to decide these questions with probably equal knowledge of them. This is not a system suited to the English character; that is only brought out into full action by the responsibility of independent power within the range of each man's sphere of duty. This I believe to be the chief cause of the success of British seamen, and of the constant vitality of our Navy through all England's difficulties. The General of a district ought, like the Admiral of a Fleet, to feel himself responsible for every part of the military matters in his district; for the fortifications, the guns, the military stores, the provisions, and for the efficiency of all the arrangements we have been talking of, for the defence of the country. At present he is virtually only responsible for the discipline of the troops and the drill of the infantry and cavalry; and it has this doubly injurious effect, that the Generals cease to take a real interest in the defensive measures of the country, and it comes to be considered that ability in drilling troops of the line is the one essential qualification for a General. And there is the same want of unity of knowledge and power in the War Office in London. There is no Commander in-Chief of the British forces really; he is only the Officer commanding the regular troops in the United Kingdom. We have little wars going on continually in every climate on the globe, and we don't know how soon we may have great wars going on in parts we are totally ignorant of; and yet we have only just established an Intelligence Department to collect the indispensable information for such wars; and we have now no one permanent person in a position to combine that information with a knowledge of all the war resources of the empire, in such a manner as to guide the temporary political War Minister in conducting the defence of it.

Naval Preparations in England.

Over-Confidence in our Security.

I am not competent to enter into any detailed discussion of the lessons to be drawn from the naval preparations in England to oppose the projected invasion of 1803. I can only state, and that briefly, the

general character of them, and such points in them as strike me to be prominent; leaving it to naval men to extract what moral they can for the next time.

The general impression made upon me by the records of the naval part of the defence is, the confidence in the successful result of it that was felt both on sea and land; and yet the Navy was in just the same condition of unreadiness as the Army when the war broke out. Twice in his career had Mr. Pitt to re-construct the British Navy—once in 1793, and again in 1804. In 1792 there were only 15 line-of-battle ships in commission and 15,000 seamen; in 1794 there were 80 liners in commission and 70,000 seamen.[1] Here seems an argument for providing a large reserve for the Navy, of seamen, ships, and stores; what expense, what labour, what unjust misery must have been occasioned by having to purchase, build, and impress to that extent in a year. The unsatisfactory character of the impress was shown by Pitt's attempt, in 1794, to raise a reserve, by taking a tithe of men, out of the Merchant Service, in a systematic way, according to tonnage, by which, out of a total number of 100,000 merchant seamen, he expected to get 20,000; and another 10,000 by levying one man from every parish. But this rude and unjust method did not apparently succeed any better than the still ruder and more unjust impress. In 1802, the number of seamen was allowed to get down to 30,000, and in 1804 it had to be raised again to 80,000.[2] And of the vessels purchased at this time for the Navy, to replace those sold in 1801, many were lost owing to their unfitness for the purpose. James says that, in 1804, there were 87 war vessels launched;[3] the Government, in 1802, had evidently been "preparing for peace," according to Mr. Forster's interpretation.[4]

Notwithstanding this makeshift fleet, there seemed to be no doubt in anybody's mind that "the narrow seas" were quite securely guarded. The tone of the Navy is that of men accustomed to victory, and whether the squadrons were large or small, badly found or not, there was no hesitation about keeping up the blockade of the enemy's naval forces. This difference of feeling, as compared with the land forces, was not due to any difference in the men themselves, for as soon as England got a really efficient army on to the Continent, under a really efficient commander like Wellington, we find exactly the same atmosphere of victory, and feel the same confidence in ultimate success in all difficulties. In each case the men were confident in their own strength, only in the Navy that had grown up as a part of their necessarily self-dependent and responsible existence; whereas, in the Army, that state of existence is a war plant not grown in peace time.

There is, however, I think, a note of warning to us, in that very confidence of the people of England in the secure guarding of the narrow seas; for it was that underlying feeling which caused them to neglect their defences on land. There was evidently at the bottom

[1] "Ann. Reg.," 1795. [2] "Ann. Reg." [3] James, "Nav. Hist."
[4] Mr. W. E. Forster's address at Edinburgh, Nov., 1875.

the unspoken idea that all the preparations on land were very well as an evidence of the spirit of the people; but that the enemy would never really come, the Fleet would take care of that. We shall see in the next part how very, very nearly the enemy were in coming in spite of the Fleet.

Naval Forces in 1805.

In 1805, according to James's list, there were altogether in the British Navy about 800 vessels having a total tonnage of 660,000 tons, including 80 building;[1] this list does not appear to include the special flotilla got up for opposing the French flotilla; for, in 1804, the Secretary of the Navy, in the House of Commons, stated that there were about 600 vessels in the flotilla, in addition to 880 in the main part of the Navy.[2] Of this fleet, 180 were ships of the line, but only 83 of these were commissioned as sea-going. In Steel's Navy List for April, 1805, the following is the distribution of the ships of the line; this month's list fairly represents the general disposition of the fleet for opposing the scheme of invasion, and before the opening of the ocean drama of 1805 by Napoleon disturbed the previous general arrangements.

Distribution of British Liners.—From Steel's Navy List, April, 1805.

1. In the English and Irish Channels (Rear-Admiral Lord Cornwallis)	22
2. In the Downs and North Sea (Admiral Lord Keith)	6
3. In the West Indies and America (Rear-Admiral Lord Cochrane)	8
4. Coast of Spain and Portugal (Vice-Admiral Collingwood)	14
5. Mediterranean (Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson)	12
6. In the East Indies (Rear-Admiral Sir E. Pellew)	8
7. In port, fitting	18
8. Guard ships, Hospital and Prison ships	16
Total in commission	104
9. In ordinary, &c., and building	78
Total	182

The distribution of the regular war-ships for the special defence of the narrow seas against the French flotilla, is thus given in the Commander-in-Chief's records, by the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time. These were all under the command of Admiral Lord Keith.

[1] See end of paper for detail of the fleet, from James. [2] "Ann. Reg."

June, 1803.

On the French Coast—		
From Ushant to Boulogne.. ..	20	Frigates and others.
From Boulogne to Dunkirk ..	7	„ „
On the coast of Holland	9,	including 1 liner.
On the English Coast—		
From the Start to the Downs ..	12,	including 2 liners.
About the Thames	11,	including 2 liners.
Thames to Yarmouth	10	frigates and others.
The Naze and the Humber ..	3	frigates and others.
Fitting in port	6	
Total	78	

In addition to these, there were in the Thames, 10 frigates across the river, a little below Gravesend, manned by the Trinity House; and at the Nore, about 6 gun-boats and at least 40 gun-barges; and 4 floating batteries were proposed for the Thames and Medway. In this account no mentioned is made of any special flotilla, which, by other letters, appears to have been under the orders of Sir Sidney Smith, for attacking the French flotilla in its course of concentrating at Boulogne.

Seamen.—Marines.—Sea Fencibles.

The personal naval force in 1805 consisted of 90,000 seamen, 30,000 marines,[1] and about 26,000 sea fencibles along the coasts of England and Ireland. It is noteworthy here that, as the naval force increased, so it was found advantageous, and even necessary, to increase the marines; for it is probable that as our more extended empire causes a much greater demand for over-sea expeditions than in those days, this necessary body, from its very amphibious nature, will become a far more important element in such expeditions. It was once, I think, proposed to increase this force largely, expressly with that view. I have included the sea fencibles among the naval forces, as well as in the land forces, because, although they were ordinarily stationed on shore, under the Generals of districts, they had boats (1,846, in 1805, in Ireland alone), for assisting in attacking any enemy who appeared on the coast, and when so afloat they were under the Admiral's orders. This fencible body is worthy of notice. They were originally recruited (voluntarily) out of the whole seafaring population along the coast, but when it was found that it was used as a means of escape from the Navy impress, it was modified to include only those not liable to serve elsewhere, either by land or sea. But, with a proper system of reserve for the Royal Navy, there would be no need for such restrictions; they would be the sea Militia of the country, and would be drawn from the whole seafaring population, excluding only the Naval Reserve, just as the ordinary Militia are drawn from the rest of the population. Their organisation is quite a model for any Militia force. The south and east coast of England, from Cornwall to Yorkshire, was divided into eleven districts, each under a Post

[1] "Ann. Reg."

Captain; in Ireland there were twenty-one districts; they had alarm posts along the coast, where they kept their arms (only pikes), and assembled once a week for gun-drill, in such parties and on such days as might be most convenient to the men (which, be it remarked, might be on a Sunday), otherwise they carried on their private business, unless specially called out. Two permanent men were stationed to each boat, with 2*s.* a day pay; the other men had 1*s.* a day when on duty, and naval pay and allowances when away from their own district. The cost of them, including all expenses, appears to have been about £5 per head per annum.[1]

Dispersion of the Naval Strength.

Thus the naval forces of the country were chiefly employed in watching the enemy's coasts. This does not appear to have been considered, even then, as an altogether satisfactory system of naval warfare. It was true it gave a feeling of security to England, but it was at a great expenditure of men and ships, which kept the sea perpetually at all seasons, while the enemy's fleet was safe and well in harbour; and it scattered the naval strength over a great extent of ocean, in small squadrons, each employed in blockading an enemy's port or his colonies, thus giving him the chance, if he could escape out of one or two ports, of concentrating a sufficient force to defeat these small squadrons in detail. This was a plan of operation which suited the ideas of Napoleon, and this dispersion of the British naval forces suggested to him that tremendous scheme of naval strategy by which, in 1805, he so very nearly accomplished his purpose. Moreover, this system of "unenterprising defence," as Burke called the similar one in 1797, was not at all suited to the adventurous character of the British seamen. If the land defences and land forces of England and of her colonies had been better organized, a body of the fleet would have been available sufficient to have carried the British flag in triumph through the colonies of the enemy and her allies.

Still less does this system appear advantageous now, when an enemy has greater facilities of breaking through a blockade, and much greater certainty of concentrating his squadrons. And to give even the same feeling of security to the coast would now require such a naval force as would use up, in a wasteful manner, the maritime strength of the country. There is one element of naval warfare that never changes, and that is the distance of the horizon. With increased speed and certainty of movement, the enemy has only got the same zone of observation to pass over. Napoleon calculated on advancing over that zone at three miles an hour; he could now do it at ten. Napoleon had to construct vessels expressly for the transport, and collect them by degrees together, to make sure that they would cross simultaneously; he would now find, in the ports of the countries he then controlled, sufficient merchant steamers to carry over the same force he proposed, and which, leaving each their own separate ports, might deceive the British Fleet (as he deceived it in 1805), and meet at a given place at a given time, within a few hours of each other.

[1] Principally from Admiralty records.

And even in 1805 this feeling of security was not felt by the Admiral himself who had charge of the naval defence. Lord Keith, in a very remarkable private letter to the Duke of York, in October, 1804, shows that he at least divined that Napoleon would never attempt to cross with the flotilla alone, but that he would endeavour to get part of his blockaded squadrons out, so as to assemble a sufficient force in the channel to cover the passage of the flotilla. And he goes on to point out that is was quite possible for the French squadron in Brest (twenty-one sail of the line) to escape in easterly weather, when the British blockading squadron would be driven off; and so to get as much as eight days' start of it. He then considered it practicable for the flotilla to cross over a sufficient force to secure a position inland in Kent, and for reinforcements to be brought over in sufficient strength to get altogether 300,000 men in England; and that the covering fleet would still have time to escape to the North Sea, before the British Fleet from Brest made its appearance.

In the face of these warnings, rendered doubly telling now by the increased advantages to the invader, I think it would be safer to make the real defence of England begin on the coast of England, and continue, step by step, every foot of the way, between that coast and London; and thus to allow the main body of the British Fleet to take its proper part in war of attacking the enemy, leaving the sea defence of the coast line to special gun-boats manned by a sea Militia.

Our Present Naval Forces.

But there are those who think the naval strength of Great Britain ought to be equal to playing both parts. I think if they would consider the amount of war-ships of different kinds that will be required for our various war purposes during the next great contest, they would be surprised at it. We have now in the Royal Navy, according to the Navy List for July, 1875, about 400 vessels of all kinds; this includes 26 building, but does not include 134 employed in permanent harbour duty, and not in commission or ever likely to be. The total tonnage by weight of these 400 vessels is about 900,000 tons; but to compare this with the tonnage of 1805, which was no doubt by old measurement, that number must be reduced to about 600,000, which is nearly equal to the total tonnage of the Royal Navy in 1805, as given by James. But our population has doubled since then, and the people are certainly not poorer; hence we may assume that, to defend the same interests, the Royal Navy in time of war will have to be doubled, and that it will not even then press so heavily on the people as in 1805. But the interests are not by any means the same; our exports and imports, which may be taken as a comparative measure of our floating commerce, have increased tenfold since 1805, and the tonnage of our merchant shipping has increased nearly fourfold. We are dependent on foreign countries for half our annual supply of the necessaries of life, and we have interests and responsibilities scattered over the globe in dependencies and colonies, far beyond those which, in 1805, caused so much anxiety. Our interests, therefore, have

increased in a greater ratio than our population, and our war Navy must be in a greater proportion also.

But it will be said: the standard of our Fleet, like that of our Army, must be determined by that of the Fleets that are likely to be opposed to us. We have some measure of comparison on that scale also. About 1805, Napoleon calculated on being able to raise, out of the Navies of Europe, 180 line-of-battle ships to oppose England (he had 80 at his disposal in 1805); the greatest number of British line-of-battle ships in commission for sea service during the war was a little over 100, the greatest number for all purposes was 240. At the present time, the total tonnage of the British iron-clad fleet is about 350,000 tons, and that of all the rest of the world is about 770,000 tons.[1] If, therefore, we may compare iron-clads with line-of-battle ships, our Navy now bears rather less proportion to the Navies of the world than it did then. But these are only the peace establishments that are now existing; in war we must expect that foreign powers will increase their Navies, not only up to the increased extent of their own interests in population and commerce, but (in case of war with England) up to the value of the British interests assailable; and we must recollect that to attack sea commerce and most colonies does not require costly iron-clads of slow growth, but vessels of a class that most nations can now manufacture quickly for themselves.

On the whole, therefore, it appears probable that there will be plenty of occupation for the whole of the present British Fleet, and a good deal more to boot, on the outbreak of serious war, without including in that duty the guarding of the coasts of the United Kingdom.

The Drama of 1805.

First Act.

The year 1805 was one of the most eventful in the history of England. The story of it, with its surprising incidents, the great forces brought into play, the great issue at stake, reads like a grand epic drama, played upon the ocean for a stage, France and England for the actors, and all Europe for an audience. For once more in her history, as in 1588, England was standing up alone to hold mortal duel with the possessor of half Europe; once more England, the nominal champion of aristocracy, was in reality upholding the cause of true liberty; and once more her opponent, like Philip II, the self-styled liberator of the world, was the true representative of absolute despotism.

The drama may be said to open with the coronation of Napoleon, at the end of 1804. Amid the thundering applause of obsequious Europe, and with the sanction of the ancient ecclesiastical authority of the Roman Empire, the young conqueror at length ascended the last step of the ladder which was to put him nearly on an equality with the Cæsars. It is not surprising that he was thought to be the arbiter of nations—a conqueror, a statesman, a savant, and a genius,

[1] Dislere's "Marine Cuirassée."

and, withal, young and noble looking; he was as successful, as astute, and as indefatigable as Cæsar, as large-minded as Charlemagne, and as interesting as Alexander. No wonder that wherever he went, the people believed him when he said he was the giver of enlightenment and order; and that from the Baltic to the Adriatic they were ready to learn that lesson at his feet. His coronation procession may be said to have extended politically, as it almost did in reality, from Holland, throughout France, and across the Alps into Italy.

But throughout the whole of the magnificent spectacles that succeeded each other in these months, his mind was deeply occupied with the coming struggle between himself and the one European power which had shown itself determined to resist him. Hitherto, as M. Thiers points out, the two combatants had been resting as it were looking at each other, each holding the dominion on his own element, but neither willing to enter on the other and strike the first blow. And this careful calculator of chances had no desire to precipitate the contest, until he had extracted out of his subject kingdoms a naval force sufficient to make the operation almost a certainty. His early intentions were to have had 100 line-of-battle ships before he made the first stroke, even if he waited ten years for it: and all that great show of preparations at Boulogne in 1803 was partly to occupy the minds of the French people, and partly to keep England in a state of alarmed passive defence. The threatening attitude of Russia and Austria in 1804, brought about mainly by the ability of Pitt, forced him to act before he otherwise intended; and at the end of that year the hostilities commenced by England against Spanish vessels gave Napoleon an opening for completing a close alliance with that country, by which he obtained control over their fleet. This power of utilising towards his great scheme the maritime resources of all the States subject to his influence, was always made by him a *sine quâ non* in his treaties, and showed the bent of his real desires. Early in 1805 he had therefore at his disposal towards the great project about 80 ships of the line and 180,000 men; he trusted that his genius and his prestige would compensate for the deficiency of the former. Here we, judging after the event, can see a defect in this mighty mind, in basing his calculations for sea operations on quantity without regard to quality; he could not appreciate the full effect of individual character in ocean warfare. It may be doubted whether he did, or whether any continental nation at the present time do, fully appreciate its effect in land warfare. On the Continent, where all armies are alike drawn by conscription from all ranks and all conditions, numbers alone may decide the day; but in England we can afford to put a higher value on each individual who voluntarily takes up soldiering as a profession. Colonel G. T. Chesney struck a true national chord when he advocated an army organisation based on this principle at this Institution in 1874. In ocean warfare it is true that steam has now done much towards putting seamen of all nations on an equality —so much the worse for us—nevertheless, it is still to a great extent true that the real seafaring race cannot be created artificially, they must grow by nature to be true sons of Neptune.

Now, here is the plot of the drama we are reviving, in the words of the great author himself, written immediately after its failure confidentially to his Minister of Marine, in September, 1805.

"CHAPITRE I.

"*Quel a été mon but dans la Création de la Flotille de Boulogne.*

"Je voulais réunir quarante ou cinquante vaisseaux de guerre "(ships of the line) dans le port de Martinique, par les opérations "combinées de Toulon, de Cadix, du Ferrol, et de Brest; les faire "revenir tout d'un coup sur Boulogne; me trouver pendant quinze "jours maître de la mer; avoir cent cinquante mille hommes, et dix "mille chevaux campés sur cette côte; trois ou quatre mille bâtimens "de flotille, et aussitôt le signal de l'arrivée de mon escadre, débarquer "en Angleterre, m'emparer de Londres et de la Tamise. Ce projet a "manqué de réussir. Si l'Amiral Villeneuve, au lieu d'entrer au "Ferrol, se fût contenté de rallier l'escadre espagnole, et eût fait "voile sur Brest pour s'y réunir avec l'Amiral Gantheaume, mon "armée débarquait, et c'en était fait de l'Angleterre.

"Pour faire réussir ce projet, il fallait réunir cent cinquante mille "hommes à Boulogne, y avoir quatre mille bâtimens de flotille, un "immense matériel, embarquer tout cela, et pourtant empêcher "l'ennemi de se douter de mon projet: cela paraissait impossible. "Si j'y ai réussi, c'est en faisant l'inverse de ce qu' il semblait qu'il "fallait faire. Si cinquante vaisseaux de ligne devaient venir pro-"téger le passage de l'armée en Angleterre, il n'y avait besoin d'avoir "à Boulogne que de bâtimens de transport; et ce luxe de prames, de "chaloupes canonnières, de bateaux plats, de péniches, &c., tous "bâtimens armés, était parfaitement inutile. Si j'eusse ainsi réuni "quatre mille bâtimens de transport, nul doute que l'ennemi n'eût vu "que j'attendais la présence de mon escadre pour tenter le passage: "mais en construisant des prames et des bateaux canonniers, en "armant tous ces bâtimens, c'étaient des canons opposés à des "canons; des bâtimens de guerre opposés à des bâtimens de guerre, "et l'ennemi a été dupe. Il a cru que je me proposais de passer de "vive force par la seule force militaire de la flotille. L'idée de mon "véritable projet ne lui est point venue; et lorsque les mouvemens de "mes escadres ayant manqué, il s'est aperçu du danger qu'il avait "couru, l'effroi a été dans les conseils de Londres, et tous les gens "sensés ont avoué que jamais l'Angleterre n'avait été si près de sa "perte."[1]

I have given Napoleon's own words, because they show the true state of the case, on both sides, in a few lines, better than any other account I have read, and because it is a game that might be played again, and with advantages in favour of the assailant.

It was not carried out precisely as Napoleon describes it, but the idea was sufficiently adhered to as to confirm him, by its success, in the sagacity of his design. What a wonderfully daring scheme of

[1] Dumas, xii, 315.

naval strategy it was for those days of sailing vessels, requiring four months of sea voyaging in face of an enemy who had the "dominion "of the sea" at the time. The alarming point about it to us now is, that under such almost impossible circumstances, it virtually succeeded; the British Government was fully deceived, and the French naval force was eventually massed in the Bay of Biscay, in superior strength to the British force there at the time.

Future naval wars will probably be full of such strategic combinations. With proper pre-arrangements, steam navies can be assembled from different ports, one or two months' voyage distant, at an appointed place on an appointed day. Part of Napoleon's scheme, which he does not allude to in the above memorandum, gives us an idea as to the advantages steam now affords towards an invasion of England. He had to give considerable latitude to his naval commander-in-chief, Villeneuve, and in his final instructions he offered him two or three alternatives, in case of his being unable to carry out the main proposal. One of these was, to raise the blockade of Brest, and land the military force there on the north coast of Ireland, and immediately proceed north of Scotland, raise the blockade of Texel, and then go on to Boulogne.[1] One may presume, from the indications on the map of the channel I have before mentioned, that part of the Brest expedition would have landed in the Bristol Channel, and part of the Texel expedition on the east coast. And if the naval works at Antwerp had been completed as he proposed, that would probably have been the point of departure of a more powerful expedition to the east coast of England.

He would not require to construct an Antwerp now, nor to build transports; there are some half-a-dozen ports in the north of Europe which would now supply merchant steamers large enough for his whole Army, and powerful enough to assemble from each port at a given distant rendezvous, and then move together to any point on the east coast or west coast of England. Neither would he have to locate the troops for the expedition at the ports of departure; if the military stores and provisions are embarked beforehand, the men, and even the horses, could be brought by railway from the interior at the time for the departure. A scheme of ocean strategy which, in 1805, required two years' preparation by Napoleon, could now be arranged in two months, with less difficulty than one on land. What advantages have we gained since 1805 to counterbalance these of the enemy? None on the sea. We cannot expect to have more energetic commanders, nor, in all probability, shall we be so powerful at sea again; and we certainly are not likely to have a more wide-awake Ministry. But we can do this, which will counterbalance all the enemy has gained,—we can make his landing on the coast, and his advance from it, as dangerous an undertaking as the passage over the sea was formerly.

It was quite true, as Napoleon says, Great Britain was congratulating herself that her enemy's naval forces were securely shut up, and apparently *hors de combat*, and was fixing her whole attention on

[1] Dumas, xi, 214.

guarding her shores from the immense force and flotilla that had been gradually assembling immediately opposite to them. The shouts of that force, on the appearance of their Emperor as if for instant action, seen and almost heard from the English shores, may be said to close the first act of the drama of 1805.

The Second Act.

The second act opens with the escape of two French squadrons from their blockaded ports, one from Rochfort of 6 liners under Admiral Missiessy in January, and one from Toulon of 11 liners under Admiral Villeneuve in March. The action of the plot now begins.

Great consternation of English government busily employed watching Boulogne, at this unexpected flight of 17 French liners into mid ocean, to reappear nobody knew where. Perhaps at Alexandria, perhaps in the West Indies, perhaps in the East Indies, perhaps in Ireland; certainly not in the Channel: nobody in England apparently (except Lord Keith) thought of that possibility.

The Rochefort squadron was first heard of in the West Indies; Admiral Lord Cochrane with 6 liners was immediately sent in pursuit; but the whereabouts of the Toulon squadron was a most alarming puzzle to the British Government. The natural supposition was that it had gone to unite with the other squadron; but with an enemy like Napoleon anything was possible. Egypt and India beyond it were known to be still looked at with longing eye. Napoleon took care to foster the alarm he had calculated on; he massed an army at Tarentum in South Italy, and got Spanish vessels moved, as if for a fresh Egyptian expedition: he published false news of operations by the French in the East Indies and the Cape; and part of Villeneuve's work was to threaten the British colonies in the West Indies, and even to take St. Helena. So that, as he expressed it himself, Great Britain would find herself attacked at once in Asia, Africa, and America: and would thus be compelled to send her fleets from the shores of England to the rescue.[1]

It is fearful to think what would have been the British anxieties, had the Suez Canal been then in existence. The whole land forces of the country would hardly have been enough to stop the man, who had already conquered Egypt with 25,000 men, from appearing some day at Bombay.

Then to add to the general alarm Nelson with his 10 liners, who had been watching Toulon for two years, disappeared also: this was perhaps a greater cause of anxiety to Napoleon than to the British Government; it was bad enough to know that Nelson was off any port, but not to know where he was at all, moved even the indomitable Emperor. The Admiralty would doubtless in their distraction have done exactly what Napoleon wished them to do, dispatch another Fleet after Villeneuve, if they had not been relieved from their distress, by news from Nelson himself; that after a month's fruitless search through the Mediterranean, he had ascertained that Villeneuve had picked up

[1] Dumas, xi, 209.

6 Spanish and 1 French liner at Cadiz, and gone westward; and that he was about to follow them. So did our great seaman earn the Laureate's crown of praise:—

"O shaker of the Baltic and the Nile,
O saviour of the silver coasted isle."

In all his calculations, which were daily written throughout his coronation tour, Napoleon slighted the notion that even Nelson, with ten ships worn out with two years' cruising, would follow across the Atlantic eighteen fresh ones. His daily correspondence with his Minister of Marine at this time, published by Dumas, his close calculations of all contingencies, every mile of the way to the West Indies and back, every day Villeneuve would require, and the close agreement of them with the result, give one an insight into the foundation of his power. He had victuals prepared for Villeneuve at several of the ports where he might touch on his return; and to the expostulations of his Minister, he returned an answer, which the British War Department might take to heart: "This is not a time for "ridiculous economy—in such a war it is only ignorance, not to have "plenty of provisions, which keep so well."

The scene now changes to the West Indies. Nelson perceived very soon after his arrival there, by the action of the French fleet, that their return to Europe was imminent; and for the first time the real origin of all these sea movements occurred to him. Now in this part of the drama, it must be allowed that the French have some reason to complain, as they have done, of the unhandsome treatment of their cause by fortune. Villeneuve was 35 days from Spain to the West Indies, Nelson was only 25 days; on the return voyage, Villeneuve was 54 days from the West Indies to Spain, Nelson was only 36.[1] But the unkindest cut was the vessel that Nelson sent home to warn the Admiralty of his discovery of the plot; it had apparently been captured from the French, and was, like many of their vessels, a model sailer, and therefore selected for this great international race across the Atlantic. The "Curieux" started 16 days after Villeneuve, and got to Europe 15 days before him:[2] it was certainly hard that their own science of ship building should be made the means of their defeat. Mars and Minerva had led their favourite Napoleon triumphantly over the terra firma of Europe, and now sat on the prows of the French flagship; Neptune sulking at the general incapacity of the British Government to rule the surface of his domain, was appeased by the noble sacrifice of his dear son Nelson, and held on to the stern of the Spanish liners while he shoved the "Curieux" a head.

The last scene of this act lies in London. The First Lord of the Admiralty is discovered fast asleep in bed on the morning of the 9th July, 1805, worn out no doubt with watching Boulogne and wondering what had become of Villeneuve. He opened his dispatches in bed with regret at having to begin his official day so early; and finds one

[1] The times of the French fleet are taken from Dumas; and of the English fleet from James.

[2] James.

from Nelson, which had been lying by his side all night, informing him that by the time he was reading that letter, Villeneuve would probably be entering the Channel with a force sufficient to sweep Cornwallis and Keith before him, and ferry Napoleon over to Dover. What an awakening to the real light of the case, for the hitherto benighted First Lord devoting day and night to watching Boulogne! With the danger, however, came the pluck to meet it; he then and there, unwashed, unbreakfasted, unshaved, sent off the orders to Cornwallis to intercept Villeneuve if possible; and, Neptune relenting at this reveillée, which Napoleon himself could hardly believe, Sir R. Calder was at Cape Finisterre, with 15 liners, by the 15th July.[1]

The Third Act.

Then begins the third and most momentous act of this startling drama, at which Europe held its breath. On the 22nd July, the fog, emblem of the impenetrable secrecy that had hitherto enveloped Napoleon's schemes, lifted for a moment at Cape Finisterre, and showed to Calder the French and Spanish fleet, now 20 liners strong, before him: just seven days too late. After two years of careful maturing in the master mind, and four months of equally careful execution, so precisely calculated and so precisely carried out, that this final issue was within a few days of its prediction, it was lost by only seven days. Well might Napoleon say that his able arrangements and their marvellous accomplishment deserved success: and well might we too now say, that the absence of arrangement and haphazard execution by the British Government did not deserve that they should be saved by the bold devotion of one man.

They were not saved yet though. The climax of the plot was still to come. The engagement which, of course came off between Villeneuve and Calder, was a drawn battle; Calder then went north to join Cornwallis again, thus leaving it open to Villeneuve to pursue the route which Calder had been sent expressly to intercept. To take in the proper idea of the extreme peril England was in during the fortnight after that battle, we must recollect the position of the respective forces at the time. *On the English side*, the main body of the Fleet, 18 liners, was with Cornwallis off Brest,[2] with 4 or 5 in addition off the coast of Ireland, Calder with now only 12 liners in the Bay of Biscay, Keith with 6 in the North Sea fully occupied in watching the enemy's coast and guarding his own: Collingwood off Cadiz with 4, Nelson at Gibraltar with his 11 pretty nigh exhausted with their late expedition. *On the French side*, Villeneuve had still 18 liners; there were 5 French and 10 Spanish in Ferrol, and 5 under Admiral Lallemand, cruising off the Bay of Biscay on the look out for Villeneuve, and 21 shut up in Brest under Gantheaume: and at least 10 liners at Cadiz. Nelson and Collingwood knew nothing of what was going on at Cape Finisterre, and the former after revictualling in Gibraltar made his way into the channel, and joined Lord Cornwallis on the 15th of August, from

[1] James. [2] James, iii, 184.

whom he first learned the result of his forethought in sending home the "Curieux."[1] Thus between the 22nd July and the 15th August, during 24 days, Villeneuve had the opportunity of assembling 38 ships of the line off Brest, which with the 21 in that harbour, would certainly have compelled Lord Cornwallis even if he had been joined by the 5 in the Irish Sea and by Calder's 12, to have retreated before them, and have given the command in the Channel to the French for at least 14 days.

One can well imagine the exultation of Napoleon, who was already at Boulogne, on hearing of the arrival of Villeneuve at the appointed rendezvous, and at the appointed time. There is, perhaps, no other instance in history, where a scheme of war strategy, involving so many combinations, subject to so many chances of failure, and extending over such an area, was so completely carried out. The victorious Emperor stood on the heights of Boulogne, with all that enthusiastic host of soldiers fully prepared in every way to leave the French coast within twelve hours after the appearance of the combined fleet, and as certain as ever an army was of at last striking that overwhelming blow at England for which all Europe had been waiting for two years. In his feeling of securely grasping success about this time, he wrote, after discussing various possible moves of the English Admiralty: "I do not know, indeed, what precaution "England can now take to shelter herself from the terrible chance "she is running. That nation is little wise, when, without fortifica- "tions, without an army, she allows herself to get into the condition "of seeing 100,000 men land on her shores,"[2] One can also well conceive what must have been, or at least what ought to have been, the fear and remorse of the British Government, at having so completely failed in providing any sort of strategic combinations on their own element equal to the occasion. Sir R. Calder was made the scapegoat of the national panic, for which the Government and Parliament were the real defaulters; and, as if appeased by this poor victim, the angry sea-god once more saved his neglectful daughter Britannia by the glory of his dear child Nelson.

Villeneuve did make an attempt to carry out his mission, the completion of which Napoleon pressed upon him by daily messages; but it was not till the 12th of August that he left Ferrol with 29 liners, French and Spanish; and before he had gone far northward he heard that 25 English liners were before him;[3] and believing that his unceasing pursuer, the terrible Nelson, was with them, he did not feel his fleet equal to that encounter, and so turned south, and, taking advantage of part of Napoleon's instructions, he made for Cadiz. It was true that Calder, reinforced to 20 liners, was in his neighbourhood, and that part of Nelson's squadron was with him; but as Napoleon told him afterwards, Nelson's ships without himself were no more than any other ships. Towards the end of August, the news arrived in London and Boulogne that Villeneuve was in Cadiz, and it was felt on all sides at once that the game was over for that season. The turning of Villeneuve southward about that 14th August, 1805,

[1] James. [2] Dumas, xi, 171. [3] James iii, 255.

was like that day in August, 1588, when the Duke of Medina turned his head toward the North Sea after the battle of the Godwins; it was the day of salvation to England from a crisis such as occurs seldom in a nation's history, and it was virtually brought about by the same cause in both cases. The combined Franco-Spanish fleet was not in a condition to try another battle with the English fleet; there is no stigma of want of courage in either the French or Spanish Admirals; it was a fleet of two nations, and the Spanish ships were not in good condition. Thus, Napoleon's long-drawn plot was eventually defeated, as the Spanish Armada was defeated—not by the patriotic unity of the British Parliament, nor by the forethought of its Government, but by the character of the British fleet.

The Fourth Act.

If, in the beginning of September, 1805, we suppose the curtain to rise upon the scene of our drama for the fourth act, the vast legions assembled on the opposite shores of France for England's destruction would be found to have disappeared; of all those 150,000 experienced soldiers, collected so gradually and with such forethought, not 20,000 remaining; and that unexampled flotilla, so completely organised, in rapid progress of being dismantled, and stored away. It required but a few hours' thought of that extraordinary mind to turn the whole current of war from west to east. So clear and prescient was his brain, that on the same day of his receiving the news of Villeneuve's retreat, he dictated the plan of the campaign that conquered Austria: before Britain had realised her escape, the great "Army of England," as it was called, had begun to move towards the Rhine. Within a month of his watching on the heights of Boulogne for the signal to invade England, he was at Strasburg, watching the concentration of all his forces from Hanover, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and Boulogne, upon Bavaria; and before Britain had recovered her supreme relief at Trafalgar, he had subdued Austria at Austerlitz.[1]

Villeneuve's retreat had not removed all fear of invasion in England; though the fleet was shut up in Cadiz, it still existed, and more powerful than ever, for the Spanish liners it found at Cadiz brought it up to the strength of 43 ships of the line; a very powerful engine of war, and which, in Napoleon's hands, might still some day repeat the enterprise from which only good fortune and good fleet had delivered them. And Napoleon fully intended that it should; and, moreover, he deliberately made arrangements for the express purpose of keeping alive in England that alarming possibility, and expressly in order that she should thereby be prevented from interfering with his schemes on the Continent. He kept a portion of his army still at Boulogne, and sufficient of the flotilla to carry 50,000 men; it was easy for him to assemble that force; and hence, if at any time during the chances of war he could obtain the command of the Channel again, he could in one tide transport that force into England. Thus, at a small expense to the French, Britain would be compelled to keep

[1] Dumas, xii.

up a large force of troops along the southern coast, and a portion of her fleet constantly in the Channel.[1]

And those arrangements of his fully answered his purpose; for Great Britain had not yet awoke to the clear perception that it was only by interference on the Continent that Napoleon's power could be really made innocuous; and they would have gone on perhaps for years content with guarding their own shores, if Nelson, who had so often checked Napoleon whenever he put his foot upon the ocean, had not given him a final checkmate at Trafalgar.

The Fifth Act.

The great drama of 1805 closes with this complete settlement of the question of invasion. Nelson had been sent to watch Villeneuve, and the latter, in pursuance of Napoleon's plan, was moving into the Mediterranean to threaten Malta and Egypt; when Nelson, who felt that there could be no rest so long as the naval forces of the enemy were so powerful, at once attacked him, and on the 21st October, 1805, at Trafalgar, Great Britain was finally freed, by the destruction or capture of the majority of the combined Franco-Spanish fleet, from all real danger to her own sacred soil during the rest of Napoleon's career.

The last scene of the last act of this most eventful period may be said to be the death of the two Englishmen who had been the two heroes of the drama—the statesman Pitt, who by his powerful spirit had roused his country at home and the discontented States on the Continent to vigorous action against the despotic power of Napoleon; and the seaman Nelson, whose daring and devotion had compelled the conqueror of the land to feel himself powerless on the sea. It seemed as if, when the tide of war was thus turned from the west to the east, that the work of these two great Englishmen was done; together they had worked head and hand to bring about that result, together they sank, and together they live in Scott's lines:—

> "—— The buried warlike and the wise,
> The mind that thought for Britain's weal,
> The hand that grasped the victor's steel."
>
> SCOTT ("Marmion").

SUMMARY.

"If you wish for peace, prepare for peace," said Mr. Forster at Edinburgh. So say we all: if you wish for peace,—*prepare*—that you may have peace. *Prepare* is the watch-word which should be written over our war departments, naval and military. And if we read the story of the war of the great French Revolution aright, especially that episode in 1805, and then consider the present condition of our war preparations, we shall, I think, all come to the conclusion, that to avoid the evils of those times, we had better begin as soon as possible to remedy the following deficiencies in that war apparatus:—

1st. *A Reserve of trained men, both for our Regular Army and Regular Navy:* of strengths equal at least to the respective present

[1] Dumas, xii, 315.

peace establishments of each: which shall consist of really efficient soldiers or sailors, and shall be really forthcoming at the time and to the full numbers required.

2nd. *Reorganisation of the Militia both for land and sea service:* to take them out of that half and half position into which they were forced during that war, and which failed over and over to produce the effect desired, and restore them to their proper constitutional position, of local bodies of the armed people of England: of which the volunteers would then become the elite. These two bodies together should be so organised that on declaration of war, in a few days, a sufficient force would be embodied and armed to line the shores of Great Britain.

3rd. *The Mobilisation scheme for the defence of the country* should be perfected and have given to it the necessary legal authority; so that the local commanders will be able to proceed in the assemblage of the forces, and the military stores, and the provisions, without further reference to London.

4th. *An expeditionary equipment*, including all the military stores required for 50,000 men, should be kept always ready in our arsenals. And arrangements should be made that certain vessels of the Royal Navy or merchant vessels shall be available for the transport of men and stores, so as to ensure that men and stores shall be disposed in the vessels in a manner suitable and effective for the purpose of the expedition.

5th. *Coal depôts in secure harbours* should be provided at the strategic points in the world, best suited for the support of our naval and military operations.

The Question of Cost.

But we must cut our coat according to our cloth, says the cautious public man. Well, it is a good cloth, there is no denying that, and deserves to be well made: and cut of a fashion that will do credit to the owner; for, as a good English authority tells us "the apparel oft "proclaims the man." But however truly we apply that to ourselves privately, in our military dress we often think our "clothes more "costly than our purse can buy." It is not by any means certain, however, that Prussia is not upon the whole paying more heavily for her military power than Great Britain is at this moment. Military organisation, like gymnastics, may be carried too far and weaken the body it was intended to strengthen: and may be drawing on the strength of a nation more than any mere money payment ever can do.

In 1793 they had the same cloth that we have now; they made it up cheaply, not expecting to have to use it; and when the war storm unexpectedly turned upon them, the cheap military coat let it in at the seams, and, as generally happens with cheap articles, John Bull had to get a new one sooner than he expected; and such a creature of habits of all kinds he is, that the second coat was made up as cheaply as the first and lasted no longer; and a third followed in the same course. About which time he began to see that the quantity of cloth he used

up cost more than the making in the most expensive style. By trying to do it cheaply at first on £7,000,000 a-year for all his war expenditure, instead of blowing the fire out, he blew it up; then he thought he could put it out with £12,000,000 a-year, but it was beyond that already; and at last at the end of twenty years he had got up to £55,000,000 a-year for purely war expenses; and not only was that generation burdened with this expenditure, but their posterity have had to go on paying and will have to go on paying £25,000,000 a-year for this cheap tailoring. And this was expressly said at the time to be "preparing for peace," and not preparing for war: if so, preparing for peace sounds to us very like shoving the expense on future generations.

It is not certain either whether these proper reorganisations of our war apparatus will be more expensive than the present one. At least as regards the Reserves, which is the most expensive part, there have been schemes proposed and estimates made, notably that by General Simmons,[1] which show an actual decrease of expenditure for an improved army. It is certain that our present system is an expensive way of preparing for war; for by it, during all the years of general peace, we keep up an army and navy of a costly description, and larger than we require for our peace garrisons by sea and land. And this is done, solely because we are afraid as a nation to look war straight in the face; we persist in keeping it out of sight and pretending to ignore its possible existence: and thus Governments, Parliaments, and people are driven to practice the self-deception by which nobody is deceived, of declaring every year our disbelief in permanent armies and in war, while all the time we are keeping up a permanent army and navy, extravagant for peace, because we know we dare not dispense with one man of it in our present state.

The Question of Safety.

But if we blame that generation for not seeing more clearly the full extent of the war storm that was coming upon them, when its aspect was mainly political; what should we say of them, if their means of existence had been plainly liable to be cut off at the first burst of war. If Napoleon thought England foolish for allowing herself to fall into the condition of imminent invasion, what would he have thought of her, if, in addition to that danger, she had only secured the means of feeding half her people: if England had allowed herself to be not only invested, as Burke expressed it, but on half rations? Such is, however, our case now. We are dependent every year upon foreign countries for nearly half our supply of bread and meat; of the foreign meat supply the chief quantity comes from Northern Europe; of the foreign bread supply the chief quantity comes from the United States. Thus, if the ports of one of the great Northern Powers were closed to us, the price of meat would quickly rise in England; and if it was those of the United States, bread would rise; and a coalition against us of those States with one of the northern Powers, would

[1] "The Military Forces of Great Britain." By General Sir L. Simmons, R.E. 1871.

compel us to fight for life; and in any case of war, we should start with this certain disadvantage, a discontented population upon reduced wages and increased cost of living.

The political economist would immediately say, then form alliances with the States which supply you with food, and you have the double security of preserving peace both by political alliance and commercial intercourse; but commercial intercourse has not succeeded in former times in ensuring peace between two nations. In 1588 there was great commercial intercourse between England and Spain, and yet that did not stop the Armada from coming. In 1807 there was great commercial intercourse between England and the whole of Europe, especially the Northern Ports, but that did not prevent Napoleon from closing the whole of the ports under his control against the commerce of England. And the instructive part in this latter instance is that the first country to complain of the stoppage of trade was England herself. She felt it more than the continental nations, because she was not only the producer but the carrier also. In the present day Great Britain has not only this war disadvantage as compared with other nations, but she has the additional one, with respect to northern countries, that the trade is not of equal importance on each side. Because the produce that those countries get from Great Britain are chiefly luxuries, whereas those she draws from them are chiefly necessaries of life.

The theories of the political economist in this respect appear, therefore, to be of an artificial composition, which won't stand the heat of war. We have, however, means within our power of insuring to a great extent our supply of food at all times, in our great colonies of Canada, the Cape, Australia, and New Zealand, which are all essentially food-producing countries.

The question of the length of voyage is one mainly of price; and a case of war would be quite possible, in which the price of meat in England would well remunerate the importer from any of those colonies. But if those colonies are to be any advantage to the mother country in this respect in war time, the food trade with them must not be left to be produced by the exigencies of war, but must be fostered during peace by an alliance based on mutual interest.

With respect to the question of commerce generally, it is somewhat remarkable that the countries from which we draw these necessaries of life are the northern countries of Europe and America, whereas the commerce with the southern countries of Europe, Asia, and America, is chiefly for what we may call the luxuries of life. It has also so happened, that the general coalitions in war have been between the northern countries against the southern. If, therefore, in case of a war with the northern States, we are in danger of losing our food-supply, the same measures of security which we shall have to take to preserve our commerce with southern Europe and with Asia, would also preserve our food supply from Australia and the Cape.

The Question of Honour.

There is another point of view from which the war aspect has

changed considerably since 1805. All the great European powers have increased in importance since that time; but those on the Continent have grown, like our forest trees, by the spreading of the roots and branches of the parent stock; whereas Great Britain has grown, like the banian tree of India, by her branches descending again to earth and taking fresh root in new soil, and thus the parent trunk is surrounded by numerous others, each with an independent growth, but still supplying vitality to the whole tree. Great Britain has, in fact, changed during that period from a single State into an Empire; and with that change has come increased responsibilities and dangers, but with them has also come advantages, if we choose to use them, which will more than counterbalance the dangers.

In the course of next century, as Mr. Forster pointed out at Edinburgh, the population of Great Britain will have doubled, and the population of all our great colonies together will be greater than that of the parent country. We shall, therefore, be in a more dangerous state, with respect to our food supply, than we are at present; at the same time, those colonies will not only be better able to supply us with food, but would be also a material addition to our strength if in confederation with us. It seems, indeed, to be a matter of vital necessity to Great Britain to have some such close connections with such countries. The dominion of the sea and sea commerce do not of themselves add to the permanent strength of a nation, for they only produce a fluctuating wealth, dependent on foreign countries; it is only population and productive territory together that form permanent power; and, if the population increases much beyond the food-producing power of the territory, they must either form confederations with food-producing countries, or allow themselves to fall into a condition of dependence on the goodwill of foreigners. If we can suppose a State which imported the whole of the food for its people, however great that population might be, however extensive its commerce, however powerful its fleets, it would still be at the mercy, sooner or later, of the States from which the supply of food came. Thus, if continental nations should increase their productive territory while Great Britain's remains the same, their real strength might have increased in proportion to Great Britain's, notwithstanding that our population might be larger.

The people of these islands must be greatly changed from the days of Raleigh, Drake, Pitt, and Nelson, if they allow their country to get into such a state of dependence, or if they wish to draw back one foot from their position as head of the English speaking races. In that position we have certain responsibilities to our colonies which cannot be measured by the rules of political economy; and, however sentimental they may seem to some politicians, there can be no dispute that we have taken on ourselves a very palpable and serious responsibility in assuming the government of India, from which we cannot withdraw, at whatever cost to ourselves, without loss of national credit. Thus our commerce, our safety, and our honour lead us on the perilous path of empire, while to stand still will be to go back from the footsteps of our predecessors.

The path seems perilous only because we have not made up our minds to prepare for it; we are still striving to manage an empire after the fashion of a municipality. But if our descendants in the United States could found an empire capable of indefinite expansion, surely we could form a confederacy suited to our present position in the world. These islands are remarkably situated, politically and geographically, for holding the position we do at present. The continents of Europe and Asia form a great parallelogram, and all the continental states upon it, whether in Europe or Asia, have land frontiers to guard, and almost all their operations with each other, whether of peaceful commerce or war, have to be carried on by land. The British Islands, placed in a detached position on the north-west flank of this parallelogram, are more secure in themselves from attack, and yet by this position and by the character and habits of the people they have the means of operating round the whole circumference of the continental parallelogram, by sea, either for commerce or war. And this capability of utilizing the sea for these purposes will preserve an advantage to Great Britain over continental countries as long as the spirit of the British people remains the same, and as long as sea transport is so much easier than any kind of land transport, and is at the same time more harassing to the enemy.

From the political point of view, the geographical position of these islands has further advantages over other States. They are just opposite the line, on the continent of Europe, which divides the northern races from the southern; by descent, by language, by religion, and by productions, the States on each side of this line are more allied together than they are with those on the other side of it. And England, approximately to the main land just at this point, is in a position to watch, and, if necessary, to control almost the whole of the sea traffic that passes from North to South Europe.

Thus, by position, by resources, and by character, Great Britain appears to be marked out by Providence to be, at the present period, the peace officer of the world.

The Japanese are a race of islanders, similarly situated on the north-east flank of the continental parallelogram, and if their people had the same qualities as the British race, they ought to have played a similar part in the history of the Asiatic continent to that Great Britain has played in the history of the European continent.

A Marine Army.

But to utilize these advantages which Providence has given us, for the benefit of our commerce in peace and our security in war, the last two of the five principal improvements required in our war system should be taken in hand, and placed on a better footing.

An expeditionary equipment has an aggressive sound, but, in our present condition, it is really as much a part of our defensive system as the mobilisation scheme just published. For, in case of any serious war, our dependencies and military posts all over the world would require such additions immediately as would use up a considerable portion of our Regular Army at home, and more than all our present

transport Fleet. We could no more avoid occupying certain points on the ocean in strength, than we could hesitate about moving regiments to their appointed places for the defence of our shores. Some provision has been made in the mobilisation scheme for the troops for such an expeditionary force, but the difficulty and the delay in sending out expeditions from home has not been in the selection and preparation of the troops, but in their equipment and transport. The equipment for war of a certain force of troops has been laid down on paper, but if it is not to be one more record of official good intentions, it requires to be put into a more practical form for actual use. It is not enough to have a mass of war stores stacked in bulk in great storehouses; there are certain of them, including cavalry and artillery equipments, and guns and ammunition, which any expeditionary force would require to have with them ready for action on landing; these should be kept at the places of embarkation, and arranged, not merely for the voyage, but so as to be immediately available for use at the end of it, so that each ship-load of troops will find themselves landed fully equipped, for a time, with stores and provisions. We have been too much in the habit of treating troops and stores as two species of goods, which are to be carried somewhere somehow, but when and in what order has been thought a secondary concern—to the shipper, at least. In the Crimean War, the shipment of guns and artillery stores from England, in this general cargo fashion, was one of the causes of the confusion and delay that occurred in that expedition. But if we are really to take full advantage of the ocean as a base of operations, these points must be considered, experimented on, and practised just as much as for land transport.

The subject of our sea transport has been ably discussed by Captain Hoseason, R.N., both in this Institution and out of it. He has shown, not only the inefficiency of this system of taking up tonnage on the spur of the moment, and shovelling troops and stores in as they happened to come, but the extreme extravagance of it. It is like a man buying up the corn of a province without having any means of taking it to market; he is at the mercy of the carriers. We have now six regular troop ships in the Royal Navy, and five belonging to the Indian Government; the total tonnage of these eleven vessels is about 33,000 tons (old measurement); they would, therefore, carry about 16,000 men, without guns or horses, on a long sea voyage. This is a poor provision for an empire on which the sun never sets and wars never cease; not enough to punish an African Chief with. An ocean empire, like Great Britain, in which some expedition is going on every year, and every one of them joint expeditions—naval and military—should have a regular organisation for the purpose, something like a "*unit of sea transport*," such as Napoleon had in his mind in 1805, only, of course, on a larger scale. This unit, whether of one vessel or more, would contain a complete section of an Army, of all branches, with a proportion of stores and provisions; and the vessels would be, not merely transports to convey them to a port and have done with them, but would be attached to that division of the army during the expedition; they should be felt to be their real base of

operations, their great depôt and means of supply: ships and troops should form one whole machine, fitted to each other for the whole work to be done. A British Army would then be able to fall back upon its movable base, and proceed with it to another line of operations, refreshed and in complete condition; while the enemy would be expending time, resources, and the strength of his troops in changing the seat of war by land: and one such "Marine Army" would be a match for two on land.

We have no proper place of embarkation for our expeditions at present. They are dispatched from one of the dockyards or from Woolwich Arsenal, as it happens to be convenient for the vessels. The wharf space in any of the dockyards available for this purpose is only large enough for one or two vessels, and even that would be required by the Navy in war time, and that at Woolwich Arsenal would be fully occupied, in any serious war, with the dispatch of the reserve stores; and it would not be desirable to enlarge the accommodation there, with the object of embarking troops also; for the reserve stores would be sent in different vessels altogether from those above alluded to, which would be only for the active force and for the equipment required for immediate use.

Its Strategic Points.[1]

When Napoleon was organising his great scheme of combined naval and military strategy, one of the most important class of preparations that he had to make, was to plant depôts of provisions for the force at certain places on the route of operations. If the epoch of the affair had been seventy years later, he would have substituted coal for provisions. We can have little doubt, from his great care in providing those, that one of his first proceedings would have been to plant depôts of coal in numerous and secure places; he would have considered economy in such a matter as still more "ridiculous" and "ignorant" of war, than he did in provisions.

We have a good many harbours for the refitting and re-coaling of our naval forces, scattered over our ocean empire, but not enough for carrying out the defence of that empire on an efficient system of naval and military strategy; and in many of those existing, there are not sufficient means of protection, or for putting the coal on board expeditiously. Our chief lines of strategic operation will probably be those of our most important sea commerce, because they are also our lines of communication with our great productive colonies and depencies. One of the greatest of these is the line of commerce to India and Australia; and, perhaps, at the present period, the two most important places in the world to Great Britain, outside of her own islands, are Suez and Singapore. We have lately obtained a legitimate footing of control towards preserving the freedom of the Suez Canal, both in peace and in war; and whatever the consequences of that step may be, commercially or politically, there can be no doubt that it will be of the highest value towards the naval and military

[1] In considering these subjects I have been indebted to an admirable pamphlet by Captain J. C. R. Colomb, R.M.A., entitled, "Three Smouldering Questions," 1875.

defence of the empire. Singapore must always be the centre of naval operations for the protection of our immense trade between Great Britain and India, on one hand, and China and Japan and the Pacific Islands, on the other, and also as the nearest point in the line of communication to Australia. It would be a serious danger to our connection with those countries, if the opposite coast of Sumatra should ever be occupied by a hostile force.

The extension of our trade to the north of China and to Japan, and the spread of Russian power on the north-east coast of Asia, and of the United States on the north-west coast of America, together render Hong Kong no longer so advantageous to us as a naval and military station as it was. Some position nearer to the Japanese Islands, which would also have a climate more favourable to our northern race, would now be desirable for a strategic harbour to protect our trade in those seas. Also some more connecting links between Singapore and Australia are now required, as that is a line of communication, like a road in a forest country, that offers many advantages to an attacking party.

It is impossible for us to escape from the necessity of securing such strategic positions on the ocean; if we do not make them deliberately in peace we shall have to do so hastily and expensively in war. In 1805, the fear of being attacked in the East Indies, and of losing one of our West Indian colonies or the Cape of Good Hope, was sufficient to give great anxiety to the British Government, and to take up the attention of a large portion of their forces, both naval and military. It was with them more a question of prestige than commerce; but with us now, the commerce with those same countries has become a question of necessity to provide occupation for our people; and secure harbours for coal depôts are far more necessary for the protection of that commerce than provision depôts were in 1805.

To the Unprofessional Reader.

At our public schools we leave the boys to settle their disputes among themselves, because we think a man should be trained to defend himself and defend others in life; he is not a man else.

That is what we soldiers and sailors want to persuade Great Britain to do in the world school, to be trained to defend herself and to defend others; Great Britain is not a nation else.

Well, and have we not always defended ourselves? says the English countryman. But you have never trained yourselves, and your backwardness has encouraged the enemies of peace to deeds that have forced you to rush in and lose a deal of blood in your clumsy ignorance; if you had shown yourselves prepared, you might have prevented it.

But, says the countryman, why am I to be prepared to defend others more than anybody else? Because you are the only nation in the world in a position to do it. You are safer from attack on your own land than any other nation; you have resources which draw wealth from all parts of the world to your shores; you have responsibilities all over the world. You are, by all these, made the peace officer of the world, and if you don't take up the duty, some other

nation will have to be appointed instead, and you are not at present prepared to do the work committed to you.

Surely, says the countryman, we are paying more for Army and Navy than anybody else; and look what an Army and Navy we have to what we used to have.

Look what armies and navies they are getting on the continent of Europe, compared to twenty years ago. When a pugnacious boy comes into a school, there will be a deal more fighting until he finds his level; so when a nation increases its armed strength, other nations must be prepared for war until it finds its level. Europe has gone back from peace to war; we may think it a great backsliding, a grievous waste of the resources of civilisation; but to sit down, and cry about it, is not quite manly. If your boy at school was to do so, you would tell him that he must take the fighting with the bread and jam, just as they come; he can't expect a school to be all bread and jam.

Well, says the countryman, we'll hold our own yet. I don't think, my friend, you quite know what that means at the present period of your history. It means a great deal more than sitting still to watch the coast of Great Britain. Europe is getting now into the condition described by Austria in 1804: "A situation which is not peace, but "more destructive than actual war; in which a single Power, already "too formidable by its greatness, continues alone armed, and is pre-"vented by no opposition from occupying one independent State "after another."[1] If Great Britain allows herself to be a party in such a situation, it will not be her own land only that will be threatened, but her colonies and India; and "holding our own" will then mean, that the Government of the day is in a better state of preparation than it was in 1803, when it was said of them, "they "were unable to remonstrate in such a manner as became the "Ministers of a great and powerful nation, or to interfere in such a "manner as to make their interference effective, or to mediate in such "a manner as to aid those in whose favour they mediated."[2] If we are to "hold our own" better than that, if we are to prevent the lapse of Europe into despotism, whether autocratic or democratic, and if we are to preserve in our dependencies true liberty, political and religious, we must take the patriotic advice of Burns, which he gave to the defenders of 1805, only applying it to the whole Empire of Great Britain:—

> "Be Britain still to Britain true,
> *Amang oursel's united:*
> For never but by British hands
> Maun British wrangs be righted."

List of Books referred to in this Paper.

Dumas: *Précis des Ecénemens Militaires* (1822).—Is really not a *précis*, but a precise account, and with all the appearance of careful accuracy, and is distinguished above others for its copious extracts

[1] "Ann. Reg.," 1805. [2] "Ann. Reg.," Parl. Deb., June, 1803.

from original documents. It also has this peculiar double advantage, that the author was present in high official capacity at most of the scenes he narrates; and yet, being under the Restoration when he wrote, his bias, though thoroughly French, of course, is not Napoleonic; and, for a Frenchman of that period, he is fair to England.

THIERS: *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire* (1845).—From his position as Minister to Louis Phillippe, M. Thiers had access to official papers beyond the reach of Dumas; but he has not used his advantages in the same conscientious way, and has not given us the same means of forming our own judgments by extracts. The tone of the work is not that of a calm historian writing forty years after the events, but of an advocate supporting a particular cause, which is that of French glorification, and therefore he is not so trustworthy as Dumas.

VICTOIRES ET CONQUETES DES FRANCAIS (1817).—These records, though written by eye-witnesses, comprise so extensive a range of events for the size of the work, that the accounts of each are brief, and there are few, if any, extracts from original documents.

JAMES'S NAVAL HISTORY (1823).—This is the only book on the English side at all corresponding to Dumas; for, until the Peninsular War, there was little but naval operations to record, and this is more a register of the British Navy and its exploits than a history of the naval warfare of the period; but, as far as it goes, it has the advantage of being a conscientious compilation from original sources, with, of course, a certain prejudice as to the invincibility of the British Navy on all occasions.

ALISON'S *History of Europe during the French Revolution* (1830).—Perhaps, still, the best and indeed almost the only English account of the whole transactions of that period. But it was written at a time when the British feelings against everything Napoleonic were still strong; and, however well founded, they gave a tone to the record of all the events on either side. One can, however, separate the opinions from the record in Alison, which it is more difficult to do in Thiers, though he wrote fifteen years later.

THE ANNUAL REGISTER.—Is chiefly valuable for showing the opinions prevalent at the time both in Parliament and among the people generally; the extracts from Parliamentary discussions on important questions are particularly valuable. The records of particular events are sometimes very useful, but the details are in general insufficient for a full account.

CLODE'S *Military Forces of the Crown* (1869).—A very full and very useful compilation of all the legislation with reference to the British military forces of all kinds; specially advantageous to refer to alongside of the Parliamentary discussions, during those years, 1803–13, when so many schemes for recruiting were tried.

I have been much indebted to the assistance I have received from the Officers in the Intelligence Department of the War Office in examining the records of the Quartermaster-General's Department.

Considering the rising importance of military affairs, it is much to be wished that a complete *précis* of the records both in that office and in that of the Inspector-General of Fortifications of that period, were compiled; it would be of great assistance in the reorganisation of our forces on a more national basis.

I have also to thank the Officers of the Admiralty and of the Record Office, and last, but not least, of the Royal United Service Institution for assistance.

Etat Général des Flotilles Françaises et Hollandaises. Servant à faire connaître le nombre de chaque espèce de Bâtimens existant dans les ports de réunion au 1er Thermidor XIII (20 *Juillet*, 1805), *et le nombre d'hommes et de chevaux qui devaient y être embarqués.*

Espèces de Bâtimens.	Désignations des Ports.							Totaux par espèce.	Nombre d'Hommes et de chevaux qu'ils peuvent porter.	
	Etaples.	Boulogne.	Vimereux.	Ambleteuse.	Calais.	Dunkerque.	Ostende.		Hommes.	Chevaux.
				Bâtimens de Guerre.						
Prames	...	13	...	3	1	...	...	17	1,920	840
Bombardes	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	2	100	...
Paquebots	1	9	...	...	...	...	...	10	380	56
Avisos	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Bateaux 1er	36	181	36	...	...	...	10	263	34,190	...
Bateaux 2e	108	202	36	...	...	...	...	346	34,905	676
Bateaux 3e	73	147	72	1	2	...	20	315	20,790	...
Flotille Hollandaise — Bateaux 1er	...	...	..	25	11	19	...	55	7,150	...
Flotille Hollandaise — Bateaux 2e	...	...	...	107	...	100	...	207	20,700	404
Flotille Hollandaise — Bateaux 3e	...	...	...	3	3	12	...	18	1,188	...
Caiques	...	18	...	...	...	...	...	18	540	...
Corvettes de pêche	...	...	...	...	81	...	...	81	8,349	233
Péniches destinées à l'Empereur	...	2	...	...	...	...	...	2	132	...
Caiques destinées à l'Empereur	...	1	...	...	...	...	...	1	30	...
Péniches destinées aux maréchaux	1	1	...	...	...	...	...	2	132	...
Péniches destinées à l'Amiral	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2	132	...
Totaux des bâtimens de guerre	219	578	144	139	98	131	30	1,339	130,639	2,219
				Bâtimens de Transport.						
Bâtimens destinés aux écuries	72	144	56	17	81	15	20	405	24,245	6,596
Bâtimens destinés à l'Artillerie	18	36	14	4	...	5	3	80	1,260	...
Bâtimens destinés à l'Etat-major	36	72	14	10	5	6	2	145	2,270	244
Bâtimens non classés	...	13	...	...	...	...	...	13	195	...
Bateaux terre-neuve	20	73	6	3	...	...	...	102	1,224	...
Bateaux baleiniers	...	188	2	...	19	...	...	209	1,363	...
Totaux des Bâtimens de transport	146	526	92	34	105	26	25	954	30,577	6,840
Totaux des Bâtimens de guerre	219	578	144	139	98	131	30	1,339	130,639	2,219
Totaux Général	365	1,104	236	173	203	157	55	2,293	161,215	9,059
Equipages sur les bâtimens de Transport	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	2,430	...
Total Général									163,645	...

From Dumas, vol. xii.

Récapitulation Général du Personnel et du Matériel embarqués sur les diverses espèces de Bâtimens de Guerre et de Transport.

Personnel et Matériel.	Flotille de							Total.
	Chaloupes canonnières.	Bateaux canonniers.	Bâtimens de grande espèce.	Caïques.	Bateaux pêchrs armés de guerre.	Transports.	Transports de chevaux.	
Infanterie	30,132	30,744	1,512	2,160	3,240	.. ..	.. ..	76,798
Cavalerie	.. ..	8,640	3,000	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	11,640
Canonniers	1,620	2,160	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	3,780
Charretiers	1,620	2,160	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	3,780
Non-combattants	2,592	3,456	108	.. ..	.. ..	8,080	3,240	17,476[1]
								114,554
Chevaux	.. ..	864	2,700	.. ..	162	1,208	2,160	7,394
Fusils	8,748	11,644	1,458	.. ..	2,187	8,800	.. ..	32,837
Baïonnettes	6,480	11,644	1,080	.. ..	1,620	.. ..	.. ..	20,824
Cartouches	3,888,000	5,184,000	648,000	216,000	972,000	2,992,000	.. ..	13,900,000
Pierres à feu	388,800	518,400	.. ..	.. ..	97,200	264,000	.. ..	1,268,400
Biscuit	388,800	518,400	64,800	21,600	97,200	311,600	32,400	1,434,800
Eau de vie	48,600	64,800	.. ..	1,080	12,150	104,200	5,400	236,230
Outils	8,748	8,640	10,800	.. ..	2,187	.. ..	.. ..	30,375
Moutons	1,298	1,728	324	108	324	928	210	4,924
Selles	.. ..	.. ..	3,240	.. ..	.. ..	3,000	4,320	10,560
Brides	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	3,000	4,320	7,320
Son	.. ..	4,320	27,000	.. ..	810	5,840	32,400	70,370
Avoine	.. ..	4,320	27,000	.. ..	810	5,840	32,400	70,370
Pièces de campagne	.. ..	432	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	432
200 coups à tirer	.. ..	86,400	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	86,400
Caissons d'Infanterie	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	88	.. ..	88
Charrettes	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	176	.. ..	176
Fourgons	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	88	.. ..	88
Caissons de campagne	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	176	.. ..	176

[1] Ce nombre de non-combattants devient trop considérable, mais on les remplacera par des hommes, n'importe de quelle arme.

From records, Quartermaster-Gen.'s Office.

Distribution of Regular Forces, June, 1805.

District.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Regular Infantry.	Militia.	Totals.
North district	416	111	462	4,006	4,995
York district	130	563	631	2,906	4,220
East district	1,086	1,971	3,697	12,615	19,369
South district	2,290	4,835	15,785	16,874	39,784
South-west district	1,016	2,040	5,943	2,986	11,985
Isle of Wight	91	19	239	653	1,002
West district	382	622	1,250	5,061	7,315
Severn district	7	..	545	1,697	2,249
North-west district	..	93	680	..	773
North Inland district	..	200	669	..	869
South Inland district	..	188	103	..	291
London district	56	185	6,143	1,143	7,526
Home district	3,670	1,530	..	2,068	7,268
Channel Islands district	284	..	7,436	..	7,720
North Britain district	194	627	3,533	6,308	10,662
Total	9,622	12,984	47,116	56,316	126,028

From records, Quartermaster-Gen.'s Office.

Disposition of Volunteer Forces, November, 1803.

Counties.	Artillery.	Cavalry.	Infantry.	Totals.	To assemble at
North Britain	790	2,513	44,237	47,570	
Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland, Durham (North district)	210	1,351	11,411	13,672	
Yorkshire, Lincolnshire (York district)	168	1,709	15,305	17,182	
Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex, Cambridge, Huntingdon (East district)	84	3,393	18,989	22,466	
Kent, Sussex (South district)	561	1,910	13,513	16,014	
Hants, Dorset, Wilts (S.W. district)	1,229	2,803	13,549	17,081	Salisbury.
Somerset, Devon, Cornwall (West district)	1,602	3,313	26,147	31,562	
Gloucester, Monmouth, Glamorgan, Brecknock, Radnor, Carnarvon, Cardigan, Pembroke (Severn district)	..	794	15,516	16,310	Bristol.
Chester, Flint, Denbigh, Merioneth, Montgomery, Carnarvon, Anglesea (N.W. district)	520	670	9,174	10,564	Chester.
Disposable Force (not explained what this means).					
Surrey, Herts	50	1,715	11,089	12,854	
Middlesex, London	..	42	36,838	36,880	
Oxford, Berkshire	..	1,135	6,051	7,816	Reading.
Northampton, Bedford, Bucks	..	2,505	6,694	9,199	Aylesbury.
Rutland, Leicester, Warwick	..	1,221	7,094	8,315	Northampton.
West Riding, Yorkshire	..	1,494	14,605	16,099	Wakefield.
Lancashire (except Liverpool), Cheshire (except Chester), Derby, Nottingham, Stafford	140	2,841	25,462	31,433	Lichfield.
Shropshire, Worcester, Hereford	..	1,570	11,324	12,894	
			General total	327,286[1]	

[1] These totals are taken direct from the book.

From James's "Naval History."

AN ABSTRACT *of the Ships and Vessels belonging to the British Navy in the commencement of the year* 1805.

Letters of reference.	Rate.	CLASS.	For Sea Service.		For Harbour Service.		Building or ordered to be built.	Grand Total.	
			In Commission.	In Ordinary.	In Commission.	In Ordinary.		No.	Tons.
			No.	No.	No.	No.			
		Three-deckers.							
A	First	120-gun ships	1	..	..	..	1	2	5,124
B	„	112 „ 18-pounder	..	..	..	..	..	1	2,351
C	„	„ „ 12 „	1	..	1	..	..	2	4,855
D	„	100 „ 18 „	..	1	..	..	1	2	4,575
E	„	„ „ 12 „	3	..	..	..	2	5	10,732
F	Second	98 „ 18 „ .. large	..	..	..	..	2	2	4,554
G	„	„ „ „ „ .. .. small	3	..	..	..	..	3	6,363
H	„	„ „ 12 „	8	3	..	..	..	11	21,470
I	„	90 „ „ „	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
		Two-deckers.							
K	Third	80-gun ships	4	2	1	2	..	9	19,380
L	„	74 „ 24-pounder	8	2	..	..	4	14	26,470
M	„	„ „ 18 „ .. .. large	11	3	..	3	..	17	31,860
N	„	„ „ „ „ .. .. middle	11	..	1	2	15	29	50,266
O	„	„ „ „ „ .. .. small	19	13	..	12	1	45	73,214
P	„	64 „	13	9	8	7	..	37	51,152
Q	Fourth	60 „	..	..	..	2	..	2	2,511
		Line	83	33	11	28	26	181	315,147
R	„	56 „ flush	..	..	1	..	..	1	1,426
S	„	54 „ „	1	..	..	..	..	1	1,176
T	„	50 „ common, or quarter-decked	9	1	1	6	..	17	18,174
U	„	„ „ flush	2	..	..	..	..	2	1,823
V	Fifth	44 „	1	1	1	..	..	3	2,680

Abstract of the Ships and Vessels belonging to the British Navy in the commencement of the year 1805—continued.

Letters of Reference.	Rate.	CLASS.	For Sea Service.		For Harbour Service.		Building or ordered to be built.	Grand Total.	
			In Commission.	In Ordinary.	In Commission.	In Ordinary.		No.	Tons.
			No.	No.	No.	No.			
		One-deckers.							
W	Fifth	44-gun frigate	4	..	..	2	..	6	8,304
X	„	40 „ 24-pounder	1	..	..	..	..	1	1,277
Y	„	„ „ 18 „	4	..	..	..	..	4	4,657
Z	„	38 „ „ „ .. .. large	13	2	..	2	7	24	26,249
A	„	„ „ .. .. small	10	3	..	2	1	16	15,995
B	„	36 „ 18-pounder .. .. large	6	3	..	2	..	11	11,324
C	„	„ „ „ „ .. .. small	14	1	1	2	4	22	20,231
D	„	„ „ 12 „	10	4	..	5	..	19	17,586
E	„	32 „ 18 „ .. .. large	5	..	..	..	..	5	4,542
F	„	„ „ „ „ .. .. small	6	..	..	..	..	6	4,733
G	„	„ „ 12 „ .. .. large	3	..	2	2	..	7	5,654
H	„	„ „ „ „ .. .. small	18	5	1	6	3	33	22,651
I	Sixth	28 „	7	3	2	1	..	13	7,991
K	„	24-gunpost ship, quarter-decked	5	..	..	2	..	7	3,693
L	„	„ „ flush	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
N	„	22 „ „	1	1	..	..	..	2	1,130
O	„	20 „ quarter-decked	3	1	1	2	..	7	3,207
P	„	„ „ flush	3	1	..	1	..	5	2,685
Q	Sloops	{ "Arrow" and "Dart," mounting 28 carronades .. .. .. }	2	..	..	..	..	2	772
R	„	18-gun ship-sloop, quarter-decked ..	10	1	..	..	1	12	5,118
S	„	„ „ flush	19	..	1	..	2	22	8,381
T	„	16 „ quarter-decked, large	14	1	1	1	7	24	9,053
U	„	„ „ „ .. small	3	..	..	..	..	3	975
V	„	„ „ flush	14	..	..	..	..	14	5,048
W	„	14 „ quarter-decked ..	2	..	..	2	..	4	1,174
X	„	„ „ flush	13	..	..	..	..	13	3,788
Y	„	18-gun brig-sloop .. .. .. large	20	..	..	..	9	29	11,114
Z	„	„ „ .. .. .. small	7	..	..	1	..	8	2,613

Abstract of the Ships and Vessels belonging to the British Navy in the commencement of the year 1805—continued.

Letters of Reference.	CLASS.	For Sea Service.		For Harbour Service.		Building or ordered to be built.	Grand Total.	
		In Commission.	In Ordinary.	In Commission.	In Ordinary.		No.	Tons.
		No.	No.	No.	No.			
	Sloops, 16-gun brig-sloop	12	..	..	..	..	12	3,650
	„ 14 „	3	..	..	2	..	5	1,200
d	Bombs of 8 guns and 2 mortars	17	..	1	2	..	20	7,108
e	Fire-ships, 14 guns	1	..	1	..	..	2	668
f	Gun-brigs, 14 „	8	..	..	..	..	8	1,626
g	„ 12 „	73	..	..	..	7	80	14,090
h	„ 10 „	2	..	..	..	..	2	321
i	Cutter, &c., 14 „	4	..	..	..	1	5	926
k	„ 12 „	8	..	1	2	..	11	1,635
l	„ 10 „	13	..	..	..	12	25	2,956
m	„ 8 „	1	..	..	..	..	1	98
n	„ 6 „	2	..	..	..	..	2	184
o	„ 4 „	16	..	..	..	..	16	1,232
	Cruisers	473	61	26	73	80	713	586,065
q	Troop-ships	14	7	3	14	..	38	34,598
r	Store-ships	10	1	..	2	..	13	7,579
w	Gun-vessels, from 1 to 4 guns	5	..	..	..	..	5	655
x	Advice-boats and tenders	6	..	..	..	..	6	964
y	Sloop on discovery	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
a	Hospital, prison, receiving ships, &c.	..	..	10	15	..	25	29,757
b	Royal yachts	..	..	6	..	1	7	1,288
	Troop ships, &c.	35	8	19	31	1	94	74,841
	Grand total	508	69	45	104	81	807	660,906