

*Colonel Cradock's Missions to Egypt*¹

COLONEL CRADOCK, afterwards the second Lord Howden (1799–1878), was employed on two diplomatic missions to Egypt, respectively in 1827 and 1828, the story of which has hitherto been comparatively obscure. The author of his life in the 'Dictionary of National Biography'² says truly of Cradock:

In 1827 he was ordered to Egypt, in order to try to prevent Mehemet Ali from intervening in the struggle between Turkey and Greece. In this he failed, and he was then ordered to join Sir Edward Codrington . . . as military commissioner, with instructions to force Mehemet Ali to withdraw the army with which he had occupied the Morea.

But, as will be seen, he is in error in adding, after having mentioned that Cradock was wounded at Navarino, that 'he had afterwards no difficulty in securing the withdrawal of the Egyptian army.' Again, the Austrian statesman Prokesch-Osten put in circulation a statement that in 1827 Cradock, having communicated to Mehemet Ali the treaty of London, in the name of the three powers, England, Russia, and France assured him of '*the acknowledgment of the independency of Egypt, but that Mehemet Ali rejected the offer with indignation.*'³ This statement has been repeated by other historians, e.g. by Mendelssohn-Bartholdy in his history of Greece, who adds the further misstatement that Mehemet Ali was 'aided by Prokesch-Osten and the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople in rejecting the Englishman's seductive proposals.'⁴

¹ I desired to elucidate the story of Cradock's missions to Egypt for the third volume of my *History of Europe* (Berlin, W. Hertz), and I have to thank the Foreign Office for granting me permission to consult the official documents preserved in the Public Record Office, of which I make use in the following pages. They are contained in the volumes 'Turkey,' 'Col. Cradock,' 'Admiral Codrington,' 'Admiral Malcolm,' June 1827 to May 1829, nos. 240, 182; 'Turkey, Consuls,' nos. 218, 160; 'Turkey, From Stratford Canning,' nos. 214, 256. I have also taken some hints from the 'Papers of Stratford Canning,' deposited at the Record Office (cf. S. Lane-Poole, *The Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*, 1888, preface). I beg leave to thank the officers at the Record Office for the kind assistance they have lent to my researches.

² Vol. ix. 29. In writing 'Cradock,' instead of Caradoc, Crawdock, Cradok, I follow Sir John's own spelling.

³ Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen*, Wien, 1867, ii. 166. Cf. the same author's *Denkwürdigkeiten und Erinnerungsblätter aus dem Orient; Aus J. Schnellers Nachlass*, herausgegeben von E. Münch, 1887, iii. 571, 572, and *Aus dem Nachlass des Grafen Prokesch-Osten*, 1881, i. 120 (Prokesch to Gentz, 9 April 1828). His statement is based on a communication from Ibrahim.

⁴ Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, Leipzig, 1870, i. 478.

The same proposals were repeated, if we are to believe Prokesch-Osten, by Cradock on his second mission to Ali and his adoptive son, Ibrahim, in 1828.⁵ The materials in the Record Office, however, place us on surer grounds, as we have found from the instructions given to Cradock on his first mission in 1827, and are enabled to conjecture the character of his later instructions for his second mission of 1828 from different important sources. Whatever differences of opinion may arise on details, there can be no doubt that on both occasions Cradock's exertions missed their aim.

The ambitious designs of Mehemet Ali had for a long time been no secret to any one. 'Would it be impossible,' wrote Stratford Canning on 4 June 1826 to his cousin George Canning, 'to enlist the viceroy of Egypt, if you do not go to war with him, in the service of Greek mediation . . . by holding out to him the prospect of a pashalik in Syria, in place of the Morea, and some assistance, if he behaves well, in his shipbuilding schemes?'⁶ Mehemet Ali, indeed, in the course of conversation with the English consul-general in Egypt, Henry Salt, who is best known as a traveller and a collector of antiquities, had in that year made proposals which proved clearly 'that he had no great taste for the war.'⁷ The sultan, too, knew well that if he was to secure the pasha's further assistance against the Greeks he would have to make great sacrifices. Accordingly, after long negotiations, in the early part of 1827 he dismissed Khurev Pasha, the old adversary of Mehemet Ali, surrendered to the latter the supreme conduct of the war, and put the isle of Candia under his sovereign jurisdiction.⁸

I fear (reported Salt about this time) the Greeks are likely this year crushed. His Highness might have been easily drawn off from the Greek war, but his honour is now pledged; he stands committed before the whole Musulman world as its champion.

Still he ventured, after a new conversation with Mehemet Ali, to remark:

I feel persuaded that his Highness is yet far from being satisfied with the Porte, and that he is rather inclined to still further embroil the business in the hope of thereby compelling the Grand Signior to grant whatever may be the object of his desires.⁹

Did not the confidential language of the pasha here reported hint at his real wish? Might it not be hoped that he might be persuaded to stand aloof from the struggle? It was well known that he was about to despatch a strong fleet, destined, together with

⁵ Prokesch-Osten, *Mehemed-Ali*, Wien, 1877, p. 12, where the author confounds the years 1828 and 1829; *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen*, ii. 248.

⁶ Lane-Poole, *Lc.* i. 409.

⁷ *Wellington Despatches*, *Contin.*, iii. 469 (Wellington to Canning, 27 Nov. 1826).

⁸ Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen*, ii. 109.

⁹ Salt to Lord Dudley, 8 March, 8 April 1827.

the Turkish fleet, to attack the isle of Hydra. If he persisted in this course, the offer of mediation and the demands of an armistice, as contained in the treaty of London, had been made in vain.

Such was the situation when Canning decided to charge Major Cradock, then attached to the embassy at Paris,¹⁰ with a special mission to the pasha of Egypt. Cradock's instructions are dated 14 July 1827. He was to consider as the main object of his mission to secure the pasha's neutrality, to impress him with the strongest language short of 'absolute menace,' and to direct his attention to the formidable strength of the three powers which were bound together by the treaty of London. He was to remind him of the fatal consequences of identifying himself with the Porte, and to tell him that in case any rash and violent determination of the Divan should bring on a conflict with the three powers the sultan's triumph would not only be very improbable, but even in the occurrence of this unlooked-for eventuality the pasha's own position would be changed for the worse.

The effect of so complete a triumph as is here assumed of the arms and counsels of the Porte would be felt in every part of the empire, and it is not likely that the sultan, flushed with success, would long be restrained by gratitude from invading *that species of independence* which, though veiled by some forms of deference to ancient superiority, has for a long time past given to the authority of the pasha of Egypt the character not so much of a province as of an empire.¹¹

This is the only mention of the word *independence* of Egypt in these instructions.

When, on 8 Aug., Cradock arrived at Alexandria, he learned, to his sorrow, that the Egyptian fleet had sailed three days before, and that the pasha himself had left for Cairo. In the work now before him his best counsellor was his friend Salt, who advised him to have an interview with Boghaz, the pasha's confidential dragoman.¹² Boghaz consented to precede Cradock and Salt to Cairo, carrying with him a note from the former. Salt was too well acquainted with the ground to underrate the difficulties of the task.

The mission (he wrote to Stratford Canning) comes late after great efforts made and great expenses incurred, and after his Highness has, as it were, staked himself to the Grand Signior as to the whole Ottoman empire to the performance of something of importance. Besides, as you will observe, we have to ask from him a neutrality, which may compromise him altogether with the Porte and have nothing specific to offer in return. As Boghoz over and over again observed, 'But what proposition

¹⁰ Gervinus (*Geschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*), vi. 386, erroneously makes Cradock join the embassy at Constantinople.

¹¹ Draft to Major Cradock, signed 'Dudley,' 14 July 1827. Instructions relative to Cradock's special mission on 14 July 1827.

¹² Compare the sketch of Boghaz's appearance and character by Prokesch-Osten (*Mehemed-Ali*, p. 4, and *Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Orient*, iii. 422).

has your government to offer? If the Porte should, as is likely, turn its whole force on the pasha, will your government support him in his views of independence? Will it acknowledge him as a separate power?'

On 15 Aug. Cradock, in the presence of Boghaz and Salt, had an audience of Mehemet Ali. The pasha eluded giving a direct answer to Cradock's demand. He declared himself always ready to look to the friendship and protection of England, but he styled himself during the whole conversation with studied affectation a subject and dependent of the Porte.

On the morning of 19 Aug. Salt had a private conference with the pasha, of which he gave the following account:—

*Sunday, 19 Aug.*¹³—I had this morning by appointment a private conference with the pasha.

I opened the discourse by saying that, as the British government had paid him the compliment of sending the Honourable Major Cradock from England on purpose to conciliate his Highness, I trusted he would be prepared to give such an answer as might prove satisfactory to our minister.

He replied that he did not see what other answer he could give. Was Major Cradock authorised to give any specific reply to the propositions he had hinted at to me in our former confidential communication? Had he any advantage to offer him for the sacrifices which, by favouring our views, he should be called upon to make?

I told him that Major Cradock had already explained to his Highness the extent of his mission, and that he must be aware that the propositions he referred to had been of too vague a nature for it to have been possible for our minister to give any direct instructions relative to them. At the same time I ventured to advise him, if his answer must depend upon that point, not to lose the opportunity that now presented itself, and which might never again occur, of speaking out clearly—of explaining in precise terms his wishes to the British government. He might be assured that every delicacy would be used respecting such a communication, and that it would be kept a profound secret.

His Highness observed that, according to his calculations, there would not be time for such a communication—nor any possibility of receiving, before the crisis had taken place, an answer, as the period for active operations must, he conceived, arrive in about twenty days.

I answered that it was true such was likely to be the case, but that in the meantime H.H. might find means to delay the operations of his fleet, and take such precautionary measures as might prevent any unpleasant collision, until the moment when he might become acquainted with the final resolutions of our cabinet.

H.H. said that this was difficult. He had waited and waited and delayed, under one excuse or another, until the Porte had become greatly dissatisfied with his proceedings. That even if he was disposed to give such orders to his own fleet there was always that of the Grand Signior,

¹³ Memorandum of Henry Salt, general consul at Cairo, 19 Aug. 1827 (P. R. O., Foreign Office Papers, *Turkey*, no. 214, no. 156).

commanded by bigots, who would not, he well knew, be easily brought to second his purposes. That even Ibrahim Pasha might be disposed eighty per cent. to attend to his directions, but for the remaining twenty per cent. would have a will of his own. The British government must have seen his situation, and had he been worthy of its notice must have known how to draw him honourably out of the business.

I told him that a stronger proof of the amiable intentions of our government could not have been given than that of sending Major Cradock to H.H.; that everything must have a beginning, and the opening now presented did appear to me, as an individual, the most favourable that could have occurred towards his general views; that I had his interests and those of Egypt at heart, and would not give the advice I did if such were not my real sentiments. But if such an opportunity of ingratiating himself with the European powers were once permitted to slip by he could never expect to find a similar one. It was the part of a wise man to make the most of such rare occasions.

H.H. at this part of our conference began to assume a more easy and confidential tone. 'Well,' said he, 'I am convinced of your wish to serve me. I have always found your advice good, and am truly glad to find, as Boghoz has informed me, that you stand so well with your government. I will tell you the truth. I have already, to satisfy their *amour-propre*, had some discourse on this matter with my chief officers, Mahmoud Bey, the Defterdar Bey, and Osmyn Bey, but I have not disclosed even to them what are my real intentions.

'My determination is this: Let Major Cradock proceed directly to your admiral, and let him recommend to the admirals of the combined fleets to send immediately an officer with a letter from them addressed to Ibrahim Pasha, to tell him that matters are now brought to a crisis, and that he must not think any longer of attacking Hydra, as they are determined if he do so to prevent him by force—in fact, to beat him off. Do not let the officer charged with this letter wait for any answer, but let him merely deliver it into the hands of Ibrahim Pasha.'

I said this might be all very well, but I feared it would have little effect if not backed by secret instructions from H.H. 'Leave all that,' he said, with a very expressive look, 'to me. I am going to act a dangerous part. If I were to remain by the Grand Signior on this occasion, I might, it is true, lose my fleet, but I should be certain to gain Syria and Damascus. Whom else has he to lean upon? He would be obliged to give me my own terms. You will see I shall shortly have some great personages sent from Constantinople to make me propositions. It is a great thing that I am doing to satisfy your government. You know the difficulties I have to contend with, but I rely upon the friendship of England. Let England stand by me and I shall be repaid. I have long wished ardently for her support, and to form a lasting league of commerce and amity with her; and she must, I should hope, now feel that she is bound to aid me.' I told him, as my private opinion, that when the occasion came, should he carry this business successfully through, England would not desert him. His Highness seemed to me already in everything but the form independent.

'Yes,' he replied, 'as the Turkish phrase expresses it, every man is

a king in his own house ; but Egypt is but a small kingdom ; Syria and Damascus and Arabia are in fact at my disposition. I will speak out. I will for once boast like a Bedouin or a man from the mountains. If I should not have what I seek, I could raise up a religious war that should rage for fifty years ; but this is not a thing to speak of ; this is private discourse between ourselves. If your government support me, as I hope, if it will acknowledge me when occasion comes as an independent prince, I shall be satisfied. You will some day not far remote, I trust, reside here in another capacity from that of consul.' I thanked H.H., smiling, for the promotion he was disposed to bestow upon me, and at the same time assured him that, whatever might be the issue, I should be perfectly ready to attach my fate to his.

During part of the above discourse his Highness's face became lighted up as he spoke, and his eyes flashed as if the fate of empires were already in his hands.

Soon afterwards H.H. asked me when Major Cradock would think of going. I said I had no doubt, when he knew H.H.'s intentions, that he would take his leave to-morrow.

He said he should be most happy to see him. 'As to my answer,' he said, 'it cannot be otherwise in appearance than a declaration of my being obliged to look to the Porte as the guide of my conduct. The rest must be secret.' I then took my leave.

Mehemet Ali repeated the hint of a secret understanding on 20 Aug. at the final audience of Cradock.

Go to the admiral (he said), and tell him immediately after he has seen you to send an officer to Ibrahim Pasha with a letter, in the strongest terms representing to him the danger of exposing himself to a collision with the Christian powers, and dissuading him from any hostile step, particularly from attacking Hydra. . . . Let the admirals notify conjointly to Ibrahim their intention of opposing him should he make any attempt to carry on the war. I wish the letter to be dated off Hydra ; it will carry more force with it. No answer to the letter must be required, and leave all the rest to me.

Mehemet Ali assured Cradock that Ibrahim, on the receipt of the admiral's letter, would take no step without communicating with both Constantinople and Cairo, and that at all events time would thus be gained, which would be equivalent to neutrality. Cradock urged the pasha to explain himself as to the means which he intended to employ in order to carry his neutrality into practice. The pasha's only answer was, 'We Turks have a way of doing things among ourselves. Depend upon it the event will be as you desire.'¹⁴

In the course of his conversations with Cradock Mehemet Ali continually alluded to the protection and support of England,

¹⁴ Salt to Stratford Canning, Alexandria, 12 Aug. 1827. Stratford Canning to Lord Dudley, Constantinople, 16 Sept. 1827 (enclosing Salt's Memorandum, 19 Aug. The original, written for Cradock, was sent to Stratford Canning.) Cradock to Stratford Canning, confidential, Cairo, 21 Aug. 1827. Cradock to Lord Dudley, Smyrna, 7 Sept. 1827. H.M.S. 'Pelican,' off Navarino, 21 Sept. 1827.

'though he gave no authority to the major to make any specific proposal to the British government.' As to Cradock, he carefully avoided saying a word about Egypt's future 'independence,' though he was somewhat more communicative in a private visit to Boghaz.

The conversation (he reports to Stratford Canning) was turned by that gentleman (Boghaz) on the independence of Egypt. I held no sort of encouragement to the idea, being wholly destitute of instructions on the point, but I said, as my own opinion, that, were Egypt to become a separate and self-governing power, having worked out her own independence and capable of maintaining it, I saw no reason why England should not acknowledge that independence, as she had already done that of other states whose march has been the same.¹⁵ I gave this entirely as a private opinion.

Cradock left Cairo on 21 Aug. for Smyrna, still doubtful of the result of his mission. After his departure Salt wrote to Lord Dudley :

What the pasha's line of conduct may prove after the Grand Signior's resolution shall have been known is still somewhat difficult to divine, but his Highness has already declared to the confidential part of his court that it must depend almost entirely upon the communications to be made to him by the Grand Signior. If that exalted personage should give his orders drily to the pasha, without offering him any new means, his Highness declares that he is determined to refuse obedience under one pretext or another ; but, on the contrary, if Syria and Damascus should be placed at his disposal by the Grand Signior, as he says he has a right to expect, his Highness seems disposed to risk the sacrifice even of his fleet, if necessary, to obtain these so long desired possessions, always reserving to himself, it is to be remembered, the power, as alluded to in my note of conversation under date 19 August, addressed to Mr Cradock, of separating himself from the cause of the Ottoman empire, if he can obtain from our government, or rather the allied powers, what he would esteem still more highly, a positive assurance of support in his plans of independence as of aggrandisement. His Highness, as the crisis approaches, is daily expecting the arrival of some personage of distinction from Constantinople. . . . Should the Grand Signior not come forward so liberally as he expects, his Highness will be ready, I feel persuaded, to withdraw immediately his fleet and to recall his son and army and take the chance of what may follow.¹⁶

A slight notice of the well-known events which followed will be sufficient. Cradock, on his way to Greece, met the French admiral de Rigny and told him what he had to communicate about his mission to Egypt. The French admiral had strong doubts as to the measures to be taken. He wrote to the French ambassador at Constantinople on 18 Sept. :

¹⁵ Perhaps Ibrahim, having information of his words, took them as an official explanation of the designs of the British government, and thence unintentionally misled Prokesch-Osten (cf. *supra*, p. 277, note 3).

¹⁶ Salt to Lord Dudley, Cairo, 27 Aug. 1827.

Mon opinion serait de laisser Ibrahim s'embarquer pour son entreprise, de l'arrêter et l'engager à retourner directement en Egypte, ou au moins à la Sude, bon gré mal gré. En faisant une démonstration pour l'empêcher de sortir de Navarin avec la flotte, il renoncera peut-être à son expédition navale, mais avec ses renforts il peut et pousser la guerre dans l'intérieur et appeler par conséquent l'emploi d'autres moyens que ceux de la force navale. Je crains aussi (à supposer que la démarche proposée à M. Cradock par Méhémet-Ali fût bonne à faire) qu'elle ne puisse être faite maintenant avec le mystère qui, aux yeux de ce pacha, en rendait le résultat possible et efficace.¹⁷

Meanwhile the English admiral, Sir Edward Codrington, had already on 19 Sept. written to Ibrahim a letter threatening him with hostilities in the event of his refusal to accept the treaty of London. A second letter of 22 Sept., written in the same sense, bore the signature of De Rigny besides that of Codrington. The two admirals had met before Navarino. On 23 Sept. De Rigny had an interview with Ibrahim in his tent, Tahir Pasha, the commander of the Turkish ships, being present when they first met, though at Ibrahim's command he reluctantly retired. On 25 Sept. a second conference took place, Codrington, Cradock, and other officers being present. It resulted in an agreement to suspend naval hostilities until Ibrahim's couriers had returned from Constantinople and Alexandria.

La flotte turque (announced De Rigny to Guilleminot) reste inactive dans Navarin. Si elle en sort, par suite de nouveaux ordres de la Porte, qu'Ibrahim ne peut recevoir avant 21 jours du moins, nous la trouverons dans l'Archipel, et tout retour en Morée lui sera impossible. Des communications très confidentielles d'Ibrahim me donnent tout lieu de penser qu'il nous fera même aviser secrètement quand il devra sortir, et je crois pouvoir affirmer d'avance qu'une simple démonstration suffira pour reconduire en Egypte et aux Dardanelles cette formidable expédition. Je ne dois pas omettre de dire ici qu'avec le consentement de M. Cradock j'ai instruit Ibrahim de ce qui avait été concerté au Caire avec son père, et que la lettre de Méhémet-Ali, dont j'étais porteur depuis mon voyage en Egypte, où j'avais parcouru devant ce pacha toutes les suppositions qui se sont réalisées depuis, cette lettre, dis-je, adressée à son fils, a convaincu celui-ci de prendre le parti que j'annonce qu'il prendra.¹⁸

Codrington, too, although not as sanguine as his French colleague, hoped for the best. He wrote on 29 Sept. to Stratford Canning :

I must still add that it is evident by what passed yesterday, in reference to the private communication which Mehemet. Ali held with

¹⁷ 'Le contre-amiral de Rigny au général comte de Guilleminot,' 18 Sept. 1827 (*Nouveau Recueil de Traités*, par G. de Martens, continué par F. Murhard, 1837, t. xii. p. 94).

¹⁸ Martens, *l.c.*, p. 111. I am unable to say more about the above-noticed letter of Mehemet Ali. I find no mention of it in the article of Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Gravière, 'Les Missions Extérieures de la Marine : la Station du Levant' (*Revue des Deux Mondes*, tome cviii. 1873). According to Prokesch-Osten (*Nachlass*, i. 92) De Rigny's journey to Egypt had taken place in May 1827.

Colonel Cradock, that Ibrahim had instructions from his father, for he has done precisely all that the father said he would do upon our making to him the representations which we did according to the father's suggestion.¹⁹

It belongs to general history to show how, in spite of the agreement of 25 Sept., the fleets came to blows at Navarino. Some weeks after that event Codrington wrote to Stratford Canning:

De Rigny is quite cured of any predilection he may have had for the Egyptians, and well he may be, for nothing can be more clear than that Mehemet Ali has long been playing him to his private purposes. . . . And that wily chief seems to have worked in the same manner upon Mr. Salt and even Colonel Cradock, who would hardly believe in his treachery until it became too glaring.²⁰

It is not easy to see wherein Mehemet Ali's treachery consisted. What we know is that, while Ibrahim wasted Messenia in the most barbarous manner, the admirals of the allied fleets, by their entrance into the harbour of Navarino, forced on the commanders of the Turkish-Egyptian fleet the combat, which ended with its destruction.²¹

Mehemet Ali took the news of this event 'with great magnanimity.' As he read the ominous despatch he frequently stopped to exclaim aloud, 'I told them what would be the consequence. Did they think they had to deal with Greeks?' And before he came to an end of the report he sent for M. le Comte d'Oysonville, commander of the French frigate 'La Vestale' (the only man-of-war in port), for the express purpose of assuring him that the destruction of his fleet had made no alteration in his friendly sentiments towards French subjects. Likewise he also promised Salt's successor, J. Barker, that, in case of war with the sultan, the personal property of British subjects in Egypt should be safe. He added emphatically, 'I know well how to appreciate and maintain the reputation I have acquired for justice and liberty.'²²

In consequence of the information received of Mehemet's state of mind the British government resolved to despatch Cradock

¹⁹ *Memoir of the Life of Admiral Sir Edward Codrington*, edited by his daughter, Lady Bouchier, 1878, ii. 7 seq.

²⁰ *Ibid.* ii. 123.

²¹ According to Prokesch-Osten's letter, addressed to Gentz. 18 Dec. 1827 (*Aus dem Nachlass Prokesch-Ostens*, i. 93), he was informed by De Rigny that on 19 Oct. the Egyptian brig 'Washington' arrived, conveying Mehemet Ali's answer and a ciphered letter, proving that Ibrahim had been repeatedly directed to follow strictly the orders of the Porte. De Rigny assured Prokesch-Osten that 'the admirals, having got this news, came to the resolution to enter the harbour of Navarino.' We know, however, that the admirals had already come to this resolution on 18 Oct., and we have no confirmation of De Rigny's report.

²² J. Barker to Codrington. Barker had been till now consul at Cairo, but on Salt's death, after a painful chronic 'illness,' on 28 Oct. 1827, in a village on the Nile (J. Barker to John Bidwell, 29 Oct., to Lord Dudley, 30 Oct. 1827), he acted as provisional consul-general.

on a second mission to Egypt. It was no longer Canning who stood at the head of the ministry; but the Foreign Office was still presided over by Lord Dudley, who on 21 Dec. 1827 ordered Cradock again to repair to Alexandria in the same capacity in which he had appeared there a few months before, and 'to consider the instruction addressed to the late Mr. Salt as addressed to himself.' Lord Dudley held it desirable 'that the substance of this paper should be conveyed to the pasha of Egypt by some person not unacceptable to his Highness and capable of explaining and enforcing the points to which they relate.' He further informed Cradock that

the messenger who is bearer of this despatch conveys instructions to the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian state to make directly to Ibrahim-Pasha a proposal for withdrawing his army from the Morea. . . . In case he should have refused to act except by the authority of his father, your advice and interposition may be usefully employed in obtaining the pasha's sanction to a step so agreeable to those maxims of prudence by which he has been generally guided. If, as we have been given to understand through more than one channel, his Highness is desirous to withdraw himself from all share in the war against the Greeks, he will hardly refuse to avail himself of this occasion of establishing for the future a neutrality *de facto* without further loss or discredit and without breach of his engagements to the Porte.²³

It cannot be doubtful that the main object of Cradock's second mission to Egypt was to effect the evacuation of the Morea.²⁴

Le général Adam (wrote Capodistrias to General Church) s'est rendu à Modon pour engager Ibrahim-Pacha à se retirer du Péloponnèse. Le colonel Cradock a été envoyé dans la même vue à Alexandrie.²⁵

But this time too Cradock had nothing more to offer than 'a kind of temptation to independence by wishing the pasha to act in disobedience to his government,' without any guarantee of aid in the event of the pasha incurring the anger of the Porte. This at least was the retrospective opinion of Sir Frederick Adam's adjutant, who accompanied Cradock on his journey.²⁶

Codrington himself had from the beginning a very poor opinion of the use of Cradock's reappearance at Mehemet Ali's court.

'I beg leave to suggest,' he wrote on 21 Jan. 1828 to the duke of Clarence, 'that the threat of a blockade of Alexandria would have more effect upon Mehemet Ali than any negotiation whatever.' 'Colonel Cradock,' he informed Admiral de Rigny on 8 Feb. 1828, 'is again gone to the

²³ Lord Dudley to Lieutenant-Colonel Cradock, 21 Dec. 1827.

²⁴ Perhaps the instructions addressed to the late Mr. Salt, which Cradock had to consider as addressed to himself, referred also to the question of the deliverance of Greek slaves. Cf. Bulwer, *Life of Palmerston*, Tauchnitz edition, i. 269.

²⁵ *Correspondance du comte Capodistrias*, 1837, i. 490.

²⁶ Captain W. F. C. to Mr. Bethell, Malta, 8 April 1828: *Memoir of the Life of Codrington*, ii. 205.

viceroys of Egypt. I do not approve of asking terms, which I think I have the right and power to dictate.' 'The mission of Colonel Cradock,' he told Capodistrias, 'will not produce any result.'²⁷

Indeed, Cradock's experiences at Alexandria were rather discouraging. At his first audience on 11 Feb. 1828 Mehemet Ali promised only to send a Tartar to Constantinople with a letter expressing his opinion that further resistance in the Morea would be useless. He begged Cradock to stay until an answer arrived. Cradock gives his impression of Mehemet Ali's feelings at this time:

The pasha is evidently most anxious for the return of his army, provided he can do it without compromising what he calls *his honour*. I find a great change in his Highness since I last saw him. He has grown old in appearance and extremely nervous in his manner.

Almost seven weeks elapsed before, on 30 March, Cradock got an answer in the form of an extract of a letter addressed by the pasha to his confidential interpreter.

Delay (he wrote) has ever been the unbroken policy of the Porte and its dependents, but I have always found in my communications with the viceroy of Egypt even more than Turkish temporisation.

He was of opinion that Mehemet Ali might like to retain him indefinitely. This would satisfy his vanity, as Cradock would pass for the representative of a great European power, and at the same time he might hope 'to reap at Constantinople all the fruits of the most subservient loyalty.'²⁸ The pasha stated that he had received a negative answer from the sultan, who had meanwhile sent an ultimatum to the ambassadors of the three powers.

Néanmoins (he continued) j'ai fait, en considération des trois puissances, arrêter mon fils de la continuation de ses attaques sur les Grecs. . . . Je l'ai même empêché, d'après l'ordre reçu, de passer en Roumélie.

He even expressed the hope

qu'il serait permis à son fils de faire à Zante l'achat de quelques provisions pour être transportées dans la Morée.

It was quite clear that nothing positive was to be got by negotiation from the crafty pasha. Cradock's final opinion was that his determination is evidently to persevere in his present system and to admit no argument but the appearance of unanswerable force.

Cradock's second mission to Egypt had thus ended in failure. The withdrawal of Ibrahim from the Morea was settled only some months later, when Codrington, before the arrival of the French expedition under command of General Maison, forced on Mehemet Ali at Alexandria the treaty of 6 Aug. 1828.

ALFRED STERN.

²⁷ *Memoir of the Life of Codrington*, ii. 176, 184, 207.

²⁸ Cradock to Lord Dudley, Alexandria, 12 Feb., 30 March 1828 (enclosure, extract of a letter of Mehemet Ali to Boghaz, to be communicated to Cradock).