

he has to understand it, then he feels it because of his cherished affection, and then there is the nervous agitation. Emotion is not as it has often been represented by physiologists a mere nervous reaction from an external stimulus, like the kick which the frog gives when it is kicked. It begins with a mental act and is essentially an operation of the mind.

Each of these four elements has been noticed by different observers. All moralists have talked of the motives by which men are swayed, and attempts have been made by Dugald Stewart and others to classify them. Aristotle remarked Ὁρετικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας (*De An.*, III. 10), no appetite without a phantasm; and the Stoics represented passion as consisting in idea, and argued that passion could be subdued by controlling the idea. The excitement with the attachment is the prominent characteristic in the common apprehension and especially among novelists. Physiologists are apt to magnify the organic affection, and may be able to throw more light upon it than they have hitherto done. He who can unfold the whole of these four elements and allot to them their relative place and connection, will clear up a subject which is confusedly apprehended at present, will find a good classification of the emotions and be able to show us what emotion is in itself, and what place it has in the human constitution.

JAMES M'COSE.

IX.—CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. TYLOR'S REVIEW OF *The Principles of Sociology*.

Of the criticisms which Mr. Tylor makes on those chapters of the *Principles of Sociology* reviewed by him in the last number of MIND, I do not propose to say anything, further than to thank him for pointing out some errors of detail which I hope to correct: not, however, so soon as I should like, since the second edition was nearly through the press before his review appeared. But certain of his statements I feel called upon to notice, because of their personal implications.

These implications are contained in the second paragraph of his review, by the following among other passages:—

“As a worker for many years on the ground where Mr. Spencer is now engaged, I am desirous of noticing where he has followed lines already traced. . . . These chapters may, I think, be properly described as a new statement, with important modifications and additions, of the theory of Animism which (to pass over less complete statements in previous years) was given by me in summary in the *Journal of the Ethnological Society* for April 26, 1870,* and was worked out with great fulness of detail in my *Primitive Culture*, published in 1871. . . . How far his conclusions have been arrived at independently of mine I cannot say. . . . In comparing Mr. Spencer's system with my own, I am naturally anxious to see where the later writer differs from the earlier, and where for the better and where for the worse.”

* In the last No. of MIND, this date was erroneously given as 1871.

Whether intentionally or not, Mr. Tylor, by these sentences, and especially by the one giving dates, inevitably conveys to his readers two impressions:—first, that I have adopted his views; and, second, that I have done this without acknowledgment. I proceed to show that the first impression is erroneous, and that therefore the second is baseless.

The date of Mr. Tylor's "summary" given above as April 26, 1870, is the date at which it was read before the Ethnological Society. At that date there was in print, and four days later there was issued, in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1870 (see also *Essays*, Vol. III., pp. 102-4), an essay of mine on "The Origin of Animal-Worship," in which there occur the following passages:—

"The rudimentary form of all religion is the propitiation of dead ancestors, who are supposed to be still existing, and to be capable of working good or evil to their descendants. . . . Everywhere we find expressed or implied the belief that each person is double; and that when he dies, his other self, whether remaining near at hand or gone far away, may return, and continues capable of injuring his enemies and aiding his friends. . . . Here, out of many experiences which conspire to generate this belief, I can but briefly indicate the leading ones:—(1) It is not impossible that his shadow, following him everywhere, and moving as he moves, may have some small share in giving to the savage a vague idea of his duality. It needs but to watch a child's interest in the movements of its shadow, and to remember that at first a shadow cannot be interpreted as a negation of light, but is looked upon as an entity, to perceive that the savage may very possibly consider it as a specific something which forms part of him. (2) A much more decided suggestion of the same kind is likely to result from the reflection of his face and figure in water: imitating him as it does in his form, colours, motions, grimaces. When we remember that not unfrequently a savage objects to have his portrait taken, because he thinks whoever carries away a representation of him carries away some part of his being, we see how probable it is that he thinks his double in the water is a reality in some way belonging to him. (3) Echoes must greatly tend to confirm the idea of duality otherwise arrived at. Incapable as he is of understanding their natural origin, the primitive man necessarily ascribes them to living beings—beings who mock him and elude his search. (4) The suggestions resulting from these and other physical phenomena are, however, secondary in importance. The root of this belief in another self lies in the experience of dreams. The distinction so easily made by us between our life in dreams and our real life, is one which the savage recognises in but a vague way; and he cannot express even that distinction which he perceives. When he awakes, and to those who have seen him lying quietly asleep, describes where he has been, and what he has done, his rude language fails to state the difference between seeing and dreaming that he saw, doing and dreaming that he did. From this inadequacy of his language it not only results that he cannot truly represent this difference to others, but also that he cannot truly represent it to himself. Hence, in the absence of an alternative interpretation, his belief, and that of those to whom he tells his adventures, is that his other self has been away and came back when he awoke. And this belief, which we find among various existing savage tribes, we equally find in the traditions of the early civilised races. (5) The conception of another self capable of going away and returning, receives what to the savage must seem

conclusive verifications from the abnormal suspensions of consciousness, and derangements of consciousness, that occasionally occur in members of his tribe. One who has fainted, and cannot be immediately brought back to himself (note the significance of our own phrases "returning to himself," etc.) as a sleeper can, shows him a state in which the other self has been away for a time beyond recall. Still more is this prolonged absence of the other self shown him in cases of apoplexy, catalepsy, and other forms of suspended animation. Here for hours the other self persists in remaining away, and on returning refuses to say where he has been. Further verification is afforded by every epileptic subject, into whose body, during the absence of the other self, some enemy has entered; for how else does it happen that the other self on returning denies all knowledge of what his body has been doing? And this supposition that the body has been "possessed" by some other being is confirmed by the phenomena of somnambulism and insanity. (b) What, then, is the interpretation inevitably put upon death? The other self has habitually returned after sleep, which simulates death. It has returned, too, after fainting, which simulates death much more. It has even returned after the rigid state of catalepsy, which simulates death very greatly. Will it not return also after this still more prolonged quiescence and rigidity? Clearly it is quite possible—quite probable even. The dead man's other self is gone away for a long time, but it still exists somewhere, far or near, and may at any moment come back to do all he said he would do. Hence the various burial-rites—the placing of weapons and valuables along with the body, the daily bringing of food to it, etc. I hope hereafter to show that, with such knowledge of the facts as he has, this interpretation is the most reasonable the savage can arrive at."

In succeeding pages of the essay I have contended that "out of the desire to propitiate this second personality of a deceased man" there grows up "the worship of animals, plants, and inanimate objects": facts being given in proof that animal worship is hence derived; that fetishism is hence derived; that nature-worship is hence derived. And after showing how the hypothesis yields interpretations of all orders of superstitions, even to "the worship of compound animals, and of monsters half-man half-brute," I have ended the essay with the following paragraph:—

"These views I hope to develop in the first part of *The Principles of Sociology*. The large mass of evidence which I shall be able to give in support of the hypothesis, joined with the solutions it will be shown to yield of many minor problems which I have passed over, will, I think, then give to it a still greater probability than it seems now to have."

Unquestionably the general theory here sketched, is identical with that contained in those chapters of the *Sociology* reviewed by Mr. Tylor; and as this general theory, with its essential applications, was set forth by me at a date coinciding with that at which his "summary" was read, he causes a misapprehension by saying that "as a worker for many years on the ground where Mr. Spencer is now engaged, I am desirous of noticing where he has followed lines already traced". Should he fall back on his "less complete statements in previous years," then I draw his attention to a statement earlier in date, I think, than any work he has published. On turning

to the *Westminster Review* for April, 1854, pp. 360-1 (see also *Essays*, first series, pp. 114-15, and in the current edition, Vol. I., pp. 66-8) he will find indicated as clearly as the available space allows, the belief that the ghost-theory is the origin of religious ideas and observances; that the savage understands death only as temporary desertion of the body; that he expects the other self to return; that from fears and hopes directed towards this double of the dead man result sacrifices at graves; and that the various evidences "almost unavoidably suggest the conclusion that the aboriginal god is the dead chief: the chief not dead in our sense, but gone away" for a time. On p. 137 of the *Principles of Sociology*, I have referred, in a note, to these preceding brief statements of the conception. Unfortunately, Mr. Tylor appears to have missed this note. Had he read the passages I have quoted and referred to, he would not, I think, have said that the chapters he reviews are "properly described as a new statement, with important modifications and additions, of the theory of Animism which was given by me" [him], &c. His characterisation of these chapters would rather have been:—first, that their essential idea dates back to 1854; second, that in 1870 this idea was set forth in a developed form; third, that in the *Principles of Sociology* I have "followed lines already traced" by myself; and fourth, that I have done this in fulfilment of a promise, made seven years ago, which distinctly refers to the accumulated evidence and the various elaborations now published.

From the question of date I pass to the question of identity. I expected to have in Mr Tylor an opponent. That I so misunderstood what he asserts to be his view, is, I think, due to the fact that the foreground of his exposition is occupied by another interpretation than that on which he now chiefly insists; and that the first impression produced by it is stronger than subsequent impressions. That part of his *Primitive Culture* which treats of superstitions, begins with three chapters on Mythology; throughout which the teaching appears to be that the personification of inanimate objects and powers is primordial, and quite independent of the ghost-theory. Here are some passages implying this:—

"To the human intellect in its early childlike state may be assigned the origin and first development of the myth." (Vol. I., p. 257, 1st ed.)

"First and foremost among the causes which transfigure into myth the facts of daily experience, is the belief in the animation of all nature, rising at its highest pitch to personification. This, no occasional or hypothetical action of the mind, is inextricably bound in with that primitive mental state where man recognises in every detail of his world, the operation of personal life and will. This doctrine of Animism will be considered elsewhere as affecting philosophy and religion, but here we have only to do with its bearing on mythology." (*Ib.* p. 258.)

This "idea of pervading life and will in nature far outside modern limits, a belief in personal souls animating what we call inanimate bodies, a theory of transmigration of souls as well in life as after death," &c. (*Ib.* p. 260.)

These, and many kindred passages occurring in the chapters on

mythology, left on me the impression that Mr. Tylor ascribes to the aboriginal mind an innate tendency to animistic interpretation, quite apart from those experiences which lead to the notion that each man has a double. Especially did passages such as those I have italicised suggest the belief that, in Mr. Tylor's view, the ascription of souls to objects in general, apart from their appearances as living or dead, is primeval; and that the human soul is but one kind of the souls, independently conceived of as possessed by things in general. And this impression is confirmed by various of his illustrative statements, as when he says:—

“So it is with the stars. Savage mythology contains many a story of them, agreeing through all other difference in attributing to them animate life. They are not merely talked of in fancied personality, but personal action is attributed to them, or they are even declared once to have lived on earth.”

A mode of representing the matter, which, joined with the previous generalisation, presupposes the belief that personalisation of these celestial objects had first arisen, and that their identification with human beings took place afterwards. As I have endeavoured to show that there is no primitive animistic tendency at all, and that until the ghost-theory has been developed the personalisation of objects does not take place, I not unnaturally regarded Mr. Tylor as at issue with me “in respect to the order of genesis and mode of dependence of primitive superstitions”; as said in the above-named note on page 137 of the *Principles of Sociology*. In a subsequent chapter of *Primitive Culture*, I find passages which unquestionably represent the ghost-theory as primary; though how Mr. Tylor reconciles them with preceding statements I do not see. But he has so marshalled his facts and arguments as, at any rate, to cause misconceptions in many minds besides my own. I have put the question to six competent readers. One of them thought Mr. Tylor's view was that which he alleges. Two were in doubt as to his belief concerning the origin of Animism. The remaining three were under the impression that he regarded the tendency to think of all objects as containing independent personalities, or souls, as primary and general; and that the conception of a human soul is one of its manifestations.

It is satisfactory now to find that this last is not Mr. Tylor's view; but that, contrariwise, he substantially agrees in regarding the ghost-theory as primary and other forms of superstitions as derived—substantially, I say, for it appears that he does not hold this view in the unqualified form given to it by me.

HERBERT SPENCER.

19th April, 1877.

In my review of Mr. Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* in last quarter's MIND, I took pains to bring prominently forward whatever opinions in it seemed new and peculiar. He now raises the question whether I was right in considering him to have partly “followed lines already traced”. In noticing how remarkably a great part of