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Religion and Civil Society in Europe

 Springer

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ISBN 978-94-007-6814-7 ISBN 978-94-007-6815-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-6815-4
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013944287

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Printed on acid-free paper

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Chapter 11

Religion and Social Participation in Postcommunist Europe

Mălina Voicu and Claudiu Tufiş

11.1 Introduction

Social participation is at very low levels in Central and Eastern European countries, postcommunist citizens being less interested in politics (Martin 2003) and less involved in civic associations (Howard 2003; Valkov 2009) as compared to other European citizens.¹ This lack of activism was considered a legacy of the communist past, which hampered the development of civil society in the region (Letki 2004; Coffe and van der Lippe 2010) in various ways: strictly controlling (even forbidding, in some cases) free civic association; changing the voluntary character of civic work into a compulsory one, controlled by the state (Voicu and Voicu 2003); or eroding interpersonal trust, leading to lower levels of involvement into the civic life (Coffe and van der Lippe 2010).

In this chapter we investigate the way in which religion influences social participation in postcommunist societies. Previous studies have shown that religion has a positive effect on civic engagement, both beliefs and behaviors increasing the level of social participation (Verba et al. 1995; Curtis et al. 2001). The relationship between religion, state, and society, however, is different in postcommunist countries. The communist regimes imposed a forced secularization, isolating religion into the

¹Claudiu Tufiş's work on this chapter was supported by CNCSIS-UEFISCSU, project number PN-II-RU-PD172/2010.

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private life and reducing its impact on public affairs (Tomka 1991, 2002). Thus, we investigate how postcommunist legacy shapes social participation in countries from Central and Eastern Europe. We focus our analyses on social participation, understood as membership in civic organizations, excluding religious organizations. Using European Values Study data collected in 2008 in 36 countries, out of which 21 are former communist countries, we test the research hypotheses using multilevel logistic regression. Our analysis exploits only data collected in postcommunist countries.

The first section of the chapter is an overview of the relationship between religiosity and social participation, paying special attention to the way in which religiosity shapes civicism in postcommunist societies. The second part introduces the indicators and the strategy used for analysis, followed by the data analysis. The final section is dedicated to conclusions and to a short discussion.

11.2 Religion, Social Participation, and the Communist Legacy

Previous studies have approached the relationship between religion and participation focusing on three different aspects of religious life: beliefs, behaviors, and denomination. Religious beliefs shape the ways in which the individual perceives the human nature (Smidt 1999) and instill norms of altruism (Ruiter and de Graaf 2006) and feelings of responsibility for others, as well as trust in fellow citizens (Bekkers and Schuyt 2008). All these elements exert a positive influence on social participation, motivating people to get involved in actions aimed towards producing public goods.

Various aspects of religious behavior have a significant impact on social involvement. Church attendance and participation in church activities connect people with social networks, which is a key element of social participation (Ruiter and de Graaf 2006; Lam 2006; Verba et al. 1995); encourage charitable behavior (Smidt 1999); and provide civic skills and information (Lam 2006; Smidt 1999; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). Private prayer psychologically empowers the individuals, who feel more politically effective and more inclined to participate (Loveland et al. 2005).

Social participation, however, is learned during primary socialization and is highly dependent on the social context existing during the formative years (Kirlin 2002). Therefore, people who socialized in Central and Eastern Europe during the communist period are less likely to participate in voluntary associations because these associations were strictly controlled. Moreover, family plays an important role in preparing children for social activism, with children of people characterized by higher rates of social participation being more likely to participate as well (Khane and Spote 2008; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Langton 1984; Janoski and Wilson 1995). Consequently, the communist legacy of civic passivity affects not only the cohorts socialized during the former regime but also the younger generations, which grew up in a culture of civic passivity and lacking a model of social participation among the older generations.

The communist regime affected social participation both directly by controlling civil society and restricting civic life and, indirectly, by impeding religious life. These societies have experienced a dual process of secularization, a self-induced as well as

an enforced one, imposed by the totalitarian regime (Meulermann 2000, 2004; Need and Evans 2001; Pollack 2001). Marxist ideology considered religion “the opium of people,” and the communist regimes did their best to exclude religion from public and private life. All around the region, churches were eliminated from the political and social life, religious education was forbidden, while religious practices were strictly controlled (Stan and Turcescu 2007; Tomka 1991, 2002; Voicu 2007).

As a consequence of these policies, religion did not completely disappear, but was mainly a private matter, while churches continued to exist but were not allowed to be involved in the public life (Tomka 1991). The believers were discriminated against and excluded from public office (White et al. 2000). The church focused on the individual’s spiritual needs, ignoring aspects related to public life, such as charity or volunteering. Moreover, since the church was not allowed to organize such activities, it lost its role as provider of civic skills and information useful for civic engagement. At the same time, the public and the political space were perceived, in the communist states, as characterized by lying and cheating (Voicu 2005), promoting different moral standards as compared to those imposed by the church. The involvement in public space was not desirable for a churchgoer because of the different moral norms. In the long run, religion detached from the public life and did not support social involvement.

Even if previous studies found a positive effect of religiosity on social participation in Western societies, this relationship does not hold for postcommunist societies. First, due to the forced secularization imposed by the communist regime, religion detached from the public area and exerted no effect on political or civic issues. Moreover, in communist societies, the public space was perceived by the population as one of lying and cheating and of moral values opposed to those supported by the religion. Therefore, the real believers chose not to get involved in activities characterized by values and moral norms opposed to those promoted by the church. Unlike in Western societies, where the norms and values promoted by the civil society and by religion were largely congruent, in communist societies this congruence was completely missing. This leads us to expect a negative relationship between religious practices and beliefs and social participation in postcommunist societies.

The dominant religious denomination represents an additional religious factor having a different effect on social participation in Central and Eastern Europe. Previous studies, carried out in long-established democracies from Western Europe and North America, point out that social participation varies by religious denomination (Lam 2006; Ruiter and de Graaf 2006; Suanet et al. 2009; Jeong 2010). Thus, religious denomination exerts an effect at both individual and country level, by shaping individual values and creating a specific context for civic engagement.²

²In analyzing the relationship between religion and civic participation, we distinguish between the individual level and the country level. At the individual level we are interested in the relationship between individual’s religious denomination and his or her degree of civic participation. At the country level, we are interested in the relationship between the distribution of the population by religion and the average level of civic participation. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, we also denote the individual level by microlevel or level 1 and the country level by macro level, level 2, aggregate level, or context.

Many studies have focused on the distinction between Catholics and Protestants. The two denominations differ with respect to the values induced to the church members and in creating an institutional context, which may encourage or hamper civic involvement (Lam 2006). Thus, at individual level, Protestantism encourages social tolerance and “extra-familial orientation,” weakening kinship ties and stimulating associational activities. The organizational differences between the two denominations produced differences across societies, with an impact on the level of social participation (Lam 2006). According to Verba et al. (1995), the Protestant denominations are organized in smaller congregations and allow for a higher participation of lay on the liturgy, as compared to Catholic churches, which have a hierarchical strict organization and do not allow for a significant involvement of the people on the religious services. Thus, the Protestant denomination stimulates participation and creates the opportunity for practicing civic skills by stimulating the development of civic associations. The result is a higher propensity of people belonging to Protestant denominations and living in Protestant countries to participate in civic activities. Previous empirical research supports these assumptions (see Verba et al. 1995; Lam 2002, 2006; Ruiters and De Graaf 2006).

The repression experienced by the Catholic and Protestant churches under the communist regimes from Central and Eastern Europe differently shaped the relationship between religious denomination and social participation. Catholic churches from countries experiencing a communist regime received a strong international support from the international structure of Catholic Church and great support from Vatican. This better protected them against the communist repressions and helped them to survive. By contrast, Protestant churches did not get any external support and were more affected by the communist repression (Pollack 2001; Stark 2001; Froese 2004). While the Catholic Church openly opposed the political power and contributed to organizing political opposition in countries like Poland, the activity of the Protestant church was drastically reduced. The strict control on associational activities practiced by the communist power impeded the Protestant church to develop its associational structure and provided less opportunities for Protestant believers to practice their civic skills. Because the Catholic Church was more active than the Protestant churches, we expect to find stronger contextual effects of the Catholic denomination in Central and Eastern Europe. Summarizing, at the individual level, we expect people belonging to the Catholic denomination to be less civically active; at the same time, at the country level, we expect a larger proportion of the population to be involved in civic activities in those countries in which a higher proportion of the population belongs to the Catholic denomination. On the other hand, as previous studies pointed out, Protestant churches instill values of tolerance and stimulate extra-familial ties, stimulating individuals to get involved in civic actions. Thus, at the individual level, we expect to find a positive effect of belonging to a Protestant denomination on social participation.

Orthodox denomination shapes social participation in a different way. Throughout history, the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the state was governed by the concept of *symphonia*, which involved a subordination of the religious institution to the political power (Stan and Turcescu 2000, 2007). In the Byzantine

Empire, the emperor was coordinating the church's activity and he led it as one department of the state (Wach 1955). The relationship remained unchanged over time, regardless of who was representing the state. While political power controlled public life, the Orthodox Church was in charge only with spiritual life, but its dominance in this area was challenged, from time to time, by political leaders (Stan and Turcescu 2007).

The total subordination of the Orthodox Church to the political power and its excessive concentration on spiritual issues had significant consequences for the public role of the church and for its impact on shaping civic life. In societies dominated by Catholicism and Protestantism, there was a strict separation between political and ecclesiastical power (Huntington 1997). The two types of power were involved in the public life, sometimes competing, other times supporting each other. In the Orthodox world, the political power subordinated the spiritual one and monopolized the public space. Even when the church got involved in public affairs, its involvement was controlled by the state. Consequently, the church was in charge only with spiritual life and did less to transmit civic information and to create civic skills. Moreover, the model promoted by the Orthodox Church resembles what Jepperson (2002) calls a statist society, a society dominated by the state, which represents a separate and superior order of political governance. Previous studies pointed out that statist societies do not stimulate the development of civil society and of social participation (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001). Based on these arguments, we assume that belonging to the Orthodox denomination will exert a negative effect on civic engagement at the individual level. Moreover, at the country level, we expect to find lower levels of civic engagement in those countries in which the proportion of people belonging to the Orthodox Church is higher.

Studies dedicated to social participation identify various individual and contextual factors influencing people's propensity to engage in such activities. At the individual level, studies have shown that characteristics such as education, employment status, income, family, and gender have a significant impact on social participation. Age, education, being married, being male, and being employed have a positive impact on volunteering and membership in civic organizations (Ruiter and de Graaf 2006; Curtis et al. 1992; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas 2001).

Previous studies have also shown that membership in voluntary organizations is linked to political values and attitudes. Interest in politics is positively associated with social participation (Verba et al. 1995; van Deth and Elff 2004; Bekkers 2005). Interpersonal trust is also considered to be linked to associational membership (Levi and Stoker 2000; Letki 2004; Sonderskov 2010). In addition to values and attitudes, membership in voluntary associations can also be influenced by evaluations of government (Levi 1998).

Starting from the theoretical approaches presented above and controlling for all the relevant predictors, we test four hypotheses regarding the relationship between religion and social participation. The first hypothesis (H1) refers only to the relationship between religion and social participation at the individual level. The other three hypotheses reflect our expectations about the relationship between social participation and belonging to a specific denomination, both at the individual and

at the country level, assuming interactions between individual-level influences and aggregate-level influences.

- (H1) Religious beliefs and behaviors have a negative impact on social participation in postcommunist societies.
- (H2) Catholic religious affiliation exerts a negative effect on social participation at the individual level, while at the aggregate level, the predominance of the Catholic denomination increases the social engagement in postcommunist countries.
- (H3) Protestant religious affiliation exerts a positive effect on social participation, at the individual level, while, at the aggregate level, the predominance of the Protestant denomination has no effect on civic engagement in postcommunist countries.
- (H4) At the individual level, Orthodox religious affiliation exerts a negative effect on social participation, while at the aggregate level, the predominance of the Orthodox denomination decreases the social engagement in postcommunist countries.

11.3 Data, Measurement, and Methods

The analyses presented here use data from the 2008 wave of the European Values Study.³ The sample we use contains all 21 postcommunist countries included in the first official release of the data (the number of cases for each country is included in parentheses): Albania (1,534), Azerbaijan (1,505), Armenia (1,500), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1,512), Bulgaria (1,500), Belarus (1,500), Czech Republic (1,821), Estonia (1,518), Georgia (1,500), Hungary (1,513), Latvia (1,506), Lithuania (1,500), Moldavia (1,551), Montenegro (1,516), Poland (1,510), Romania (1,489), Russian Federation (1,504), Serbia (1,512), Slovak Republic (1,509), Slovenia (1,366), and Ukraine (1,507).

11.3.1 *Dependent Variable*

The dependent variable is *membership in voluntary organizations*. The variable indicates whether the respondent belongs (coded 1) or not (coded 0) to any of the following voluntary organizations and activities: social welfare services for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; education, arts, music, or cultural activities; trade unions; political parties or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality; third world development or human rights; conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights; professional associations;

³For more details about the European Values Study, see www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu

youth work; sports or recreation; women's groups; peace movement; voluntary organizations concerned with health; other groups. Given our focus on the effect of religion on social participation, we did not include in the dependent variable membership in religious or church organizations.⁴

11.3.2 Independent Variables

11.3.2.1 Individual Level

We have included four groups of variables measured at individual level in the estimated models. The first group of variables controls for sociodemographic characteristics: gender (coded 1 for male respondents and 0 for female respondents), age (measured in years), education (indicated by the age when respondents completed full-time education), and town size (ordinal variable with eight categories). We also included in this group controls for other variables shown in previous studies to have an effect on social participation: employment (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are employed), marital status (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are married or in a couple), and immigrant (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents who are immigrants).

The second group of variables includes indicators of religious beliefs and behaviors: importance of god in respondent's life (variable ranging from 1 "not at all important" to 10 "very important"), frequency of praying to god outside religious services (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents praying at least once a week), church attendance (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents attending church services at least once a month), and church attendance during childhood (dummy variable coded 1 for respondents attending church services at least once a month during childhood).

The third group of variables is represented by a set of dummy variables indicating the respondents' religious denomination. We have included dummy variables for Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and other religion, with the reference category being represented by respondents who indicated they do not belong to any religious denomination.

The fourth group of variables controls for a series of political values and attitudes related to social participation. We have included in this group variables measuring the importance of politics in respondent's life, frequency of political discussions with friends, interpersonal trust, evaluations of government, and concern about the living conditions of children in poor families. By adding these variables in the model, we estimate the effects of religion on social participation while controlling for other factors that might have an effect on the dependent variable.

⁴We have estimated the final model with the dependent variable including membership in religious or church organizations as well (the results, not shown here, can be obtained from the authors), but the results do not differ substantively from the models presented here.

11.3.2.2 Country Level

The models we estimate use two variables measured at country level. The first variable is an aggregate measure of church attendance at country level, constructed from individual-level data, indicating the percentage of the population declaring at least monthly church attendance. The second variable represents the percentage of the population belonging to the Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox denomination, depending on the model.

11.4 Results

The EVS data shows significant variation in the level of social participation across postcommunist Europe: the percentage of people belonging to at least one voluntary organization (see Fig. 11.1) varies from a low of 8 %, in Georgia, to a high of 51 %, in Belarus, with the sample average being 24 %. With the exception of only four countries (Belarus, Slovenia, Czech Republic, and Estonia), the rate of social participation in all other postcommunist countries is below a third of the population.




Fig. 11.1 Percentage of population belonging to at least one voluntary organization (Note: Religious or church organizations not included. Data source: EVS 2008)

These results confirm previous studies, which show postcommunist citizens to be less interested in social participation (Miszlivetz and Jensen 1998).

In order to assess the relationship between different aspects of religion (denomination, beliefs, and behaviors) and social participation, we have estimated a series of multilevel logistic regression models. The first model we estimated was the null model (results not presented here). The results of this model show that there is significant variation between countries with respect to membership in voluntary organizations.⁵

The three models presented in Table 11.1 have the same set of independent variables at the individual level, but they differ at the country level, each model taking into account the percentage of the population belonging to one of the three main religious denominations we analyze (Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox) and corresponding, thus, to the last three hypotheses stated above.⁶ Due to the reduced number of cases on the aggregate level, we cannot simultaneously control for the effect of the main religious denomination in the country and we have run different models for each denomination.

The individual-level results confirm most of the findings of previous studies: social participation is higher among respondents who are younger, better educated, and who are employed.⁷ Membership in voluntary organizations is lower among respondents living in large cities and among immigrants. Gender and marital status do not have a significant effect on social participation in postcommunist European countries. All indicators of political values and attitudes have significant positive effects on the dependent variable.

Moving on to the relationship between religion and social participation, the results show that three of the variables measuring religious beliefs and behaviors (church attendance during childhood, frequency of prayer, and importance of God) do not have significant effects on social participation. The only variable with a significant effect on membership in voluntary organizations is the present-time church attendance: people who attend church services at least once a month have higher levels of social participation, compared to people who attend church services less than once a month.

This is, however, only part of the story. At the country level, the aggregate church attendance has a significant negative effect, indicating that the rate of social participation is lower in countries in which the percentage of the population going to church at least once a month is higher. In addition to this, the interaction term between individual church attendance and aggregate church attendance is significant and negative

⁵The χ^2 test for the variance component between countries has a value of $\chi^2=2,192.93$, with 20 degrees of freedom and $p<0.001$.

⁶Basically, the three models are composed of an individual-level model and a country-level model. In the individual-level part, which is common to all three models, we predict whether an individual is belonging to a voluntary organization or not. In the country-level part, which is specific to each model, we predict the average level of participation at the country level.

⁷We have also estimated a model testing for a curvilinear effect of age, but the coefficient for age squared was not statistically significant.

Table 11.1 Multilevel logistic regression analyses of membership in voluntary organizations

	Model 1: Catholic	Model 2: Protestant	Model 3: Orthodox
	Odds ratio <i>p</i>	Odds ratio <i>p</i>	Odds ratio <i>p</i>
Intercept	0.02***	0.03***	0.04***
Church attendance	0.98**	0.98*	0.98*
% Catholic	1.01*		
% Protestant		1.00	
% Orthodox			0.99*
Religious denomination			
Catholic	0.99	1.00	1.00
Protestant	1.58***	1.59***	1.58***
Orthodox	1.00	0.99	1.00
Other religion	0.79**	0.78**	0.78**
Religious behaviors and beliefs			
Church attendance	1.33**	1.33**	1.33**
Aggregate church attendance	0.99	0.99*	0.99*
Church attendance childhood	1.01	1.01	1.01
Frequency of prayer	1.01	1.01	1.01
Importance of God	0.99	0.99	0.99
Controls			
Gender	1.04	1.04	1.04
Age	0.99***	0.99***	0.99***
Education	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***
Town size	0.97***	0.97***	0.97***
Marital status	0.99	0.99	0.99
Employed	1.80***	1.80***	1.80***
Immigrant	0.86*	0.86*	0.86*
Importance of politics	1.10***	1.10***	1.10***
Frequency of political discussions	1.36***	1.36***	1.36***
Interpersonal trust	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*
Evaluation of government	1.03***	1.03***	1.03***
Concern for poor children	1.13***	1.13***	1.13***
Level 2 variance	0.27***	0.36***	0.28***

Notes: Level-1 $N=31,873$. Level-2 $N=21$. Listwise deletion. Random intercept, Bernoulli. Reference category for religious denomination: no religious denomination

* $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

in all three models, indicating that the interpretation of the relationship between church attendance and membership in voluntary organizations should take into account both individual and aggregate church attendance.

Figure 11.2 presents this relationship in a graphical format, which is easier to interpret. The results show that in countries in which the percentage of population attending church services at least once a month is low, people who go to church at least once a month are more likely to be members in a voluntary organization by comparison to those who go to church less often. In more religious contexts, however, the likelihood of being civically active decreases, and this




Fig. 11.2 Relationship between membership and aggregate church attendance for low-high individual church attendance groups (This graph is computed using the results of model 1. Since the graphs computed based on the results of the other models are identical, they are not presented here)

decrease is more accentuated for those with high church attendance than for those with low church attendance, so that in highly religious contexts, the relationship between individual church attendance and membership in voluntary organizations is reversed.

The results discussed so far offer only partial support for our first hypothesis. First, only church attendance has a significant effect on social participation, while the other variables indicating religious beliefs and behaviors do not have significant effects. Second, although the effect of church attendance at the individual level is positive, contrary to our expectations, the results show that the relationship between church attendance and membership in voluntary organizations is negative at the aggregate level. Third, the results also show that the context matters: being a highly religious person in a highly religious society is not the same as being a highly religious person in a less religious society.

We turn our attention now to the set of variables indicating membership to specific religious denominations. In all three models we estimated, the results at the individual level are similar: people belonging to the Protestant denominations are more likely to belong to a voluntary organization, while belonging to the Catholic Church or to the Orthodox Church does not have a significant effect on our dependent variable.

The models we estimated also test for the effect of religious denomination on the dependent variable at the aggregate level, using the percentage of population

belonging to the Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox denomination as a country-level independent variable. The predominance of the Catholic denomination in a postcommunist country is associated with higher levels of social participation (see Model 1 in Table 11.1). Model 2 shows that the percentage of Protestants in a population does not have a significant effect on membership in voluntary organizations. Finally, the model taking into account the percentage of population belonging to the Orthodox Church (see Model 3) shows that countries with higher proportions of people belonging to the Orthodox Church are characterized by lower levels of social participation. All these results confirm our expectations regarding the relationship between the predominance of a certain religion in the population and membership in voluntary organizations. The history of the three religious denominations in Central and Eastern Europe seems, thus, to have a continuing effect on social participation. The activism of the Catholic Church in the region and its open opposition, fueled by the external support it received, to the communist regimes have offered a model of social participation that seems to have been adopted by those living in countries with a strong Catholic Church. At the same time, the Orthodox Church, controlled by the communist regimes, could not offer such a model, and as a result, people living in countries where Orthodoxy is dominant are less inclined towards social participation.

11.5 Conclusions

In this chapter we have investigated the relationship between religion and social participation in a sample of 21 postcommunist European countries, paying particular attention to the effects of belonging to a specific religious denomination and to the effects of religious variables indicating beliefs and behaviors in the postcommunist context. The results presented here lead to a series of significant conclusions, but, at the same time, they also indicate the need for additional research that could explain some of our results.

The results presented here offered only partial support for our first hypothesis: out of the groups of variables measuring religious beliefs and behaviors, church attendance is the only variable with a significant effect on social participation. The results suggested, however, that this relationship is highly dependent on the religious context: high individual church attendance has a positive effect on social participation in contexts characterized by low religiosity, while in contexts characterized by high religiosity, high individual church attendance has a negative effect on social participation.

Our expectations regarding the effects of the predominance of a particular denomination at aggregate level on civic activism were supported by the data: people's involvement in voluntary organizations is higher in countries in which the Catholic Church is strong and lower in countries in which the Orthodox Church is dominant. At the individual level, however, belonging to the Catholic or the Orthodox Churches does not have an effect on social participation, and only belonging to a Protestant denomination is associated with increased involvement in civic activities.

After the breakdown of the communist regime, a religious revival was registered in most of the postcommunist countries, but this was a short-time effect and most of these societies followed the secularization pathway after the first years of transition (Pickel 2009). Based on our results, we could expect a decrease in social participation in highly secularized countries from Central and Eastern Europe, such as Czech Republic or Slovenia, because a reduction in the number of churchgoers in these countries will reduce their social engagement. At the same time, it should be noted that, despite the fact that religion has a significant effect on social participation, this effect is rather small by comparison to the effects of different values and attitudes or those of different characteristics of the respondents. This suggests that changes in social participation are more likely to result from changes in these determinants than from changes in religious beliefs and behaviors.

For further research we suggest two new directions of investigation. The first one is to investigate the effect of religion on social participation in Central and Eastern Europe from a longitudinal perspective. As we have pointed out before, the end of communist regime was followed by an increasing and then by a decreasing in religiosity. In this context, further research can focus on the impact of the dynamic of the religious field on social participation in postcommunist societies. A second direction should focus towards identifying those characteristics of different denominations that have an effect on social participation at the individual level and that may explain why belonging to a Protestant denomination has a positive effect on civic activism, while belonging to the Catholic or Orthodox Church has no significant effect, despite the hierarchical modes of interaction they promote.

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