

American Current Literature on Kant.

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I. New Books.

Ladd, George Trumbull, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. *The Philosophy of Knowledge. An Inquiry into the nature, limits, and validity of human cognitive faculty.* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1897, pp. XV, 614. — In my paper on the influence of Kant's philosophy in America, published recently in this journal, reference was made to a forthcoming work on the theory of knowledge by Professor George T. Ladd. That volume has been now before the public for some time, and several critical reviews of it have already been published. The general consensus of opinion seems to be that *The Philosophy of Knowledge* possesses the characteristic merits and defects of the author's earlier works. To clear the way for the pleasanter task by speaking first of what seem to me to be faults of the work, — it must be confessed that, in spite of occasional passages of great vigor, the discussions are oftentimes so long as to become wearisome. If this were the necessary result of a detailed analysis of special questions, or a thorough-going examination and criticism of historical opinions, one would, of course, have no reason to complain. But the work before us is rather an exposition of the writer's own view, than a critical search for a tenable standpoint. This being so, it is not difficult to understand that it might have been improved by condensation. The main thing to be regretted is, of course, that many will be deterred from reading the book by the time and effort which such an undertaking demands.

Another, and perhaps more serious defect, is the result of the unfortunate feeling of isolation under which the author has worked. The sense of cooperation, of working shoulder to shoulder with one's fellows, which makes scientific work in modern times so inspiring, seems to have been wholly lacking. Indeed, the preface to the work states that there are 'no modern writers in English from whom any help is to be derived'; and that the book 'asks and should receive the treatment due to a pioneer work'. These statements in themselves are, of course, quite incomprehensible, and require no refutation. The spirit which they express, however, has exercised an unfortunate influence upon both the manner and the matter of the author's discussions. Professor Ladd's independence

of the work of his predecessors and contemporaries is, naturally, by no means so absolute as he himself believes. As will appear later, his conclusions may be said to be the direct outcome of the spirit, if not of the letter, of Kant's teachings; and there is also abundant evidence that he has even derived help unconsciously from some "modern writers of philosophy in English". This, however, must be regarded as a merit, not as a defect of the work: a "pioneer work" on epistemology at the present day would not be entitled to any serious consideration.

On the other hand, it is easy to find much to commend in the volume before us. Perhaps there is nothing more worthy of note in the book than the spirit of practical earnestness which permeates all its discussions. "I have constantly striven", he says, "to make epistemology vital, — a thing of moment because indissolubly and most intimately connected with the ethical and religious life of the age" (p. IX). Problems of knowledge have thus for the author more than a merely abstract and theoretical interest. For, as he himself expresses it, "the agnostic or despairing attitude towards the problem of knowledge itself lies, both logically and in fact, at the base of all other agnosticism and of manifold forms of despair" (p. 27). The insistence upon the unity of mind, and upon the part, which feeling and will play in processes of cognition, is another excellent feature of the book. To this subject two special chapters are devoted. (Chaps VI and XVII). I may mention further, as especially worthy of consideration, the chapters entitled "Sufficient Reason", "Experience and the Transcendent", and "The Teleology of Knowledge". In these discussions, Professor Ladd puts himself in line with the most valuable results of modern epistemological writing.

It is possible, I think, to indicate the general nature of the author's conclusions by considering the relation in which he stands to Kant. "I have had", he writes, "the method and the conclusion of the great master of criticism before me, from the beginning to the end of my work. Yet the position to which my independent investigations have forced me, are chiefly critical of, and antagonistic to, the positions of the Critique of Pure Reason" (p. IX).

In chapter III (the second of two chapters dealing with the "History of Opinion"), the author formally sets forth the main points of agreement and difference between his own position and that of Kant. He finds, with the latter, that "cognition of things is impossible without the so-called faculties of sense, imagination, and intellect all being called forth and developed in their living unity" (p. 79). He also recognizes that the universal and necessary form of knowledge is the work of the mind. "The subjective gives laws to the objective. The forms of cognizing faculty set terms to our cognition of things" (p. 80).

Professor Ladd, however, denies that either space and time or the categories are merely subjective, and do not belong to the nature of the real world. This, of course, involves also the rejection of Kant's fundamental distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves. Further, he refuses to admit that Kant's antinomies are real antinomies at all. They are either self-made difficulties, or "starting-points or incitements

to the outreach after those higher truths in the full apprehension of which the very appearance of paralogism or antinomy passes away" (p. 82). Moreover, knowledge can not be limited to the domain of sensuous cognition. The distinction between knowledge and faith cannot be maintained. All knowledge transcends experience. Finally, in enumerating the points of divergence between Kant's doctrines and those of Professor Ladd, we must mention the latter's view of the Self. For the author, as for Fichte, the Ego is known directly and intuitively, and furnishes the key by means of which the world is interpreted. "While the knowledge of Self may attain an intuitive penetration to the heart of Reality, the knowledge of things remains an analogical interpretation of their apparent behaviour into terms of a real nature corresponding, in important characteristics, to our own" (p. 227).

Notwithstanding these important differences, which are somewhat strongly emphasized throughout the work, Professor Ladd's system may, I think, be said to be built upon Kantian foundations. We have already seen how fundamental are the points of agreement which he himself admits. And this impression of relationship is strengthened by noting how completely he adopts Kant's critical or transcendental method. For he begins, like the latter, by emphasizing the synthetic and objective character of judgment; and proceeds to show what is necessarily involved (or, as he expresses it, "implicated") in this fact. Following this method, he arrives, as we have seen, at the notion of an actively functioning Ego or Self, as the supreme condition of knowledge. And from the nature of this highest principle he seeks to explain the nature of knowledge. The categories of Identity and Difference, Sufficient Reason, and Teleology, are all expressions of the nature of the self-active Ego — conditions, one might say, of the unity of self-consciousness. Kant's characteristic caution, as is well known, prevented him from taking this position with regard to teleology. But it is not difficult to see that Professor Ladd's position on this point corresponds to the extension of the Kantian doctrine which was made by Kant's followers.

Even the distinction between knowledge and faith which is, in a sense, fundamental to Kant's system, and which, as we have seen, Professor Ladd emphatically rejects, is not entirely overcome in the volume before us. It is true that by emphasizing the organic unity of all of the parts of mind, and by pointing out the function of feeling and will in the processes of cognition, the author has been able to mediate to some extent this antithesis. But that some such distinction remains, and must be recognized is evident, I think, from the paragraph which concludes the discussion of this question:—"Even among themselves men differ greatly concerning the conformity of particular beings, or of concrete actions, to their own ethical and æsthetical ideals. This difference shows that the mind is here dealing with subjects which, although not to be wholly disconnected from its most assured cognitions, are not connected with these cognitions in the most assured way. They belong to the realm in which feeling and what is called "faith" have a more important part to perform. But this conclusion is a very different thing from assigning all apparent

cognitions concerning these subjects to the realm of illusion, or of the wholly unknowable. For it has been shown that feeling and faith are factors in knowledge" (p. 529).

There are naturally many points of interest discussed in the book upon which I have been unable to touch. A theory of reality, to which the author proposes to devote a future volume, is merely outlined. The highest synthesis, for the author, as for Lotze, takes the form of an Absolute- or World-Self which includes in an organic unity the life of individual things, all of which also exist as souls or selves. In closing, one feels obliged to excuse oneself from discussing any of the conclusions here laid down. With many of them the present writer is in hearty sympathy. But it is surely fair to demand that an author shall attempt to come to an understanding with those working in the same field, and that he shall set forth the arguments by which his position is sustained. One can not but feel that the value and influence of Professor Ladd's book would have been greatly increased, if the expository procedure (which always has an air of dogmatism) had been abandoned, and the reader admitted to partnership in a real investigation.

Josiah Royce, Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University, **Joseph Le Conte** and **G. H. Howison**, Professors in the University of California, and **Sidney Edward Mezes**, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Texas. *The Conception of God. A Philosophical Discussion concerning the Nature of the Divine Idea as a Demonstrable Reality.* New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co., 1897, pp. XXXVIII, 354. — This book is the outcome of a public discussion before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, which took place about two years ago. In this discussion, Professor Royce, as the principal speaker, formulated essentially the same conception of God as that which he had already developed in his earlier works: *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, and *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, although he here follows Bradley in employing the term 'Experience' instead of 'Thought' and 'Knowledge'. Every intelligent interpretation of experience, Royce holds, involves an appeal from this experienced fragment, to some more organized whole of experience in whose unity this fragment is conceived as finding its organic place. To assert that there is any absolutely real fact indicated by our experience, is to regard this reality as presented to an absolutely organized experience in which every fragment finds its place (p. 42). This Absolute Experience is God. "God is known as thought fulfilled; as Experience absolutely organized, so as to have one ideal unity of meaning; as Truth transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with Idea; as Selfhood eternally obtained" (pp. 45, 46). The essay in which these conclusions are advanced, as well as the critical papers by Mezes, Le Conte, and Howison, (respectively entitled; "Worth and Goodness as Marks of the Absolute", "God and Connected Problems in the light of Evolution", and "The City of God, and the true God as its Head") appeared in the pamphlet report published soon after the discussion took place. These

papers, together with a long supplementary essay by Professor Royce on "The Absolute and the Individual", are now republished, under the editorship of G. H. Howison, as Volume I of the Publications of the Philosophical Union of the University of California.

The Introduction to the volume supplied by the editor (pp. IX—XXXVIII), states very clearly and forcibly the difficulties which the critics have found in Royce's position. The three main questions brought forward are thus stated: 1. Whether the novel method of proving God real put forward by the leader of the discussion . . . is adequate to establish in the Absolute Reality a nature in the strict sense divine. 2. Whether the conception of God upon which the whole argument of the leader proceeds, is in truth a conception of a Personal God. 3. Whether this conception is compatible with that autonomy of moral action, which mankind in its fully enlightened civilization, and especially under the Christian consciousness, has come to appreciate as the vital principle of all personality (p. XI). While answering all of these questions in the negative, Howison, who is not only the most trenchant critic, but who, as editor of the volume, has the best opportunity of stating his views, comes into the sharpest opposition with Royce on the third point. His contention is that this theory of the Person, making the single Self nothing but an identical part of the unifying Divine Will, gives to the created soul no freedom at all of its own (p. XIII). The conflict then comes to be one between Monism and Pluralism, or, since both parties interpret their views in terms of Idealism, between Monistic Idealism, and Pluralistic or Ethical Idealism.

In the supplementary Essay (pp. 135—354), which forms the larger as well as the more important part of the volume before us, Royce proposes to seek reconciliation rather than refutation. "I shall try to show", he says, "not that Professor Howison is wrong in the stress which he lays upon ethical importance of his individuals, but that the Absolute, as I have ventured to define the conception, has room for ethical individuality without detriment to its true unity I shall also try to show that the very essence of ethical individuality brings it at last, despite the mentioned antinomy, into a deeper harmony with the concept of the Absolute, so that just because the ethical individual is sacred, therefore must his separate life be 'hid', in a deep and final sense, in the unity of the system to which he is freely subordinated." (p. 137). This Essay falls into five parts, of which the first restates the original argument, and the last is devoted to answering the objections of the critics. In the remaining three divisions, which treat respectively of "The Conception of Will and its Relation to the Absolute", "The Principle of Individuation", and "The Self-Conscious Individual", the author seeks to add to the conception of the Absolute Intelligence, the element of Will. "The Divine will is simply that aspect of the Absolute which is expressed in the concrete and differentiated individuality of the World" (p. 202). Moreover, "the One Will of the Absolute is a one which is essentially and organically composed of Many The many ideals are all thus subject, even in their very freedom, to the condition that

their various embodiments of freedom should be such as ultimately to unite in the one system of the Absolute Will" (274). This condition, however, does not exhaustively condition the content of the various ideals, and, therefore, leaves room for individuality. Further, it is maintained that "the sort of dependence which each individual thus constituted has upon other individuals, and upon the whole, is precisely the sort of dependence demanded by the moral world A world of individuals more separate than this, more endowed with absolute caprice than this, would be a world of anarchy, no City of God, but a moral hell" (274, 275).

It would, of course, be absurd to say that Royce has furnished a completely satisfactory account of the individual and his relation to the Absolute. Although one who looks for a ready-made, fixed, definition of the individual may find his results disappointing, it is impossible to deny that his treatment possesses great value and suggestiveness. It is interesting to note that even in the light of this essay, the various critics maintain their objections to Royce's theory. The editor of the volume promises in a separate writing, and at a date not too remote, a thorough affirmative treatment of "Personal Idealism with a genuine Personal God".

Watson, John, Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queens University, Canada. *Christianity and Idealism. The Christian Ideal of Life in its Relations to the Greek and Jewish Ideals and to Modern Philosophy.* New edition, with additions. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan & Co, 1897, pp. XXXVIII, 292. — This book also originated in a course of lectures delivered by the author before the Philosophical Union of the University of California, and first appeared under the editorship of Professor G. H. Howison. In republishing it, the author, while leaving unchanged the first part (dealing with the Greek, Jewish, and Christian ideals of life) has enlarged the philosophical exposition of Idealism contained in the second part by adding three chapters dealing respectively with "The Failure of Materialism", "The Idealistic interpretation of Natural Evolution", and "Idealism and Human Progress".

Watson is well known throughout the English-speaking world as the author of *Kant* and his *English Critics* (1881), *Selections from Kant* (1887), *Comte*, *Mill*, and *Spencer* (1895), and other works. He represents that form of Hegelian Idealism of which Edward Caird, the Master of Balliol College, Oxford, is perhaps the best known exponent at the present day. The two main theses of the volume before us seen to be: 1. That philosophy and religion cannot be divorced. "Reason must be religious and religion rational, or human progress is inconceivable" (p. 251). 2. "That Idealism is in essential harmony with the Christian ideal of life, as held by the Founder of Christianity, however it may differ, at least in form, from popular Christian theology" (p. 257). In support of the first thesis, the author criticises sharply the distinction recently urged by Balfour in his *Foundations of Belief* between 'reason', and 'faith', or 'ethical needs' (pp. XIff., 121ff.), as well as the view maintained by Kidd in his work entitled *Social Evolution*, that

religion is essentially 'ultra-rational', or 'supernatural'. The author's interpretation of Christianity gives evidence of much historical insight, and the exposition and defence of Idealism is throughout extremely clear and vigorous. Although more popular in form than Watson's earlier works, the book deals in an able and interesting way with some of the most important problems of the present time.

Walker, Wm. H. *The Development of the Doctrine of Personality in Modern Philosophy.* Part I, Ann Arbor Mich. 1896, pp. 80. — This work, although printed in America, was written in Germany as an Inaugural Dissertation under Professor Windelband's direction at the University of Strassburg. It is a careful and painstaking study of the doctrine of Personality in the writings of the most prominent thinkers from the time of the Renaissance, down to, and including Kant. The author indicates that he intends to continue his investigation by examining the opinions of those who have written since Kant's day. As a result of his studies, he finds that the history of modern philosophy shows a gradual and necessary return to a consideration of the nature and worth of personality. The philosophers of the Renaissance turned away from man to nature. Walker traces the gradual growth and development of the concept of Personality until its culmination in Kants *Kr. d. pr. V.* Kant closes one epoch and begins a new one. "With Kant it may be said that the doctrine of personality as it exists in the individual man is complete" (p. 78). In the new period, however, the conception is reached of the personality of God as the underlying ground of the world and of man, and henceforth the discussion of the personality of man and the personality of God go hand in hand (p. 79).

Wenley, R. M., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. *An Outline Introductory to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.* New York, Henry Holt & Co., 1897, pp. VI. 95. — The author writes in his preface: "I have found that students, when about to undertake first-hand consideration of a classical text, are apt to be sensibly handicapped by a lack of a general conspectus of its contents." To obviate this difficulty in the case of the *Kr. d. r. V.*, the author has produced this little volume which he proposes that students should master before proceeding to deal with the text. He also promises, if the present work meets with a favorable reception, to prepare, with the help of prominent philosophical scholars in America and Britain, similar accounts of the other masterpieces of philosophy.

The book contains a brief account of the genesis of the Critical philosophy, and a few pages devoted to the problem of *Kr. d. r. V.* Wenley follows Caird in representing the Critique as an inquiry into the possibility of knowledge, and makes little or nothing of the 'mediating tendency' of the work. In the summary of Kant's views, he states in a simple and admirable fashion the main doctrines of the Critique, following the principal divisions of that work. A list of reference books, and an explanation of some of the terms most frequently employed by

Kant, are appended. The author has accomplished well the task he set himself. The present writer, however, is inclined to believe that students could obtain the information contained in this little volume equally well from any standard work on the history of philosophy. Strangely enough, a great many of the dates set down in the book are wrong. Thus, for example, Hume died in 1776, not in 1779 (p. 1); and his *Essays* including the 'Inquiry' were translated into German 1754—56, not in 1765 (p. 91). Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*, was published in 1710, not in 1709 (p. 89); *The Critique of Judgment* appeared in 1790, not in 1793 (p. 92): The dates given for a number of the other works of Kant are also wrong.

Hyde, William De Witt, President of Bowdoin College. *Practical Idealism*. New York, The Macmillan Company, London, Macmillan & Co., 1897, pp. XI, 335. — In this clearly written volume, the author attempts to tell in a simple and popular fashion how thought builds up the world in which we live. "Its practical aim precludes the discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, and confines it to those concrete aspects of philosophy which lie closest to the common concerns of men" (p. VI). The author divides his work into two main divisions, treating respectively of "The Natural World", and "The Spiritual World". Under the former heading, he discusses the procedure of intelligence in constructing the various worlds of Sense-Perception, of Association, of Science, and of Art. The Spiritual World includes the World of Persons, the World of Institutions, the World of Morality, and the World of Religion. In the later chapters of the book, the author shows how the principles of philosophical Idealism can be applied to the various practical problems of individual, family, social, and political life. The book illustrates, in an admirable way, the fact that philosophy is not a mere scholastic discipline, but has a real bearing on the most concrete and practical affairs of human life.

II. Articles.

Everett, C. C., Professor of the Philosophy of Religion, Harvard University. *Kant's Influence in Theology*. New World, Vol. VI. No. 21 (March 1897). — The theological outcome of Kant's speculations was fundamental to his thought, and what chiefly interested him in his philosophical investigations. — By an analysis of the postulates which Kant laid down when dealing with the moral problem in the first two Critiques, the author shows that "with Kant theology became subjective rather than objective; so that it may be said to rest upon religion rather than religion upon it". — He then proceeds to discuss the relation of later theological developments to this position. Hegel and Schleiermacher, as well as the school of Ritschl, may be said to have built upon the continent which Kant discovered.

Creighton, J. E. Is the Transcendental Ego an Unmeaning Conception? *Philos. Review* VI, 2 (March, 1897). — This article takes account only of the theoretical or cognitive side of consciousness. The psychological mode of investigation, which investigates the quality, duration, intensity, etc. of conscious processes and their mode of combination, is distinguished from that of epistemology, which must take as its starting-point the judgment. Now, from the latter standpoint, the Ego is not something behind or beyond the judging Thought. To assert this would be to return to Substantialism. The real question is whether judging Thought itself possesses the predicates which the Transcendentalists applied to their Ego. The author argues that such predicates do belong to Thought — that it is permanent, and self-identical, and in a certain sense infinite.

Calkins, Mary Whiton (Professor at Wellesley College). Kant's Conception of Leibniz's doctrine of Space and Time. *Philosoph. Review* VI, 4 (July, 1897). — The thesis of this paper is, 'that Kant looking, as he himself admits, through Wolffian glasses, yet with occasional support from exceptional statements of Leibniz himself, has completely misunderstood the latter's doctrine of space and time'. In spite of several ambiguous statements which might naturally be interpreted in this way, Miss Calkins maintains that for Leibniz space and time are not abstractions from extra-mental monads. Attention is called to the clear distinction made, in the correspondence with Clarke, and in the *Examen des principes de Malebranche*, between space and time, and extension and duration. Although space and time for Leibniz are undetermined and not even actual without things, they are yet independent of things, and exist as subjective ordering principles of the divine mind. Miss Calkins further calls attention to the fact that Kant sometimes states that Leibniz teaches that space and time are relations of phenomena, sometimes considers them as relations of things-in-themselves. This seeming contradiction is, however, to be explained by Kant's further statement that Leibniz regarded phenomena as intelligibilia, and thus identified them with things-in-themselves. 'The theories which Kant opposes are, in truth, not those of Leibniz at all; but Leibniz probably holds, with Kant, that space and time are subjective principles, ordering forms of consciousness'.

Edmunds, Albert J. Time and Space: Hints Given by Swedenborg to Kant. *The New-Church Review*, Vol. IV, 2 (April 1897), pp. 257—265. — It is maintained in this article that, while Swedenborg was acquainted with Leibniz's views of Space and Time as expressed in his letters to Clarke, he himself set forth the doctrine in certain passages of the *Arcana Coelestia* (which are here quoted) that Space and Time are forms of the human intellect, and that angels have some other and higher kind of thought-forms. The author points out that we know from Kant's statement (*Vorbericht to Träume eines Geistersehers*) that he bought and read the *Arcana*, and that it is

impossible to suppose that he was not influenced by the views of space and time contained in it. He also quotes a passage from the *Träume eines Geistersehers* in which Kant says, among other things, that "Metaphysics is a science of the boundaries of human reason" (*Werke* pp. 375—76 Hartenstein). Here, the author maintains, Kant expressly says that it was his inquiries into Swedenborg which led him to formulate the central doctrine of his critical system: That the bounds of the human intellect must be determined before metaphysics can begin to be a science. This, he points out, has been already stated by a writer in *Macmillan's Magazine* for May 1864. In denying to space and time any existence outside the human mind, however, Kant lost sight of the presence and action of the Creator. Curiously enough, in the *Dissertation* he defines space to be the [Divine] omnipresence as a phenomenon; and time the phenomenal eternity of the universal cause. This view, which Kant afterwards abandoned, had been maintained by Swedenborg; and Lotze has lately called us back to such a modification of the Kantian doctrine. Swedenborg's doctrine, the author maintains, contains what is best in Leibniz, Kant, and Lotze.

Becker, Geo. F. Kant as a Natural Philosopher. *American Journal of Science*. Vol. V, pp. 97—112 (Febr. 1898). — The author in this article calls attention to the physical theories of Kant, especially as set forth in the *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte*. He points out that Kant was not the first to speculate regarding the origin of the heavenly bodies, though he was the first Newtonian to do so. The first germ of the nebular hypothesis in modern times is found in Descartes *Principia Philosophiae*. Swedenborg also published a rational cosmogony, though it contained scarcely any advance upon that of Descartes. (Becker refers to an account of Swedenborg's views by N. Nyren in the *Vierteljahrsh. d. astron. Gesellschaft* 1879, p. 80, which appeared in an English translation in the *New Church Review* for July 1897; and also to a paper by E. S. Holden in *The North American Review*, Vol. CXXXI (1880), p. 377). After giving a summary of Kant's views, and of the deductions which he made from his nebular hypothesis, B. compares the theory with that of Laplace and of Lord Kelvin. He also refers at some length to Kant's theory of base-levelling, and of the final destruction of the solar system by the falling of the planets into the sun.

Schurman, J. G. The Genesis of the Critical Philosophy. 1 (Jan. 1898), pp. 1—22, 2 (March. 1898), pp. 135—161, 3 (May 1898), pp. 225—247. — These articles, as well as the paper on "Kant's Critical Problem" (previously published in the *Philos. Review*, Vol. II, p. 129ff.) form part of a work on the Critical Philosophy of Kant which was written several years ago, but which unfortunately, has not yet appeared in print. In discussing the genesis of the Critical philosophy, the author first calls attention to Kant's primitive bent towards mediation. This mental trait is of so much importance for the right

understanding of his philosophy that it must be recognized at the very outset. He then proceeds to show that for Kant 'dogmatism' is synonymous with the uncritical rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff; while 'scepticism' was simply what we now-a-days call empiricism, and not that sensationalist nihilism — the doctrine of Hume's *Treatise* — which Kant sometimes refers to as 'absolute' or 'universal' scepticism. "The sensationalist atomism which Kantio-Hegelians both in Britain and America represent Kant as overcoming, was never really in his mind as a problem to be overcome. For him at least, Hume was not the apostle of nescience, but the clear-seeing and critical champion of experience." Criticism is a synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, the combination of the conflicting elements, 'tendencies', and results, of pre-Kantian philosophy. "Rationalism is adhered to: there is knowledge a priori. But rationalism is also modified: this a priori knowledge is of the objects of our experience, and of these only because they are appearances to us, not things-in-themselves The novelty of Kant's system is that it combines for the first time this sceptical limitation of the range of knowledge, with a strongly rationalistic view of the nature of knowledge. At the same time, this rational theory of the nature of knowledge is modified by empiricism, and this sceptical limitation of the extent of knowledge based upon rational principles."

In the second article, Schurman undertakes a consideration of the development of the Critical philosophy in Kant's own mind. Kant's pre-critical period falls into two divisions which may be separated by the year 1760. In the latter period (1760—1769), his mind was in a sceptical ferment; in the earlier (1746—1760), it still reposed in the philosophy of Wolff as it had been delivered by Schultz and Knutzen, though by 1755 there were clear signs of independent thought. By a consideration of Kant's writings between 1761 and 1766, Schurman finds that Kant was led from rationalism to empiricism by the natural development of his own thought. He argues that this development was not the result of Hume's influence, and (in the third article) he gives the beginning of the year 1774 as the most probable date for the beginning of Hume's influence. Moreover, there is danger of exaggerating Kant's affinity to Hume in the period from 1762—1766. From rationalism Kant never escaped. In the empirical, as in the later critical direction of his thought, it remained his ideal of philosophy. Further, he is equally removed both from Hume and from Wolff by his dialectical method — his plan of proving contradictory propositions for the sake of discovering that illusion of the understanding which stood in the way of mediating between them. Reflection upon this illusion brought Kant to the discovery of its source in 1769. This was nothing less than the insight that dogmatist and sceptic alike assume that the objects of knowledge are things-in-themselves. But, "if it was the antinomies that forced him to distinguish between the phenomenal and the real world, this distinction depended upon a prior one between sensuous and intellectual cognition, and such a one as had never been made before." This separation is the characteristic note of the *Dissertation*. But sense and reason,

sundered in the Dissertation, are married in the Critique, and rational knowledge is saved by narrowing the entire bounds of the knowable to phenomena. And Hume is the mediator between those two phases of the philosophic thought of Kant. The dogmatic slumber from which Hume aroused him was the belief that reason could know things-in-themselves. Hume's principle that reason cannot go beyond experience enabled Kant to solve his problem without giving up the theory of the a priori origin of concepts; so that the essential advance of the Critique upon the Dissertation is due to the direct influence of Hume. On this point, the Critical philosophy is a continuation of Empiricism, while, with reference to the question of the origin of Knowledge, it remains true to rationalism.
