

400,000,000,000,000 undulations a second, a vast number of rhythmic motions may exist, none of which have wrought any subjective correspondence in the human organism. It may, I suppose, be inferred that these unrepresented forces, if they do exist (which must depend upon the existence of an appropriate medium), are not of much use as signs or guides to inhabitants of our planet, or else a correspondence would probably have been developed by selection; but they may be the most useful of all guides in some other world, and entirely fill the consciousness of its inhabitants.

Here then is a possible unseen world at two removes of intelligibility, and there can be no harm in indulging our fancy there, as long as it does not distract us from better certified realities. But is it conceivable that any religious inspiration should proceed from such surmises; any "sanctions of eternity" (however deserving a meaner name!) or strength of motive to aid and not to injure the men whom we know to live and suffer? From Time and Space, Feeling and the Postulates of Logic to the fear of God and the love of Man—how abrupt, how unnatural a transition! There is nothing so irreverent as Metaphysics. The only unseen worlds whose dwellers, by the virtue of imagination,

"as from some far region sent,
Can give us human strength and strong admonishment,"

are the world of effort which has brought us hither, and the world of fellowship and justice which does not yet appear.

CARVETH READ.

V.—JOHN STUART MILL (IV.).

WHAT I have to say on Mill's ten years from 1848 to 1858 may be conveniently introduced by a reference to the *Autobiography*, p. 237. He states that for a considerable time after the publication of the *Political Economy*, he published no work of magnitude. He still occasionally wrote in periodicals, and his correspondence with unknown persons on questions of public interest swelled to a considerable amount. He wrote, or commenced, various essays on human and social subjects, and kept a watch on the progress of public events.

The year 1850 was chiefly noted for the first important revision of the *Logic*, namely, for the third edition. He had to answer many attacks upon it, including a pamphlet by Whewell. As I was absent from London while this was going on, I had a good many letters from him, chiefly on Whewell's criticism, of

the weakness of which he had a very decided opinion. I suggested some alterations and additional examples, but I scarcely remember what they were. The edition was printed in November; and no revision of anything like the same extent was undertaken till the eighth edition came out in 1872.

The *Political Economy* was subject to more frequent revisions, and occupied a good deal of his attention at one time or other, but I did not keep pace with him on that subject.

In spring, 1851, took place his marriage to Mrs Taylor. In autumn of that year, I took up my abode in London again, and remained there, or in the neighbourhood, till 1860. I continued to see him at intervals, in the India House, but he had changed his residence, and was not available for four o'clock walks. He could almost always allow a visitor fifteen or twenty minutes in the course of his official day; and this was the only way he could be seen. He never went into any society, except the monthly meetings of the Political Economy Club. On some few occasions: a little after his marriage, Grote and he and I walked together between the India House and his railway station.

Only three of his reprinted articles belong to the period I am now referring to; but he must have written for the *Westminster Review* at least one or two that were not reprinted. I cannot help thinking that the failure of his energy was one chief cause of his comparative inaction. As an instance, I remember, when he first read Ferrier's *Institutes*, he said he felt that he could have dashed off an article upon it in the way he did with Bailey's book on Vision: and I cannot give any reason why he did not.

He wrote for the *Westminster*, in 1849, a vindication of the French Revolution of February, 1848, in reply to Lord Brougham and others. In French politics he was thoroughly at home, and up to the fatality of December, 1851, he had a sanguine belief in the political future of France. This article, like his "Armand Carrel," is a piece of French political history, and the replies to Brougham are scathing. I remember well, in his excitement at the Revolution, his saying that the one thought that haunted him was—Oh, that Carrel were still alive!

It was for the *Westminster* of October, 1852, that he wrote the article on Whewell's *Moral Philosophy*. What effect it had upon Whewell himself I cannot say; he took notice of it blandly in a subsequent edition of his *Elements of Morality*, in reviewing objectors generally, omitting names. John Grote thought that in this and in the "Sedgwick" article, Mill indulged in a severity that was unusual in his treatment of opponents. I could not, for my own part, discover the difference. Yet it is no wonder, as he told me once, that he avoided meeting Whewell

in person, although he had had opportunities of being introduced to him (I suppose through his old friend Mr Marshall, of Leeds, whose sister Whewell married).

In 1853, he wrote his final article on Grote's *Greece*, in which he enters with enthusiasm into Grote's vindication of the Athenians and their democratic constitution. He was, quite as much as Grote, a Greece-intoxicated-man. Twice in his life he traversed the country from end to end. I remember, when I met him at the India House after his first tour, he challenged me to name any historical locality that he had not explored.

In 1854, he had an illness so serious that he mentions it in the *Autobiography*. It was an attack in the chest, ending in the partial destruction of one lung. He took the usual remedy of a long tour, being absent about eight months, in Italy, Sicily and Greece. I remember Sir James Clark giving a very desponding view of his state; the local disease, however, he said, was not so serious as the general debility, and, in all likelihood, he never would be fit for any other considerable work. According to a remark made to Grote by Peacock, the head of his office, his absence was severely felt at the India House. He rallied, nevertheless, and resumed his usual routine.

In the year following his recovery, 1856, his two seniors in the Examiner's office retired together, and he became head of the office. This made an entire change in his work; instead of preparing despatches in one department, he had to superintend all the departments. The engrossment of his official time was consequently much greater; and he had often to cut short the visits of friends. In little more than a year after his promotion, in the end of 1857, the extinction of the company was resolved upon by the Government, and he had to aid the Court of Directors in their unavailing resistance to their doom. For this purpose he drafted the *Petition to Parliament* in behalf of the Company, in which he brought to bear all his resources in the theory and practice of politics. The Petition, as ultimately submitted, after some slight amendments by the Court of Directors, was pronounced by Earl Grey the ablest state-paper he had ever read. I do not mean to advert to its contents, further than to quote the two introductory sentences, the point and pungency of which the greatest orator might be proud of:—

“That your Petitioners, at their own expense, and by the agency of their own civil and military servants, originally acquired for this country its magnificent empire in the East.

“That the foundations of this empire were laid by your Petitioners, at that time neither aided nor controlled by Parliament, at the same period at which a succession of administrations under the control of Parliament were losing to the Crown

of Great Britain another great empire on the opposite side of the Atlantic."

Several other documents were prepared by Mill for the Court of Directors, while the abolition of the Company was under discussion in Parliament. It so happened that the Liberal Government, which first resolved on the measure, retired from office before it was carried, and the Government of Lord Derby had to finish it. Under the management of Lord Stanley, as President of the Board of Control, the new India Council was much more assimilated to the constitution of the old Court of Directors; and I am inclined to believe that the modification was in great measure owing to the force of Mill's reasonings.

The passing of the Bill led to his retirement from the India House. He told Grote that, but for the dissolution of the Company, he would have continued in the service till he was sixty. An attempt was made to secure him for the new Council. After the Chairman, he was the first applied to by Lord Stanley to take office as a Crown nominee. In declining, he gave, as his reason, failing health: but had he been stronger, he would have still preferred retirement to working under the new constitution.

His deliverance from official work in 1858 was followed by the crushing calamity of his wife's death. He was then on his way to spend the winter in Italy, but immediately after the event, he returned to his home at Blackheath. For some months, he saw nobody, but still corresponded actively on matters that interested him. His despondency was frightful. In reply to my condolence, he said "I have recovered the shock as much as I ever shall. Henceforth, I shall be only a conduit for ideas." Writing to Grote, he descanted passionately on his wife's virtues: "If you had only known all that she was!"

In the beginning of 1859, I was preparing for publication my volume on *The Emotions and the Will*. I showed the MS. to Mill, and he revised it minutely, and jotted a great many suggestions. In two or three instances, his remarks bore the impress of his lacerated feelings.

He soon recommenced an active career of publication. The *Liberty* was already written, and, as he tells us, was never to be re-touched. His pamphlet on *Parliamentary Reform*, written some years previously, was revised and sent to press. On this he remarked in a letter:—"Grote, I am afraid, will not like it, on account of the ballot, if not other points. But I attach importance to it, as a sort of revision of the theory of representative government." A few days later, he wrote—"Grote knows that I now differ with him on the ballot, and we have discussed it together, with no effect on either".

Of course the pamphlet was well reasoned, but the case against the Ballot had not the strength that I should have expected. The main considerations put forward are these two—first, that the electoral vote is a trust, and therefore to be openly exercised; second, that, as a matter of fact, the coercion of the voter by bribery and intimidation has diminished and is diminishing. The argument from “a trust” was not new; it had been repeatedly answered by Grote and by others. The real point at issue was—whether the withdrawing the elector from the legitimate control of public opinion, be not a less evil than exposing him to illegitimate influence; and this depends on the state of the facts as to the diminution of such influence. Experience seems to be against Mill on this head: and it is unfortunate for his political sagacity and prescience, that the Legislature was converted to the ballot, after he had abandoned it.

The *Liberty* appeared about the same time. The work was conceived and planned in 1854. While thinking of it, he told Grote that he was cogitating an essay to point out what things society forbade that it ought not, and what things it left alone that it ought to control. Grote repeated this to me, remarking—“It is all very well for John Mill to stand up for the removal of social restraints, but as to imposing new ones, I feel the greatest apprehensions”. I instantly divined what the new restraints would be. The volume must have been the chief occupation of his spare time during the last two years of his official life. It is known that he set great store by the work; and thought it would probably last longer than any of his writings, except perhaps the *Logic*.

The old standing question of Freedom of Thought had been worked up, in a series of striking expositions, by his father, in conjunction with Bentham, and the circle of the *Westminster Review*; he himself, from his earliest youth, was embarked in the same cause, and his essays were inferior to none in the power and freshness of the handling. The first part of the *Liberty* is the condensation of all that had been previously done; and for the present, stands as the chief text-book of Freedom of Discussion. It works round a central thought, which has had a growing prominence in later years, the necessity of taking account of the *negative* to every positive affirmation; of laying down, side by side with every proposition, the *counter-proposition*. Following this cue, Mill's first assumption is, that an opinion authoritatively suppressed may possibly be true; and the thirty pages devoted to this position show a combination of reasoning and eloquence that has never been surpassed, if equalled, in the cause of intellectual freedom. The second assumption is that an opinion is false. Here his argument takes

the more exclusive form of showing the necessity of keeping in the view the opposite of every opinion, in order to maintain the living force of the opinion itself. While there is much that is effective here also, I think that he puts too great stress upon the operation of negative criticism in keeping alive the understanding of a doctrine. It is perfectly true that when an opinion is actively opposed, its defenders are put on the *qui vive* in its defence; and have, in consequence, a far more lively sense of its truth, as well as a juster view of its meaning and import; but the necessity of keeping up imaginary opponents to every truth in science may easily be exaggerated. We need not conjure up opponents to gravitation so long as a hundred observations and a hundred thousand ships are constantly at work testing its consequences. This is the substitute that Mill desiderates (p. 80) for the disadvantage of the cessation of controversy in truths of great magnitude.

When he proceeds to illustrate the enlivening influence of negation by the case of ethical and religious doctrines, I think he fails to make out his case. It may be true enough that when a creed is first fighting for reception, it is at the height of its fervour, but the loss of power at a later stage is due to other causes than the absence of opponents. Mill's illustration from Christianity is hardly in point. Never since the suppression of pagan philosophy was Christianity more attacked than now; but we cannot say that the attacks have led, or are likely to lead, to a resuscitation of its spirit in the minds of Christians; the opposite would be nearer the truth.

The last branch of the argument for Free-Thought is constituted by Mill's favourite doctrine that conflicting doctrines usually share the truth between them. This view is, I think, both precarious in itself, and of very doubtful relevance to the author's main thesis. The example from the two state-parties—the party of order and the party of progress—will not stand a severe scrutiny. Not to mention, what he admits, that there is perfect freedom of discussion on the matter, the war of parties is, in point of fact, scarcely conducted according to his ideal. More to the point is the well-known passage on Christian Morality, which he regards as a series of half-truths, needing to be made up by truths derived from other sources. As far as his main purpose is concerned, I think all this belongs to the first branch of the argument and might have been included there; that first branch containing to my mind the real strength of the contention for Freedom of Thought.

The second half of the book is on Liberty of Conduct, as against the restraints of our social customs. This is introduced

by a chapter on Individuality, considered as one of the elements of well-being. Excellent as are many of the author's remarks, there are various openings for criticism. The chief thing that strikes me is the want of a steady view of the essentials of human happiness. I shall have to notice again the defects of Mill's Hedonic philosophy. I think that he greatly exaggerates the differences between human beings as regards the conditions of happiness. The community of structure in our corporeal and mental framework far exceeds the disparities; there are certain easily stated requisites, in the possession of which no one could be very unhappy; while the specialities needed to impart to a given individual the highest degree of felicity, are seldomer withheld by the tyranny of custom, than by causes that society cannot control. Mill pleads strongly for the energetic natures, for the exuberance of spontaneity and strong impulses. But energy as such is not thwarted; and the difficulty will always remain, that superabundant energy is exceedingly apt to trench upon other people's rights. Mill too closely identifies energy with originality or genius, and genius with eccentricity. In regard to all these characteristics, many fine distinctions need to be drawn over and above what Mill gives us. When he talks of the present state of Englishmen as a state of collective greatness and diminishing individuality, it takes a little reflection to see what he is driving at. Nor is his reference of the unprogressiveness of the East to the despotism of custom a wholly satisfactory explanation; the problem of stationary societies is still undecided.

The chapter following, entitled "The Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual," helps us better to his real meaning. He lays it down as an axiom that society should interfere only in what concerns itself. One might suppose that this would have passed as an axiom, instead of being cavilled at on all hands. Why should society, more than any other entity, interfere with what does not concern it? Even accepting the axiom, we may yet work it in society's favour by those numerous pretexts whereby individual action is alleged to have social bearings; but to refuse the axiom itself argues some defect of intelligent comprehension.

As a piece of vigorous composition, this chapter is not inferior to any in the book; it is admirable as an exposition in practical ethics, and might be enshrined as a standing homily in the moral instruction of mankind. It does what homilies rarely do, namely, endeavour to draw precise lines between social duty and individual liberty; and reviews the more notable instances where society still tyrannises over minorities. Still, the instances adduced seem scarcely to justify the denunciations of the author;

they are the remains of past ages of intolerance, and are gradually losing their hold.

It is in his subsequent chapter of "Applications," that we seem to approach his strongest case; but it is little more than hinted at; I mean the relationship of the sexes. It hardly admits of question that any great augmentation of human happiness that may be achieved in the future, must proceed first upon a better standard of worldly circumstances, and next upon the harmonising and adjusting of the social relations. After people are fed, clothed, and housed, at a reasonable expenditure of labour, their next thing is to seek scope for the affections; it is at this point that there occur the greatest successes and the greatest failures in happy living. The marriage relation is the most critical of any; and we have now a class of thinkers that maintain that this is enforced with too great stringency and monotony. To attain some additional latitude in this respect is an object that Mill, in common with his father, considered very desirable. Both were strongly averse to encouraging mere sensuality; but, though not prepared with any definite scheme of sexual reform, they urged that personal freedom should be extended, with a view to such social experiments as might lead to the better fulfilment of the great ideal that the sexual relation has in view.

The *Liberty* was exposed to a good deal of carping in consequence of Mill's admitting unequivocally that a certain amount of disapproval was proper and inevitable towards persons that behaved badly to themselves. It was said—What is this, after all, but a milder form of punishing them for what does not concern either us or society at large? He fully anticipated such a remark, and I think amply disposed of it, by drawing the very wide distinction between mere lowered estimation, and the treatment proper to offenders against society. He might have gone farther and drawn up a sliding scale or graduated table of modes of behaviour, from the most intense individual preference at the one end to the severest reprobation at the other. At least fifteen or twenty perceptible distinctions could be made; and a place found for every degree of merit and demerit. Because a person does not stand high in our esteem, it does not follow that we are punishing or persecuting him; the point when punishment in any proper sense could be said to begin would be about the middle of the scale. Mill remarks justly—"If any one displeases us, we may express our distaste and stand aloof from such an one; but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable;" still less to send him to prison or to the stake.

Closely connected both in date of composition and in subject-

matter is the *Utilitarianism*. I find from a letter that it was written in 1854. It was thoroughly revised in 1860, and appeared as three papers in *Fraser's Magazine* in the beginning of 1861. I am not aware that any change was made in re-printing it as a volume, notwithstanding that it had a full share of hostile criticism as it came out in *Fraser*.

This short work has many volumes to answer for. The amount of attention it has received is due, in my opinion, partly to its merits, and partly to its defects. As a powerful advocacy of Utility, it threw the Intuitionists on the defensive; while, by a number of unguarded utterances, it gave them important strategic positions which they could not fail to occupy.

It is this last point that I shall now chiefly dwell upon. What I allude to more particularly is the theory of pleasure and pain embodied in the second chapter, or rather the string of casual expressions having reference to pleasures and pains. I have already said that I consider Mill's Hedonism weak. I do not find fault with him for not having elaborated a Hedonistic theory; that is a matter still ahead of us. My objection lies to certain loose expressions that have received an amount of notice from hostile critics out of all proportion to their bearing on his arguments for Utility. I think that, having opponents at every point, his proper course was not to commit himself to any more specific definition of Happiness than his case absolutely required.

It was obviously necessary that he should give some explanation of Happiness; and on his principles, happiness must be resolved into pleasure and the absence of pain. Here, however, he had to encounter at once the common dislike to regarding pleasure as the sole object of desire and pursuit; "a doctrine worthy only of swine," to which its holders have both in ancient and in modern times been most profusely likened. He courageously faces the difficulty by pronouncing in favour of a difference in *kind* or *quality* among pleasures; which difference he expands through two or three eloquent pages, which I believe have received more attention from critics on the other side than all the rest of the book put together. My own decided opinion is that he ought to have resolved all the so-called nobler or higher pleasures into the one single feature of including with the agent's pleasure the pleasure of others. This is the only position that a supporter of Utility can hold to. There is a superiority attaching to some pleasures that are still exclusively self-regarding, namely, their amount as compared with the exhaustion of the nervous power; the pleasures of music and of scenery are higher than those of stimulating drugs. But the superiority that makes a distinction of *quality*, that rises clearly

and effectually above the swinish level, is the superiority of the gratifications that take our fellow-beings along with us; such are the pleasures of affection, of benevolence, of duty. To have met opponents upon this ground alone would have been the proper undertaking for the object Mill had in view. It surprises me that he has not ventured upon such a mode of resolving pleasures. He says—"On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, *apart from its moral attributes and consequences*, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, must be admitted to be final." Apart from moral attributes and consequences, I do not see a difference of quality at all; and when these are taken into account, the difference is sufficient to call forth any amount of admiring preference. A man's actions are noble if they arrest misery or diffuse happiness around him; they are not noble if they are not directly or indirectly altruistic; his pleasures are essentially of the swinish type.

Still rasher, I think, is his off-hand formula of a happy life,¹ if he meant that this was to be a stone in the building of a Utilitarian philosophy. As a side-remark upon some of the important conditions of happiness, it is interesting enough, but far from being rounded or precise. It was only to be expected that this utterance should have the same fate as Paley's chapter on Happiness, namely, to be analysed to death, and have its mangled remains exposed as a memento of the weakness of the philosophy that it is intended to support. It was clearly his business in conducting a defence of Utility, to avoid all questionable suppositions, and to be content with what everybody would allow on the matter of happiness.

His third chapter, treating of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility, has been much cavilled at in detail, but is, I consider, a very admirable statement of the genesis of moral sentiment under all the various influences that are necessarily at work. Here occurs that fine passage on the Social feelings of mankind, which ought, I think, to have been the framework or setting of the whole chapter. Perhaps he should have avoided the word "sanction," so rigidly confined by Austin and the jurists to the penalty or punishment of wrong.

The real stress of the book lies in the last chapter, which is well reasoned in every way, and free from damaging admissions.

¹ Happiness was "not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing".

Under the guise of an inquiry into the foundations of Justice, he raises the question as to the source of duty or obligation, and meets the intuitionists point by point in a way that I need not particularise.

By far the best hostile criticism of the *Utilitarianism* that I am acquainted with, is the posthumous volume of Prof. John Grote. It will there be seen what havoc an acute, yet candid and respectful, opponent can make of his theories of happiness. Many of those strictures I consider unanswerable. Prof. Grote also makes the most of Mill's somewhat exaggerated moral strain, and his affectation of holding happiness in contempt; "doing without it," if need be.

It was in 1860 that he wrote his volume on *Representative Government*. The state of the Reform question, which led him to prepare his pamphlet on Reform, was the motive of the still larger undertaking, his principal contribution to a Philosophy of Politics. He says in the Preface, that the chief novelty of the volume is the bringing together, in a connected form, the various political doctrines that he had at various times given expression to; but the mere fact of viewing them in connexion necessarily improved their statement and bearings; and the six or eight months' additional elaboration in his fertile brain could not but infuse additional freshness into the subject.

In my estimate of Mill's genius, he was first of all a Logician, and next a social philosopher or Politician. The *Political Economy* and the *Representative Government* constitute his political outcome. People will differ as to his political conclusions, but certainly any man that wishes to judge of any matter within the scope of the *Representative Government* should first see what is there said upon it; and the work must long enter into the education of the higher class of politicians. The chapter on the "Criterion of a good form of Government" contains an exceedingly pertinent discussion of the relation between Order and Progress; and demonstrates that Order cannot be permanent without Progress: a position in advance of Comte. The third chapter demolishes the fond theory entertained by many in the present day that the best government is "Absolute authority in good hands". Then comes a question that needs all the author's delicacy, tact, and resource,—Under what conditions is representative government applicable? But his strongest point throughout is the exposition of the dangers and difficulties attending on Democracy. This was one of his oldest themes in the *Westminster Review*; he has put it in every possible light, and discussed with apostolic ardour all the contrivances for withstanding the tyranny of the majority. He took up

with avidity Mr. Hare's scheme of Representation, and never ceased to urge it as the greatest known improvement that representative institutions are susceptible of. He dismisses Second Chambers as wholly inadequate to the purpose in view, however useful otherwise. The discussions on the proper functions of the Local Governing Bodies, on Dependencies, and on Federations are all brimful of good political thinking. He passes by the subject of Hereditary Monarchy. Both he and Grote were republicans in principle, but they regarded the monarchy as preferable to the exposing of the highest dignity of the state to competition. From my latest conversations with Mill, I think he coincided in the view that simple Cabinet Government would be the natural substitute for Monarchy.

In 1861 he began to turn his thoughts to a review of Hamilton's Philosophy. Writing to me in November, he says, "I mean to take up Sir William Hamilton, and try if I can make an article on him for the *Westminster*". He chose the *Westminster* when he wanted free room for his elbow. He soon abandoned the idea of an article. In December he said:—"I have now studied all Sir W. Hamilton's works pretty thoroughly, and see my way to most of what I have got to say respecting him. But I have given up the idea of doing it in anything less than a volume. The great recommendation of this project is, that it will enable me to supply what was prudently left deficient in the *Logic*, and to do the kind of service which I am capable of to rational psychology, namely, to its *Polemik*."

He was interrupted for a time by the events in America. In January, 1862, he wrote his paper on the Civil War in *Fraser*. He expected it to give great offence, and to be the most hazardous thing for his influence that he had yet done.

After spending the summer in a tour in Greece and Asia Minor, he wrote again on the American Question, in a review of Cairnes's book in the *Westminster*. This done, he set to the *Hamilton*, which was the chief part of his occupation for the next two years. His interruptions were the article on John Austin in the *Edinburgh*, in Oct., 1863, the two articles on Comte in the end of 1864, and the revision of the *Political Economy*.

I had a great deal of correspondence with him while he was engaged with Hamilton. He read all Hamilton's writings three times over, and all the books that he thought in any way related to the subjects treated of. Among other things, he wrote me a long criticism of *Ferrier's Institutes*. "I thought Ferrier's book quite *sui generis* when I first read it, and I think so more than ever after reading it again. His system is one of pure

scepticism, very skilfully clothed in dogmatic language." He was much exercised upon the whole subject of Indestructibility of Force. His reading of Spencer, Tyndall and others landed him in a host of difficulties, which I did what I could to clear up. His picture of Hamilton grew darker as he went on; chiefly from the increasing sense of his inconsistencies. He often wished that he was alive to answer for himself. "I was not prepared for the degree in which this complete acquaintance lowers my estimate of the man and of his speculations. I did not expect to find them a mass of contradictions. There is scarcely a point of importance on which he does not hold conflicting theories, or profess doctrines which suppose one theory while he himself holds another. It almost goes against me to write so complete a demolition of a brother philosopher after he is dead, not having done it while he was alive."

During my stay in London in the summer of 1864, he showed me the finished MS. of a large part of the book. I offered a variety of minor suggestions, and he completed the work for the press the same autumn.

Of the many topics comprised in the volume, I shall advert only to one or two of the principal. After following Hamilton's theories through ten chapters, he advances his own positive view of the Belief in an External World. Having myself gone over the same ground, I wish to remark on what is peculiar in his treatment of the question.

I give him full credit for his uncompromising Idealism, and for his varied and forcible exposition of it. In this respect he has contributed to educate the thinking public in what I regard as the truth. But in looking at his analysis in detail, while I admit he has seized the more important things, I do not exactly agree with him either as to the order of statement, or as to the relative stress put upon the various elements of the Object and Subject distinction.

In the first place, I would remark on the omission of the quality of *Resistance*, and of the muscular energies as a whole, from his delineation of the object or external world. In this particular, usage and authority are against him to begin with. The connexion of an External World with the Primary Qualities has been so long prevalent, that there must be some reason or plausibility in it. His own father and Mansel are equally emphatic in setting forth Resistance as the primary fact of Externality. Mill himself, however, allows no place for Resistance in his psychological theory. In a separate chapter on the Primary Qualities of Matter, he deals with Extension and Resistance, as products of muscular sensibility, and as giving us our notions of *Matter*, but he thinks that simple tactile sensi-

bility mingles with resistance, and plays as great a part as the purely muscular ingredient; thus frittering away the supposed antithesis of muscular energy and passive sensibility. Now, for my own part, I incline to the usage and opinion of our predecessors in putting forward the contrast of active energy and passive feeling as an important constituent of the subject and object distinction; and, if it is to be admitted at all, I am disposed to begin with it, instead of putting it last as Mr. Spencer does, or leaving it out as Mill does. It does not give all that is implied in Matter, but it gives the nucleus of the composite feeling, as well as the fundamental and defining attribute.

The stress of Mill's exposition rests on the *fixity of order* in our sensations, leading to a constancy of recurrence, and a belief in that constancy, going the length of assuming independent existence. Although he shows a perfect mastery of his position, I do not consider that he has done entire justice to it, from not carrying along with him the contrast of the objective and the subjective—the Sensation and the Idea. Indeed, the exposition is too short for the theme; the reader is apt to be satisfied with the portable phrase—"permanent possibility of sensation," which helps him to one vital part of the case, but does not amount to a satisfactory equivalent for an External and Independent World. There would have been more help in an expression dwelling upon the "common to all," in contrast with the "special to me," to use one of Ferrier's forms of phraseology. This ground of distinction is not left unnoticed by Mill, but it is simply mentioned.

His chapter on the application to our belief in the permanent existence of Mind is, I think, even more subtle than the preceding on Matter. The manner of disposing of Reid's difficulty about the existence of his fellow-creatures is everything that I could wish. It is when, in the concluding paragraph, he lays down as final and inexplicable the Belief in Memory, that I am unable to agree with him. This position of his has been much dwelt upon by the thinkers opposed to him. It makes him appear, after all, to be a transcendentalist like themselves, differing only in degree. For myself, I never could see where his difficulty lay, or what moved him to say that the belief in memory is incomprehensible or essentially irresolvable. The precise nature of Belief is no doubt invested with very peculiar delicacy, but whenever it shall be cleared up, it may very fairly be capable of accounting for the belief that a certain state now past as a sensation, but present as an idea, was once a sensation, and is not a mere product of thought or imagination. (*Cf. The Emotions and the Will*, 3d. edit., p. 532.)

I may make a passing observation on the chapter specially devoted to Mansel's *Limits of Religious Thought*. It is a considerable digression in a work devoted to Hamilton, but Mansel's book touched Mill to the quick; in private, he called it a "loathsome" book. His combined argumentative and passionate style rises to its utmost height. Mansel sarcastically described his famous climax—"to hell I will go"—as an exhibition of taste and temper. That passage was scarcely what Grote called it, a Promethean defiance of Jove, inasmuch as the fear of hell never had a place in Mill's bosom; it sprang from the strength of his feelings coining the strongest attainable image to give them vent.¹

Mill could not help adverting to Hamilton's very strong and paradoxical assertions about Free-Will; but as he never elaborates a consecutive exposition of the question, I doubt the propriety of making these assertions a text for discussing it at full. Mill's chapter is either too much or too little; too much as regards his author, too little as regards the subject. The connexion of Punishment with Free-Will should be allowed only under protest; the legitimacy and the limits of punishment make a distinct inquiry. Punishment, psychologically viewed, assumes that men recoil from pain; there may be other springs of action besides pain or pleasure; but as regards such, both reward and punishment are irrelevant. I think Mill very successful in illustrating the independence of moral good and evil on the question of the Will. He is not too strong in his remonstrance against Hamilton's attempt to frighten people into Free-Will by declaring that the existence of the Creator hangs upon it. It was quite in Hamilton's way to destroy all the other arguments in favour of a doctrine that he espoused, in order to give freer course to his own. He damages the advocacy of Free-Will by his slashing antinomy of the two contrary doctrines. It is certainly a clearing of the ground, if nothing more, to affirm, as he does so strongly, that "a determination by motives cannot escape from necessitation". Such admissions give an opponent some advantage, but only as respects him individually. The general controversy, however, must proceed on different lines from his, and hence the waste of strength in following his lead.

Hamilton's attack on the study of Mathematics was a battery of learned quotations brought out to confound Whewell and Cambridge. It is not very convincing; it hardly even does what Mill thinks toleration of hostile criticism tends to do,

¹ Grote thought that the phrase was an echo of something occurring in Ben Jonson; where a military captain's implicit obedience is crowned by the illustration—"Tell him to go to hell, to hell he will go."

namely, bring out the half-truth neglected by the other side. It was not worth while to write so long a chapter in reply; but Mill, partly from what he learnt from Comte, and partly from his own logical studies, had a pat answer to every one of Hamilton's points. Most notable, in my view, is the paragraph about the disastrous influence of the mathematical method of Descartes in all subsequent speculation. He seems there to say that the *a priori* spirit has been chiefly kept up by the example of Mathematics. Now, I freely admit that the axioms of mathematics have been the favourite illustration of Intuition; but there is no certainty that, in the absence of that example, Intuitionism would not have had its full swing during the last two centuries. Mill admits that the crudity of Bacon's Inductive canons had an equally bad effect on English speculation; but all this shows simply that error is the parent of error.

The two subjects taken up while the *Hamilton* was still in hand—John Austin and Comte—deserve to be ranked among the best of his minor compositions. The "Austin" article took him back to his early days when he worked with Bentham and attended the lectures of Austin at University College. It does not seem to contain much originality, but it is a logical treat. The two "Comte" articles are still more valuable, as being Mill's contribution to the elucidation of Comte's Philosophy. It will be long ere an equally searching and dispassionate estimate of Comte be given to the world; indeed, no one can again combine the same qualifications for the work.

The publication of the *Hamilton* in the spring of 1865 was followed by a crowd of events. He had already embarked on an article on Grote's *Plato*, which had lately appeared. He had arranged with his publisher for cheap reprints of the *Political Economy*, the *Liberty*, and the *Representative Government*. Then came the requisition to stand for Westminster, by which his name blazed into a sudden notoriety, under which the cheap volumes went off like wildfire, while there was an increased demand for the *Logic*. His letter, announcing his compliance with the requisition on certain conditions, was a surprise. It was scarcely to be expected that he could feel himself "honoured" by being elected to Parliament, in the maturity of his great reputation. Perhaps we must go farther back to account for his ready compliance. He had felt it acutely as a disadvantage of his being placed in the India House that he could not enter Parliament; and again, in the days when he was heading the philosophic radicals, he was conscious of the weakness of his position in not being himself in the House of Commons. He had not yet ceased to be a practical politician, although he had

become many things besides ; and the long slumbering idea of being in Parliament was suddenly awakened into life. His anticipation of success in the election was not sanguine ; but his supporters were enthusiastic, and his appearances at the meetings of the electors procured daily accessions to his cause. Above all things, the attempts to entrap him by cunningly devised questions most signally recoiled upon the authors.

Half of his year for the next three years was given up to attendance in the House and engrossment with public questions. I am not about to criticise his career as a member of Parliament. The part of the *Autobiography* where he is perhaps most self-complacent, is what relates to his speeches and doings in those years. He set a good example of perfect party loyalty, combined with the assertion of difference of opinion on particular questions. For a number of years his relations with Mr. Gladstone had been far more cordial and intimate than the outer world was aware of. His idea of ventilating questions that had as yet scarcely any supporters appeared to me to be carried to an extreme. He was not an orator physically ; but he composed and delivered speeches possessing all the qualities of his published writings, that is to say, original in thought, powerfully reasoned, and full of passionate fire when the occasion demanded.

In the six months' recess he carried on his philosophical and other writings. In the autumn and winter of 1865 he had to finish his long article on *Plato*, on which he bestowed great pains, having taken the trouble to re-read the whole of Plato in the original. To the reader of Grote, the article does not impart much that is absolutely new ; but Plato being an early subject of his as well as of his father's, his handling has freshness and gusto.

The extraordinary stimulus given to the sale of his books prematurely exhausted the current edition of the *Logic* ; and it had been his intention to revise it for the next edition (the Sixth). This had to be seen to, along with the "Plato," during the same recess. His revision, on this occasion, partly consisted in improving the "Induction" by new examples. I referred him to Brown Séquard's interesting research on Cadaveric Rigidity, and induced him to read the same author's volume of *Researches on the Nervous System*. I also obtained from Thomas Graham a complete set of his *researches on Gases and Liquids* : pointing his attention to what I thought most available. It was in this edition that he first combated Mr. Spencer's doctrine of "Inconceivability of the opposite" as a test of truth.

The same winter recess was not allowed to conclude without another distraction. The students of St. Andrews had, without

asking his leave, elected him Lord Rector. On its being announced to him, he wished to decline. This, however, was not easy after the thing was done; and he accepted on the understanding that he was not to deliver the Rectorial Address till next year.

Meantime, his letters to me were full of the notices that had come out on the *Hamilton*. When the session of 1866 was concluded, after a tour in the Alps and Pyrenees, he settled down at Avignon to write his Address for St. Andrews, and to answer the attacks on *Hamilton* for the third edition; both which feats he accomplished before the opening of the session of 1867.

The St. Andrews Address was a very lengthened performance; its delivery lasted three hours. It aimed at a complete survey of the Higher Education. Its absolute value is considerable; but in relation to the time, place, and circumstances, I consider it to have been a mistake. Mill had taken it into his head that the Greek and Roman classics had been too hardly pressed by the votaries of science, and were in some danger of being excluded from the higher teaching; and he occupies nearly half of the address in vindicating their importance. The second half is a vigorous enforcement of the claims of Science.

The performance was a failure, in my opinion, for this simple reason, that he had no conception of the limits of a University curriculum. The Scotch Universities have been distinguished for the amount of study comprised in their Arts Degree. Mill would have them keep up the Classics intact, and even raise their standard; he would also include a complete course of the Primary Sciences—Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, Logic, and Psychology, to which he would add Political Economy, Jurisprudence, and International Law. Now at present the obligatory sciences are Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, Logic, and Moral Philosophy. If he had consulted me on this occasion, I should have endeavoured to impress upon him the limits of our possible curriculum, and should have asked him to arbitrate between the claims of Literature and Science, so as to make the very most of our time and means. He would then have had to balance Latin and Greek against Chemistry, Physiology, and Jurisprudence; for it is quite certain that both these languages would have to be dropped absolutely, to admit his extended science course. In that case he would have been more careful in his statements as to the Greek and Latin languages. He would not have put these languages as synonymous with “literature”; and he would have made much more allowance for translations and expositions through the modern languages. He would have found that at the present day we

have other methods of correcting the tendency to mistake words for things than learning any two or three additional languages. He would not have assumed that our pupils are made all "to think in Greek"; nor would he have considered it impossible to get at the sources of Greek and Roman History without studying the languages. If he had had a real opponent, he would not have given the authority of his name to the assertion that Grammar is "elementary Logic". His mode of speaking of the style of the ancient writers, to my mind at least, is greatly exaggerated. "Look at an oration of Demosthenes; there is nothing in it which calls attention to itself as style at all" "The Athenians do not cry out—What a splendid speaker, but—Let us march against Philip." He also gives way to the common remark that the teaching of Latin and Greek could be so much improved as to make it an inconsiderable draft upon a pupil's energies. On this point he had no experience to go upon but his own, and that did not support his position.

In the scientific departments he carries out strictly the Comtean hierarchy of the fundamental sciences, and in this respect the address was valuable as against the mischievous practice of culling out a science from the middle of the series, say Chemistry, and prescribing it by itself to the exclusion of its forerunners in the hierarchy. While he speaks fairly and well on the Mathematical and Physical Sciences, his remarks on the Moral and Political display as usual the master's hand. From these he was led to talk of Free Thought, on which he maintained a somewhat impracticable ideal for our Universities. From Science he proceeded to Art, and enforced a favourite theme—the subservience of Poetry to Virtue and Morality. One feels that on this topic a little more discrimination was necessary; art being a very wide word. His conclusion was a *double entendre*. "I do not attempt to instigate you by the prospect of direct rewards, either earthly or heavenly; the less we think about being rewarded in either way, the better for us."

In the reception given to the Address he was most struck with the vociferous applause of the Divinity students at the Free-thought passage. He was privately thanked by others among the hearers for this part.

The Third Edition of the *Hamilton* contained replies to the host of critics that had assailed it. The additional scope given to the author's polemical force greatly enhanced the interest of the book. In answering the attacks made on his criticism of Hamilton's doctrines on the Relativity of Knowledge and Philosophy of the Conditioned, as well as in the reply to Mansel on

Religion, he showed to considerable advantage. In defending the Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World, he grappled with the stock arguments against Idealism. He made least way in the Free-Will controversy; affording, as I think, a confirmation of the impolicy of carrying on so many extraneous questions together.

His next literary project was the editing his father's *Analysis*. This was commenced in the recess of 1867, and finished in the following year, being brought out early in 1869. I had necessarily a long correspondence with him on the allocation of topics; but each of us took his own line in regard to the doctrines. Coincidence of view was the rule; the discrepancy seldom went beyond the mode of statement, the chief exception being the topic of Belief. The work contains perhaps the best summary of his psychological opinions, although the *Hamilton* shows them in the more stirring shape of polemics.

Before this work came out his Parliamentary career was at an end. The circumstances that led to his defeat in the election of 1868 are detailed by himself. They included the singular indiscretion of his allowing his subscription to Mr Bradlaugh to be made public before his own election day; very unlike his usual circumspectness. His apology is somewhat lame; and does not take account of the fact that he was contesting the seat in the interest of other people and at their expense. So energetically did the opposition ply the weapon thus put into their hands that they may have owed their success to it alone. Although on public grounds he regretted being no longer in Parliament, he was not sorry to resume his quiet and his leisure for other work.

The pamphlet entitled *England and Ireland*, brought out in the beginning of 1868, declared, as he says, his whole mind on the subject of Ireland, chiefly as regarded the land, and is couched in very strong language indeed. He believed that this pamphlet helped to determine Mr. Gladstone to commence his Irish Legislation with the Church, leaving the Land to a later operation.

The year 1869, his first year of release, saw the publication of his last book—*The Subjection of Women*, together with the two first articles in his fourth volume of *Dissertations*—"Endowments," and "Labour and its claims," a review of Mr. Thornton's work on that subject.

The volume on the *Subjection of Women* he tells us was first written in 1861. It was, he says, a joint production; portions were written by Miss Taylor, while his share was the result of

innumerable conversations and discussions with his wife. However the merits be partitioned, it is a book of a very marked character. It is the most sustained exposition of Mill's life-long theme—the abuses of power. The extent of the illustration and the emphasis of the language render it the best extant homily on the evils of subjection in general; while the same arts are maintained in dealing with the application to the disabilities of women. This case, which of all others most engaged his feelings, is, I think, the one instance where he may be charged with overstraining. In discussing political freedom at large, he is always sufficiently alive to the necessities of government; in the present question, he leaves us to suppose that the relations of men and women between themselves may work upon a purely voluntary principle. He abstains here and elsewhere from advocating divorce pure and simple, because of the complications attending the question; while he does not show what is the remedy when a man and a woman united by the marriage bond are unable to co-operate as equal partners.

His handling of the mental equality of the sexes is, to my mind, open to exception. In the intensity of his special pleading on this question he hardly avoids contradicting himself, while he postulates a degree of equality that does not fall in with the experience of the least biassed observers. He grants that women are physically inferior, but seems to think that this does not affect their mental powers. He never takes account of the fact that the large diversion of force for the procreative function must give some general inferiority in all things where that does not come in, unless women are made on the whole much stronger than men. In an allusion to his experience of the government of India, he tells us that, in three cases out of four, if a superior instance of good government occurs, it is in a woman's reign; which looks like the fallacy of proving too much.

Without entering into an argument with him on his equality view, I expressed my doubts as to the expediency of putting this more strongly than people generally would be willing to accept it; inasmuch as the equality of rights did not presuppose absolute equality of faculties. He replied with much warmth, contending that the day of temporising policy was past; that it was necessary to show not simply that the removal of restrictions would leave things as they are, but that many women are really capable of taking advantage of the higher openings. And further, he urged, it was necessary to stimulate the aspirations of women themselves, so as to obtain proofs from experience as to what they could do.

A considerable portion of his labours during the last three years of his life was given to the Land Question, which he greatly

helped to mature for future settlement. Under this movement he renewed his old fight for peasant properties, and started the new heresy of the unearned increment. It was his pride to co-operate in all these questions with the working classes and their leaders, and had he lived, he would have been of unspeakable value as a mediator in the struggles between labour and capital, and between the working population generally and the heads of political parties. He would not, however, I think, ever have been a working-men's champion on their own lines. He would not have held out any tempting bribe of immediate amelioration such as to inspire the highest efforts of the existing generation. His greatest hopes were of a very slow progress in all things; with the sole exception, perhaps, of the equality-of-women question, on which his feelings went farther than on any other.

The posthumous *Essays on Religion* do not correspond with what we should have expected from him on that subject. Never, so far as I know, did he give any hint of wishing or attempting to re-construct a system of Theism on a scientific basis. In one sentence in the *Hamilton* he spoke approvingly of the argument from Design, but laid more stress on its persuasiveness than on its soundness. The *Autobiography* represented his attitude towards Religion as pure negation, or nescience, just as his father's had been.

The Essay on *Nature* paints the world black enough, and from that he was not likely to rise to a flattering estimate of Nature's God. I think he should have widened his survey considerably before pronouncing as he does. For although there are good grounds for many of his statements of fact, the case is by no means complete. By his own showing in other places, many happy lives have been passed in the world as we find it, and he looked forward to a time when happiness might be the rule instead of the exception. I should have expected him to push the analysis of the causes of evil a step further, namely, first, to the inadequacy of man's intellectual force to cope with the obscurities of nature, and next to the want of ability to counteract known causes of mischief. A remark that he once made regarding his own temperament, is a part of the case in considering nature; he said, in answer to some gloomy utterance of Grote's, that with himself the difficulty was not so much to realise pleasure as to keep off pain; and it is the fact that there are many pleasurable resources in the world if we could only submerge the attendant miseries. His exposure of the insufficiency of Nature as a *guide* is pure logic, and in that he was not likely to be wanting.

The Essay on the *Utility of Religion* is a farther illustration of his old theme (in the *Utilitarianism*) as to the sufficiency of the sanctions and motives of the present life for sustaining not only the inferior moral virtues, but also the elevated sentiments of mankind. He here puts forward a sort of Religion of Humanity, constructed on the basis of men's amiable feelings towards one another. To this he had been led, I have no doubt, in the first instance, by Comte, although the filling-up is his own.

But by far the most laboured of the Essays is the last—uniting a destructive and a constructive *Theism*. The destructive part is in accordance with all his antecedents; it is the constructive part that we were not prepared for. It was indeed quite compatible with his warm human sympathies, and with his long-standing doctrine that every creed is likely to contain some portion of truth, that he should try and ascertain what there was in religion to commend it to the best minds among its adherents; our doubt would have been whether, after painting the world in such gloomy hues, he could set up a Deity that would replace, in the hearts of men, the one that he undertook to destroy. Religion, we know, is exceedingly variable, but there are some things in it not easy to dispense with. Until the advent of the modern sentimental Theism, it has usually contained the idea of authority and subjection; the prescription of duties with rewards and punishments attached to them. Men's deities in all early ages had to be propitiated as powers capable of evil at least, if not also of good. In pure Monotheism, the unbounded beneficence of the Deity has been an indispensable attribute, in spite of the difficulties attending it. Plato insisted that this belief should be supported by state penalties; and we know how essential it is regarded in the present day by the Theists that do not accept revelation. All these points of support Mill dispensed with; while working upon the idea, so repugnant to the religious worshipper, of putting a logical limitation and restriction on the great object of worship. A Being that would not interfere to do us either harm or good can scarcely excite in us any strong regards; at least until we have undergone a new education. The supposed limitations of his power, besides being strangely at variance with the undeniable vastness and complex adjustment of the world, would seem fatal to his ascendancy in our minds.

The speculation is equally precarious as regards a future life. Mill hardly does justice to the natural difficulties of reproducing human existence, after death, for an eternal duration; and yet casts doubts on the omnipotence of the Power that is to perform the miracle.

A. BAIN.